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B. Disqualifications Authority: Power of Congress to prescribe disqualifications 1.

Congress may not add disqualifications where the Constitution has provided them in such a way as to indicate an intention that the disqualifications provided shall embrace all that are to be permitted 2. Individuals who lack any of the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution or by law for a public office are ineligible or disqualified from holding office 1. General disqualifications a) No candidate who lost in an election, shall, within 1 year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government. b) No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. c) No appointive official shall hold any other position in the Government, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his office.*ex-officio capacity 2. Specific disqualifications Particular Disqualifications to hold public office: 1. Mental or physical incapacity 3. An idiot or other person non compos mentis is incapable of accepting or holding public office 4. A public officer must be in possession of his mental faculties 2. Misconduct or crime 5. Persons convicted with crimes involving moral turpitude 6. Reason: To promote honesty and integrity in candidates for and holders of public office 3. Impeachment 7. Article XI, Section 2, 1987 Constitution 8. Judgment in cases of impeachment is limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. 4. Removal or suspension from office 9. There must be a constitutional or statutory declaration of ineligibility for such cause for the court to impose disability 5. Previous tenure of office 6. Consecutive terms 7. Holding more than one office 8. Relationship with the appointing power 9. Office newly created or the emoluments of which have been increased 10. Being an elective official 10. Minimize spoils system 11. The disqualification subsists only during the tenure in office (not term of office) of the elective official. He may be appointed provided he forfeits his seat 11. Having been a candidate for any elective position 12. Directed against the so-called political lame-ducks 13. Members of the Constitutional Commission must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment

12. Under the Local Government Code 14. The following persons are disqualified from running for an elective local position: a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence; b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; d. Those with dual citizenship; e. Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad; f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and g. The insane or feeble-minded With respect to the appointment of elective and appointive local officials and candidates who lost in an election, the Code provides: a. No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure b. Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries (RA 7160, Sec. 94) President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members and their Deputies and Assistants shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure, UNLESS otherwise provided in the Constitution. No Senator or Member of the HR may hold any other office or employment in the Government including GOCC, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created nor the emoluments increased during the term for which he was elected. Members of the SC and of Other Courts Established by Law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. No Member of the Constitutional Commission shall during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Applies to Ombudsman and his deputies. Ombudsman and His Deputies shall not be qualified to run for office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation. Members of the Constitutional Commission, Ombudsman and Deputies must not have been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointments. Members of the Constitutional Commission, Ombudsman and His Deputies are appointed to a term of 7 years, without reappointment.

Spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed: As members of the Constitutional Commission Office of Ombudsman Secretaries Undersecretaries Chairmen/Heads Cases: Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 FACTS: Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Cory Aquino, was challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order referred to sections 1 to 3. In effect, they assailed that it allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is unconstitutional. YES HELD: It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan 305 SCRA 396 (1999) FACTS: Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son, his Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985

election for the Kabataang Barangay, Jowil Red won as KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate since he already passed the age limit fixed by law. Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Imee Marcos-Manotoc, then the National Chairperson of the organization, sent a telegram to Red confirming his appointment and advising him further that copies of his appointment papers would be sent to him in due time through the KB Regional Office. Red received the telegram and showed it immediately to Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz. Armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral representative of the KBs to the SB, Red was refused to attended the meeting of the Sanggunian because the appointment papers had not yet arrived. Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January 1986. But it was only on 23 April 1986, when then President Corazon C. Aquino was already in power, that he forwarded these documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by the mayor to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of 26 sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll and then authorized someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in his behalf. Three years and 9 months from the date he received his appointment papers from President Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz. Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Lecaroz is entitled to the office of KB Federation President until his successor is appointed or chosen. YES. Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The father and son were acquitted of 13 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. HELD: In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it

is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same. The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733 on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all. C. Acquisition of right or title to office 1. Appointment Appointment is one of the means by which a person may claim a right to a public office. - The term appointment means the selection by the authority vested with the power of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. - An act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to who that power has been delegated, of the person who is to exercise the duties and responsibilities of the given position Form - Generally be in writing - Some kind of written memorial that could render title to public office - Where there is no evidence of prior appointment and all that the officer can show is a designation in an acting capacity to the disputed position, the fact that the officer took his oath and his supposed appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment CANNOT prevail as against the appointment of another person to the same position. The weight of authority is to the effect that the appointment must be in writing, embodied in what is known as the COMMISSION, which is acknowledged as the best evidence of the appointment. The delivery of the commission is the last act required of the appointing power. (Cruz, 1994) - When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an ATTESTATION, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692 (1963) A [temporary designation] cannot ripen into a permanent appointment, even if it was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, because confirmation presupposes a valid nomination or recess appointment, of which there is no evidence. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints four groups of officers. 1) The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or

naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. 2) The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. 3) The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. 4) The fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Rufino vs. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13(2006)] The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. [Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549(1987)] APPOINTMENT vs. DESIGNATION APPOINTMENT Is the selection by the proper authority if an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office i.e. Appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory designation, a member of the NEDA Upon appointment of a person in certain function, a designee s authority lapses "Appointment" connotes permanency [Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 192 SCRA 326(1990)]

DESIGNATION Connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person who is already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election

Designation refers to the assignment of a public officer to perform certain functions different from those of his position to which he has been appointed. Nature: temporary does not confer upon the designee security of tenure "Designation" implies temporariness. [Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 192 SCRA 326(1990)] Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. Designation is legislative in nature. [Santiago vs. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 125(1991)]

Appointment is applied to nomination of an individual. It is essentially executive [Santiago vs. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 125(1991)], not exclusively presidential. It

may be exercised by the Supreme Court (Article VIII, Section 5) and the Constitutional Commissions ((Article IX A Section 4) over their respective administrative personnel even as similar authority is available to Congress (Article VI, Section 16(1)) over its personnel. He is entitled to full pay, allowances, and other benefits during the period that he was actually reporting for work and rendering services in whatever capacity, whether teaching, research or administration [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22(1985)] qualifications prescribed by law.

Appointments made by the President of the Philippines

Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. [Dimaandal vs. Commission on Audit, 291 SCRA 322(1998)] As such, there being no appointment issued, designation does not entitle the officer designated to receive the salary of the position. For the legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the Government

Cases: Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court 140 SCRA 327 (1985) FACTS: Dr. Esteban was a permanent employee in the government service for 25 years. He connected to several colleges and later continued teaching at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, upon the invitation of its president, Dr. Consuelo Blanco. At the Pamantasan, Dr. Esteban was initially extended an ad interim temporary appointment as Vice-President for Administration by Dr. Consuelo Blanco. Dr. Esteban received from the Secretary of Pamantasan a 'Notification of Confirmation of Temporary Appointment'. In several occasions, he was subsequently up for renewal and also received increased salaries. Later however, he discovered that he was not included in the list of employees recommended for permanent appointments. He wrote Dr. Consuelo Blanco requesting the conversion of his temporary appointment to a permanent one, considering his 2 years service. He later on received a notification that approved his appointment as Professor III and terminating his appointment as Vice-President for Administration. His appointment was withdrawn before it could be confirmed by the Pamantasan Board of Regents. On the same date, Dr. Esteban appealed to the Civil Service Commission for the protection of his tenure in the Pamantasan. The Civil Service Commission ruled the temporary nature of the appointment was conceded. His services was to be terminated at any time with or without request that he be extended permanent appointment ,or that if his temporary appointment was to be converted into permanent one, it may be stated that the issuance of such appointment is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing official.

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision reversing the Commission's resolution and adopted the earlier resolution holding that Private respondent Dr. Esteban's appointment was invalid, though he may be considered as a de facto vice-president of the University The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the CFI, declaring as permanent the appointment of the Dr. Esteban as vice- president for administration of the university under the Board of Regents' resolution and ordering his immediate reinstatement to that position with back salaries, allowances and other benefits ISSUE: Whether or not Hernani Esteban's appointment as Vice-President for Administration of the PLM holds the position in a permanent capacity as to guarantee as security of tenure. YES HELD: Dr. Esteban, whose record of government service appears quite impressive, is entitled to full pay and a five-year backpay, allowances, and other benefits during the period that he was actually reporting for work and rendering services in whatever capacity, whether teaching, research or administration. In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the Pamantasan President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee's term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. Luego v. Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327 (1986) FACTS: On February 18, 1983, Luego was appointed Administrative Officer 11 of the Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City by Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment." After protracted hearings, the Civil Service Commission found Tuozo better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked." On June 28, 1984, Tuozo was appointed by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission was authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by Tuozo. NO. Luego is entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment on February 18, 1983. HELD: Luego could not be validly replaced in the instant case since his appointment was actually permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent

Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. His security of tenure cannot be waived. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself. What made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. An appointment, whether to a vacancy or to a newly created position, is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested.