40369817

Heaven Is High and the Emperor Is Far Away Legitimacy and Structure in the Chinese State Author(s): Gary
G. Hamilton, Ben-Ray Jai and Hsien-Heng Lu Source: Revue europenne des sciences sociales, T. 27, No. 84, Sociologie de la Chine et Sociologie chinoise (1989), pp. 141-167 Published by: Librairie Droz Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40369817 . Accessed: 10/10/2013 09:07
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GARY G. HAMILTON With the Assistance of BEN-RAY JAI AND HSIEN-HENG LU
HEAVEN IS HIGH AND THE EMPEROR IS FAR AWAY LEGITIMACYAND STRUCTUREIN THE CHINESE STATE1
In his analysisof Negara,the theaterstate in nineteenth-century Geertzchallenges modernsocial sciencetheory.2 His Bali, Clifford account of the Balinese state, challengerides on his penetrating states Western from of a politicalorderthathe says is so different even "state" do not thatthe veryconceptsof "power,""authority," applyin the same way that theydo in the West. In nineteenthwill; authority Bali, powerdid not emanatefromexercising century to do withchainsof command;and the politicalcomhad nothing (i.e., the state) was not a delineated, protectedterritorial munity from arose from unit. Instead, virtue, authority power performance, and prestige."3 Using Bali almost and the state from"ceremony forwhattheWestis not,Geertzgoes on to question as a metaphor of Westernsocial science and to accuse its the directly validity in the culturalassumptions of universalizing Western practitioners name of science. as well as his critiAlthough widelyacclaimedGeertz'sanalysis, as theyshouldbe.4 He has, cisms,have notbeen takenas seriously his own obserof course,not helpedhis cause; he has marginalized
i Although acknowI must of thisessay, I blameno oneelse fortheresults on thenature research ledgethatI havenotdonethisalone. Liu Kwang-ching's oflegitimacy) ofChinese theprinciples I term, Weber, orthodoxy (which following and as eversince, thatI havebeenexploiting inspired me,gaveme keyinsights afterbeingabsentfor a it turnsout,brought me back into Chinastudies, students been number ofyears. Equally forthepresent my paperhas important whileI was at Tunghai in a seminar class thatI taught on thistopicin 1985 JaiBenin in These Taiwan. advanced students, particular University graduate and where I was right told me wheretheythought ray and Lu Hsien-heng, of the and contributed so many of their ownideasto thegeneral theory wrong, Chinese statethatI consider them co-authors.
2 Clifford Bah (PrinGeertz, Negara,The TheatreState in Nineteenth-Century ceton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1980). 3 Geertz, Negara,p. 16. 4 For a comprehensive and oftencritical evaluation of Geertz's work, see Paul Shankman,The Thick and the Thin: On the Interpretive TheoreticalPro25 (June,1984):261-279. "Current Also see gramof Clifford Geertz, Anthopology" Ronald G. Walters, the Times: and Geertz of Signs Clifford Historians,"Social Research"47 (Autumn, 1980):537-556.
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vations, by making them apply only to Bali. He straightforwardly rejects, as being too positivist,many theoretical and comparative analyses. He extols, instead, an extreme form of relativism,and prefers a literarystyle that incorporates and frames his culturally dense "thick descriptions."5 Geertz's view that Western and non-Western societies may differ and that using Western-derived intrinsically concepts to analyze nonWestern societies 'may have pernicious results is interestingand, I sound. That these observations then lead to believe, fundamentally the conclusion that all comparisons are useless and invalid is, however, quite mistaken. Indeed, systematic comparisons in line with this theoretical vision become all the more necessary and for it is only throughcomparisons that one especially illuminating, can achieve a perspective on what is unique. Moreover, as Geertz seems unwillingto acknowledge,this methodologyof systematically analyzinguniqueness is already part of a developed theoreticalpersocieties* spective that can be turned to the study of non-Western This is, of course, the Weberian perspective,which has been used so profoundlyin analyzing the distinctivefeatures of the West. It is my contention in this paper that, in a reconstructed form, the Weberian perspective can also be used to extend Geertz's insights on non-Westernpolitical order beyond Negara. In this paper, I develop a comparative analysis of the political institutionsin late imperial China that incorporates Geertz's important theoretical insightswithin a Weberian perspective. I The place to begin is with the claim that Western concepts of political structureare inappropriatefor the analysis of late imperial China. Why this should be the case involves a basic theoretical point about the nature of social science explanations. Until recently, many thoughtof sooial science concepts as being universal tools of analysis, as being analytic, abstract, and neutral with regard to the societies being studied. These qualities derived from their deduction from what was believed to be general sociological properties of all societies. The reasoning was clear: All socihave certain functional or processual features. eties, by definition, Kinship and political systems, socialization processes, stratification - these and many others ^featureswere thought to be structures necessary requisites for the very existence of society.6 Different
5 For Geertz'sown explanationsto his approach,see The Interpretation of Lecture: Anti AntiCultures(New York: Basic Books, 1973)and Distinguished 86 263-278. "American Relativism, Anthropologist" (1984): o It should be noted that thereis a Marxistequivalentto this functionalist whichin effect has a fundaargument, argues that each societies,by definition, mentaleconomicstructure consistsof specific, thatnecessarily interfunctionally relatedprocesses,contradictions, and class positionsthat change in predictable
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societieshave different of social order, therequirements ways to satisfy but they all have to satisfy them nonetheless. Therefore,if one accepts this line of reasoning,to have good social science concepts means to abstract these requisites beyond the peculiarities of any one society. Arrivingat this level of abstraction, these concepts were thought to be equally applicable to all groups that could be definedas societies, and hence their use in analysis of any one society was considered to be neutral with regard to the conclusions obtained. In principle, then, the concepts themselvesbias neither the process nor the results of analysis. This confidence in the neutralityof social science concepts, as well as in the universalityof their application, has now wanned. In the wake of this skepticism,a more self-conscious,self-critical theoryof action,as well as of social science explanations,has become commonplace.7 Central to these new concerns is a perception that subjective understandings,action, and structures are inseparable, even identical, elements of social worlds ; these social worlds- or lived in realities, as some would phrase it - are created from neither the actors' understandingof society nor the structures'constraintson actors. Rather both actor understandingand structural realityare simultaneously produced and reproduced throughactions. In other words, a context of ongoing action creates in participants both an understandingof what is happening and a "reality" or "social firmness" to the structuresthat have been created previously and are being recreated presently through their mutually directed 8 actions. Most recently,Giddens calls this process "structuration." But earlier thinkers, especially Weber and the great pragmatistphilosophers, James, Dewey and Mead, saw with equal clarity the simultaneity of structure's firmness and of actors' understanding, without eitherbeing analyticallyseparate from or causally prior to the other.9 An acceptance of this simultaneity of meaning and structurehas directand profoundeffects social science upon fashioning satisfactory explanations. The direction of most modern thinkinghas been to require that sophisticated concepts of culture and meaning patterns be incorporatedinto social explanations. How this incorporationis
ways. Nowadays,however, many scholars would argue that merelyclassifying a societyaccordingto its economicstructure (e.g., feudal society)does, in fact, bias the resultsof analysis. 7 For a surveyof and a contribution s to this area, see RichardJ. Bernstein recentbooks: The Restructuring of Social and PoliticalTheory (Philadelphia:Universityof Pennsylvania Press, 1978) and Beyond Objectivismand Relativism: and Praxis (Philadelphia: of Pennsylvania Science,Hermeneutics Press, University 1983). Gidden s discussionof structurationis foundin most of his books and most recently in The Constitution of California of Society(Berkeley:University Press, 1984), pp. 1-40. * For discussions of these thinkersin light of these issues, see Richard Praxisand Action(Philadelphia, of Pennsylvania Bernstein, University Press,1971); Hans Joas, G.H. Mead, A Contemporary Re-examination of his Thought(CamThe bridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1985);Jurgen CommunicaHabermas, Theoryof tiveAction, 2 volumes(Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
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to <be accomplished, however,has not been established in any final way. Most writers have been content to work and rework social action theory,creating an array of abstract, analytic guidelines,but without producing much in the way of empirical understandings. these guidelinesare diverse,theyall share in the recognition Although that to understand (e.g., to explain) social life is to understand the of structure,action, and meaning. simultaneity A lew modern thinkershave tried to work out these ideas in a more empirical way. Foucault's effort to define historically the linkage between knowledge (i.e., meaning) and the institutionsof control is the most influential,as well as the most important.10 Geertz, too, is an exception. He has arrived at his ideas through describing non-Westernworlds. Both approaches, however, have led these two theoriststo denounce modern social science, and they have become so engaged in the exercise to correct the positivistsins of the social science disciplines that they have retreated into solipsistic reveries on the wholeness and inseparabilityof time and place. n Weber is virtually Among these and earlier like-mindedtheorists, alone in the solution that he took to this recognition. Weber did not pursue abstract philosophic discussions of action in the ways that the pragmatistsdid, and that modern social theoristsare now doing. Unlike Foucault and Geertz,he criticizedthe culturalistapproach. 12 Instead of approaching his topic of study (e.g. Western civilization) ever more closely, as Geertz and Foucault advises us to do, he set Westerncivilization in a broad comparative framework. He argued that in order better to understandWesternpatternsof meaning,it is about those patterns,and necessaryto understandwhat is distinctive the only way to understandthe distinotiveness of one set of meaning with other patterns. patterns is to contrast it systematically Weber builds this comparative framework from his concepts, the famous "ideal types."13 These concepts are analytic summaries of historicallyspecific configurations. As distillations of particular types of social action, theyare inductivelyderived,but then logically reformulated to exaggerate their distinctive constituent elements. dialecticbetween Withthismethodology, Weber sets up an explanatory
!0 The most important of Foucault's books in this regard is Disciplineand Punish,The Birth of the Prison (New York: VintageBooks, 1979). 11 For Geertz Ames critique, Lecture:AntiAnti-Relativism, see Distinguished rican Anthropologist" 86 (1984): 263-278), and for Foucault's, see The Order of An Archaeology Things, of theHuman Sciences (New York: VintageBooks, 1973) and The Archaeology of Knowledgeand the Discourse on Language(New York: PantheonBooks, 1972). 12 For his criticismof culturalistlogic, see Weber's appeal for causal anain Max Weberon lysis as opposed to the analysisof general"meaning patterns" the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe,Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), Part III. especially i* tor a discussionot Weber s methodology, see GuentherKoth, Introducpp. xxix-xxxiv; tion,"Economyand Society(New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), and GuentherRoth and Wolfgang Max Weber's Vision of History Schluchter, of California (Berkeley:University Press, 1979).
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the historicalvariabilityof that which he was attemptingto explain and the analytic precision of inductive,but unreal concepts used in the explanation. At the conceptual level, Weber always constructed his typologiesof action on what he saw as the "affinity" between normativemeaning patterns and social structure,a relationshipput into non-causal but intrinsicterms. His typologyof domination,for instance, specifies three historically significantsets of politically directed actions designed to control subject populations. Each set shows the affinity between,indeed, the simultaneity of, a prescriptive "principle" of legitimationand an explicit organizational structure for the state.14 Weber formulated his idea types based on his knowledge of Europe, and he generallyused them to demonstratethe distinctiveness of Westernpatterns. At times,Weber certainlyovergeneralized his concepts; but, even so, because of his consistent focus on explaining the West, he was generallyable to maintain the explanatory dialectic- the ongoing linkage between the historicalphenomena to be explained and the concepts used to clarify themthat formed the foundationof his comparative methodology. Weber's concepts, however,have had a life of their own beyond how Weber used them himself. His typologies of religion,of law, and particularlyof the economy and of politics have had great influence,not only in the study of the West, but also in the study of non-Westernsocieties, China being one of these. If one carefully considers the methodologicalfoundationsof these ideal types,howin using these concepts to underever, there are obvious difficulties stand non-Westernsocieties in their own terms. This is exactly Geertz's quarrel with Weberian concepts.16 Gertz maintains that good explanations must encompass patterns of embedded meaning in order to understandsurface actions and apparent structures. He states, "To describe [a structureof action] is to describe a constellation of enshrine ideas."16 Being Eurocentric, however, Weber's break the diasettings, concept,when rudelyapplied to non-Western lectic between the internal bindedness of a social world and an observer's explanation of thingsthat happen in that world. This broken dialectic is exactlywhat happens when Weber's own of imperialChina. concepts are used to describe the political structure
Also see my articlesPatriarchalism in Imperial China and WesternEurope: A Revisionof Weber'sSociologyof Domination, "Theoryand Society"13, 3 (May, and Patrimonialism and Filial iPety:A Comparisonof 1984):393-426; Patriarchy, China and Western "British Journalof Sociology". Europe, (Forthcoming) !4 Weber, Economyand Society(New York: Bedminster Press. 1968), pp. 941955. ! Geertzexplicitly mentionsthe inappropriateness of Weber's political conWeberian formucepts onlyonce (Negara. p. 62), but in otherplaces he criticizes Weberinto the picture(Negara, pp. 121-2. lations without bringing 134-136). ie Geertz.p. 135.
10
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II buorientaldespotism, Patriarchy, patrimonialism, patrimonial - theseare officials administrative reaucracy, imperialbureaucracy, just a few of the major conceptsthat Weber and otherWestern writers have appliedto theanalysis of China. Weberwas, of course, not the firstto apply many of these concepts, but his influence, with that of Marx,has been the greatest. Now stripped together bare of their are focuson theWest,Weberian and Marxian concepts to used by sinologists, as well as by comparativists, consistently orienttheiranalysisof China. In fact,no seriousanalysisof late withoutusing these concepts imperialChina has been undertaken derived from theWest. What consequencesflow fromusing these concepts that were firstformulated from Westernhistoricalexperience? Using the theoretical positionoutlinedabove, one would have to argue,with altersthe analysts' thatthe use of Western Geertz, concepts actually because of late imperial China. The bias is introduced perceptions it sets up implicit, betweenChina and the invidiouscomparisons or even West. Western-derived concepts,such as "bureaucracy" in the contextof Westernhistory. "class," have specific meanings thesemeaning are notfully becausethey defined, Typically, go beyond a simpledelineation dimensions of traitsto tap significant symbolic thatevade simpledefinition. As a consequence, mostconcepts carry with themconsiderable culturalbaggage,and when theyare used withoutoffloading that baggage,or at least withoutexposingthe culturalmeanings through explicitcontrasts, theytend to highlight certain traits in theWest, but whichmaynotbe culturally important or historically elsewhere. significant Those concepts surrounding and supporting Westernpolitical institutions are among the most important, as well as the most in order to invidious, conceptsused to analyzeChina. Therefore, define the politicalorderin late imperialChina,it is usefulto esif onlyin summary a Western contrast tablish, form, model,which can be used to distinguish the Chinesemodel thatI will developin in the following sections. This contrastmodel gives the Western derived thatis frequently used to describe Chinaa more terminology rooted definition, thus allowingthe differsubstantial, historically ences to emerge. Whatare the distinguishing features of Western states? To simthe matter we can characterize Western plify greatly, politicalstructuresin terms of threefeatures: of legitia centrist first, conception mate power; second, a "top down" administrative of conception and third,a territorial unit in which the political organization; center'sauthority has legitimate jurisdiction. In the West,even in antiquity, fixed Western politicalstructure articulated withpolitical upon symbolically centers, powerradiating
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out fromthere. One can debatethe origins of thiscentrist concepand theone most but themostconvincing tionofpower, explanation, scholars use, is simplythat political authorities, from heads of households to heads of state,legitimated theirexerciseof authority 17 theirexclusiveaccess to divine,transcendental powers. through had a personalright to rule,a right derived Theyruledbecausethey fromGod or fromHis personalemissaries on earthor, as directly charismatic thecase in aristocratic was also commonly Europe,from as did claimed divinity, sometimes parentage. Rulers themselves Ceasar, or, in the absolutistera, divine right,as did England's JamesI. This centrist was secularized in politicalphilosophies conception and legalizedas a part of legitimate in state structure.Aristotle, described such politicalcenters in Greekcity as werefound Politics, - polis,kings, - and theireffects states aristocracies upon the hapThe RomanRepublic pinessof therespective politicalcommunities. and laterthe Empirefurther the state as a command systematized structure. The center,which was firstthe Senate and later the became symbolically the source of all commands. ObeEmperor, dienceto thecenter's untoCeasarwhatis Ceasar's"), power("Render as well as the degreesof freedom for Roman citizensfromthat power was codifiedinto Roman law. With this further systemthe state and its characterization as a centerbecame an atization, irreductible Western legal principle. With this legal foundation, stateshave developed in manyways,as Perry Anderson has shown so well.18 But in all its various forms, Westernstate structures, foundedupon this centrist as Weber deconception, represented, 19 of domination." pictedthem,"organized systems In his analysisof Western states,Weber is quite rightto describesuch organized of strucas administrative systems domination 20 Conceptually, turesand territorial units. earthly powers,ranging fromkingsto heads of households have jurisdictions.Such jurisdictionsare explicitly delimitedby social and usually territorial - theking, whichthepersonat thecenter within thepope,the units, exercisehis or, less frequently, judge, the father can legitimately her will. In the largerunits,an administrative is created structure to link the centerto the boundaries in of the center'sjurisdiction, order to enforcethe center'scommandsand to collect revenues structure necessaryto sustain the apparatus. The administrative is legitimized a a center that claims by political upon monopoly the ultimate use of force and upon the rightful rightof command withinits territorial of ithepolitical jurisdiction.This description
17 See RobertBellah's discussionof this point in Fatherand Son in Christiain "BeyondBelief" (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). nityand Confucianism, is Perry to Feudalism(London: NLB, 1974) Anderson, Passages fromAntiquity and Lineagesof the Absolutist State (London: NLB, 1974). I* weoer,economy ana society,pp. y*u?od. 2su bee Weber s discussionor this point in Politics as a Vocation,m rrom Max Weber"(New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1948).
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state is Weber's sociologicalconclusion, and Weber's typology of domination is his historical of the threeconceptually most summary and instituimportant waysthatrulersin theWesthave legitimated tionalized and their the administrative linkagesbetweenthemselves subjects. For the sake of this essay,let us conceiveof this centrist conand administrative structure, ceptionof power,the corresponding the territorial unit as a line and block chart. Such a diagramis the most commonrepresentation in Westernsocietiesof organizationalstructures of all types. Let us further characterize the prinin such an organization as beingbased upon the ciple of domination of the personat the will, and concomitantly, upon the commands thedirector, thepresident, themanager, topofthelineandblockchart, the leader in charge. Leaders may be good or bad, may give apor inappropriate but howevertheywield the commands, propriate the commands powerof their position, givenat the top,in principle, of all shouldeffect the actionof individuals locatedin lowerranks, who are located withinthe boundariesof the organization.One of course,thatin organizations of any size it is problematic knows, that commandsgivenat the top will be obeyedby those at the but we view this,as did Weber, as an aspectof the ongoing bottom, and decenbetweencompeting struggle powers for centralization tralization. of Fromthisconception statecomesthe meaning of theWestern the conceptsmostoften used to describethe Chinesestate:bureauruler,emperor, official, bureaucrat, cracy,patrimonial bureaucracy, even the term"state"itself. All of theseare derivedfrom empire, contestedagainsta centrist and, in the Chinesecontext, implicitly a of and state conception, ception politicalorganization legitimacy, I suggest, thatis without in Chinese foundation organization. political Ill one expectthe Chinesepoliticalorderto differ from Whymight theWestern model? The mainreasonone shouldexpecttheChinese and Western state structures to differ is that,froma dramatically Weberian of domination, and hencethe pointof view,theprinciples ideas beinginstitutionalized in structure, differ between dramatically the two locations. In the West, legimitation had their strategies structural in Christian there origins cosmology.In China,however, were no transcendental no gods on high,fromwhomearth deities, bound people would claim theyobtainedthe rightto rule. Hence, no centrist of power developed. In China,rulersdid conception claim theyhad the "mandateof heaven" (tianming), but the differences betweenthe amorphous "Heaven"of the Chineseand the "God" of the West are many and large indeed. anthropomorphic Heavenwas not an explicit force, place, was not a willed,directed and couldnotbe supplicated to or madeto change its mind. Instead,
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heaven was the sun and moon, the planets in their motion,the night and day, the natural ways of life beyond earth (di) and beyond earth's most important inhabitants, mankind (ren). These three- heaven, earth,and mankind- formedthe key trinity in Chinese cosmology. Each had their own roles to play, their own natures to follow; for one to deviate from its nature, even in small ways, would be to throw the entire system out of balance. There is no centrist conception in China, no "uncaused cause," no "unmoved mover,11 no one place from which all the forces of life emanated. As Joseph Needham put it, the Chinese knew of no view that probilliard ball conception of causation, no God-centered vided the West with such a basic cosmological foundation.21 Inforces of stead, for the Chinese, the distinct,functionallydifferent life joined in a dance of harmony, a dance that had no cosmological no absolute law-likemotions, and no predicted endings. beginnings, and everyonewere implicated,and so all were involved Everything in this cooperativedance of life,even the dead, 22so that the resulting and preciselyordered universe,in which image was of "an extremely things 'fitted''so exactly that you could not insert a hair between them."'23 In contrast to the West's billiard ball conception of causation, Needham called the Chinese model, "associative thinking," else. In this has mutual influenceon everything therebyeverything dance of distinct,but complementaryparts, order does not come from the personal will of a leader in charge or from any exterior source, but rather only comes from each knowing and voluntarily one's own part, even the emperor, who was called to his fulfilling duties by 'means of a subordinate kinship term, tianzi, the Son of Heaven. between China and the Although these cosmological differences West are well known, their implications for political structurehave barely been explored. For the purpose of this essay, let me mention three of the most important implications and some empirical evidence to support them. Western and Chinese political prinFirst, and most significant, In differ. the West, at both ideal and material ciples dramatically levels, political philosophyis concerned with power, with the willed capacity of one person to determinethe actions of another person. The relative measure of that capacity for power, the jurisdiction withinwhich that capacity can appropriatelyoperate, and the legitimacy of the person's will are issues central to Western conceptions of power and corresponding social action. Equally, this overwhelming concern with commands and domination draws out the - all dialectical emphasis on freedom,contract, and individualism
21 JosephNeedham. Science and Civilisationin China, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Press, 1956), University pp. 279-291. Cambridge 22 By means of ancestor worship,the Chinese involved the dead in their quest for harmony. 23 Needham,Science and Civilization, 2, p. 286.
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and the legitimacy conceptsthathave been used to counterbalance of hierarchical command structures. authority In China,however, the emphasisis not on the exerciseof will, actionsand self-willed butrather upon its opposite, upon "subduing not with to social expectations" (he ji fu Zi).24 Concern conforming Chinese and but rather obedience with (xiao) gives power authority its substance. Actionhad to be justifiedfuncpoliticalthinking in termsof its consequencesto the group. Such an imtionally, nonremovesin theory, transcendental though manent, justification not alwaysin fact,appeals to the charismatic qualitiesof the indiin theWest. Therefore, to rulership vidual,whichwas so important to another submission obedience was conceptually not seen as simply rule. Instead,obedience as wouldbe implied in charismatic person, (xiao) called for each personto submitto the dutiesof one's own and humanroles- fortheson to be a son,forthewifeto be slwife, is a required Submission forthe official (guari)to be an official.25 to a specific directed is certainly aspectof each role and submission thusrequiring of personalloyalty.But,nonsome elements person, normative. is rigidly is rule-bound, etheless,the act of submission to action, content Different distinctive rulesof submission, a implying and,hence,the dutyto obeyis only applyto different relationships, of social locatedin specific social relationships, and is not a function as would be impliedby the territorial (e.g., locations, organizations households, manors,cities and kingdoms)in the West. In this and not within sense, obedienceis embeddedwithinrelationships jurisdictions. of power, and hence of Second, withouta centrist conception formarking rationale there wouldbe no principled centers, competing to censocial and physical to locate subjectsin relation boundaries ters. In a context of competing wills (e.g.,kingsvs popes,heads of householdvs heads of state),the Western line-and-block mentality of commands be defined, thatthecontent requiresthatjurisdictions be clarified, be spelled and that the extent of "self-determination" out. But in China, ofconflicting a conception without wills,of those human billiard balls bouncing is no sensethatsocial to and fro, there boundariesneeded to be drawn. - to aid the The Chinesedrewboundariesforpracticalreasons of land- but such collection of taxes,to determine the "ownership" boundarieswere provisional and were generally "agreedupon" by draw boundariesfor the people involved.26Westerners, however,
24 This Confucian Book 12,Chapter1) is usually phrase (ConfucianAnalects, translatedas "Subdue the self and returnto propriety." 25 This is a paraphraseof a passage fromthe ConfucianAnalects(Book 12, when Chapter 11, Paragraph2). The exact quotationis "There is government, and is father, when the father is minister; the princeis prince,and the minister the son is son." 26 Some discussion ot customarylaw is round in ru-mei Chang Chen ana Law and theEconomicGrowth Ramon H. Myers, of China duringthe Customary wenti"3 (November1976):1-32and (December 1978): Ch'ingPeriod,"Ch'ing-shih 4-27.
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- in orderto locateego in a physical reasons and,hence, ideological a politicalspace. Space connotesproperty, ownership, prerogative, and so Westerners and hence the rightof command, are obessed with locationbecause the self has no meaningwithoutits being such a mentality located in space. Accordingly, fills space with and and their that the possessions, requires people geographical lines separating people be precise. Disputed lines resultin arguments among neighbors, feuds among families, and wars among nations. exactboundaries for ImperialChina were however, By contrast, when Westernpowers never drawnuntil the nineteenth century, and Fairbank As Lattimore began to markoffand claim territory. China's relationships with its neighbors have variouslyexplained, but rather werenotdefined byboundaries, by tributary relationships of therulerof peripheral to the areas to submit (i.e.,thewillingness boundaries China'sinternational werefrontiers Chineseemperor).27 without lines,and identified (allies and enemies)rather relationships than space. Whatwould have been a borderin Europe,the Great it of the Chinesefrontier; Wall, was in China only the beginning admineverservedas the borderof the Empire. Equally,internal wererepeatedly boundaries wereless thanprecise, nistrative changed fordifferent and were in fact different the throughout dynastic period, and henceland landboundaries, setsof officials.Likewise, although did in factofficials setbyofficial weresupposedly surveys, ownership, set boundaries. to land and did not officially the rights not monitor in a more informal This insteadwas controlled way by local resi28 dents. for a centerist one shouldexpectthat, without Third, legitimation authowhich within without and specific jurisdictions power political rity prevailed,the Chinese political order would not develop a a strong command structure.Without Western styleadministrative Western as the such that centrist gods, suppliedby justification, to supplythe rationalefor a Chineserulerswould findit difficult rationalized (that is, an administrative "topsystemof domination theemperor thatwouldradiateout from down"command structure) withina geographically and thatwould connecteveryone, logically, as occurred and compliance, in theWest. ofcommand matrix defined We know,of course,that the Chinesegovernment developeda but whatevidence is therethatChina politicalorganization, complex structure like that whichformed in the createdan administrative
27 JohnKing Fairbank, in JohnKing Fairbank On theCh'ingtributary system, ThreeStudies (Cambridge:HarvardUniand Ssu-ju Teng,Ch'ingAdministration: Inner Owen Asian 107-218. Frontiersof China Lattimore, versityPress, 1960), Society,1951). Geographical (New York: American 28 Chenand Myers, Law and theEconomicGrowth Customary of Chinaduring wen-ti"3 (November1976): 1-32and (December the Ch'ingPeriod, "Ch'ing-shih 1978):4-27.
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West?29 I believe there are several reasons from the outset to question an assumption that the structureswere similar. The firstreason is that the numbers do not bear out this equation. The Da Qing Huidian of 1899 lists 20,000 officialsserving in civil service posts. 30 The population for that period is usually calculated at 450,000,000. That works out to be a ratio of .000044 to 1, or one half of an officialfor every ten thousand persons approximately or 5 officialsfor everyone hundred thousand persons. It is known, of course, that in imperial China the civil service was verysmall and that the unofficial "sub-bureaucracy"was much larger. But even if the sub^bureaucracywere added, the total number of officials is still very modest. Bastid, using the calculations of a number of at 1.5 million. people, estimates the total size of the sub-bureaucracy That figureincludes servants, runners, secretaries,everybody. Adding this figureto the 20,000 officialsbrings the total up to 3 government related workers out of every ten thousand persons, but that still does not approach European standards. What were the comparable figuresfor Europe? Though hardly an administrativestate then, France in 1665 still had 46,000 state officials in a population of 20,000,000. This makes 2 officials for every thousand people. In the late 1700s, on the eve of the French Revolution,therewere 300,000bureaucrats in France, which included minor city scribes and gate keepers, in a population of around 31 That makes a ratio of 7.5 state paid workersfor every 40,000,000. thousand persons. France had the highest ratio, but in the same period England's ratio was 1.5, Prussia's was 2, and Spain's was 3 officials per thousand.32 In the nineteenth centurythe percentageof state workers began rapidly to increase, so that by the turn of the twentiethcentury,all the European states averaged between 20 and 30 state workers for every thousand persons, the same period that China had 3 officialsfor every ten thousand persons. were Their verynumbers would indicate that the Chinese officials not administratorsin the same sense that Western officialswere. But a second reason is even more to the point. AlthoughI counted the so-called "sub^bureaucracy" in the calculations that I made
2 There is, of course, a long and developedliterature on Chinese "bureaudo not wish to argue here and I certainly cracy"and on Chinese"bureaucrats," that thisliterature is inaccurate. The point I am makinghere is similarto that made by S.R. Schram and his collaborators, who have forcefully argued that the discussionsof the Chinesestate "is in part distorted," and that those distortions arise from"misunderstandings of which the causes lie in ourselves."Karl in S.R. Bunger,Forward: The ChineseState betweenYesterdayand Tomorrow, Schram (ed.), The Scope of State Power in China, (Hong Kong: The Chinese of Hong Kong Press, 1985), University p. xviii. 30 MarianneBastid,The Structure of the State in of theFinancialInstitutions the Late Qing,in Schram,The Scope of State Power,p. 70. 31 Fischer and Lundgreen, and Trainingof Administrative The Recruitment Personnel,in Charles Tilly (ed.)f The Formationof National States in Western Eurooe. Princeton: Princeton Universitv Press. 32 The ratiosare calculatedfromthe figures givenby Fischerand Lundgreen, Personnel." "The Recruitment and Trainingof Administrative
ANDSTRUCTURE LEGITIMACY
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above, in fact the sub-bureaucracywas not a part of an official administrativeorganizationpaid for by the state.33 Like property boundaries among landowners, the sub-bureaucracywas customary and pragmatic; it was outside of the "normal" apparatus and was of the staffed by people who did not have any of the quantifications magistrates. This unofficialapparatus developed gradually and into assist the magistratein accomplishinghis tasks, but was formally never strictlyspeaking a part of the state apparatus. In fact, it handled what would be consideredin the West as the most important tax collection,record keeping, aspects of bureaucraticadministration: and local pacification. The central governmentdid not pay people to do these tasks,but ratherthe magistratehimselfpaid people to do them out of his own pocket, from the unauthorized surplus gained throughtax collection. This sort of informalarrangementcompletely runs counter to the logic of Western political structure. It is the very antithesis of "rational administration," if by that term we mean the developmentof systematictop-downcommand structures. Is the Chinese political structurea "failed bureaucracy?" Is it an illogicallyarranged distortion of what developed in a pristineway in the West, a corruptioncaused by, as Weber saw it, the presence of 34 Or do we need to underan exaggeratedcase of patriarchalism? stand Chinese political structure in light of differentconcepts? After all, Chinese imperial organization,the longest lived political system in history,is hardly a failure from the point of view of longevity. IV If one grants,then, a certain validity to the argument that one should expect there to be large conceptual, as well as empirical, differencesbetween Western and Chinese political structure,then what concepts are suitable for analyzing the Chinese case? The place to begin is with Chinese instead of Western concepts, and no concept is more important in determiningthe content of social action than xiao. Xiao is, in fact, the phenomenological counterpart to the Western concept of power.35 Xiao should be defined broadly,as the obligation to obey the duties of one's "role" as that role is defined within explicit sets of dyadic roles.36 In
33 For detailedinformation see T'ung-tsu on the sub-bureaucracy, Ch'u, Local Mass.: Harvard University Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge, Press, 1962)and JohnR. Watt. The DistrictMagistratein Late Imperial China (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1972). 34 This is describedin detail in Hamilton, Patriarchalism in Imperial China and WesternEurope: A Revision of Weber's Sociology of Domination." 35 For more detail,see Hamilton, od. at., dd. 410418. 36 One of the most troublesome, and indeedquestionable, aspect of this essay is my use of the Western conceptsof role theory. I suspect,by merelyusing Chinese case I am the but role that the terminology, somewhat, misinterpreting theoryseems as generaland as nearlycomparableto the Chinese situationas that I am aware of. Nonetheless a word of warning any theoretical terminology is in order.
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Chineseclassical politicalthought, of the role sets, the legitimacy such as the parent/child is question. Every relationship, 'beyond personis morally requiredto submitto thesenaturalroles; refusal to do so threatens the entire moralorder. This logic is generalized as a whole. Politto politicalstructure in ical roles are defined, and are embedded in terms, largely dyadic roles. Acof complementary, largernetworks mutually supportive is as I will describebelow,Chinesepoliticalorganization cordingly, best characterized roles arranged as a series of institutionalized One can betterunderstand this sort of hierarchy hierarchically. line and block it in opposition to theWestern conceptually by setting modelof the administrative state,and a way to do thatis compare it to a structurally similartypeof organization foundin the West, the organization of universities.Such a comparison betweenthe of Western schoolsand theChinese stateis notwithout organization some foundation, because the ideology of educationlies at the very core of Confucianism. and administrators formdistinct of Students, faculty, categories and different rules and regulations individuals, applyto individuals in each category.Within thereis, in theory, no distinct universities, chainofcommand from theadministrator in chargedown emanating to everystudent. Instead, each person in each categoryfulfills theirown duties,whichare separate,distinct, but complementary. The focusin the university is supposedly the students and not the and the educationalsystemideallyworks for the administrators, overallbenefit of students and of society in general;and the administrators and faculties ideallyserve the goal of studenteducation. Thereis, of course,a system of domination within schools. present Administrators influence the faculty and faculty certainly members, members influence but the system of domination students, certainly is not, strictly a manifestation of the will of the adminspeaking, istrator in charge, but rather growsout of needsof thosebeingeduthemselves and the orderly cated,the students processof education. This so-called"serviceorientation" a centriststrucde-emphasizes ture and places, instead, considerableinfluence in the hands of - of faculties educators in Western universities and of the scholar/ in imperial China. manager(shi/guan) I will call thistypeof politicalorganization a "statushierarchy." This organization consistsof a hierarchically set of roles arranged thatare largely self-contained and thatare not linkedby an explicit commandstructure.It is important to note thatthe Chinesehave of this type of organization: the many symbolicrepresentations carvedivory ball thatcontains balls within free-floating free-floating a box within a box. balls; the nesting boxes,whichis a box within The outer one containsthe innerones withoutbeing directly or attached. physically In a simplified as illustrated in FigureOne, this system of form, autonomous functional, nestingboxes or inner spheressymbolizes
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the Chinesepoliticalsytem. This conception of a statushierarchy the to corresponds OHK FIGURE OF CHINESE DEPICTION MPEBIALSTATESIBUCTtflB
UmUA EnPEROB HMRNNIZES

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of the composition Confucian classification of the politicalcomthe late imperial munity during period. Thereare fourmain status to formthe nesting box positions, onlythreeof whichfittogether of the Chinesepoliticalcommunity. The fourpositions conception are the emperor tianzi),officials (huangdi, {bai(guan),commoners (waireri). xing),and outsiders What followsis an attempt, well-known inforusing generally Chinesepoliticalstructure based upon mation,to reconceptualize of statushierarchy.I will briefly this conception describeeach of the fourstatuspositions, as represented in FigureTwo, and then of thisnesting box system of political analyzetheinstitutionalization organization. Commoners centerof theChinese At thesymbolic is not politicalorganization for the comthe ruler,but ratherthe people. The classification monerstatus positionis usuallyregardedas a depiction of stratas a division of thehumancommubut it is better ification, regarded roles necessary for the maintenance of occupation nityinto distinct These roles are and an orderly scholar, artisan, peasant, society. merchant.
156 FIGURETUO
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Much has been made of the hierarchical arrangementof these roles, an emphasis that would makes this system similar to the estate systemin feudal Europe. The emphasis is largelymisplaced. On the one hand, the estate system blocked the mobility of individuals from roles and defined their position in legalistic terms. On the other hand, different roles within the commonerstatus group does not imply, in late imperial China, any barriers to individual the moral, as well as the functional, but ratherdid identify mobility,
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behaviorof people in those roles. In imeprialChina,commoners and in fact,move fromrole to role,but to be a could,in theory to act in a peasant,or any of the otherroles was, morally, scholar, to do particular things. particular ways and, normatively, of so thatthebehavior Each of theseroleswas further specified, how about a peasant, for instance,includedon-going speculation role theyoccupied,however, peasantsoughtto live. In whatever commoners were expectedto remain dutifulto the fundamental within of obligations principles life,mostbasic of whichconcerned to to one's parents thefamily, and, in the case of women, especially one's husband. Not to obey these dutieswas to put into question one's veryhumanity. In Europe, the king's court had jurisdiction over both nobles and commoners, but in China each status group was, in theory, witheach actingaccording to themorality self-maintaining, implied roles. Only in serious disturbances their could offiby respective of cials or the emperor himself in the affairs intervene legitimalety commoners.All commoners were directly and could be controlled legitimately punishedby their own parents and senior lineage who may reach theirdecisionin a lineage council. (A members, Chinesesayingputs it like this: "All nationshave laws, all clans In additionto control commoners regulations.") groups, by kinship mechain different roles were subjectto controlby dispute-solving which to thatrole. Peasantshad their nismsinternal councils, village in southern Chinaoftenoverlapped witha kinship group. Artisans and merchants intoguildsand regional associations, orgaorganized nizations whichcould createregulations and punishoffenders. Only whendisputescould not be resolvedinternally did cases go to the for resolution. Officials resolvecivil disofficials would normally blame on thebasis of the moral putes and perhapsassigncriminal offia family, breachedin the case. If the case involved principles if cials would invoke kinshipprinciplesand lineage regulations; the check the case involved merchant specific activities, might they thathad been broken. guildregulations An important, illusdiscussions recurring questionin philosophic tratesthe relation between commoner and official statusesand the nature of status roles in general. The question concernswhich an official's comes first, to the emperor, whichis based obligation or his obligation whichis based to his parents, upon loyalty (zhong), takesprecedence (xiao). Whichrole and roleprinciple uponfiliality is not important to this discussion, althoughI should note that scholars and statesmen came downon bothsides of theissue. What is important here is thattheveryissue emphasizes the gap between statuspositionsand the distinctive, separatemoral natureof each the Chinesepartially resolvedthe official's role. In imperial times, and state by requiring that an official role conflict betweenfamily resignhis post upon the death of a parent,so thathe, a sa comcould perform his family moner, obligations. In the end, being a
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commoner was the most basic status,the sine qua non of civilized the centeraround which the rest of the political order society, revolved. Officials The officials themoralsphere occupiedthesecondstatusposition, located betweenthat of the emperor and that of commoners.In thissphere, in theWestern Chineseofficials werenot administrators sense of thatterm, but rather were educators and judges,exemplars par excellence.This factis clearly by theirsmallnumbers suggested and by the factthatthesenumbers did not increaseas theydid in theWest. Their very numberswould indicate that the Chinese officials the werenot administrators whose responsibility was to implement orders. Indeed,the official rationaleforhavingofficials emperor's in the first out his place was not to servethe emperor by carrying but instead,to serve the emperorby settinga moral commands, discussions thepeople. Thereare lengthy exampleand by educating in the Confucianclassics and later commentaries about how to becomeworthy ofbeingsucha scholar/manager and how to perform theduties oftherole. Theimportant that, pointhereis to understand in theChinese roletlowed thefunctionality of theofficial conception, fromits profound was a ethical and moral content. Officialdom status position that, in principle,demanded of individualsthe It was not a group of funchighestlevel of moral commitment. tionaries, people with technicalduties,as it was in the Western sense of bureaucrat.37 As with the commoner's sphere,the official's sphere was also separate fromother spheresand was, in theory, self-maintaining. It was farremoved from theposition of commoners, who in facthad into this statusposition, but it was even furverylimitedmobility therremoved fromthatof the emperor. Officials had no mobility whatsoever into thatposition, not even in the case of an emperor who had lost themandate of heaven. Commoners could conceivably become an official by provingtheirmoral qualifications; theyhad to pass through severallevels of examinations and onlythenwere for apointment to serve the emperor in an official theyconsidered theexaminations and appointment, theofficial would capacity. After a "riteof passage" whichwould normally culminate in go through an audiencewith,and a pledgeof loyalty to, the emperor. Besides beingseparatedfrom otherstatuses, the role of officials a distinctive had, in theory, self-maintaining partto play in attaining and order. The responsibility of the officials was not to harmony as would be the case in a Europeanstate. governthe commoners, Instead,the defining qualityof theirrole was loyalty (zhong)to the
37 For the originsof the Westernconcept of bureaucrat, see Bendix's essay on "Bureaucracy" in ReinhardBendixand Guenther Roth.Scholarshipand Partiof California sanship(Berkeley:University Press. 1971).
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and in the Chinesesystemthis meantthat theywere to emperor, be exemplars, settingthe moral standardsto which commoners shouldaspire. This was fundamentally the dutiesof an educator, not an administrator. If one examinesthe regulatory amongthe apparatusestablished one discoversa systemdesignedto controlthe officials officials, and to keep them to hold themto theirresponsibilities themselves, can make virtuous and honest. Onlya greatamountof imagination whosepurposewas to extend it intoa system the ruler'spowerinto local society.For instance, rulers of late themostdespotic byrepute both establishedtheir imperialtimes,Ming Taizi and Yongzheng, methodsto regulatethe activities of high reputations by divising to controlcommoners at all. not by attempting rankingofficials, Ming Taizi even went so far as confinehis districtmagistrates to thecounty themfrom seat,forbidding goinginto the countryside and "disturbing the people." Yongzheng and extensively improved used the palace memorialsystem, so that officials could secretly the corruption of otherofficials.As Silas Wu concludes, "In report the Qingimperial the keyfacetof politicalcontrol was government, controlover the high-ranking whichwas designedin bureaucrats," thatthegovernment partto meet"theChinese people'svalue demand fulfill its responsibilities."38 as ThomasMetzger Moreover, shows, the regulatory mechanism that controlled the behaviorof officials was restricted to people of that status.39 It was not a part of a general legal framework applicableto all, but ratherwas aimed at statusgroup. In short, this specific the state apparatus, so famous in the West as a first at creating an administrative state, attempt is perhapsbetterseen as a framework of ranks,procedures, and a self-contained, status group. regulations creating self-regulating The revenues land taxation made theofficials gainedfrom largely As individuals werenotdependent self-sustaining. they uponstipends bestowedupon them by the emperor. Instead, the entiresalary and support forofficials werehandledby officials.Apropos systems of theirdutyto provideforpeace in the empire, also the officials used rice gainedfromtaxation which forthe state granary system, such naturaldisasters as droughts provided peoplewithfoodduring and floods. Emperor "Tian gao huangdi is far yuan" (Heavenis highand the emperor the identifies away) is a common expressionthat symbolically of theemperor in theChinese position political system.The emperor is called the "son of heaven,"and as emperor he had earned the "mandateof heaven." In relationto other groups,the emperor
3 Silas H.L. Wu. Communication and Imperial Controlin China (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1970), p. 117. 39 ThomasA. Metzger, The InternalOrganization (Camof CKing Bureaucracy bridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1973).
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"holds up heaven/'and his sphere of responsibility was tianxia, beneathheaven. The emperor's everything explicitdutiesincluded most prominently his personalritualworshipof heaven,whichhe alone performed twiceeach year at the Altarof Heaven. The emto dutiesin relation peroris, then,the closest to heaven, performs heaven,and occupies the role of the outermost spherecomprising the Chinesepoliticalcommunity. Thereare a number of concrete of thispositioning. manifestations The emperor had theresponsibility forall relations withnon-Chinese outsiders. One aspect of this was the tribute and another system, of wars theemperors' control of foreign the including waging policy, on the frontier.Another could be seen in spatial manifestation terms. In relation to otherpeople,the emperor was alwaysup. In courthis seat was physically in an elevatedon a dais, and officials audiencewere requiredto remainon theirknees. Even any reference to the emperor or his desires"was alwaysseparated and from, elevatedabove (taitou),the rest of the lines of any document in whichit appeared."40 The emperor's spherewas not occupied by himalone. In theory, at least, his sphere,like the others,was autonomousand selfmaintaining.He was sustainedby imperialhouseholdestatesand by revenuesgained fromforeigntrade, some types of domestic trade(e.g.,licensing salt merchants) and particular enterhousehold of porcelain. He was servedby prises,such as the manufacture particular bondservants, typesof household personnel (e.g.,eunuchs, and disstaff relatives)who providedadvice, clerical help, and all mannerof personalservicefor him and the entireimperial family. The emperor, in residencewithinthe imperialhousehold, was phyas well as offisicallyseparatedfromall contactwithcommoners, of ritual tasks at predetermined cials, exceptin the performance sites. In theory, the emperor harmonized the relations between heaven, and mankind.In fulfilling theseobligations, heaven. he served earth, Fromthe affairs of everyday life,he was faraway,as faras heaven is high. UnlikeWestern rulers,such as Louis XIV, the Sun King, the Chineseemperor was not the centerout of whichthe flowand meaningof life radiated. Instead,he was the outer sphere,the so to speak,thatensuredthatthe flowof other protective covering, and peaceful.41 peoples' lives would be orderly
40 RichardJ. Smith,China's CulturalHeritage,The Ch'ingDynasty, 1644-1912 (Boulder. Colorado: WestviewPress. 1983Vd. 33. 41 As JamesL. Watsonshows,however, commoners accepted the completely notionthat the emperorwas far away,but this also suggestedto themthat the outside the norms of ordinary emperorwas "a remote and dangerousentity, human compassion." ("Wakingthe Dragon: Visions of the Chinese Imperial State in Local Myth," in Hugh Baker (ed.). Maurice FreedmanMemorialIssue, Journalof the Anthropological Society of Oxford. Forthcoming, 1988). This "normative" view of the emperoraccords perfectly commoners's withthe notion that the emperoroccupies a distinctive, status position that is distant from life and that normally has nothing to do with that life; this is a view ordinary view of European commoners. that "normative" quite different
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Outsiders
The last status position is that of the outsider. This is the status of individuals who, although they live within boundaries of China, and were not regarded as full members of the political community, thus had no legitimateplace within it. Lacking an exact role, and thus not needing to act according to precise, predeterminedmoral principles made this an extremelyuseful category of people in a political order in which there are large gaps between rigorously definedstatus groups. Outsiders in China had served the very imby portant inside role of being status intermediaries(zhongjianreri), bridgingthe gaps between status positions. Using people that had no standing within the political communityfacilitated such communicationbetween status roles as would otherwise result in a loss of "face" for both parties. Outsider were sub-classifiedinto people who are not ethnically Chinese (non-Han) or who, for a number of reasons, were not Chinese, were ethically Chinese. This last group, the not-ethically the ones most often used as status intermediaries,but not exclufromMarco Polo on can testify. sively so, as a long line of foreigners These people were categorized as "mean people" (jianmiri), which is a classificationthat implies some form of heterodoxyor fundamental disreputability. Examples of these people include slaves, eunuchs, prostitutes,and a number of semi-hereditary occupations, including bandits, revolutionaries,and yamen runners. People in this group were ineligible to sit for the civil service examinations, as all commonerswere able to do regardless of their occupation or conditionin life. Like non-Hanpeople, mean people did not conform to a Chinese way of life or were excused from acting in a fully to push them beyond Chinese manner,both of which were sufficient the bounds of reputability, and hence made them useful when procedures of decorum would not work. V How did these four status positions functionin regard to the operation of the state? In this final section, I want to examine of power in brieflyone dimension regardingthe institutionalization the Chinese imperial state, namely the justificationand transmission of orders. In order to highlightthe distinctivenessof the Chinese political system, I will begin with a contrast with Western state structure. Were the Chinese systembased on a centristconception of political power, then one would expect the emperor to be in charge of an which in turn governscomthe officialdom, administrative structure, moners on behalf of the emperor and in relation to his commands. Let us call this manner of organizingauthorityrelationshipsa "com11
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and the typeof organization mand structure," arisingfromsuch a an "administrative commandstructure bureaucracy." whichis the one usuallyapplied to political This interpretation, of in organaization imperialChina,is, I believe,a misapplication is best viewedas a Western theory. Chinesepoliticalorganization ratherthan a a "status structure" status hierarchy.It represents command structure.In the West,poweris embeddedin command in relationto administrative and is defined Structures jurisdictions those within who have command and to individuals responsibilities have of in individuals power positions Accordingly, jurisdictions. theirwill (as qualified the rightto transmit post) by a particular to otherswithintheirjurisdictions. In China, in contrast, only behavior is allowed. of inappropriate correction basis the legitimate In China,thiskeyidea of correction conveys in variouslocationsin the systemcan direct by whichindividuals else's action. This idea is foundin themostobviousplace, someone itself. "Zhengzhi" is alwayssimply in theverywordforgovernment but the charactersimlpya different as "government," translated for government. than the one withwhichwe are familiar meaning behavior:to or appropriate The rootradicalof zhengmeans correct to be true to form. The otherpart of the character be upright, meansto of the term, meansto follow. "Zhi,"the secondcharacter of describes the system heal,to cure. This term, zhengzhi, precisely in China: The powers are to followcorrectbehavior government thatwhichis incorrect. and to set right themselves but rather notissue from other does in words, commands, Power, fromconformity. JacquesGernetand Bastid argue that forChina and equilibrium, not maintain '"To governis to regulate, harmony to commandand compel.' We are led to thinkof the opposition betweenthe power of constraint (kratos) which definespolitical and the Chinesenotionof government: zhi,to govpowerin Greece, the flowof to to ern,signifies especially regulate literally regulate, to treatand to heal."42 The Emperor water, governed by correcting laws in the Europeansense. not by issuingpositive and by healing, did issue instrucChinese law the maker, emperor Thoughnot a of a classification tions. Leon Vandermeersch imperialedits, gives sensewouldseemto be commands.In China, in theWestern which, of sovereign decisions"in no way denotes thesecategories however, fundamental laws of natureinsofar refer to the laws; (they) positive The deconductof government." as theseare modelsforthe right of the models and not use of and standards, issuing laws, velopment is at the centerof imperialdecisions. In a key passage, Vanderoflaw withtheChinesenotion notion contrasts meersch theWestern of ritualorder. social different of the ritualorderis altogether The principle - which - rites are in thatorder, are modeled uponforms relations,
42 Schram (ed.), The Scope of State Power, p. xxxi.
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of things. Onlyin conformity the reasons (li, principles) with those reasons can the world function harmoniously.Once the rites have been respected,and harmonyhas therebybeen introducedinto each individual behaves as is most fitting for society, spontaneously all and for himself to ....Peopleare persuadedto subject themselves theritesby the prestige and the imposing forms of the greatest cereand by the ascendancy, and the example,of the highest monies, perThisis whythemostimportant edicts sonagesof thesocial hierarchy. are thosewhichconcern celebrations and thosewhich greatliturgical involvegreat dignitaries.The sovereign, being in possessionof the on each occasion,the conductof those Way,has only to determine, whoare to givetheexample. This is decidedon thebasis of their place in thehierarchy, and therestfollowsof itself. The Chinese, afterall, have alwaysupheldas theirmodeltheadministrator who neverintervenes in the affairs of thosewhomhe administers, the latteracting, underthe influence of his virtue, in spontaneous withthe conformity normsof the social order. Lu, the Chinesetermfor law, properly - constants denotesthe laws of musicalharmony of the social order, of pitch are constantsof the harjust as certainproportionalities monicorder.43 The political system in China was founded upon correction and of commands. healing, as opposed to commands and administration How was such a system institutionalized? As described above each within it a self-regulating group has institutionalized capacity. Parents had the responsibilityin regard to their children, and hence have legitimatepower over them when they act inappropriately. In late imperial times a parent could even put their child to death if he or she violated the behavior required by xiao (filiality). District which were known colloquially as "parental officials"(fumu officials, had a similar relationshipwith commoners within their disguari), tricts. If parents or officialsfailed to act and if their subordinate's misbehavior caused a public disorder, then higher ranked persons could become involved. A lineage council imay be called to discipline the child, and the officialwould likely be removed and punished by higherrankingofficials or the emperor himself. As disorder spreads, more and higher ranked people become involved in restoringorder,while others may 'be punished for allowing the disorder to continue. This type of political system rests on a presumption of clear, well definedroles in which authority,in principle, is invoked only when role incumbentsdo not fulfill theirduties. As can be recognized this arrangement in maintaining, immediately, mightbe veryeffective the status quo, but would be very ineffective when decisions literally, made at the top need to be carried out quickly and efficiently by people in other status groups. It is in this regard that we can understand the informalsystems of decision-making and of transmission of orders that developed over
43 Schram (ed.), The Scope of State Power,p. 13.
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time in the Chinese state. These often complex informal systems circumventedthe two major status gaps that existed in the Chinese the firstbetween the emperor and officialsand the status hierarchy, second between officialsand commoners. In each informalsystem two channels of communicationand transmissiondevelop, a direct betweenunequals, and an indirect one allowingformalcommunication one allowing informalcommunicationthroughstatus intermediaries. I will brieflydescribe each of these systems. In late imperial times, but particularlyduring the Qing period, the last dynasty,the emperors Gangxi and Yongzheng desired a method of direct communication with high ranking officials that between the emperorand official. allowed a measure of confidentially Before that time audiences and memorials to the emperor were ritualistic and were handled largely by officialsfor their own purposes. Gangxi began to develop a secret memorial system,which allowed the top officials to write to him without other officials knowing of the communication. The documents, which were supposedly formal greetings to the emperor, were read only by the emperor and a few household officials. During the reign of Yongzheng, who followed Gangxi, the secret memorial system was rouwho were "inner tinized,and a special group of household officials, grand secretaries," were established as the Grand Council to read the secret memorials, then to advise the emperor about possible courses of action, and to transmitdocuments signed by the emperor to the appropriatelocation in the status apparatus of officialdom. The second aspect of this informalsystem between the emperor with officials and officialswas the indirectmeans of communicating documents. Since very early times, and with and of transmitting great consistencyin the last two dynasties,the standard means of communicatingbetween the emperor and officialwas by a "messenger" from the imperial household. Most of these messengers were eunuchs, and sometimes in the Qing, bondservants. Especially during the Ming dynasty,these status intermediariesmanaged all aspects of the indirect contacts between the emperor and officials. For example, according to Robert Crawford, and Hsiao-tsung From 1471to 1497,Hsien-tsung (1488(1465-1488) held ministers.Wu-tsung withtheir heldno audiences (1506-1522) 1506) about no audiencesas he was morefrequently engagedin wandering in disguise. For forty-five (1522-1567) years of his reign,Shih-tsung held only one audience. From 1589 to 1602,Shen-tsung (1573-1620) met his ministers only once and this because of an attempton the Heir Apparent's life.44 Without audiences, however, the governmentdid not cease, as it - the infamous would have in Europe, because status intermediaries Ming eunuches- advised the emperor, draften and delivered cor44 RobertB. Crawford, Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty, "T'oung Pao" 49 p. 115. (1961-62),
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served as the emperors'guards and doormen, respondenceto officials, the managed imperial estates, watched over the emperors' fiscal interests in foreign and domestic trade, administered the imperial treasury, and sometimes led the emperors' armies and navies.45 Throughout the imperial period, these officiallydisreputable individuals served as eyes, ears, and hands of the emperor in all his indirect contacts with the world outside of the imperial household. earned the undyingenmityof officials, In so doing,these go-betweens whose writingsconsistentlydamn their presence. This type of informalsystem used to circumventthe status gap between emperor and officialis repeated for the relations between officialsand commoners. As Fei Xiaotong writes, the office of the - so high, indeed, that no ordimagistrate"was as high as the sky " nary person could reach up to it! 46 Magistrates,nonetheless,routinely made direct, but informal contact with commoners through informal discussions held with the group of commoners who held the role of scholar. These individuals were degree-holders (shenshi), people who had passed one of the levels of examinations,but who held no appointmentin officialdom. Both being cultivated (in the Chinese meaningof that term),officialand local scholars could meet on common ground. Though certainlynot on the same level, they could nonetheless informallycircumventthe gap that lie between them by virtue of their common training. Moreover,scholars were the only group of commonersthat could freelyenter the site of the magistrate's office and, as Ch'u T'ung-tsuwrites, "it was the only group that could legitimatelyrepresentthe local communityin discussing local affairswith the officialsand in participating in the governingprocess."47 The exchange of informationwas informal but was decisive nonetheless, because there was no other direct channel by which desires on either side could be communicated. The indirectmeans of communicationbetween officialsand commoners handled by far most of the contact between the two groups. the As with the indirectcontact between the emperor and officials, indirectcontact at this level was made throughstatus intermediaries. In the words of Fei Xiaotong, Those who made the actual contact between the yamen (the office)and the people, the ruler and the ruled, were magistrate's servants(yayi)occupied the servants of the officials. These officials one of the lowest positionsin the Chinese social scale; theywere of mostof theircivilrights, and theirsons were not allowed deprived to take theexaminations.It is significant pointin the Chinesepower
45 Crawford, and Decisionop. cit.; also see Jung-pang Lo, PolicyFormulation Peace ana War.in CharlesO. Hucker(ed.), Chinese Makingon Issues Respecting in MingTimes(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Government pp. 41-72. Press,1969), 46 Fei Xiaotong.China's Gentry(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). p. 80. 47 Ch u, Local Government, p. 168.
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G.G. HAMILTON
structure thatthesemenwho werein the position of mosteasily 48 abusedpower should havebeenheldso low. Indicativeof such intermediaries in Chinesesociety, those having the mostcontactwithnon-scholar commoners were the lowestranked. "Lictors, footmessengers, horsemen, ...,coroners, jailers,doorwere rankedverylow, men,archers"and otherssimilarly employed but "the policemenoccupiedthe most inferior positionof all the 49 That policemenwere so lowly ranked,a runners." government to theirchildren as well,is a clear indication stigmathatextended of the status-violating in a politicalsystem tasks theyperformed as a statushierarchy.Were the Chinesestate organized organized as an administrative systemwith an explicitcommandstructure, thosefuncions runners and yamen handled by suchpeopleas eunuchs wouldbe in the hands of those honoredamongall others. VI Max Weber's political sociologycontains deeply seated Eurocentricbiases, but Weber's equally deep insightsinto the nature basis by of politicalorganizations a theoretical of all typesprovides can be order whichClifford notionof non-Western Geertz's political and extended. Geertz'sanalysisof the Balinese reconceptualized theatrestate,Negara,also can be applied to China. The Chinese stateis fully a non-Western state; like Negara,the Chinesestate is based uponprinciples Western from thoseundergriding quitedistinct and to use onlyWestern politicalsystems, conceptsto understand these politicalordersis to misunderstand thementirely. is much said one must also thatthere But,having that, emphasize to distinguish The between theChinese and Balinesestatestructure. in imperial elitesin Negaraare aristocrats ofbirth; political byvirtue China,theyare scholarsby virtueof passingthe examination.In was an "exemplary center"the verymodelof Negara,the emperor while good behavior. But in China,this role fell to the scholars, the emperor was distantand activein creating orderin the world. Whilethere was certainly theemperor's at court, pompand ceremony presencedid not come frommereprestige. He had the obligation to correct disorder in the world,and in thisrole he and his forces could be terrible, the his intermediaries, and cruel. Through fierce, had his personalarmies,could claim vast imperiallands, emperor and had his own sources of revenuesand supplies. The emperor was not a passive observer he or a royalrecluse. To commoners, was dragonthathad best be leftasleep.50
^8 Fei. China's Gentry, d. 80. 49 Ch'u, Local Government, p. 62.
so Watson, "Waking the Dragon."
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betweenGeertz'sand Weber's Thereis also much to distinguish to approaches comparative analysis. Geertz too oftensubstitutes for probingcontrasts. He drama for concepts,deep descriptions what the West is makes Negara into a metaphor that symbolizes not. But such a metaphorical framework is not,at the same time, that a comparative framework. ofconcepts Geertz his analysis strips would allow the East and West to be juxtaposed,so that the differences can be exploredand explainedmore fully. In this sense a "theatre" as an intellectual is really state;however Negara, product, Geertz'scharacterization containsmuch theatrical brilliant, performance and too littleintellectual substance. Weber can be justly fornot criticized his analysis, forleaving out too muchhistory from into cultural Indeed, diggingdeeply enough meaningpatterns. Geertz'sand Foucault's writingsadd depth to Weber's insights. Weber'sframework does not substitute fordeep structural Although and those areas of theoretical analysis,it does, however, identify substantive significance upon whicha deep structural analysiscan proceed. Withoutcareful theoretical preparationbased upon a cultural and comparative analysis, analysis is often directionless reconstructions and strangely empty. That is because theoretical historical are not separateexercises, but ratherare both revisions the humancondition. aspects of the singularact of understanding In this regard, historical, comparative analysishas a large part to the theatrestate of Bali, as well as the distant play in analyzing in imperialChina. emperor Department of Sociology Davis University of California, et GraduateInstitute of Sociology TunghaiUniversity

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Heaven Is High and the Emperor Is Far Away Legitimacy and Structure in the Chinese State Author(s): Gary

GARY G. HAMILTON With the Assistance of BEN-RAY JAI AND HSIEN-HENG LU

LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

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LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

UmUA EnPEROB HMRNNIZES

PARENTS AND HUSBANDS HABffONlZE FAHILIES

G.G.HAMILTON IN LATE IflKSlftL CHI Or STATUSHIEBABCH* SlimftRS

OUT1 RITUfiL 3ERME HEMPEN

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CORRECT OFnCIALS * ESTARUS*

SLAUES, QJNUCHES, RONDSERWAHTS, MO RELATIUES

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SERMI PARENTS AND HUSBANDS

OUTSIDERS jf A. FOREIQfERS ItEAN PEOPLE EUMJCHES VANEI1 R. SLAMES

LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

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LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE

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