Defending Rawls' Theory of Justice Against Honneth's Objections

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Social justice: Defending Rawls' theory of justice against Honneth's objections

Miriam Bankovsky Philosophy Social Criticism 2011 37: 95 DOI: 10.1177/0191453710384363 The online version of this article can be found at: http://psc.sagepub.com/content/37/1/95
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Social justice: Defending Rawls theory of justice against Honneths objections

Miriam Bankovsky
Politics Program, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
Philosophy and Social Criticism 37(1) 95118 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0191453710384363 psc.sagepub.com
Abstract
This article argues that Honneths plural conception of justice, founded on a theory of recognition, does not succeed in distancing itself from Rawls liberal theory of justice. The article develops its argument by evaluating three major objections to Rawls liberalism raised by Honneth in his recent articles on justice: namely, first, that the parties responsible for choosing principles of justice are too individualistic and their practical reasoning too instrumentalist; second, that by taking as its object-domain the negative liberty of persons, Rawls theory fails to promote the actual realization of liberty; and finally, that Rawls method of principle justification undermines the priority of its Kantian formality by presupposing a substantive commitment to a conception of individual good. Arguing that Honneths interpretation of Rawls theory contains important errors, the article concludes that both theories share the basic intention of securing for all citizens the material and institutional conditions for the actualization of otherwise merely formal liberties or, in Honneths terms, mutual self-realization.
Keywords
Axel Honneth, justice, liberalism, John Rawls, recognition, redistribution, self-realization
Introduction
Since the publication of The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (1995a), Axel Honneth has produced a number of articles dealing with the implications of his theory for political and social justice.1 Using the framework he had developed for determining the normative content of claims raised in individual and
Corresponding author: Miriam Bankovsky, Politics Program, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC 3086, Australia. Email: m.bankovsky@latrobe.edu.au
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social struggle, Honneth now outlines a plural theory of justice which he hopes will break the theoretical deadlock between, on the one hand, formal, Kantian and liberal theories of justice and, on the other hand, axiological, Hegelian and civic republican theories of ethical life. Where Kantian theories (like those of John Rawls and Ju rgen Habermas) defend egalitarian norms which hold independently of actors commitments to specific values, and where Hegelian theories (like those of Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel) seek instead to promote the qualitative conditions of human flourishing defined within specific communities, Honneths plural theory of justice intends to walk the fine line between the two positions. More precisely, it seeks first to articulate and then to promote those structural elements of human flourishing which can be normatively extricated from the plurality of all particular forms of human life (Honneth, 1995a: 172). In this article, I propose to focus attention on only one part of Honneths intention. I want to determine whether Honneth succeeds in distancing himself from Rawls liberal theory of justice. I undertake this task by presenting and evaluating, in each of three sections, three major criticisms of Rawls liberalism found in Honneths recent articles on justice. Honneths first criticism targets the ideal of the person which Rawls constructivist decision procedure incorporates. The liberty of the parties who are responsible for choosing principles of justice is too individualistic and the practical reasoning of these parties is too instrumentalist (Honneth, 1991: 202, 27, 29; Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 12731, 138, 1425). Real and effective liberty (or human flourishing) depends, Honneth argues, on the existence of certain types of selfother relations which support the development of practical relations-to-self. Consequently, insofar as the realization of individual liberty depends on instituting supportive selfother relations, the practical reasoning of Rawlsian parties should not be instrumentalist. Honneths second criticism targets the object-domain of Rawls theory of justice. The theorys object of concern is negative liberty or freedom from external interference in individual choice (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 129, 133). Insofar as material and institutional disadvantage is equivalent to external interference in the free choice of the individual, the theory seeks to protect the individual from such disadvantage. For Honneth, however, preventing external interference in individual life- projects in no way guarantees the realization of individual liberty (that is, positive or social liberty) which remains, for Honneth, the true object-domain of a theory of justice. An appropriate theory would not merely distribute advantages (as does Rawls theory) but would also bring into effect those supportive intersubjective relations on which real and effective freedom depends (ibid.: 131, 137, 142, 144). A third criticism targets the ideal Rawls employs in his method of principle justification. Justified by reference to their form, principles refer to a formal Kantian ideal of impartiality or neutrality: they are justified when deemed acceptable by those free and equal persons who are affected by them. Principles can then be said to apply to all in the same way, formally maintaining egalitarian right, hence Rawls claim that right limits the different substantive conceptions of the good life which may legitimately be pursued. Reversing the justification procedure, Honneth argues that Rawls theory cannot maintain its claim to neutrality because it implicitly requires an anterior commitment
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to a conception of the good: seeking to guarantee individual liberty, egalitarian right presupposes an ideal of individual human flourishing (Honneth, 1991: 2931; Honneth, 2004a: 357). However, by prioritizing right, Rawls ideal of human flourishing is too individualistic (Honneth, 2004b: 389). The theory thus misunderstands its true objective: instead of securing individual rights to freely pursue a project, a theory of social justice should critically identify, diagnose and redress those concrete experiences of injustice which prevent individual human flourishing. Instead of principles justified by reference to a formal Kantian ideal of impartiality (right), Honneth recommends principles which amend social pathologies and ensure mutual self-realization (the good). This, Honneth and Anderson write, is a profoundly different and largely unexplored way of thinking about social justice (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 144; see also Honneth, 2004a: 353). Honneths alternative model promises in this way to focus theoretical attention on everyday cases of disrespect and humiliation which disable real freedom, cases that Rawls theory might appear to overlook (Honneth, 1997: 323). However, I intend to show that Honneths criticisms of Rawls should not be so easily accepted and that Honneths interpretation of Rawls theory contains important errors. To this end, I will now examine more closely Honneths three criticisms of Rawls liberalism. Concluding that Honneth does not succeed in distancing himself from Rawls theory, the article will show, by means of its analyses, that the theories of both thinkers indeed share the basic intention of securing for all citizens the material and institutional conditions for the actual exercise of otherwise merely formal rights and liberties or, in Honneths terms, mutual self-realization.2
I The ideal of the person in Rawls constructivism: individualistic and instrumentalist?

Let us examine, first, Rawls ideal of the person, which Honneth argues misrepresents the autonomy of real persons and fails to appreciate the nature and extent of the various threats to autonomy. To evaluate Honneths objection, we must first understand the role Rawls himself attributes to the ideal of the person in constructivist theory. While certainly implied by A Theory of Justice (1971a),3 the defining features of this ideal are explicitly clarified only later in Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980), in The Independence of Moral Theory (1975) and in Political Liberalism (1993). Honneths reconstruction of Rawls theory overlooks Rawls developed account of the role of personhood ideals in theory and, consequently, Honneths criticisms miss their true target. In Kantian Constructivism and Moral Theory Rawls defines constructivism and the role it ascribes to personhood ideals. First, constructivisms real task is practical not epistemological (Rawls, 1980: 306, 341). Unlike moral realist views such as rational intuitionism, whose first principles are self-evident truths given by the nature of things and known by rational intuition (ibid.: 344), constructivism frames its first principles to meet particular social problems, providing a public basis by means of which citizens justify their institutions to one another (ibid.: 347). Second, constructivisms method begins with the standpoint of persons as agents of construction. Whereas the rational intuitionist
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method requires quite simply the correct recognition of first principles whose content is already fixed, constructivism establishes a framework for deliberation which relies on our own powers of judgement, powers which are not fixed once and for all but are developed and shaped by a shared public culture (ibid.). Constructivism seeks in this way to establish a suitable connection between a particular ideal of the person and first principles of justice using a procedure of construction (ibid.: 304). Moreover, if constructivism is to generate an appropriate public basis for justification, it must also be coherentist: it must coincide with those considered moral and non-moral judgements which we are unlikely to give up, thus clarifying the reason for our refusal to renounce them. Consequently, whereas rational intuitionism implies a sparse notion of the person as one who cognizes moral truth, constructivism requires a complex ideal of the person as an agent of construction. Principles result from a construction which expresses conceptions that citizens have of themselves and of their society. Now, there are as many constructivisms as ideals of persons. Examining average utilitarianism and Hobbes contractarianism from the perspective of what Rawls refers to as the original position, Rawls concludes that both are compatible with constructivism.4 Both can be said to refer to a particular ideal of the person as part of a contract device, whose outcome determines the content of justice. Rawls Kantian constructivism seeks the principles on which free and equal moral persons would all agree when fairly represented as such (Rawls, 1980: 305). The moral person is endowed with two moral faculties rationality and social cooperativeness which make justice both necessary and possible. The capacity for formulating and pursuing a conception of ones rational advantage makes justice necessary since it leads persons with different life-plans to make conflicting claims on the available natural and social resources (Rawls, 1971a: 127/110 rev.). The capacity for formulating and abiding by a conception of justice (or the Reasonable), makes justice possible, describing a willingness to live by principles of justice even when their contravention might bring personal advantage. Rawls constructivism thus varies with alternative constructivist views on account of this personhood ideal. Persons in a Hobbesian contract are, according to Rawls, atomistic and instrumental rational egoists. Hobbesian persons are unlike their Rawlsian counterparts in that the former are endowed with the faculty of instrumental rationality alone whereas the latter are also endowed with the second moral faculty of social cooperativeness. I will return to this point when dealing with Honneths first objection that the parties responsible for choosing principles of justice are too individualistic and their practical reasoning too instrumentalist. Returning to Hobbes, Rawls suggests that self-, family- and group-interest is, for Hobbes, the only available political motivation (Rawls, 1971b: 2045; Rawls, 1987: 4223). Consequently, Hobbesian partners choose principles of mere prudence and not of justice. Since cooperative institutions are extremely fragile persons might at any moment attempt to secure their own interests at others expense a powerful sovereign with effective penal machinery is required to guarantee the security of all (Rawls, 1963: 104; Rawls, 1971a: 240/211 rev.). It is also by reference to a constructivist procedure that the principle of average utilitarianism is defended against its classical version (Rawls, 1971a: 27 28). Only when a decision on principles is considered from the perspective of free and equal persons, whose moral relevancy depends, in this case, on their capacity to satisfy desires and
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on their willingness to take the same risks, can the average utility principle be favoured over its classical alternative. Given the choice, such persons would choose to maximize their individual total utility (the average utility principle), having no interest in total utility sum (the classical utility principle) which ignores the large differences in well-being which can exist among individuals. As for the Rawlsian decision procedure, moral persons are represented by contractual parties who are modelled as free, equal and rational and who are placed in a decision situation, the original position, which interprets the idea of a fair agreement. To prevent parties from choosing only those principles to their individual advantage, a veil of ignorance models the reasonable the sense of justice (Rawls, 1971a: 24). Behind this veil, parties lack knowledge of those particular facts about their individual situation which would position them unequally. Parties are unaware of their class, social status, particular generation and natural abilities. They do not know the nature of their particular conception of the good, nor are they aware of their individual psychological tendencies. Representatives of real citizens, parties must choose those principles which citizens would find acceptable when they finally have full knowledge of the particularities of their situation.
Are parties characterized by individualistic liberty? Does the veil of ignorance fall too low?
Honneth objects to the description of the liberty of parties behind the veil of ignorance. The notion of an autonomous and atomistic individual selecting personal projects in a purely monological manner is, says Honneth, unrealistic (Honneth, 1991: 202, 267, 29). The veil of ignorance falls too low: Rawls insists that the parties in the original position should not have knowledge of what people in the society are like, except the most basic features of their instrumental rationality (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 1401). However, if principles are to be adequate to the needs of real persons, parties need to know that they cannot actually realize their liberty without the support of others (ibid.: 12731, 138, 1425). In Honneths own theory, real and effective freedom depends on developing certain practical relations to self, relations which themselves depend on the validation of ones capacities by ones peers. Drawing on the distinction that Hegel makes within Objective Spirit between the family, the state and civil society, Honneth abstracts three practical relations to self (each with their mode of intersubjective validation) from the social life-world of modern societies. The first is self-confidence or the ability to trust in ones own feelings and desires, insofar as these are validated by the solicitude of others (in the intimate, affective relations of love and friendship). The second is self-respect or the belief that one has an authority equal with others to make claims and demands, insofar as this authority is validated by others (who mutually accord each other egalitarian rights). The third is social esteem, social achievement, or the feeling of belonging, insofar as this feeling is validated by others (in relations of solidarity) (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 12731, 138, 1425). For Honneth, the concept of justice has plural meanings: moral claims can be raised in all three spheres of intersubjective relation (affective, reciprocal, or
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cooperative). The content of what we call just is here to be measured according to the respective kind of social relationship that subjects maintain with one another. If the concern is with a relationship shaped by an appeal to love, then the principle of need has priority, whereas in legally shaped relationships the principle of equality takes priority, and in cooperative relationships the principle of merit (Honneth, 2004a: 358; see also Honneth and Fraser, 2001: 170, 1745, 1801). In the affective sphere, appeal to mutually attested love can ground a demand for the affective recognition of newly developed or previously unconsidered needs in what Honneth refers to as a different or expanded kind of care (ibid.: 144).5 In the sphere of egalitarian right, appeal to the basic idea of equality can ground a demand for the legal recognition of previously excluded groups or of previously neglected facts (ibid.). In the sphere of cooperative and social recognition, appeal to the achievement principle can ground a demand for the consideration of hitherto neglected or underappreciated activities and capacities which contribute to the common good and are deserving of greater social esteem and material resources (ibid.). Justice always concerns the individual requirements for effective freedom, dependent on social patterns of mutual recognition. The justice or well-being of a society is proportionate to its ability to secure the conditions of mutual recognition under which personal identity-formation, hence individual self-realisation, can proceed adequately (ibid.: 174). It is because principles must respond adequately to real vulnerabilities and needs that Honneth speaks of his theory as an attempt to reinvigorate the project of a social philosophy which would elucidate and diagnose social pathologies. As Christopher Zurn explains, in contrast both to moral philosophy, which deals with questions of individual obligation and right action, and to political philosophy, which attends to those of law and fair distribution, social philosophy is concerned with the structural conditions necessary for human flourishing and the social deformations in those conditions which damage subjectivity (Zurn, 2000: 118).6 Social philosophy is a therapeutic critique of pathological social practices and, as such, requires a standard of social normalcy for evaluation, namely, a standard which extrapolates, from all particular substantive conceptions of the good life in developed societies, the formal conditions necessary for a healthy identity or, in other words, a formal conception of ethical life (Honneth, 1995a: 1719).7 As concerns Rawls theory, Honneth argues that for principles of justice to take account of the real vulnerabilities and needs of parties, the latter must be aware of their subjective dependence on intersubjective recognition relations (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 140). To what extent are parties in Rawls original position aware of human vulnerabilities and needs? And, more generally, what kind of knowledge do they actually have access to? Rawls response is very clear and indicates an error in Honneths interpretation. There are no limitations on general information: parties know everything they need to about their society in order to decide upon its principles (Rawls, 1971a: 1378/119 rev.). Parties know, first, that their society is defined by the circumstances of justice objective and subjective alike which define the role that justice is to play (Rawls, 1971a: 126/109 rev.). Objective circumstances are the relevant facts about the object of cooperation: that many individuals coexist together; that their geographical territory is finite; that there exists moderate scarcity in natural and other resources so that, while mutually advantageous arrangements are feasible, benefits fall short of the demands put
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forward. Subjective circumstances are the relevant facts about the subjects of cooperation: that subjects have their own conception of the good which leads them to make conflicting claims on available resources; that subjects regard their own life-projects as worthy of recognition; that persons have similar needs and interests as determined by the positive sciences for example, persons need the recognition of others in order to even want to pursue a conception of the good; that persons are able to abide by a conception of justice; and that persons suffer shortcomings of knowledge, thought and judgement such that there exists a diversity of belief and a conflict of interests. Unless these circumstances existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice (ibid.: 128/110 rev.). Moreover, parties are also presumed to know general facts about their particular society: facts about political affairs, the general principles of economic theory, the basis of social organization, the laws of human psychology, and the empirical findings of the human and social sciences. Honneth misinterprets the role which the veil of ignorance is to play. Rawls clearly states that the parties are presumed to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice (Rawls, 1971a: 137/119 rev.). If relevant, then, such knowledge certainly includes the general findings about subjective interdependency as determined by the positive sciences. As a procedural device, the veil of ignorance interprets the second moral faculty the sense of justice by modelling the inadmissibility of any unilateral defence of purely individual interests. The veil does not block out facts in general, but only knowledge of those particular facts about ones own context which would situate parties unequally: each person abstracts from his or her individual interests, impartially considering the interest of all. Rawls explains why parties are to have access to these general facts: constructivism defends its ideal of the person by reference to a coherentist theory of justification which means that personhood ideals are themselves justified relative to different bodies of evidence. A personhood ideal must satisfy two requirements. First, it must cohere with nonmoral judgements about normal empirical identity established by the human sciences, insofar as these conclusions refer to the ideal of scientific impartiality. Second, it must cohere with considered moral judgements about justice which we are unlikely to give up, insofar as these judgements refer to the ideal of moral impartiality. If a constructivist solution did not satisfy such coherentist requirements, it would not respond to the practical problem for which it is designed. As regards the first requirement, Rawls explains that the conclusions of the human sciences impose feasibility requirements on personhood ideals (Rawls, 1975: 295301). Whereas the human sciences provide descriptions of human needs and capacities, moral and political theory produces normative ideals of the type of person we aspire to be.8 The descriptions of the human sciences represent the constraints that any sound criterion of identity must satisfy (ibid.: 296), detailing minimal conditions of mental and physical health necessary for any social cooperation whatsoever. The human sciences identify conditions for physical and mental continuity, the capacity to reason and use language and, most importantly, the ability to cooperate with others. A moral theory must be rejected if its incorporated personhood ideal requires physical or psychological characteristics which would violate the minimal conditions that descriptivist conceptions indicate are necessary for personal identity, survival and intersubjective cooperation (ibid.: 296; Rawls, 1980: 321).
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The empirical conditions of intact identity which Honneth provides are clearly descriptivist. He uses the idea of recognition in a merely descriptive sense, pinpointing minimal conditions of mental and physical health necessary for undamaged social interaction (Honneth, 2004a: 354; see also Honneth and Fraser, 2001: 173). Rawls would certainly agree that parties in the original position should be aware of such conditions. As Rawls himself notes, parties indeed know that without the pre-requisite experience of social recognition, no one would even wish to formulate and pursue a conception of the good.9 As coherentist requirements specify, should Rawls ideal of the person prevent the production of the practical relations to self which are minimally necessary for valuing both our pursuits and our own capacities for pursuing them, then the ideal would need to be rejected. However, says Rawls, the first feasibility constraint imposed by the non-moral judgements of the human sciences is rather weak: most standard moral theories tend to satisfy it (Rawls, 1975: 296).10 The feasibility constraint imposed by non-moral scientific findings thus underdetermines choice among the different ideals Hobbesian, average utilitarian and Kantian because such findings are consistent with the available ideals and provide no conclusive evidence for the validity of one over another. The instrumental self-interest of the Hobbesian person is fully compatible with the conclusions of the human sciences: in Hobbes social context, the desire to pursue a rational life-project and to seek the positive recognition of certain significant others is the very reason why individuals require a powerful sovereign to guarantee all the necessary conditions for survival and basic social cooperation. Equally compatible with the empirical descriptions of the human sciences is the average utilitarian personhood ideal: the interest of persons in satisfying their desires leads them to defend the average utility principle so as to guarantee for themselves the right to survival and the right to pursue life-projects in satisfying cooperative forms. And, finally, the Rawlsian persons interest in her or his two moral faculties (for formulating and pursuing a conception of the good and for formulating and abiding by a conception of justice) also concords with descriptivist feasibility requirements: by acting in accordance with principles of justice, persons express their nature as free, equal, rational and socially cooperative beings subject to the general conditions of human life (Rawls, 1971a: 253/222 rev.). It is because the first feasibility constraint provides no conclusive evidence for the validity of one personhood ideal over another that a second feasibility constraint comes into play: a personhood ideal must also cohere with the considered moral judgements of the society in question.11 Such judgements are provisional fixed points which we presume any conception of justice must fit (Rawls, 1971a: 20/18 rev.; see also 9), and they include the convictions that religious intolerance, racial and sexual discrimination, the institution of slavery, manipulation and torture are unjust. It is because the Kantian ideal of the person coheres more clearly with such judgements that Rawls prefers it to the alternatives. The average utility principle, he argues, runs the risk of authorizing judgements which we think unjust: persons, represented by parties who without exception follow the principle of insufficient reason in their calculations and thus take the same risks, might well justify to each other the institution of slavery on the basis that it produces the greatest average happiness, and that each, in the initial contractual situation, would choose the average utility principle even at risk of subsequently being enslaved (ibid.: 167/145 rev.). This judgement being intolerable to persons in modern liberal democratic
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societies, the average utility personhood ideal must be rejected. Equally untenable in todays society is the Hobbesian view that purely instrumental interest is the only available, or the only politically relevant, motivation. Our democratic society, argues Rawls, is no longer fragmented by those sectarian divisions and conflicts of interest which once characterized Hobbes historical moment (Rawls, 1987: 422). Against Honneth, then, I argue that the veil of ignorance does not fall too low. Parties in the original position know whatever facts affect their choice of principles, including the empirical findings about persons which the human sciences describe and the considered moral judgements about justice of the society in question. I shall suppose that the parties possess all general information. No general facts are closed to them (Rawls, 1971a: 142/122 rev.).
The publicity condition requires the parties to assume that as members of society they will also know the general facts. The reasoning leading up to the initial agreement is to be accessible to public understanding. Of course, in working out what the requisite principles are, we must rely upon current knowledge as recognized by common sense and the existing scientific consensus. But there is no reasonable alternative to doing this. We have to concede that as established beliefs change, it is possible that the principles of justice which it seems rational to acknowledge may likewise change. (Rawls, 1971a: 548/480 rev.)
Principles of justice must thus cohere with these non-moral findings and moral judgements. There is no reason to rule out these facts . . . since conceptions of justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation which they are to regulate (Rawls, 1971a: 138/119 rev.). Moreover, in anticipation of Honneths next criticism, it appears that Rawls ideal, in contrast to that of Hobbes, does not attribute to persons a merely instrumental capacity for practical reasoning.
Are persons endowed with merely instrumental reason?

According to Honneth, Rawls commits a second error when defining his personhood ideal: he attributes to the parties merely instrumental capacities for practical reasoning, in order to avoid having to take up complex and controversial claims about the moral character of humans (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 140). Consequently, it is difficult to explain why the parties should subsequently be motivated to abide by the agreed-upon principles (ibid.: 140). Now, insofar as parties in the original position are not fundamentally motivated by any sense of obligation towards other persons and are, in contrast, only concerned to advance their own interests, their reasoning is purely instrumental, says Honneth, and not moral.12 Parties behind the veil of ignorance are motivated solely by their instrumental desire to secure what Rawls calls primary goods. With more primary social goods (liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect, etc.) and with more primary natural goods (health and vigour, intelligence and imagination, etc.), persons are generally assured greater success in advancing their ends (Rawls, 1971a: 62/ 545 rev., 92/79 rev.). Lacking all knowledge of their particular situation, parties choose to guarantee for all a fair distribution of these goods, thereby protecting themselves from
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being subsequently disadvantaged either by their particular end or by the lottery of birth. As Rawls himself says, parties are conceived as not taking an interest in one anothers interests and the concept of rationality is interpreted in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to ends (ibid.: 1314/12 rev.). However, there are two ways that Rawls could respond to Honneths criticism.13 First of all, Honneth overlooks the distinction Rawls draws between party, personhood ideal and citizen. The motivation of the parties should not be confused with that of the moral person (the personhood ideal) whose two moral faculties are interpreted by two very different procedural devices (Rawls, 1980: 316). The original position procedurally renders the first faculty (the Rational) by describing parties artificial representatives of real citizens as agents who pursue their own rational advantage. In this respect, Honneths criticism appears to hold. However, the second faculty (the sense of justice) is procedurally rendered by the constraints imposed on deliberation by the veil of ignorance, constraints which situate parties symmetrically such that the outcome can be said to be fair (ibid.: 308). Although the first device does appear to model merely instrumental interest, the second device represents the obligation to cooperate in view of mutual good. By conflating party and moral person Honneth overlooks the procedural role of the veil of ignorance which is intended to abstract from instrumental private ends and instead represent the non-instrumental sense of justice. It is because he also confuses party and citizen that Honneth finds it difficult to explain why citizens Honneth and Anderson unfortunately use the term party should subsequently be motivated to abide by the agreed-upon principles. Indeed, a citizens desire to live in accordance with a normative personhood ideal is neither instrumental nor difficult to grasp: this motivation is already included in the ideal of the person which real citizens implicitly affirm in a well-ordered society. Second, one can indeed argue and Rawls suggests as much himself that even the purely rational interest of parties equates to interest in both moral faculties, including instrumental and non-instrumental interest alike. Rational interest in this enlarged sense concerns the realization not only of instrumental advantage but also the sense of justice. The rational is interpreted by the original position in reference to the desire of persons to realise and to exercise their moral powers and to these powers correspond two highestorder interests (Rawls, 1980: 316). Our good is ultimately determined by the plan of life which we would adopt with full deliberative rationality if the future were accurately foreseen and adequately realized in the imagination (Rawls, 1971a: 421/370 rev.). Pursuing both of the higher-order interests, full deliberative rationality appears to coincide with the Hegelian and Honnethian ideal of self-realization in that it concerns the realization of effective liberty in association with others. From which it follows that rational desire for primary goods is desire for those goods which are necessary for the pursuit of both instrumental and moral ends alike.
II The object-domain of Rawls theory: merely negative liberty?

I will now examine the object-domain of Rawls theory. Following Honneth, Rawls theory takes as its object the purely negative liberty of individuals (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 129, 133). Rawls theory seeks to protect individuals from the external
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interference represented by material and institutional disadvantages such as inadequate access to food and shelter, education, opportunities for participating in ones culture and so on, hence the term redistributive justice. According to Honneth, Rawls commits two errors. First, his theory limits itself to the language of egalitarian right, that is, equal right to the same formal liberty to develop ones faculties and pursue life-projects or, in Rawls vocabulary, right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all (Rawls, 2001: 42). For Honneth, this language of right misses its target (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 138): although egalitarian right may well protect individuals from external interference, thus formally guaranteeing the liberty to develop ones faculties, protection alone does little to guarantee the realization of these faculties. Such faculties cannot be actualized without the development of practical relations to self (self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem) which themselves require validation in the form of supportive intersubjective relations. In this sense, the object-domain of Rawlsian egalitarian right equates to negative, not positive, liberty (ibid.: 131, 137, 142, 144). Second and consequently, Rawls theory of justice maintains egalitarian right by the fair distribution of primary goods which means, again, that it does not deal with the real source of positive, social liberty. Realized liberty results not from a fair distribution of goods but rather from the existence of practical relations to self, conditioned by supportive communicative relations. For Honneth, the true object-domain of a theory of social justice is the quality of communicative relations (Honneth, 2004a: 351). The broad relevance of recognitional conditions necessitates a shift away from exclusively distributive issues (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 142; see also Honneth, 2004b: 387). Justices object-domain is not the negative liberty to seek the recognition which permits the self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem that are necessary for liberty to be actualized, but rather, the actualization of liberty (that is, positive or social liberty). So, then, do the egalitarian rights of Rawls constructivist procedure undertake to guarantee the mere right to seek the realization of liberty and of the moral faculties (which, as Honneth claims, in no way guarantees this realization), or do such rights undertake to guarantee the realization of this liberty and of the moral faculties? Against Honneth, I argue that Rawls constructivist procedure aims at least in intention to guarantee the actual realization of these faculties to a certain minimal level of functioning.14 A well-ordered society should ensure that citizens capacities do not fall below the minimum essential capacities for being normal and fully cooperating members of society (Rawls, 2001: 1712). For Rawls then, a theory of justice should allow citizens to realize the basic capabilities necessary for normal functioning (ibid.: 169). As we saw earlier, the theory must abide by the conclusions established by the human sciences regarding the nature of these basic capabilities, and this requirement demands that the theory be realistic: it must actually realize these capacities to the required minimum level. On one occasion, Honneth does suggest that Rawls implicitly shares his own commitment to the actualization of the social and psychological preconditions for the realization of individual autonomy. Honneth suggests that the commitment is implied by Rawls list of basic goods because Rawls believes that such goods express the conditions that, to
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the best of our knowledge, are indispensable to giving every individual an equal chance to realise his or her personality (Honneth and Fraser, 2001: 177). Moreover, Honneth refers albeit rather briefly to the importance of the basic good of self-respect for the moral-psychological development of the person (ibid.: 179). He nonetheless concludes that by focusing exclusively on distributive issues Rawls does not follow this implied commitment to its logical conclusion. And yet, Honneth seems unaware of the extent to which Rawls sociologically informed description of the stages of moral development indeed resembles his own. Rawls explicitly foregrounds the Honnethian idea that intersubjectively developed practical relations to self are conditions for the actualization of freedom, and that a just society must secure realized freedom to the required minimum degree. Let us consider the development of self-confidence, the first of Honneths conditions for social freedom and the first stage in the sequence of moral development for Rawls (Rawls, 1971a: 70). Where Honneth attributes to intimate, affective relations of love and friendship the task of confirming or correcting the feelings and desires of the individual, Rawls in a similar vein entrusts the family in one of various forms with the role of validating, by precepts and injunctions, the moral attitudes of children (ibid.: 4623/405 rev.). Given that the child does not yet understand moral distinctions, the reactions of parents or carers to his or her instincts, desires and behaviours function as validations or injunctions. Drawing on the human sciences in a manner which closely resembles Honneths, Rawls explains that these reactions enable the child to trust in her or his feelings, to trust in others, and to have confidence in his or her abilities, enabling the child to launch out and test maturing abilities and skills (ibid.: 464/406 rev.). The transmission of socially acceptable behaviour contributes to the orderly reproduction of society, its values and its culture from one generation to the next (Rawls, 1997: 595; Rawls, 2001: 162). The family can, of course, exert an unfavourable influence on the child, infringing the latters basic liberties and opportunities as a future citizen. In a manner similar to Honneths, Rawls maintains that a public conception of justice requires the family to guarantee the reproduction of basic capabilities: the abuse and neglect of children is thus prohibited by family law (Rawls, 2001: 165). While it would be inappropriate to require that the internal life of families be fully regulated by political public principles, a public conception does bind the family indirectly because it requires the prevention of mental and physical precariousness so as to ensure that the minimal essential capacities for normal functioning and for achieving voluntarily organized, reciprocal relations are maintained (ibid.: 1011, 1637). According to Honneth, Rawls account of the indirect regulation of internal family life by principles of justice is not sufficient because it does not stress the fact that justice in families makes internally necessary another, more just, division of labour in families (Honneth, 2004b: 387), one that demands concrete guarantees of the intersubjective conditions of effective freedom. In the context of the family, this means that social measures must actively encourage the production and maintenance of reciprocal intimate relations and this requires, for Honneth, the familial institutionalization of reciprocity of labour. For Honneth, the normative requirement that reciprocal intimate relations be secured within the family means that the problem of justice in families does not simply include the negative Rawlsian task of merely reducing social and economic
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conditions which support a certain unjust division of labour but also includes the enforcement (ibid.) of a certain understanding of the normative infrastructure of families so that participants themselves come to see that they should accept a fair distribution of labour in families (ibid.). According to Honneth, Rawls defends the position that a normative understanding of families should not be enforced and that a shared concept of justice will probably suffice to guarantee social conditions under which the division of labour in families is organized voluntarily. Honneth says, explicitly, that this is not sufficient (ibid.). Against Honneth, I have attempted to show that Rawls public conception does require a normative conception of family life ensuring the development and maintenance of minimal essential capacities and seeking to guarantee voluntary organization. Albeit not as thick as Honneths, this conception nonetheless intends to guarantee the reciprocal intimate relations which Honneths theory emphasizes. Rawlsian justice should guarantee social conditions under which the division of labour in families may be organized voluntarily, that is, in terms of structures which are mutually recognized. In this sense, justice is to protect the individual from physical and psychological abuse while at the same time protecting the family from the external interference of an overly paternalistic state. If intimate relations are mutually and voluntarily recognized within families in this way, then it seems undesirable to enforce as Honneth appears to suggest a thicker normative conception of family life (Honneth, 2004b: 387). Rawls normative conception of family life need not include more than the guarantee of minimal essential capacities for pursuing and maintaining reciprocal relations (which includes protective measures against both intra-familial physical and psychological abuse and extrafamilial state paternalism). Let us consider, next, the development of self-respect, the second condition according to Honneth of realized liberty. For Honneth, juridical relations function to confirm the belief in ones authority equal to that of all others to make claims and demands. This view is mirrored in Rawls description of the way in which egalitarian right distributes liberties and the social bases of self-respect. This intersubjective validation of ones equal authority allows one to see oneself as entitled to the same status and treatment as all others. Indeed, Honneth himself remarks that Rawls account of egalitarian right is an important step in the right direction (Honneth and Anderson, 2005: 129) because it supports the development of self-respect, the second practical relation to self necessary for realized liberty. Let us consider, finally, the development of self-esteem, the third condition according to Honneth of realized liberty. Solidarity, for Honneth, describes a cultural climate where the acquisition of a sense of belonging and of interdependence is possible: no member of society is denied social esteem for her or his contribution to the common good. Again, in intention, Rawls theory is not dissimilar: the second stage of moral development (the morality of association [Rawls, 1971a: 71]) describes the internalization of norms of conduct imposed by the reactions of approval and disapproval of group members, or of those in authority, to ones behaviour, a description supported by the companion principle of the Aristotelian Principle (ibid.: 4401/3867 rev., see also 65 and 67). Without the pre-requisite experience of social recognition, no one would even wish to formulate and pursue a conception of the good. By internalizing
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normative patterns of social recognition, one learns the virtues of a good student and classmate, the ideals of a good sport and companion and even of a good citizen (ibid.: 4678/40910 rev.). Seeking to secure for all the opportunities to strive to perfect ones conception of the good and to seek recognition for this good among ones peers, Rawls theory formulates the Honnethian idea that expressing ones nature in mutually sustaining forms is a fundamental element of ones good. Speaking of the idea of social union, Rawls explains that people need one another since it is only in active cooperation with others that ones powers reach fruition. Only in the social union is the individual complete (ibid.: 525 n./460 n. rev.), like a group of musicians, says Rawls, who by tacit agreement set out to perfect their skills on a chosen instrument so as to realize the powers of all in a joint orchestral performance (ibid.: 524 n./459 n. rev.). In this respect, Rawls theory intends to realize the sense of belonging and social esteem which the human sciences reveal to be minimally necessary for normal functioning. It is through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. . . . [Members] recognize the good of each as an element in the complete activity, the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to all (ibid.: 523/459 rev.). In intention, then, Rawls theory surely aims to actualize real and effective powers and not simply to protect the merely negative and empty liberty to seek such actualization. Since a democracy aims for full equality of all its citizens, it must include arrangements to achieve it (Rawls, 1997: 600; emphasis added). If a democracy did not realize the faculties to a minimal degree, it would not facilitate a relatively well-ordered society. The question turns, then, around what constitutes the minimal degree for a relatively well-ordered society.
III Rawls method of principle justification: formal Kantian egalitarian right, or mutual self-realization (good)?
I turn, finally, to examine the ideal Rawls employs in his method of principle justification. Rawls theory explicitly founds itself on a formal, Kantian ideal of impartiality (right). Honneth argues that Rawls theory cannot maintain its claim to be neutral among ends but instead involves an anterior commitment to a particular conception of mutual good, namely, an ideal of individual human flourishing (Honneth, 1991: 2931; Honneth, 2004a: 357). Moreover, misunderstanding its fundamental commitment, the theorys implied ideal of human flourishing is overly individualistic (Honneth, 2004b: 389): by prioritizing the fair distribution of equal rights, Rawls theory overlooks those concrete experiences of injustice which damage subjectivity and impede self-realization. In The Limits of Liberalism (1991), Honneth considers the contrasting assessments provided by Rawlsian liberalism and communitarianism to explain the accelerated pluralization of individual life-orientations and the associated degeneration of cultural communities in contemporary western industrial societies. He situates his own assessment between the two. Liberalism evaluates this trend with reference to a formal ideal of impartiality. If egalitarian right indeed limits substantive conceptions of the good life, then the trend is acceptable. Right endorses neutrality: the state should not privilege any one particular conception of the good be this individual or communitarian over
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any another. In contrast, communitarians analyze the same trend with reference to the ideal of individual good. Drawing on the findings of the human sciences, Charles Taylor (1977) shows that the ability to objectively evaluate our own desires a condition for liberty to be effective depends on internalizing the confirmations or corrections of these desires by other people who also orient themselves towards our own good. Social trends are thus assessed by communitarians with reference to their ability to allow individuals to validate their values in relations of solidarity. For Honneth, Rawls defence of formal egalitarian right involves an implicit and anterior commitment to the ideal of freedom in association with others, that is, social freedom or mutual self-realization (Honneth, 1991: 279). Without this commitment, argues Honneth, persons would have no reason even to demand the formal protection of autonomy which egalitarian right offers. Rawls must concede that egalitarian right is necessary only insofar as it promises to safeguard the process of ethical self-assurance now conceived as intersubjective in nature against social and economic limitations (ibid.: 25). However, now that egalitarian right has been shown to derive from an ideal of individual good, Rawls theory can no longer maintain its commitment to neutrality among values: to orient itself towards its ideal, it must support those values which are structurally necessary for mutual human flourishing. Moreover, by prioritizing right, Rawls theory misunderstands its fundamental commitment. With respect to Rawls, for example, I would say there is already a certain pre-understanding of what the good life incorporates, namely, a quite individualistic one as some other critiques such as Thomas Nagels (1973) have made clear (Honneth, 2004b: 389). If Rawls theory had correctly understood the fundamental ideal which implicitly informs it i.e. human flourishing in social interaction then it would have needed to sacrifice Kantian neutrality for the pursuit of those intersubjective values necessary for the realization of persons in their various communities (Honneth, 2004a: 3578). Honneth thus reverses Rawls justification procedure: the defence of egalitarian right becomes necessary only insofar as a particular conception of the good discovers a limit to its applicability when faced with other, sometimes conflicting, conceptions of the good. As alluded to earlier, theorys task is, for Honneth, therapeutic rather than procedural. Misunderstanding its fundamental ideal, Rawls theory overlooks its real task. Instead of diagnosing and redressing those social deformations which give rise to concrete experiences of injustice that injure subjectivity, Rawls theory presents mere procedures which are supposed to interpret the ideal of impartiality such that the fairness of the procedure can be said to carry over to the results. My first response is to confess that I do not quite understand how Rawls theory of justice can be said to overlook the concrete experiences of injustice with which Honneths alternative theory supposedly begins. In other words, I cannot see the difference that Deranty and Renault are driving at when, following Honneth, they write that the definition of justice will be provided by the criteria of the experiences of injustice rather than by a reconstruction of our intuitions of justice (Deranty and Renault, 2007: 95). The reflections about justice which provide the starting point for Rawls constructivist, coherentist justification are precisely those judgements which arise in concrete situations that are experienced as just or unjust. Hence, Rawls judgements about justice and Honneths concrete experiences of injustice are closely and internally related.
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Rawls constructivist approach to judgement begins with judgements about justice which arise in concrete experiences, judgements which are then ordered, first, by means of a coherentist theory which requires that they also coincide with descriptivist and experiential conceptions of healthy subjectivity and, second, by the ideal of the person implied by the most stable of such judgements. In so doing, normative standards can be determined that constructively account for this body of moral and non-moral judgements. Moreover, it is by reference to the constructivist formulation of immanent normative standards that experiences themselves can be normatively judged. If Honneth is indeed to begin with concrete experiences of injustice then he requires a normative conception of justice immanently defined in relation to judgements about justice that would allow him to determine which experiences actually qualify normatively as experiences of injustice. In this sense, Rawls constructivist approach to the determination of normative standards cannot be said to overlook the experiences with which Honneth begins. Second, Rawls model does appear to permit responses to these concrete experiences of injustice: if it did not, it would need to be rejected for constructivist reasons, since it would no longer respond to the problems for which it is designed. If, on the Honnethian model, an analysis of a concrete situation reveals that individual experiences of disrespect can be read as typical for an entire group and that a claim of justice is at stake (Honneth, 1995a: 16070), then, on the Rawlsian model, such groups would be entitled by reference to the principles of justice to demand that their rights to the social, material and institutional conditions of real freedom be reinstated. Such experiences would point to the fact that public institutions are not yet sufficiently ordered by the appropriate public conception of justice. Moreover, as the body of judgements about justice change, that is, as new experiences are taken up in judgement, constructivist requirements may well require adjustments to the public conception itself: as established beliefs change, it is possible that the principles of justice which it seems rational to acknowledge may likewise change (Rawls, 1971a: 548/480 rev.). In my view, Rawls, like Honneth, must commit, in this sense, to a concept of progress in the determination of principles, acknowledging that the public conception on which an overlapping consensus should obtain is necessarily open to change. The public conception will need to respond, in Rawls case, to new judgements about justice and, in Honneths case, to those particular aspects of a persons context (his or her needs, her or his legal status, or the perceived value of his or her contributions) which have not been adequately considered.15 Finally, as regards Honneths claim that an ideal of human flourishing is logically implied by Rawlsian egalitarian right, Rawls would certainly not disagree. Indeed, in Political Liberalism, Rawls himself affirms explicitly that the just and the good are complementary: no conception of justice can draw entirely upon one or the other, but must combine both in a definite way (Rawls, 1993: 172). Indeed, Rawls could remind Honneth that the defence which the latter offers for the supposed anteriority of the commitment to the ideal of mutual good itself invokes Rawls Kantian ideal of impartiality, thus confirming the Rawlsian claim that the just and the good are complementary. Honneth clearly states that his defence of the ideal of self-realization in association with others is not of a strictly communitarian nature: the commitment is rather to the individual self-realization of all members of society, in their different communities, and thus
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beyond any one particular community. Honneths ideal of the self-realization of all members of society already includes the Kantian ideal of impartiality, neutrality, formality and mutuality, that is, right (Honneth, 1991: 2931). Indeed, it is precisely so as to accentuate the formal nature of mutual good that Honneth sketches a formal conception of ethical life, to be understood as a critical normative standard which is both universal and substantively concrete (Honneth, 1995a: 1719). The conception is universal in the Kantian sense because it applies in the limit to everyone in society (communities, groups and individuals). It is concrete and substantive in the communitarian sense because it includes those values particular to the society in question which are necessary for the realization of all members of that particular society (mutual good). Rawls conception of justice is likewise at once formal and substantive, cohering with the normative expectations at work in everyday intersubjective life and with the descriptivist conditions of healthy identity formation. Indeed, the normative conception of mutual good which it expresses theoretically resembles Honneths. Rawls writes: In the well-ordered society of justice as fairness, citizens share a common aim, and one that has high priority: namely, the aim of insuring that political and social institutions are just, and of giving justice to persons generally, as what citizens need for themselves and want for one another (Rawls, 1993: 146; emphasis added). Such a society realizes itself in activities that are intrinsically good and not merely cooperation for social or economic gain (Rawls, 1971a: 525 n./460 n. rev.). Honneth thinks that his own intersubjective determination of the good contrasts with Rawls insofar as subjects are also presumed to have an interest in the freedom of the others from whom they expect social recognition (Honneth and Fraser, 2001: 259) However, Honneth overlooks the fact that Rawls expresses his normative conception of mutual good in precisely these intersubjective terms, namely, as what citizens need for themselves and want for one another (Rawls, 1993: 146; emphasis added). On one brief occasion, Honneth himself concedes that Rawls, like Hegel, tie[s] a justification of [his] conception of social justice to an ethical theory that defines the socially influenced preconditions that must be available for individual subjects to realize their autonomy (Honneth and Fraser, 2001: 178). Honneth nonetheless believes that this dimension only ashamedly forms the hidden basis of Rawls liberalism (ibid.: 180). It seems to me, however, that Rawls constructivist methodology explicitly yields a formal conception of mutual, substantive good which is not dissimilar to Honneths. Indeed, Rawls later presentation of justice as fairness is explicitly framed not merely by a formal conception of right but also by what Rawls takes to be a distinctly Hegelian insight, namely, the determination of the normative potential of historical institutions of social cooperation or, in Rawls words, the determination of the normative structures of societys historical form as a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next (Rawls, 2001: 35; see also Rawls, 2000: 371). Like Honneth, Rawls thus ascribes to political philosophy what he takes to be an explicitly Hegelian task: political philosophy is to constructively formulate the fair and mutually recognized conditions of cooperation which are implied by the main political and social institutions in which we find ourselves in a particular moment of historical time (Rawls, 2001: 34).16 Both Honneth and Rawls agree that this task requires a methodological approach which is at once formal and substantive. For Rawls and Honneth alike, political
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philosophy has the potential to illuminate the shared good and benefits of political society (Rawls, 2001: 4).
Conclusion
Honneth does not achieve the desired break with Rawls liberal theory of justice because Rawls political liberalism does not in fact resemble the interpretation which Honneth offers of it. Indeed, Rawls liberalism is far closer to Honneths own theory than the latter realizes. Rawlsian parties in the original position are not characterized by purely individualistic liberty, as Honneth claims, but rather are fully aware that the citizens they represent are subjectively interdependent, vulnerable to attack and unable to realize their liberty without the support of others. In this sense, the veil of ignorance does not fall too low. Moreover, Rawlsian parties in the original position are not endowed with merely instrumental reason, as Honneth argues, but rather are interested in realizing their full deliberative rationality which includes the real pursuit of their two higher-order interests in their capacity to formulate and pursue a conception of their good and their capacity to formulate and abide by a non-instrumental conception of justice. In this sense, full deliberative rationality coincides with the Hegelian and Honnethian ideal of self-realization in association with others. Furthermore, Rawlsian egalitarian right does not aim merely to protect the negative liberty of individuals to seek the realization of life-projects and faculties, as Honneth suggests, but rather undertakes to secure the actual realization of such projects and powers. Indeed, Rawls theory was shown to draw on the descriptions provided by the human sciences concerning subjective interdependence, the stages of moral learning and the need for self-confidence, self-respect and social esteem. And it was shown that Rawls conception of justice intends to ensure that citizens capacities do not fall below the minimum essential capacities as specified by the human sciences which are necessary for existing as normal and fully cooperating members of society or, in Honneths terms, for pursuing and maintaining reciprocal recognition relations. Finally, the anterior commitment to an ideal of mutual good which Honneth argues is nonetheless implied by Rawls theory of impartial right is not too individualistic. Nor does Rawls misunderstand the ideal by focusing on the procedural rendering of the value of impartiality rather than on concrete experiences of injustice. Rather, the ideal of impartiality which founds Rawls theory is at once formal and substantive, informed by those very judgements about justice which arise within concrete experiences of injustice and by those judgements about the nature of healthy subjectivity which the human sciences provide. In this sense, Rawls ideal closely resembles Honneths formal conception of ethical life and is not so far removed from Honneths self-avowed profoundly different model (Honneth and Anderson, 2005). Indeed, by means of its analyses, this article has revealed that the theories of both thinkers in fact share a basic intention, namely, to guarantee for all citizens the social, material and institutional conditions for the actual exercise of otherwise merely formal rights and liberties or, in Honneths words, mutual self-realization. Consequently, both
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thinkers commit to the idea of progress in the construction of principles of justice, so as to consider new judgements about justice or previously unconsidered injustices within a social context. Notes
I thank Paul Patton, Christian Lazzeri, Sotiria Liakaki and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. My thanks also go to Alice Le Goff, Marie Garrau and Christian Lazzeri for the opportunities offered by the research centre SOPHIAPOL. I acknowledge that this research was generously supported by the Bourse dexcellence Eiffel doctorat awarded by the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. An earlier version of some of the ideas presented here has been published in La Justice sociale: de fendre Rawls contre les objections de Honneth (Bankovsky, 2009). 1. Honneth deals with the question of political and social justice in the following articles: The Limits of Liberalism (Honneth, 1991), Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice (Honneth, 2004a), From Struggles for Recognition to a Plural Concept of Justice: an Interview with Axel Honneth (Interviewed by Gwynn Markle) (Honneth, 2004b) and Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice, co-authored with Joel Anderson (Honneth and Anderson, 2005). Honneth also provides some perspectives for a recognition-theoretical concept of justice in his debate with Nancy Fraser in Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (Honneth and Fraser, 2001: 17089). 2. There are two further reasons why Honneths relation to Rawls must be assessed. First, to the best of my knowledge, the task has not yet been explicitly undertaken in the English secondary literature. Second, Honneths claims regarding the differences between himself and Rawls tend to be merely repeated in the secondary literature without critical reflection. Nancy Frasers presentation of the apparent opposition is certainly cursory; intuitive rather than argued (Honneth and Fraser, 2001). And Jean-Philippe Deranty and Emmanuel Renault are not alone when they remark in passing, and again without real argument, that a political theory of recognition allows justice to be defined in terms that do include the real experiences of social injustice, whereas the different Kant-inspired theories of justice [e.g. Rawls] all end up devising theoretical models that seem unable to account for the modern phenomena of exclusion, oppression and domination (Deranty and Renault, 2007: 107). It is my view that Honneths claims should not be so easily accepted and that Honneths discussion of Rawls requires more careful consideration. 3. As is customary, references to A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971a) will indicate page numbers for both the 1971 original edition and the revised edition (Rawls, 1999). 4. Rawls writes that there are various forms of constructivism. A number of views not usually thought of as constructivist can be presented in this way (Rawls, 1980: 3223). He adds that average utilitarianism might be presented as a kind of constructivism (ibid.: 323). As Onora ONeill remarks, Rawls also contrasts his Kantian constructivism with a further version of non-Kantian constructivism, namely, the Hobbesian version of liberalism found in the work of David Gauthier (ONeill, 2003: 364; see also Rawls, 1987: 422). As ONeill explains, Gauthier views morality as constructed out of a process of rational bargaining which presupposes the ideal of a person who seeks the satisfaction of antecedent individual preferences (ONeill, 2003: 364; see also Gauthier, 1997 and 1986).
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5. Honneth now insists that normative claims to justice can indeed be raised in all three spheres of intersubjective relation, including that of the affective sphere. He thus corrects the thesis that he still maintained in The Struggle for Recognition according to which love does not admit of the potential for normative development (Honneth, 1995a: 282). 6. For Honneths account of social philosophy as an endeavour distinct from moral and political philosophy, see Honneth, 1994. Christopher Zurn also directs us to consult Honneth, 1995b, especially pages xixxxii, and chs 3, 13 and 14. 7. I will discuss the defining elements of Honneths formal conception of ethical life in Section III of this article. 8. As concerns the difference between descriptivist conceptions and normative ideals of personhood, Rainer Forst is correct to remark that the ideal of the person as free and equal with a conception of the good and a sense of justice is not a theory of the self . . . the concepts lie on different levels, one ontological, one abstract and normative. To argue for individual rights is not to argue for individualist life-plans: legal rights do not replace relations of love, affection, friendship, and solidarity . . . they secure the needs of concrete persons (Forst, 1992: 299). Unfortunately, the distinction between normative ideals of autonomous personhood and descriptivist theories of the self is overlooked by Bryce Weber when he uses the earlier work of Honneth to argue against liberal ideals of autonomous subjectivity (Weber, 2006). 9. For Rawls account of the pre-requisite need for social recognition, I advise the reader to consult his discussion of the Aristotelian Principle and its companion effect: The conception of goodness as rationality allows us to characterise more fully the circumstances that support the first aspect of self-esteem, the sense of our own worth. These are essentially two: (1) having a rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle [i.e. one that calls upon natural capacities in an interesting fashion]; and (2) finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed. . . . Unless our endeavours are appreciated by our associates, it is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile (Rawls, 1971a: 4401/3867 rev., see also 41415/364 rev., 65 and 67). 10. For further discussion of the undetermined nature of personhood ideals in Rawls constructivist ethics, see David O. Brink (1987). 11. Gerald Doppelt (1988, 1989) and William Galston (1982) argue that liberal democratic societies are characterized by a variety of rival personhood ideals not only Kantian, but also bourgeois-individualist and patriarchal ideals and that these alternatives are also rooted in modern political judgements and practices. Neither author believes that Rawls offers objective criteria for preferring one ideal over another. In contrast, I argue that Rawls does offer such criteria: constructivist conceptions must satisfy the two feasibility requirements, namely, coherence with non-moral judgements about the person established by the human sciences and coherence with considered moral judgements about justice of the society in question. 12. Honneths argument that the reasoning for the principles is instrumental and not moral is not novel. The claim was first raised against Rawls in the context of the Kantian interpretation which he provided for his theory (Rawls, 1971a: 40). Critics like Oliver Johnson (1974, 1977), Andrew Levine (1974), Thomas Nagel (1973), Robert Paul Wolff (1977) and Homer Mason (1976) argued that Rawls personhood ideal was not Kantian enough: where Kant requires that principles be chosen on the basis of pure duty to persons, Rawlsian parties are motivated by purely instrumental desire for a greater stake in primary goods.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
Honneth explicitly sides with the argument which Nagel develops in 1973 (Honneth, 2004b: 389) (see Section III of this article). In contrast to such views, others, like Stephen Darwall (1976, 1980), have argued that Rawls description of the two moral faculties incorporates both instrumental and non-instrumental reason alike. Clearly, I side with Stephen Darwall in such debates. The defences which I offer for Rawls are inspired by the arguments of Stephen Darwall (1976, 1980), arguments to which Rawls himself will refer when defending justice as fairness against the criticism that Schopenhauer makes of Kant, a criticism which resembles the one that Honneth here brings to Rawls (Rawls, 1980: 31819; Rawls, 1993: 1047). Schopenhauer argues that Kantian principles are those that egoism cunningly accepts as a compromise because it appeals to what rational agents, as finite beings with needs, can consistently will to be universal law. I maintain that Rawls constructivist procedure intends to guarantee the actual realization of the moral faculties. As to whether or not public institutions regulated by Rawls principles of justice would, in fact, achieve the actualization of these faculties is another question, beyond the scope of this article. If their institutionalization carefully sets its sights on their normative intention, then faith in or commitment to the success of the constructivist procedure is warranted. However, I refer the reader to Christian Lazzeris detailed and ultimately negative evaluation within the framework of recognition theory of the capacity of Rawls two principles to satisfy the desire for realized liberty (2004). I do not deal with Lazzeris arguments here because my fundamental question is different. I do not seek, as does Lazzeri, to determine whether Rawls principles would, in fact, satisfy the desire of real individuals for realized liberty, but rather, I ask whether or not Rawls constructivism even intends to satisfy this desire because it is precisely the existence of such an intention in Rawls theory that Honneth calls into question. Against Honneth, I claim that Rawls theory does intend to satisfy such desires. For Honneths commitment to progress in the quality of recognition relations, see Honneth, 2004a: 355, 35963; Honneth, 2002; and Honneth, forthcoming). For a consideration of the necessarily revisable character of theories of justice, and a reflection on the radical implications of the Kantian faith in progress which I believe characterizes the constructivist, rational reconstructivist and normative reconstructivist theories of Rawls, Habermas and Honneth alike, I refer the reader to Perfecting Justice in Rawls, Habermas and Honneth: Constructivism from a Deconstructive Perspective (Bankovsky, forthcoming). It seems to me that the criticism Honneth here develops is the opposite of the one Habermas brings to Rawls in Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawlss Political Liberalism (Habermas, 1995). For Honneth, Rawls method fails because it attempts a purely formal justification of principles (in terms of the idea of Kantian impartiality) where it should instead justify principles in terms of the substantive conception of mutual good which is implied by historical institutions. In contrast to Honneths take on Rawls, Habermas states that Rawls failure lies in the fact that his method depends on shared substantive assumptions which are contingent to a historical tradition and does not develop itself in a strictly procedural manner as per Habermas discourse-theoretical approach (Habermas, 1995: 126). In my view, the fact that Honneth and Habermas each direct opposing criticisms at Rawls methodology is significant: Rawls political constructivism is neither simply formal nor simply historical and substantive.
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Defending Rawls' Theory of Justice Against Honneth's Objections

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Social justice: Defending Rawls theory of justice against Honneths objections

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I The ideal of the person in Rawls constructivism: individualistic and instrumentalist?

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Are persons endowed with merely instrumental reason?

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II The object-domain of Rawls theory: merely negative liberty?

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