Rachel Dobbs HT Week 6

John Hyman

Free Will
The question of whether or not humans have free will, as well as the capacity to exercise it, has extensive implications on the way in which me must conceive of the mechanisms of the world around us, both ethically and logically. The capacity to take responsibility for our own actions and, by extension, to hold others to account for theirs is necessarily dependent on idea that we, to a greater or lesser extent, have the potential to choose between various outcomes and, under the correct circumstances, to orchestrate the one that we desire the most. This capacity seems fundamental to the conception of ourselves as conscious, dynamic beings rather than passive automations and as Watson writes that the denial of free will seems threatening to the meaning of human life.1 However, this ability to control the events that we partake in also seems to be at odds with the conception that events do not occur in isolation, but rather are the result of a chain of inter-connected causes and effects, a view which is particularly prevalent through in the scientific view of the world being governed by specific physical laws which causally link past events with the present and will go on to link present events with those in the future. Throughout this essay I will discuss the way in which the concept of free will is affected by and affects both moral responsibility and determinism, ultimately arguing that the notions are compatible with one another, as it is possible for a certain degree of free will to exist within the constraints created by the physical world and prior events. One of the first attempts to align the concepts of determinism and moral responsibility and their relationship to free will came from Hume, who argues that the apparent tension between them is primarily the result of ambiguity in how such terms are defined. Hume initially argues for a degree of causality within the world but defines this as the regular conjunction of similar events. This means that whilst the same events tend to follow the same causes and the same actions follow the same motives. However, we must not expect that this uniformity in human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men in the same circumstances will always act precisely in the same manner, without allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices and opinions.2 Therefore Hume seems to advance an argument that incorporates elements of determinism, regarding ideas of causation as governing human choice in a similar way to which they govern the physical universe. However, he also makes this notion more compatible with the idea of free will by allowing for differences in the desires and actions of men and via his definition of liberty, which he describes as the power to act or not act according to the determinations of the will, without the constraints of a prisoner in chains. Humes definition of liberty or freedom has been strongly contested by other philosophers debating the concept of free will for it appears to suggest that our capacity to have free will is dependent on our potential to act on this will despite the events and circumstances that surround us. In his essay Alternate Possibilities
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Watson, Introduction, Free Will, pg. 2 Hume, D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect viii., pg. 62

Rachel Dobbs HT Week 6

John Hyman

and Moral Responsibility, Harry Frankfurt describes this notion as the principle of alternate possibilities, which he says states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if could have done otherwise.3 Under this principle, a person can only be said to have acted freely if he made a choice that was completely unconstrained by external factors. This has important implications for the question of moral responsibility with regards to free will as it suggests that we are exempt from taking responsibility for our actions if factors exist that have effected our decision in a way that our will would not have, such as coercion. Frankfurt concedes that such a position is an attractive notion, stating that it is a very plausible proposition that moral responsibility is excluded by coercionthe fact that a person was coerced to act as he did may entail both that he could not have done otherwise and that he bears no moral responsibility for his action. 4 However, Frankfurt goes on to argue against the principle of alternate possibilities, offering an example of how if a moral agent, Jones, could only have done X, he could still be held to moral account for X. Suppose Black wants Jones to do X. Black is prepared to do whatever necessary to ensure that Jones does X, however Black does not want to show his hand. Black will only coerce Jones when Jones is about to act contrary to X. Whatever Jones initially decides in this situation, he will end up doing X. Jones, however, decides himself that he does wish to do X. Black need not even get involved in the decision. Thus, Jones decided what he wanted to do and so bears moral responsibility, yet it is simultaneously true that he could not have done otherwise since he was coerced (albeit without his knowing). This example allows Frankfurt to conclude that our free will and what we determine to do through this will is relevant even in the presence of external constraints upon it. He therefore offers an alternative to the principle of alternative possibilities, stating that a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise. This principle does not appear to conflict with the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.5 This view is further supported by Ayer, who states that a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid.6 Ayer also further supports the idea that it is possible for free will to exist within a casually governed world. Indeed, he expands this idea further, stating that the admission of moral responsibility, far from being incompatible with determinism, seems rather to presuppose it.7 The most interesting aspect of Ayers argument is that he explains why freedom and determinism are not Frankfurt, Harry G. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility in Watson, Free Will, pg. 167 4 Frankfurt, Harry G. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility in Watson, Free Will, pg. 171 5 Frankfurt, Harry G. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility in Watson, Free Will, pg. 176 6 Ayer, A. J. Freedom and Necessity in Watson, Free Will (First Edition), pg. 15 7 Ayer, A. J. Freedom and Necessity in Watson, Free Will (First Edition), pg. 22
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Rachel Dobbs HT Week 6

John Hyman

diametrically opposed notions, but allows for the idea that each can influence the other stating if all that is meant by determinism is that it is possible, in principle, to deduce it from a set of particular facts about the past, together with the appropriate general laws, then, even if this is true, it does not in the least entail that I am the helpless prisoner of fate. It does not even entail that my actions make difference to the future: for they are causes as well as effects; so that if they were different their consequences would be different also.8 As discussed, I believe that humans have the capacity for free will but that our ability to exercise this is constrained by the world around us. However, in this belief I chiefly agree with Frankfurt and Ayer that whilst our actions are inevitably causally effected by prior events that shape our character and circumstance, this does not prevent us from having free will within the limits of such constraints and from having moral responsibility over how we choose to exercise this will within these parameters. This is a viewpoint that I feel is perfectly summarized by Austin in his discussion of the way in which the language surrounding free will affects the way in which we conceive it with his declaration that we must regard freedom as not a name of a characteristic of actions, but the name of a dimension in which actions are assessed.9 Bibliography Hume, D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect viii., Oxford University Press, accessed via http://ezproxy.ouls.ox.ac.uk:3611/ehost/detail?sid=cad31a49-dacd-463c-af5f06d64f921aaf%40sessionmgr10&vid=1&hid=9&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2Z Q%3d%3d#db=nlebk&AN=216022 on 15/02/2013 Austin, J.L. A Plea for Excuses in Philosophical Papers, Oxford Scholarship Online, accessed via http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001/acp rof-9780192830210-chapter-8 Watson, Gary (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press (2002) Kenny, Anthony, Freewill and Responsibility, Routledge & Kegan Paul (1978)

Ayer, A. J. Freedom and Necessity in Watson, Free Will (First Edition), pg. 23 Austin, J.L. A Plea for Excuses in Philosophical Papers, Oxford Scholarship Online, pg. 180
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