RAYO vs.

CFI of BULACAN FACTS: During the height of typhoon Kading, the National Power Corporations plant superintendent Chavez opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam. As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded (particularly Norzagaray). About a hundred of its residents died and properties worth million of pesos were destroyed. The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood, filed several complaints for damages against NPC

and the plant superintendent. NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function. Thus, it cannot be sued without the express consent of the State. The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not governmental but merely proprietary functions and that based on the organic charter of NPC, it can be sued and be sued in any court. ISSUE: WON the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter

includes the power to be sued for tort. HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. NPC, as a government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. In any court, NPC can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the Orders of the

respondent court dated December 12, 1979 and October 3, 1980, are set aside; and said court is ordered to reinstate the complaints of the petitioners. Costs against the NPC. EBRO III V NLRC (INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION) FACTS: Private respondent International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency engaged in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United

National Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. It was one of the agencies accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center at Sabang, Morong, Bataan. On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employed petitioner Jose G. Ebro III to teach "English as a Second Language and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at the refugee processing center. The employment contract provided in pertinent part: Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months probationary period is

P3,155.00 inclusive of cost of living allowance. Upon being made regular after successful completion of the six (6) months probationary period your monthly salary will be adjusted to P3,445.00 inclusive of cost of living allowance If either party wishes to terminate employment, a notice of two (2) weeks should be given in writing to the party. - After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective December 21, 1985, the latters services was terminated for his failure to meet the requirements of "(1) classroom

performance . . . up to the standards set in the Guide for Instruction; (2) regular attendance in the mandated teacher training, and in the schedule team meetings, one-on-one conferences with the supervisor, etc.; and (3) compliance with ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures." On February 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, accrued leave pay, 14th month pay, damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation. Petitioner alleged that there was no objective evaluation of his performance to

warrant his dismissal and that he should have been considered a regular employee from the start because ICMC failed to acquaint him with the standards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed for reinstatement with back wages; P3,155.00 for probationary and P3,445.00 for regular salary adjustments; value of lodging or dormitory privileges; cost of insurance coverage for group life, medical, death, dismemberment and disability benefits; moral, and exemplary, and nominal damages plus interest on the above claims

with attorney's fees. Answering the complaint, ICMC claimed that petitioner failed to quality for regular employment because he showed no interest in improving his professional performance both in and out of the classroom after he had been periodically evaluated; that petitioner was paid his salary up to December 31, 1985, two weeks pay in lieu of notice, and 14th month pay pro-rata; and that his accrued leave balance already been converted to cash. After the parties had formally offered their evidence, private respondents submitted their

memorandum on July 31, 1989 in which, among other things, they invoked ICMC's diplomatic immunity on the basis of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 15, 1988 between the Philippines government and ICMC. The Labor Arbiter held that ICMC's legal immunity under the Memorandum could not be given retroactive effect since "[that would] deprive complainant's property right without due process and impair the obligation of contract of employment." He also expressed doubt on the ground that it was provided for by agreement and not

through an act of Congress. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered ICMC to reinstate petitioner as regular teacher without loss of seniority rights and to pay him one year backwages, other benefits, and ten percent attorney's fees for a total sum of P70,944.85. Both parties appealed to the NLRC. On August 13, 1990, petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's appeal because of the latter's failure to post a cash/surety bond. In its order of October 13, 1992, however, the NLRC ordered the case dismissed on the ground that, under the

Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine government and ICMC, the latter was immune from suit. ISSUE: WON the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 15, 1988 granted ICMC immunity from suit HELD: YES. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the

host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member State of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. LANSANG VS. CA FACTS:

Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner

Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner. ISSUE: WON the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not prosper without the States consent

HELD: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are

unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the

petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of GABI. The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation

by the previous administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27244 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the DISMISSAL of the complaint for damages by the trial court for want of merit is AFFIRMED. No costs.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL FACTS: In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands such as: giving lands for free to farmers, zero retention of lands by landlords, stop amortizations of land payments. On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with

MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez. Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting. Tension mounted the next day. The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices. On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands. There was a marchers-police

confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and

the military/police officers involved in the incident. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity (2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages HELD: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the

Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable

because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned

orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL. FACTS: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40. The

award is for the satisfaction of a judgment against the Phlippine Government. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said decision. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks, especially on Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) and Philippine National Bank (PNB). The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans

Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP; hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

ISSUE: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid? HELD: No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can

be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of

proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from

their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC. G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994 FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 sq.m (Lot 5-A, TCT No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots (Lots 5-B & 5-D) registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the

lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal

Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana. Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off *its+ sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith

elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio. ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity. RULING: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a

foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure

imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired

said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in

the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose-off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters

have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint. Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against

the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy. Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

Spouses Jose & Virginia Fontanilla v. Honorable Inocencio Maliaman & NIA G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045 February 27, 1991 Paras, J. Facts: On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30PM, a pick-up owned and operated by National Irrigation Administration, driven officially by Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco

Fontanilla, son of the petitioners, and Restituto Deligo at Maasin, San Jose City. As a result of the impact, both were injured and brought to the City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later on transferred to Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Garcia, on the other hand, was a regular driver of NIA who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and qualified for employment after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by NIA authorities. i

On March 20, 1980 the trial court rendered judgement and directed respondent NIA to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to the petitioners. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 1980 but the trial court denied its petition. Issue: Whether or not NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus exempt from suit for damages caused by the negligent act of its driver.

Held: No. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee.

FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINO MALONG, petitioners v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

PANGASINAN, Lingayen Branch 11, respondents

Facts: The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977, their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The

spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370. The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of the Constitution). The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving

only questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary appeal i.e., by notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41 to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45. Issue: 1. Whether or not PNR is immune from suit.

Held: No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. It did not remove itself from operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. Like any other private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in the private business. It is not

performing any governmental function. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National Railways. Ratio: The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determjined by the character

of the objects for which the entity was organized."

US vs. Hon. Eliodoro Guinto US vs. Hon. Rodolfo Rodrigo US vs. Hon. Josefina Ceballos US vs. Hon. Concepcion Alarcon Vergara En Banc Facts: In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the

ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented On the first suit: On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed

that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid. The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representative petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon but Dizon was already operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession. On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint to compel PHAX and the

individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation. Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-

suability and on the same day, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss. On the second suit: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in

cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio. The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued

Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting initially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning On the third suit: Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King,

Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI). Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The counsel for

the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent. Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer. On the fourth suit: Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the

petitioners (except USA). According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed and unleashed dogs on them. Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RPUS Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions. Motion to dismiss

was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants. Issues: 1. Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without its consent. 2. Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit for acting within their official functions. Held:

1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Petition is DISMISSED. Respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing. TRO is lifted. 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

Petition is GRANTED and Civil Case is DISMISSED. 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The petition is GRANTED and Civil Case is DISMISSED. 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Respondent court is

directed to proceed with the hearing. TRO is lifted.

DFA vs. NLRC G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996 Facts: On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"). ADB and the DFA

notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favour Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues: 1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit. 2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit. Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by

the Philippine government which must be respected. Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an

organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its memberstates." 2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which

should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure

imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of theinquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident

thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach. Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS

Ferdinand Marcos, former President of the Republic of the Philippines, is presently involved in a lawsuit in the United States District Court of Hawaii. The lawsuit sought for the return of certain gold and currency allegedly brought by Marcos to Honolulu in violation of the Philippine export and currency laws. Marcos then filed a counterclaim in response against the Central Bank and the Republic of the Philippines to enjoin the efforts of the Central Bank to locate and seize the assets of Marcos. The United States, in its role

as "custodian" of the monies, is named as a defendant in the suit, but for purposes of this motion, is acting on behalf of the plaintiffs. In the course of discovery, Marcos served a subpoena on Philippine Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez on August 20, 1986, during a recent visit of his to San Francisco for delivering a rd speech in commemoration of the 3 anniversary of the assassination of President Aquino. The subpoena required Ordonez to appear for a deposition/testimony on August 25, 1986, and to bring with him certain documents concerning various legal

proceedings in the United States, investigations in the Philippines concerning Marcos' conduct as President, and the suspension of the Philippine Constitution and the Philippine Legislature. On August 22, 1986, The embassy of the Philippines sent a letter to the US Department State invoking diplomatic immunity in behalf of Ordonez. The letter stated that Ordonez is a Philippine Government official on a diplomatic mission. The US Department State recognized such immunity as such the United States filed the present motion to quash the subpoena on

the grounds that Ordonez was entitled to immunity pursuant to a "Suggestion of Immunity" issued by the United States Department of State. The Court, having considered the moving and opposition papers and having heard oral argument, grants the motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds that Ordonez is entitled to diplomatic immunity. ISSUE: WON the letter from the State Department constitutes certification of Ordonez diplomatic status?

HELD. Although the letter does not expressly certify Ordonez as a diplomat, when read in light of the circumstances surrounding this subpoena and with regard to the letter from the Philippine Embassy, there is sufficient evidence for the Court to find that the State Department evinced a clear intent to grant diplomatic status to Ordonez. The State Department's letter, issued the same day as the Philippine request, refers to the Embassy's request for diplomatic immunity as a request for "immunity"; this careless

lack of specificity by the State Department is repeated throughout their letter. Yet, the State Department's does state that Ordonez was here in this country as a "representative" of the Philippine government, that he was here to perform "official functions," and that the "Department believes that it would be appropriate to recognize and allow the immunity" of Ordonez. The letter of the Embassy specifically requested diplomatic immunity, and in response to that request the State Department agreed and drafted the appropriate letter. Despite the

carelessness of the State Department's letter, in light of all the evidence submitted, this Court finds that the State Department has provided the Court with a letter certifying Ordonez as a diplomatic agent and requesting diplomatic immunity on his behalf. Out of respect for the foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch, this Court finds that Ordonez is entitled to diplomatic immunity. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Solicitor General Ordonez is a diplomatic agent, as recognized by the United States Department of State, and as

such is entitled to all the privileges of the Vienna Convention, including immunity from civil jurisdiction and any requirement that he give evidence as a witness or otherwise. Therefore, the motion to quash the subpoena is granted, and Ordonez is under no obligation to obey or respect the terms of the subpoena.

DOH vs PHIL PHARMAWEALTH FACTS: Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying

pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines. Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998,outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10, Series of 2000, providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with

petitioner DOH. Only products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH and all other entities under its jurisdiction. Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic Penicillin G Benzathine. But to no avail, the request has been hang. Petitioner DOH, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G

Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract). Respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. Only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at however, of the nonaccreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS. (another competitor) Respondent thus filed a complaint with the RTC to nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant DOH, defendant

Romualdez, defendant Galon and defendant Lopez to declare plaintiff Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff, for *the therein specified. Petitioners subsequently filed MTD for dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. Respondent filed its comment/opposition contending, in the main, that the doctrine of state

immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for damages. ISSUE. WON state of Immunity is available to DOH? HELD: No, The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of

official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. Respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated

agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 5823 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State since the officials who exercised grave abuse of discretion are the subject of the litigation. While the doctrine of state immunity appears

to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act. Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of

his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The

rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 12, 2005 and Resolution dated August 9, 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT vs.

HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal Facts: Dr.Leonce Verstufyt was assigned by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. He is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement of the RP and WHO. The privileges according to the agreement are personal inviolability, inviolability of the official properties, exemption from local

jurisdiction and exemption from taxation and customs. When Petitioner personal effects which contain 12 crates entered in the Philippines, they were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Nevertheless, the respondent judge issued search and seizure warrants of the personal effects of the petitioner official upon the application of the respondents COSAC officers for alleged violation of RA 3601 of Tariff and Customs Code directing the search and seizure of dutiable items in said crates. Thus, a petition is made requesting for the quashing of

a search warrant issued by the respondent judge. The judge, nevertheless, asserted that unless the higher court restrained him, the effectivity of the search warrant will still subsist. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo pleaded to Hon. Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the

petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quash hence, the petition at bar. Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search andseizure under the diplomatic immunity? Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the

Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. The unfortunate fact remains that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents COSAC officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items "The provisions of Republic Act 75 declares as null and void writs

or processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process. The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant

issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. The writs of certiorari and prohibition from the petitioners were granted.

Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995 Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations

Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Labor Arbiter denied the complaint of the petitioner on the ground of Diplomatic Immunity based on the attached letter from the DFA which acknowledges the immunity of the private respondent. Thus, the petition was denied.

Pettioner appealed to the NLRC but another rejection in the petition was obtained. Petitioner then filed an instant appeal for certiorari without seeking a resolution from NLRC. Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they may only be questioned through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant petition. Moreover, the petition lacks any explanation for

such omission. Petitioner argued that the acts of mining and exploration of the respondent is outside the functions of the international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Thus, when the respondent engaged in such act and entered into the contract of employment with petitioner, it deemed waived its right for immunity. Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity Held: Petition is dismissed. The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is

covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations: 1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent

exercise of their functions in connection with the organization. As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized

agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on

Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench.

ICMC v. Hon. Calleja GR 85750 September 28, 1990 FACTS: As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's

communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan. ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at

the request of the Holy See, as a nonprofit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank

and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF).

Subsequently, DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election sustaining the affirmative of the proposition citing: (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (infra);

(2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

ISSUE:Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. HELD: The foregoing issue constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the

principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly

necessitated by its international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to

ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution. For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized

agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they

have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is

neither remote and from which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."

G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003 KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents "(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the

moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction." FACTS:

Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited

drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo, working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19,

of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case ISSUE: WON the defendant, ) Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. HELD: A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he

is acting within the directives of the sending state. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseurbuyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said

to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties, respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000 Source: policemom007.blogspot.com

FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of

protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section

45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt. (2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative. HELD: (1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the

prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. (2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be

invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

G.R. No. 82631 February 23, 1995 SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and YONG CHAN KIM FACTS: The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD, an

international agency was established by the Government of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam. The Philippines was a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC. The purpose of establishing said international organization is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the

Center, and governments external to the Center (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1). `On June 10, 1983, private respondent Yong Chan Kim (Yong) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC). On June 16, 1986, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner ". . . to reinstate complainant [respondent Yong] to his former position . . . with full back wages . . . and to pay complainant moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 (Rollo, p. 65). Petitioner

appealed the decision to the NLRC. Respondent Yong likewise filed a partial appeal wherein he sought to increase the award of moral damages to P200, 000.00.On August 20, 1987, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but increased the moral damages to P200,000.00, added P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and awarded ten percent of the total monetary awards as attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 84). It was held that NLRC had no jurisdiction over petitioner, the latter being "an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local

agencies of the Philippine Government." ISSUE: WON NLRC had no jurisdiction over petitioner, the latter being "an international and is entitled to immunity from local jurisdiction. Answer: SEAFDEC as an international organization is subjected for immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the court where it is found. (See Jenks; Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to

the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially, on behalf of its member-states. in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations, (jurisdictional immunity, is specified in the enabling instruments of

international organizations) jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id; See Bowett. The Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-285). WON jurisdiction over the ase of NLRC is non-waivable as to the doctrine of estoppel ruled in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).. Answer: estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Tijam case applies only to ordinary litigants and not to parties which expressly by enjoy sovereign or

diplomatic immunity. With respect to foreign states and international organizations, the immunity from suit or the jurisdiction of local courts can only be waived said entities and not by the employees or agents HELD: the petition is GRANTED. The restraining order is made PERMANENT

SEAFDEC V. ACOSTA, GR 97468-70 SEPTEMBER 2, 1993 This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a

prayer for the issuance of a restraining order, to set aside the order of respondent labor arbiter, dated 20 September 1990, denying herein petitioner's motion to dismiss the cases subject matter of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been

wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner. The petitioner being an international inter-government organization challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the cases. ISSUE: WON SEAFDEC have already waived its right to be sued because it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction. Answer: While the petitioner did not question the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did

so before it rested its case and certainly well before the proceedings thereat had terminated. Held: dismissed WYLIE V. RARANG, GR 74135, MAY 28, 1992 The pivotal issue in this petition centers on the extent of the "immunity from suit" of the officials of a United States Naval Base inside Philippine territory. FACTS: In February, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while

petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard. M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military

personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On Febru ary 3, 1978, the POD published, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" where it mentions Auring a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal to benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel and consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal. That the private respondent was the same "Auring"

referred to in the POD was conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication. The private respondent then commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Zambales (now Regional Trial Court) against M. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule;

and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel. She prayed that she be awarded P300,000.00 as moral damages; exemplary damages which the court may find proper; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored on three grounds: 1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore,

immune from suit; 2. The United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent; and3. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties in this case. The judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants jointly and severally ISSUE: Are American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? Pursuing the

question further, does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the United States under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts ANSWER: no. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused

the private respondent. It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records. The petitioners

have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and why their decisions should be reverse