Neohelicon XXXIV (2007) 1, 115122 DOI: 10.

1007/s11059-007-1011-0

PAOLO BARTOLONI

THE VALUE OF SUSPENDING VALUES

This article sets out to interrogate the notion of literary value by placing it within a broader discussion of literatures relation to truth. It asks, in other words, if it is possible to evince the value of literature by assuming that literature is a carrier of certain truths. Institutions have in turn been called upon or even created to evaluate and demonstrate its value according to a series of criteria often based on the investigation of the relation author-work-audience. I argue that the dynamicity of literary values, their development and changeability, is related to the priority that one of the terms of the relation authorwork-audience has enjoyed over the others at different historical times. I also argue that the emphasis on the link between literary values and strong truths (demonstrable truths) has produced disabling dichotomies and, perhaps more importantly, violated the nature of literature in relation to experience phenomenological, ontological, metaphysical or aesthetic experience. This article introduces an alternative approach to literary value predicated not so much on strong truth as on weak truth. In this context reference will be made to the work of the Italian philosophers Mario Perniola and Gianni Vattimo.

THE ARTIST AS ALTER DEUS

The belief that literature has value and that there are values in literature, originates in the contiguity between literature and truth. The implications of this relation are, however, complex and require careful consideration. Could the truth of literature be extricated, for instance, from the mystical aura that, at various periods of history, has surrounded the author? It is in the Renaissance first and during the romantic period later that the idea of the artist as genius and creator acquires connotations that elevate the poet to the category of alter deus. These are, in fact, the very terms with which Giulio Cesare Scaligero refers to the poet in his 1561 Poetices libri septem,1 one of the most comprehensive treatises of the period on the ars poetica. If it is true that the poet partakes of some divine qualities whereby she can create freely and from nothing, it fol1

Quoted in Rdiger Bubner, Esperienza estetica, trans. Monica Ferrando (Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1992), p. 41.

Paolo Bartoloni, Italian Studies & International and Comparative Literary Studies, University of Sydney, A18NSW, 2006, Australia; E-mail: paolo.bartoloni@arts.usyd.edu.au
03244652/$20.00 2007 Akadmiai Kiad, Budapest Akadmiai Kiad, Budapest Springer, Dordrecht

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lows that artistic creation is firstly removed from a given truth, and secondly that it is naturally connected with a transcendental truth. In other words, the poet as genius does not simply reproduce what is already available in reality, she instead accesses (attinge) a truth which is at once removed and invisible to the level of quotidian life. But this in itself does not mean that artistic creation explains and makes available the truth, it only means that creation contains the truth which, however, might very well remain undisclosed. The work only speaks its truth disinterestedly and unknowingly. It is in this sense that the significance of Kants articulation of the aesthetic experience becomes obvious: if the work as such is silent as to its own word, it is the reader who may give it a voice resonating with truths and values. But, in order to apprehend these values and truths, the reader, like the work itself, must be disinterested; she must, in other words, renounce the already known in order to capture that which is by necessity removed from and invisible at the level of reality. Truth is, in this sense, three times removed from the work of art; it is in the first instance, historically speaking, within the domain of the author, in the second instance that of the reader, and in the third instance that of an experience which, although revolving around the work, leaves it behind, pointing to a further goal which is often equated with secrecy and, in more contemporary time, negativity.

HEIDEGGERS TURN

An interesting instance in which the value of literature is renewed from the outside, often regardless of the intentions of the author and that of the work, is found in the philosophical interpretation of literary texts. Examples abound, and yet the most notable case, the one that inaugurated a long and illustrious series of literary texts read and commented by philosophers, is Martin Heideggers investigation of German poetry, notably that of George, Hlderlin, Rilke and Trakl. Heideggers famous turn (Kehre), that is, the work after Being and Time, is strongly indebted to his growing interest in poetic language. The obvious reference is the book On the Way to Language2 in which Heidegger embarks once again on an exploration of language by way of reading a series of poems by George and Trakl. One poem in particular Das Wort (Word) by Stefan George catches Heideggers attention. There is no thing where the word breaks, writes George, a realization that elicits in the poet an aesthetic acknowledgement and a poetic disposition: thus I sadly learned to renounce. These two lines sent Heidegger into a philosophical trajectory whose outcome has been extraordinarily important for the history of twentieth century hermeneutics and deconstruction. Heidegger essentially interprets Georges words as the emblem of a discourse on which the discussion of negativity still hinges, persisting in the view that if
2

Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper, 1982).

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truth exists, it has to be found in language. And yet language, poetic language, has learned to renounce the effability of truth since the proximity between truth and language is also their mutual negation. It is either truth or language, and their simultaneity remains impossible, or, as Giorgio Agamben would say, an impossible possibility.3 Heideggers innovation, however, is not so much the statement that language does not speak truth as the proposition that language retains truth by renouncing it. But languages keeping of truth is also truths inevitable loss. This condition decrees at once the greatness of poetic language but also its weakness. We will return shortly to the notion of weakness to discuss Gianni Vattimos famous conceptualisation of weak thought. A further clarification must be made at this stage; if it is true that for Heidegger the mutual appropriation of language and truth leads to their inevitable separation, it is also true that this language is no common language; it is specifically poetic language. The language of communication, according to Heidegger, has no communion with truth. Truth and language can recreate their natural belonging only if humans accept a new experience of language, and allow language to be as such, to be just language. Poetic language, states Heidegger as he interprets this poem by George, is the human language that comes closer to language as such through learning to renounce the efforts of conceptualisation, rationalisation and effability with regard to truth. By contrast, and paradoxically, poetic language says the truth by removing it or, as Derrida would say, by deferring it ad infinitum. Heideggers philosophical position, as we see, is far from negating any notion of truth, it indeed celebrates it by suspending it or, as Vattimo would say, by making it stronger through exposing its weakness which is its dispersal, its negativity and its disappearance/appearance among the folds of language. Many critics have more than a few doubts as to the accuracy of Heideggers interpretation of his favourite German poets.4 They are probably correct when they state that Heideggers interventions do not add to the scholarly discussion of German literature or, at worst, that they are mystifying and misguided. Heidegger embarked on what many other critics have done and still do with regard to works of art: he read these texts to advance his own theory and views, and to anchor and support his critique of metaphysics. And yet he could not have done it, or done it as well as he did, without these texts. Heidegger may have disregarded the intention of the author and the intention of the work, but in doing so he has also made a long lasting contribution to continental philosophy, renewing in the process the literary value of those texts in conjunction with his philosophical texts. It would be impossible to understand the work of Agamben, Blanchot, Derrida, Gadamer, Vattimo, to name only a few, with3 4

Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 88105. Cf. Anthony Gottlieb, Heidegger for Fun and Profit, New York Times Book Review, January 7, 1990; and Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

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out the support of Heideggers conceptualisation of language and being along the paradigmatic axis of Verzicht (renunciation) and Gelassenheit (abandonment).5 This brings us to a reassessment of literary value according to the relation author-work-audience. If literature retains a value in virtue of its connection to truth, this would be an ethical value, and not necessarily an aesthetic value. The ethical value in literature resides in its weak truths.

VATTIMOS WEAK THOUGHT

Gianni Vattimo has coined the notion of weak thought (pensiero debole) in the domains of aesthetics, ethics and politics.6 Vattimos weak thought is a reconceptualization and an extension of Heideggers philosophical project which, as we saw earlier, is underpinned by a conceptualization of language and being, the main thrust of which is to rethink and go beyond metaphysics.7 According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics is predicated upon a series of polarizations rotating around the all-encompassing opposition subject-object that in the end forget and even obliterate the essence of Being. In the context of metaphysics truth, for instance, is always and already external to being, either as the Platonic idea or the Catholic and Jewish God. Moreover, the metaphysical truth is a strong truth that requires obedience and reverence. Heideggers project is to challenge metaphysics by undermining its transcendental spirit, and he does so by emphasizing the facticity of life and its throwness in the world. When, for example, Heidegger says that language is being and that being is language,8 an equation that Vattimo picks up immediately,9 he stresses their contiguity and their mutual appropriation. Distinction, exclusion and separateness are removed from Heideggers thought in the attempt to bring about a new experience of Being, and truth. This is the state of aletheia, a Greek word meaning unconcealment but also truth, in which individuals open themselves to the world and are appropriated by the world but also appropriate the world. Mutuality and togetherness are some of the concepts that resonate strongly in Heideggers philosophy. It is because of this that Vattimo recognizes in Heideggers philosophy a democratic and inclusive element that he sets out to explore. 10
5

7 8 9 10

For a discussion of renunciation in Heidegger see also my Renunciation: Heidegger, Agamben, Blanchot, Heideggerian Consequences, ed. Vrasidas Karalis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). A recent volume of collected essays, including works by Umberto Eco, Jean-Luc Nancy and Charles Taylor, explores the relevance of Vattimos philosophy, especially in relation to weak thought, Ed. Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo (McGill: Queens University Press, 2006). For a discussion of being in Heidegger see the recent book by Santiago Zabala, The Remains of Being (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2007). Heidegger, Martin, On the Way to Language, op. cit., p. 94. Gianni Vattimo, Let dellinterpretazione, op. cit., p. 63. Gianni Vattimo, Heidegger: A Philosopher of Democracy, Heideggerian Consequences, ed. Vrasidas Karalis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

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A mutual appropriation, as Vattimo understands it, implies a symbiotic relation to truth which, by remaining internal, might lose a sense of direction and urgency, especially in those who are used to follow ready- made truths. And yet it is by switching the attention from that which is outside to that which is naturally inside that an ethics and also an aesthetics of democracy might commence. To stress this point, Vattimo turns to the Gospels, and especially to Paul, relating Pauls discussion of weakness (asthens) and love (agpe) to Heideggers philosophy. Pauls thought is predicated upon weakness11 as the ultimate strength that first has enabled God to provide the ultimate sign of love by allowing his son to die on the cross for the salvation of humans, and second to establish his Church on the weakness and sins of individuals. But this can be achieved only if the love for the truth, and therefore the love for God, is not thought and seen, as in Catholicism or Judaism for instance, as a love that flows from people to deity, rather from deity to people. It is by demonstrating his unconditional love regardless of laws (Judaism) and sins (Catholicism) that the Christian God comes down from the sky and the cross and becomes one of many. But in turning form one to many, the love of God becomes the love for each other and a love which is simultaneously within and without.12 In Vattimos reflections on religion,13 one finds the mutual appropriation of human and God, of being and Being along a path that arrives at an interesting discussion of democracy via Paul and Heideggers thought. Weak thought is, therefore, the thought that unites the community by suspending truth, which does not mean that truth is negated; it means that truth is appropriated, questioning the false strength of transcendental and metaphysical truth.

PERNIOLAS INTERESTED DISINTEREST

Can renunciation and weakness have value today? In other words, What value can be found in suspending values? Literature is fast disappearing from the university curricula, and literary texts are seldom read unless as a pretext to illustrate some topical issues. Is it possible, then, to regain literatures dignity and role, and its significance as a vehicle of ethic and aesthetic values? One possible answer to these questions is: yes, but providing that literature and its conventional value systems are brought to react with various other systems of values, both contingently and historically. This ought not to be a confrontation, not even a comparison, in that comparison itself retains the uniqueness and the specificity of the terms of comparison. This would be more like a transversal experience through which the very notion of values, knowledge and attendant prescriptions
11 12 13

Corinthians, 1, 2229; 2, 15; and Corinthians 2, 12, 110. On love in Paul see also Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), especially pp. 5253. Gianni Vattimo, Credere di Credere (Milano: Garzanti, 1998); Gianni Vattimo and Jacques Derrida, Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

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will be suspended and momentarily renounced. I am using renunciation in the Heideggerian sense of Verzicht,14 which implies a process of becoming knowledgeable by virtue of learning renunciation. It is the path toward learning renunciation that, according to Heiddegger, eventually leads to a new experience in his case of language and Being in our case of values. How do we learn renunciation? Through the literary canon, and its embodiment as suspended language within other suspended languages from, for instance, the philosophical canon. This is not, in other words, a process enacted by spectacularized destruction, nor by amnesia or forgetfulness. It is, rather, a process a hermeneutic process that may renew the significance of values by virtue of suspending and renouncing them. This is, for instance, the path that Mario Perniola announces in an important essay, La letteratura nonostante tutto, anzi a maggior ragione (Literature in spite of all, more of it as a matter of fact).15 But it is also a more general aesthetic attitude that the Italian philosopher explores with considerable insights in other recent works such as Contro la comunicazione (Against Communication) and Silence: The Utmost in Ambiguity.16 In these works, Perniola advocates a form of open intellectual hostility against the superficial emotions of the contemporaneous through the mobilisation of aesthetic acts informed by discretion and selection which are predicated on what, in a contemporary shift of the Kantian paradigm, he terms disinteresse interessato (interested disinterest). This takes into consideration the need to engage the contemporaneous head on with regard to its very core value, economy, and question it through a profession of rational critique which collides frontally with ephemeral and immediate requirements of aesthetic gratification. Perniolas is an original discussion and reconfiguration of modern and contemporary tropes informed by suspension and renunciation. One of the most emblematic examples of suspension is Melvilles Bartleby, the Scrivener. As we all know this is the story of a scrivener who chooses not to carry out the tasks he is assigned. Bartleby simply prefers not to do what he is required of him. He sits in the legal office, closed off from the other employees by a screen that the principal has provided him with. Behind the screen this man who can copy more quickly and effectively than all the other clerks in the office, remains idle, and yet always potentially ready to act and produce, should he prefer to. Bartlebys behaviour and presence charisma, mysticism ? are so uncanny that his employer is not only disarmed, but also wonderfully touched and disconcerted.17 The lawyer himself, the narrator of Melvilles Bartleby, tells us that Bartleby appears to be engaging in some kind of passive resistance. 18
14 15 16

17 18

Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, op. cit., pp. 139156. Mario Perniola, La letteratura nonostante tutto, anzi a maggior ragione, Agalma 12 (September 2006): 122125. Mario Perniola, Contro la comunicazione (Turin: Einaudi, 2004); Silence: The Utmost in Ambiguity, Ambiguity, eds. Paolo Bartoloni and Anthony Stephens (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, forthcoming). Herman Melville, Billy Budd and Other Stories (Vermont: Everyman, 1993), p. 105. Ibid., p. 107.

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PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Maurice Blanchot picks the notion of passive resistance up with relish in The Writing of Disaster in which he defines Bartlebys action as non-action. According to Blanchot, Bartlebys is in fact an abdication which equates with a relinquishment of identity.19 Blanchot pairs this form of refusal with another kind of refusal in which a decision is expressed; a refusal that does not yet allow separation from the power of consciousness.20 Blanchots very own literary production is based on an active refusal and renunciation of conventional language and narrative strategies, and yet one cannot help but think that this renunciation in action is the result of a longer process of learning renunciation that may very well need to pass via passive renunciation, and via that abdication of identity that Blanchot speaks of in relation to Bartleby. Is Bartleby, then, a model, a value, the necessary starting point from which a renegotiation of literature its production and consumption might commence? In value terms, this would mean to suspend our ability, willingness, desire to judge, but not because we do not want or because we cannot, but because we prefer not to. Perniola understands the risks inherent in a thought and a literature which have made passivity and negativity their paradigmatic raison dtre. In fact, he reaches the conclusion that the cause of literatures demise might very well imputed to the process of self-reflexivity and insularity that, starting with Mallarm, ends with Blanchot. According to Perniola, literature arrives with Blanchot at a state of separation and detachment from the world, which, although producing a form of refusal, is equated with a position of aristocratic contemplation. The refusal, in Perniola, cannot be just disinterested, it must instead gain a purchase on the world via its main vector, economy. It must become, in other words, an interesse disinteressato . The values inscribed in the literature of passivity cannot be underestimated. They lie in the demands that they as literary texts implicitly and explicitly make, and these demands need to be transversed by us. We might start judging again, but only from the threshold of the suspension of judgement, from that position, that is, in which we could always already decide that we prefer not to. Our judgement will be marked by the ability to return, paraphrasing an Italian contemporary poet, Giorgio Caproni, to where we have never been. In 1971 Caproni wrote the poem Ritorno (Return) and published it in the collection of poems Il muro della terra [1975] (The Wall of The Earth).21 In keeping to Capronis style, the poem is simple, paired down, unaffected and yet incredibly ambiguous, refractory. In time it has become a powerful symbol of suspension and inde-

19 20 21

Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 17. Ibid. Giorgio Caproni, The Wall of The Earth, trans. Pasquale Verdicchio (Montreal: Guernica, 1992).

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terminacy.22 It reads: I returned there/ where I had never been./ Nothing, from how it was not, has changed./ on the table (the checkered/ cloth), half filled/ I found the glass/ never filled. Everything/ is still as/ I have never left it.23 We are where we have never been, and yet we are not. The topos that Caproni sketches in Return is not so much the moment of arrival or departure as the movement that maintains and incessantly reconstitutes the known as foreign and the foreign as known. Literature might as well have a future, remarks Perniola, but it must first of all bid adieu to the cultural mechanisms it has become entangled with.

22

23

On this see also my Literature of Indistinction: Blanchot and Caproni, After Blanchot: Literature, Criticism, Philosophy, ed. Leslie Hill, Brian Nelson & Dimitris Vardoulakis (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005), pp. 238256. Giorgio Caproni, The Wall of the Earth, op. cit., p. 81.