Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2003. 29:283-306 doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100105 Copyright 2003 by Annual Reviews.

. All rights reserved First published online as a Review in Advance on June 4,2003

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF MAX WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

Richard Swedberg
Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7601; email: rs328@comell.edu

Key Words rational choice, interests, economic sociology, sociological theory Abstract Over the years the secondary literature on Max Webers sociology has grown enormously, and it is time to raise the following question: Is the picture of his sociology the same today as it was yesterday? In this review I argue that the traditional picture of Webers sociology has begun to change and that one important factor in this change has to do with the perception of the role that the theme of the economy plays in Webers life and work. Special attention has recently been paid to Webers relationship to economics, his economic sociology, and the fact that Weber came from a background of wealthy merchants that he strongly identified with. Several new topics in Webers sociology are explored that are related to the changing picture of his work. Special attention is also paid to interpretations of Weber that draw on rational choice sociology and an interest-based type of analysis.

INTRODUCTION
For several decades the general picture of Max Weber in sociology, and especially in American sociology, has roughly been as follows: Webers main contribution to the social sciences is to be found in his sociology, which is comparative in nature and based on an immense richness of historical material. Two of his most important concepts are domination and legitimation, and he especially made contributions to sociology through his studies of religion and politics. From a theoretical viewpoint, Weber assigned special importance to the way that the actor understands his or her actions (verstehen), and these actions can be grouped into his four types of social action (instrumentally rational, valuerational, affectual, and traditional). Weber had a good eye for Realpolitik and can be described as a liberal in despair. The world, as he saw it, was increasingly being rationalized and bureaucratized; it was turning into an iron cage. This picture of Weber and his work is heavily influenced by literature such as the following: Parsonss The Structure of Social Action (1937), Gerth & Millss From Max Weber (1946), and Bendixs Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (1960). That it is possible to give a more refined and detailed version of the reception of Weber in American sociology is clear from the existing literature and can be exemplified,
0360-0572/03/0811-0283$14.00

283

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

284 SWEDBERG

first of all, by the important work by Roth (1977a,b; Roth 1996; Oakes 1997) but also by other scholars (e.g., Cohen et al. 1975; Eliaeson 1982,2002; Hinkle 1986; Baehr& Wells 2002). In what amounts to Roths (1977a,b) most detailed attempt in this regard, he argues that it is possible to distinguish between three different stages in the reception of Weber in the United States. During the first of these periods (1930 to the late 1950s) Parsonss interpretation and translation of The Protestant Ethic were dominant (Weber [1904/1905] 1930). Bendixs (1960) important study of Webers comparative historical sociology was added to the secondary literature during the next period (the late 1950s to the mid-1960s). During the third period (the mid- 1960s to the early 1970s) a stream of new works appearedso large that the individual reader no longer can keep track of it (Roth 1977a, p. xx). Nonetheless, important studies of Webers work on bureaucracy and methodology, as well as on his political opinions, were produced during these years. Many of the individual contributions to what may be called the traditional picture of Max Weber are still valid. Weber, for example, did produce an outstanding comparative historical sociology in which such concepts as domination and legitimation play a key role. The verstehen approach and the typology of social action are central to Webers theoretical sociology, and so on. The overall Gestalt of the picture of Webers contribution to sociology has, however, begun to change, and the reason for this is that a number of new facts and interpretations have been presented during the past ten or so years. A special mention must also be made of the more than dozen volumes of Webers collected works that have started to become available since the mid-1980s, through the giant efforts of Mommsen, Schluchter, Ay, and many other excellent scholars (see, e.g., Poggi 1986, Roth 1996). From all of this new material we have learned, for example, that Weber participated in an important fashion in the debate about the stock exchange in the 1890s in Germany. His various writings and interventions in this debate have recently been published in two volumes of more than 1100 pages (Weber 1999a; for comments, see Borchardt 2002, Borchardt & Meyer-Stoll 1999, Hennis 2000, Roth 2002; for recent translations of Webers pamphlets on the stock exchange, see Weber [1894] 2000, [1896] 2000; for comments on these translations, see Lestition 2000). During the 1890s Weber was also an advocate of a broad concept of economicswhat he called Sozialbkonomikwhich included not only conventional economics but also economic history and economic sociology (Swedberg 1998; but see Nau 1997). It has been noted that when Weber presented himself officially, throughout his life, it was as an economist and not as a sociologist (e.g., Dahrendorf 1987, p. 574). The accuracy of Marianne Webers portrayal of her husband as a fervent nationalist has been challenged, and her general description of Webers family background has been complemented and revised on several points (e.g., Roth 2001, Palonen 2001; but see Marianne Weber [1926] 1975). It has also been suggested that instead of constantly emphasizing Webers views on rationality and the iron cage, it would be interesting to look at his analysis of different types of capitalism and his defense of capitalism against its various critics.

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY 285

The most radical challenge to the traditional picture of Weber, however, has come from the advocates of rational choice sociology (e.g., Kiser & Hechter 1998; E. Kiser, unpublished paper; Elster 2000; Norkus 2000, 2001, 2002; but see S. Turner, unpublished manuscript). These advocates argue that Webers work has more in common with the analytical camp of neoclassical economics than with the nontheoretical camp of mainstream sociology and that his ideas on rationality, methodological individualism, and the importance of models in historical research have all been misunderstood or neglected. Weber can be seen as an advocate of rational choice sociology or as one of its predecessors. In any case, Webers work is of much interest to rational choice sociology. Where does this leave us today? The answer to this question is not immediately clear. On the one hand the challenge to the traditional picture of Weber is real enough: There are a number of facts about Weber, as well as texts by his hand and interpretations of his work, that simply do not fit the picture of Parsons (1937), Bendix (1960), and others. The old vision, it would seem, cannot hold. On the other hand it is not clear what the new picture of Weber is. There are bits and pieces that point to something new, but exactly what the new picture will look like is by no means obvious. In the following pages I try to bring some clarity to this situation, and I proceed as follows. First of all, I present some of the most important texts, facts, and interpretations that diverge from the traditional picture of Weber. The two themes I have chosen to focus on are (a) new information about Webers life and (b) the role that analytical models from economics play in Webers sociology. Others could have been selectedwhat Weber has to say on gender, emotions, and evolution, for examplebut these latter show more of a continuity with the traditional picture (e.g., Bologh 1990, Barbalet 2000, Runciman 2001). I then try to add to the changing picture of Webers sociology through a discussion of some new aspects of Webers work in theoretical sociology and economic sociology.

NEW INFORMATION ON WEBERS LIFE

A student of Webers work in the mid-1970s may well have thought that the information that was available at that point in time on Webers life was quite sufficient. There was, first of all, the detailed portrait of Weber in his wifes biography (Marianne Weber [1926] 1975; for a recent evaluation of this work, see Roth 1988). There was also a fine little volume with letters that Weber had written as a young man, and various portraits and reminiscences by contemporaries (Weber 1936; e.g., Jaspers [1920-1962] 1989, Honigsheim [1946-1963] 2000, Baumgarten 1964). For Webers political opinions, the reader could consult Mommsens huge study as well as the debate it inspired (Mommsen [1959] 1984, Stammer 1971). Many other items existed as well (for a bibliography of items in German, see Seyfarth & Schmidt 1977, and for ones in English, see Kivisto & Swatos 1988, Sica 2003).

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

286 SWEDBERG

Since the mid-1970s, however, quite a bit of new material on Webers life has been published (even if we still have no new biography; but see Kasler 1989). Several volumes with Webers correspondence have, for example, become available as part of the publication of Webers collected works (these cover the years 1906-1912; Weber 1990,1994,1998; see also Roth 1996). Other volumes in the Gesamtausgabe have also been published that contain new information about Webers activities as a professor in economics: what courses he taught, what books he assigned in his courses, which economists he knew, and so on (see especially Weber [1898] 1900, Mommsen & Aldenhoff 1993; see also Tribe 1995; Swedberg 1998, pp. 173-206). Many individual scholars have also combed the archives in search of new information, and thanks to their effort we now have some new material on Webers trip to the United States as well as his relationship with his contemporaries (e.g., Mommsen & Osterhammel 1987, Scaff 1998, Whimster 1999). The more than 1000 pages of notes that Webers lecturing in economic theory in the 1890s resulted in will also soon be made available through the efforts of Nau (2003; for a sample, see Nau 1997). There is also Roths magnificient new biography of the Weber family, Max Webers deutsch-englische Familiengeschichte 1800-1950 (Roth 2001). Of these new works, Roths volume is in a special category of its own and represents, next to Marianne Webers biography, the most important source of information on Webers life and background (for articles in English with material from Roths book, see especially Roth 2000,2002; see also Roth 1988,1993a,b, 1997). In a rare feat of scholarly accomplishment Roth covers four generations of Webers family in great detail, drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary material. This means that he not only discusses Weber himself and his parents, but also grandparents and great grandparentssomething that takes the reader all the way back to the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s. Roths main finding is that Weber was not simply a nationalist and imperialist, as his wife and others have presented him; but rather there was a tension in his personality between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. According to Roth (2001), Weber can best be described as cosmopolitan nationalist, and the Familiengeschichte describes in great detail how Weber came from a rich and well connected merchant family, which played an important role in the rise of the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Europe. From Marianne Webers biography the reader learns that Weber, on his fathers side, came from a family that owned several textile mills. Roth adds to this knowledge about wealth on the fathers side, but also shows that Weber, on his mothers side, was similarly related to a powerful capitalist clan. This was the Souchay familya German-English merchant family with London and Manchester as its strongholds. The considerable fortune of the Souchay family (part of which ended up with Webers mother) had its origin in merchant banking and cotton. Through his cousins Weber was also related to the powerful Bunge family that was headquartered in Holland and South America. The Bunge family, as things turn out, is still one of the worlds richest merchant families, with cereal production and shipping as its specialties.

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY 287

Roth notes that the Weber family was not only well connected in economic circles but also in political circles. How the economic and political links mixed with one another in the Weber network can be illustrated with the following quote from Roths work: Max jun. [that is, Max Weber] realized early that his Heidelberg grandmother, Frau Geheime Finanzrat (Privy Councilor) Emilie Souchay Fallenstein was the daughter of the Anglo-German business founder Carl Cornelius Souchay; the sister of the Frankfurt senator and mayor Eduard Souchay and of the two English patrician merchants (Handelsherren) Charles and John Souchay in Manchester; the sister-inlaw of Friedrich Wilhelm Benecke, head of Benecke, Souchay & Co. in London; and the mother-in-law of the Baden prime minister Julius Jolly, the political writer and historian Adolph Hausrath, the Alsatian geologist Ernst Wilhelm Benecke, the leading Antwerp businessman Karl Gustav Bunge, as well as of his own father, the Berlin city councilor in charge of public construction and member of the Reichstag and Prussian diet. (Roth 2002, p. 511) Roth argues that Webers family background influenced his career as well as his thinking in various ways. In his youth, for example, Weber tried for several years to go into business to learn the practise of the import/export trade (Weber 1936, p. 326, as cited in Roth 2002, p. 511). In his academic studies Weber decided to specialize in commercial law, which he also taught for some time in Berlin. When he left this position it was to accept a chair in economics at the University of Freiburg. Weber then continued to teach economics until his nervous breakdown at the end of the 1890s. Roth also emphasizes that the portrait of Weber as a fervent nationalist and imperialist needs to be revised in the light of Webers cosmopolitan leanings. During World War I, for example, Weber argued strongly against the anticapitalist propaganda of the right-wing nationalists, and he was always an advocate of free trade in the international arena. Weber emerges as strongly procapitalist in Roths account. From early on in his academic career Weber criticized the economic policy of the agrarian interests and backed the alternative vision of Germany as a modem industrial nation, on a sound capitalist foundation. He fought hard against the Junkers attempt to stop the German stock exchanges from trading in grain and thereby protecting their economic interests. Germanys problem, he noted, was not that it had too much capitalism, as the right wing and the intellectuals charged, but that there wasnt enough. Let us stop the railing against capital and bourgeoisie! We dont have too much but too little capital and too few big entrepreneurs! (Weber 1984, p. 668, as cited in Roth 2002, p. 517). Weber was especially irritated at the German intellectuals, whose critique of capitalism he felt was immature and childish (the stupid outcries of the literati against capitalism) (Weber 1984, p. 212). During World War I Weber warned against nationalizations after the war and against creating a strong welfare state. These type of measures, he argued, would sap the strength of capitalism.

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

288 SWEDBERG

THE ROLE OF MODELS FROM ECONOMICS IN WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

There is one argument especially that distinguishes the current discussion of Webers sociology from the one that was dominant before the mid-1970s. This is the argument that an important strength in Webers sociology comes from the fact that he borrowed several key ingredients from the economists model of analysis. Most sociologists know of this argument only in the form of rational choice sociology, which they tend to be critical of (see, e.g., Kalberg 1994 and Schluchter 2000 for critiques of the attempt to interpret Webers sociology in terms of rational choice). As I try to show, however, the discussion of the role of economic models in Webers sociology encompasses at least two different conceptions of what these models are like in the first place. There also exists different opinions among rational choice sociologists about the usefulness of various parts of Webers work. Some find the core of Webers sociology helpful, whereas others only find bits and pieces of interest (for the former, see, e.g., Kiser & Hechter 1998; for the latter, see, e.g., Coleman 1990, Goldthorpe 1998). The first sociologist to argue that Webers sociology had gained considerably in sharpness and originality by borrowing models from economics is Bourdieu. The hostility of Bourdieu to neoclassical economics is well known, so it hardly needs to be mentioned that the models that Weber had borrowed from economics, according to Bourdieu, were not neoclassical (homo economicus, rational choice, and so on). Bourdieu based his argument on this point primarily on a reading of Webers sociology of religion (Bourdieu [1971] 1987). The two notions in Webers work that Bourdieu highlights are interests and competitionin this specific case, religious interests, and competition for religious legitimacy and for lay followers. In a later work Bourdieu sums up his argument about Webers use of economic models in the following way: Economics is one of the major reference points for sociology. First and foremost economics is already a part of sociology, largely due to the work of Max Weber, who transferred numerous models of thought [schmes de pense] borrowed from economics into the area of religion among others. (Bourdieu [1987] 1990, p. 46; see also 1987, p. 61) The approach to Weber that can be found among the advocates of rational choice sociology differs from that of Bourdieu, even if it is more in degree than in kind, as I try to show in this review. Two of the earliest attempts to approach Webers work from a rational choice perspective can be found in the writings of Coleman and Elster. Coleman was sympathetic to Webers version of methodological individualism and used the key argument in The Protestant Ethic to illustrate his famous micro-to-macro model, which was to become something of a symbol for rational choice sociology (see also the debate about Colemans interpretation of The Protestant Ethic in Hemes 1989a,b, Coleman 1989). A few other aspects of Webers work are also discussed in Foundations of Social Theory (e.g., Coleman 1990, pp. 422-25,612-13).

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY 289

Elster, in contrast, argues that although Webers work on rational action deserves an honorable place in the history of rational choice, it falls short in comparison with the concept of rational action that has been developed in game theory. Although Weber correctly understood that the social actor makes a rational choice among existing alternatives (parametric rationality in Elsters terminology), he did not realize that the choice of the actor also depends on what other actors do [strategic rationality (see, e.g., Elster 1979, p. 68)]. More recently, Elster has argued that Webers attempt to introduce emotions into his analysis of action and rationality is stunning (Elster 2000, p. 39; for the traditional interpretation of Webers concept of rationality, see the literature cited in Schroeder 1992, pp. 34-42, Scaff 2000, pp. 49-51). Today there also exist many other attempts to draw on Weber for rational choice sociology and see how well Weber fits the paradigm of rational choice sociology. For example, several attempts have been made to develop a broad concept of rationality by explicitly drawing on or referring to Weber. In a programmatic text by Nee, we read, for example, that he [Weber] pioneered the context-bound rationality approach in sociology (Nee 1998, p. 6, see also Hechter & Kanazawa 1997, p. 194). Another example is Boudon (1996,1997,2001), who draws strongly on Weber in his attempt to develop a cognitivist model in sociology. Boudons argument is that Webers concept of value rationality can help us to better understand how beliefs can be integrated into a rational choice type of analysis. More precisely, Webers concept of Wertrationalitat (translated by Boudon as axiolog- ical rationality) can be of assistance in showing how one can analyze situations where the actor does not base his or her decision on some kind of cost-benefit calculation but on an argument of the following type: I do this because it is good, fair, legitimate, and so on. Finally, a scholar who has carefully gone through the whole debate about Weber and rational choice concludes that Webers work can best be described as an anticipation of RCA [that is, Rational Choice Analysis] (Norkus 2000, p. 268; see also Norkus 2001, 2002; Voss 2000). Two new expressions that sometimes appear in discussions of Weber and rational choice are analytical Weberianism and neoclassical sociology. The former was launched in a heated debate about the use of rational choice models in comparative historical sociology in The American Journal of Sociology in 1998 (for the various texts, see Gould 2002). According to Kiser & Hechter, who initiated this debate, it is important to develop an analytical Weberianism, just as there already exists an analytical Marxism. The rationale for this is that the core of Webers approach to historical analysis corresponds to emerging developments in sociological versions of rational choice theory (Kiser & Hechter 1998, p. 798). A concrete example of what analytical Weberianism may look like can be found in a few recent articles by Kiser on bureaucracy. In a creative manner, Kiser recasts Webers analysis of bureaucracy and legitimation in terms of agency theory (e.g., Kiser & Schneider 1994, Kiser 1999, Kiser & Baer 2001). The principal, Kiser and his coauthor argue, wants the agent to carry out some task, and the extent to which the agent conceives of this task as legitimate is of great importance. The authors conclude that future work [in analytical Weberianism] should address other key

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

290 SWEDBERG

substantive themes in Webers work, such as types of legitimacy, forms of religion, and the relationship between religion and politics or economics (Kiser & Baer 2001, pp. 27-28). Also the expression neoclassical sociology is embroiled in discussion and refers to Webers work on an important point. In a recent issue of The American Journal of Sociology Burawoy (2001, p. 1100) accuses several well-known analysts of Eastern Europe of sacrificing their earlier critical stance for a watered down and sociological version of neoclassical economics. The use of neoclassical to describe the new research program [of these authors], Burawoy charges, suggests parallels with neoclassical economics, and indeed parallels there are. Szel6nyi, Stark and some other sociologists are then severely criticized along these lines. Burawoy, however, seems to have been tricked by the similarity between the terms neoclassical economics and neoclassical sociology because these two approaches have next to nothing in common. According to Szel6nyi, who often uses the term neoclassical sociology, this expression basically means that a reinterpretation of the classics has become possible after the fall of Communism. Webers idea that capitalism should not be seen in unitary terms is of special importance in the following reinterpretation: The neo-classical turn in sociology does not imply at all a neo-classical convergence of economics and sociology. The opposite is the case: the neo-classical turn in sociology helps sociology to engage economics at the very core of its project (as it was the case in the classical epoch). The key difference is that economics operate with a single concept of capitalism (or market), while sociology sees it as a multiplicity of forms. (Szelenyi 2001, see also Nee 2002)

ADDING TO THE PICTURE OF WEBER

As earlier mentioned, it would not be correct to say that a new picture of Webers sociology has emerged and that the old one has vanished. A more accurate characterization of the current situation is that traits from the old and the new picture mix and blend with one another. It should also be noted that even if a few parts of the new picture can be discerned with some clarity, its overall gestalt is not clear. This is also true for the new parts that I have chosen to focus on so far in this review, which all have to do with the economy: how Weber analyzed the economy, how he used models from economics in his sociology, and so on. Here as elsewhere, the dots can be connected in different ways. Instead of spending more time in this review on recent secondary literature, however, I now proceed to suggest two areas where I think it is possible to push ahead and advance our understanding of Webers work so that we can make better use of it. The ones I have chosen are key concepts in Webers theoretical sociology and his economic sociology. Both of these topics, I argue, are currently underdeveloped and can be improved by being analyzed from a perspective that sets Webers view of the economy and how to analyze the economy at the center. Once this has been done, I suggest a way to connect the dots.

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

291

Topic # 1: Webers Theoretical Sociology

Over the years considerable work has been carried out on Webers theoretical sociology, which is mainly to be found in Chapter 1 of Economy and Society and in the essay Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 3-62, [1913] 1981). Topics that have been analyzed include the following: ideal type, the notion of verstehen, the concept of rationality, the four types of social action, and Webers theory of causality. A number of important topics nevertheless remain to be researched, and the ones that I discuss here are Webers concepts of interest, institution, and orientation to others. The concept of interest, I argue, constitutes one of the most important concepts in Webers sociology, even if little attention has been devoted to it. Not only is it a key concept in its own right, but many other concepts in Webers sociologysocial action, institution, and so oncan only be fully understood if they are related to it. The concept of interest is also strongly related to the economy, to the concept of rational action, and to the whole problematic of rational choicein brief, to many of the issues that are at the heart of the changing picture of Webers sociology. To better understand the role that interest plays in Webers thought therefore becomes an imperative task. At first it may seem surprising that Weber assigns such a central role in his work to the concept of interest. Given the crucial role that the concept of interest has played in Western social, political, and economic thought, however; and given the role that they played in Webers own time, it would actually be more peculiar if it did not appear in a prominent place in Webers work. Although there is no definitive study of the role of interest in Western thought, the general importance of this concept has been well established by Hirschman, Holmes, and other scholars (see especially Orth & Koselleck 1982, Hirschman 1986, Holmes 1990, Heilbron 2001). All of these show that from the 1500s onward practically every major social thinker assigned a central place to the concept of interest in his or her analysis. A plethora of different interests have been discussed: political interests, economic interests, self-interest, class interests, the public interest, and so on. The concept of interest in particular plays a key role in the works of Hume, Smith, Tocqueville, Mill, and Marx. Although Hirschman and the other historians of the concept of interest discuss in great detail the role that interest has played in the works of philosophers, political thinkers, and economists, they have nothing to say about the use that sociologists have made of this concept. It is at this point that Weber comes into the picture because he tried to introduce a sociological concept of interest (Swedberg 2003). By sociological in this context it is meant, on the one hand, that the concept of interest is used as part of a sociological analysis, and on the other hand, that interest is not seen as something given or biological, but as something that comes into being as part of society. By assigning such a central role to the notion of interest, it can be added, Weber was not alone among sociologists of his generation. Simmel and several others did the same (e.g., Simmel [1908] 1971, see also Ratzenhofer 1898, Small 1905,

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

292 SWEDBERG

Bentley [1908] 1949). Among contemporary sociologists, especially Coleman and Bourdieu have used the concept of interest prominently in their works. The main theoretical concept in Colemans rational choice sociology is precisely interest, defined as control over resources that actors want (Coleman 1990, pp. 27-44). For Bourdieu, interest is one of a handful of key concepts that the sociologist needs to use, next to habitus, field, and different types of capital (e.g., Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp. 115-40). According to Bourdieu (1998), a disinterested act is not possible, and acts that appear to be disinterested typically mask some interest. Furthermore, interests are always shaped by society, and just about anything can be turned into an interest by the force of society (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 117). In order to get a better sense of the way that Weber viewed the concept of interest, and the role that it plays in his analysis more generally, one may begin with the following famous quote: Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern mens conduct. Yet very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. (Weber [1915] 1946, p. 280) Although often cited, little sustained attention has been devoted to this passage (see, however, Kalberg 1985; see also Blau 1996). What first of all should be noted about this passage is that Weber breaks with the tendency in mainstream economics to equate interest exclusively with one type of interest (self-interest), and he does this by speaking about different types of interests. By doing so, he is much closer to people such as Smith, Tocqueville, and Mill than to contemporary economists. What should also be pointed out is that although the interests are portrayed by Weber as the driving forces, it is the social element (in the form of world images or religious world views) that channels and steers the actions. The stronger these driving forces are, we may conclude, the more energy people will invest in their actions, the stronger the clashes are likely to be between actors, and so on. Although Weber does not mention from where the interests come, and although we would naturally tend to identify the world images with what is social, a moment of reflection tells us that the interests themselves must be socially shaped (from Webers perspective)if nothing else simply to qualify as either ideal or material interests. Even if one grants a certain centrality to the famous passage about ideal and material interests, which can be found in a prominent place in Webers Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion (Weber [1920/1921] 1988), it is legitimate to ask what role interests play elsewhere in Webers work, especially in his theoretical sociology. No answer to this question can be found in the secondary literature, even if one student has pointed out that the concept of interest can be found in nearly 800 sentences in Economy and Society and on roughly every third page (Peillon 1990, p. 55; see also Sprondel 1973). To this can be added that Weber uses a large number of different types of interests in Economy and Society, including sexual

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

293

interests, speculative interests, class interests and emotional and affective interests (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 41, 345, 928; for a complete listing of all the places in Webers work where he uses the term Interesse, see the index in Weber 1999b). Weber also speaks of interest struggles and the well-known phrase material and ideal interests turns up in Economy and Society as well (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 202; [1922] 1976, p. 209). To give a sense of the centrality of the concept of interest in Webers work, I use his sociology of law as a brief example. In one of the well-known passages of Economy and Society, Weber outlines the general relationships that exist between law and the economy (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 333-37). There are six such relationships, and interest plays a key role in three of these. We are told, for example, that law does not only protect economic interests, but also the most diverse interests ranging from the most elementary one of protection of personal security to such purely ideal goods as personal honor or the honor of the divine powers (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 333). When economic interests stand against interests promoting conformance to the rules of law, Weber continues, everything hinges on the relative proportion of strength (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 335). He also states that even if the law in many cases does not appear to have been shaped by economic interests, this is nonetheless often the case. In explaining why this is so, Weber states that legal power usually depends on support from the major social groups, and the formation of [major] social groups depends, to a large extent, upon constellations of material interests (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 334). Webers concept of institution has also been neglected in the secondary literature, even if there exist some exceptions. An institution has its beginning, Weber says, in the interaction of a few actors, which after some time acquires a certain independence in their eyes. This order (Ordnung) is seen as obligatory or exemplary to the actors (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 31). An institution is typically supported by habit as well as by legitimation. What completes the needed requirements for there to be a full-scale institution are as follows: Significant interests must be involved, and (in modem society) coercion will be applied by a staff when there are threats to the institution (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 34,48-56). To Weber, the number of institutions in society are relatively few. There is what he terms the legal order, the economic order, the household, and so on. What is especially important in Webers notion of institution is that these are conceived as constellations of interests that have been locked into specific configurations through social relations (including world images and the capitalist spirit). What this means is that institutions are hard to change; they are deeply rooted in interests, something that gives them considerable strength and survival capacity. That the basic institutions of society may nevertheless change under certain conditions is clear from The Protestant Ethic and other studies by Weber. However, the force that challenges an institution has to be strong and firmly grounded in competing interests. One reason for emphasizing the role of interests and enforcement in Webers view of institutions is that there is little discussion of these in what constitutes

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

294 SWEDBERG

the most popular account of Webers ideas on this specific topic, namely The Social Construction of Reality by Berger & Luckmann (1967; see also Powell & DiMaggio 1991 for the use of these ideas in the area of organizations). This work, which draws heavily on Alfred Schutzs phenomenological interpretation of Weber, is an important source in contemporary sociology for the widespread notion that everything is socially constructed. Although this may be true on a high level of abstraction, this proposition can also easily lead wrong if the role of interests and the enforcement of challenges to these interests are not explicitly taken into accountwhich they rarely are in the work by Berger & Luckmann (but see Berger & Luckmann 1967, pp. 22,45,48,51-67). If people try to socially construct something that goes against the existing institutions of society, they run the risk of being hit by a force similar to that of a train rushing ahead (to use Webers railroad metaphor). The last theoretical concept I discuss is orientation to others, which has been generally ignored in the secondary literature on Weber. Why this is the case is not clear, but it may well have to do with the fact that it is closely linked to Webers concept of methodological individualism. Weber was a strong defender of methodological individualism in sociologya topic that for rather obvious reasons has not attracted much attention in the conventional picture of Weber with its advocacy of social systems and other forms of holism (for Webers ideas on methodological individualism, see, e.g., Udehn 2001, pp. 95-103). The concept of orientation to others appears in a prominent place in Webers sociology, namely in the first paragraph of Economy and Society, where the task of sociology is outlined (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 4; see also [1913] 1981, p. 152). Sociology, Weber states, is the science that deals with social action. You have action when there is behavior to which the actor attaches a subjective meaning, and this action becomes social if it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented [orientiert] in its course. Elsewhere in Chapter 1 of Economy and Society Weber states that an action can be oriented to the past, the present, or the futurethat it can be oriented to an order, and that it can be oriented to several orders simultaneously. To this it should be added that the only actor who can carry out and orient an action is the individual, and this is consequently where methodological individualism comes into the picture. The orientation of an actor is in principle driven by his or her interests, and the course that the action will take will be shaped by existing world images (or their equivalents).

Topic # 2: Weber's Economic Sociology

Economic sociology is a topic that is close to the current Zeitgeist, and it would therefore seem suitable to further explore Webers work in this respect. Some advances in this field have already been made (e.g., Collins 1986, pp. 19-142; Holton & Turner 1989b; Bruhns 1996; Engerman 2000). It has, for example, been increasingly realized that Economy and Society is not so much a work in general

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY 295

sociology, with independent sections on law, religion, and so on, as was earlier believed. Economy and Society should rather be understood as a study that explores the relationship between, on the one hand, the economy, and on the other hand, politics, law, and religion (e.g., Stinchcombe 1960; for the coming into being and structure of Economy and Society, see especially Mommsen 2000, Orihara 1999, 2002). Webers Wirtschaftssoziologie has also attracted some direct attention during the past few years, as opposed to the earlier literature. Its general structure and main areas have, for example, been outlined (Swedberg 1998). A text with Webers key texts in economic sociology has also been published (Weber 1999c; see also the recent translations of Webers study of the stock exchange and of his dissertation on the lexmercatoria in Weber [1889] 2003, [1894] 2000, [1896] 2000). Added to this should be single studies of Webers analysis of the firm, the market, the business community, patrimonialism, entrepreneurial opportunities, and the relationship of sociology to marginal utility theory (Segre 1998; Makler 2000; Engelen 2001; Zafirovski 2001a,b; Jagd 2003, Kaelber 2003b). There is also what we have recently learned about Webers relationship to the work of single economists, from Smith to the Austrians (see Hennis 1987; Mitzman 1987; Osterhammel 1987; Schon 1987; Holton & Turner 1989a; Sica 1992, pp. 225-48; Zafirovski 2000). Even if a few first steps have been taken along the path of a better understanding of Webers economic sociology, many topics still remain to be analyzed or have not been sufficiently explored. Little is known, for example, about the giant handbook on economics that Weber edited and of which Economy and Society is a part, Grundriss der Sozialdkonomik. We also need to better understand the following topics: Webers view of economic theory, the general structure of his theoretical economic sociology (in Chapter 2 in Economy and Society), his view of the firm, and his view of capitalism. Although all of these topics represent worthwhile enterprises in their own right, I focus on the latter two because these best illustrate that we are indeed witnessing a change in the general picture of Webers sociology. Webers analysis of the capitalist firm was little discussed during the early period of Weberian studies. What instead fascinated and even spellbound American sociologists was Webers analysis of bureaucracy. The text on bureaucracy that was cited over and over again originally appeared in Gerth & Millss best-selling anthology From Max Weber (1946, pp. 196-204; for this work, see Oakes 1999, Oakes & Vidich 1999). A vivid debate soon broke out over whether Webers theory of bureaucracy was correct. Several of the most creative sociologists in the postWorld War II generation, such as Merton and Gouldner, took part in this debate, usually suggesting that Weber was wrong on some point, but that this could be amended with the help of the authors own revisions (for reviews of the relevant literature, see, e.g., Albrow 1970, Scott 1998, pp. 42-49). Two aspects of Webers work on bureaucracy were, however, not explored during the earlier period: Webers general theory of organization, of which his ideas on bureaucracy are an integral part, and his view of the modem firm. In Chapter

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

296 SWEDBERG

1 of Economy and Society Weber carefully develops the concept of organization, starting out (as always) with the social action of the individual (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 48-52). Two actors who interact with one another create a social relationship, and these relationships can be either open or closed. An organization is defined by Weber as a closed social relationship, with a person or staff in charge of enforcing its rules. Weber discusses three broad classes of organizations in his theoretical sociology: political, economic, and religious organizations (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 52-56, 74-75). These are distinguished from each other on several accounts, such as the way that authority is maintained and what type of interests are involved. Economic organizations, for example, can be exclusively devoted to economic tasks (such as the modem firm); they can be partly devoted to economic tasks (such as the modem state); they can have as their task the regulation of economic activities (such as a trade union); and they can protect the economic order from interference (such as the laissez-faire state) (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 74-75). Three types of actors can be found in the modem firm, according to Weber: entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and workers. The bureaucrats run the corporation on an everyday basis, by virtue of their knowledge and dedication. The workers execute the orders given to them by the bureaucrats, in a disciplined manner. The entrepreneur represents the capitalist spirit, and is the only one who is able to successfully challenge the bureaucrats. What the entrepreneur lacks in detailed knowledge, compared to the bureaucrats, he or she makes up for through independence and economic power. In each firm, as in capitalism as a whole, there is a constant struggle between the aggressive profit seeking of the entrepreneur, on the one hand, and the correct behavior and the defense of the status quo of the bureaucrats, on the other. The bureaucrats value competence, skill, and honor more than profit making. They actually abhor profit making, according to Weber, who says that every bureaucracy tends to stifle the private economic initiative (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 1108-9; 1988, p. 277). Another aspect of Webers work on the modem firm that has been ignored in the traditional view of his work has to do with the history and the development of the firm. In Economy and Society as well as in several other works, we find an interesting attempt to sketch the history of the firm, starting with the commenda and the family firm in Antiquity (see, e.g., Weber [1889] 2003, [1923] 1981; but see Kaelber 2003a). Weber also highlights the emergence of limited liability in the firm and the notion of the firm as a legal personality, two key innovations that occurred in the Middle Ages. Weber notes further the emergence of the shareholding corporation, and he devotes considerable energy to describing the kind of giant corporations that emerged around 1900, and which not only Weber but also Chandler has held up as the apex of efficiency (e.g., Chandler 1977). Webers analysis of the modem firm is not only part of his general theory of organization but also of his general analysis of capitalismthe second topic in Webers economic sociology that I have selected to discuss in this review as part

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

297

of the changing picture of his sociology. What fascinated many earlier students of Weber, it should be pointed out, was not so much capitalism per se as the process of rationalization and the place of capitalism in this. It was well understood that Western society was capitalistic, but capitalism was typically seen as part of a much larger process that not only encompassed the economy but also art, law, science, and so on. As a kind of symbol for the shift from capitalism to the process of rationalization one can cite Parsonss edition of The Protestant Ethic, which has been used by generations of American students (e.g., Roth 1999, p. 521). Instead of beginning his edition with Chapter 1, Parsons inserted another text by Weber at the beginning, something that made the reader believe that Webers main concern in The Protestant Ethic was the general development of rationality in the West (Weber [1904-1905] 1930, pp. 13-31). Exploring Webers view of capitalism is a task that fits in well with current concerns in sociology and the social sciences when it comes to capitalism. For several years an interdisciplinary debate has been going on about the varieties of capitalism that can be found in the different parts of the world (e.g., Hollingsworth et al. 1994, Hall & Soskice 2001). Some sociologists have similarly argued that it is time, once and for all, to abandon the notion of a single, unitary capitalism and instead embrace the idea that several different types of capitalism exist (e.g., Stark 1996). Webers work has been largely absent in the varieties-of-capitalism debate until now, but it would seem to have quite a bit to offer since one of Webers main points is precisely that you have to distinguish between different types of capitalism (e.g., Eyal et al. 1998; G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi, E. Townsley, unpublished paper). To what has already been said on this topic it should be added that Weber breaks decisively with Marxs argument that there only exists one type of capitalism, namely the type that made its appearance in the West in modem times. According to Webers most important statement on capitalism in his theoretical sociology, one can distinguish between three major types of capitalismtwo that have existed far back in history, and modem capitalism of the Western type, which is relatively recent in origin (Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 164-66). The two earlier types are political capitalism and traditionalcommercial capitalism; and the one that has only emerged in modem times is rational capitalism. What is interesting about Webers three types of capitalism is first of all that they are still quite useful in analyzing economies. Modem capitalism, for example, lends itself nicely to being conceptualized in terms of some combination of rational, political, and traditional capitalism. But there is also Webers important argument that capitalism should not be seen as a system (as in Marx) but as a social configuration of different types of social action. Weber, in brief, tried to recast the theory of capitalism in terms of social action and thereby situate it at a level that makes it meaningful to the individual actor. Webers approach to capitalism on this point can be seen as an illustration of how he uses methodological individualism to bring life and dynamics to his economic sociology. Capitalism is defined in Economy and Society in terms

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

jk

298 SWEDBERG

Figure 1 The different types of capitalism in social action terms, according to Weber in Economy and Society ([1922] 1978, pp. 164-66).

of a mode for capitalistic orientation of profit-making (Weber [1922] 1978, p. 164; see also [1904-1905] 1930, p. 17). What is at the heart of Webers view of capitalism is, in other words, the individual, driven by his or her economic interest and trying to make a profit while simultaneously orienting his or her actions to various institutions. According to the key passage on capitalism in Economy and Society, there are six of these modes of capitalistic orientation of profit making. Two of these can only be found in the modem Western world, whereas the other four have been around for several thousand years in many parts of the world (see Figure 1). (1) Continuous buying and selling in free markets, and continuous production of goods in capitalist enterprises. (2) Speculation in standardized commodities or securities; continuous financial operations of political organizations; promotional financing of new enterprises by selling securities; speculative financing of new enterprises and other economic organizations to gain power or a profitable regulation of the market (3) Predatory profit can come, e.g., from the financing of wars, revolutions, and party leaders. (4) Continuous business activity thanks to force or domination, e.g., tax and office farming, colonial profits (plantations, monopolistic, and compulsory trade) (5) No more information on this type of political capitalism can be found in section 31 in chapter 2 of Economy and Society. (6) Trade and speculations in currencies, professional and credit extension, creation of means of payment, the taking over of payment functions.

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

299

Weber broke with Marxs idea that there only exists one type of capitalism, which emerged in the West in the modem period. He also tried to recast capitalism in social action terms in order to avoid the notion of capitalism as a system independent of the individual. According to the main theoretical passage on capitalism in Economy and Society, Weber distinguishes between six different types of principal modes of capitalistic orientation of profit- making. Only two of these main modes of capitalistic orientation of profit making are typical of modem times and the West; the other four can be found far back in history all over the world. The former two Weber terms are rational capitalism, and the remaining four are political capitalism and traditional-commercial capitalism.

CONCLUSION
During the course of this review I have made references to three different interpretations of Weber that can be described in ideal-typical terms (see Table 1). There is first of all what I have referred to as the traditional viewpoint, which represents the early interpretation of Weber in American sociology. The work of such scholars as Parsons and Bendix are central here, but this interpretation is still strong and can be found in a number of contemporary works as well. The individual actor is primarily seen as driven by norms and values, and authority is crucial to the structuring of society. Webers comparative work on religion and domination is at the center of this interpretation.

TABLE 1 What drives the actor, according to Weber? Three ideal-typical answers

Traditional viewpoint
Cause of action View of verstehen View of methodological individualism Paradigmatic text by Weber Ideal-typical representative Values, norms Incorporated Downplayed

Rational Choice viewpoint

Rational choice Downplayed Context-bound

Interest viewpoint
Interests Incorporated Social of

Sociology of authority and Chapter 1 of Economy and Sociology religion religion Society Parsons Kiser-Hechter Bourdieu

Source: Parsons 1937; Kiser & Hechter 1998, pp. 785-816; Bourdieu 1987, pp. 119-36. Note; It is possible to distinguish between three different views in the secondary literature on Weber on what drives the actor: the traditional view, where values and norms are central; the rational choice view, where the actor makes a rational decision; and the interestbased view, where the actor attempts to realize his or her interests. These three views can also be distinguished on several other accounts, as indicated in the table. It can be added that the view of history differs as well between these three views. The conventional view sees history as a progression in terms of rationality; the rational choice view is focused on historical comparisons; and the interest view is mainly concerned with different types of capitalism.

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

300 SWEDBERG

More recently this view has been challenged by interpretations that argue the individual actor in Webers sociology is driven by other forces than norms and values, such as interests and rational choice. Bourdieu exemplifies the interest view, and Hechter and Kiser the rational choice view. These three interpretations also differ on several other accounts, as Table 1 indicates. They have different views on how to understand Webers notion of verstehen and his view of methodological individualism. Is it possible to arbitrate between these different interpretations and assert that one is preferable to the others, in the sense of leading to better sociology? It is difficult to give an affirmative answer to this question. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the reader who wants to know something about Webers view of various economic topics, including Webers use of the models of the economists, will find little material in the secondary literature before the mid-1970s. Similarly, the great majority of the issues that have concerned Parsons, Bendix, and other advocates of what has here been called the traditional interpretation of Weber have not been much discussed by the representatives of the other two approaches, which have a long way to go before they are fully developed. As things stand today, the various views of Webers work complement each other, and the serious student of Weber may want to consult them all. Earlier in this review I mentioned that several new pieces of information about Webers life and work have recently become available that in one way or another deal with the economy and that there may also be a way of understanding their general significance or gestaltto connect the dots, so to speak. Before giving my own answer to how this may be done, it should be noted that both the rational choice interpretation and the interest interpretation of Webers sociology, as I see it, pick up on something that is absolutely central in Webers work and which has been neglected. What they pick up on is Webers use, in his sociology, of models of thought from economics (as Bourdieu puts it). The rational choice approach, however, suggests a radical recasting of Webers work from a viewpoint that, to a large extent, has been created after Webers death, namely modem rational choice analysis. Game theory, for example, did not exist in Webers days. One can also use Posners (1995) critique of Weber to illustrate the distance that exists between modem rational choice theory and Weberian sociology as a whole. According to Posner, Weber is interested in describing broad themes in human history, not in developing mathematical models for predicting the behavior of rational actors. Modem rational choice theory also differs on several accounts from the type of analytical economics with which Weber was familiar, and which he also was influenced by, namely the type of analysis that can be found in the works of economists such as Menger and Mill (e.g., Weber [1898] 1900; see also Udehn 2001, pp. 95-103). Interest analysis, in contrast, picks up on several elements that are already present in Webers work. Weber speaks, for example, to a large extent in interest terms, as I have tried to show, and when he does not do so explicitly, he many times does so implicitly. The interest model, as opposed to the modem rational choice

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY

301

model, is also better at capturing the fact that although Weber borrowed much from economics, he did not borrow everything. There are parts of theoretical economics, Weber argues in Economy and Society and elsewhere, that are simply not useful in sociology. Webers relationship to the models he found in economics can be summed up in the following way: Weber borrowed quite a bit from economics, as he did from the other social sciences, but he did not simply reproduce what he had borrowed in his sociology. Instead he turned it into something new and excitingand profoundly sociological. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For comments and/or information I thank Raymond Boudon, Sven Eliaeson, Michael Hechter, Stephen Kalberg, Edgar Kiser, Harry Makler, Heino Nau, Zenonans Norkus, Guenther Roth, Dick Scott, Ralph Schroeder, Alan Sica, Ivan Szelenyi, and Stephen Turner. This review was written while I was at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and I am grateful for financial support from Center General Funds and the William and Flora Hewlitt Foundation Grant #2000-5633. The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org

LITERATURE CITED
Albrow M. 1970. On Bureaucracy. London: Macmillan Baehr P, Wells G. 2002. Editors introduction. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Other Writings, ed. M Weber pp. ix-lxiii. New York: Penguin Books Barbalet JM. 2000. Beruf rationality and emotion in Max Webers sociology. Arch. Eur. Sociol. 41(2):329-51 Baumgarten E, ed. 1964. Max Weber. Werk und Person. Dokumente. Tbingen: Mohr Bendix R. 1960. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Bentley A. [1908] 1949. The Process of Government: A Study of Social Processes. Bloomington, IN: Principia Berger P, Luckmann T. 1967 . The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday - Blau J. 1996. The toggle switch of institutions: religion and art in the United States since the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Soc. Forces 74:1159-77 Bologh RW. 1990. Love or Greatness: Max Weber and Masculine ThinkingA Feminist Inquiry. London: Unwin Hyman Borchardt K, MeyerStoll C. 1999. Einleitung. In Brsenwesen. Schriften und Reden 18931898. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 1/5, pp. 1111. Tbingen: Mohr. 2 Vols. Borchardt K. 2002. Max Webers writings on the Bourse: puzzling out a forgotten corpus. Max Weber Stud. 2(2): 139-62 Boudon R. 1996. The cognitivist model: a generalized rational-choice model. Ration. Soc. 8(2): 123-50 Boudon R. 1997. The present relevance of Max Webers Wertrationalitt (value rationality). In Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics, and Economics in the Newer Historical School, ed. P Koslowski, pp. 4-29. New York: Springer Boudon R. 2001. The Origin of Values: Sociology and Philosophy of Beliefs. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Bourdieu P. [1971] 1987. Legitimation and

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

302 SWEDBERG

structured interests in Webers sociology of religion. In Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, ed. S Lash, S Whimster, pp. 119 36. London: Allen & Unwin Bourdieu R 1987. Choses Dites. Paris: Ed. Minuit Bourdieu P. [1987] 1990. In Other Words. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press Bourdieu P. 1998. Is a disinterested act possible? In Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, pp. 75-91. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press Bourdieu P, Wacquant L. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press Bruhns H. 1996. Max Weber, leconomie et lhistoire. Ann. Hist. Sci. Soc. 51:125987 - Burawoy M. 2001. Neoclassical sociology: from the end of communism to the end o W classes. Am. J. Soc. 106:1099-20 Chandler A. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in America. Cambridge, MA: Belknap - Cohen J, Hazelrigg L, Pope W. 1975. Deparsonizing Weber: A critique of Parsons interpretation of Webers sociology. Am. Soc. Rev. 40:229-41 Coleman J. 1989. Weber and the protestant ethic: a comment on Hemes. Ration. Soc. l(2):291-94 Coleman J. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press Collins R. 1986. Weberian Sociological Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press Dahrendorf R. 1987. Max Weber and modem social science. See Mommsen & Osterhammel 1987, pp. 574-80 Eliaeson S. 1982. Bilden av Max Weber: En Studie i Samhdllsvetenskapens Sekulariser- ing (The Picture of Max Weber: A Study in the Secularization of Social Science). Stockholm: Nordstedt Eliaeson S. 2002. Max Weber's Methodologies: Interpretation and Critique. Cambridge, UK: Polity Elster J. 1979. Some unresolved problems in the theory of rational behavior. In Sociological

Economics, ed. L Levy-Garboa, pp. 65-85. London: Sage Elster J. 2000. Rationality, economy, and society. See Turner 2000, pp. 21-41 Engelen E. 2001. Breaking in and breaking out: A Weberian approach to entrepreneurial opportunities,/. Ethn. Migr. Stud. 27(2):203- 23 Engerman SL. 2000. Max Weber as economist and economic historian. See Turner 2000, pp. 256-71 Eyal G, SzelSnyi I, Townsley E. 1998. Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggle in Post-Communist Central Europe. London: Verso Gerth H, Mills CW, eds. 1946. Introduction: The man and his work. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 1-74. New York: Oxford Univ. Press Goldthorpe J. 1998. Rational action theory for sociology. Br. J. Sociol. 49:167-92 Gould R, ed. 2002. The Rational Choice Controversy in Historical Sociology. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press Hall P, Soskice D, eds. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. New York: Oxford Univ. Press Hechter M, Kanazawa S. 1997. Sociological rational choice theory. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 23:191-214 Heilbron J. 2001. Interest: history of a concept. In International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. N Smelser, P Baltes, 11:7708-12. Amsterdam: Elsevier Hennis W. 1987. A science of man: Max Weber and the political economy of the German historical school. See Mommsen & Osterhammel 1987, pp. 25-58 Hennis W. 2000. Fur Wissenschaftler sind Kursgewinne bedeutunglos (Review of Max Weber, Borsenwesen. Schriften und Reden 1893-1898). Frankf. Allg. Z Oct. 17:L52 Hemes G. 1989a. The logic of the Protestant ethic. Ration. Soc. 1(1): 123-62 Hemes G. 1989b. Response to Coleman. Ration. Soc. 1(2):29599 Hinkle G. 1986. The americanization of Max

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY 303

theory in economics, political science and Weber. Curr. Perspect. Soc. Theory 7:87 sociology: an illustration from state policy 104 implementation. Sociol. Theory 17(2): 146 70 Hirschman AO. 1986. The concept of interest: From euphemism to tautology. In Rival Views of Market Kiser E, Baer J. 2001. The bureaucratization of states: toward an analytical Weberianism. Society and Other Recent Essays, pp. 35-55. New Pepared for the Conf. The Making and UnYork: Viking Hollingsworth R, Schmitter P, making of Modernity, March 30-April 1, Streeck W, eds. 1994. Governing Capitalist Northwestern Univ. Economies. New York: Oxford Univ. Press Holmes Kiser E, Hechter M. 1998. The debate on historical S. 1990. The secret history of self - interest. In Beyond Self-Interest, ed. J Mans- bridge, pp. 267- sociology: rational choice theory and its critics. Am. J. Soc. 104(1998):785816 Kiser E, Schneider E. 86. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press 1994. Bureaucracy and efficiency: an analysis of taxation in early Prussia. Am. Soc. Rev. 59:187-204 Kivisto P, Swatos W. 1988. Max Weber: A BioHolton R, Turner BS. 1989a. Max Weber, Austrian Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Lestition economics, and liberalism. See Holton & Turner 1989b, pp. 30-67 Holton R, Turner BS. 1989b. Max S. 2000. Historical preface to Max Weber, stock and commodity exchanges. Theory Soc. 29:289-304 Weher on Economy and Society, pp. 30-67. New Makler H. 2000. Bank transformation and priYork Routledge vatization in Brazil: financial federalism and some Honigsheim P. [1946-1963] 2000. The Unknown lessons about bank privatization, Q. Rev. Econ. Max Weber, ed. A Sica. New Brunswick, NJ: Finance 40:45-69 Mitzman A. 1987. Personal Transaction Jagd S. 2003. Max Webers last conflicts and ideological options in Sombart and theory of the modem business enterprise. Max Weber Stud. 2(2): In press Jaspers K. [1920- Weber. See Mommsen & Osterhammel 1987, pp. 99 105 1962] 1989. On Max Weber. Mommsen W. [1959] 1984. Max Weber and New York: Paragon House Kaelber L. 2003a. German Politics, 1890-1920. Chicago: Univ. Introduction: Max Webers dissertation in the Chicago Press Mommsen W. 2000. Max Webers context of his early life and career. In The grand sociology: The origins and composition of History of Commercial Partnerships in the Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Soziologie. Hist. Middle Ages, pp. 147. New York: Rowman & Theory 39:364-83 Mommsen W, Aldenhoff R. 1993. Littlefield Einleitung. In Landarbeieterfrage, Nationalstaat Kaelber L. 2003b. Max Webers dissertation. und Volkswirtschaftspolitik. Schriften und Reden Hist. Hum. Sei. In press 1892-1899. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 1/4, 1:1Kalberg S. 1985. The role of ideal interests in Max 68. Tbingen: Mohr Mommsen W, Osterhammel J, Webers comparative historical sociology. In The eds. 1987. Max Weber and His Contemporaries. Marx-WeberDebate, ed. R Antonio, R Glassman, London: Unwin pp. 46-67. Lawrence: Univ. Kans. Press Klber S. Nau H. 2003. Max Weber Economist. In press Nau 1994. Max Webers Comparative- Historical H. 1997. Eine Wissenschaft von MenSociology. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press s c h e n M a x Weber und dir Begrndung der Ksler D. 1989. Der retuschierte Klassiker. Zum Sozialkonomik in der deutschsprachigen gegenwrtigen Forschungsstand der Biographie konomie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot Max Webers. In Max Weber Heute, ed. J Weiss, pp. 29-54. Frankfurt Main: Suhrkamp -+ Kiser E. 1999. Comparing varieties of agency

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

304 SWEDBERG

Nee V. 1998. Sources of the new institutionalism. In The New Institutionalism in Sociology, ed. M Brinton, V Nee, pp. 1-16. New York: Russell Sage Found. Nee V. 2002. Discussion with Richard Swed- berg about the term neo-classical sciology - Ithaca, NY, Oct. 6 Norkus Z. 2000. Max Webers interpretive sociology and rational choice approach. Ration. Soc. 12(3):259-82 Norkus Z. 2001. Max Weber und Rational Choice. Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag Norkus Z. 2002. Max Weber and Rational Choice. Vilnius: Inst. Soc. Res. Oakes G. 1997. Guenther Roth and Weberian studies in America. Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc. 11(1): 175-79 Oakes G. 1999. Gerth, Mills, and Shils: the origins of From Max Weber. Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc. 12(3):399-433 Oakes G, Vidich A. 1999. Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life: Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Urbana: Urbana 111. Press Orihara H. 1999. Max Webers Beitrag zum Grundriss der Sozialkonomik. Das Vorkriegsmanuskript als eines integriertes Ganzes. KlnerZ. Soz. Sozialpsychol. 51(4): 724-34 Orihara H. 2002. From a torso with a wrong head9 to \five disjointed pieces of carcass9?: Problems of the editorial policies for the Mm - Weber Gesamtausgabe 1/22 (Old Manuscript Known as Part IV of the Economy and Society). Work. Pap. Seri., Sugiyama Jogakuen Univ., Aichi-ken, Jpn. Orth EW, Koselleck R. 1982. Interesse. In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, ed. O Brunner, W Conze, R Koselleck, pp. 305-64. Stuttgart: Klott-Ketta Osterhammel J. 1987. Varieties of social economics: Joseph A. Schumpeter and Max Weber. See Mommsen & Osterhammel 1987, pp. 106-20 Palonen K. 2001. Was Max Weber a nationalist? A study in rhetoric of conceptual change. Max Weber Stud. 1(2): 196214

Parsons T. 1937. The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill Peillon M. 1990. The Concept of Interest in Social Theory. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Poggi G. 1986. Max Weber: A monumental edition in the making. Br. J. Soc. 37(2):297- 303 Posner R. 1995. The sociology of the sociology of law. Eur. J. Law Soc. 2:265-84 Powell W, DiMaggio P, eds. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press Ratzenhofer G. 1898. Die Soziologische Erkenntnis. Leipzig: Brockhaus Roth G. 1977a. Introduction to the New Edition. In Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, pp. [xiii]xxxvi. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press Roth G. 1977b. Max Weber: a bibliographic essay. Z. Soziol. 6(1):91102 Roth G. 1988. Introduction to the new edition. In Max Weber: A Biography, pp. xv-lx. Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Roth G. 1993a. Between cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism: Max Weber in the nineties. Telos 96:148-62 Roth G. 1993b. Weber the would-be Englishman: Anglophilia and family history. In Weber's Protestant Ethic, ed. H Lehmann, G Roth, pp. 83121. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press Roth G. 1996. The complete edition of Webers work: an update. Contemp. Sociol. 25(4):464-67 Roth G. 1997. The young Max Weber: AngloAmerican religious influences and Protestant social reform in Germany. Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc. 10:65971 RothG. 1999. Max Weber at home and in Japan: On the troubled genesis and successful reception of his work. Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc. 12:515-25 Roth G. 2000. Global capitalism and multiethnicity: Max Weber then and now. See Turner 2000, pp. 117-39 Roth G. 2001. Max Webers deutsch-englische Familiengeschichte 1800-1950. Tbingen: Mohr

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WEBERS SOCIOLOGY 305

Roth G. 2002. Max Weber: Family history, eco nomic policy, exchange reform. Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc. 15:509-20 Runciman WG. 2001. Was Max Weber a selectionist despite himself? J. Class. Soc. 1(1): 1332 Scaff L. 1998. The cool objectivity of soci- ation: Max Weber and Marianne Weber in America. Hist. Hum. Sei. 11(2):6182 Scaff L. 2000. Rationalization and culture. See Turner 2000, pp. 42-58 Schluchter W. 2000. Handlungs- und Strukturtheorie nach Max Weber. Berl. J. Soziol. 10:125-36 Schon M. 1987. Gustav Schmoller and Max Weber. See Mommsen & Osterhammel 1987, pp. 59-70 Schroeder R. 1992. Max Weber and the Sociology of Culture. London: Sage Scott WR. 1998. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 4th ed. Segre S. 1998. Business communities and their milieux: reappraisal of Toennies, Weber, and Simmel. Int. J. Pol. Cult. Sociol. 11:411-37 Seyfarth C, Schmidt G. 1977. Max-Weber Bibliographie. Stuttgart: Enke Sica A. 1992. Weber, Irrationality and Social Order. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press Sica A. 2003. Max Weber: A Comprehensive Bibliography. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press Simmel G. [1908] 1971. The problem of sociology. In On Individualism and Social Forms, ed. D Levine, pp. 23-35. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press Small A. 1905. General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main Development of Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press Sprondel W. 1973. Sozialer Wandel, Ideen und Interessen: Systematisierungen zu Max Webers Protestantischer Ethik. In Seminar: Religion und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, ed. C Seyfarth, W Sprondel, pp. 206-24. Frankfurt Main: Suhrkamp Stammer O, ed. 1971. Max Weber and Sociology Today. New York: Harper Torchback

Stark D. 1996. Recombinant property in East European capitalism. Am. J. Sociol 101:9931027 Stinchcombe A. 1960. Review of Max Weber. Economy and Society. Am. J. Sociol. 75:28286 Swedberg R. 1998 . Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press Swedberg R. 2003. Principles of Economic Sociology. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press Szelenyi I. 2001. Email message to R Swedberg, June 7 Tribe K. 1995. Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 17501950. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Turner S, ed. 2000. Cambridge Companion to Weber. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press Udehn L. 2001. Methodological Individualism: Background, History and Meaning. London: Routledge Voss T. 2000. Rational choice theory in sociology: a survey. In The International Handbook of Sociology, ed. SR Quah, A Sales, pp. 50-83. London: Sage Weber M. [1889] 2003. The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Weber M. [1894] 2000. Stock and commodity exchanges [Die Brse (1894)]. Theory Soc. 29:305-38 Weber M. [1896] 2000. Commerce on the stock and commodity exchanges [Die Brsenverkehr]. Theory Soc. 29:339-71 Weber M. [1898] 1900. Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen ber Allgemeine (theoretische) Nationalknomie (1898). Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. [1904/1905] 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen & Unwin Weber M. [1913] 1981. Some categories of interpretive sociology. Soc. Q. 22(Spring):151-80 Weber M. [1915] 1946. The social psychology of the world religions. See Gerth & Mills 1946, pp. 267-301 Weber M. [1920/1921] 1988. Gesammelte

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

306 S WEDBERG

Aufstze zur Religions-soziologie, /-///. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. [1922] 1976. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Tbingen: Mohr. 5th ed. Weber M. [1922] 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. G Roth, C Wittich. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press Weber M. [1923] 1981. General Economic History. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Weber M. [1926] 1975. Max Weber: A Biography. New York: Wiley Weber M. 1936. Jugendbriefe. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. 1984. Zur Politik im Weltkrieg. Schriften und Reden 1914-1918. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 1/15. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. 1988. Gesammelte Aufstze zur Sozialund Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. 1990. Briefe 1906-1908. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe II/5. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. 1994. Briefe 1909-1910. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe II/6. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. 1998. Briefe 1911-1912. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 11/7. Tbingen: Mohr Weber M. 1999a. Brsenwesen. Schriften und

Reden 1893-1898. Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 1/5. Tbingen: Mohr. 2 Vols. Weber M. 1999b. Max Weber im Kontext. Gesammelte Schriften, Aufstze und Vortrge. Berlin: Karsten Worm, InsoSoft- Ware Weber M. 1999c. Writings in Economic Sociology, ed. R Swedberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press Weber M. 2002. Excerpts from Die Brse. Max Weber Stud. 2(2):239-41 Whimster S, ed. 1999. Max Weber and the Culture of Anarchy. New York: St. Martins Press Zafirovski M. 2000. Latent theoretical convergence upon a pluralist conception of action: Adam Smith and Max Weber. Const. Polit. Econ. 11:119-45 Zafirovski M. 2001a. Exchange, Action and Social Structure: Elements of Economic Sociology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Zafirovski M. 2001b. Max Webers analysis of marginal utility theory and psychology revisited: Latent positions in economic sociology and the sociology of economics. Hist. Polit. Econ. 33:43758

This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 05:29:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions