Karen Page Winterich, Vikas Mittal, & Karl Aquino

When Does Recognition increase Charitable Behavior? Toward a i\/loral Identity-Based i\/iodei
Each year, people in the United States donate more than $200 billion to charitable causes. Despite the lack of understanding of whether and how recognition increases charitable behavior, charities often offer it to motivate donor action. This research focuses on how the effectiveness of recognition on charitable behavior is dependent on the joint infiuence of two distinct dimensions of moral identity: internalization and symbolization. Three studies examining both monetary donations and volunteering behavior show that recognition increases charitable behavior among those characterized by high moral identity symbolization and low moral identity internalization. Notably, those who show high levels of moral identity internalization are uninfluenced by recognition, regardless of their symbolization. By understanding correlates of the two dimensions of moral identity among donors, nonprofits can strategicaily recognize potential donors to maximize donation and volunteering behavior. Keywords: charitable behavior, recognition, morai identity, symbolization, social reinforcement

urrently, 81% of nonprofit organizations in the United States rely on unpaid individual volunteers (Corporation for National and Community Service 2006), and more than 70% of annual charitable donations come from individuals rather than corporations (Giving USA 2011). Not surprisingly, marketing scholars have extensively examined donations of both time and money (Amett, German, and Hunt 2003; Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Shang, Reed, and Croson 2008; White and Peloza 2009). We view voluntary donations of time or money that are intended to help others as falling under the broader domain of charitable behavior (for an overview, see Table 1). One way nonprofits encourage charitable behaviors is through recognition of donors (Grace and Griffin 2006; Kotier and Lee 2005; Moore 2008). Indeed, several charity consultancies help charities create and execute donor recognition programs (Gaffny 1996; see also http://donorrecognition.ca). Fisher and Ackerman (1998, p. 264) define recognition as an "expression of appreciation given by a group to individuals who undertake desired behaviors." Similarly, Kwarteng, Smith, and Miller (1988, p. 60) define recognition as "forKaren Page Winterich is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University (e-mail: kpw2psu.edu). Vikas Mittal is J. Hugh Liedtke Professor of Marketing, Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University (e-mail: vmittal@rice.edu). Karl Aquino is Richard Poon Professor of Organizations and Society, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Division, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia (e-mail: karl.aquino@sauderubc.ca). The authors are grateful to Rajan Sambandam and Christi Clark at TRC Inc., Fort Washington, Penn., for facilitating data collection through the online panel. They appreciate feedback on prior versions of this article from Utpal Dholakia, Ajay Kaira, and Bill Ross. Cornelia Pechmann served as area editor for this article.

mal and/or informal favorable attention given to an individual to provide him/her a sense of appreciation." The social component (public vs. private continuum) of recognition may vary from recognition that is highly public (e.g., buildings and programs named after a donor [Harbaugh 1998]; donor names listed in newsletters [Kotier and Lee 2005]; giving pink ribbons to breast cancer donors to wear [Moore 2008]) to private (e.g., a letter of thanks sent to the donor, appreciation expressed in personal conversation [Merrill 2005]). In this article, we define "recognition" as an explicit expectation by the donor that their donation behavior received or will receive attention by one or more persons. Is recognition a universally effective marketing strategy for increasing charitable behavior? It is tempting to believe that recognition almost always enhances charitable behavior. However, recognition as a marketing strategy may also be ineffective under some conditions. For example, some donors avoid recognition to prevent unwanted charity solicitations, whereas others prefer anonymity due to religious reasons (Associated Press 2009; Beatty 2008). As we review subsequently, evidence from empirical research on the effectiveness of recognition has produced mixed results (Wymer and Samu 2002). These equivocal findings suggest a need for research aimed at understanding when and why recognition is an effective marketing strategy for charitable behavior. In this article, we propose and test an identity-based model to examine the contingent nature of the effectiveness of recognition as a marketing strategy for charitable behavior. We examine a consumer's "moral identity" (Aquino and Reed 2002) as a construct that might influence whether and why recognition may or may not be effective. According to Aquino and Reed (2002), moral identity has two dimensions: internalization, or the degree to which moral traits are
Journal of Marketing Voiume 77 (May 2013), 121-134

2013, American Marketing Association ISSN: 0022-2429 (print), 1547-7185 (eiectronic)

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TABLE 1 Overview of Charitable Behavior Definitions and Operationalizations

Article Definition of Charitable Behavior and/or Prosocial Behavior Operationallzation of Charitable Behavior Conceptual framework and research propositions

Bendapudi, Singh, Helping behavior is behavior that enhances the welfare and Bendapudi of a needy other, by providing aid or benefit, usually with (1996) little or no commensurate reward in return. (Defined from the perspective of charitable organizations.) Fennis, Janssen, Benevolence; no explicit definition provided. and Vohs (2009) Examples of diverse acts of benevolence: Endorsing a campaign for traffic safety Working as a volunteer on a canned food drive for homeless shelters 'Signing a petition supporting an increase in tuition fees

Fisher and Ackerman (1998) Klein, Smith, and John (2004)

Volunteerism; no explicit definition provided

Prosocial behavior includes "actions intended to benefit one or more people other than oneselfbehaviors such as helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperation" (Batson 1988, p. 282). Organizational citizenship behavior is defined as not being directly or formally recompensed by the organization's reward system though it does not need to be beyond the job or not lead to system rewards (Organ 1997). Prosocial behavior (donation and helping behavior); no explicit definition provided

Willingness to keep a food diary for two weeks (yes/no) Willingness to volunteer as a future research participant for studies conducted on behalf of the Tax and Customs Administration (number participants volunteered for from 0 to 10) Length of time willing to volunteer as a research participant throughout the year (0-240 minutes, in 30-minute intervals) Willingness to volunteer to participate in future studies (yes/no) Number of hours willing to donate to fundraising drive (number of hours per day for one week, up to 25 hours) or soccer festival (0-11 hours) Boycott decision

Willingness to volunteer for a follow-up experiment Agreement to participate in a follow-up survey and degree of actual participation Lee and Shrum Donation likelihood (2012) Actual monetary donations to Feeding America Likelihood of helping in six scenarios Reed, Aquino, and Charitable behavior; no explicit definition provided Perceptions of giving time versus money Levy (2007) Preferences for giving time versus money Zhou et al. (2012) Charitable behavior is a form of prosocial behavior; such Monetary and volunteer intentions behavior entails actions that intend to help and do help Monetary donations to a real charity others (Taute and McOuitty 2004).

Korsgaard et al. (2010)

central to the self, and symbolization, or the degree to which moral traits are reflected in the respondent's actions in the world. We report three studies examining the contingent nature of the effectiveness of recognition using these two dimensions of moral identity. In addition. Study 3 shows that social reinforcement mediates the proposed effect of recognition. This research makes several theoretical and practical contributions. First, it extends existing identity-based models of how consumers relate to companies (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003), evaluate services (Homburg, Wieseke, and Hoyer 2009), and make charitable contributions (Shang, Reed, and Croson 2008). We not only show that different identity dimensions can have an interactive effect but also demonstrate that their behavioral manifestation is differentially sensitive to contextual cues. For example, a contextual cue such as recognition may be associated with one identity dimension (e.g., symbolization) but not the other (e.g., intemalization). Second, and more specific to moral identity, prior research has established the effectiveness of moral identity intemalization as a predictor of charitable bebavior (Reed,

Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterieh, Mittal, and Ross 2009). However, little prior research has systematically investigated the effectiveness of moral identity symbolization. As Reed and Aquino (2003, p. 1284) state, "future research should examine conditions under whether the private (internalization) or public (symbolization) aspects of the selfimportance of a person's moral identity will be stronger predictors of particular outcomes." The current research theoretically delineates and empirically tests conditions in which symbolization has a unique and systematic effect beyond that of intemalization, on the basis of the level of recognition. Third, we demonstrate that social reinforcement mediates the effect of recognition. Specifically, the self-verification process, which relies on social reinforcement, explains why recognition may be effective under conditions of low internalization and high symboiization but not under high internalization. Moreover, our social reinforcement mechanism accounts for why both private and public recognition may be effective. Fourth, from a managerial perspective, our research clarifies why recognition can be more or less effective for

122 / Journal of Marketing, May 2013

different donors. As we explain subsequently, recognition of charitable behavior provides an opportunity to reinforce a person's moral identity socially. Because the need for social reinforcement of moral identity is particularly high for people high in symbolization but low in intemalization, we find recognition to be most effective when people have high levels of symbolization but low levels of intemalization. In doing so, our research provides a more nuanced approach to the use of recognition as a tool to motivate individual charitable behavior. It also provides a framework to explore other potential mediating mechanisms in future studies.

Conceptual Framework
As Harbaugh (1998, p. 278) states, "Virtually every 'how to' book on fundraising agrees, that the actions of charities to solicit gifts and reward donors with public recognition have a large effect on giving and voluntary provision of public goods." Yet Harbaugh also acknowledges that there is little understanding, theoretically or empirically, of how recognition works. He proposes two primary motives for charitable behavior: (1) internal gratification, or the positive feeling of a "warm glow" arising from giving (Andreoni 1990), and (2) social prestige, or the possibility of some material or social return for charitable behavior when others know about the behavior. In addition, there may be psychological benefits of charitable giving (Andreoni 1990; Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996; Peloza and Hassay 2006). Recognition as a Predictor of Charitable Behavior Empirical research on the effectiveness of recognition as a means for increasing charitable behavior is equivocal. In one of the earliest studies on charitable giving, Dawson (1988) examines four reasons for giving to medical research: (1) to improve a person's social worth, (2) to advance a person's career, (3) to receive tax benefits, and (4) in exchange for benefits received in the past or anticipated need in the future. To the author's surprise, only the last two predicted charitable giving. In a recent study. Ko, Gibson, and Kim (2011) surveyed ticket buyers of and donors to the performing arts from 14 university partners. They find that reported desire for recognition versus anonymity significantly predicted self-reported donation amount over the past four years. Examining recognition through rewards such as volunteer T-shirts and plaques. Fisher and Ackerman (1998) find that promised recognition increased volunteering only when participants believed that the needs of the organization were high; thus, recognition did not increase volunteering when the group's need for volunteers was not great. Schlegelmilch and Tynan (1989) identify five personality types of potential givers: (1) sympathetic benevolents, who are generous with friends; (2) indifferent individualists, who help others that they do not know well; (3) pragmatic philanthropists, who feel personal responsibility toward others' misfortunes; (4) hard-hearts, who do not feel guilty when acting selfishly; and (5) glory givers, who are concerned with gaining recognition for their gifts. Interest-

ingly, the glory-giver segment explained the least amount of variance in giving. Similarly, Peterson (2004) surveyed alumni from a business college and found that recognition did not predict the actual number of hours volunteered. Prince and File (1994) segmented donors into different groups and obtained qualitative opinions from each segment. Those segmented as altruists explicitly stated that they did not want recognition: "I find it especially upsetting when the charities misconstrue my motivations ... or want to make a public event out of something I have done" (p. 76). In contrast, donors deemed communitarians stated, "I really appreciate it when they [nonprofit organizations] give me some recognition. It means something when my neighbors are aware of the ways I help" (p. 29). In summary, the empirical evidence regarding the association of recognition and charitable behavior is equivocal at best and suggests that the effect of recognition is conditional. Moreover, it does not provide theoretical insight into conditions under which recognition is most effective at enhancing charitable behavior. Recognition and Charitable Behavior: The Moderating Role of Moral Identity Aquino and Reed (2002) propose a sociocognitive model of moral identity in which an associative network of related moral traits, goals, and behaviors may represent a person's moral identity. Within this associative network, the strength of these moral associations reflects the degree to which a person's moral identity has high self-importance. This model posits two dimensions of moral identity: the private (intemalization) dimension and the public (symbolization) dimension. This two-dimensional conception of moral identity is consistent with the self as having both an intemal (private) and extemal (public) aspect (Erikson 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 1975). According to Aquino and Reed (2002), a person with higher moral identity intemalization should have moral traits, goals, and behaviors more accessible in their thoughts. Note that people with relatively lower moral identity intemalization are not void of moral thoughts; rather, thoughts regarding moral traits, goals, and behaviors are not as dominant in their minds. In other words, it is important that a person's view of him- or herself (i.e., privately) aligns with his or her actions such that people who view themselves as high in moral identity intemalization are more likely to engage in moral actions, including charitable behavior, because doing so enhances the consistency of their self-concept as a moral person (Blasi 1984). In contrast, the public dimension of moral identity, referred to as symbolization, accounts for people's desire to express their moral character to others through their actions in the world. As such, people with high levels of moral identity symbolization aim to engage in activities that express their moral identity to others, whereas people low in moral identity symbolization are less likely to seek opportunities to express their moral identity to others though their actions. Notably, a person's symbolization may not reflect his or her intemalization such that although all people may have a base level of moral standards, some may

Toward a Moral Identity-Based Model /123

have higher levels of moral identity intemalization, whereas others have higher levels of moral identity symbolization. We propose that the mechanism underlying the symbolization dimension of moral identity stems from social reinforcement (Kandel 1980; Lieberman et al. 2001). Social reinforcement entails the comments or actions of others that serve to reinforce a person's identity to him- or herself through the reflected appraisals of others (Lieberman et al. 2001; Schlenker and Weigold 1992). Self-verification theory grounds the logic for social reinforcement: people desire to provide an accurate portrayal of themselves to others because doing so contributes to an experience of psychological coherence (Reed et al. 2012; Swann 1983). In essence, recognition of charitable behavior provides a person with the opportunity for his or her moral identity to be reinforced to him- or herself through the comments and actions of others (i.e., social reinforcement). The social reinforcement that arises from recognition is likely to be particularly important for those with high moral identity symbolization who aim to express their moral selves through their actions in the world. We specify our prediction in this regard next. Table 2 summarizes the expected effects of recognition by moral identity intemalization and symbolization in line with the arguments we make here regarding the motives that underlie the two dimensions. We expect the self-consistency motive to be the primary driver of charitable behavior for consumers who are high in intemalization, regardless of their level of symbolization, such that recognition will have no effect on predicting charitable behavior. In contrast, selfverification motives, which can be achieved through social reinforcement occurring from recognition of the charitable behavior, will influence charitable behavior among those high in symbolization but low in intemalization; specifically, these donors need social reinforcement to motivate charitable behavior, and thus, recognition will exert a significant effect on their charitable behavior. Finally, for those who are relatively low in both moral identity dimensions, recognition will not predict charitable behavior because self-consistency and self-verification do not motivate these TABLE 2 Effect of Recognition on Charitable Behavior by Moral Identity Intemalization and Symbolization
Moral Identity Synnbolization High Moral Identity Intemalization High Low Cell A CellB No recognition Recognition needed; needed; Self-consistency Provides social motives prompt reinforcement of charitable behavior charitable behavior

donors. Thus, we expect recognition to exert the strongest influence on charitable behavior in cell B of Table 2.' More specifically, when moral identity symbolization is high, we expect recognition to have a stronger positive relationship with charitable behavior among donors who are low (compared with high) in moral identity intemalization. This effect should occur because, unlike those who are higher in moral identity intemalization, self-consistency should not motivate those low in moral identity intemalization. In other words, motivation that is independent of recognition will be limited for donors low in moral identity intemalization. Consequently, the social reinforcement needed for the self-verification motive that accompanies symbolization will result in recognition being a more influential predictor of charitable behavior. However, when the self-consistency motive is strong, as it is for those high in intemalization, the self-verification motive of symbolization that seeks social reinforcement has less influence on charitable behavior, thereby attenuating the effectiveness of recognition in motivating charitable behavior. Among donors with low symbolization, we argue that recognition will not significantly predict charitable behavior. This null effect should occur because those low in symbolization do not seek social reinforcement, thereby rendering recognition irrelevant. As such, self-consistency becomes the primary driver of behavior. If this assertion is correct, no positive relationship should exist between recognition and charitable behavior among low symbolizers. Because our arguments specify different effects of recognition depending on levels of moral identity intemalization and symbolization, we propose a three-way interaction that arises from a two-way interaction involving recognition and moral identity intemalization, predicting charitable behavior when symbolization is high but not when it is low. Formally, we propose the following: Hi : The effect of recognition on charitable behavior is stronger among consumers who are high rather than low in moral identity symbolization, but only among those who are low in moral identity intemalization. How does our theorizing, summarized in Hi, contribute to research on the effect of moral identity on charitable behavior? Although there are more than ten articles documenting more than 25 studies using Aquino and Reed's (2002) measure of moral identity, most studies find intemalization to be a stronger and more consistent predictor of charitable behavior, whereas the effect of symbolization shows a weak or no relationship to this outcome (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009; Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012). Thus, symbolization's effect, if any, and when and why it occurs is not understood. We contribute to this literature by theoretically 'It is important to clarify that "high" and "low" intemalization or symbolization refers to the relative strength within one dimension of moral identity. Because these dimensions represent two distinct psychological phenomena, we do not compare the strength of a person's moral identity across the two dimensions: intemalization as central to the self-concept and symbolization reflected through actions in the world.

Low

CellC

CellD

No recognition No motivation for needed; charitable behavior Self-consistency motives prompt charitable behavior

124/Journal of Marketing, May 2013

arguing a strong, positive relationship between recognition and charitable behavior among those characterized by moral identity symbolization, albeit only for those not motivated by the self-consistency associated with high importance of intemalization.

Study 1 : Recognition, Moral Identity, and Monetary Donations

In Study 1, we focus on monetary allocations to a charity offering recognition and operationalize recognition as private acknowledgment through a thank-you card from the organization. We measure moral identity intemalization and symbolization. Participants Participants were 410 adults (62% female; Mgge = 47.84 years, SD = 11.99, range = 20-85 years) from an online panel in the United States who were entered in a $50 Amazon, com gift card lottery in exchange for participation. Participants first responded to Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity scale (see Appendix A). We then explained that if they won, they could choose to donate any portion in $10 increments or the entire $50 gift card winning to a nonprofit organization. Last, participants completed a manipulation check and background information. We randomly assigned participants to one of two nonprofits: Childhelp or the National Cancer Coalition. The results were consistent for both charities, so we collapsed data across them. Measures Monetary donation behavior. As standard practice, the online research firm we used incentivized participants with a chance to win a $50 Amazon.com gift card. We adapted this incentive by telling participants they could choose to donate some portion in $10 increments or the entire $50 gift card winning to a nonprofit organization (Freeman, Aquino, and McFerran 2009; see Appendix B). Thus, the dependent variable is the amount, if any, of the $50 allocated as a donation, with options of $0, $10, $20, $30, $40, or $50. We assured participants that their donation allocation would not infiuence their chance of winning the lottery and that we collected their allocation commitment at this time solely for ease of administration. Participants randomly selected as lottery winners received their $50 winning according to their allocation selected in the study, with the research panel administrator facilitating the allocated amount to the charity and the remaining portion to the Amazon.com gift card. The research participant received a thank-you card from the randomly assigned charity recognizing their donation, which is standard practice for both charities selected. Moral identity. Participants completed Aquino and Reed's (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, which appears in Appendix A. This measure (1) is intemally consistent, (2) shows significant test-retest reliability, (3) has a stable two-factor stmcture exhibiting discriminant validity in the two dimensions, and (4) has strong predictive validity in terms of various moral cognitions and behaviors (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino and Reed 2002; Reed and

Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Reynolds and Ceranic 2007; Skarlicki, Van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). As Appendix A shows, participants responding to the scale encountered a list of nine moral characteristics. These characteristics do not constitute the moral identity scale or directly correspond to the ten scalable items. Instead, Aquino and Reed (2002) inductively derived these nine characteristics to capture lay constnials of a prototypical moral person (Aquino and Reed 2002). Although the instrument does not use the word "moral," this methodology makes accessible, through spreading activation, other traits around which a person's moral identity is organized (Collins and Loftus 1975). Thus, participants should have accessible an array of traits that represent their moral identity when they respond to the ten self-importance of moral identity items. As a result, we can assess the importance of this particular identity to the self. Participants responded to the ten items (1 = "strongly disagree," and 7 = "strongly agree"), which constitute two subscales. The five items on the intemalization subscale assess the extent to which a person experiences his or her moral identity intemally as part of the self-concept. The five items on the symbolization subscale assess the extent to which a person projects his or her moral identity to others through actions in the world. In the specific scale items, the reference to "these characteristics" may include not only the nine moral characteristics listed in the scale directions but also others that the participants' associative networks may reference. Notably, it is the way these characteristics are referenced in each scale item (i.e., as important to the self for intemalization vs. expressed to others for symbolization) that differentiates assessment of intemalization and symbolization dimensions. The eighth item of the moral identity scale intended for the symbolization dimension may seem to assess both dimensions. Therefore, we conducted analysis with this item excluded and with a four-item symbolization measure, but we found that the reliability of the symbolization index decreased and the correlation between the two dimensions increased, indicating that this item was appropriate to assess the symbolization measure. These findings notwithstanding, study results remained the same when we used the fouritem measure only. For consistency with prior studies examining symbolization (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Reynolds and Ceranic 2007; Skarlicki, Van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008), the results reported in the text are for the original five-item measure of symbolization in this and all subsequent studies. We averaged the five items measuring intemalization (a = .85; M = 6.17, SD = .96) and symbolization (a = .77; M = 4.71, SD = 1.13) to form two subscales, which were moderately correlated (r = .25, p < .01). Note that not only is the intemalization mean significantly higher than symbolization, but also, at the absolute level, intemalization is very high, with an average score exceeding 6 on a seven-point scale. Thus, reference to low intemalization is not indicative of an absence of intemalization; rather, it is lower in a relative sense such that moral identity may still be important to a person's self-concept (e.g., those scoring 5 on a

Toward a Moral Identity-Based Model /125

seven-point scale; less than 15% of respondents scored 5 or lower), but it is not as important as it is to those with higher intemalization (i.e., those scoring 7 on a seven-point scale, approximately 30% of respondents). In contrast, symbolization scores tend to be lower on average than intemalization scores, with more than 50% scoring below 5 and less than 5% scoring 7. These means are consistent with those obtained in the scale development (Aquino and Reed 2002) and in subsequent research (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Reynolds and Ceranic 2007; Skarlicki, Van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008). Because we use 1 SD to calculate effects, we use the traditional low versus high terminology; however, note that low (-1SD) intemalization is still above the midpoint of the scale (approximately 5 to 5.5 on a sevenpoint scale). Recognition. Participants randomly assigned to the recognition condition (I = recognition, 0 = no recognition) were told that any donation they made of their gift card winnings would be made in their name and that they would receive a thank-you card recognizing their donation. A pretest (n = 48) assessed perceived recognition by tbe charity with two items (see Appendix B; r = .81,p < .01). Those in the recognized (vs. unrecognized) condition thought that donations would be recognized by the charity to a greater extent (M = 5.67 (1.35) vs. 4.69 (1.27); t = 2.59,/? < .05). Control variables. We controlled for gender, coded as 0 (male) and 1 (female), because women may be more likely to engage in donation behavior (Winterieh, Mittal, and Ross 2009). We also included charity type, Childhelp or National Cancer Coalition, as a control. Results and Discussion Monetary donation behavior. We ran a regression with monetary donation allocation as the dependent variable and the control variables of gender and charity type, effects of intemalization, symbolization, and recognition as well as their two- and three-way interactions as predictors of charitable behavior. Note that the change in the dependent variable is equivalent ($10) at each level, and the variable is ratio-scaled; thus, linear regression is appropriate. We also replicate the results using an ordered logit. We centered both intemalization and symbolization before analysis in this and all subsequent studies. The results show a main effect of recognition (b = 4.04, t = 2.46,/? < .05) and a main effect of intemalization (b = 3.92, t = 3.08, p < .05). No two-way interactions were significant. The three-way interaction was significant (b = -3.56, t = -2.01,p < .05). Gender and charity type were nonsignificant (ps > .50). We explored the pattem of the three-way interaction by examining the effect of recognition at high and low levels (1 SD) of both intemalization and symbolization. Simple slope analysis revealed that for those with higher symbolization, recognition has a significant effect if intemalization is low (b = 9.93, t = 239, p < .05). In contrast, recognition is not significant when symbolization and intemalization are high (b = -.77, t = -.25, n.s.). Moreover, recognition was not significant when symbolization was low for those low in intemalization (b = 1.73, t = .60, n.s.) and for those

high in intemalization (b = 5.26, t = 1.50, n.s.). Figure 1 illustrates tbe results of the simple slope analysis that support H). Discussion. In support of our theorizing, recognition increases charitable bebavior when intemalization is low and symbolization is high; recognition does not affect monetary donations when intemalization is high and symbolization is high or when symbolization is low, regardless of intemalization. To increase general i zability, we next examine the effect of recognition when it occurs through volunFIGURE 1 Monetary Donation as a Function of Moral Identity Intemalization and Symbolization and Recognition of Donation (Study 1) A: High Symbolization
$50 n
High internalization Low internalization

$40re u O)O

!> ^ $30 -

u( D
c

$10-

$0

No Recognition B: Low Symbolization

Recognition

$50-1

High internalization Low internalization

$40(0

CAO C =

> Z $30

$10-

$0

No Recognition

Recognition

126 / Journal of Marketing, May 2013

teer names listed on a website. In addition, we examine donations of time (i.e., volunteer behavior). Although it may be intuitively appealing to assume that the pattem found in Study 1 will apply to donations of time, empirical research suggests that this may not be the case because the factors that infiuence giving may differ by donation modality (Lee, Piliavin, and Call 1999). For example. Reed, Aquino, and Levy (2007) find that moral identity differentially influenced donations of time (vs. money) because donors may perceive donating time as more effortful and moral than donating money. However, donations of time are critical to many charities (Eisner et al 2009): more than 60 million volunteers donated more than 8 billion hours of service in the United States in 2010 (valued at $173 billion), and 81% of nonprofit organizations in the United States rely on volunteers (Corporation for National and Community Service 2006, 2012). Thus, we aimed to replicate these results with donations of time.

Study 2: Recognition, Moral Identity, and Volunteer Behavior

Existing literature has examined donation of time in a variety of ways (for a review, see Table 1). These include subtle but clever measures such as volunteering to participate in future research studies (Fennis, Janssen, and Vohs 2009; Korsgaard et al. 2010), willingness to complete a two-week food diary (Fennis, Janssen, and Vohs 2009), and participation in a follow-up survey (Korsgaard et al. 2010). To determine whether our theorizing holds for donations of time, we follow this existing research and operationalize charitable behavior with voluntary participation in a follow-up survey. Participants and Procedure Participants included 197 adults (64% female; Mgge = 48.32 years,SD= ll.ll,range= 18-73 years) from the same online research service provider in the United States. Participants first responded to Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity scale used in Study 1 (intemalization [a = .81; M = 6.21, SD = .89] and symboUzation [a = .75; M = 4.62, SD = 1.06]; r = .23, p < .01). Then, they completed background information and responded to filler questions for approximately ten minutes. As in Study 1, we included gender as a control. At the end of this main survey, we asked participants to volunteer five minutes of their time to complete a survey for a nonprofit educational organization. The volunteer request clearly indicated that (1) respondents were under no obligation to participate and (2) there was no financial incentive for their participation. The surveywhich we used for our university-related research, thereby benefiting a nonprofit educational organizationelicited evaluations of various nonprofit organizations. Participants indicating "yes" were redirected to the new survey; otherwise, the survey ended (0 = did not volunteer, 1 = volunteered). We manipulated recognition (1 = recognition, 0 = no recognition) by informing participants that, in exchange for completing the second survey, their name would be listed on a website. Although only those in the recognition condition knew this before making their volunteer decision, all par-

ticipants could choose to have their name added to the recognized list of volunteers at the end of the survey. After they completed the survey, we provided participants with a link to an actual university web page listing volunteer names. This manipulation is consistent with Fisher and Ackerman's (1998, p. 264) definition of recognition as "an expression of appreciation given by a group to individuals who undertake desired behaviors." Nonprofits frequently use inclusion in such a list as a form of recognition. For example, the American Marketing Association and the Association for Consumer Research regularly list volunteer reviewers and other conference volunteers in conference programs and/or at conference luncheons. A pretest (n = 43) assessed perceived recognition by the public with two items (see Appendix B; r = .53,p < .01). To a greater extent, those in the recognized (vs. unrecognized) condition thought volunteering would be publicly visible (M ^ 4.20 (1.03) vs. 3.38 (1.18); t = 2.44,p< .05). Indeed, perceived public visibility was not particularly high. This may be due to the low visibility of the specific website to the public at large; in any case, it provides a more conservative test of our theory. Resuits and Discussion Volunteering behavior. A logistic regression for volunteering behavior revealed a two-way interaction of intemalization and symbolization (b = .69, Wald X^(l) = 4.38, p < .05), which was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of intemalization, symbolization, and recognition (b = -.77, Wald x2(l) = 3.99,/? < .05). No main effects were significant. Gender was not significant. As in Study 1, when symbolization was high among those with low intemalization, recognition had a significant effect on volunteering (b = 1.78, Wald x2(l) = 3.81,/7 = .05). When symbolization was high and participants had high intemalization, the effect of recognition was not significant (b = -.26, Wald X^(l) = .28, n.s.), indicating that offering recognition did not increase the likelihood of volunteering. When symbolization was low, the effect of recognition was not significant when intemalization was low (b = -1.13, Wald %2(i) = 2.49, n.s.) or high (b = .24, Wald 5c2(i) = .15^ .s.). We also calculated the percentage of respondents who volunteered in each condition, using median splits to illustrate the pattem (see Figure 2). The change in the volunteering from 6% unrecognized to 21 % recognized among those with high symbolization and low intemalization could be interpreted as either recognition increasing volunteering or no recognition decreasing volunteering, because the volunteer rates were similar for those with high intemalization (20%-24%). Given that when we added recognition to the volunteer request, those with low intemalization (and low symbolization) had a relatively lower likelihood of volunteering (13%-14%), we interpret these results as recognition increasing volunteering for participants characterized with high symbolization and low intemalization. Notably, these results suggest that recognition only affects volunteering among those with high symbolization and low intemalization, which is consistent with Study l's results for more private recognition of monetary donations.

Toward a Moral Identity-Based Model /127

FIGURE 2 Volunteering as a Function of Moral Identity Internalization and Symbolization and Recognition of Donation (Study 2) A: High Symbolization
60% -,
High internalization Low internalization

2'5r5o%
8 ? 40%
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JP ai

his or her charitable behavior regardless of whether the recognition is public or private. However, recognition only infiuences charitable behavior among potential donors who are high in symbolization and low in intemalization. These results systematically explain why recognition does not always increase charitable behavior; that is, intemalization motivates charitable behavior regardless of recognition. Yet why is recognition effective for those with low intemalization but high symbolization, particularly when this effect occurs regardless of whether the recognition is private or public? Drawing on self-verification theory, we argue that recognition provides social reinforcement for those who are high in symbolization.

. 2 1 30%
> o 2>

Charitable Behavior: The Mediating Roie of Sociai Reinforcement

21% We base our argument for the mediating role of social reinforcement on self-verification (Reed et al. 2012; Swann 1983). As we described previously, people strive for others to view them as they view themselves. As such, the extent to which the behavior provides the opportunity to verify a person's identity through the responses and views of others infiuences the motivation to engage in a behavior (Swann 1983). Thus, consumers may engage in a reinforcement monitoring process to determine the extent to which others have verified their identity through their behaviors (Reed et al. 2012). Recognition of charitable behavior provides social reinforcement and, thus, self-verification of a donor's moral identity. As we argued previously, social reinforcement arising from recognition of charitable behavior will be more important to those with high symbolization but low internalization. Such social reinforcement verifies the selfimportance of a key identity through feedback in response to a person's action. That is, it supports a person's underlying identity through the refiected appraisals of others. In other words, recognition of charitable behavior socially reinforces moral identity, affirming a donor's morality to him- or herself. Thus, we propose that social reinforcement underlies the effect of recognition on charitable behavior for those with high symbolization who are not motivated by self-consistency due to lower intemalization. Consistent with our theorizing for Hj, social reinforcement arising from recognition should not infiuence charitable behavior for consumers high in intemalization: they should engage in charitable behavior regardless of whether the behavior is recognized or unrecognized. Consumers high in moral identity intemalization can experience selfconsistency of their moral identity simply by acting morally (e.g., engaging in charitable behavior) regardless of whether the behavior receives recognition. In contrast, for those who are low in intemalization and lack self-consistency but are high in symbolization and seek self-verification, we predict that social reinforcement will underlie the effect of recognition on charitable behavior. We make this prediction because self-verification can only occur when the moral (e.g., charitable) behavior is socially reinforced, which occurs when it is recognized. In line with these arguments, we test the following hypothesis:

0, i5 20%

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Discussion. Jointly, Studies 1 and 2 support H| for two different kinds of charitable behavior: donating money (Study 1) and donating time (Study 2). By demonstrating that our theorizing is identical for donations of both time and money. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that managers can use similar strategies for both types of charitable behavior from their donors. In addition, giving someone a plaque at an awards dinner or listing his or her name in a program offers public recognition, but sending a thank-you note to his or her home does not. The important element of recognition for this research is that the donor perceives recognition of

128 / Journal of Marketing, May 2013

H2: Social reinforcement mediates the moderating effect of the two dimensions of moral identity on the effect of recognition on charitable behavior. More specifically, social reinforcement mediates the effect of recognition on charitable behavior among consumers who are high in moral identity symbolization, but only among those who do not already have high moral identity intemalization.

tion (b = .28, t = .15, n.s.) and for those high in intemalization (b = 1.04, t = .45, n.s.). Figure 3 illustrates the results of the simple slope analysis, which support Hi and the pattem found in Studies 1 and 2. Mediating role of social reinforcement. We conducted mediated moderation analysis following Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) to determine the extent to which social reinforcement of charitable behavior mediated the effect of recognition, moderated by symbolization and intemalization, on charitable behavior. We used bootstrapped estimation of conditional indirect effects because it directly estimates the size of the indirect effects, provides confidence intervals (CIs) for the estimated effects, demonstrates higher power and greater control over Type I error rates, and relies on fewer assumptions about the sampling distribution, especially for smaller samples such as ours (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). Conducting 5,000 iterations, the 95% CI for the highest order, three-way interaction excluded zero (-.0587 to -.0042). Thus, we examined the pattem of mediation at high and low (1 SD) levels of both intemalization and symbolization. For high intemalization, the 95% CI for the indirect effect of recognition on charitable behavior included zero for both low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) symbolization (-.0776 to .0159; -.1074 to .0099). For low internalization, the 95% CI also included zero for low symbolization (-.0314 to .0360). However, for low intemalization and high levels of symbolization, the 95% CI did not include zero (.0067 to .1384), indicating that social reinforcement of charitable behavior mediates the effect of recognition on charitable behavior for those with high symbolization and low intemalization, in support of H2. Discussion This study replicates the results of the previous two studies and shows the mediating role of social reinforcement. To our knowledge, these results are the first to demonstrate empirically how social reinforcement may explain the effect of recognition in conjunction with a person's moral identity.

Study 3: The Mediating Role of Social Reinforcement on Charitable Behavior

Participants and Procedure Participants were 267 adults (78% female; M^ge = 49.94 years, SD = 12.17, range = 22-78 years) from an online panel in the United States. Participants received panel points for participation, which is standard practice for the panel. In addition, participants were entered in a $50 Amazon.com gift card lottery. Participants then responded to the donation allocation measure with the recognition manipulation, which were both identical to Study 1 except that Feeding America would receive all donation allocations. After the donation allocation, participants completed a series of measures regarding the donation as well as personality measures, which included the moral identity scale and demographic information. We calculated an index for each moral identity dimension (intemalization [a = .89; M = 5.96, SD = .87] and symbolization [a = .80; M = 3.95, SD = 1.20]; r = .16, p < .01). We controlled for gender as in the previous studies. As Appendix B shows, we measured social reinforcement with eight items (a = .76; M = 2.63, SD = 1.22) adapted from Lieberman et al. (2001). Participants thought about friends and/or coworkers to whom they feel close or fiiends and/or coworkers who have the greatest effect on their behavior and ideas. We reminded participants that there were no right or wrong answers. We did not expect responses to these items to correspond specifically to participants' donation allocation, but we anticipated that the extent to which people perceived their friends and/or coworkers to reinforce charitable behavior socially represents the extent to which they themselves are motivated by social reinforcement. Social reinforcement was not correlated with moral identity intemalization (r = -.06, p = .29) but was positively correlated with moral identity symbolization (r= .40,/? < .01). Results Monetary donation behavior. A regression analysis revealed a main effect of intemalization (b = 2.44, t = 2.33, p < .05). No two-way interactions were significant, but the three-way interaction of intemalization, symbolization, and recognition was significant (b = -2.11, t = -2.07,/? = .04). Gender was not significant (p = .14). Simple slope analysis revealed that when symbolization was high, recognition had a significant effect for those low in intemalization (b = 5.92, t = 2.75,/7 < .01). In contrast, recognition was not significant when symbolization and intemalization were high (b - -1.75, t = -.96, n.s.). Recognition was not significant when symbolization was low for those low in intemaliza-

General Discussion
These three studies show that recognition enhances charitable behavior, but only among those with low intemalization and high symbolization. We find this result whether we measure charitable behavior as donations of money (Studies 1 and 3) or as volunteering time for research (Study 2). The finding is also robust to recognition that is private (i.e., thank-you card: Studies 1 and 3) or public (i.e., name listed online: Study 2). Moreover, respondents were adults from nationally representative panels, not undergraduates. Thus, collectively, our studies provide robust evidence for our theorizing. Theoretical Contributions to the Identity and Charitable Behavior Literature Aquino and Reed's (2002) two-dimensional model of moral identity has typically been applied as a simple additive-

Toward a Moral Identity-Based Model /129

FIGURE 3 Donation Allocation and Social Reinforcement as a Function of Moral Identity Internalization and Symbolization and Recognition of Donation (Study 3) A: High Symbolization $50-,
High internalization Low internalization

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effect model (for an exception, see Skarlicki, Van Jaarsveld, and Walker [2008], although they do not explicitly examine recognition). We examine the interactive effect of the two dimensionsinternalization and symbolizationshowing that recognition increases charitable behavior for consumers with high symbolization. Nonetheless, consistent with the robust support for the effect of internalization, recognition does not increase charitable behavior when internalization has already motivated giving. It is critical to understand that for consumers to hold a relatively high level of either internalization or symbolization, they need to have

a base level of moral trait associations that they deem important. However, beyond this base level of moral trait associations, consumers may have (1) relatively stronger or weaker levels of general self-awareness based on introspection of their inner thoughts and feelings and (2) relatively stronger or weaker levels of general sensitivity to the self as a social object (Erikson 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 1975) for which they may seek self-verification (Swann 1983). Thus, a consumer's relatively low moral identity internalization does not preclude him or her from having relatively high moral identity symbolization. After meeting

130 / Journal of Marketing, May 2013

a base threshold of moral trait associations of importance to themselves, consumers may have stronger or weaker levels of internalization and symbolization that are not necessarily highly correlated. This nuance is an important contribution to the field's understanding of Aquino and Reed's (2002) conceptualization of the two dimensions of moral identity. Our demonstration that social reinforcement mediates this phenomenon is an additional contribution of our research in that it provides theoretical insight into the conditions in which recognition is most effective at enhancing charitable behavior. However, we acknowledge that there may be other, unexamined potential mediators. For example, in this research, we demonstrate that the role of social reinforcement varies according to the extent to which it verifies the identity to the self, and we propose that a desire for consistency with the self underlies the effect of moral identity internalization. Further research should examine these additional motives as potential mediators. Manageriai Implications: Recognition as a Marketing Strategy for Charitabie Behavior With regard to managerial implications, first, managers can use the brief instrument shown in Appendix A to determine the level of both moral identity internalization and symbolization for their current and potential donors to better understand how they will respond to various charitable donation solicitations. We acknowledge that measuring a donor's individual differences may not always be practical for organizations. Yet the measure is short and may be particularly beneficial if one moral identity dimension tends to characterize the donor base more strongly than the other dimension. For example, in the present research, a large subset of participants (approximately 50% in our samples) would donate regardless of recognition, and a smaller subset would not donate even when offered recognition. If managers can ascertain the average levels of moral identity of their donors, they can determine whether offering recognition will likely be effective (i.e., a reasonable proportion of their donor base is characterized by low internalization and high symbolization) or less effective (i.e., a large proportion of their donor base is characterized by high internalization or both low internalization and low symbolization). If one of the latter cases is present, managers may be better off employing strategies other than recognition (e.g., donation matching, emphasis of personal benefits) to increase charitable behavior. Prior research on moral identity shows that it can be temporarily activated and will have effects consistent with those of chronically important moral identity (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). Importantly, product advertisements can activate moral identity (Choi and Winterich 2013). Thus, managers could temporarily activate moral identity in a donation appeal or an advertisement for a cause-related marketing campaign. In taking this approach, recall that the present findings demonstrate that recognition is less effective at increasing charitable behavior for those characterized by high internalization. Thus, managers who temporarily activate moral identity internalization in their donation appeals should not need to incorporate recognition into their marketing strategy because the motivation for charita-

ble behavior would arise from internalization regardless of the presence or absence of recognition. In such cases, managers could save the costs associated with engaging in donor recognition. When using recognition to increase charitable behavior, managers should examine various forms of recognition with the aim of maximizing effectiveness while minimizing cost. For example, recognition by listing donor names on a website is similar in effectiveness to sending thank-you cards. To the extent that online recognition may be less costly, managers should consider using online tools and social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, or Linkedin, to develop effective but efficient recognition strategies. The effectiveness of such low-cost forms of donor recognition should be of particular interest to managers who need to engage in recognition to manage their volunteer pool strategically yet have limited funds to do so (Eisner et al. 2009). Moreover, these recognition strategies may be more appealing to younger donors than the more formal, standard recognition methods. This area is ripe for further research. In addition, we suggest that managers of nonprofits should develop more targeted recognition strategies rather than employing them universally for all donors. For example, charities may want to give donors a choice to "opt in" to receive recognition by checking a box on the donation request, because not all donors may seek such recognition. This can save money from any costs associated with recognition. In other cases, if organizations know or believe that the majority of their donor base is high in symbolization and low in internalization, they may implement an "opt out" strategy so that those who strongly do not desire recognition can choose not to receive it, whereas all others will. Understanding the relative effectiveness of such opting in/out strategies is a key area for further research. Finally, managers may enhance charitable behavior by training employees to reinforce donors' identities socially. For example, training cashiers to offer social reinforcement may make donation appeals at store checkout more effective. More generally, the notion that recognition is an effective means of facilitating the reinforcement of social identity may apply in many contexts beyond charities. For example, in many cases, people consume brands as a way to manage and bolster their own identity. Strategically recognizing customers on the basis of the self-importance of their identity can foster stronger brand connections. However, future studies should address the extent to which other consumer identities may be amenable to recognition. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research We recognize that our studies are subject to several limitations. First, we measured moral identity, although previous research has shown isomorphic results using both measured and temporarily activated moral identity internalization (Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Still, future studies should replicate our results using activated moral identity. Second, there is a need to explicate the construct of recognition more comprehensively and examine how different types of recognition may affect not only charitable

Toward a Moral Identity-Based Model /131

behavior but also other consumption behaviors. Although our studies indicated similar results for different types of recognitionnamely, private and public recognitionthe similarities in the current results for both types of recognition should not mask the subtle differences between these recognition modalities, which deserve careful consideration in further research. Moreover, organizations should not use different types of recognition strategies indiscriminately. In addition to their cost, they may be differentially related to other aspects of a donation context (the extent to which an organization aims to motivate others to donate) or donor characteristics (e.g., altruism, self-monitoring). Third, our recognition manipulation of a thank-you card sent to the donor from the charitable organization in Studies 1 and 3 is a subtle form of recognition. It is likely that offering stronger, more direct forms of recognition may increase its effectiveness for those high in symbolization and low in intemalization. The subtle recognition we used in our studies suggests a more conservative test of our hypothesis. Moreover, our theorizing may also explain results from Reed, Aquino, and Levy (2007), who find that intemalization consistently predicted giving both time and money, but symbolization predicted donations of time but not money. Our theorizing suggests that this effect could have occurred if participants perceived donating time (e.g., volunteering at a local community service organization) to result in greater recognition than donations of money through writing a check or electronic transfer. Fourth, to the extent that recognition can have a nonlinear impact, additional studies may reveal that high levels of public recognition are a detriment to charitable behavior among some consumers, likely those who prefer anonymity (Associated Press 2009; Beatty 2008). Similarly, low levels of recognition may negatively influence charitable behavior if donors expect some minimal level of recognition as a form of gratitude (Prince and File 1994). We theorize and empirically demonstrate that social reinforcement underlies the effect of recognition moderated by symbolization and intemalization on charitable behavior. This social reinforcement likely provides psychological benefits through self-verification. However, it is important to note that there is an ongoing debate regarding whether experiencing a "wami glow" from giving is egotistic versus altruistic to the extent that it offers psychological benefits (Andreoni 1990; Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996). We do not address this debate. Notably, people may use self-interest motives as justification for engaging in charitable behavior (Miller 1999); however, the stronger underlying motive may be the psychological benefits of social reinforcement. We hope that further research will explore these issues.

Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, please indicate your agreement with each statement below.
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. (I) 2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. (I) 3.1 often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics. (S) 4.1 would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. (I/R) 5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics. (S) 6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics. (S) 7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. (I/R) 8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations. (S) 9.1 am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that 1 have these characteristics. (S) 10.1 strongly desire to have these characteristics. (I) (Notes: I = intemalization item; S = symbolization item; R = reverse-coded)

Appendix B Description of Measures Used in All Studies

1. Monetary Donation Allocation (Studies 1 and 3; from Freeman, Aquino, and McFerran 2009)
Donation choices were as follows:
1. $50 donation/no gift card 2. $40 donation/$10 gift card 3. $30 donation/$20 gift card 4. $20 donation/$30 gift card 5. $10 donation/$40 gift card 6. No donation/$50 gift card Monetary donations range from 1 to 6, with higher numbers indicating larger monetary donations.

2. Recognition (Pretest for Studies 1 and 3)

To what extent did you think donations would be acknowledged by the charity? To what extent did you think donations would be recognized by the charity? (Seven-point scale: 1 = "definitely not acknowledged/recognized," and 7 = "definitely acknowledged/recognized")

Appendix A Self-importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino and Reed 2002)

Instructions: Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

132 / Journal of Marketing, May 2013

3. Recognition (Study 2 Pretest)

To what extent did you think donations would be recognized by others? To what extent did you think donations would be publicly visible to others? (Seven-point scale: 1 = "definitely not recognized/visible," and 7 = "definitely recognized/visible")

4. Sociai Reinforcement (Study 3; Adapted from Lieberman et ai. 2001)

My friends and/or coworkers and I talk about our charitable behaviors quite often.

My friends and/or coworkers encourage me to donate. My friends and/or coworkers often point out opportunities to make donations. My friends and/or coworkers have shown me ways I could use to donate more. My friends and/or coworkers have told me that I should donate more. My friends and/or coworkers and I rarely talk about charitable behaviors, (reversed) My friends and/or coworkers encourage me to be charitable. I feel my friends and/or coworkers expect me to donate. .

(Seven-point scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," and 7 = "strongly agree")

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