Volume 19: Number 1

February 2012

RISK WATCH

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited

CLAIMS AND LEGAL

a supplement for Members claims handlers and legal departments

Navigation and seamanship

1 SAMCO EUROPE collision with MSC PRESTIGE 4 Another heavy weather death reported on a container ship in ballast/lightship condition

SAMCO EUROPE collision with MSC PRESTIGE

Risk management
4 Enclosed spaces

container lashings influencing helm orders unnecessary VHF exchanges give way ship altering to starboard but still attracting majority blame.
Safety
8 Poor rigging fails to prevent predictable accident

A English recent law report illustrates how court experts (Elder Brethren) analyse the factual circumstances leading up to a collision and offers useful guidance as to what the watch officers should do to comply with the collision regulations. The collision occurred in the Gulf of Aden in conditions of good visibility of approximately 10 nautical miles. The MSC PRESTIGE, a container ship, was heading for Mauritius on a course of 101 and making about 24 knots. The SAMCO EUROPE, a laden VLCC, was heading for Rotterdam on a course of 300 at 16.5 knots. Neither ship was entered with the Association.
The Court separately reviewed the conduct of both ships

Crew matters
4 Myanmar seamans books

showed that the SAMCO EUROPE was acquired on ARPA when the ships were 14 miles apart but the Second Officer stated that he did not observe the ship until 9 miles apart. At 9 miles apart, 14 minutes before the collision (C minus 14), the SAMCO EUROPEs echo was about a point on the starboard bow of the MSC PRESTIGE. VDR records show that MSC PRESTIGE altered course to starboard at C minus 11 over a period of one and a half minutes until settling on a heading of 107 (C minus 9.5) which was maintained for another two and a half minutes. The Court decided that this alteration was undertaken in order to avoid another ship in the vicinity of SAMCO EUROPE. The Court noted the SAMCO EUROPE remained on the starboard bow of the MSC PRESTIGE. The Second Officer then, at C minus 7, ordered another alteration of course to starboard such that by C minus 5 she was

The Second Officer of the MSC PRESTIGE did not actively monitor the SAMCO EUROPE until the ships were 9 miles apart. The VDR data

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 19: Number 1: February 2012

Navigation and seamanship

SAMCO EUROPE ARPA

SAMCO EUROPE collision with MSC PRESTIGE (continued)

heading about 117. It is at this time, between C minus 7 and C minus 5, that a voice recording on the bridge of the MSC PRESTIGE evidences some confusion on the part of the Second Officer as to what the SAMCO EUROPE was doing. He was heard to state wait, wait, waitthis fellow iswhat is he doing? is he altering to port?(profanities uttered) Immediately thereafter, at C minus 5, the MSC PRESTIGE called SAMCO EUROPE on the VHF. MSC PRESTIGE repeated twice a request for a passing red to red. Confusingly the Second Officer of SAMCO EUROPE replied Ah yes, Ive already altered to port. Thank you. MSC PRESTIGE replied Thank you. Shortly after, at C minus 4 , the SAMCO EUROPE (SE) called the MSC PRESTIGE (MSC P): SE: MSC P, you are not giving me any CPA, Im altering to port. Im still getting this just 1 cable. Are you altering? MSC P: Im going to starboard right now, starboard. SE: Im altering to port, youre coming to starboard, youre coming towards me. MSC P: I told red to red. SE: For red to red you have to alter to port. MSC P: Yeah OK, I maintain my course, you go to port please. It was apparent that the Second Officer of the MSC PRESTIGE was intending to pass SAMCO EUROPE port-to-port and he continued with that intention after the VHF exchanges. It was unclear as to whether the Second Officer had observed SAMCO EUROPEs green light opening. By C minus 7.5 the ARPA was indicating that MSC PRESTIGE would pass ahead with a CPA of about 2 cables. The Second Officer of the SAMCO EUROPE decided to alter course to port but only slightly, such that at C minus 7 she was heading 295. The intention was to increase the CPA. At C minus 6 he again altered course slightly to port such that the bearing of the MSC PRESTIGE passed from the port bow to the starboard bow. Immediately thereafter the MSC PRESTIGE called on the VHF (the C minus 5 VHF exchange referred to above). According to VDR data, he should have been able to do so at C minus 6. At C minus 4 the heading of the MSC PRESTIGE was about 121 and by C minus 3.5 it was about 125 i.e. was still altering course to starboard. Only shortly before the collision was hard to starboard rudder ordered. The Second Officer of the SAMCO EUROPE observed the MSC PRESTIGE quite early at a range of 16-17 miles, one point on the port bow, 27 minutes before the collision (C minus 27). The Second Officer acquired the MSC PRESTIGE as a target when 12 miles distant. He had correctly assumed the ship was a container ship and it would have been apparent she was doing 24 knots crossing ahead from port to starboard with a CPA of 4 cables. The Second Officer would have been aware of several other targets, particularly target number 11 on the starboard bow proceeding in a similar north-westerly direction at a faster speed than the SAMCO EUROPE. At C minus 16 MSC PRESTIGE was still bearing one point on the port bow and at a distance of 10 miles. From the ARPA he observed a small alteration of course to starboard by MSC PRESTIGE and he assumed it was to increase the port-to-port passing distance between MSC PRESTIGE and the previously mentioned target number 11. The Second Officer of the SAMCO EUROPE again ordered a small alteration of course to port so that by C minus 4 she was heading 285. The CPA by this stage had actually decreased to less than a cable, starboard-tostarboard, but it is unclear as to whether the Second Officer had registered this fact. Shortly after C minus 4 the Second Officer was surprised to observe the mast headlights of the MSC PRESTIGE narrow and to see both side lights when previously he had only seen the green side lights. He immediately called the MSC PRESTIGE on the VHF (the C minus 4 VHF exchange referred to above). The Second Officer subsequently accepted that he was mistaken in saying that for a red to red passing MSC PRESTIGE would need to go to port. He admitted to being confused in the heat of the moment. The Second Officer continued to alter course to port and by C minus 3 was on a heading of 278. There followed another confusing exchange by VHF and the Second Officer called the Master to the bridge. By C minus 1 the ship was heading at 264.
The Courts findings of fault

Both sides accepted that MSC PRESTIGE was the give way ship. MSC PRESTIGE contended that her action to avoid collision in altering course to starboard was timely but seemed to admit that it was not substantial (as required by Rule 8(c) and Rule 16). On this point the Judge asked the Elder Brethren to advise on when good seamanship would require that the MSC PRESTIGE take action pursuant to Rules 15 and 16.Their advice was as follows: In accordance with the Rules and good seamanship MSC PRESTIGE should have altered course to starboard at about C minus 12 (23:35:00) when SAMCO EUROPE was one

MSC PRESTIGE ARPA

point on his starboard bow at 8.1 miles The alteration of course to starboard (early and substantial) should have been at least 20 in order to show a broad red aspect. Accordingly, the Court decided that the Second Officer of the MSC PRESTIGE was at fault for not making a substantial alteration of course to starboard at C minus 12. He failed to keep a good radar lookout on SAMCO EUROPE (whilst he was busy taking action in respect of other ships) and failed to keep a good visual lookout by observing the green light of SAMCO EUROPE open at C minus 5.5 as she was turning to port. A discussion arose as to what MSC PRESTIGE would have been expected to do had she observed the SAMCO EUROPE green light open at C minus 5.5 (at a distance of over 3 miles). The Elder Brethren advised that MSC PRESTIGE should have continued her turn to starboard but with the application of full starboard rudder (and take a turn round to starboard) and reduced speed. Instead of putting the rudder hard to starboard the Second Officer decided to call the SAMCO EUROPE on the VHF.
Court dismisses the influence of lashing limits

container lashings would be unduly stressed as a result (no evidence was produced by MSC PRESTIGE to support their assertion). The Courts view was that, by raising this issue, the owners had introduced a question of unseaworthiness in respect of their own ship.
VHF conversations: both Officers to blame

that makes MSC PRESTIGEs fault in failing to apply hard starboard helm at and after C minus 5.5 more blameworthy. When the VHF conversation was resumed by SAMCO EUROPE (the C minus 4 VHF exchange) SAMCO EUROPE mistakenly requested MSC PRESTIGE to alter to port which led to MSC PRESTIGE agreeing to maintain her course rather than substantially alter course to starboard, i.e. contrary to the Collision Regulations. This resumption of the VHF conversation and mistaken request by SAMCO EUROPE makes SAMCO EUROPEs fault of going to port to more blameworthy. It was decided that the use of VHF by each ship was inappropriate and, in relative terms, increased each ship's culpability by about the same extent.
The Decision: MSC PRESTIGE must accept majority of blame

English Courts make a distinction in collision cases between cause and blameworthiness. The Courts decision will be based on the degree of blame attributed to the faults and how causative those faults were. Whilst they consider that VHF exchanges can determine blameworthiness, it is navigational action, or inaction, in breach of the Collision Regulations, which causes collisions. In deciding how blameworthy those VHF conversations were, the Courts will consider whether VHF exchanges were appropriate in the circumstances i.e. whether their content or intent conflicted with the Collision Regulations. It was argued that the Second Officer of MSC PRESTIGE contacted SAMCO EUROPE by VHF (the C minus 5 exchange) in order to inform SAMCO EUROPE of his intention to pass red to red and that this action was appropriate because it confirmed what the Collision Regulations required. However, the Court was of the view that the VHF conversation was commenced at a time when MSC PRESTIGE ought to have been applying hard starboard helm. Instead of taking the action required of her by the Collision Regulations she chose to commence a conversation by VHF when the ships were closing each other at a combined speed of 40 knots and were only about 3 miles apart. At such times VHF conversations may result in valuable time being lost, lead to confusion and distract from adherence to the Collision Regulations and for that reason the VHF conversations were inappropriate. To some extent therefore

Somewhat unusually, MSC PRESTIGE interests made a direct submission to the Court (not via their lawyers) urging the Court not to accept the 20 alteration suggested by the Elder Brethren. They claimed it would be excessive because it would put undue stress on the container lashings. The owners also added that they ordered their junior officers to alter course gently. The Court, accepted the Elder Brethrens advice, stating that they believed a 20 alteration of course could be achieved quickly by applying a limited amount of helm and that it was unlikely that

The Court concluded that the dangerous close quarters situation was brought about by the fault of both ships but the fault of MSC PRESTIGE in not taking early and substantial action to keep out of the way of SAMCO EUROPE had the greater causative effect. Each ship failed to take the appropriate action to avoid collision at C minus 5.5. Overall, MSC PRESTIGE was more at fault though the extent of the disparity was reduced by SAMCO EUROPEs greater culpability at C minus 5.5. Thus MSC PRESTIGEs fault was greater than that of SAMCO EUROPE both in terms of cause and blame. However, the Court, having considered all the circumstances, did not consider that MSC PRESTIGE was twice as much to blame as SAMCO EUROPE and therefore concluded that MSC PRESTIGE should bear 60% responsibility for the collision and that SAMCO EUROPE should bear 40% responsibility for the collision.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 19: Number 1: February 2012

Navigation and seamanship

Another heavy weather death reported on a container ship in ballast/lightship condition

In June 2010 Risk Watch included an article on the tragic death of a watch keeper who had been thrown violently from one side of the bridge to another as a result of extraordinary acceleration forces on board a container ship (The CHICAGO EXPRESS) which had been required to leave Hong Kong in a partially loaded condition, because of an impending typhoon.
The investigating authority, the Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (the BSU), has recently reported another two similar incidents, one of which again resulted in the death of a watch keeper. Both incidents involved container ships in light ship or ballast condition. In September 2009 The CNNI GUAYAS (The GUAYAS) a modern 2,468 teu container ship was required to leave her lay up anchorage in Hong Kong due to the arrival of typhoon Koppu. Eleven hours later, in conditions of Beaufort (Bf )10 - Bf12 winds and significant wave heights of around 6 metres, the Third Officer, an able seaman (AB) and the Master were on the bridge. The Third Officer was standing mid ships near the radio work station apparently holding firmly on with both hands whilst the Master sat on the starboard side holding on to a hand rail. A considerable number of objects, e.g. papers and books, had fallen to the floor and the Third Officer was observed bending down to pick up something. Shortly afterwards he was heard to scream and was observed to slide to the port side where he struck the radar responder and a radiator. He tried but failed to hold on to the radiator before sliding across to the starboard side of the bridge and striking the bridge door with his face. He then started to slide to the port side again before being grabbed by the Master and secured in the area of the Masters chair. The Third Officer subsequently died of his injuries. The GUAYAS had on board 6,400 tonnes of ballast with a metacentric height (GM) of 5.617 metres. The low draught created a considerable windage area and she had difficulty maintaining her course. The heading and the course over ground differed in the order of 90-100. The GUAYAS was only able to maintain two knots over ground and at times propeller immersion was virtually nil. The bridge inclinometer pointer reached the limit stop at 35 and roll periods were in the region of 8 seconds. Transverse acceleration in the region of 12 M/S/S (1.3g) were calculated in computer simulations of The GUAYAS motions. It should be noted that the possibility of parametric rolling was investigated but discounted, the motion of the ship was thought to arise from direct excitation moments from the swell. A description of the wave encounter speeds and directions

giving rise to the motion is beyond the scope of this article but is well illustrated in the form of polar coordinate diagrams in the BSU report. The particular seagoing behaviour of modern container ships at very shallow draught in relation to the swell was deemed to be the cause of the accident. The investigating authority was clearly concerned about the options the Master had in reducing the GM and thereby the motions of the ship whilst at the same time improving steerage. In addition to highlighting the problem of the high GM, the very slow speed of the ship was noted to contribute to the violent motions. In The CHICAGO EXPRESS case the slow speed of the vessel was to some extent by choice and, although the Master was not to know it at the time, the reduced damping at very slow speed was causative of heavy and quick rolling. It was determined in computer simulations that if The GUAYAS had carried no ballast whatsoever the circumstances would have improved significantly. Although the GM itself would not have been reduced (GM in any event not being a good indicator of stability at large angles of roll), the BSU investigations determined an improvement in roll angles and roll period in circumstances where the ship had virtually no forward draught i.e. the forward perpendicular was no longer immersed, the prominent bow flair no longer wetted in swell. This significantly reduced the roll moment applied to the ship by the swell.

Unfortunately, this ballast free condition (which the BSU determined would have provided a solution for the Master) would in fact have breached Classification rules, namely those rules requiring forward perpendicular immersion to a certain depth in order to avoid slamming. The BSU observed that Class approved stability books are drawn up with the intention of avoiding capsizing accidents but without taking sufficient note of the dangerous consequences of too much stability. The BSU also highlighted what appears to be a lack of coordinated overall safety assessment with regard to excessive stability in container ships, implying that the safety rules contained in the stability book and the cargo securing manual are not fit for purpose in terms for setting up an upper limit for stability. The incident involving The GUAYAS took place in the sea area off Hong Kong as did the incident on The CHICAGO EXPRESS, but incidents of this type are not confined to those waters. The ship FRISIA LISSABON (a ship of very similar design to The GUAYAS), suffered a similar incident in October of the same year. The BSU report details a very similar set of circumstances in terms of ship condition and weather to that of The GUAYAS. This incident took place in the North Sea.

Again, in common with the report into The CHICAGO EXPRESS incident, the design of the bridge and specifically the hand bars and lashing points were questioned. Masters and Officers may wish to familiarise themselves with the particular difficulties of container ships in light ship or ballast conditions in heavy weather and would be well advised to read the full report of the BSU at:
http://tiny.cc/u140f

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 19: Number 1: February 2012

Risk management

Enclosed spaces
The Club has recently handled a claim where a stevedore died in an enclosed space.
There can be few aspects of personal safety on board ships that have received more attention than the importance of following the correct procedures before entering an enclosed space. Unfortunately, it is clear that the measures which have been put in place have failed to prevent the death of many seafarers and third parties on board ships. At the 27th Assembly of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) meeting in London in November 2011 a resolution was adopted to amend SOLAS with respect to enclosed space entry and rescue drills. The draft amendments will be forwarded for review by various sub-committees before submission to the Maritime Safety Committee for adoption. The draft amendments are aimed at reducing fatalities linked with enclosed space entry and would require crew members with enclosed space entry or rescue responsibilities to participate in an enclosed space entry and rescue drill at least once every two months. At the 27th Assembly, the IMO also adopted Resolution 1050 containing a set of revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces. Each enclosed space entry and rescue drill should include the checking and use of personal protective equipment required for entry, of communication equipment and procedures, of rescue equipment and procedures, and instruction in first aid and resuscitation techniques. Accidents in enclosed spaces continue to be all too frequent within the maritime sector and many of the incidents across the industry are due to: complacency leading to lapses in procedures lack of knowledge potentially dangerous spaces not being identified; and, would-be rescuers acting on instinct and emotion rather than knowledge and training. The current IMO Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces on board ships is contained in the Resolution A.864 (20) adopted 27 November 1997 and this has now been replaced by Resolution A.1050(27). Under the definitions of enclosed spaces, the Resolution states: 2.1 Enclosed space means a space which has any of the following characteristics: 2.1.1 limited openings for entry and exit; 2.1.2 inadequate ventilation; and 2.1.3 is not designed for continuous worker occupancy, and includes, but is not limited to, cargo spaces, double bottoms, fuel tanks, ballast tanks, cargo pump-rooms, cargo compressor rooms, cofferdams, chain lockers, void spaces, duct keels, inter-barrier spaces, boilers,

engine crankcases, engine scavenge air receivers, sewage tanks, and adjacent connected spaces. This list is not exhaustive and a list should be produced on a ship-byship basis to identify enclosed spaces. The incident handled by the Club involved third parties on board the ship carrying out cargo operations. Many cargo spaces on board ships fall within the definition of an enclosed space and it is extremely important that the crew remain vigilant during loading and discharge operations and that access by stevedores and other third parties is carefully monitored and controlled in compliance with standard operational procedures and with the ships enclosed space entry procedures. Cargo spaces may also be deficient in oxygen and/or contain flammable or toxic fumes, gases or vapours. In this incident, the stevedore had entered a cargo hold while the ship was discharging a cargo of coal. A fully enclosed spiral ladder was fitted at the aft bulkhead of the hold and the lower opening of the ladder was immersed in the cargo and harmful gases entered the spiral ladder space. The stevedore succumbed to the presence of harmful gases and a lack of oxygen in the spiral ladder space.
Procedures and arrangements before any entry into an enclosed space:

3) Safety Briefing: ensure that all personnel are aware of what is being undertaken. 4) Atmosphere: ensure that appropriate ventilation has been carried out as required and maintained where considered necessary. 5) Atmosphere: ensure that the space has been tested for the presence of gases and oxygen content, and is tested at regular intervals thereafter, with a certificate issued by a qualified person where appropriate. The atmosphere in adjacent spaces should also be verified if there are any potential concerns or doubts. 6) Communications: ensure that communications with the duty officer have been established and permission obtained for entry to be effected. 7) Rescue: ensure that recovery equipment is readily available at the entry/exit point, and that sufficient qualified personnel are present to assist. 8) Competency: ensure that the personnel entering the space are qualified to do so and/or accompanied by qualified personnel. The IMO revised recommendations requires an attendant a person who is suitably trained within the safety management system to be present to keep watch and maintain communication with those entering the enclosed space areas. 9) Personal Safety: ensure that personnel entering the space are wearing the right safety equipment, appropriate to the space being entered, including helmets, clothing, safety shoes, torches, walkie-talkies, breathing apparatus or Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBD), harnesses etc.

10) Check in and Out: ensure that personnel entering the space are checked in and out. 11) Secure: ensure that the space has been closed and/or fenced off as appropriate after all personnel have exited. 12) Documentation: records of entry into enclosed spaces should be maintained as required. Procedures for entering enclosed spaces is one of the key shipboard operations for safety of personnel and the ship within the ISM Code provisions. Audits must be carried out to ensure that procedures for entry into enclosed spaces are compliant. Entry into enclosed spaces has been a feature of Britannias technical seminar programme over the past two years and a paper on this subject is being prepared for the 2012 programme. Videotel Marine International has recently joined forces with Mines Rescue Marine to produce and launch a training package entitled Entry into Enclosed Spaces. Details from:
www.videotel.co.uk sales@videotelmail.com

1) Risk Assessment: carry out a risk assessment. 2) Permit To Work: ensure that the Companys Approved Enclosed Space Entry Form or Checklist is available and completed by authorised personnel, including the Master.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited Regis House 45 King William Street London EC4R 9AN Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588 Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942 www.britanniapandi.com

RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be found at www.britanniapandi.com/en/publications The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watch to be reproduced but would ask that written permission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

Safety

Crew matters

Poor rigging fails to prevent predictable accident

The July 2011 edition of Risk Watch included two articles on unsafe accommodation ladders. Continuing that theme, we now draw the attention of crew to a recent incident reported to the Association. A Quarantine Officer slipped on the ships accommodation ladder while disembarking at a port near Shanghai. He fell into the water between the ship and the quay. Thankfully the Officer was rescued from the water with only minor injuries. As can be seen from the photograph, no stanchion (with accompanying hand rails/ropes) existed on the outboard corner of the leading edge of the lower platform of the gangway. Thus no support or prevention existed for persons falling or slipping in the direction of the leading edge i.e. in the direction of the gap between the ship and the quay. There appeared to be no fitting for such a stanchion on this design of accommodation ladder. Further , the cargo net should have extended from the ships side to the quay (especially where , as in this case , the accommodation ladder was not placed on the quayside but was hanging freely above the water). Any equipment used for the purpose of access and any safety net must be fit for its purpose and properly maintained. All access equipment should be inspected by a competent person at appropriate intervals. The rigging of accommodation ladders is addressed in the IMO publication MSC.1/Circ.1331.

Myanmar seamans books

The Association has recently been advised of two separate instances of the authenticity of Myanmar Continuous Discharge Certificates (CDCs or Seamans books) being questioned. In both cases, one in China and the other in Indonesia, the immigration authorities cancelled the Seamans Books because they were forgeries. On making further enquiries with our Yangon correspondent we have been advised that it is not uncommon for Myanmar seamen to have two CDC books. The genuine book is used to enter and leave Myanmar. The forgery will have additional (fictional) endorsements, including the names of ships the seaman claims to have served on, and is used when the seaman joins the ship. We understand that forged seamans books do not have a working hologram affixed to the seamans photograph. Masters should also compare the quality of the pages and the bindings to other Myanmar CDC books held by the ship.

Editors message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within
Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk