Asia-Pacic Edu Res (2013) 22:7990 DOI 10.

1007/s40299-012-0028-y

Examining Intentional Knowing Among Secondary School Students: Through the Lens of Metacognition
Chwee Beng Lee

Published online: 17 November 2012 De La Salle University 2012

Abstract In this study, we examine intentional knowing through the lens of metacognition. Learners are not just active in their construction of meaning, but they can also be intentional. This would mean that they are cognitively engaged in the learning process, monitoring and regulating their learning. To learn intentionally, students must consciously understand and be able to dene their strengths and weaknesses, their learning processes, how they examine the way they execute learning tasks, monitor learning, evaluate learning, and whether they innovate in order to learn intentionally. The two main purposes of this study are to examine whether the IKIS (revised MAI) is able to provide a six-factor solution to explain intentional knowing and to predict the inuences of age and intellectual ability on students intentional knowing. This study involved 732 secondary school students, and several statistical analyses such as exploratory and conrmatory factor analysis were performed. A six-factor solution was generated and the implications of this study are discussed. Keywords Intentional learning Intentional knowing Metacognition Factor analysis

Introduction The importance of metacognition in learning is unquestionable. Researchers have found that metacognition is related to intellectual skills (Veenman et al. 2005), problem solving (Mayer 1998; Lee and Teo 2011), critical thinking
C. B. Lee (&) School of Education, University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia e-mail: Chwee.Lee@uws.edu.au

(Choy and Cheah 2009; Kuhn and Dean 2004; Magno 2010), and motivation (Sungur and Senler 2009). Despite the numerous studies conducted on metacognition and the amount of attention given to it, metacognition remains an elusive construct. There is no single explanation of what exactly being metacognitive or cognitive is, and different researchers tend to dene metacognition and its components differently (Zohar and David 2009). There are also great efforts to develop instruments and methods to examine and measure metacognition (see Pintrich et al. 1991; Weinstein et al. 1987; Tobias and Everson 2000, 2002). Regardless of such attempts, we still do not fully comprehend the nature of metacognition, its components, or its functionality. With regard to the use of self-reports, reliability is an issue, as participants may not always provide truthful responses. Despite their aws, self-reported inventories are perhaps the least problematic technique and they are still a relatively effective way of teasing out participants metacognition (Sperling et al. 2002). Lee et al. (2010) studied pre-service teachers metacognition and argued that obtaining such a prole was crucial to the design and implementation of teacher preparatory programs within a diverse population comprising pre-service teachers of different ethnicities. Despite efforts to measure metacognition, however, little is known regarding the psychometric properties of the measures (Sperling et al. 2012). Also, Muis et al. (2007) examined three self-report measures of adult learners metacognition and found that not all existing measures similarly assess metacognitive processes. Given the complexities and vagueness of metacognition as well as its variation in assessment, we propose using an alternative approach to understanding learners thinking about thinking. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1989) suggest that learners are not just active in their construction of meaning, but can also be intentional. This suggests that

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learners are cognitively engaged in the learning process, monitoring and regulating their learning (Sinatra and Pintrich 2003). Such courses of action are not just purposeful, but may also be caused by an intentional agent, an agent with a mind of its own (Sinatra et al. 2008). To learn intentionally, students as active agents must intentionally understand their strengths and weaknesses, their learning processes, examine the way they execute learning tasks, monitor their learning, evaluate their learning, and examine whether they innovate in order to learn intentionally. We have named such mental processes intentional knowing, and we argue that it is a critical element in propelling intentional learning. Our ultimate purpose is to suggest a theoretic model supported by performing statistical analyses that can accurately explain intentional knowing.

Literature Review Models of Metacognition Flavell et al. (2002) divided metacognition into metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive monitoring and selfregulation. Metacognitive knowledge was further classied into knowledge about tasks, knowledge about strategies, and knowledge about persons. In later years, most researchers came to an agreement that metacognition mainly consists of two main components: knowledge about metacognitive resources and self-regulation of cognition (McLain et al. 1991). On the other hand, Kuhn (1999) proposed the metalevel of knowing which comprises three sub-levels, namely epistemological metaknowing, declarative metaknowing, and procedural metaknowing. She further sub-divided procedural metaknowing into understanding of the task and understanding of potential strategies. Similar to Kuhns (1999) model, (Zohar and David 2009) describe a model that focuses on explaining a subcomponent of metacognition which is metastrategic knowledge. According to the researchers, metastrategic knowledge comprises knowledge about tasks and knowledge about strategies. They further divided these two components into knowledge about tasks which includes task goals and task characteristics for the use of the strategy, and knowledge about strategies which includes explaining and naming strategies. To elaborate the model, under explaining, there are 3 more sub-components which are when to use the strategies, why to use the strategies, and how to use the strategies. The researchers who study metastrategic knowledge suggest its importance and describe how it can be developed through instruction (see Zohar and David 2009; Zohar 2006). However, the studies conducted by this group of researchers were mainly

qualitative in nature and hence the model is limited in its generalizability. A recent attempt by (Efklides 2008) discussed in detail the complexity of metacognition and stated that it is a multifaceted phenomenon (p. 280). Efklides (2008) came up with a metatheoretical model to explain the multifaceted and multilevel model of cognition. In her model, there are the non-conscious level, the personal-awareness level, and the social level. The non-conscious level (object level) comprises processes involved in cognition as well as in emotion/affect. Functions of cognition at a non-conscious level involve two separate regulatory systems based on nonconscious monitoring and control processes. The products of each of the two regulatory systems, as well as their interactions, along with perceptions of their behavioral outcomes, are represented at the personal awareness level. The components at this level include metacognitive experience (ME), metacognitive knowledge (MK), and metacognitive skills (MS). The personal awareness level informs the metameta level which represents the social level of metacognition. At the social level, there are only metacognitive judgments about ones and others ME, MK, and MS. The framework is comprehensive and seeks to explain the complex nature of metacognition. However, measuring metacognition using such a framework may pose several levels of challenges due to its complexity. The extent of its power to fully explain metacognition is yet to be established through empirical studies. According to Schraw and Dennison (1994), metacognition comprises two main components: regulation of cognition and knowledge of cognition. Within regulation of cognition, there are planning (e.g., goal setting and allocating resources prior to learning), information management (skills and strategy sequences used online), monitoring (assessment of ones learning or strategy use), debugging (strategies used to correct comprehension and performance errors), and evaluation (analysis of performance and strategy effectiveness after a learning episode). Within the knowledge of cognition, there are declarative knowledge (knowledge about ones skills, intellectual resources, and abilities as a learner), procedural knowledge (knowledge about how to implement learning procedures), and conditional knowledge (knowledge about when and why to use learning procedures). In their later works, (Schraw and Moshman 1995) removed debugging and information management from their conception of metacognition after performing statistical analyses to conrm a six-factor solution. Intentional Learning In this study, we examine intentional knowing through the lens of metacognition.

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In cognitive psychology research, intentional learning strictly refers to the presence of notication to participants in a psychologic experiment that they will be tested after the experimental task (Hulstijn 2005). However, few educational psychologists further explained the term intentional learning with reference to the way learners respond in accordance to learning. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1989) suggest that learners are not just active in their construction of meaning, but can also be intentional, which means that they are cognitively engaged in the learning process, monitoring and regulating their learning (Sinatra and Pintrich 2003). Sinatra and Taasoobshirazi (2011), drawing from Bereiter and Scardamalia (1989), state that an intentional learner is one who utilizes knowledge and beliefs to engage in internally-initiated, goal-directed action, in the service of knowledge or skill acquisition (p. 210). Schnotz and Kurschner (2007) dened that when learning is intentional, the learner not only has the intention to learn, but also possesses an awareness of what has been learned. Intentional learning is explicit when the learner acquires a specic set of target knowledge and when he or she is aware of and able to articulate what has been learned (Frensch 1998; Kirkhart 2001). In this paper, we further argue that to learn intentionally, students must consciously understand and be able to dene their strengths and weaknesses, their learning processes, how they examine the way they execute learning tasks, monitor learning, evaluate learning, and whether they innovate in order to learn intentionally. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1989) used the term intentional learning to refer to cognitive processes that have learning as a goal rather than an incidental outcome. It is an achievement, not an automatic consequence of human intelligence. (p. 366). As put forth by Scardamalia and Bereiter (2003), intentional cognition is more than selfregulated learning; it is the active pursuit of a mental life, whereas self-regulated learning is usually a set of study skills and learning-to-learn strategies. They mentioned that there is a need for metaknowledge to foster intentional learning. Such an understanding is very much aligned with Efklidess (2008) metatheoretical model in which, at the personal awareness level, there are conscientious efforts to monitor and control processes. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1989) dened it as knowledge about knowledge, access to ones own knowledge, and skills which take the knowledge as an object to operate on. They also specify that major metaknowledge needs may be characterized as, rstly, a problem-solving framework for approaching learning. This means that learning should be approached within an executive structure that makes it possible to apply effort effectively. Secondly, awareness of that knowledge can enable the acquisition of other knowledge and bring about the revision of other knowledge, and can be conjoined in various ways to play various

roles which are critical to intentional learning. Thirdly, such awareness helps learners to identify decits in their knowledge. Although (Bereiter and Scardamalia 1989) present a sound argument for the need for metaknowledge, their views have not been empirically tested. A Proposed Model of Intentional Knowing We used the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) (Schraw and Dennison 1994) as the instrument for data collection. The MAI has been used in several studies (Lee et al. 2010; Lee and Teo 2011) and has been shown to possess sound psychometric properties in terms of item reliability and construct validity (Sperling et al. 2002). However, the models and results generated from MAI are not conclusive. Although Schraw and Dennison (1994) found the presence of six factors in their study, they also concluded that a two-factor solution (knowledge and regulation of cognition) had a better t with theoretic predictions. On the other hand, Lee and Teo (2011) reported a six-factor solution. Hence, a reexamination of the items and their correspondent constructs will allow us to reconceptualize the possible constructs that MAI may be assessing. In this study, we use the term intentional knowing as the overarching construct. We tend to take a constructivist and knowledge-building approach that learning should be intentional to be meaningful. Hence, intentional knowing propels intentional learning. Taking a constructivist perspective, we are keen to explore and examine the level of knowing that is goal directed and intentional. One premise of constructivism is that learners are aware of the central role of ideas in the development of knowledge and how ideas are revised through a process of conjecture, argument, and testing (Smith et al. 2000). This type of processing is not a mere response to the external circumstances or environment. In a sense, intentional level processing is not only initiated by the learners, it is under the learners conscious control (Sinatra and Pintrich 2003, p. 4). On the other hand, if a learner is not intentional, the learning process is determined largely by the external factors such as prior knowledge, types of tasks, facilitating conditions, etc. As intentional agents, the learners (1) understand their own self-capacity, (2) understand their own learning processes, (3) examine the way they evaluate their learning processes, (4) examine the way they monitor their learning processes, (5) examine the way they execute their learning processes, and (6) devise innovations to cope with learning. Understanding self-capacity refers to the understanding of ones ability as a learner. This is similar to Schraw and Dennisons (1994) denition of declarative knowledge and Flavells (1979) knowledge about persons.

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However, self-capacity provides a broader view of ones understanding of ones own ability and yet is more precise than simply having knowledge about persons. This component includes the ability to know ones strengths and weaknesses. It also includes knowing ones goals and how to go about achieving those goals, which is similar to goal intention and implementation intention (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). A possible item associated with this construct may be I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something new. The other component we propose is understanding the learning process. This is also similar to Schraws procedural knowledge and conditional knowledge which cover learners understanding of their own learning processes (including what strategies to use and how to insure the completion of learning tasks). It is also close to Kuhns (1999) procedural meta-knowing which includes the understanding of tasks and the understanding of potential strategies. Our newly dened constructs of intentional knowing are different because they cover a wider perspective, as we acknowledge the fact that procedural metaknowing is about learning processes and is a multidimensional construct which may not be feasible for itemization. A possible item associated with this construct is I change strategies when I fail to understand. The constructs of examining evaluation, examining monitoring, and examining execution are close to the sub-components in Schraw and Dennisons (1994) work, which are components of regulation of cognition. Brown (1980) also refers to this as executive control processes which include planning, monitoring, and evaluation of an individuals cognitive and affective functioning. However, while regulation of cognition refers to metacognitive activities that help control ones thinking or learning, we have recoined these terms to reect whether learners can examine the way they evaluate their learning, examine the way they monitor their learning, and examine the execution of their learning. Such understanding is aligned with the discussion on metacognitive judgment which refers to the probabilistic judgment of ones performance before, during, or after performing a specic task (Schraw 2009). One such conscious effort is the ability to think about the signicance of a specic strategy or heuristic, and is intentional level processing (Hennessy 2003). This is quite different from the initial notion of regulation of cognition, as the latter refers to how learners regulate their own cognition. However, knowing how to regulate ones own cognition does not necessarily mean that one is engaged in conscious efforts to reect on why a particular strategy is or is not effective, or why the learning process is awed or successful, or whether one needs to redene ones own monitoring process. When examining execution, the learners consciously scrutinize the way learning is carried out. Items associated with this construct may

include I stop and go back over new information that is not clear. When learners examine their monitoring processes, they check to see whether the monitoring process is feasible and renement is needed. An item such as I nd myself using learning strategies automatically fall into this category. Examining the way one evaluates learning processes is critical as it insures that the evaluation is carefully and logically carried out. One possible item associated with this construct could be I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals. The last component we identied is devising innovation, which refers to students awareness of the need to devise innovative strategies to deal with the learning. This component is close to Schraw and Dennisons (1994) debugging component. However, we believe that if learning is intentional, learners may innovate in order to deal with difcult decisions, for example items such as I create my own examples to make information more meaningful. Age, Intellectual Ability, and Intentional Knowing In recent years, studies have suggested the relationship among age, intellectual ability, and the use of metacognitive skills. According to some researchers (Berk 2003; Veenman and Spaans 2005), children start to develop metacognitive skills between the ages of 8 and 10 years and they continue to expand their skills during the years after. Some studies have pointed out students continuous development in the use of metacognitive skills between the ller 1996; Veenman and ages of 11 and 15 (Baumert and Ko Spaans 2005; Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons 1990), whereas others have concluded in their studies that there is no increase in the use of metacognitive learning strategies between the ages of 16 and 18 (Baumert 1993). The connection between age and the use of metacognitive skills is clear, but the related ndings are not conclusive. Similarly, evidence also suggests that students intellectual ability is related to the use of metacognitive skills, but the ndings have not been conrmed. For instance, researchers have found signicant differences in the usage of metacognitive strategies between intellectually gifted and average students (Cheng1993; Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons 1990; Hannah and Shore 1995). However, some studies have suggested otherwise (refer to Allon et al. 1994). As an initiative to explore intentional knowing, we were motivated to understand how age and intellectual ability affect students intentional knowing. To sum, the two main purposes of this study are 1. 2. to examine whether the MAI is able to provide a sixfactor solution to explain intentional knowing and to predict the inuences of age and intellectual ability on students intentional knowing.

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Method Participants Data were collected from 732 secondary one to three students (1315 years old) of mixed academic abilities in a secondary school in the AsiaPacic region through convenient sampling which includes 7 classes of secondary one, 7 classes of secondary two, and 8 classes of secondary three students. The sample covered over 75 % of the schools population as was intended. There are ve academic levels in the school and three academic streams (Express, Normal Academic, and Normal Technical). The express students take 4 years to complete their studies and sit for the Singapore-Cambridge General Certicate of Education Ordinary examination, while the normal academic students take 5 years to do so. The normal technical students are not included in this study. As a Catholic school, the majority of the students are ethnic Chinese, with less than 5 % of students of other ethnicities. The students in this sample have learned English as part of their formal schooling for at least 12 years. Procedures Permission was obtained from the school leaders to administer a survey questionnaire to the participants. Data were collected by the trained researchers, and at each administration of the questionnaire, specic instructions were given to the effect that participants were free to choose not to participate at any time during or after the administration of the questionnaire. Participants congregated in the schools hall where the questionnaire was administered. A total of 22 classes were involved. Within the 7 secondary one classes, two were normal academic, while ve were express stream classes. This structure was the same for the secondary two classes. Among the eight secondary three classes, three were normal academic, while ve were express stream classes. Two trained researchers were on site to brief the teachers who administered the questionnaire and the students on the purpose of the study. The participants took from 20 to 30 min to complete the questionnaire. Measure The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) (Schraw and Dennison 1994) was adopted in this study. The MAI was employed by Baker and Cerro (2000) and Pintrich et al. (2000) and has been found to possess adequate internal consistency: knowledge scale (a = .88) and regulation scale (a = .91). These ndings corroborate those of Schraw and Dennison (1994). In this study, we were

motivated to examine whether the 52 MAI items would support a model that explains the 6 components of intentional knowing: understanding of self-capacity (US), understanding of learning process (UP), examining evaluation (EV), examining monitoring (EM), examining execution (EE), and devising innovation (DI). In this study, age and intellectual ability of metacognition were included as independent variables as it was hypothesized that both factors may affect intentional knowing. Participants responded to the 52 items using a 7-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Although the participants in this study were Asian students, all items were presented in the English language.

Findings Descriptive Analysis Several statistical analyses were performed in this study. These included descriptive statistics, ANOVA, t tests, and conrmatory factor analysis. Our descriptive statistics showed that all the mean scores of the items were above the midpoint of 4.00 and ranged from 4.60 to 6.11. The standard deviations reected a fairly narrow spread of scores, with the majority falling within a range of 1.1251.545. The skewness and kurtosis indices ranged from -.165 to -1.355 and 0.006 to 1.845, respectively. These values suggest univariate normality in the data (Kline 2005). To check for internal consistency of the measure, the Cronbachs alpha coefcients were computed and were found to be sufciently high: factor 1(examining execution) (a = .878), factor 2(understanding the learning process) (a = .915), factor 3(examining evaluation) (a = .712), factor 4(understanding self-capacity) (a = .905), factor 5(devising innovation) (a = .759), and factor 6(examining monitoring) (a = .908). Principal Component Analysis A principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was conducted to explore the underlying structure of the measure. The criteria used for determining the number of components to retain were Kaisers (1960) eigenvalue greater than 1 and Cattells (1966) scree test. The initial solution yielded six components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, accounting for a total of 57.74 % of the variance (see Table 1). Examination of the scree plot supported the retention of the six components. The Kaiser MayerOlkin value was .973 which indicated a good distribution of values for conducting factor analysis. The Bartlett Test of sphericity (\.05) also indicated that the set

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of distributions was acceptable for factor analysis. In the rotated factor solution, items with loadings greater than 0.4 have practical signicance (Hair et al. 2010) and were hence retained for further analysis. In all, 51 items were retained. Conrmatory Factor Analysis A conrmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to conrm the factorial structure of the 51-item scale, and AMOS 19 was used to test the model. Model t was assessed using several indices. We rst examined the v2 (CMIN), but included v2/df (CMIN/DF) for a more pragmatic approach as v2 has been found to be too sensitive to sample size (Hu and Bentler 1999). We also examined the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative t index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). Our initial solution from the conrmatory factor analysis did not reveal an acceptable model t with v2/df = 3.015, although some t indices were at the acceptable level (e.g., CFI = .902; RMSEA = .053). An examination of the modication indices suggested that model t might be improved by correlating some error variances. Following this process, 34 items were retained, and our nal analysis revealed an acceptable model t (v2 = 1510.756, v2/ df = 2.92, TLI = .917, CFI = .925. and RMSEA = .053). Although few correlations were added into the model, it did not violate the requirements (for each factor, there are at least two indicators the errors of which are uncorrelated, and the errors of both indicators are not correlated with the error term of a third indicator for a different factor) as described by Kenny et al. (1998). Figure 1 shows the CFA model of the 6-factor scale. From the CFA, 34 items were retained. There were eight items for understanding self-capacity (USC), six for understanding the learning process (ULP), four for examining monitoring (EM), four for examining evaluation (EEv), four for devising innovation (DI), and ve items for examining execution (EEx). Table 2 shows the unstandardized estimates, standard error (SE), t value, and standardized estimates for each of the 34 items in IKIS. The signicance of each parameter estimate was determined by examining the t value (or critical ratio) to see if it was greater than 1.96. If any parameter estimate is greater than 1.96, it is signicant at p \ 0.05. All the t-values shown in Table 2 are greater than 1.96, indicating that the parameter estimates of all 34 items in IKIS are signicant at the p \ 0.05 level. A closer examination of the items revealed that their associated key phrases suggested the nature of the clustering after CFA was performed (refer to Table 2). Items that were clustered under understanding self-capacity (USC) were those that ask learners about how well they

know themselves, their goals, and implementation intentions. The key phrases associated with this component include I understand my intellectual strengths, and I know what I am good at. Items clustered under understanding the learning process (ULP) include asking learners to identify the strategies to use and the understanding of tasks. Some key phrases associated with this component are I consider several alternatives and I change strategies. Items that ask for learners to state the courses of action they take during learning are clustered under examining execution (EEx), and the related phrases are I stop and go back over new information and I slow down. Items that require learners to state what they do to learn better are clustered under examining monitoring (EM). Key phrases such as I try to use strategies that have worked and I am aware of what strategies work for me characterize this component. Items asking learners how they appraise their learning are grouped under examining evaluation (EEv), and some possible key phrases are I ask myself periodically and I pause regularly to check. Lastly, items seeking to nd out whether learners come up with new ways to cope with learning are clustered under devising innovation (DI), and some key phrases associated with this component are I create my own examples and I try to translate new information. The Inuence of Age and Intellectual Ability on Intentional Knowing To test whether students streams (Normal academic and Express) and academic levels (i.e., Secondary 1, Secondary 2, and Secondary 3) inuence the six factors of intentional learning, an independent-sample t test and ANOVA were performed, respectively. The independent-sample t test (see Table 3) revealed no signicant differences between students in the Express and Normal academic streams. In addition, the Levenes test for equality of variances indicated that equal variances were not assumed for either group of students. An ANOVA (see Table 4) was performed to explore the inuence of students academic performance on the 6 factors. As the Levenes test for homogeneity was greater than .05, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated. Signicant differences were found for ve factors excluding examining execution (EEx). These factors were understanding the learning process (ULP)F (2, 720) = 6.67, p = .001; understanding self-capacity (USC)F (2, 720) = 10.49, p = .000; devising innovation (DI)F (2, 720) = 3.96, p = .019; examining monitoring (EM)F (2, 720) = 5.853, p = .003; and examining evaluation (EVv)F (2, 720) = 3.63, p = .027. To avoid a Type 1 error, researchers recommend performing a Bonferroni correction, a more stringent test for statistical signicance. This resulted in EEv and DI

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Examining Intentional Knowing Among Secondary School Students Table 1 Factor analysis of 52 items
EEx1 EEx2 EEx3 EEx4 EEx5 EEx6 EEx7 EEx8 ULP1 ULP2 ULP3 ULP4 ULP5 ULP6 ULP7 ULP8 ULP10 ULP9 ULP11 ULP12 EEv1 EEv2 EEv3 EEv4 USC1 USC2 USC3 USC4 USC5 USC6 USC7 USC8 USC9 USC10 USC11 USC12 USC13 DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EM5 EM6 EM7 EM8 EM9 EM10 Var. extracted Note Selected factor loadings are shown in bold % Var. extracted

85

1 .086 .094 .297 .182 .141 .261 .239 .359 .221 .401 .223 .206 .245 .293 .232 .225 .212 .194 .341 .151 .153 .068 .312 .281 .433 .424 .499 .506 .654 .473 .618 .633 .590 .405 .502 .411 .482 .255 .315 .105 .177 .172 .374 .211 .194 .035 .149 .455 .502 .276 .137 5.952 11.445

2 .330 .217 .104 .169 .133 .141 .287 .113 .563 .541 .654 .645 .464 .582 .568 .503 .518 .419 .505 .490 .152 .370 .305 .160 .260 .408 .379 .244 .291 .333 .131 .225 .354 .264 .146 .031 .127 .225 .204 .092 .137 .276 .229 .319 .208 .169 .229 .226 .171 .119 .274 5.803 11.159

3 .548 .709 .546 .645 .720 .552 .571 .541 .174 .165 .235 .134 .185 .191 .273 .413 .077 .171 .161 .162 .044 .259 .168 .199 .341 .230 .202 .349 .128 .279 .045 .219 .178 .199 .172 .353 .111 .068 .179 .118 .360 .228 .224 .290 .189 .176 .432 .229 .183 .271 .093 5.234 10.065

4 .121 .101 .277 .136 .148 .195 .229 .219 .222 .305 .171 .133 -.045 .119 .185 .182 .247 .389 .435 .379 .109 .187 .328 .366 .041 .101 .117 .254 .083 .235 .110 .233 .057 .183 .455 .333 .272 .348 .103 .097 .239 .449 .464 .482 .436 .552 .553 .543 .566 .549 .541 4.968 9.554

5 .125 -.057 .082 .352 .053 .398 .174 .313 .082 .034 .163 .385 .408 .249 .107 .146 .378 .039 .129 .160 .559 .468 .430 .611 .279 .318 .059 .011 .145 .081 .174 .189 .165 .093 .256 .109 .368 .179 .076 .196 .068 .420 .118 .159 .146 .042 .162 .226 .230 .412 .419 3.547 6.822

6 -.082 .110 .168 .137 .171 .158 .248 .254 .098 .053 .115 .083 .145 .225 .233 .141 .341 .401 .083 .310 .061 .121 .183 .186 .187 .146 .186 .220 .201 .155 .197 .127 .167 .028 .076 .175 .262 .574 .638 .674 .552 .256 .322 .293 .457 .249 .123 -.004 .033 .211 .226 3.467 6.667

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being removed from further analysis due to a lack of signicance. Post hoc multiple comparisons were made to compare each group with every other group following the least signicance difference (LSD), Bonferroni and Tukey Honestly Signicant Difference (HSD) procedures. In terms of ULP, all three procedures revealed that there were signicant differences between the secondary 1 and secondary 3 students at p \ .05. In terms of USC and EM, there were signicant differences across all levels at p \ .05. No signicant differences were found between the secondary 1 and 2 students and between the secondary 2 and 3 students.

Discussion and Conclusion The aims of this study were to examine whether a six-factor solution would explain intentional knowing and to assess the impact of age and academic ability on these six factors. The

revised MAI instrument was adopted and renamed IKIS (Intentional Knowing Instrument for Students). By performing an exploratory factor analysis, 51 items were retained and 6 factors were found. From the conrmatory factor analysis, the list of items was reduced to 34 when a good model t was obtained. The IKIS is an initial effort to measure the intentional knowing of youth between the ages of 13 and 15. It measures respondents perceptions of examining execution (EEx), understanding the learning process (ULP), examining evaluation (EEv), understanding self-capacity (USC), devising instruction (DI), and examining monitoring (EM). From the results of the CFA, there was evidence of factorial validity for the IKIS. In answer to Sigler and TallentRunnels (2006) call for efforts to improve on instruments for testing metacognition, the IKIS, which is based on Schraws initial work, demonstrates the potential to assist educators and teachers in creating learning environments that promote intentional knowing. It may also provide

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Examining Intentional Knowing Among Secondary School Students Table 2 Estimates of the 34-item IKIS Examining evaluation EEv1 EEv2 EEv3 EEv4 Devising innovation DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 Examining execution EEx3 EEx4 EEx6 EEx7 EEx8 Examining monitoring EM2 EM3 EM4 EM6 EM7 EM8 EM9 ULP3 ULP4 ULP6 ULP7 ULP11 ULP12 USC2 USC3 USC4 USC5 USC6 USC8 USC11 * \ 0.05 USC12 1.000 .941 .926 .890 .974 .997 1.027 1.000 .992 1.017 1.027 1.094 1.122 1.156 1.038 1.110 1.117 1.123 1.127 1.153 1.000 .049 .052 .047 .050 .051 .050 19.374 17.770 18.870 19.417 19.465 20.625 .733 .723 .667 .706 .725 .727 .767 .695 .691 .707 .690 .737 .714 .684 .642 .704 .657 .700 .711 .704 .603 1.114 .887 .888 1.000 .861 .961 1.051 .992 1.000 .049 .047 .046 .044 17.655 20.664 22.730 22.431 .069 .057 .065 16.097 15.695 13.736 .744 .667 .574 .721 .631 .728 .774 .775 .806 .789 .731 .853 1.000 .067 .046 .044 11.729 15.892 19.489 .453 .604 .727 .765

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Unstandardized estimates

SE

t value*

Standardized factor loading

Understanding the learning process .049 .058 .060 .060 .064 .077 .072 .072 .076 .073 .073 .075 20.054 17.387 16.988 18.132 17.598 15.071 14.335 15.386 14.639 15.336 15.509 15.397

Understanding self-capacity

researchers with a reliable tool to assess intentional knowing for more effective research interventions. Our results suggest that in terms of academic performance, there were no signicant differences among the normal academic and express students. It seems that intentional knowing has its own virtue in learning. Interestingly, the results of this study contrasted many studies

that reported correlations between metacognitive strategies and academic achievement. Our nding corroborates that of Pintrich et al. (1991) who suggested that metacognition and learning strategies are not correlated with academic achievement. Similarly, Veenman et al. (2005) also found few correlations between intelligence and metacognition. Future studies must look into the relationships between

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88 Table 3 t test analysis of the inuence of age and intellectual ability on intentional knowing Dimension EEx ULP EEv USC DI EM Express mean 5.544 4.846 4.730 4.881 4.867 4.862 Normal mean 5.414 4.857 4.755 4.804 4.856 4.899 t -1.802 .136 .268 -1.015 -.120 .468

C. B. Lee

Table 4 ANOVA of the inuence of academic performance on intentional knowing Factor EEx ULP EEv USC DI EM Mean F 2.872 6.678 3.636 10.496 3.961 5.853 Sig. .057 .001** .027* .000** .019* .003**

* These gures were signicant at p \ .05. By applying Bonferroni correction, they became not statistically signicant ** Signicantly signicant even after applying Bonferroni correction

intentional knowing and abilities such as problem solving and critical thinking which are important attributes of twenty-rst century learners. Where age is concerned, we found signicant differences across the three levels for USC, ULP, and EM. This supports the ndings of other studies (e.g., Stewart et al. 2007; Veenman and Spaans 2005) that there is continual development in the use of metacognitive skills among learners between the ages of 11 and 15. What is most intriguing is that there were no signicant differences between the secondary 1 and 2 students or between the secondary 2 and 3 students, but signicant differences were found between the secondary 1 and 3 students in terms of understanding self-capacity (USC), examining monitoring (EM), and understanding the learning process (ULP) after the Bonferroni correction was applied. Such ndings may imply that when building students intentional knowing, especially in the areas of understanding self-capacity, examining monitoring, and understanding the learning process, teachers must design their instruction according to their students needs. Intentional Knowing for Intentional Learning The reconceptualization of metacognition is built on the premise of constructivist learning and has important practical implications for learning. Intentional knowing may be

a propelling force behind intentional learning. Such knowing is the conscious knowing of ones capacity and learning process, the knowing of how one examines ones own monitoring, evaluation, and execution processes, and in addition how one innovates to cope with demanding tasks. Intentional learners not only cognitively engage in the learning process, but also regulate their learning. From the pedagogical perspective, to develop learners who have the intentionality to learn, we suggest that educators not only create learning opportunities to cognitively challenge their students, but also embed meaningful tasks and activities to help them acquire skills to understand their own strengths and weaknesses and their own learning processes. Paris and Paris (2001) also suggested that providing students with the opportunity to use a variety of strategies through engaging in challenging activities and interacting with peers promotes student metacognition. Sungur and Senler (2009) found that as students deal with more challenging tasks, they become more metacognitively active in terms of knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. There must also be opportunities for learners to examine their own monitoring, execution, and evaluation processes. Most importantly, enabling them to develop strategies to cope with demanding and challenging tasks is critical. In recent years, there have been efforts to design computer systems or online learning environments to foster metacognition, and their success has been widely documented (Jones et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2010; Mair 2011). The other consideration for fostering intentional learning is through engaging students in discourse that promotes the scrutinizing of ones thinking processes and the ability to identify ones own selfcapacity and learning process. Online platforms such as the Knowledge Forum may supports students in advancing their metacognitive and epistemic capacity by constantly examining their understanding. Assessing Learners Intentional Knowing as a Key to Building Intentional Learners It is not the goal of this study to negate the validity of the MAI. Rather, this study is an initial attempt to reconceptualize metacognition through the lens of metacognition with the use of the MAI. We argue that to develop intentional learners who have cognitive goals, conscious control, and use knowledge purposively (Bereiter and Scardamalia 1989; Sinatra 2000), there is a need to also help them acquire intentional knowing which is germane to intentional learning. Hennessey (2003) made a clear distinction between metacognitive processes at the representational and evaluative level. According to the researcher, the evaluative level, which includes the ability to draw inferences about ones unobservable constructs, consider the implications or limitations inherent in personal

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Examining Intentional Knowing Among Secondary School Students

89 Kognitionen und Schulleistung (pp. 137154). Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags Union. Bereiter, C., & Scardamalia, M. (1989). Intentional learning as a goal of instruction. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), Knowing, learning and instruction: Essays in honor of Robert Glaser (pp. 361392). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Berk, L. E. (2003). Child Development. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Brown, A. L. (1980). Metacognitive development and reading. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), The theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. 453479). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Cattell, R. B. (1966). The scree test for the number of factors. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 1(2), 245276. Cheng, P. (1993). Metacognition ang giftedness: The state of the relationship. Gifted Child Quarterly, 37, 105112. Choy, S. C., & Cheah, P. K. (2009). Teacher perceptions of critical thinking among students and its inuence on higher education. International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 20(2), 198206. Efklides, A. (2008). Metacognition: Dening its facets and levels of functioning in relation to self-regulation and co-regulation. European Psychologist, 13(4), 277287. Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring A new era of cognitive developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34, 906911. Flavell, J. H., Miller, P. H., & Miller, S. A. (2002). Cognitive development. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Frensch, P. A. (1998). One concept, multiple meanings. In M. A. Stadler & P. A. Frensch (Eds.), Handbook of implicit learning. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement: A meta-analysis of effects and processes. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 69119. Hair, J. E, Jr., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivariate data analysis (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Hannah, C. L., & Shore, B. M. (1995). Metacogniton and high intellectual ability: Insights from the study of learning-disabled gifted students. Gifted Child Quarterly, 39, 95109 Hennessey, M. G. (2003). Metacognitive aspects of students reective discourse: Implications for intentional conceptual teaching and learning. In G. M. Sinatra & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional conceptual change (pp. 103132). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for t indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 155. Hulstijn, J. H. (2005). Incidental and intentional learning. In C. J. Doughty & M. H. Long (Eds.), The handbook of second language acquisition. Blackwell Publishing, 2005: Blackwell Reference Online. 3 Oct 2012. Jones, M. E., Antonenko, P. D., & Greenwood, C. M. (2012). The impact of collaborative and individualized student response system strategies on learner motivation, metacognition, and knowledge transfer. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 28(5), 477487. Kaiser, H. F. (1960). The application of electronic computers to factor analysis. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 20, 141151. Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Bolger, N. (1998). Data analysis in social psychology. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 233265). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. Kirkhart, M. W. (2001). The nature of declarative and nondeclarative knowledge for implicit and explicit learning. Journal of General Psychology, 128(4), 447461.

knowledge claims, refer to ones thinking or learning process, comment on the status of ones conception (p. 126), requires intentional effort. This would necessarily mean that when learners are engaged in intentional learning, they would invoke the metacognitive processes at the evaluative level, which is similar to the intentional knowing we advocate in this study. The intentional knowing model may serve as a guide to fostering intentional knowing among learners. To understand learners level of intentional knowing, the IKIS may be used as a tool for classroom diagnosis. In addition, it may also aid in classroom intervention and provide necessary information for educators and teachers to decide on teaching pedagogies. No study is free from aws. Similarly, we caution our readers to take a critical stance on the generalizability of our results. Although we were able to administer our survey to a relatively large group of participants, it must be noted that our participants came from an all girls school. Hence, it is not known whether similar results would be obtained from an all boys school or from a mixed gender co-educational school. Several researchers have reported that there is a clear advantage for female students as they tend to be more mature in comparison to male students where metacognition is concerned (Artelt et al. 2003; Schiefele et al. 2003; Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons 1990). It is also important to note that the ndings of the present study mainly rely on participants responses to a self-report instrument. Although the usefulness of selfreported surveys is supported by Schiefele (2005) who suggested that decontextualized self-report data may reect learners awareness, there is a need to examine learners intentional knowing in different contexts to develop a theoretic model for wider generalization.

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