Design Process
In designing the airframe, McDonnell-Douglas chose to make the DC-10 much like the older DC-8 and DC-9, two very successful and safe aircraft.
PRO: sped up design process;
fitted an oft-stated company policy of technological caution
technological caution
Quotes from McDonnell-Douglas company literature expressing this aspect of corporate culture:
Be not the first by whom the new are tried / Nor yet the last to lay the old aside. (Alexander Pope) Pioneering dont pay. (Andrew Carnegie)
Another opinion:
There are a few points on which most experts agree, however:
the DC-10 is fully airworthy in the sense that it meets all federal standards for airworthiness; from a statistical point of view, it has been, like the other jet-powered aircraft, a very safe airplane; . . . and the airlines that operate DC-10s appear satisfied that it does the job for which it was intended (Newhouse, 2, p.84)
Airworthiness
If in inspecting an airplane, the F.A.A. sees a need to repair or modify something, it issues what is called an airworthiness directive. Once issued, such a directive has the force of law. (Newhouse, 2, p. 84)
As of May 25, 1982, McDonnell-Douglas was well ahead:
Hydraulic
In most ways that matter to airlines, the DC-10 is similar and does not compare unfavorably with the other wide-bodies.
Redundancies
Location of systems
DC-10: all 3 systems ran in parallel under the cabin floor Boeing: control lines run through the ceiling above the cabin
FMEA Report
Ship 1 (1970)
the prototype ship was undergoing standard pressurization tests on the ground outside Long Beach plant
The cargo door blew and The cabin floor collapsed
Frenchs Analysis:
the McDonnell-Douglas system . . . Is fundamentally weak and easily compromised by employees who have fallen into a rather automatic pattern of behavior encouraged by that company policy and procedure. (French, 9) The evidence supports the view that over the years McDonnell-Douglas established an inspection procedure that invites or tempts inspectors to be lax and careless and some of the inspectors, either through inadvertence or because of conditioning to laxness, cursorily performed tasks that, given the basically poor design of the aircraft, called for the closest attention to detail to insure safety. (French, 9)
Bibliography
Peter French, What is Hamlet to McDonnell-Douglas or McDonnell-Douglas to Hamlet? Business & Professional Ethics Journal vol. 1, no. 2 (1982), pp. 1-13. Daniel A. Vallero, and P. Aarne Vesilind. Socially Responsible Engineering Justice in Risk Management. (Hoboken, NJ John Wiley & Sons, 2007), pp. 66-71. Charles B. Fleddermann. Engineering Ethics. (Upper Saddle River, NJ Prentice Hall, 1999).
Bibliography (2)
John Newhouse, A Reporter at Large: A Sporty Game, The New Yorker
1. Betting the Company June 14, 1982 (pp. 48-105) 2. Turbulent June 21, 1982 (pp. 4693) 3. Big, Bigger, Jumbo June 28, 1982 (pp. 45-86) 4. A Hole in the Market July 5, 1982 (pp. 44-89)
Webography
Applying Lessons Learned from Accidents: Turk Hava Flight TK981, DC-10, Paris
http://faalessons.workforceconnect.org/l2/Turk/