Contents
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Patterns of authoritarianism Post-Zia period and the return to democracy The breakdown of Presidential rule Conclusion Notes and references
The assassination of General Zia-ul-Huq heralded the return of democracy to Pakistan. The military's withdrawal, however, was without regrets or remorse. Instead, General Mirza Aslam Beg publicly justified the army's interventions and argued for legal means whereby the army could return. He claimed that the military intervened only `to clear the mess created by the political parties' and wanted a `permanent constitutional role for the army'.(n1) His words that civilians were incapable of giving stability to the country, now almost seem prophetic. First, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was ignominiously dismissed by the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Next, Nawaz Sharif appeared to go in a similar manner only to receive a last minute reprieve from the Supreme Court. His reinstatement was accompanied by a most unsightly scramble for power which left the most cynical political observers despondent. Melancholic memories the political crisis of the 1950s were revived, raising deep concerns about the future of democracy in Pakistan. Patterns of authoritarianism As a historical generalization military-bureaucratic involvement in politics took on two forms. There were phases when the civil-military oligarchy interfered covertly and when this proved to be inadequate for their purposes they intervened' directly into the body politics. It was in the 1950s when these parameters were forged and they continue influence Pakistani politics today. The indirect option was adopted when it was realized by the praetorian guards that the balance of power was unfavourable for an army takeover. Precisely for this reason the military-bureaucratic oligarchy interfered in politics to alter the equilibrium in their favour. In the 1950s the military-bureaucratic combine tried to manipulate, with some success, the political process to form pro-establishment and pro-US coalitions. The first victim of this strategy was the Prime Minister Nazimuddin. The oligarchy, led by the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, and backed by General Ayub Khan, encouraged the Chief Minister of the Punjab, Mumtaz Daultana, to rebel against the Prime Minister.(n2) With public confidence in Nazimuddin severely shaken by the disturbances in the Punjab Ghulam Mohammad was able to dismiss him with little resistance. Institutional and regional interests were behind the oligarchy's actions. Once in control they made two major policy initiatives. First, they adopted a pro-US foreign policy which eventually led Pakistan into a series of military alliances, such as CENTO and SEATO. The subsequent military and economic aid turned the balance of power into the oligarchy's favour, thus preparing the ground for direct military rule. Second, they promulgated a centralized constitution in 1956--with One Unit as its centre piece. The constitution dramatically enhanced the powers of the centre at the expense of the provinces, neutralized the possibility of East Bengal exerting political dominance and the President was made significantly more powerful than the Prime Minister. These changes, however, were arrived at without political
consensus or ratification by the electorate. In the search for legitimacy President Iskander Mirza created a `palace party', the Republican Party, which he intended to lead to victory in the impending general election. Consequently he used his office to interfere actively in the political process in order to create loyal coalitions. His actions led to the disintegration of the political process and a dramatic increase in anti-centre opposition particularly in East Pakistan. When it became clear that Shaheed Suhrawardy probably would come to power in a free general election Mirza opted for direct military rule. However, once martial law was declared Mirza's protege, Ayub Khan, forced him to resign and took over.(n3) Ayub Khan, in a macabre parody, presented himself as the honest soldier who was going to clear up the political mess. He successfully established the view that parliamentary democracy was unsuitable for Pakistan and discredited the established political elites. Most politicians were barred under Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) and Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) from public life and the bureaucracy became extremely influential behind the facade of military rule. Direct intervention, however, was no panacea and the problems of legitimacy and political stability continued to plague the regime. Ayub's answer was `controlled democracy'. A new political structure which avoided the problems that Mirza was confronted with. The Basic Democracies (BD) system provided the regime a popular veneer, a secure clientele, undertook development work and provided a building block for local government. The 1962 Constitution enveloped the BD system, turning it into an electoral college for presidential and assembly elections. Under the 1962 Constitution the, President was unrestrained by the National Assembly and exclusively supervised and controlled the central and provincial executives. However, he was acutely conscious that his real power base was the army. The new Constitution removed the Ministry of Defence from civilian control and placed it directly under the authority of the President. Moreover the military's loyalty was sustained by high expenditure on defence and by various facilities and perks such as chairmanships of autonomous bodies and ambassadorships. `Controlled democracy' never gained legitimacy and popular support. It was inherently unstable and did not diffuse the political tensions but only exacerbated them. The ban against politicians expired in 1966 and the demand for adult franchise, restoration of fundamental rights and revision of the Constitution to reflect popular consensus became more vociferous. In the case of East Pakistan the regime was associated with West Pakistani domination which led to the buildup of anti-centre opposition. In West Pakistan the impact of the 1965 war undermined the regime. There was great despondency over the Tashkent Declaration, and the cutting of US military aid compounding with the economic cost of the war was ruinous for the country. Ultimately Ayub's regime failed because it was unable to generate popular support and he was forced to hand over power to the Commander-in-Chief, General Yahya Khan. His regime could not restore the defunct institutions which Ayub had created. Nor was the continuation of martial law feasible and only a general election could defuse the political crisis. The military tried to retain the initiative through the Legal Framework Order. It required that the Constitution had to be presented to the President within 120 days for approval. It was assumed that no party would win a clear mandate, thus allowing the army to dictate it terms. Mujib-ur-Rahman's landslide victory in East Pakistan upset this calculation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, however, won a majority in West Pakistan and was unwilling to accept Mujib as Prime Minister and boycotted the Constituent Assembly. This allowed the militarybureaucratic oligarchy to regain the initiative. The combine were extremely hostile to the autonomy demands explicitly expounded in the Six Points and they opted for a military option. Ultimately Ayub's policies resulted in the breakup of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh.(n4)
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's rule represented an interregnum in this pattern of overt and covert intervention. There was a shift of power back to parliament. The army was demoralized and faced public humiliation after its defeat in East Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto was able to exploit these factors and took steps designed to keep military-bureaucratic oligarchy out of civil society. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim, along with others associated with the Yahya regime, were sacked.(n5) The head of state became the Commander-in-Chief and the 1973 Constitution explicitly referred to military takeover as an act of treason. These moves were designed to deter the army's appetite for political power. He also promoted a junior .general, Mohammad Zia-ul-Huq, to the position of Commander-in-Chief. Hoping that this unassuming and unambitious officer would remain loyal to him. Moreover the formation of the, feared, Federal Security Force was intended to free the civilian authorities from dependence on the army for the maintenance of law and order. Similarly the monopoly of the Civil Service of Pakistan was broken by sacking 1300 officers and the merger of the central services into a unified administrative service. Bhutto's nationalization programme and reforms, however, alienated not only the large industrialists but also the middle class from small towns. Small traders who had suffered from the nationalization of flour mills, rice husking, cotton ginning and exporters of rice and cotton now formed the core of the anti-Bhutto campaign. They led the Pakistan National Movement (PNA) mobilization in protest of the rigging of the 1979 elections. Leaders of the PNA, such as Ashgar Khan, appealed to the army to take over. Zia, however, intervened on 5 July 1977 when it became clear that suppression of the PNA movement was creating divisions in the army.(n6) Once in power Zia was confronted with the same basic problems of legitimacy and stability which had troubled Ayub's regime. The postponement of elections became virtually impossible after the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy led a mass agitation in August 1983. Thus he took a leaf from Ayub's book and established his own version of `controlled democracy'. To prepare the move towards civilianizing military rule he first secured a dubious mandate for the presidency by holding a referendum in 1984. This was followed by non-party elections in February 1985 that co-opted conservative forces--landed, business and religious groups--while excluding the opposition. This allowed him to revise the 1973 Constitution particularly those aspects which were prejudicial to the regime. The Restoration of Constitution Order (RCO) was promulgated in March without referral to the new parliament. The main changes were the consolidation of enormous power in the hands of the President at the expense of the Prime Minister. The President nominated the Prime Minister, Chief of Army Staff, Supreme Court Judges, the Governor of the Provinces and had the power to prorogue the National Assembly. Later, the Indemnity Bill was presented to parliament. It offered in return for the withdrawal of martial law complete constitutional protection for all martial law decrees, actions and military courts judgements. Unexpectedly there was resistance to granting a carte blanche and a compromise solution was reached which became the Eighth Amendment. The major concessions that Zia was forced to make was the exclusion of the Political Parties Act from the constitution and the scrapping of the National Council. This effectively prevented Zia from establishing a constitutional role for the army.(n7) Zia's intention was to control the democratic process by wielding the autocratic power invested in the office of the presidency. There were, however, two structural flaws which denied this project stability. Just as in the case of the 1956 Constitution there was continuous friction between the competing ambitions of the President and the Prime Minister, there were
differences between Zia-ul-Huq and Mohammad Khan Junejo. The Prime Minster wanted to establish his credentials independently of Zia and attempted to use the Geneva negotiations on the Afghan conflict to project himself as a political figure. His attempts to develop a national consensus on this issue and to investigate the Ojehri Camp explosion put him in to direct collision with the President. On 28 May 1988, a few months before he was assassinated, Zia abrogated the national and provincial assemblies and sacked Junejo. The other fundamental flaw was that the Constitution, like its 1956 and 1962 predecessors, was imposed through coercive means and did not reflect a political consensus. Furthermore the entire edifice established by the military was perceived by many minority nationalities to be the legal cover for Punjabi domination. In 1983 there was a rebellion in upper Sindh against military rule. The long-standing grievances of Sundhis against the centre were exacerbated by the hanging of Bhutto. It made the province resentful of Zia's regime and Sindh became the centre of the democratic opposition. This development combined with the emergence of the Kalashnikov culture, a spin off the intervention in Afghanistan, which raised the degree violence to an unprecedented level. Bhutto's execution triggered off the first agitation but it was not until the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which drew together eight political groups: Peoples Party of Pakistan (PPP), the National Democratic Party (NDP), Tehrik-iIstiqlal and others, that it made a serious impact. PPP's leaders, such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and members from the Talpur and Chandio families, were arrested. The Pir of Hala mobilized his murids and as many as 50,000 followers were involved in the agitation. Sindhi nationalist, Mumtaz Bhutto, was responsible for winning over the support of the Sindhi middle class. The Sindh Awami Tehrik, a left organization led by Rasul Bux Palejo, provided the organization needed to mobilize peasants, students and workers, particularly in Badin, Thatta and Ghotki.(n8) The army cracked down on the increasingly militant and violent agitation and it has been claimed that 20,000 arrests were made.(n9) This action even led to the politicization of dacoits and some of them joined the Jeay Sindh Students Federation (JSSF) and the Sindh Peoples Students Federation (SPSF).(n10) The military's action did not suppress the opposition but hardened it along ethnic lines. The struggle was perceived by many to be the liberation of Sindh from a Punjabi army of occupation. Zia complemented the suppression of the MRD with a divide and rule strategy, which was partially successful. He exploited internal rivalries among Sindhis and was able to wean G. M. Sayed away from the MRD. His hostility to the army was only exceeded by his differences with the PPP. This strategy was effective in reducing the influence of the PPP in the towns. More significantly, Zia's regime via the Intelligence Security Services (ISI) fostered the emergence of the Muhajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) as another powerful bulwark, in the urban areas, against the PPP.(n11) Muhajirs had been complaining that the quota for Sindhis in the civil service restricted their opportunities. Their preponderance in the federal bureaucracy fell from a peak of 30% to 20% after Bhutto acted in favour of Sindhis by introducing a quota for Muhajirs.(n12) Their position in Karachi was further eroded by the advantages gained, at their expense, by Punjabis and Pakhtuns during the Zia period. This led the MQM, initially, to move closer to Sindhis. Even though the Muhajir leadership remained aloof from the MRD campaign they disregarded attempts by the Zia regime to encourage inter-ethnic friction in order to undermine the protest against the government. This resistance was based on the realization that the demands for an increase in jobs, education and patronage by both groups could only come at the expense of the Punjab. Consequently one saw the extraordinary scene in 1986 when MQM leader Altaf Hussain addressed Sindhi nationalists in their stronghold at Liaquat Medical College. This convergence found practical expression when Jeay Sindh
organized blood donation for Muhajir victims of the Aligarh colony massacre. This process, however, collapsed in the post-Zia period with the demise of the PPP-MQM accord.(n13) Post-Zia period and the return to democracy Zia's assassination left the military little choice but to hand over power. The plane crash that killed Zia had decapitated the military high command. General Beg needed time, which he did not have, if he was going to resist the popular demand for the return of democracy. There was also real concern that 11 years of military rule had undermined the army's professionalism, efficiency and prestige. Moreover there was genuine disquiet that the revolts in Sindh required a political solution to avoid travelling down the same slippery slope which had resulted in Bangladesh. They did not, however, dismantle the structures constructed under Zia's regime and these allowed them to manage the political process. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, armed with awesome powers under the Eighth Amendment, made a formidable opponent for Benazir Bhutto. Despite this a countervailing political force was considered necessary. It was claimed that the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was formed by General Hamid Gul, Director General of the ISI on the explicit orders of General Beg. The IJI, a nineparty alliance consisting of both factions of the Muslim League and the Jamat-i-Islami, did not have a clear political programme other than broad support for the Islamization programme. Out of the various contenders for the leadership, the Chief Minister of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif, was returned at the expense of the former Prime Minister, Junejo and the former Premier of the Interim Government Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. This was not surprising as Nawaz Sharif, who along with other young aspiring politicians, had been groomed by General Ghulam Jilani when the latter had been the Governor of Punjab. In 1981 Nawaz Sharif had been invited to become Finance and Sports Minister of the province and after the 1985 provincial elections Zia appointed him Chief Minister of Punjab. Once the militarybureaucratic oligarchy installed their man at the head of the Islamic coalition they used the intelligence agencies to assist his election campaign. Brigadier Imtiaz, Additional Director General of Internal Security of the ISI, played a crucial role in Sharif's campaign, especially in the Punjab.(n14) The fact that Benazir Bhutto won the 1989 elections only demonstrated that the ISI miscalculated the strength of the opposition and the degree of public hostility to all those associated with the old order. The PPP did not have a clear majority in the assembly and the President delayed nominating Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister for 15 days. Nawaz Sharif's claim that he could secure support of independent candidates and form an IJI administration became unsustainable when Benazir Bhutto won over the support of the MQM. Even when faced with this eventuality the military -bureaucratic combine continued to oppose her appointment until they negotiated tacit concessions from her. The result was an emasculated premiership which had in effect surrendered major areas of policy. The military wanted no interference in the nuclear programme, or its support for Afghan and Kashmiri guerillas. Nor was it willing to accept cuts in the defence expenditure running at 40% of the budget. Benazir Bhutto was forced to accept, without reservation, the economic strategy chalked out, which included the International Monetary Fund's conditions for aiding Pakistan. Moreover the opposition controlled the largest province. The fact that the centre did not control the Punjab was a unique situation in Pakistan's history. Benazir Bhutto attempted to topple Nawaz Sharif's government and he retaliated by refusing to accept over 200 federal civil servants sent to Punjab. The centre-province struggle quickly overshadowed all other issues threatening administrative paralysis and in December 1988 under army pressure the two sides agreed to a frosty modus vivendi.(n15)
The Prime Minister chafed at these restrictions and her attempts to bypass them, as expected, led to an acrimonious relations with the President. In her tussle with Nawaz Sharif the IshaqBeg combine actively supported the Chief Minister of the Punjab against her.(n16) This was not her only setback. Benazir Bhutto had to drop her attempts to repeal the Eighth Amendment and was also forced to drop her attempts to retire Admiral Sirohi, Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff Committee. Her efforts to take control of the ISI was also easily thwarted. The Jallabad fiasco, a humiliation for the ISI, led to the replacement of General Hamid Gul by her nominee Admiral Kallue. `No clue Kallue', as nicknamed by PPP leaders, was unable to assert his authority over the organization. In November 1989, however, General Beg delivered a body blow against the government. He was responsible for bringing over the MQM to the opposition. It was claimed that the meeting between Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi of the IJI and Imran Farooq of the MQM was held in Beg's own house. The failure of the BegGul combine to oust Bhutto by passing a no-confidence motion led to a change in tactic. They instead undermined her government by encouraging MQM to destabilize Sindh.(n17) It was over the `mini-insurgency' in Sindh that overt differences with the militarybureaucratic oligarchy developed. There were three elements in the insurgency: bandits, PPP and Sindhi nationalists and MQM. Bandits, at least some of them, had become politicized by developments in 1983 and saw themselves as fighting against a Punjabi occupation army. In the 1989 elections many dacoits threw their lot in with Benazir Bhutto, helping to mobilize voters in support of her in the hope of an amnesty.(n18) Nationalist Sindhis had also fought the 1989 elections under the PPP banner realizing that a nationalist ticket would not get them elected. This element pressurized Benazir Bhutto not to honour the accord with MQM. When MQM joined the IJI it produced a violent response by Sindhi nationalists. The Pucca Qilla massacre of Muhajirs triggered off a vicious cycle of violence. Benazir Bhutto, however, was not prepared to act even-handedly, only arresting MQM activists, which did not improve the law and order situation. The army demanded a free hand in dealing with the problem by being sent in under Article 245 of the Constitution. As it would have alienated Sindhis from her government and leave her at the mercy of the generals, this was refused. She was only prepared to let the army into Sindh under Article 248, which placed them under the jurisdiction of judiciary. Within seven weeks of the massacre President Ghulam Ishaq, with full approval from General Beg, dismissed the government on the spurious grounds of corruption and breakdown of law and order.(n19) After Benazir Bhutto's dismissal an interim federal government was formed headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a member of the IJI alliance. The PPP formed the People's Democratic Alliance (PDA) a coalition with three smaller parties: Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), Malik Qasim faction of the Muslim League and the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh Jafaria (TNFJ). The PDA campaign was limited to the injustice of Benazir Bhutto's dismissal, its organization was weak and it was unable to recover the credibility the PPP had lost while in power. Her government had gained the reputation of being inexperienced and lacking initiative. The fact was that during the brief PPP tenure no reform programme was presented to the National Assembly and it gave the impression of being more interested in jockeying for positions in the government and access to lucrative import/export licences. These factors partly explained the significant swing in IJI's favour. However, there were electoral malpractices. The interim government was in theory supposed to be neutral but in practice the entire state media and machinery backed the IJI campaign. There were also electoral abuses. The electorate were coerced in several constituencies in Sindh, such as Naushero Feroz where Jatoi contested from, and in the crucial province of the Punjab it was claimed that the vote was rigged.(n20)
The breakdown of Presidential rule For the military-bureaucratic combine, the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, was merely a democratic cloak to disguise the regime's authoritarian character. Nawaz Sharif quickly found his position in the troika become untenable. It was evident that the locus of power in the ruling oligarchy had shifted in Ghulam Ishaq's favour. He had dismissed Benazir Bhutto, appointed Jatoi, and supported Nawaz Sharif's elevation to power. During the Gulf War he remained staunchly pro-US and opposed General Beg's pro-Iraqi posturing. Nawaz Sharif's junior status was brought home to him on many occasions. Almost as soon as he became Prime Minister he became aware of his subordinate position. When he tried to abolish the post of Chief Commissioner and Inspector General Police for Islamabad the President informed him that his actions violated the Constitution and his orders should be rescinded.(n21) This incidence set the tone for his term of office with Ghulam Ishaq taking all the important decisions. The President selected General Asif Nawaz Janjua as Chief of Army Staff on Beg's retirement, conducted negotiations with the Chinese and US delegations in 1991 and conferred with the heads of state when visiting Iran and Saudi Arabia. In January 1992 he snubbeid US Senator Pressler by refusing to meet him for his hostile comments concerning Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.(n22) The President was also influential in constructing domestic policy, particularly in Sindh. His strategy, however, contributed to the deterioration of law and order in the province. In Sindh, Jam Sadiq was installed as Chief Minister and with the blessing of Ghulam Ishaq he patched together a coalition. The largest group in his cabinet was MQM and the other components consisted of the supporters of the Pir of Pagara and G. M. Sayed, the Muslim League, independents and PPP dissidents. As the legitimacy of such a coalition was always in question it was accompanied by a crackdown on the PPP. The large-scale arrests led to an increase in alienation from the provincial government. The MQM consolidated its terrorist network and ruled urban Sindh with a mailed fist. The result was criminalization of government and politics. In this power vacuum there was an explosion of kidnapping, dacoities and car thefts. Many of the criminals were patronized by powerful landlords and government officials.(n23) Some of the local police were in the pay of the dacoits and it was suggested that at least 5000 policemen would need to be removed in any clean-up of the police force.(n24) The military eventually had to move into Sindh when it realized that the MQM was taking over the central administration, criminalizing the police and even influencing the intelligence gathering agencies. Two key figures were identified by the army--Irfanullah Marwrat, Adviser to the Home Office and son-in-law of Ghulam Ishaq, and Saleem Shazad, Senior Vice-Chairman of the MQM. Jam Sadiq delayed the army's intervention, fearing the PPP more than the MQM or the dacoits, and in December 1991 warned Altaf Hussain who promptly fled the country.(n25) When the army did move in it was the President this time who delayed action against the MQM as the party's support was required by Nawaz Sharif to pass the budget in May 1992. Complicating the issue was the Tando Bahawal incident, where several innocent Sindhis were killed by the army. The immediate uproar among Sindhis forced the army to restrain its operations in the rural areas. The army was then compelled to turn on its original target but the delays had allowed MQM to disperse its weapon stockpiles and its leadership went underground. The military launched a two-pronged action. On one hand it rounded up the remaining leadership and attempted to disgrace the organization in the eyes of the Muhajir population by opening up its torture chambers to the glare of publicity.
Second it backed the Haqqi faction of the MQM in its attempt to depose the old leadership.(n26) In order to appear even-handed the military also identified other offenders. It wanted the new Chief Minister, Muzaffar Hussain Shah, to dismiss the 800 criminal elements, identified by army intelligence, in the government. He also took no action against the 72 politicians on the army's list, many of whom were closely associated with the government, such as the Pir of Pagara. Consequently the army presented the President with a dilemma. The policy adopted to keep the PPP out of power in Sindh had patently failed and to impose Governor's Rule would eventually lead to a PPP-led alliance forming the government.(n27) The structures on which the President's authority was based were, however, crumbling. Hostility developing between the Premier and President exposed fundamental flaws in the system. Nawaz Sharif attempted to widen his support base within the military-bureaucratic combine. He had already established a position of influence within the Punjab bureaucracy, based in Lahore, during his tenure as Chief Minister and he attempted to expand his influence in the army. The Chief of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Brigadier Imtiaz, was a senior member of the Premier's kitchen cabinet. All important decisions were reached here before being presented to the cabinet for approval. The IB was used to develop a loyal niche in the army. Nawaz Sharif's position improved when he was able to replace General Durrani, the head of the ISI, with Lieutenant-General Javed Nasser.(n28) The latter was a relative and supporter of Brigadier Imtiaz. Ghulam Ishaq, however, put a stop to this gradual encroachment of his authority by getting his candidate, General Abdul Waheed, nominated Chief of Army Staff when General Asif Nawaz suddenly died. Enmity between the two came into the open when the President made it clear that he wanted to renew his term of office. The Prime Minister retaliated by publicly stating that he would only agree if the notorious Eighth Amendment was repealed. Ghulam Ishaq had no intention of allowing his protege to clip his wings and feared that it would ultimately result in his removal from office. Ghulam Ishaq, through Anwar Saifullah, his son-in-law, orchestrated a near rebellion in Nawaz's cabinet and won over ministers to his side. He also wooed the opposition, making it clear that it was their last chance to join an interim government which would take over once the national assembly was dissolved. Eventually the PPP, astonishingly, joined in the negotiations and arch-foes Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam Ishaq put aside their differences. Seeing that his support was melting away Nawaz Sharif was ready to capitulate but the President, now so close to victory, was in no mood to compromise. Sensing that all was lost the Premier rushed to his stronghold in Lahore and made a vitriolic attack on national television against the President accusing him of acting against the elected government. The President retaliated by charge sheeting Nawaz Sharif for corruption and dismissed the government. Balakh Sher Mazari was nominated as Prime Minister of the interim government which included representatives from all the parties including the PPP. To achieve this extraordinary state of affairs Ghulam Ishaq had to swallow his pride and accept Asif Zadari as a cabinet minister. In the desperate struggle to hang on to power the President jettisoned the central plank of his political stratagem, which was to keep the PPP out of office.(n29) Events, however, were slipping out of control for all those involved in this game of musical chairs. The judiciary, still smarting under the humiliations it had suffered during the recent past, were now, to their credit, no longer willing to act as the lap dog of the militarybureaucratic oligarchy. Evidence of this change was apparent when General Beg, under the
threat of contempt proceedings, was forced to retract claims that he had ordered the Supreme Court to reject the Junejo constitutional petition. The court accepted Nawaz Sharif's petition and declared that the President's actions were unconstitutional and that the interim government was illegal. This audacious move by the judiciary has to be seen in context. It was patently clear that there were sharp divisions in the army high command over whom to support and the lack of consensus forced the army to remain neutral.(n30) Another factor inhibiting the military was the threats from the United States that it was contemplating declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. This hardly made it an opportune moment for a coup. The Premier and the President remained locked in mortal combat. The Ghulam Ishaq attempted to regain control of the situation by dissolving the Punjab and Frontier assemblies and installed caretaker governments. This was done in order to restrict Nawaz Sharif's authority to Islamabad. Thus it became imperative for Nawaz Sharif to take control of Punjab, his power base. He passed a resolution, of dubious legality, imposing emergency rule in Punjab. This was declared unconstitutional by the President and has led to paralysis of the administration in the Punjab as it was unclear whose orders to follow--the President's or the Prime Minister's. This uncertainty has led the army to make a clear statement that if this state of affairs continues it will intervene. Benazir Bhutto offered an olive branch to Nawaz Sharif on the condition that elections should be held. With PDA's support Nawaz Sharif could demolish the President by repealing the Eighth Amendment and set Pakistan on course towards a true democracy. The fly in the ointment was that Nawaz Sharif was unlikely, confronted with a hostile President, to win the elections. Consequently he was only prepared to accept Benazir Bhutto's proposal as long as he headed the interim government.(n31) Eventually Abdul Waheed stepped in as the honest broker to break the deadlock and pressurized both Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq to resign. Wasim Sajjad, Chairman of the Senate, assumed the presidency and Moeen Quershi was sworn in as the Premier. Quershi's brief was to head a neutral cabinet acceptable to all parties, including the opposition, and prepare for elections on 6 October 1993.(n32) The preceding events demonstrated that the constitutional structures erected by Zia were intrinsically unstable and can only be sustained by coercion. Pakistan faces a crisis of consensus. The incoming government has to negotiate with the military-bureaucratic oligarchy the repeal of the Eighth Amendment. To make this move acceptable an amnesty for past sins, which includes the opposition's, needs to be agreed on. In these circumstances the combine would be made accountable to the democratic processes. The praetorian guards will then have to defend, publicly, the high expenditure on defence, its privileges, foreign policy particularly concerning Afghanistan and Kashmir as well as its nuclear policy. Only the achievement of a new consensus on these issues would allow a truly democratic system, warts and all, to consolidate itself over a period of time. Conclusion Pakistan saw many attempts by military regimes to control the democratic process. The periods of overt intervention were relatively small as both Ayub and Zia moved to some form of civilian cover. The division between military and democratic rule was therefore ambiguous. The common denominator that emerges was that Mirza, Ayub and Zia, using different means, attempted to regulate the political process in order to stabilize and legitimate their regimes. By concentrating significant powers in the Presidency they hoped to produce loyal and cooperative combinations. The fact that their regimes were based on coercion and not consensus meant that this approach, no matter how refined, was doomed to failure. The
legacy of military rule, contrary to their claims, was far more damaging than any civilian government. In the domestic arena the attempts to manage the political processes precipitated the political crisis of the 1950s, the emergence of Bengali separatism and secession in the 1970s, and in the 1980s contributed to the development of Sindhi nationalism. The structures established by Zia were continued by his colleagues to produce another example of `controlled democracy'. In certain areas of foreign and domestic policy Benazir Bhutto was relegated to titular status. On top of this the military-bureaucratic oligarchy actively worked to undermine her authority. When the army's demand for a carte blanche in Sindh was rejected she was deposed from power. To make sure that she would not be reelected Ghulam Ishaq appointed Jatoi as the interim Prime Minister who mobilized the state in favour of the IJI. The election of Nawaz Sharif to the premiership led to no change in the system, except that the locus of power was now firmly in hands of the President. This was epitomized by his opposition to General Beg's position on the Gulf War. He was the most influential person concerning sensitive issues in foreign affairs such as relations with Pakistan's important allies, policy over Afghanistan, Kashmir and the nuclear controversy. Even in domestic policy, as in the case of Sindh, Ghulam Ishaq played a leading role. However, the President's policy on Sindh exacerbated the deteriorating law and order situation, forcing the army to intervene. The allies of the ruling group were the main culprits, for the spiralling violence and the army's action threatened to bring down the entire edifice created by the regime. Nawaz Sharif's position was untenable and his attempts to assert his authority met with little success. He made a little headway in establishing a niche in the army thorough the IB but Ghulam Ishaq put an end to his meddling and nominated General Ghulam Waheed when Asif Nawaz died. The Prime Minister openly crossed swords with the President when the Ghulam Ishaq made it clear, implicitly, that he wanted another term in office. Nawaz Sharif was only prepared to do this if the Eighth Amendment was repealed. Ghulam Ishaq retaliated and Nawaz Sharif was dismissed but the Supreme Court upset this strategy by declaring the President's action to be unconstitutional. With the President and the Prime Minister locked in a titanic struggle the administration was paralysed. The army was deeply divided over whom to support. For this reason it abstained from intervening and instead persuaded both to resign and to accept fresh elections administered by a neutral interim government. The present crisis again demonstrates that the military-bureaucratic combine's attempts to control democracy have patently failed. The structures established by Zia were intrinsically unstable, lacked legitimacy and were primarily designed to protect the interests of the oligarchy. The repeal of the Eighth Amendment has to be negotiated and to ease the process an amnesty is required in order to bury the past. This would allow a new consensus to be arrived at which would need to make the praetorian guards accountable to civil society. Issues such as the policy on Afghanistan, Kashmir, nuclear policy and defence expenditure need to be openly debated so that a consensus can be reached. This approach would allow the consolidation of the democratic process, no matter the imperfections, over a period of time.
[*] This article was presented at a conference in early 1993 prior to Benazir Bhutto winning the election. Notes and references (n1.) Dawn, 4 May 1992.
(n2.) Daultana nurtured the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation and turned it against the government. The agitation snowballed into a rebellion against the provincial and federal government which was only put down with the declaration of martial law in Lahore. Y. Samad, `Indian Muslim Politics 1937-1958', Oxford, D.Phil, Chapter 4 passim. (n3.) Ibid, Chapter 5 passim. (n4.) G. Rizvi, `Riding the tiger: institutionalizing the military regime in Pakistan and Bangladesh' in C. Clapham and G. Philip (eds) The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp 205-217. (n5.) T. Ali, Can Pakistan Survive: The Death of a State (Middlesex: Pelican, 1983) p 99. (n6.) G. Rizvi, ibid, pp 219-221. (n7.) Mohammad Waseem, `Pakistan's lingering crisis of democracy', in Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No 7, July 1992, pp 622-624. (n8.) Khalid Bin Sayeed, `Pakistan in 1983: internal stress more serious than external problems', Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No 2, February 1984, pp 221-223. (n9.) Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991) p 86. (n10.) The Herald, July 1991. (n11.) The Herald, July 1992, p 33. (n12.) Charles Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987) p 194. (n13.) Hamza Alavi, `Nationhood and communal violence in Pakistan', Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 21, No 2, 1991, pp 169-171. (n14.) The Daily Jang (London) 31 Oct./1 Nov. 1992. (n15.) John Bray, `Pakistan in 1989: Benazir's balancing act', The Round Table (1989), 310, pp 195-197, 199. (n16.) The Herald, June 1993, p 31. (n17.) The Daily Jang (London) 31 Oct./1 Nov. 1992. The Friday Times, 10 16 Sep. 1992. (n18.) Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp 131-132. (n19.) The Friday Times, 10 16 Sep. 1992. (n20.) John Bray, `Nawaz Sharif's new order in Pakistan', The Round Table (1991), 318, pp 183-184. (n21.) The Herald, May 1993. (n22.) Mohammad Waseem, ibid, p 631. (n23.) The Herald, June 1988; The Herald, March 1991; The Herald, April 1990. (n24.) The Friday Times, 11-17 June 1992. (n25.) The Herald, Oct. 1992.
(n26.) The Friday Times, 24-30 Sep. 1992. (n27.) The Friday Times, 17-23 Sep. 1992. (n28.) The Daily Jang (London) 31 Oct./1 Nov. 1992. (n29.) The Herald, April 1993. (n30.) The Herald, June 1993. (n31.) The Guardian, 5 July 1993. (n32.) The Guardian, 19 July 1993. ~~~~~~~~ By YUNAS SAMAD Yunas Samad is Lecturer in Sociology and Director of the Masters Programme in Race Relations, Department of Economic and Social Studies, University of Bradford, UK.