Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asias Defence Diplomacy

David Capie

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 35, Number 1, April 2013, pp. 1-26 (Article) Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies DOI: 10.1353/csa.2013.0004

For additional information about this article

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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 35, No. 1 (2013), pp. 126 DOI: 10.1355/cs35-1a 2013 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asias Defence Diplomacy
DAVID CAPIE

This article examines why Asias multilateral defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. It argues that explanations that stress the catalytic role of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats are underdetermining. Rather, Asias new multilateral defence diplomacy reflects strategic emulation on the part of ASEAN elites, who localized ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEANs central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has also been helped by the changing role of militaries in some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article briefly assesses the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. Keywords: defence diplomacy, ASEAN, ADMM, Shangri-La Dialogue, norms, constitutive localization.

Asias multilateral defence diplomacy is an increasingly important aspect of regional politics and a burgeoning area of interest for scholarship. The creation of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002,

David Capie is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.


David Capie

the inauguration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in May 2006 and the arrival of the ADMM-Plus process in October 2010 has seen the establishment of a major new stream of regional dialogue and diplomacy. These arrangements also have a track two multilateral partner the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutes (NADI), a parallel arrangement to the long-running and influential ASEAN-ISIS.1 These processes are increasingly attracting interest from analysts, although the body of work remains comparatively small alongside the attention lavished on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2012 a special issue of the journal Asian Security examined Southeast Asias defence diplomacy, including Chinas activities in the region and the contribution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).2 Scholars have asked whether there is a Southeast Asian model of defence cooperation that might be emulated or referenced by others.3 The origins and function of the SLD have been the subject of close academic scrutiny,4 and there is a growing body of research looking at bilateral defence diplomacy5 and the connection between bilateral and multilateral arrangements.6 To date, however, most of this work has been more concerned with describing the evolution of defence diplomacy in the region, its origins and purpose than it has been with considering recent developments in the context of theoretical debates.7 This article seeks to build on the existing literature by outlining some ways in which Asias defence diplomacy can inform and challenge contemporary debates in international relations theory.8 In particular, it looks at the rise of multilateral defence diplomacy against the backdrop of the scholarship concerning norm change and institutional innovation. At its heart are two questions: why was multilateral defence diplomacy so late to arrive in Asia, and what explains its rapid rise? The article is divided into three parts. The first section briefly defines defence diplomacy and outlines the general trajectory of East Asias defence and military diplomacy in recent decades. The second part explores why defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. I argue that explanations that stress the catalytic role of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats (for example, the rise of China) are underdetermining. Rather, the explanation advanced here focuses on agents and changing norms around multilateral defence cooperation. Using the lens of constitutive localization, I argue that the institutional innovation

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that has occurred since 2006 reflects a strategic calculation on the part of ASEAN elites, who adopted and adapted ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEANs central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has been helped by the changing role of militaries in some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article offers a brief assessment of the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. Defining Defence Diplomacy Defence diplomacy is a relatively new arrival in the lexicon of Asia- Pacific security. One study of the vocabulary of regional security published in 2008 includes numerous terms for diplomacy and engagement but notably omits defence or military diplomacy.9 What then does defence diplomacy mean in Asia? Like many expressions in the security studies lexicon, the origin and meaning of the term are contested. Anthony Forster describes military and defence diplomacy as the non-operational use of the armed forces by the government in order to pursue foreign and defence policy objectives.10 Although the idea that the armed forces have a role beyond the direct use of violence is not new, as a distinct concept, defence or military diplomacy seems to have grown in prominence in the last decade.11 According to Stephen Blank, the idea emerged in post-Cold War Europe. The belief was that by establishing relationships of trust and mutual confidence among former rival militaries, confidence could be built, generalized standards could be achieved with regard to the interoperability of militaries and a broader democratization of civil-military relations could take part in what was once the Soviet Bloc.12 As a particular policy position, defence diplomacys origins are often traced to the 1998 British Strategic Defence Review. Britains Ministry of Defence described the concept as involving the use of military forces to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution. It said we require armed forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside economic, trade and development levers, to strengthen security and avert conflict.13 The British approach included three broad sets of activities: arms control, non-proliferation policies, and confidence and security-

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building measures; instruments that were designed to encourage stability, particularly in Russia, through bilateral assistance and cooperation programmes; as well as other assistance programmes aimed at relationships beyond Europe.14 Within these broad areas, education and training programmes were regarded as particularly important, along with the use of ship and aircraft visits, shortterm advisory teams, as well as visits and interactions between ministers, and military and civilian personnel at all levels. According to one analyst, the philosophy underpinning British defence diplomacy is a cosmopolitan liberal vision of the promotion of western principles and values. The assumption is that through intensive and sustained military engagement [] shared knowledge and mutual trust will over a period of time enhance peace and stability.15 Not long after the British Review was released, a number of states in the Asia Pacific began to use the concept in their own national security policies. After decades in which regional states had preferred to use the term defence cooperation, the phrase defence diplomacy suddenly became commonplace. In a 2006 statement to Singapores Parliament, Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean said the objectives of Singapores defence diplomacy were to develop positive and mutually beneficial relationships with friendly countries and armed forces, [and] to contribute to a stable and cooperative regional environment and international order.16 The New Zealand Defence Force embraced the term, likening defence diplomacy to preventive diplomacy, and describing it as all the varied activities undertaken to promote peace and security through constructive engagement and confidence building. Its aim is to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust.17 In her analysis of Chinas military diplomacy, Kristen Gunness argues that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is expected to support the larger foreign, diplomatic, political, economic and security agenda set forth by the leadership of the Party/State. PLA interactions with foreign militaries are seen as a political undertaking using military means for strategic reasons, not as a freestanding set of military initiatives conducted by military professionals for explicitly military reasons.18 In terms of specific activities, Gunness lists high-level strategic security dialogues, military functional exchanges, professional military education exchanges, the import and export of military weapons and equipment, and participation in peacekeeping operations.19 Looking at Indias defence diplomacy, Saroj Bishoyi stresses

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the role of education and training in areas such as defence management, civil-military relations and military justice as well as a wide range of military-to-military contacts with other states; foreign military financing in the form of grants and loans; joint combined exchange training of special forces; [and] military sales.20 Pankaj Jha emphasizes the importance of Indias military exercises with countries in Southeast Asia as an assurance strategy, sending a signal of its benign intentions.21 Clearly then, Asian states quickly picked up on the language of defence diplomacy. However, they did not embrace it without reservations. The British approach was grounded in a set of broader goals around the promotion of democratic civil-military relations. In the 1999 UK Defence White Paper, defence diplomacy was included in a chapter called Building a better world associating it with the aims of the so-called ethical foreign policy.22 After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, counterWMD proliferation efforts also became an important element of Western defence diplomacy. 23 The East Asian use of the term is, however, much more limited, focusing primarily on building trust and eschewing any role in the internal affairs of participant states. It has none of liberal trappings that elevate the importance of promoting democratic control of armed forces. Tan and Singh have framed this as a distinction between transformational European and more pragmatic Asian diplomacy, but the same process could also be described as the localization of an imported concept, much in the way that ASEAN has borrowed and adapted earlier European ideas such as common security. 24 East Asian states pruned away the aspects of the practice that they found incompatible with the character of regional diplomacy, but kept the parts they found useful. The Patterns of Asian Defence Diplomacy If the term defence diplomacy is increasingly common and evolving in meaning, in practice it has a long history in Asia. Military and defence officials from across the region have met, consulted and shared strategic perceptions for decades. Not surprisingly, some of the closest defence diplomacy is based around the prevailing security structures of the region, in particular Americas alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. As Atkinson notes: the U.S. alliances require a significant level of person-to-person interaction, particularly at the more senior

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ranks, as well as continued diplomatic exchanges between the U.S. and allied military and political leaders. Personnel of all levels interact on a daily basis within established institutionalized security alliances.25 Indeed, many of these alliances include formal provisions that establish institutions through which defence officials and military officers meet to discuss security issues. The 1951 Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) Treaty, for example, established the ANZUS Council, which annually brought together senior military officers, along with foreign and defence ministers from Australia, New Zealand and the United States. In the case of the U.S.Japan alliance, high level defence talks date back to 1976 when a Sub-Committee on Defence Cooperation (SDC) was established, made up of diplomats, senior American military officials based in Japan and the Japan Defence Agency. Its primary purpose was to discuss contingencies involving a possible attack on Japan and conflict elsewhere in the region, but it also addressed activities and consultations regarding the U.S.-Japan defence relationship.26 U.S.-Thai defence relations include regular consultations and more than 40 combined military exercises a year. According to one report, tens of thousands of Thai military officers have taken part in U.S. training and educational exchanges.27 Yet if the U.S. alliances have long provided vehicles for dialogue and exchange, bilateral defence interactions also have a history among non-allies. For example, under agreements that date back to 1959, Malaysia and Thailand have maintained two committees that discuss defence policy and counter-insurgency operations along their shared border. In the 1970s, they held joint exercises targeted against communist insurgents, and a Joint Border Committee Office (JBCO) provided a vehicle for broader security cooperation based on mutual concerns over Vietnamese expansionism. Malaysia and Indonesia maintain a similar arrangement with a joint border committee created in 1972 and augmented with a 1984 security agreement. 28 Following a 2008 meeting between Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, the two countries committed to further enhance bilateral defence cooperation, including intelligence exchanges, coordinated naval patrol, reciprocal visits of defence, security and other relevant officials, exchanges of programmes by their respective command and staff colleagues, joint disaster relief operations, and joint disaster response, training and exercises.29 Indonesia and the Philippines signed their own bilateral agree

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ment for enhancing defence cooperation in 1997. This created a Joint Defence and Security Cooperation Committee that met annually to implement, manage and monitor defence cooperation between the two countries.30 Other examples from inside ASEAN include a MalaysiaPhilippines defence agreement that provides for regular combined military exercises, exchanges of military information, and the possible use of each others facilities for logistics and repairs.31 Singapore and Indonesia have agreements that allow the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to train in Indonesian waters, and make use of helicopter training facilities and an air-combat range in Sumatra. Alongside these numerous bilateral defence interactions, some ASEAN states were also regular and active participants in working level multilateral activities, although these have often been overlooked in analyses of defence diplomacy. One of the most durable examples is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which has taken place since 1988. Its goal is to have the leaders of regional navies meet for frank and open discussions to promote mutual understanding and to discuss common challenges. Its initial focus was on common issues affecting naval professionals and not on political issues, nor on the maritime confidence and security building measures occupying the minds of those concerned with second track diplomacy, but over time, the WPNS agenda has evolved along with its membership.32 Held every two years, WPNS was originally structured around symposia, where service chiefs would receive briefings on a range of common challenges and issues. However, at the second WPNS in 1992, the chiefs agreed to establish a work programme with a series of workshops involving mid-level officers. These produced papers and non-binding recommendations to be considered by the chiefs at the subsequent symposium. As WPNS has progressed, the range of activities it undertakes has also expanded. It now encourages personnel exchanges, attendance at overseas Staff Colleges, study visits and tours (including visits by naval units), and senior officer visits.33 As WPNS members have grown more accustomed to interacting, exchanges have also allowed service personnel to spend time on one anothers ships at sea. As one Australian analysis concludes:
Collaboration through multilateral activities including disaster relief, and search and rescue, provides an understanding of how each navy thinks and operates, and of their capabilities. It also provides an opportunity for personnel to interact, exchange ideas and professional expertise, and gain an understanding of each

 others cultures.34

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A second long-standing example of working level multilateral defence diplomacy is the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), which has been meeting annually for more than three decades. Formed in 1978, PAMS is the largest gathering of senior army/security forces officers in the Asia-Pacific region. It has expanded from an original membership of nine states (China, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and the United States) to twenty-nine by 2010. PAMS has been described as a forum for senior-level officers from the Asia Pacifics regional ground forces to exchange views and ideas. It provides opportunities for future leaders of regional armies to develop strong interpersonal relationships.35 In many respects the WPNS, PAMS and other similar arrange ments resemble the regional multilateral institutions that have attracted so much attention when foreign ministers and heads of government are involved. Like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), WPNS and PAMS are mostly about building habits of dialogue, stressing the importance of informality, and relationship building. As one senior participant told the 2010 WPNS in Sydney:
the value of building relationships and trust begins here, in formal gatherings such as this plenary session, but just as importantly, in the individual meetings and informal chats outside of these doors. Dialogue is the necessary first step, and our ability to talk to each other here or in other settings because of the relationships we build today will put us in a better position tomorrow to work together to overcome some of the challenges [we face].36

They are also inclusive arrangements, involving U.S. allies as well as non-like-minded states like China. They have modest intersessional work programmes that feed practical suggestions for defence cooperation to service chiefs for consideration by their respective militaries and governments. Where they differ from other Asian security institutions is that they are managed and organized not by ASEAN, but by the United States military, albeit often in partnership with an Asian state. These working level multilateral arrangements notwithstanding, until very recently East Asia lacked any comparable interactions at the highest levels. There was, for example, no equivalent of the annual NATO Defence Ministers Meeting or the Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas, either within ASEAN or on

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the wider regional stage. This, however, began to change in 2002 with the creation of the Asian Security Summit, or as it is better known, the Shangri-La Dialogue. From Non-official to Official Multilateralism The idea for an annual Asian Security Summit was developed by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2000. Its inspiration was the annual Munich Conference, which brings together European and American policy-makers and strategic thinkers. The inaugural meeting was held at Singapores Shangri-La Hotel in mid-2002. Twenty-two countries were repre sented, with eleven defence ministers attending. While the SLD had strong supporters in Australia, Japan, Singapore and the United States, it received a cool reception from some regional states, notably China, which did not send ministerial representation. However, the SLD grew steadily and by the time it celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2011, twenty-eight countries were represented, with hundreds of officials taking part along with the largest number of ministers yet, including, for the first time, defence ministers from China, Myanmar and Vietnam. SLD is not a formal inter-governmental summit and, in prac tice, it represents an interesting accommodation between multi lateralism and bilateralism. From one perspective, the SLD works as a loose, multilateral framework in which defence ministers and senior military officials interact. The main multilateral element is a series of lunches and dinners for ministers. By 2008 and 2009, there were also trilateral and mini-lateral interactions occurring on the sidelines of the SLD, but these remained informal and not part of the main meeting. More valuable for participants than any multilateral or trilateral interactions, however, has been the chance to arrange bilateral meetings during the SLD. Australia, for example, organized more than twenty bilateral meetings with other regional military and defence officials on the sidelines of the 2009 SLD.37 Singapore used the 2010 Dialogue to conclude a defence cooperation agreement with Australia. But although the SLD quickly became established as a defence ministers meeting by default, calls to transform it into a formal inter-governmental meeting were consistently rejected.38 Despite this, the SLD had an important demonstration effect in terms of encouraging other forms of multilateral defence cooperation. It showed that many regional defence ministers saw value in meeting

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as a group and it helped pave the way for the creation of additional multilateral mechanisms, including an inter-governmental ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). ASEANs Regional Defence Diplomacy The origins of ADMM can be traced back to 2004, when the ASEAN Secretariat was directed by a special ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting to draw up a concept paper for an ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting. The idea was initially broached as part of the proposal for an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), laid out in the 2003 Bali Concord II declaration. ADMM convened for the first time in May 2006 and has slowly become more institutionalized. Defence ministers now meet regularly and are supported by their own senior officials process (ADSOM). The growth of interactions among ASEAN defence officials has been impressive. As Singh and Tan note, in 2011 alone ministers or senior officials met almost once a month. Alongside ministerial and senior officials meetings, a glance at the current ADMM calendar reveals an ASEAN Military Operations Informal Meeting (AMOIM), a Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM), an East Asian Security Outlook Seminar (EASO) and a Chiefs of Defence Force Informal Meeting (ACDFIM). There is also a growing programme of practical activities. In 2011, ASEAN militaries conducted their first multilateral table top exercise, a symbolically important step.39 Soon after the first ADMM in Kuala Lumpur, ministers began to consider contacts with other regional states. The 2007 ADMM agreed on a concept paper that set out the modalities and principles in the event that a wider meeting with ASEANs Dialogue Partners might be created.40 The third ADMM agreed a set of principles for an expanded membership in a paper drafted by Singapore and Thailand.41 This final step towards the establishment of a regional defence diplomacy architecture came to fruition in October 2010 when the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) was inaugurated at a meeting in Hanoi, with ASEAN defence ministers joining their counterparts from China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand, Russia and the United States. Three years after the first meeting in Hanoi, ADMM-Plus is only beginning to get established.42 The eighteen ministers will meet for only the second time in Brunei in August 2013. A busy ADMM-Plus Work Plan has begun but it remains focused on less sensitive, non-traditional security issues. Five Experts Working

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Groups (EWGs), each co-chaired by one ASEAN and one nonASEAN member, address peacekeeping operations, maritime security, military medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-terrorism. Most have met two or three times since 2010. A number of table top exercises have been held and in 2013 there will be three field training exercises, addressing HADR and Military Medicine (Brunei, 1720 June 2013); maritime security (Sydney, 28 September1 October 2013) and counter-terrorism (Sentul, Indonesia, 913 September 2013). Notwithstanding, the limited contact between ministers to date and the focus on non-traditional security issues, the creation of a region-wide grouping of defence ministers represents an important innovation in Asias security architecture and a break with the past preference for bilateralism. Explaining Late Multilateral Defence Diplomacy in Asia This pattern immediately presents two related puzzles for analysts. First, why were foreign ministers from Asia-Pacific countries able to meet to discuss security issues in the ARF since 1994, but it took as long as 2006 for ASEAN defence ministers to assemble in their own forum? Why did it take sixteen years after the creation of the ARF before a parallel region-wide defence ministers meeting could meet? Second, what caused the deeply established norm in favour of bilateral defence cooperation to break down in the way that it did? The existing literature provides much clearer answers to the first question, than it does for the second. There is widespread acceptance that the prevailing norm among ASEAN states for the groups first few decades was to maintain bilateral (or at best trilateral), rather than multilateral defence relations, at least at the highest levels. Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak summed up the prevailing sentiment: ASEAN military forces are familiar with each other on a bilateral basis. To me, thats good enough.43 Various proposals in the late 1980s and 1990s, whether for a defence community, regional multi lateral exercises, or a fully-fledged defence ministers summit, were all rejected.44 What made bilateralism the preferred arrangement for high-level defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia? There are both instrumental and normative explanations.45 Looking at the balance of threats, Southeast Asian states lacked the glue of shared threat perceptions that had propelled collective defence in Cold War Europe. During

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the Cold War, some were more concerned about subversion and insurgency, others about external aggression from the Soviet Union or Vietnam. Many, including Indonesia, were more preoccupied with state-making and internal security issues than the regions changing security order.46 Second, multilateral defence cooperation also appeared to have limited utility. In most cases, defence ties with neighbours offered only marginal practical benefits compared to engaging with outside Great Powers such as the United States. There were also challenges in terms of capacity and inter-operability between regional militaries. Finally, suspicion and mistrust characterized several bilateral relationships. Unresolved territorial disputes between Malaysia and Singapore, and Malaysia and the Philippines, aggravated relations from time to time. ThaiMalay defence cooperation stumbled over thorny issues such as the hot pursuit of insurgents by Malaysian forces. Singapore and Malaysia tensions flared periodically over issues as diverse as water and Singapores contacts with Israel. But the strong preference for bilateralism was not simply about efficiency or the nature of threat perceptions. Acharya also outlines normative reasons why multilateral defence cooperation was considered illegitimate, tracing the origins of the norm to postwar ideas that saw regional pacts associated with colonialism and the interference of external powers.47 These deeply held cognitive priors undermined collective defence pacts such as the SouthEast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and helped ensure that no Asian NATO appeared in the 1950s or 1960s.48 He argues that the norm against multilateral military cooperation has clearly survived into the post-Cold War period.49 While there is a large literature explaining why ASEAN maintained its strong preference for bilateralism, there is less work exploring how this strong norm was eroded so quickly with the rapid rise of multilateral inter-governmental defence dialogues between 2006 and 2010. This is surprising, because as See Seng Tan notes, new processes like ADMM and ADMM-Plus stand at odds with the regions express rejection of collective defence and collective security on the one hand, and its collective aspiration for neutrality on the other.50 Broadly speaking, the theoretical literature takes two approaches to explaining the rise of multilateral institutions, one stressing the role of structure, in particular the influence of material factors, such as changes in the balance of power. The second focuses more

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on the role of agents and emphasizes the importance of norms and ideas.51 Recent work has stressed the indeterminacy of wholly power-based approaches, showing how they are unable to account for the particular trajectory of post-Cold War security multilateralism in the region.52 However, a modified approach emphasizing the important role of external shocks, remains influential. 53 This asserts that critical junctures, such as war or depression call into question the existing rules of the game and facilitate the rise of new institutions.54 A small number of analysts have begun to explore the puzzle of Asias late defence multilateralism in the context of theories of institutional change. In his detailed survey of Southeast Asias evolving defence diplomacy, Evan Laksmana argues that the recent rise of defence diplomacy can be explained by three developments. First, that within the ASEAN context, multilateral defence diplomacy initially rose as a way to recover from the regional anxiety caused by the 1996 Asian financial crisis.55 Second, that it was related to the increasingly worrying trend in regional arms development. The proliferation of fourth-generation fighter aircraft, advanced surface vessels and submarines arguably led ASEAN countries to reassess their position on intraregional defence cooperation and to gradually accept the notion that elevating the profile and scope of defence diplomacy [was] becoming a strategic imperative. Third and related to this the growing number of multilateral defence diplomatic activities under the auspices of the ARF between ASEAN and its regional partners concerning a wide range of security issues can be attributed to the concern with Chinas rise and the ensuing potential return of great-power politics in the Asia-Pacific.56 While these worries were all doubtless important topics on the minds of ASEAN decision makers during the late 1990s and early 2000s, a focus on the changing balance of power or external shocks like the AFC seems to be under-determining when it comes to explaining institutional innovation in the field of defence diplomacy. Alarm bells about the potential for an arms race to develop in Southeast Asia and the proliferation of advanced weapons systems were regularly sounded throughout the early and mid-1990s.57 Concerns about Chinas rising power and fears of a confrontation with the United States were felt in the mid-1990s (the 1996 Cross-Straits crisis for example) and again in the early part of the Bush administration (the 2001 EP-3 incident). Yet when calls were made for defence ministers to meet officially in a multilateral

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context, they were consistently dismissed. For example, as late as 2002 a suggestion by the head of the Japan Defence Agency to convert the SLD into an Asian Defence Ministers Meeting was blocked by ASEAN.58 Nor is it clear why the AFC worked as an initial catalyst to provide a rationale for closer defence dialogues.59 The primary effect of the AFC as far as regional militaries were concerned was to see their budgets slashed and modernization programmes delayed. Indeed, in his insightful assessment of Sino-Australian defence diplomacy, Brendan Taylor argues the financial crisis was one of the main reasons holding back multilateral defence diplomacy in the region.60 In the aftermath of the AFC, ASEAN leaders wrestled with revising the groups norm of non-intervention, and stepped up efforts to build an East Asian financial architecture (including through the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three process), but proposals for multilateral defence interactions remained unwelcome.61 Even after another external shock the 9/11 attacks that might have been expected to lead to closer multilateral defence ties, the initial responses in ASEAN were to pursue bilateral or trilateral counter-terrorism cooperation.62 Finally, a focus on structural factors or external shocks also does not explain why it was even necessary to create a distinct track of defence diplomacy. Concerns about arms control, the development of confidence building measures, or the engagement of a rising China could have been handled exclusively within existing arrangements such as the ARF. If structural explanations provide a less than adequate guide to institutional innovation in defence diplomacy, an alternative approach is to focus on the role of agents, and examine how new ideas and norms are diffused, challenged and adapted by a range of actors. This scholarship divides between so-called cosmopolitan approaches which emphasize the role of norm exporting actors (often in developed Western states) and explanations which focus on the way norm targets adapt and revise norms to make them congruent with established local traditions or cognitive priors.63 The most influential of these latter accounts constitutive localization argues that a norm is more likely to be modified and localized when it has the support of influential insider proponents and where it can be made compatible with local normative traditions. Unlike structural explanations that see rapid change brought about through the catalytic role of shocks, constitutive localization sees norm change as an incremental

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and evolutionary process. It builds on the work of historical institutionalists, who argue that pre-existing choices shape the design and formation of new institutions.64 Agents, Path Dependence and Norm Change Discussions about the rise of defence diplomacy do make reference to the role of agents in shaping the regions security agenda. The contribution of civil society groups and track two networks are pointed to as important in encouraging the development of a broader security agenda that looks at non-traditional as well as traditional security issues.65 But, surprisingly, few analyses direct attention to the primary participants in defence diplomacy dialogues, namely military officers and defence officials. I argue one reason for their late involvement in multilateral diplomacy lies in the identity of regional militaries and defence institutions and in the way these groups have historically seen themselves. Asian militaries did not meet multilaterally in an inclusive, dialogue-focused forum because they saw their primary role not to discuss political issues, but to manage violence. In many important cases, militaries were inward-looking institutions, whose primary security role was to defend the nation from internal as well as external threats. One Philippines official sums it up simply: ADMM and ADMM-Plus were slow to develop because defense ministries of ASEAN countries were simply the last ministries to engage in direct dialogue with one another.66 This self-perception on the part of regional armed forces and defence officials was often exacerbated by bureaucratic rivalries. As one survey of regional institutions in Asia notes, foreign ministries have jealously guarded their prerogatives at multilateral meetings. 67 In U.S.Japan relations, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs long objected to closer ties between the Japan Self- Defence Forces and the U.S. military. Bureaucratic politics also prevented Canada from participating in the SLD until 2008, because the Canadian foreign ministry didnt want the defence ministry stealing the limelight from them in terms of taking on a more prominent role in advancing Canadas engagement with Asia.68 Canada was hardly unique in this respect. When defence officials began attending ARF meetings in the late 1990s, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials informally commented to their counterparts, that they would prefer the PLA not to be these meetings.69

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Since the end of the Cold War, however, the focus of regional militaries has changed in several respects. First, armed forces, reflecting broader socio-political influences, have begun to embrace a range of new non-traditional roles and functions.70 Foremost among these new roles was dealing with so-called transnational issues, including humanitarian and disaster relief, and countering piracy and transnational crime. 71 These problems are by their nature difficult for states to respond to unilaterally and provide an incentive for cooperation.72 This is not to say that traditional tasks such as war-fighting have become irrelevant. Indeed, in some states they have become more, not less, salient, but in most cases they are now augmented with a wide range of other functional responsibilities. Second, many regional militaries have also taken important steps towards professionalization in the last decade, including reducing their role in domestic politics and internal security. 73 For example, Marcus Mietzner argues that the TNI has lost much of its internal security role to the police, leaving it with occasional missions in disaster-relief, large-scale communal conflict and anti-separatist campaigns.74 Further, Gary Hogan notes that the new generation of TNIs leaders are more sophisticated, worldly, and conscious of the wider implications of military actions for Indonesias international image and reputation. 75 Thomas Bickfords analysis of the PLA similarly notes the arrival of a new generation of better-educated leaders, the development of its own group of international experts and a more outward looking focus.76 Change within regional militaries was of course highly uneven and is in itself insufficient to explain the creation of institutions. But these changes gave armed forces and defence officials a greater incentive to engage with one another and to seek a place in the growing number of regional multilateral security dialogues. They unfolded as a number of external actors were challenging the norm around bilateral defence cooperation by proposing the gradual inclusion of defence officials within ARF processes.77 The first meeting of defence officials in the ARF context took place on the sidelines of an ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF SOM) at Langkawi, Malaysia in 1997.78 The Malaysian foreign ministry was very dubious about including defence officials and although the only meeting was an informal lunch, the Malaysian chair even refused to allow any kind of agenda for discussion.79 But the event passed without incident and another small step came

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later the same year when the heads of defence universities met under the auspices of the ARF. In 2001, defence officials were invited to meet informally on the sidelines of the ARF Inter-sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBM). In 2002, this process was augmented by an ARF Defence Officials Dialogue (DOD), with meetings held several times a year, including one meeting held back-to-back with the annual ARF Foreign Ministers meeting. According to one participant in these early encounters, only a small number of countries were active and most representatives were largely passive. This slowly began to change, as participants became more familiar with the process and more comfortable with the broader pattern of multilateral interactions. Chinas attitude to the inclusion of defence officials is one example, reflecting Beijings growing comfort in participating in all forms of multi lateralism. Chinese MOFA officials initially expressed reservations about PLA involvement in ARF activities, but Beijing soon changed to be more proactive and innovative in regional defence dialogues.80 According to one participant, it went from being hesitant, to playing a lead role with proposals and wanting to chair. 81 In 2004, China proposed another defence meeting, an annual ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy Conference (ASPC) bringing together defence officials at the level of vice-minister. Because all these early encounters took place in the context of the ARF, they offered wary participants assurance that they would operate on the basis of established ASEAN norms. They could be sure that the focus would be solely on dialogue, not intrusive or constraining confidence-building measures. If the norm against high-level multilateral defence interactions began to be challenged incrementally after 1997, the arrival of the SLD provided an additional push factor. A key attraction of the initial dialogues was the participation of senior U.S. defence officials and military officers, including Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SLD showed that there was a demand for high-level defence interactions in the region, and the star power of the U.S. secretary of defence provided a practical incentive for regional states to send their own high-ranking delegations.82 As one analyst has noted, the SLD certainly undercut the flawed assumption that the region [was] not ready for a ministerial-level defense forum.83 But although the SLD was highly valued by some Southeast Asian states (in particular Singapore) it also represented a challenge

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to ASEAN and its drivers seat role in regional cooperation. The SLD after all was organized by outsiders a European thinktank, something that led to some grumblings in the region.84 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudds claim that SLD was the pre-eminent defence and security dialogue in the AsiaPacific region pointed to a real risk that ASEAN and the ARF could become marginalized. 85 ASEANs decision to convene an inter-governmental defence diplomacy process through ADMM and then ADMM-Plus, was part of a strategy to retain control over what was becoming an increasingly vibrant aspect of regional diplomacy. It is no accident that the Joint Statement issued to mark the founding of ADMM-Plus in October 2010, both reaffirms ASEANs centrality and also pointedly declares that ADMM-Plus is the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism for regional security issues among the ASEAN member states and the eight Plus countries.86 Yet, if these push and pull factors provided incentives for greater defence interactions, the rapid institutionalization of defence diplomacy also owes much to historical contingency and in particular the influential role of two ASEAN Chairs: Indonesia and Vietnam. 87 Indonesias time in the Chair in 200304 was critical in providing a spur for greater multilateral defence cooperation, in particular with its tabling of ambitious proposals for a regional peacekeeping force and an ASEAN Security Community. The role of key individuals in advancing this process, in particular the work of Rizal Sukma, the Executive Director of the Jakarta Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been well documented.88 Vietnams time in the Chair in 2010 also hastened the creation of ADMM-Plus. One regional defence official recalls that in conversations with ASEAN counterparts in 2008 the consensus was that the realization of a broader regional defence ministers meeting was still some way off. As ASEAN Chair in 2010, however, Vietnam was seeking to play a larger role on the regional and global stage, including serving as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It was determined to put its mark on ASEAN and pushed more hesitant ASEAN members to agree that a regional defence ministers meeting should be hosted in Hanoi.89 Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh described the creation of ADMM-Plus as the highlight of Vietnams time in the chair.90

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Incrementalism and the Future of Defence Diplomacy This analysis suggests that rather than being propelled by a series of dramatic external shocks or changes in the balance of power or threats, Asias multilateral defence diplomacy can be seen as an incremental process, shaped in important ways by Southeast Asias pre-existing institutions. The erosion of the norm favouring bilateral defence cooperation and the creation of new defence diplomacy arrangements can best be explained by looking at the way in which new ideas were proposed by outsiders, and picked up and adapted by local agents. Much of the initial impetus for multilateral defence interactions came from outside ASEAN: the initial enthusiasm for the inclusion of defence officials in ARF dialogues was suggested by ASEANs Dialogue Partners, who were at first the most active participants in the ARF defence track activities. The SLD was conceived and driven by the Londonbased IISS, creating a de facto ministerial meeting by default. Its strongest supporters included the United States and Australia. These developments found local supporters in the form of changing regional defence establishments that increasingly saw themselves as having an external role and a new range of non-operational functions. But they also challenged the norm of ASEAN centrality, demanding a response from local elites in the form of ADMM and ADMM-Plus. What does the above analysis suggest about the future of Asias defence diplomacy? First, it is important not to overstate the change that has occurred. Although the strong preference for defence bilateralism has been significantly modified in the last decade, the norm has not been completely displaced. Multilateral dialogues have become widely accepted, and there is support for practical collaboration between militaries on a range of non- traditional issues and even for the first time on shared approaches to defence industry within ASEAN.91 However, there is little sign that ASEAN states are interested in forming any kind of multilateral collective defence pact. Second, the emergence of multilateral defence diplomacy to date owes much to incrementalism and path-dependency, and is likely to continue to evolve in much the same way. ADMM-Plus ministers will meet for only the second time in Brunei in August 2013 and after that will still only meet in the ASEAN+8 format every second year. Despite a stated desire to focus on practical outcomes, progress in the work programme is likely to be slow.

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This will not be helped by changes in EWG leadership. Those ASEAN members that did not get to co-chair a group when these roles were first distributed in Hanoi in 2010 are now seeking to do so. As new chairs take over in 2014 it seems likely that some groups will lose momentum. There is also little prospect for radical change in the kind of issues that feature on the regional defence diplomacy agenda. In the lead up to the 7th ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in May 2013, Vietnam (with the support of Cambodia and Laos) proposed the formation of a new EWG looking at Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). It is unclear how much support there is for this across ASEAN, in part because the ERW issue is seen to be a concern primarily for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. There seems less chance still that ADMM or ADMM-Plus will move to tackle hard or traditional security issues in the near term, or that they will be able to make rapid progress on initiatives such as an Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement. Rather, a more likely scenario is to see increasing levels of cross-pollination and joint activities between the different working groups. Some synergies are already evident, for example, the potential for overlap between military medicine and HADR. The first ADMM-Plus exercise scheduled for Brunei in June 2013 will incorporate a military medicine component into a broader disaster response scenario. Finally, the analysis here suggests there is unlikely to be a neater defence diplomacy architecture any time soon. The ADMMPlus agenda, especially its focus on non-traditional security issues such as HADR, increasingly overlaps with the work of ARF intersessionals. In 2013, for example, both the ARF and ADMM-Plus will hold their own disaster relief exercises. The SLD continues to meet and discuss many of the same issues. But to date, there has been no agreement about how the respective processes can avoid duplication and make a distinct contribution. In July 2012 the ARF Foreign Ministers did agree to drop the one Defence Officials Dialogue (DOD) meeting that had been held back-to-back annually with the ARF Ministerial, but this is unlikely to signal any broader consolidation.92 Competing national interests stand in the way of better coordination and consolidation. Indeed, as one analyst argues, a certain level of incoherence suits ASEAN as it prevents the concentration of power in the hands of one or more of its Dialogue Partners, something that might ultimately see the Association sidelined.93

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NOTES
1

For more information about NADI, see Tan Seng Chye, The Relevance of the Network of Asian Defence and Security Institutes to the ADMM, in From Boots to Brogues: The Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, edited by Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan, RSIS Monograph no. 21 (Singapore: RSIS, 2011). See also: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi/>. Ian Storey, Chinas Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 287310; Ralf Emmers, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 27186. See Seng Tan, Talking Their Walk? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 23250. See for example, David Capie and Brendan Taylor, The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defence Diplomacy in Asia, The Pacific Review 23, no. 3 (July 2010): 35976. Brendan Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defense Diplomacy: Convergence or Divergence in Sino-Australian Security Relations?, Contemporary International Relations 21, no. 3 (2011); Richard Bitzinger, U.S. Defense Diplomacy Towards Southeast Asia, in Singh and Tan, eds., From Boots to Brogues, pp. 10415; On China, see Ian Storey, Chinas Bilateral Defense Diplomacy, op. cit., and also L.C. Russell Hsaio, PLA Steps Up Military Diplomacy in Asia, China Brief XI, issue 8 (6 May 2011). David Capie, The Bilateral-Multilateral Nexus in Asias Defense Diplomacy, in Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation, edited by Brendan Taylor and William Tow (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); David Capie and Brendan Taylor, Two Cheers for ADMM+, PacNet, no. 51 (20 October 2010); Ron Huisken, ADMM+8: An Acronym to Watch, East Asia Forum (8 October 2010). Evan Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 25170. Alastair Iain Johnston, What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About International Relations Theory?, Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 5378. David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p. 79. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper no. 365 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004). Stephen Blank, Defense Diplomacy, Chinese Style, Asia Times, 11 November 2003. Strategic Defence Review (London: Ministry of Defence, 1998), pp. 1067. Defence Diplomacy, Policy Paper no. 1 (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2000), pp. 23.

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Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, op. cit., p. 187. Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at the Committee of Supply Debate 2006, <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ nr/2006/mar/06mar06_nr.print.img.html>. New Zealand Defence Force Capability Review (Wellington: New Zealand Defence Force, 2000) <http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/nzdf-caprev/operational.html>. Kristin Gunness, Chinas Military Diplomacy in An Era of Change, paper presented to the National Defense University symposium on Chinas Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests, National Defense University, 20 June 2006, p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Sraoj Bishoyi, Defence Diplomacy in U.S.-India Strategic Relationship, Journal of Defence Studies 5, no. 1 (2011): 65. Pankaj Kumar Jha, Indias Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Journal of Defence Studies 5, no. 1 (2011): 4763. Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, op. cit., p. 187. Storey, Chinas Bilateral Defence Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 294. Singh and Tan, Introduction, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 22131; on localization, see Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 23975. Carol Atkinson, Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 19722000, International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006): 520. Michael Green and Koji Murata, The 1978 guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Process and Their Historical Impact, National Security Archive Working Paper no. 17 (1998) <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/ GreenMurataWP.htm>. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 8 February 2011, pp. 1314. Sheldon Simon, The Regiobalization of Defence in Southeast Asia, The Pacific Review 5, no. 2 (1992): 119. Joint Statement between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia at the Armed Consultations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 12 January 2008, para 8. DND Hosts Joint Defense and Security Cooperation Committee Meeting with Indonesia, press release, Philippines Department of National Defence, 16 December 2010. For a list of bilateral defence interactions in Southeast Asia, see Singh and Tan, eds., From Boots to Brogues, op. cit., p. 7. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Semaphore , issue 14 (14 July 2006). Ibid.

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Ibid. Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference, fact sheet published by U.S. Army Pacific, <http://www.usarpac.army.mil/PACCPAMS/>. Remarks of Captain John Bischeri, Head of International Plans and Policy, U.S. Pacific Fleet at the 12th Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Sydney, 2729 September 2010. Capie and Taylor, The Shangri-La Dialogue, op. cit. Interview with American participant in the Shangri-La Dialogue, Kuala Lumpur, 4 June 2008. Singh and Tan, eds., From Boots to Brogues, op. cit., p. 9. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Concept Paper, <http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3372~v~ASEAN_Defence_ Ministers__Meeting_-_Plus_Concept_Paper_on_the_Establishment_of_the_ASEAN_ Defence_Sectoral_Body.pdf>. Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defense Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 3. Capie and Taylor, Two Cheers for ADMM+, op. cit. Cited in Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 150. For examples of earlier proposals, see Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defense Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 12; see also Amitav Acharya, Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Security Community or Defense Community?, Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 15978. For a volume that emphasizes the instrumental and normative features of regional order, see Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security, in Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 477512. See for a detailed discussion see Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), Chapters 3 and 4. See Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism and the Origins of Multilateralism, International Organization 56, no. 3 (June 2002): 575607. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 149. Tan, Walking Their Talk?, op. cit., p. 234. See for example Donald Crone, Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy, World Politics 45, no. 4 (1993): 50125. For a more recent analysis see Mark Beeson, Does hegemony Still Matter? Revisiting Regime Formation in the Asia Pacific, in Globalisation and Economic Security in East Asia: Governance and Institutions, edited by Helen Nesadurai (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006). Hemmer and Katzenstein, Why Is There No NATO in Asia?, op. cit.

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See for example the institutional bargaining approach set out by Aggarwal and Koo. This does not discount the role of elite beliefs and ideologies, but assigns primary importance to external shocks which create the impetus for change. See Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, Asias New Institutional Architecture: Evolving structures for Managing Trade, Financial and Security Relations (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2008), p. 14. Kent Calder and Min Ye, Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explaining the Organization Gap in Northeast Asia, Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (2004): 191226; Aggarwal and Koo, Asias New Institutional Architecture, op. cit. Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means?, op. cit., p. 261. Ibid., p. 253. See for examples, Desmond Ball, Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region, International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 78112; Asias Arms Race, The Economist , 20 February 1993; Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994). See Seng Tan, From Talk Shop to Workshop: ASEANs Quest for Practical Security Cooperation through ADMM and ADMM-Plus Processes, in Singh and Tan, eds., From Boots to Brogues, op. cit., p. 30. Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means?, op. cit., p. 264. Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defence Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 2. For example, in Ralf Emmers careful examination of the impact of the triple shocks (the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and the 9/11 attacks) on Southeast Asias security institutions, he makes no mention of defence diplomacy. See Ralf Emmers, Southeast Asias New Security Institutions, in Aggarwal and Koo, Asias New Institutional Architecture, op. cit., pp. 181213. Emmers, Southeast Asias New Security Institutions, op. cit.; On the impact of 9/11 on Southeast Asian relations with the United States, see David Capie, Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: the War on Terror and Southeast AsiaU.S. Relations, The Pacific Review 17, no. 2 (2004): 22348. Acharya, How Ideas Spread, op. cit. See for example, Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutions, in Institutions and Social Order, edited by Karol Soltan, Eric Uslaner and Virginia Haufler (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 1543. See for example, Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means?, op. cit., p. 257. For a critical perspective on the influence of track two networks, see David Capie, When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and Asian Regionalism, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 17, no. 2 (June 2010): 291318. Philippines diplomat Hans Siriban reported in cable from U.S. embassy Manila Philippines Offers Views on ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, 8 February 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08MANILA439.html>. Time to Talk Defence, Japan Times, 18 July 2002.

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Author interview with former International Institute for Strategic Studies Council member, cited in Capie and Taylor, The Shangri-La Dialogue, op. cit., p. 363. Author interview with regional defence official, February 2013. Timothy Edmunds, What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe, International Affairs 82, no. 6 (November 2006): 105975. Ian Storey notes that in 2004 the PLA denoted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and peacekeeping as new historic missions. Storey, Chinas Bilateral Defence Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 293. For a useful summary, see report from the conference on the Evolving Roles of the Military in the Asia-Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2830 March 2000, <http://www.apcss.org/publications/report_evolving_roles.html>. See generally, Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). Marcus Mietzner, Overcoming Path Dependence: the Quality of Civilian Control of the Military in Post-authoritarian Indonesia, Asian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (2011): 276. Gary Hogan, A Promising New Generation of TNI Leaders, Lowy Interpreter, 6 March 2013, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/03/06/A-promisingnew-generation-of-TNI-leaders.aspx>. See Thomas Bickford, Searching for a Twenty-first Century Officer Corps, in Civil-Military Relations in Todays China: Swimming in a New Sea, edited by David Finkelstein and Kristin Gunness (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 17186, p. 175. One official who took part in meetings at the time recalls Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States as being most supportive of this move. Author interview with regional defence official present at series of ARF DOD and ISM meetings, February 2013. Kavi Chongkittavorn, ASEAN Needs to Chart Clearer Path for the ARF, The Nation, 2 June 1997. Author interview with regional defence official present at the Langkawi meeting, February 2013. See generally Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, Chinas New Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs (NovemberDecember 2003): 2235. Author interview with regional defence official, 12 February 2013. Author interview with Australian defence official, Kuala Lumpur, 4 June 2008. Tan, Talking Their Walk?, op. cit., p. 241. Author interview with American participant in the Shangri-La Dialogue, Kuala Lumpur, 4 June 2008. Cited in Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defense Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 2. Hanoi Joint Declaration on the First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus, Hanoi, Vietnam, 12 October 2010, <http://admm.org.vn/sites/eng/Pages/ jointdeclarationonthefirstadmm-nd-14709.html?cid=141>.

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On the influential role of the ASEAN Chair, see Alastair Iain Johnston, The myth of the ASEAN Way: Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, edited by Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999). See for example, Donald K. Emmerson, Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up? Security, Community and Democracy in Southeast Asia, <http://iisdb.stanford.edu/evnts/4130/Emmerson_04_05_2005.pdf>; Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 279, n. 50. According to some reports, Vietnam initially supported an ASEAN+10 membership for the ADMM-Plus, but in consultations that took place after a February 2010 foreign ministers retreat in Danang, the consensus was that this should be reduced to Plus-8, omitting two of ASEANs Dialogue Partners, Canada and the European Union. See Vietnams Impressions of ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat in Danang, cable from U.S. embassy Hanoi, February 2010 <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10HANOI17.html>. Important Milestone in ASEAN Defence Ties, Vietnam News, 16 August 2010. Tan Walking Their Talk?, op. cit., p. 240. This meeting was not held in 2011 when Indonesia was in the chair. The 2012 ARF Ministerial in effect confirmed a decision that had already been taken the previous year. Tan Walking Their Talk?, op. cit., p. 245.

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