Learning in the Spanish Conquest:

Changing Beliefs about Native Rationality in Yucatan during the Expeditions of Grijalva, Crdoba, and Corts

By Daniel Dufour

History 101 Stephanie Ballenger Spring 2009 University of California, Berkeley

Table of Contents Introduction Argument Definitions Primary Sources Methodology Expedition under Hernndez de Crdoba Introduction 10 Cape Catoche (Great Cairo) 10 Campeche (San Lazaro) 12 Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle) 16 Florida 18 Conclusion 20 Expedition under Juan de Grijalva Introduction 21 Cozumel (Santa Cruz) 21 Campeche (San Lazaro) 27 Grijalva River (Tabasco River) 4 4 6 8

34 San Juan 36 Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle) 38 Campeche (San Lazaro) 40 Conclusion 41 Expedition under Hernando Corts Introduction 43 Cozumel (Santa Cruz) 43 Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle) 45 Grijalva River (Tabasco River) 46 San Juan 49 Conclusion 51 Conclusion 52 Works Cited 54

4 Argument In early March, 1517, a group of adventurous Spaniards led by Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba discovered Yucatan. They held the belief that natives were irrational. In mid July, 1519, the Municipal Council of Vera Cruz, the hastily-made council established by Corts on his way to Mexico, sent Emperor Charles V a letter updating him on the status of their conquest of the new world. This letter reveals that Corts believed that natives could be rational and that some in fact were. The difference in the beliefs of Corts and Crdoba was not accidental but the result of the Spanish experience in Yucatan from March 1517 to July 1519. Both Corts and Crdoba based their beliefs on their experiences with natives and also what they learned about the experiences of other Spaniards. The purpose of this paper is to show how such a remarkable transformation happened over the course of three successive expeditions led by Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba, Juan de Grijalva, and Hernn Corts.1

Definitions Several words in this paper have strict definitions that must be understood. A rational actor makes the best decision, knowing what she knows, through logic. A rational decision is a decision made through logic and because only rational actors use logic, only rational actors can make rational decisions. An irrational actor does not use logic to make decisions and therefore usually chooses unwisely. Actors with a most basic rationality are rational with regards to making almost instinctual decisions, such as whether to run from danger, but are irrational when it comes to more complicated matters like war and diplomacy. Actors with sophisticated rationality are
1

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 14; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 3.

5 rational in making all decisions, including those in war and diplomacy, and can develop and execute strategies, such as tricking someone into an ambush. Irrational inconsistency is the changing of decisions without any reason to do so, the product of irrationality. Rational-like is a decision that appears rational to an onlooker, considering the onlookers specific set of beliefs about what are rational and irrational decisions. Rational actors almost always make rational-like decisions. Irrational actors only make rational-like decisions by chance and therefore less frequently than rational actors. Irrational-like is a decision that appears irrational to an onlooker. Rational actors never make irrational-like decisions unless a factor unknown to the onlooker affects the decisionmaking process. Irrational actors always make irrational-like decisions unless by chance they make a rational-like one. I have chosen to define rationality very simply because racionalidad, the Spanish equivalent of rationality, as defined by 16th century Spaniards is simply unworkable for several reasons. First, the 16th century definition was contested because it entered the debate over race, religion, and civilization. Second, this paper is more geared toward the idea of rationality and less the word itself and does not want to get bogged down in modern debates on definition. Third, this papers version of rationality is defined only by what the Spaniards agreed on during the exploration of Yucatan. For example, the Spaniards agreed that it was irrational for the natives to attack them considering their military superiority Paradox adopts William Taylors definition, a seemingly contradictory set of beliefs that upon further inspection are not contradictory, and reveal a set of related truths.2 I have chosen not define the Spaniards in this paper for a number of reasons, but some
2

William Taylor, History 8A Class (UC Berkeley, Fall 2007).

6 explanation of its usage is required. The primary source accounts of the expeditions frequently use we, they, the Spaniards to describe a group of Spaniards specifying which Spaniards are in the group. This usage obscures the differences of opinion among Spaniards, which we only get rare glimpses of. Bound by the limit of the sources, this paper generally uses the Spaniards to mean the majority. This paper looks at what the Spaniards as a group learned and not as individuals. When the Spaniards decided to do something, the reader need not know which Spaniards agreed with this decision, but only infer that it must have been a good number of them because if not, then that decision would not have been made.

Primary Sources This paper uses translations of five primary sources, Bernal Dazs Historia Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva Espaa, Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedos Historia de las Indias, two versions of Juan Dazs Itinerario de Grijalva, and Primera Relacin. For Historia Verdadera, this paper uses Alfred Maudslays 1908 translation titled The True History of the Conquest of New Spain because it is the most complete scholarly translation to date. Bernal Daz finished his work in 1568, decades after the conquest of Mexico, in response to Francisco Lopez de Gomaras Historia General de las Indias written around 1550. In old age Bernal Daz had fallen on hard times and had nothing left but the memory of his valor and historical significance, which Gomara had questioned in his story. Daz wrote his own version of the conquest story in order to illustrate the bravery, intelligence, and significance of the Spanish conquerors of Mexico of which he was a part. True History has been consulted for the analysis of the Crdoba and Corts expedition. It has not been consulted for the analysis of the Grijalva Expedition, because there is significant doubt over whether that Bernal Daz ever

7 went on the second expedition as he claims in True History. Bernal Dazs account of the second expedition has been put to good use, though, in demonstrating what the Spaniards of the third expedition thought happened during the second expedition.3 For Historia de las Indias, this paper uses Henry Wagners 1942 translation of the 1535 version, titled Fernndez de Oviedos Account in Wagners The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan de Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts. Oviedo was an accomplished royal official who on coming to Cuba in 1523 set out to discover what had happened on the Grijalva Expedition asking participants and those that had been in Cuba at the time of the expedition. It is likely that the pilot of the expedition, Antn de Alaminos wrote the account, but Oviedo surely sought corroboration on certain facts. As the title of Wagners book suggests, Oviedos Account will only be used in the analysis of the Grijalva expedition.4 For Itinerario de Grijalva, this paper uses translations of two versions, a 1522 Italian edition titled Itinerario and a 1519 Latin edition titled Provinciae, both of which appear translated in Henry Wagners The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan de Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts.5 Juan Daz, the Grijalva Expeditions priest, wrote a now-lost account in Spanish which was translated into these two versions. It is not clear why Juan Daz wrote his account: possibly for fame, royal rewards, or to tarnish the reputation of Juan de Grijalva who Daz portrays as reluctant to take any risks. Provinciae and Itinerario are

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), xxxviii xli; For an argument for why Bernal Dazs participation in the second expedition is doubtful see Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 18-21. 4 Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 11-13. 5 Wagner translated the Italian version and Dr. H. E. Robbins translated the Latin version. Wagner titled the Latin edition Provinciae as an abridgment for Provinciae sive regions in India Occidentali noviter repertae in ultima navigatione or in English, Provinces or districts recently discovered in the West-Indies. Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 5-6.

8 consulted for the Grijalva expedition.6 For Primera Relacin, this paper uses Anthony Pagdens 1986 translation titled First Letter in Pagdens Letters from Mexico. First Letter was a letter sent by the town council of Vera Cruz in July of 1519, ostensibly meant to update the crown on the progress being made in the conquest. Corts had broken the expeditions contract and demonstrated disloyalty to the Governor of Cuba, Diego Velsquez, and by implication the King by founding the city of Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz. Corts heavily influenced the writing of this letter to the king if he did not write it himself, in order to make himself look like both a skilled conqueror and a humble and loyal servant of the crown. First Letter is consulted for the Corts expedition and for understanding what the Spaniards of the Corts expedition thought happened during the Grijalva expedition.7

Methodology In order to create a complete and credible picture of changes in Spanish beliefs, we must look at not only what the sources said they believed but also what they did. Passages in the sources that describe Spanish behavior and beliefs can be misleading for a number of possible reasons. First, the sources are intentionally dishonest about what the Spaniards believed and did. For example, the First Letter fails to mention Corts blunders. Second, the Spaniards had developed a legal tradition whereby a military conquest of natives was only just if the natives were treated like rational actors and given the opportunity to surrender beforehand. Thus, Spaniards often spoke as if natives were rational contrary to their beliefs in their irrationality. Third, in the words of a popular psychology textbook, people tend to recall their past attitudes and beliefs as being
6

Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 5- 9. 7 Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), xi-lx.

9 consistent with their current attitudes and beliefs, often revising their memories when they have a change in attitude.8 Therefore, sources might be unintentionally dishonest about Spanish beliefs or actions. For example, Bernal Daz participated in both the Crdoba and Corts expedition and learned along the way just like any other Spaniard. However, he probably understated the extent to which his beliefs changed because of this psychological tendency.

Michael Gazzaniga and Tod Heatherton, Psychological Science, ed. John Durbin, 2nd edition (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2006), 285-286.

10 Expedition under Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba

Introduction On February 8, 1517, an expedition led by Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba left Cuba and steered towards the setting sun and the Yucatan, although they did not know it at the time. The expedition consisted of a little more than a hundred men and three ships. The adventurers had staked what little wealth they had on the success of this expedition of discovery, having paid for almost all the supplies themselves, with a little help from the Governor of Cuba, Diego Velsquez.9

Cape Catoche (Great Cairo)10 After three weeks and a brutal storm, the expedition spotted land and a large town, which they named Great Cairo. Curiosity, as well as hunger and thirst, compelled the expedition to anchor there and quickly discover what this land held. They did not have to wait long, as the local natives spotted the Spaniards and approached in their canoes. The Spaniards, without a translator, did their best to welcome the natives to their ships. Apparently they succeed as the natives boarded the flagship, including one native whom the Spaniards thought to be the cacique. On deck the Spaniards gave some green beads to the natives who were inspecting their ship, but the natives did not reciprocate.11 Before the natives left, the cacique gestured that he would be

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 11-14. Bernal Daz writes that it was given the name Cape Catoche. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18. 11 Bernal Daz mentions no reciprocal gift-giving by the natives. This absence is nearly certain. First of all, Bernal Daz, although old in age when he wrote about these events, probably remembered this encounter in great detail because of its importance as being his first encounter with natives. Second, Bernal Daz had no apparent motive to misrepresent the truth at this time. Third, the rest of this encounter will show that the cacique did not want to give a gift to the Spanish and thus this absence fits in well with the rest of the story.
10

11 back with transport to land.12 The following day the cacique returned with several canoes to the ships. The Spaniards interpreted the caciques gestures as offering to bring them to his town and feed them there.13 The cacique offered his canoes, but some Spaniards opted for their own boats instead. All the Spaniards coordinated a simultaneous landing so that if there was an ambush they could defend themselves in unison.14 The Spaniards were eager to visit the town but also careful because they believed that the cacique was irrationally inconsistent and thus could quickly and without reason change his mind and attack the Spaniards. The Spaniards believed that the decision to welcome them was rational-like, but not necessarily rational. Once on shore, the cacique gestured that he wanted to lead the Spaniards to his town. Crdoba and his men came to a consensus to follow the cacique, but to also take all their weapons. The cacique led the Spaniards into a hilly area with a lot of brush for hiding where they were ambushed. The Spaniards fought back well, killing several natives and forcing a retreat. All the Spaniards survived the attack, but many were wounded. The Spaniards then happily reaped the spoils of war, plundering nearby temples of their low-quality gold. The Spaniards left Cape Catoche to continue their discovery as soon as they had loaded their plunder and cared for their wounded.15 The encounter near Great Cairo presents a paradox. One the one hand, the Spaniards believed that a native ambush was possible and thus prepared for one by bring their arms. One the other hand, the Spaniards were gullible and walked right into an ambush.16 The Spaniards
12 13

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 14-15. We should reserve a little bit of skepticism about whether the cacique actually promised food because the Spanish were without a doubt hungry, although not famished, after weeks of being at sea and it was probably that they infer from any offer to bring them to a caciques town an implicit offer of food, too. Whether or not the cacique explicitly or implicitly offered food is not the central concern of this analysis, however. 14 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 15-16. 15 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 16-17. 16 There are two alternate factors to consider here, the superiority of Spanish arms and hunger, but both fail to fully explain the Spaniards decision to follow the cacique. First, the Spaniards could afford to be ambushed because of their superior military power. While it is unclear that the Spaniards believed this prior to this battle, the resulting victory certainly supported this conclusion.

12 decided to follow a cacique whom they had just recently met into the unknown because they must have thought it was very unlikely that natives would ambush them at that time. If they had appreciated the risks greater, they would have returned to their ships or asked for a real demonstration of friendship, such as a gift, before advancing. The Spaniards believed that the cacique was irrational and thus incapable of developing and following through on a sophisticated plan of persuasively lying about their intentions and then orchestrating an ambush.17 The Spaniards believed that if an ambush were to happen it would be the result of the natives irrationally changing their minds.18

Campeche (San Lzaro) The Spaniards sailed on for a couple weeks before spotting another town, which they named San Lzaro. The Spaniards were in much need of fresh water and landed to fill up their casks, assuming that the town must have a local fresh water source. Bernal Daz wrote that the Spaniards had not forgotten about Cape Catoche: In order that we could all of us land at the same time, we agreed to approach the shore in the smallest of the vessels, and in the three boats,
The Spaniards cared whether they were ambushed, but their military capabilities afforded them the opportunity to take risks that they would likely not have taken if they had been in a weaker position. However, this cannot be a primary causal mechanism because military superiority did not actually force the Spaniards to take risks. [no, but plunder could be a causal factor, given that the Spanish were technologically superior] Second, the Spaniards were often in need of supplies. Although Bernal Daz does not refer to the gravity of this need at Cape Catoche, the Spaniards certainly desired free food if for no reason more than the fact that supplies were limited and more supplies would allow the Spaniards to extend their expedition. This cannot fully explain the Spaniards behavior however as hunger could support a wide range of actions, from automatically looting for food to begging for food. This cannot explain by itself the particular set of decisions.
17

Inga Clendinnen suggests that the natives may not have intended to trick or ambush the Spaniards at all. The natives may have thought that the Spaniards preparation of their arms was a tacit acceptance of a challenge to battle. In any regard, as Clendinnen points out, the Spaniards were effectively ambushed. Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-8. 18 I am not saying that the Spaniards would not have prepared for an ambush if they had believed that the cacique war rational. In reality, both a belief in native irrationality and rationality would have caused the Spaniards to prepare for an ambush either by chance or plan, but as my focus is on explaining the effects of a belief in native irrationality I do not discuss this in the body of the paper.

13 with all our arms ready, so as not to be caught as we had been at Cape Catoche.19 The Spaniards learned to be more prepared for an ambush, including while landing, because they had learned from their experience at Cape Catoche that the natives were more dangerous and the costs of an ambush higher than they had first thought. The Spaniards landed as planned, discovered a fresh water pool used by the local natives and filled all their casks without seeing anyone. On their way out, about fifty natives clad in cotton mantles presumed to be caciques approached the Spaniards. The Spaniards gestured that they only came for water and were on their way out. Much like the previous encounter at Cape Catoche, the Spaniards interpreted the caciques gestures as offering to lead them to their town. The Spaniards decided to follow the caciques because of their curiosity and the possibility of food and riches (but not water as they had already filled up). The Spaniards prepared for an ambush both mentally by keeping well on the alert and physically by maintaining good formation.20 Although they could have left content with their full water-casks, the Spaniards decided to follow the cacique while also preparing for an ambush because of three beliefs. This decision can be explained by three beliefs as follows. First, the Spaniards had learned from the ambush at Cape Catoche that they should always be very prepared for an ambush, watchful and in tight formation, even when following a cacique.21

19 20

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18-19. Quote from Page 19. 21 In Ambivalent Conquests Inga Clendinnen writes From that time forward [sometime at sea after Cape Catoche and before Campeche] decisions as to where to make landfall were dictated not by calculations of security, but by the coercive need for water. The reader would be wrong to generalize this statement to incorporate all the Spaniards decisions, however, because as it happened at Campeche, the Spaniards had no need of water when they decided to follow the caciques. Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.

14 Second, the Spaniards did not consider, much to their detriment, that water could be a decisive factor in triggering native animosity. Fresh water, not only a precious resource to the thirsty, was also very rare in the nearly riverless Yucatan where sinkholes were the only fresh water source. Foreigners taking of water from these natural wells usually meant war.22 The Spaniards did not need to know this in order to wisely choose to leave as soon as meeting the natives, but only had to consider that water could be a cause of war. Third, Cape Catoche had done nothing to change the Spaniards belief that it was impossible for the natives to develop and follow though on a sophisticated plan to deceive the Spaniards and then lead them into an ambush.23 The caciques led some of the Spaniards into a temple. While they were inside, native warriors assembled outside and encircled them. The Spaniards were then afraid that they had been ambushed, but the natives did not attack. Instead, a native lit some incense outside the temple and gestured that they would attack if the Spaniards were not gone when the incense burned out.24 Bernal Daz writes that the Spaniards decided to leave and the reasons he offers are illuminating:
When we perceived their menacing appearance and saw great squadrons of Indians bearing down on us we remembered that we had not yet recovered from the wounds received at Cape Catoche, and had been obliged to throw overboard the bodies of two soldiers who had died, and fear fell on us, so we determined to retreat to the coast in good order.25

The Spaniards attention to formation, learned from their encounter at Cape Catoche,
22

Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9, 17-28. 23 Inga Clendinnen in Ambivalent Conquests submits that the Spaniards really had no choice because they believed that a refusal would reveal their fear and lead to another brutal attack, like at Cape Catoche. (9) This interpretation only takes into account half of the decision-making process. It ignores the risks of following the caciques, which the Spaniards certainly evaluated, even if only subconsciously. Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. 24 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 19-20. 25 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20.

15 strengthened their position and increased the cost to the natives of attacking them. This may have convinced the natives here to see if they could get the Spaniards to leave some other way. The Spaniards continued to believe that an ambush was unlikely until they were encircled and completely vulnerable. At that point it no longer mattered if they predicted an ambush because the Spaniards could do to little to remove themselves from that vulnerable situation.26 After the Spaniards had used the opportunity to leave, Bernal Daz writes that they feared that the natives would change their minds and attack them: We had not dared to embark near the town where we had landed, on account of the great press of Indians, for we felt sure they would attack us as we tried to get in the boats. 27 The Spaniards believed that the natives could change their minds and still attack the Spaniards. If the natives had wanted to attack they would have done so when they had the advantage outside the temple. The natives had no rational reason to change their minds as the Spaniards left. All that had changed was that the Spaniards were leaving and were no longer encircled, but the Spaniards thought the natives were irrational and irrationally inconsistent and thus kept fearing an attack as they left.28
26

Tzvetan Todorov writes that During the first contacts, the Spaniards are not at all concerned with the impression their behavior makes on those they encounter: if they are threatened, they flee without hesitation, thereby showing they are vulnerable. Without citing specific cases, it seems that Todorov means that the Spaniards did not care about their general reputation within the land, something Todorov says Corts changes. This seems to contrast with Inga Clendinnens argument that the Spaniards were very aware of not making themselves look vulnerable, which is why they followed the cacique at Cape Catoche. There is a way to reconcile these two arguments with an understanding about the Spaniards belief in native irrational inconsistency. The Spaniards feared that they could do certain things during encounters, which might cause the natives to attack, but generally speaking, the Spaniards did not think that general reputation was not an element of the natives irrational decision-making process that only responded to only tangible factors, if any at all. Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, trans. Richard Howard (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 99.
27 28

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20. A counter-argument supporting the Spaniards continual fear of an attack is that they believed that the natives were testing the Spaniards fear and by implication their strength with the burning reeds and that the Spaniards believed that, upon the natives seeing them retreat, the natives would attack. This argument has a whole though. If the natives were to attack they would have attacked immediately when the Spaniards were still surrounded and not have waited till the Spaniards reached the beach. It is the Spaniards belief in native irrational inconsistency that underlies their fear of an attack even as they are leaving. The counter-argument has similarities to Inga Clendinnens argument about why the Spaniards followed the caciques in the first place described in Footnote Error: Reference source not found.

16 The Spaniards believed that native irrationality prohibited the natives from tricking them into an ambush as much as it meant that natives could change their minds quickly and without reason. Native behavior certainly appeared random and unpredictable to the Spaniards who were ignorant of the importance of certain factors, like water, in the natives decision-making process. The Spaniards took this one step further, taking the appearance of irrationality as reality. In other words, the Spaniards believed that the world was as they saw it. In an attempt to understand confusing native behavior, they simplified it. In reality, Spaniards had already simplified native behavior before the Grijalva expedition, but because this history is outside the scope of this paper, the reader only needs to know that it had happened. This simplification had helped the Spaniards to prepare for the ambush at Cape Catoche and possibly prevented one at Campeche, but it also made it more difficult for the Spaniards to recognize their own mistakes.

Champoton (Coast of the Disastrous Battle) From Campeche the expedition sailed for a couple weeks and experienced the same storms, hunger and thirst as before, but found fresh water sources often enough without native interference. After these couple weeks, the Spaniards arrived near a river and an unknown town (Champoton) and followed their now standard procedure of preparing for battle, coordinating their landing, posting guards, and filling up on water.29 Their experience at Champoton would not be the standard, however, as their current set of beliefs and procedures would fail them. While the Spaniards were filling up their water-casks, some natives approached in silence, which the Spaniards interpreted as a sign of peace. Little was effectively communicated except for the natives question whether the Spaniards came from the east, which the Spaniards promptly confirmed. After some time, the natives ended the conversation and left peacefully.
29

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20-21.

17 However, the Spaniards were skeptical of the local natives intentions because natives had begun to assemble around the Spaniards camp. The Spaniards posted watchmen in case of a nighttime attack. 30 The Spaniards had learned from their experiences at Cape Catoche and Campeche that an ambush was very costly, so took turns standing guard. That night, the Spaniards were encircled by hundreds of native warriors. Luckily for the Spaniards, their watchmen prove their worth and alerted the rest of the men. The encirclement had surprised the Spaniards however (much as it had at Campeche) and meant that they could no longer avoid a difficult battle if the natives wanted to attack. There was some diversity in the camp about what to do next; attack preemptively, escape immediately, or hold for the night. The Spaniards decided to hold in their camp for the night and act during the day. The rising sun revealed that the Spaniards were completely surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered. Unlike at Campeche, the natives exploited their advantage and attacked the Spaniards. The Spaniards could not possibly win, so they desperately fought to their boats and sailed away. The Spaniards suffered gravely. The water-casks and about half of their expedition, a little over fifty men, had been left behind; fittingly, the survivors dubbed this place the Coast of the Disastrous Battle. The prospects for a successful discovery at that point were dim, considering the shortage of men and supplies, so they decided to return to Cuba.31 Standard Spanish combat preparation, so successful in preventing a disaster at Cape Catoche and possibly at Campeche, was not enough at Champoton. The Spaniards made two crucial mistakes: taking on water after being approached by natives and sleeping on the shore. Compelled by their thirst, the Spaniards needed to get fresh water, but they did not need to continue in that endeavor after they had been caught doing so and certainly did not have to camp

30 31

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 22-23. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 23-26.

18 out on land. They could have loaded what water they had attained, slept on their ships, and returned the following day. The Spaniards chose not to because they did not realize that they had angered the natives.32 The specific failure to consider that water could be a cause of war was a result of the interaction of the Spaniards beliefs and the circumstances they found themselves in, specifically at Campeche. The Spaniards had not recognized the connection between their taking of water and the natives decision to threaten the Spaniards, because their belief in native irrationality dismissed looking for a logical connection in the first place.

Florida On their way back to Cuba, the Spaniards made their last important stop at Florida to refill their water-casks. The Pilot Alaminos recognized this place and warned that the last Spaniards to visit here were attacked. But there was no choice, as even Captain Crdoba, was dying of thirst. The twenty most able Spaniards, those least affected by the damages of war and sea, landed on shore to fill up what containers they still had with water from the mouth of a nearby river. They generally followed standard procedure of preparing for an ambush, except for the fact that they only placed two watchmen. They were so overcome with joy at having discovered fresh water that they spent too much time filling up: so overjoyed were we that what with satiating our thirst, and washing our clothes with which to bind our wounds, we must have stayed there an hour.33 The Spaniards low numbers and exuberance at having discovered water

32

In Ambivalent Conquests, Inga Clendinnen writes They had landed soon after midday, but by the time the casks had been filled and the parley with the warriors was over the sudden dusk of those latitudes had fallen. Inga Clendinnen seems to imply, whether she meant to or not, that the Spaniards really did not have an option to return to their ships during the day, similar to her argument about the Spaniards following of the cacique at Cape Catoche. The Spaniards had only reached the point where a daytime withdrawal to their ships was no longer possible, because they decided to continue filling up on water and communicating with the natives, rather than leave. Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11. 33 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 28.

19 seems had greatly mitigated their preparation for an ambush. While the Spaniards were filling up, Berrio, one of the watchmen, went off alone to cut down a tree. While he was chopping, natives ambushed and killed him and then proceeded after the other watchman. The other watchman ran from the natives to the Spaniards and warned them with practically no time to prepare. The Spaniards defeated the native warriors, killing twenty, but several Spaniards were wounded. After loading all the water onboard, the Spaniards left Florida for Cuba.34 Berrios behavior is a clear demonstration of how the Spaniards beliefs affected their actions. After being warned by Alaminos that there were potentially hostile natives in this land, Berrio did something which probably antagonized the local natives. We do not know what factors caused the natives to attack. Was it Berrios attempt to cut down a tree, the other Spaniards taking of fresh water, or the Spaniards trespassing, something else entirely, or a mix of these? The point is that Berrio did not know either. If he had recognized any of these actions as possible factors in natives decisions to attack, he would not have moved to an extremely vulnerable position to cut down a tree. His actions reveal that he believed that he could not possibly cause an attack. The beliefs of the Spaniards as a whole, and Berrio, in particular remained unchanged from Champoton to Florida. Specifically, the Spaniards continued to believe that the natives acted without reason and that they could to do nothing to prevent an ambush except stay vigilant. From the encounter at Champoton, the Spaniards could not but learn that the cost of failure was higher than they previously thought. The Spaniards were saved to the extent they were by what little they did learn, which was to post watchmen. All that was clear to the Spaniards was that their belief in the dangerous irrationality of natives saved them and therefore sought no reason to change this. Punishment, in the form of ambushes, for the Spaniards
34

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 29-30.

20 mistaken belief in native irrationality did not cause the Spaniards to change their beliefs if they did not understand what their mistake was.

Conclusion The Crdoba Expedition, or what was left of it, made it back to Cuba. The Spaniards still held to their initial erroneous belief that natives made irrational decisions. This belief affected what lessons the Spaniards did learn, specifically those about their strategies. Their new found regard for native warriors coupled with their belief in native irrationality resulted in them learning to be more prepared for ambushes, tighten their formation and clean their weapons, and to be prepared all the time, including when they disembark, embark, and follow a cacique. The Spaniards failed to consider that coming close to a town, taking fresh water, or cutting down trees could cause war. They also failed to learn that natives had the capacity to trick them into an ambush. This learning was not the result of unintelligence but rather a result of the interaction between their beliefs and what actually happened. The Spaniards also quite naturally generalized and made assumptions about natives. In a dangerous situation and in the absence of specific information about natives, the Spaniards predicted that all the natives they encountered in the future would be as irrational the ones they had encountered in the past. The Spaniards seemed to have over-generalized and this hampered their ability to discern connections between their own and natives behavior. Information about specific natives encountered was accessible to the next expedition and thus the next expedition would not have to generalize as much.

21 Expedition under Juan de Grijalva

Introduction On February 1518, shortly after Crdobas return, another expedition left Cuba for the Yucatan under the command of Juan de Grijalva. The expedition left with 4 ships, about 200 men, one interpreter.35 Besides having twice as many men, an additional ship, and an interpreter, the second expedition had two more advantages over the first. First, they had an undeveloped idea that natives could be rational to a small degree. Second, they had the experiences of a previous expedition off of which to base their beliefs and decisions.

Cozumel (Santa Cruz) On May 3, 1518 the expedition discovered the island of Cozumel, which they named Santa Cruz, and anchored there. It is unclear exactly how much communication the Spaniards had with the natives during the following couple days. At the least the Spaniards only saw some native canoes and at the most they and the natives met and exchanged pleasantries and gifts with the natives promising that their cacique would visit the Spaniards soon.36 Although all three sources disagree about what happened from this point up through the Spaniards ritual taking possession of Cozumel, the Spaniards belief that the natives of Cozumel lacked a sophisticated rationality appears in all of them. In Fernndez de Oviedos Account the cacique came in a canoe to the Spaniards ships
35

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 89-90. 36 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 89-91; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 69.

22 while Grijalva was exploring the coastline in the smaller boats. The Spaniards onboard entertained the cacique until Grijalva returned. After Grijalva and the cacique exchanged gifts, the cacique promised to guide the Spaniards to his town that day. The cacique returned to his town and never went to meet the Spaniards again, implying that he had taken back his promise. The Spaniards, on their own, tried and failed to find a way to his town through the swamp that bordered it. The following day, the Spaniards again requested and received permission to visit the town from some natives in a canoe that was passing by. The Spaniards landed soon thereafter.37 The Spaniards wanted a welcome, but did not require one, to visit the caciques town. The Spaniards requested a welcome a second time because, as much as the cacique did not stick to his promise, they believed that the natives would not stick to the caciques new decision, a manifestation of irrational inconsistency. Itinerario agrees with Oviedos Account about the meeting with the cacique, but does not mention the caciques failure to follow through on his offer or the Spaniards second request for a welcome. Itinerario says that, following the meeting with the cacique, the Spaniards landed battle-ready because they expected native hostility in spite of the welcome they had received.38 In the story of Itinerario, the Spaniards clearly believed that the caciques welcome did not guarantee a peaceful landing, because the cacique could be irrationally inconsistent and thus he could change his mind with reason and attack. Provinciae mentions no meeting with the cacique or requests to visit his town, but simply that the Spaniards landed.39 Provinciae and Itinerario were based on the same account by Juan Daz, so that the lack in the Provinciae is the result of a translator or editor who felt that the
37

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 91-93. 38 Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 69-70. 39 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58.

23 initial welcome was not important enough to include in this version. The belief in the natives irrationality meant that a welcome was peripheral to a story that was more about deeds than words, especially the words of the natives which could never be trusted. A Spanish belief that the natives of Cozumel were irrationally inconsistent runs through all three sources. Like the Spaniards at Cape Catoche during the first expedition, these Spaniards believed that the rational-like decision to welcome the Spaniards was not necessarily rational.40 Upon land, the Spaniards performed an act of possession at a nearby temple without any native resistance. A native priest, under whose care the temple apparently rested, approached the Spaniards and gave them pipes, which the Spaniards interpreted as a sign of peace. The Spaniards then celebrated mass in the temple. After that, Grijalva ordered that only he was to have direct communication and trade with the natives: this order did not go over well with the rest of the Spaniards.41 Grijalva did not believe that the natives would necessarily make the rational-like decision to run away from marauding Spaniards; rather, he believed that they could posses the most basic rationality to make that decision. After these new rules were introduced, Grijalva and the natives began an exchange. The natives gave some food to the Spaniards, but the Spaniards had their eyes set on something else. Grijalva told the natives that they only wanted gold. At this point, Itinerario and Provinciae drop off the description of this exchange, but Oviedo carries it on. Oviedo said that the natives
40

A counter-argument could be made that, as Oviedo tells it, the Spaniards asked the natives for permission to land simply for show, so that they had a legal reason to land. I argue that although the Spaniards may have desired a welcome, as it gave more legality to their actions, this was not the only reason. The Spaniards had already asked once and once would have been enough to satisfy a legal requirement. The fact that the Spaniards asked permission to land at least twice reveals a desire to have more than just a superficial welcome. 41 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 93-95; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 70-71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58. All three sources mention these new rules, but only Oviedo explicitly names these rules. I have also adopted the timeline of the giving of new rules from the Provinciae and the Itinerario because Oviedo is ambiguous and unclear on this matter.

24 brought some low-quality gold, saying that that was all they had.42 The absence in Itinerario and Provinciae of a description of the actual trading reveals that Juan Daz did not consider that establishing a friendly diplomatic relationship through trade was important because Juan Daz believed that the natives were irrationally inconsistent and their friendship could never be trusted. All three sources agree that the Spaniards then went to the caciques town, presumably with a native guide as they had tried and failed to reach it previously. The sources of Juan Daz and Oviedos Account differ in what they tell happened in the town and what caused the Spaniards to leave, but the Spaniards belief in the natives lack of sophisticated rationality appears in all three. Oviedo says that in town Grijalva held two hopes, to trade for significant quantities of gold and to visit the cacique. Both turned out unfulfilled. Apparently unconvinced that the natives did not have high-quality gold, Grijalva asked to trade again and got the same results. Grijalva asked to see the cacique, but was told by his interpreter that the cacique had decided to go on a trading mission elsewhere rather than meet the Spaniards. Disappointed Grijalva and the Spaniards left.43 Grijalva believed that the natives may have lied about how much gold they had the first time and could change their mind and give up their gold to trade if he only asked again because they were irrationally inconsistent. Furthermore, the caciques failure to follow through on his promise surely reinforced Grijalvas belief that the natives were irrational inconsistency. Ironically, because he believed in irrational inconsistency, he asked to see the cacique a second
42

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 94; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59. 43 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 94-95.

25 time, much like he had asked twice for a welcome. The caciques inconsistency meant that he could irrationally change his mind and make the rational-like choice to meet the Spaniards.44 Provinciae and Itinerario do not mention Grijalvas request for trade, but add an episode about the Spaniards going to dinner. The natives of the town led Grijalva and about ten other Spaniards, presumably consisting of the Spaniards captains, into a building for dinner. While they were eating or soon there after, the towns inhabitants surprised the Spaniards by leaving the town and hiding from them.45 The Provinciae says it most eloquently:
Then after a dinner had been prepared, being courteously invited by them, we were led into a stone building but suddenly changing their mind, they departed, leaving their huts, so that we saw not one of them after the third hour.46

With no natives around to talk and trade with, the Spaniards soon left. The Spaniards being led into a stone building is eerily reminiscent of Cordoba being led into an ambush at Cape Catoche and a possible ambush at Campeche. Fortunately for the Spaniards this quick change resulted in the natives hiding, rather than ambushing the Spaniards. The natives inconsistency of trading then fleeing must have appeared irrational to the Spaniards.47 By this point in their time at Cozumel, the Spaniards must have believed that the natives lacked a sophisticated rationality and

44

A counter-argument could be made that Grijalva was in a tactically more threatening position as they were in the town and that the natives might give up more gold if they have any because of increased fear of the Spaniards reprisal if they dont. I do not find this argument as persuasive as the one outlined in the paper, because there is no evidence that Grijalva recognized the change in his tactical position and the affect this could have on the natives. At the least, Grijalvas behavior does not challenge the argument that he believed that the natives were irrational. The argument for the Spaniards belief in native irrationality can stand without this episode, however, so this behavior should not be a focal point of too much controversy. 45 Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59. 46 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59. 47 It could be argued that the Spaniards walked into this ambush spot because they did not consider it an ambush spot. This leads us back to the fact that the Spaniards could not perceive of it as an ambush spot, although clearly it was, because of certain beliefs.

26 thus could not orchestrate an ambush.48 While the stories of Oviedo and Juan Daz differ, the Spaniards beliefs in these stories do not. Both stories describe Spanish behavior that demonstrate a belief that the natives lacked a sophisticated rationality and were irrationally inconsistent. While Grijalva landed at Cozumel believing that the natives of Cozumel could posses a sophisticated rationality, by the time he left he had given up all hope that they did. Their encounter got off to a bad start with the cacique failure to meet the Spaniards when they landed and guide them to his town. This one decision by the cacique to go back on a promise or what the Spaniards had thought was a promise doomed the rest of the interaction. All actions by natives would be interpreted under the belief that they did not have a sophisticated rationality. Even if the cacique had decided later to meet the Spaniards, this would have been too late and would have appeared as a result of his irrational inconsistency and not rationality. Based on what sources we have, it is a little uncertain if Grijalva believed that these natives possessed a most basic rationality to run away from danger. What is certain is that he believed that they could possess it, which in itself is a significant departure from the beliefs of Crdoba. Grijalva believed what he did because of what he had learned from the Crdoba

48

One could argue that hunger and thirst could explain Spaniards decisions to make risky decisions. Factors such as hunger and thirst, however, can not explain Spaniards decision to go to dinner this time, like they may have been able to account for some risky Spanish behavior during the Crdoba expedition. The Spanish had left Cuba about 2 weeks ago and the three sources record not troubles with storms or leaky water casks that were in found in the Crdoba expedition. Furthermore, if Oviedos account is to believed, Grijalva offered the cacique some of their food during their meeting although the cacique declined that offer. This is hardly a smart decision if they are running low on food! A counter-argument could be that the Spanish offered some of their food in the hopes that they would be supported by the cacique in greater quantities. I find this answer unpersuasive though because the Spanish had many alternative things to offer other than food and specifically brought some things other than food to be traded. Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 92.

27 expedition, although it had only ended months if not weeks before he left. Grijalva must have been surprised to learn about the alarming frequency of ambushes during the Crdoba Expedition. One or two ambushes taken separately could easily be attributed to bad luck, an irrational decision by the natives to attack at coincidentally the same moment when the Spaniards were most vulnerable, but all three ambushes taken as a whole with the almost-ambush at Cape Catoche could not be explained as random chance. Grijalva must have wondered if some of the natives encountered by Crdoba had a most basic rationality if not a sophisticated rationality. He did not believe that all the natives he encountered would necessarily be rational, but that some could be and he should always be on the look out for those that were.49

Campeche (San Lazaro) On May 7, the Spaniards sailed away from Cozumel. For more than two weeks, they were unable to find fresh water and were forced to drink wine for hydration. It is in this condition that they arrived at Campeche on May 25.50 The encounter at Campeche would be the first encounter in which the natives had had previous contact with Spaniards, those of the Crdoba Expedition. The Spaniards believed, somewhat incorrectly, that the cacique Lazaro of Campeche and Francisco Fernndez de Crdoba had been friends. As the hour was late at the time of their arrival, the Spaniards held off landing till the next day. During the night, the Spaniards witnessed from their ships the natives banging drums and yelling and believed that the natives had seen their ships and were preparing for battle. Grijalva decided to secretly land combat-ready Spaniards before the dawn
49

Crdoba may have thought it possible that natives had a basic form of rationality, but he certainly thought it less probable than Grijalva did because Crdoba enacted no policies to demonstrate it, unlike Grijalva. 50 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 99; Timeline is from Henry Wagner, Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 47.

28 broke, so that the Spaniards were not vulnerable while landing.51 The Spaniards believed that Lazaro had been a friend, but they still were very cautious and prepared for combat anyway because they believed that Lazaro likely lacked a sophisticated rationality and could irrationally decide to break his friendship with Spaniards. The Spaniards landing went without incident, but as the sun rose the Spaniards discovered native warriors had gathered to meet them. Both the Spaniards and natives decided to put off battle for the moment and communicate through Julin, the Spaniards interpreter who was probably from Campeche. The Spaniards told some natives who stepped forward as representatives that they only came to peacefully trade for water, and may have also included wood and food.52 The word choice in the Provinciae for the description of Grijalvas orders to Julian highlights the issue of rationality:
Since, however, the number of the inhabitants was large, and in order that there might be no motive to attack, the captain ordered them to be advised through an interpreter that we had not come there with hostile intent or for any harm but to obtain water, wood, and article of food and after receiving this we would withdraw straightaway.53

Grijalva communicated to the natives as if they were rational in order to test their rationality. If the natives chose the rational-like decision to let the Spaniards supply themselves, then Grijalva
51

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 99; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 60; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 72-73. The Provinciae goes as far as saying that Crdoba and cacique Lzaro agreed to a treaty, the terms of which are not stated. 52 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 100-101; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73. Both the Provinciae and Itinerario include wood in the Spanish request. The Provinciae also includes food. 53 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61.

29 would be more persuaded of their rationality while also leaving room for the exception that they were irrational and this was by chance. But if they reject the Spaniards, then they were certainly irrational.54 The sources are more ambiguous about the native response. Oviedos Account says that the natives answered first that the Spanish must turn back immediately then changed their minds and allowed the Spanish to get only water. The Provinciae says that the natives consistently told the Spanish to go away. Both the Provinciae and Itinerario tell that the Spaniards believed that the natives rejection of their requests was the fault of the translator Julin and not the natives lack of rationality. The Provinciae specifically adds that Julin told the natives that the Spaniards were their enemy and would attack them.55 The central question here is did Grijalva and the Spaniards actually believe that the tense relations were solely because of Julin? Before answering we must first understand what an answer to this question might mean. First of all, we have no reason to believe that the Spaniards had learned that competition over resources of water, wood, and food, could rationally cause war, especially considering that they tell the natives directly their desire to take resources. Therefore, the Spaniards were left with two possible answers for the question, why did the natives, seemingly irrationally, demand that the Spaniards leave? One is that the natives were irrational. The other is that Julin is spreading false information about the Spaniards. With no credible incentive for the sources to misrepresent the truth, it is almost certain that the Spaniards chose the second answer. The Spaniards believed

54

A possible factor in deciding to address the natives as rational is that Grijalva may have been trying to lend himself the veneer of legality and defend himself from later charges of aggression, much like his reading of the Requirement would do. 55 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 101; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73.

30 that the natives could posses a sophisticated rationality, but Julins lies made it impossible for the Spaniards to distinguish between a solely irrational-like decision and an irrational decision.56 Although the Spaniards thought Julin was treacherous, they still used him, indicating that they did not have another option for translator and that they believed that the natives probably would have made the wrong decision even if Julin had not lied. While the Spaniards believe that the natives of Campeche could have a sophisticated rationality, they considered it unlikely. Instead of immediately getting water, the Spaniards celebrated mass. After this, the Spaniards advanced in formation to a well that they believed was used during the previous expedition and began to fill up their casks. The natives repeated their demand that the Spaniards leave immediately and brought their warriors into clear view of the Spaniards. Grijalva insisted, through Julin, that they would stay until the following day to fill up on water.57 Relations between the Spaniards and natives took an upturn when Grijalva asked to trade and meet Lazaro. The natives responded ambiguously, as it appears in the three sources, that Lazaro would visit the Spaniards and also that the Spaniards must leave immediately after filling up. But native behavior changed significantly, as they began to trade their food and gold for the Spaniards green beads, probably after the Spaniards insistence on trade. The Spaniards stopped the exchange soon after it had begun, however, because the natives gilded objects were of little

56

It is as if the native rolled a dice, albeit in their heads, and if it landed on one they made the rational-like decision, but Julin prevented the natives from ever rolling this dice. 57 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 101-102; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 73. Although Grijalvas behavior here might at first look seem unresponsive, we cannot determine this because the incentive to keep filling up on water were too high. The Spaniards were desperate for water prior to this encounter and this well did not yield much water. The Spaniards must have been scared of what would lie ahead of them if they did not fill up on water when they had the chance. Therefore, the Spaniards insistence on staying does not necessarily reveal a belief in native irrationality.

31 worth. Lazaro never came.58 The cost of trading for the Spaniards was extremely low. The green beads they had were very inexpensive for the Spaniards, but highly valued by the natives. The Spaniards ended this exchange as soon as they realized that they were not making a very big profit. The Spaniards did not even consider that this exchange could help develop friendly relations between the Spaniards and natives. If they had, they would have at least continued trading a little longer to see if the natives would become friends and change their minds. The Spaniards believed that peace could not be bought from these natives. The natives were just as likely to act irrationally and change their minds whether or not the Spaniards gave them green beads. From the time that they blamed Julin to the time they ended the exchange, the Spaniards had lost all hope that the natives of Campeche had a sophisticated rationality. This change was the result of the natives demonstration of their irrational inconsistency. The natives decision to trade actually showed that they were irrational because if they were rational they would either traded in the first place or never trade at all. The Spaniards believed that the natives response to their presence was inconsistent because of their irrationality. Like at Cozumel, the caciques failure to appear after it had been promised he would appear, demonstrated to the Spaniards the natives irrational inconsistency. The Spaniards failed to blame Julin anymore because the examples of native irrationality were too numerous to be all Julins fault. Later that day, the situation took a turn for the worse. The natives insisted again that the Spaniards leave immediately and then escalated the situation by rallying their warriors in front of the Spaniards. Oviedos Account alone adds that the natives then tried to unsuccessfully defeat
58

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 102-104; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73. Only Oviedo explicitly states that the Spaniards cut off the trade, but the Provinciae and Itinerario suggest it in their telling of the Spaniards belief in the low-quality of the natives goods.

32 the Spaniards, but we cannot be certain that this happened because such an attack is not mentioned in Itinerario and Provinciae. Regardless, Oviedos description of the Spaniards attitudinal response to the natives rally and attack is highly informative: The captains and soldiers said that it was not proper that they should suffer such knavery and insolence from that bestial people.59 The word choice of knavery, insolence, and bestial suggest that the Spaniards believed that the natives could only possess the most basic rationality because of their animal-like nature. Tensions remained high during the night as the natives kept watch on the Spaniards while the Spaniards did the same to them. The next day, the natives repeated their request that the Spaniards leave and the Spaniards repeated their response that they would leave once they were completely filled up on water. Much like during the Crdoba expedition, a native began burning some incense in view of the Spaniards, threatening an attack if the Spaniards were not gone when it burnt out. The Spaniards said that they would not leave immediately but soon. Some natives gave the Spaniards some turkeys. When the incense burned out, the natives followed through on their threat, attacking the Spaniards. The Spaniards held from counter-attacking at first so that Grijalva could have it taken down in writing that he was defending himself because those barbarous people were about to attack him without cause. The Spaniards then fought back and eventually the natives fled after wounding forty Spaniards and killing one. Having beaten back the natives, the Spaniards continued to fill up on water as they remained vigilant and prepared for another attack. They actually fired a cannon at some native warriors who were trying to sneak up on the Spaniards, which scared them away.60
59

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 104; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74. 60 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 104-106; Juan

33 Grijalva decision to disregard the native threat is likely a result of his beliefs formed after a days interaction with the natives of Campeche. He had already formed the belief that the natives of Campeche lacked a sophisticated irrationality and succumbed to irrational inconsistency. Grijalva believed that the natives would probably not follow through on their threat because they were prone to changing their mind often. At which point, they would return to their irrational vacillation of responses. The Spaniards vigilantly posted guards throughout this encounter even after beating back native attacks because they believed that the natives lack a sophisticated rationality and could irrationally attack anytime. This belief turned out to be fortunate for the Spaniards because the natives made what the Spaniards thought was the irrational decision to maintain hostilities. The Spaniards thought a decision to attack was irrational and to surrender was rational although it was probably quite the opposite. All three sources agree that the natives then sued for peace and brought gifts of food and gold for the Spaniards, but only Oviedo describes in detail what follows till the Spaniards departure. Oviedo says that Grijalva sent a few messengers to the cacique to see what they wanted. The cacique promised to come, as the messengers relayed, and bring much gold and food to the Spaniards. The cacique failed to appear and so the Spaniards left as soon as they finished getting water, in battle-ready formation.61 Much like the Spaniards of the Crdoba expedition, the Spaniards of the Grijalva expedition feared being attacked as they left Campeche.
Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61. The quote is from page 106 of Oviedo. 61 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 106-108. Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 62; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74. Quote is from page 107.

34 Although they had thoroughly defeated the natives, the Spaniards feared an attack as they left because they believed that the natives lacked were irrationally inconsistent and could suddenly decide to attack without cause.

Tabasco River (Grijalva River) From Campeche, the Spaniards explored the coastline for a couple weeks, finding a good supply of fresh water and fish on the coastline, before reaching a large river they named Grijalva River. The rivers strong current prevented the Spaniards from sailing very far upstream, if at all, but it also meant that fresh water, pushed by the river, could be found out at sea. It is likely that the Spaniards were greeted by natives firing arrows at their ships from onshore whom they scared off with cannon fire.62 In spite of this clear indication that they were not welcome, the Spaniards refused to leave.63 The natives had demonstrated their lack of sophisticated rationality by attacking the Spaniards, but the Spaniards still believed that peace for a short time was possible. They would not have stayed if they believed that they would be caught in perpetual war. The Spaniards believed that if the natives did not change their minds by chance and make the rational-like decision to seek peace, they could use their military strength to scare the natives into peace, appealing to the most basic rationality. The Spaniards thought that a peace was sure not to last forever, but just long enough for the Spaniards to acquire water, food, gold, or whatever other resources they wanted.64
62 63

The Provinciae and Itinerario, but not Oviedo, mention this hostile greeting. Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 110; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 75; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 62; Henry Wagner, Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 47. 64 Because the Spaniards were well supplied with water and food at this point, it is clear that a decision to stay was not the result of a need to acquire supplies from the natives or their land.

35 The situation looked grim as the native warriors returned to their positions along the shore the next day, but through the use of a few captured natives as translators the Spaniards and natives agreed to trade, instead of war. The Spaniards were right to believe that the natives would change their minds although they thought incorrectly about the reasons. The exchange was profitable for the Spaniards and lasted a couple days.65 Oviedos Account and Juan Dazs two sources tell different stories about the Spaniards departure from the River Grijalva. Oviedo simply says that the Spaniards left once they realized beyond a doubt that the rivers current would not allow them to explore upstream.66 Itinerario and Provinciae say that the local cacique offered a very large ransom of a mans weight in gold for a native that the Spaniards had captured along the coast a few days earlier and now used as translator and source of information. Grijalva decided to leave that land, much to the dismay of the other Spaniards, before the cacique returned to the ships with the promised ransom.67 If Juan Dazs story is to be believed, then Grijalva must have decided to leave because he did not believe that the cacique would return with a large ransom if he returned at all. It is hard to believe the value of this native as a translator and informant outweighed this enormous offer of gold. Grijalva did not trust the cacique at his word and thus left, possibly forsaking an opportunity at much wealth, because he believed that the natives at River Grijalva did not posses the sophisticated rationality to have kept the gold hidden from him throughout
65

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 110-111; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 63; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 75-76. 66 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 112. 67 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 63; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 76.

36 their extensive trade prior to the ransom offer.

San Juan For about three weeks the Spaniards explored the coastline and participated in a few minor encounters, before happening upon a relatively wealthy group of natives. On June 19, while exploring an island off the mainland, the Spaniards saw some natives on the mainland beckoning to the Spaniards with their white banners. Grijalva decided to send Montejo to investigate. The natives had a very friendly manner and gave the Spaniards some mantles while promising to bring gold in the future. The following day more Spaniards, including Grijalva, went to the mainland to follow up. The natives maintained their friendly manner, preparing an area nearby with leaves to sit down and gave the Spaniards food, mantles, and pipes, but no gold, which they promised again. The Spaniards presumably returned the favor, giving some of their trade goods, yet only Oviedo explicitly says this. The next day, the Spaniards went to land for a third time and were met by two unarmed caciques. They displayed much friendliness as the other natives had done the days before: These principal men embraced Captain Grijalva with much pleasure and showed him and the Christians much affection as if they had known them before and had enjoyed their friendship.68 Up to this point, the Spaniards had had nothing but great and friendly relations with the natives with no cause for concern except for the fact that the natives had not yet brought the promised gold. The Spaniards must have felt good about the chances that they had discovered rational natives, considering that the natives had only made rational-like decisions, welcoming the Spaniards and trading with them, since the beginning of
68

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 114-118; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 65; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 78.

37 the encounter. Like the Spaniards of the Crdoba expedition at Cape Catoche and Campeche and the Spaniards of this expedition at Cozumel, the natives asked the Spaniards to follow them. One of the caciques led the Spaniards to a shaded area and asked the Spaniards to split up their forces: He also desired the Christians, who seemed to him to be the most principal men and those closest to the general, also to sit down and made signs to the rest of the men to be seated in the field. Grijalva conceded to this request, but posted some sentinels in case of an ambush: The general ordered them to do this but he also provided a good guard and sentinels so that like ignorant and unprepared men they should not fall into some ambush.69 The Spaniards had made two important decisions, to follow the cacique and split up their forces. Both of these decisions made the Spaniards much more vulnerable to an ambush. The posting of guards gave the Spaniards little forewarning if native ambushers moved quickly as had happened at Florida during the Grijalva expedition. The Spaniards chose to follow the cacique, split up their forces, and not ask to see the gold before advancing. Whether the Spaniards consciously considered the consequences of their decisions or wholly ignored this issue, both prove the point that the Spaniards continued to believe that natives could not trick them into an ambush as a part of a plan. The Spaniards did not accredit the natives of San Juan the sophisticated rationality required to plan an ambush. The Spaniards were not punished for their vulnerability, however, because fortunately these natives had no malicious plan. The Spaniards and natives engaged in a week and a half long trade for much gold before Grijalva decided that they should return to discovering the coastline. In spite of the profitability of trade and the friendliness of the natives, the Spaniards

69

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 118.

38 slept on their ships every night rather than make camp on land.70 Considering that they had made camp for the night at Champoton during the Cordoba expedition and previously during this expedition at Campeche this is a particularly interesting decision. The Spaniards decided to sleep on their ships because they feared that in spite of the friendly exchanges the natives might attack them while they sleep. The Spaniards believed the natives of San Juan were irrational inconsistency. The risk and cost of an ambush at night outweighed the benefit of having more time to trade with the natives by making camp on shore. Because these Spaniards had previously slept on shore something else must factor into this change in strategy. We are led back to the costs of over-generalization. The Spaniards learned from their encounter at Campeche and maybe the encounter at Champotn during the Crdoba expedition that sleeping on shore was dangerous. Although the Spaniards did not directly suffer an ambush for sleeping on shore at Campeche, the cost of the feeling of insecurity and fear probably convinced them that they should just sleep on their ships. The Spaniards applied this lesson to their encounter at San Juan where they thought the natives were irrational too although the context was very different. The Spaniards certainly recognized the context of their interactions, as did the natives. The Spaniards simply believed that the context did not matter to natives with a sophisticated rationality.

Champoton (September 1 to September 3, 1518) From San Juan, the Spaniards sailed along the mainland for about a month and in late August a vicious storm attacked them at sea. They anchored at Champotn in order to rest, fix
70

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 118-123; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 65-66; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 78-79.

39 their ships, and acquire food and water if possible. They were acutely aware of the previous expeditions disaster here.71 The Spaniards decided to land because they believed that, through either strength of arms or peaceful negotiation, they would have a better outcome. The Spaniards decided to land stealthily and prepared for battle. That night the Spaniards heard from a nearby island just off the coast the natives keeping watch loudly as natives have done previously. For some reason (it is unclear in the three sources, it was likely the receding tide or water currents), the Spaniards could not land on the mainland at the moment, so they decided to land on a nearby island with the same procedure.72 Unlike the Crdoba expedition, the Grijalva expedition decided to land stealthily, which would have hidden the Spaniards vulnerability while landing if it had worked.73 Early in the process of landing, they were approached by native warriors in their canoes. What happens next is a little unclear. Oviedos Account says that the natives attacked the Spaniards, while Provinciae and Itinerario say that the native warriors only surrounded the Spaniards. In any regard, the Spaniards fired a cannonball at a canoe, sinking it, and the rest of the natives fled. The Spaniards were virtually unharmed from this initial interaction. The natives were much more prepared for battle on the mainland and the Spaniards saw this. Many, if not all, Spaniards wished to seek revenge on these natives for their insolence and for their

71

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 124-130; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 66-68; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 79-82. 72 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 130-131; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 82. 73 The Spaniards were vulnerable for a number of reasons. While in their boats, they could not put their enemies to their steel swords. While they were wading through the water they were slow moving. Most importantly, if the Spaniards could not all land at the same time because of currents, rocks, or beach size, natives could attack those Spaniards piecemeal, applying all their combat power to those on land while the Spaniards could not.

40 deadly attack on the Spaniards during the Crdoba expedition: If they did go they had to avenge the Christians who had been killed there with Captain Francisco Hernndez, burn the two, give them a punishment that they would never forget, and not leave anyone alive if they could avoid it. The Spaniards came to consensus however that it would be prudent to leave revenge for a later time and leave Champoton, which they did on Friday, September 3.74 The Spaniards could weigh their desires for revenge with the costs of seeking it even in an intensely emotional situation.

Campeche Unwilling to fight those at Champoton, the Spaniards were hungry and thirsty when they arrived back at Campeche three days later. Grijalva had charted a course from there into the unknown and was fearful that fresh water would be difficult to acquire later, so he decided to see if they could acquire water then at Campeche. The Spaniards landed combat ready as they had done many times before and also early in the morning to avoid detection, as they had done days earlier at Champoton.75 Although the Spaniards had pacified these natives through battle, they believed that, the natives might still attack because of their irrational inconsistency. Upon shore, some Spaniards, not including Grijalva, followed some natives inland who were supposedly leading them to water. They were led into an ambush. The ambushed Spaniards held their own until Grijalva came with reinforcements and then the Spaniards as a
74

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 131-132; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 68 ; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 82. Quote is from Page 132 of Oviedo. 75 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 132; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 68.

41 whole put the natives to flight. After battle, the Spaniards found some fresh water sources, fields of maize, and sturdy trees and stocked up with enough food, water and wood for the return voyage to Cuba. The Spaniards did not attempt to reconcile their relations with the natives at Campeche and left for Cuba as soon as they were ready to go.76 While the Spaniards prepared for an attack by their former enemies, they followed these same people into an ambush. The Spaniards did not trust that the natives had good intentions, but rather they trusted that the natives had no sophisticated rationality and were thus incapable of developing or following through on sophisticated plans. Furthermore, the Spaniards did not try to establish a peace between themselves and the natives, although it had been done earlier in this expedition and they thought also in the one previous because they did not believe that the natives could ever stay peaceful, which they thought was clearly demonstrated by their irrational decisions to attack the Spaniards.

Conclusion The Spaniards supplies lasted the return voyage and they made it back to Cuba in late September, 1518.77 The Grijalva expedition had explored Yucatan for about half a year. Although the Spaniards had completed two voyages of exploration to Yucatan, Spaniards still had not believed that they had discovered any natives that possessed a sophisticated rationality, although they still believed it possible that some undiscovered natives did. This was not simply the result of civilizational prejudice, but grounded in a little more than a years worth of interaction with natives in Yucatan. Specific decisions by the discovered natives of the Yucatan,
76

Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 132-133; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 82. 77 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 133

42 such as a cacique failing to appear when he said he would and attacking to start off an encounter, persuaded the Spaniards that the makers of these decisions were not rational. Any behavior that fell outside the Spaniards strict set of rational actions meant that the actor was irrational, unless there was good excuse such as a dishonest translator. Their resultant belief in the natives lack of sophisticated rationality blinded them from seeing the diplomatic implications of ending trade and correctly assessing the risks of following natives. Like the Spaniards of the first expedition, the Spaniards of the second learned the hard way to respect that danger posed by native warriors. This lesson interacted with their belief in irrationality to produce new strategies of landing stealthily, sleeping on their ships, to complement the older strategy learned during the Crdoba expedition of always being well prepared for an ambush.

43 Expedition under Hernn Corts up until the Founding of Vera Cruz

Introduction After news of the gold acquired by the Grijalva Expedition had quickly spread throughout Cuba, many Spaniards, including nearly forty who had just returned, rushed to prepare another expedition to the mainland. In early February, 1519, five-hundred men, ten ships, and a couple translators set out from Cuba under the command of Hernn Corts.78 The third expedition would be the first to discover what they believed to be natives with a sophisticated rationality. Their discovery was the culmination of a process in which Spaniards beliefs about what constituted rational action interacted with the actions of natives apparently unaware of these beliefs. Cozumel (Santa Cruz) Like the expedition before it, this expedition stopped at the island of Cozumel on their way to the mainland. Both True History and First Letter recall the natives fear in their retelling of the Grijalva expeditions encounter at Cozumel. This fear must have been on the minds of the authors and that of other Spaniards as they encountered the natives of Cozumel.79 Pedro de Alvarado arrived at Cozumel before the others and discovered that the natives had already fled, but he and his men ransacked the empty native villages of food and gold and captured three unfortunate natives. When Corts arrived he was angry to learn what Alvarado had done: [Corts] told [Alvarado] that we should never pacify the country in that way by robbing the natives of their property. Corts saw Alvarados disobedience as an opportunity to
78

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 69-92; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 11; Members of the Grijalva Expedition,, 51-52. 79 Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 6; Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 40.

44 demonstrate his good faith to the native population of Cozumel. Corts released the captives and gave them what was left of the plunder and compensated with beads for what was not. Corts hoped that this would demonstrate that he meant them no harm and that Alvarado had been an exception. According to True History this strategy worked for the natives greeted the Spaniards and returned to their houses. First Letter says that the natives did so, only after the Spaniards caught and released another native under Corts orders that they were to beg and persuade them as best they could to come to the aforementioned port; but they were in no way to harm their persons, houses or properties, so as to avoid alarming them and driving them still farther away. After several days the Spaniards left because the island and its natives did not have the resources to support them.80 Two choices of Corts, to release the captives and to ask to have the town repopulated, demonstrated his beliefs. Corts did not just ask his men to refrain from scaring the natives like Grijalva did, but also freed captives and gave back what was taken, hoping that natives could rationally understand that the Spaniards now meant no harm. Corts also asked to see the town repopulated because he hoped that the natives were rational enough not to attack if their women and children were at their homes and vulnerable to the Spaniards retribution.81 Corts believed that the natives of Cozumel could have the most basic rationality. Corts strategies actively persuaded the natives to change their minds, whereas those of Grijalva

80

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 90-92, 103; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 11-12, 17. 81 At Cozumel the Spaniards prepared for an ambush by cleaning their arms and departing in formation, but I have decided not to include these choices as examples of the Spaniards belief in native irrationality. Although their actions are consistent with a belief in native irrationality, a counter-argument based on a basic understanding of organizational theory shows that their behavior does not necessarily prove this belief. The Spaniards preparation for an at all times ambush, even when they are leaving can be described as a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that was developed over the course of the previous two expeditions. In organizational theory, SOPs remain until they fail as it is difficult to see how this SOP could ever fail, this SOP remained. Therefore, the Spaniards procedure of always preparing for an ambush does not mean that the Spaniards of the Corts Expedition held the same beliefs as those that created this SOP, namely that the natives were irrational. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 93, 103-104;

45 only sought to restrain the Spaniards from pillaging. This difference suggests that Corts had greater optimism than Grijalva that the natives of Cozumel had the most basic rationality.

Champoton From Cozumel, the Corts Expedition sailed to the infamous Champoton. The Spaniards were not ones to forget the natives previous hostility:
Corts had a mind to give the Indians a lesson on account of the defeat they had inflicted on Francisco Hernndez de Crdova [sic] and Grijalva, and many of us soldiers who had been in those battles begged him to go in, and not to leave without giving the Indians a good chastisement, even if it did detain us two or three days.

However, when the pilot says that a good chastisement would take 8 days because of the poor quality of the harbor and wind variability, the Spaniards decided that it was not worth it and they left Champoton in peace.82 We have learned from previous encounters, as did the Spaniards, that Champoton possessed a significant fresh water supply. Water was a vital resource for the Spaniards and the benefit of having a safe water station at Champoton can not be overstated. Yet, the Spaniards were not willing to conquer the natives of Champoton if it took five more days. The key here is that the Spaniards believed that a safe water station was not possible because the natives of Champoton would never remain pacified. The Spaniards believed that they could give the Indians a lesson, but the natives would not learn to submit to the Spaniards. Although the third expedition was larger and better equipped than the previous two, it did not land because the Spaniards had learned from their irrational hostility toward Crdoba and Grijalva that the natives lacked any rationality. Apparently, the natives of Champoton did not even possess the most basic rationality that of running away from danger even though the
82

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 106-107. Quote is from page 107.

46 Spaniards had attacked them twice.

Grijalva River (Tabasco River) (March 12, 1519)83 Three days out from Champotn the Spaniards arrived at the River Grijalva, where Grijalva had negotiated peace with hostile natives. The Spaniards of the Corts Expedition knew this history well as indicated by the accurate retelling of the encounter in True History and First Letter.84 As the Spaniards came close to the river mouth, they saw thousands of native warriors assembled to prevent them from landing. Over the course of two days, Corts told the natives several times, using Aguilar as interpreter, that they came in peace to take fresh water and trade, but the natives threatened to attack if they landed. During the night between these two days, the translator Melchorejo escaped from the Spaniards. The Spaniards landed and were attacked, as the natives promised.85 Cortes, like Grijalva and Crdoba, demonstrated his failure to consider the significance of water in causing natives to attack by voicing his goal to take water. The Spaniards won the ensuing battle and conquered the natives town. First Letter says that after the battle the natives and Spaniards agreed that the Spaniards would leave after the natives supplied them with food. Both sources agree that no natives came with food and so two armed groups of Spaniards went searching for food while the rest stayed at camp. While the Spaniards were split up, the natives ambushed the Spaniards camp and one of the scouting parties. The natives and Spaniards fought a tough battle but the Spaniards won after reuniting their split forces. The Spaniards asked three natives that they had captured in the course of the battle why they attacked: through Aguilar, our interpreter, we asked them why they were so
83 84

Town of Tabasco may have actually been called Potonchan. (n1, B108) Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 107. 85 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 108-111; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 19.

47 mad as to attack us, and that they could see that we should kill them if they attacked us again. As the Spaniards interpreted it, the captives said that they attacked because Melchorejo had told them that the Spaniards were easily defeated. 86 In reality Melchorejo must have been only one among a number of factors the natives considered when deciding whether to attack the Spaniards. The Spaniards either misinterpreted the natives response to conform to their own beliefs or could not see past the captives lies about the real reasons they attacked, because of these beliefs. The Spaniards believed that the natives of Grijalva were rational, not because of anything they had done during this encounter, but because they had proven their rationality to Corts through their peaceful trade with Grijalva. Corts tried to understand why the rational natives of the Grijalva River would attack them and realized that Melchorejo must have lied to the natives. Corts predicted that the natives would return and attack the Spaniards camp, so in order to prevent this he and his men went out to find the natives. They found native warriors on the way to their camp and the natives and Spaniards went to battle. The Spaniards won only after killing hundreds of natives and suffering many wounds. The Spaniards had captured two caciques in the battle and Corts released them and gave them beads to demonstrate that the Spaniards wanted peace. The natives had had enough and some native caciques came to the Spaniards in peace bearing gifts of food, low-quality gold, and women. Corts strategy had apparently worked again. Also like at Cozumel the Spaniards requested that the natives repopulate their houses for he would recognize that as a sign of true peace, and the natives did so.87 Corts strategies, first exercised at Cozumel, demonstrate that he at least believed that the
86

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 111-115; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 19-21. Quote is from Page 115 of Bernal Daz. 87 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 115-127; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 21-23. Quote is from page 126 of Bernal Daz.

48 natives could be rational. Corts took the opportunity to ask the native leadership why they attacked and this was their response:
When all this had been settled Corts asked the Caciques what was their reason for attacking us three times when we had asked them to keep the peace ; the chief replied that he had already asked pardon for their acts and had been forgiven, that the Cacique of Chanpoton, his brother, had advised it, and that he feared to be accused of cowardice, for he had already been reproached and dishonoured for not having attacked the other captain who had come with four ships, (he must have meant Juan de Grijalva) and he also said that the Indian whom we had brought as an Interpreter, who escaped in the night, had advised them to attack us both by day and night.88

The natives decided to attack more because of their damaged honor and less because of Melchorejos advice. Whether or not the Spaniards believed in native irrationality, it was nearly impossible for the Spaniards to know that the natives of Grijalva had been called cowards and thus could not predict an attack. Corts, like any 16th century conquistador, understood the importance of honor and certainly would have believed that attacking because of it was rational. About a week after arriving at Grijalva River, the Spaniards decided to leave because winds had begun to threaten their ships. The way they left clearly demonstrated Corts beliefs about the natives: he ordered the Indians to get ready all the canoes that they owned to help us to embark.89 Corts requested transport from the natives to speed up their disembarkation, although they could have disembarked with the boats they had arrived in. This request is a significant departure from the Spaniards standard practice of leaving in formation and only on their boats. It is almost certain that the Spaniards had never before asked for the natives help in

88 89

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 127. Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 22-23; Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 130. Quote is from Page 130 of Bernal Daz

49 leaving because none of the sources ever mention such a request.90 Crdoba and Grijalva had developed the standard practice because they believed that natives could attack irrationally while the Spaniards left. A rejection of this standard procedure meant that the Spaniards believed that the natives could not attack while the Spaniards left. The only thing that guaranteed that the natives would not attack was there rationality in which Cortes believed. The natives of Grijalva River had proven to Corts that they were rational by making rational-like decisions to trade with Grijalva, responding positively to Corts release of their cacique, and not attacking after their town repopulated. Because Corts believed that the natives of the River Grijalva were likely rational before he even set foot there he was able to over look the irrational-like decision to attack them and blame it on the translator until he learned that it was a result of honor. The natives of River Grijalva had proven their rationality to Corts through a specific sequence of decisions that Corts thought were rational. Corts did not take as his own Grijalvas conclusion that the natives were irrational.

San Juan Within a week of leaving the Grijalva River, the Spaniards reached San Juan. The Spaniards knew that this was the location where Grijalva had traded with friendly natives.91 The Spaniards anchored off the coast and were welcomed by natives in canoes. The Spaniards gave them food, beads, and wine and told them that they had come to trade. The next day, the Spaniards landed, set up camp, and prepared for hostilities by strategically positioning some

90

The one time that the natives used native canoes was at Cape Catoche when the cacique offered to transport the Spaniards from their ships to land. The Spaniards were very hesitant to accept this offer and many Spaniards used their boats rather than the canoes. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 15-16. 91 Bernal Daz and First Letter correctly record at least this much about the Grijalva Expeditions encounter here.

50 cannons.92 In spite of the friendly welcome and the natives amity with Grijalva, the Spaniards still prepared for an ambush. Although hopeful that the natives of San Juan were rational, Corts did not trust to hope. Corts thought that the natives could be rational, but also could be irrational. The Spaniards preparations turned out to be unnecessary as they engaged in a friendly exchange for several days. The Spaniards bread went bad with weevils, as it had during Grijalvas encounter, but it was not a disaster because the natives generously gave food to the Spaniards. The Spaniards learned that the natives in charge were governors of the lord of Mexico, Montezuma. Rumors about the wealth of Montezuma were proven true when the governors gave the Spaniards lavish presents from Montezuma. Corts requested a meeting with Montezuma, but the governors said that Montezuma declined. The Spaniards asked several more times, which began to annoy the governors, who consistently said no. Corts finally gave up getting Montezumas consent at that time and expressed his desire to see Montezuma to his soldiers: Surely this must be a great and rich prince, and some day, please God, we must go and see him.93 At first Corts believed that Montezuma could irrationally change his mind and concede to the Spaniards request, but as Montezuma consistently responded no, Corts became less and less hopeful that Montezuma was irrational in this regard. The local natives began bringing less and less food and the Spaniards became increasingly dependent on shellfish for survival. One morning the Spaniards woke up to discover that the natives had abandoned them. The situation was bleak: without having any provisions, seeing that there was no possibility of going any further and that over thirty five soldiers had
92

Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 9, 23; Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 55-57, 136-137. 93 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 138-152; Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 23-24. Quote is from Page 148 of Bernal Daz.

51 already died in camp from wounds inflicted at Tabasco, and from sickness and hunger.94 Corts was caught off guard because he had made the mistake of believing that the natives would consistently supply the Spaniards. The natives rational-like behavior at San Juan, previously trading with Grijalva, consistently answering no to Spaniards request to visit Montezuma, and consistently supplying the Spaniards with food, had persuaded Corts that they were rational. Corts let his guard down and expected behavior that only fit his limited and what he thought was the only version of rationality.

Conclusion Corts mistake of trusting that the natives he met at San Juan would act according to his version of rationality was not catastrophic. After establishing the town of Vera Cruz and his position as Captain General and Chief Justice, Corts sent Pedro de Alvarado on a successful foraging expedition.95 Corts had made his decisions based on his beliefs which in turn were based on a history of interaction with natives. Corts had been caught off guard because he failed to understand his own learning process. It is the irony of history that while Corts beliefs were more correct than those of Grijalva and Crdoba, they did not necessarily lead to a better outcome at San Juan. Failure was a great teacher, though. It taught Crdoba and Grijalva to take more actively prepare for an ambush and would be expected to teach Corts something, too.

94

Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 150-153; Quotes if from page 153 of Bernal Daz; The First Letter mentions no misfortune in the natives leaving of the Spaniards. I have adopted Bernal Daz version, because I believe the First Letter intentionally overlooks this fact because Corts, who heavily influenced the drafting of this letter, did not want to make himself look foolish. 95 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 151 -161.

52 Conclusion From March 1517 to July 1519, the Spaniards beliefs about native rationality went through a remarkable transformation. Crdoba had believed that the natives of Yucatan were totally irrational. Grijalva believed that some of the natives could be rational, but did not see rationality in any of the natives he encountered. Corts believed that natives could be rational like Grijalva and perceived this rationality in some of the natives he encountered. This transformation is as much a testament to the Spaniards ability to learn as to what they learned from. The Spaniards did not learn that the certain natives were rational until natives proved it to them. The Spaniards learning was tied to their experiences and would continue to be as they marched inland from Vera Cruz toward Mexico. Furthermore, the relatively rapid transformation of the Spaniards beliefs suggests that buried within their subconscious was the understanding of what it would mean for the natives to be rational. The first explorers of Yucatan simply believed that native irrationality was impossible. When the natives demonstrated rational behavior, they found that they had already understood what this meant. The experiences of the Spaniards in Yucatan from 1517 to 1519 provide an important less for the modern reader: one should be careful not to over-simplify the actions of others. We should be careful not to repeat the Spaniards mistake of believing that the world is as you see it. The Spaniards did not recognize opportunities to prosper because they did not recognize how they were simplifying the actions of the natives. They ended trade if not for immediate economic gain forsaking the development of a long-term profitable relationship and they could not see the possibility of anything beneficial coming out of their efforts in Champoton. Lastly, it is the irony of history that a highly erroneous belief in native irrationality

53 sometimes led to a better outcome then a belief in native rationality. A belief in native irrationality led the Spaniards to prepare for unpredictable ambushes while a belief in native rationality led to the blunder at San Juan.

54 Works Cited Wagner, Henry Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo. In The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942.

Wagner, Henry Summary of the Accounts. In The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942.

De Oviedo, Gonzalo Fernndez. Oviedos Account. In The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts. Translated by Henry Wagner. Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942.

Daz, Juan. Provinciae. In The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts. Translated by H. E. Robbins. Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942.

Daz, Juan. Itinerario. In The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts. Translated by Henry Wagner. Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942.

Corts, Hernn. First Letter. Letters from Mexico. Translated by Anthony Pagden. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.

55 Letters from Mexico. Translated by Anthony Pagden. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.

Daz, Bernal. The True History of the Conquest of New Spain. Hakluyt Society Works 2nd Series. Translated by Alfred Percival Maudslay. Vol. 23. London: Bedford Press, 1908.

Clendinnen, Inga. Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Gazzaniga, Michael and Tod Heatherton. Psychological Science, edited by John Durbin. 2nd edition. New York: WW Norton and Company, 2006.

Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. Translated by Richard Howard. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.