Joanne Accolla
—Original Message
From: Tom Eldridge
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2004 3:30 PM
To: Joanne Accolla
Cc: Susan Ginsburg
Subject: FW: FBI Testimony
Joanne -
Thanks.
-- Tom
—Original Message
From: Caroline Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2004 2:25 PM
To: Team 6; Team 5
Subject: FBI Testimony
Congressional Statement
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI's Role in the Process of Preventing the Entry of Terrorists into the U.S.
2/17/2004
Page 2 of4
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting Director Mueller
here today to testify in this hearing, in which the Committee is examining the FBI's role in
the process of preventing the entry of terrorists into the United States. Unfortunately,
Director Mueller could not be here today, so I have been designated to provide testimony
in his stead. My name is Robert Garrity, and I have served as an FBI Special Agent since
1976.1 currently serve as the Deputy Assistant Director of one of the FBI's newest
divisions, the Records Management Division (RMD). My goal today is to inform you of
two main methods in which the FBI is an integral part of the cooperative effort of federal
agencies to screen for potential terrorists attempting to enter this country. The first
process is the FBI National Name Check Program which screens selected groups before
they receive a visa for entry into the United States. Lastly, I want to provide you with the
mission and objectives of the new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) which assists in the
efforts to respond to suspected terrorists screened or stopped at our borders.
Certain visa applications require substantial interagency vetting prior to approval by the
Department of State. The primary category is designated Visa Condor, relevant to certain
individuals who are from designated countries and who satisfy additional criteria which
may make them worthy of additional scrutiny. The FBI receives information on the
applicants from the Department of State, which is entered into the FBI's National Name
Check Program (NNCP). The information is searched against the FBI's Universal Indices
(UNI). The searches seek all instances of the individual's name and approximate date of
birth, whether a main file name or reference. By way of explanation, a main file name is
that of an individual who is the subject of an FBI investigation, whereas a reference is
someone whose name appears in an FBI investigation. References may be associates,
witnesses, co-conspirators, or victims whose name has been indexed for later retrieval.
The names are searched in a multitude of combinations, switching the order of first, last,
middle names, as well as combinations with just the first and last, first and middle, and
so on. It also searches different phonetic spelling variations of the names, which is
especially important, considering that many names in our indices have been
transliterated from a language other than English.
If there is a match with a name in an FBI record, it is designated as a "Hit", meaning that
the system has stopped on a possible match with the name being checked, but now a
human being must review the file or indices entry to further refine the "Hit" on names. If
the search comes up with a name and birth date match, it is designated an "Ident." An
"Ident" is usually easier to resolve.
Approximately 85% of name checks are electronically returned as having "No Record"
within 72 hours. A "No Record" indicates that the FBI's Central Records System contains
no identifiable information regarding this individual. By agreement with the Department of
State, partially due to our concern about the time factors in approving most visa
requests, a "No Record" equates to a "No Objection" to the issuance of a visa. The
substantive investigative divisions in the FBI, (i.e., the Counterterrorism Division (CTD),
the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the
Cyber Division (CyD)) do not review visa requests where there is no record of the
individual. Duplicate submissions (i.e., identically spelled names with identical dates of
birth submitted within the last 120 days) are not checked, and the duplicate findings are
returned to State.
Because a name and birth date are not sufficient to positively correlate the file with an
individual, additional review is required. A secondary manual name search usually
identifies an additional 10% of the requests as having a "No Record", for a 95% overall
"No Record" response rate. This is usually accomplished within a week of the request.
The remaining 5% are identified as possibly being the subject of an FBI investigation.
The FBI record must now be retrieved and reviewed. If the records were electronically
uploaded into the FBI Automated Case Support (ACS) electronic record keeping system,
it can be viewed quickly. If not, the relevant information must be retrieved from the
existing paper record. Review of this information will determine whether the information
is identified with the subject of the request. If not, the request is closed as a "No Record."
2/17/2004
Page 3 of4
The information in the file is reviewed for possible derogatory information. Less than 1%
of the requests are identified with an individual with possible derogatory information.
^^ These requests are forwarded to the appropriate FBI investigative division for further
^^ analysis. If the investigative division determines there is no objection to the visa request,
the request is returned to the name check dissemination desk for forwarding to the
Department of State. If there is an FBI objection to the visa request, the investigative
division will prepare a written Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and forward it to the
Department of State. In reviewing these visa requests, the FBI has identified individuals
attempting to enter the United States who are of serious concern to the FBI.
I want to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to the impact that delays in visa
processing may have on business, education, tourism, this country's foreign relations,
and worldwide perceptions of the United States. With these considerations in mind, the
FBI is working diligently with the Department of State toward the common goal of
improving the expediency and efficiency of the visa clearance process. At the same time,
the consequences of the FBI's mission on homeland security require that our name
check process be primarily focused on an accurate and thorough result. This means that
there are instances when the FBI's review of a visa request must require as much time
as needed to obtain an unequivocally correct result.
Processing Times
The FBI's goal is to have all requests completed within 120 days. How long does it take
to complete a visa request name check? Ninety-two percent are completed in 30 days.
Between 98-99% of the requests are resolved in 120 days. Most name check requests
that are over 30 days old are the result of the time required to retrieve and review field
office record information. Some delay occurs at substantive analysts' desks, but this is to
be expected. These analysts are assigned to the investigative divisions and are primarily
assigned to the analysis of intelligence reports from around the world in order to support
<*~\g investigations, or to support the flow of intelligence to policy makers. Despite
these significant and voluminous responsibilities, these are the best professionals to
review information in our records, and to then make an informed decision on whether a
requester of a visa represents a threat to our homeland, or is interested in illegally
acquiring our targeted technology. Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, the FBI resolves
between 98-99% of all types of visa requests within 120 days.
I alluded to the time delay for most requests in excess of 30 days being the time
necessary to retrieve the file from the field office where the file is stored. This is the
primary factor in any delay in the FBI responding to a visa name check. FBI files are
currently stored at one of 265 locations, including FBI Headquarters, all 56 field offices,
many of the larger of our 400 resident agencies, several warehouses around the
Washington Metropolitan area, in records centers operated either by the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or a commercial concern, four large
Information Technology Center facilities on the east and west coast, and at Legal
Attache offices worldwide. Delays result from NNCP personnel identifying a file's location
and then requesting the file from a field office. Time delays mount as field office staff
search file rooms and then fax or ship copies of the needed file or a prepared summary
to FBI Headquarters. This process - repeated for many tasks, not only dilutes the FBI's
responsiveness, but also limits information sharing - a critical success factor in working
counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases.
One possible solution to this problem the FBI is exploring is the establishment of a
central records repository where all of our closed paper files could be located, and our
r*^ active files stored electronically. Our frequently requested closed files could be scanned
and uploaded into our electronic record keeping system, so that Agents and analysts
worldwide would have instant electronic access to the information they require for their
jobs.
2/17/2004
Page 4 of4
The TSC was created to ensure that government investigators, screeners, agents, and
state and local law enforcement officers have ready access to the information and
expertise they need in order to respond quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened or
stopped. The TSC will consolidate access to terrorist watch lists from multiple agencies
and provide 24/7 operational support for thousands of federal screeners and state and
local law enforcement officers across the country and around the world. When fully
operational, the TSC will dramatically increase our ability to ensure that federal, state,
and local officials are working from the same unified, comprehensive set of anti-terrorist
information. The TSC allows for the consolidation of disparate information, currently held
by multiple agencies to be brought together for a single purpose of identifying and
detaining potential terrorists, or prevent future terrorist attacks. The creation of the TSC
marks a significant step in protecting America's communities and families by detecting,
disrupting or preempting terrorist threats.
Since December 1, 2003, TSC has been providing key resources for screeners and law
enforcement personnel. These include:
Since December 1, 2003, the TSC has had the ability to: (1) make the names and
identifying information of terrorists (known to or suspected by the U.S. Government)
accessible to federal, state and local law enforcement; (2) systematically review whether
a known or suspected terrorist should be included in or deleted from additional screening
processes; (3) administer a process to ensure that persons, who may share a name with
a known or suspected terrorist, are not unduly inconvenienced in U.S. Government
screening processes; and, (4) implement a system to adjust or delete outdated or
incorrect information to prevent problems arising from misidentifications.
Conclusion
The nature of the terrorist, foreign intelligence and criminal threats facing our nation
continues to evolve and so does the FBI. We have made significant strides toward
enhancing our operations, both domestically and overseas, and depend upon valuable
partnerships with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition, the FBI
recognizes the importance of accurate and timely name check processing. I want to
emphasize to you, this issue has the full attention of Director Mueller. The FBI
appreciates the interest of the Committee in this matter. I am prepared to answer any
questions the Committee may have.
Thank you.
2/17/2004
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OF TERRORISTS
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
RESPONSIVE
to
REQUEST #13-6
COMMISSION COPY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy *" /9/11 Law Enforcement
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simultaneously with the publication of the "Associates"
spreadsheet names and therefore1, contact with sll state and
local law enforcement liaisons should occur to coordinate
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000000008
Req 13-6
9/11 Law Enforcement Priivacv
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Drafted By: j_
Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350-WLC (Pending)
265A-NY-280350-LEGAL (Pending)
66F-HQ-A1255362 (Pending)
Title: PENT30MB;
"PROJECT LOOKOUT"
00: NY
Synopsis: To set forth OGC' s opinion on the entry of information on
United States Persons (US.PER) and Non-United Spates Persons
(NONUSPER) results of investigations conducted pursuant to he
Project Lookout "Watch List."
Reference: 265A-NY-280350-2164
Details: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, numerous FBI field divisions engaged in a logical
investigation of the suspected terrorist subjects. In the
interests of safety and security for the public and the
security of future commercial air travel, the investigation
expanded from the terrorist subjects themselves to other
individuals who may be linked to the criminal acts that
occurred on September 11, 2001. Based upon criteria outlined
DV roject Lookout personnel, F3I personnel are compiling a list
of individuals who might be associates of the subjects,
material witnesses to the attacks or logically connected
the criminal activity.
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICr
Read and clear,
000000011
Req 13-6
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
From: Counterterronsm
TTOS/nm./RFU/RM 5328
Contact: UC [_
Drafted By: |_ J
Title: PENTTBOM
"PROJECT LOOKOUT"
00: NY
000000012
Rsq 13-6
-o- ^.11 Field Of 3 es From: ~oun:
Re: 265A-NY-230350-KLC, 1C,':3/2001
000000014
Re: 265.V-NY-28035CI-KLC, ID.'23 '2001
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
Drafted By :
Reference: £6r -HQ-A1255352, serial 12, ca^ec 11/20/JLVJ. , ^:- _rc.Ti cne
Office of the General Counsel (OGC).
Details:
_, , 000000016
Req 13-6
9/11 Law Enforcement
Sensitive
Based upon the need for increased safetv for the Clvmpic
Games and the necessity fo.r increased information sharing with our
law enforcement partners, senior FBI management personnel concluded
that due to the substantial risk imposed upon the 2002 Winter Olympic
Games that each field division'-.would search their files to compile a
list cf subjects from the Counterterrorism program who could pose a
threat to the Olympic Games. Therefore, all field offices are
directed to immediately .compile a list of =11 Counterterrorism
Program subjects from open Dom5st_ic_Terrorism and International
Terrorism .cases (Preliminary Inquiries 'and Full Investigations'*. ?.il
assigned personnel are to immediately access end.retrieve th.e name?,
dates of birth, social security numbers and.other relevant
unclassified identifying information, such as.descriptive data
(height:, weight, eye color, hair color., etc.) , miscellaneous numbers
(passport numbers, etc.), operator license numbers, and vehicle
. information, o_f ALL investigative classifications .'for Domestic and
I International Terrorism,, including cases concerning \ ' "_ ~l
I ' \d then task vour NCIC operators
to load all names and identifying, information into the NCIC VGTOF
file by C.Q3 February 1, 2002. . Additional, information concerning
details for entry into the VGTOF, can be found in the NCJC_Operating
Manila JL, VGTOF Chapter.
Req 13-6
000000017
9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive
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Immediately assign
names and all identifying information of ALL investigative '••
classifications for domestic and international terrorism, including
cases concerning any diplomats from state sponsors of terrorism and
then task vour I^CIC ooerators to load all names and identifvinc
information into the ^CIC VGTOF system by COB February 1, 2002.
Drafted Bv:
Case ID #: 66F-HQ-A1296544-P (Pending)
Title: CREATION OF TERRORISM WATCH LIST
OO:HQ
BUDED: 03/20/2002
BUDED: 04/15/2002
Synopsis: The FBI is establishing a permanent Terrorism Watch List (TWL). The purpose of this electronic
communication (EC) is to outline the development protocol and the approach that will be followed to
establish the TWL.
Details: As you are aware, following the terrorist attacks of September 11. 2001. FBI Headquarters
compiled what became known as the "Project Lookout Watch List." The project was successful in
identifying a number of individuals potential!}' connected to the PENTTBOM investigation. Due to the
success of this effort and in recognition of the need to maintain a centralized repository of names of
investigative interest related to terrorism investigations. Director Mueller authorized the establishment of
a permanent Terrorism Watch List (TWL). As the Director noted, this TWL is not intended to replace the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Interpol "RED" notice. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAAj Security Directives, the State Department Class/IBIS/Visa Viper program, the Custom Department's
TECS, the Immigration and Naturalization Sen-ice NAILS.. FBI BOLO Alerts, or any other watch and
warning system. It is intended to supplement these existing tools and to be the CTD's single, integrated
listing of individuals of investigative interest.
Composition of the TWL
The TWL will consist of a compendium of names based on information identified through
FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations. U .S. Intelligence Community reporting, and Department
of Defense intelligence gathering, as well as information provided by foreign intelligence/ security sen-ices.
Although potential candidates for inclusion on the TWL will come from multiple sources, the FBI will
decide which names are ultimately placed on the TWL. The FBI also will decide into which systems TWL
names will be entered (e.g.. some names may be forwarded to the Violent Gang Terrorist Organizations File
[YGTOF] maintained by~N CIC. while other names may be forwarded to other databases, to include the Visa
Viper System operated by the Department of State, the FAA Watch List, or other systems).
The TWL will be designed to assist both the intelligence and the law enforcement
communities in their investigations of terrorist groups/individuals. TWL staff will coordinate with the
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division to ensure the utilization of appropriate NCIC files
\, VGTOF). This capability will provide all state and local law enforcement agencies ready access to this
information, 'information in the TWL will also be shared with U.S. Government agencies that operate
comparable tracking systems.
The TWL will be divided into three distinct categories. The first category will include the
names of individuals for whom formal criminal charges or indictments have been handed down (e.g.. the
22. individuals on the Most Wanted Terrorist list). The second category will include the names of
individuals under Full Investigations by the FBI. (Preliminary Investigations may be recommended by a
Field Office or selected by FBIHQ for inclusion into the TWL.) The third category of the TWL will include
the names of individuals of interest to the FBI but who may' not be the subjects of an active FBI investigation
The list will be based upon criteria established by CTD. Individuals on the TWL will be
listed with identifying information, much like a "wanted" poster.
The initial TWL will include the 22 individuals named to the Most Wanted Terrorists list
I'Cateeory One. as discussed above), other individuals being sought in connection with the PENTTBOM
investigation, and all hullEield investigation.subjects. From this starting point, the TWL staff will expand
the list, as appropriate, base'ckon contribution's- from the sources identified above. A protocol will be
established and mechanisms will'-be put in place to ensure full utilization of this asset. The CTD and T\VL
staff, in coordination with relevant FBIHQ divisions, will develop the protocol and establish the mechanisms
necessary for utilizing the TWL. The field W M bs advised by EC when this protocol has been developed.
However, in the interim, beainninc on the date of this EC. field offices are advised to direct all inquiries and
candidates for inclusion on the TWL to Unit Ch'Vefl \l ^ "I FRTHO ft r.nm
5432. In addition to the name, field offices will be asked to provide as many of the following identifiers as
possible for each submission: date of birth (essential), known aliases, alien registration number, social
security number, terrorist group affiliation, race, height, weight, and hair color.
000000023
To: All Field Or c:es r'romi Coun~erterroris
Re: 199-HQ-NSW, 0 3 / 1 9 / 2 0 0 2
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
CQUNTERTERR PRISM
AT TAWU
9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy
By 04/15/2002, one (]) Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and six (6) Intelligence Pperations
Specialists will be reassigned to manage and implement the Terrorism Watch List in accordance with the
«eneral framework outlined in the "Details" section of this EC.
1 - Mr.
1 -Mr.
1 -Ms.
1 - Mr.
Precedence: Date:
Drafted By: |_
i) Subject of investigation is
target of classified collection techniques
or FULL investigation was opened based upon
single source reporting.
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enforcement .
II. THE FBI TERRORISM WATCH LIST AND NCIC SIL5NT HITS
heading).
The f o u r sub-groups will be comprised of:
Req 13-6
000000029
To: All Field Offx s From: Counterter. ;ism Division
Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362 Date: 06/10/2002
s e .ub>=«.
the Terrorst Organization Classif ic.tion is: International
Extremist (INTRNTL XTHSTS'IFBI) .
All field offices that have the capability to enter
information to CJIS.
All field offices are reminded to continue to
initiate and use the two tiered Reporting and Audit system
referenced on page three (3) of the communication located at
66F^HQ-A1255362, serial 68. Additionally, all receiving
offices are instructed to continue using a 66 classification
"administrative file) for their divisions and use that file
number as the default file number for entry of all
-tterterrorism Program records (Domestic or International)
into the NCIC system.
000000032
Req 13-6
To: All Field OffV-es From: Countertei .jrism Division
Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362 Date: 06/10/2002
LEAD (s):
Set Lead 1:
CJIS
10
CJIS
11
From: CJ1S
Programs Development Section/Criminal Information
Coordination Unit/Module C3
Contact:
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Approved By: 9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy
Drafted By:
Case ID #: 66F-HQ-C1250689
Title: CJIS DIVISION VIOLENT GANG AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
FILE
Synopsis: Instructions to all field offices to utilize new terrorist organization group/subgroup codes and
to modify all NCIC VGTOF terrorist records to new codes.
Reference: 66F-HQ-A1255362 Serial 104
Enclosure(s): Modification chart/worksheet
Details: As all recipients are aware, the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File (VGTOF) has been utilized since January
/uuz in an effort to prevent potential terrorist attacks.
The referenced electronic communication provides direction
for the entry of Counterterrorism Program subjects into the
NCIC VGTOF.
The entry of the Counterterrorism Program subjects
into the VGTOF increases information sharing among law
enforcement throughout the United States and Canada. In an
effort to facilitate the field offices in modification of_
existing VGTOF records, to comply with the revised criteria
as detailed in the above referenced electronic communication
(EC), the CJIS Division has developed new VGTOF terrorist
group and subgroup codes. The new VGTOF group codes which
are co be used in new cases, as well as, in the modification
of records already entered into NCIC are listed below:
GROTJP
„ ., , 000000036
Req 13-6
9/11 Law Enforcement
Sensitive
SUBGROUPS
Category 1
Individuals \who are the subject of formal criminal
charges or indictments\(this includes individuals1 named to the
Most Wanted Terrorist List),. ALL field offices and FBIHQ's
Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit (CTAWU) have
the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category.
The new VGTOF subgroup codes which are to be used are listed
below:
Domestic NCIC Code:
International NCIC Code:
Caveat:
WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION - ARMED AND DANGEROUS.
PLEASE ARREST AND DETAIN I N D I V I D U A L . ONCE THE
INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, IMMEDIATELY CONTACT
YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD O F F I C E .
Category 2
Individuals of Counterrorism interest to the FBI, but
do riot . yet ha've formal charges pending. This category will be
limited to uniquely situated individuals such as: the three
remaining individuals listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist
List; |\ and those individuals identified during
"Operation Enduring Freedom" that pose a threat to the United
States. '-Only the FBIHQ.' s CTAWU have the ability to enter
subjects into VGTOF using this category. The new VGTOF subgroup
codes which are to be used,, are listed below:
Domestic NCIC Code:
International-.., NCIC Code:
Caveat:
Caveat:
Req 13-6
000000038
. ... _ _ _ . _ ^
Category 4
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
1) Use the newly created terrorist codes for entry of all new NCIC VGTOF records.
2) All existing VGTOF records should be modified to reflect the new codes.
3) The CJIS Division will continue to update existing VGTOF records fog
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON. DC
.Attention: Chief; Domestic Terrorism/
Counterterrorism Planning Section
For information only. Please read and clear.
From: Counterterrorism
SAWS/TWWuVRoom 11303
Contact: SSA
Approved By:
Law Enforcement Privacy
Drafted By:
. . . > r , .Q= --•• TST, < = s-ovided at the unclassified level and
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Raq 13-6
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
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Re: 66F-HQ-C1392S52, 1 2 / 2 4 / 2 0 0
LEAD(s) :
Set Lead 1:
Approved By:
Case ID #: 66F-HQ-C1250689-VGTOFTERR
66F-HQ-C1384970
GANG/GROUP
Domestic Extremist NCIC Code:
International Extremist NCIC Code:
SUBGROUP
Category 1
Individuals who are the subject of formal criminal
charges or indictments (this includes individuals named to the
Most Wanted Terrorist List). Field offices and FBIHQ's
Counterterrorism Division, National Threat Center Section,
Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit (CTD/NTCS/TWWU) have the ability
to enter .subjects into VGTOF using this category. The VGTOF
subgroup c.odes are:
Domestic NCIC Code:
International, NCIC Code:
Caveat:
WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION - ARMED AND DANGEROUS.
PLEASE ARREST AND''DETAIN INDIVIDUAL. ONCE THE
INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, IMMEDIATELY CONTACT
YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE.
Category 2
Individuals, of. Counterterrorism interest to the FBI,
but do not vet have formal charges pending. Only the FBIHQ's
CTD/NTCS/TWWU has the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using
this category. The VGTOF subgroup codes are:
Domestic NCIC Code:
International NCIC Code:
Caveat:
WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. PLEASE .DETAIN THIS
INDIVIDUAL FOR QUESTIONING. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS OF
INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO THE FBI. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL
IS SECURELY DETAINED, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD
OFFICE IMMEDIATELY.
Category 3
All subjects of FBI Domestic and International
Terrorism FULL Investigations and subjects of Preliminary
Inquiries as deemed appropriate by the SAC or Section Chief.
Field offices and the FBIHQ's CTD/NTCS/TWWU have the ability to
enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The VGTOF
subgroup codes are:
LEAD(s) :