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Accelerating Luhmann: Towards a Systems Theory of Ambivalence

Ole Bjerg Theory Culture Society 2006 23: 49 DOI: 10.1177/0263276406067098 The online version of this article can be found at: http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/23/5/49

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Accelerating Luhmann
Towards a Systems Theory of Ambivalence

Ole Bjerg

Our analysis has given no indication whatsoever that sometime during this century, and presumably during its second half, an epoch break has occurred regarding the system of society, which would justify claiming a transformation from a modern to a postmodern society. (Luhmann, 1997: 1143)1

N LUHMANNS systems theory we do not nd a concept of postmodernity.2 The reason for this is the very obvious one that Luhmann does not recognize society as being postmodern, hence there is no need for a concept of postmodernity. Luhmann does indeed agree with the proponents of postmodernism that the time we live in is permeated by a certain kind of paradoxicality. He believes, however, that this paradoxicality is already adequately incorporated in systems theorys description of contemporary society as consisting of a multitude of differentiated self-referential function systems. Luhmanns account of modernity is, in his own opinion, already sufciently equipped to grasp what some people have chosen to call postmodernism (1997: 11445). I believe, however, that Luhmanns dismissal of the problem of postmodernity is somewhat too hasty. The paradoxicality that we face in postmodern society is more radical than just the coexistence of a multitude of different world descriptions. In postmodern society we see an implosion (or explosion if you like) of meaning, whereby differentiated function systems are confronted with complexity in an ambivalent form, which they are not able to handle without dissolving themselves. This ambivalence not only questions the validity of a particular systems observations of the environment. It puts the systems fundamental possibility of observation, and thereby its very existence, at stake. The aim of this article is to propose a conception of the postmodern condition of social systems compatible with the terminology of Luhmanns systems theory.
Theory, Culture & Society 2006 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 23(5): 4968 DOI: 10.1177/0263276406067098

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50 Theory, Culture & Society 23(5)

The Possibility and Impossibility of Society Luhmanns social theory is constructed around the classical sociological question: how is society possible? This type of question connects back to the old Hobbesian problem of order and is later appropriated within the sociological tradition by authors like Durkheim (1893) and Simmel (1908). In an early article, titled precisely Wie ist soziale Ordnung mglich? (How is Social Order Possible?) (1981), Luhmann poses the question very explicitly as the central question of the development of social theory. And in the major work, Social Systems (1984), we nd it in a version accommodating his by then fully accomplished linguistic turn. To Luhmann, society is now tantamount to communication systems and, accordingly, the formulation of the question becomes: How is communication, that is, coordinated selectivity, possible at all? (Luhmann, 1984: 157). Luhmanns detailed studies of particular function systems are also based upon this type of How is X possible? question (e.g. 1982: 19, 1990a: 910). This article revolves around an inquiry into the other side of this question. By taking the possibility of society as his starting point, Luhmann makes himself blind to essential features of contemporary society. These features may be illuminated by posing the question: How is society impossible? or How is communication as a system impossible? The thesis I want to propose is that in society, in its postmodern condition, communication and systems are at the same time both possible and impossible. To fully grasp what is going on in postmodern society, theory must be able to operate with both the possibility and the impossibility of society. In other words, if systems theory and the analysis generated from it are to be in step with contemporary society, it has to incorporate the question: How are systems impossible? Systems theory does indeed take the improbability of communication as its basis, i.e., the improbability that a communicative operation will nd connection in a subsequent operation (Luhmann, 1984: 157, 1990c: 96). Probability, however, is a measure for the likelihood of a specic outcome within a eld of possible outcomes. Improbability indicates a low likelihood of an outcome, yet it still is possible. Improbability therefore presupposes possibility. Central to the notion of autopoiesis is the notion of Anschlussfhigkeit3 (Luhmann, 1984: 36). Being autopoietic, systems are intrinsically vested with the ability to connect with subsequent operations, vested with the possibility of their own meaningful reproduction. The question of the impossibility of systems is intended to open an inquiry into the impossibility of connectivity, Anschlussunfhigkeit. The argument will consist of two stages. First a deconstructive critique exposing those problems or obstacles in systems theory, which make it blind to certain features of function systems in their postmodern condition. And, second, a reconstructive stage attempting to incorporate this critique into systems theory, enabling it to grasp both the modern and the post in contemporary society.

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The Problem of Complexity A central component if not the central component of systems theory is the distinction between system and environment. A system, according to Luhmann, is only possible as one side of this distinction (1984: 176). The difference between system and environment is furthermore constituted by a difference in gradients of complexity between environment and system (1984: 1815). We may speak of a drop in complexity (Komplexittsgeflle). The capacity of systemic self-reproduction hereby consists in the ability to reduce the complexity that is present in the environment. Reduction of complexity is carried out in a process where the system selects and actualizes potential observations in the environment. Complexity works as a generator for system creation and Luhmann speaks of a complexity pressure (1990b: 68) whereby the system is being forced to select (1984: 25) by the surplus of possible observations in the environment. But for complexity to function as a catalyst for the creation and reproduction of systems, we must assume that complexity in the form of potential observations is present prior to the system, that is, prior to the actualization of the observation (for an exposition of this problem see Habermas, 1971: 153). If the environment complexity only comes into being with the systems observation of the environment, it cannot function as the compelling force behind the creation of the system (for a discussion on this topic see Bjerg, 2000). Neither will it make sense to ascribe a complexity-reducing function to the system, since then the system would have rst produced the complexity that it later reduces. It would be like a pyromaniac reman who puts out a re that she herself has started. So Luhmann has to work with the assumption of an environment, which is in some way complex an sich. As will be demonstrated, it does not sufce to assume that systems just select from a horizon of pre-existing possible observations, thereby reducing complexity. We must also have an eye for the fact that systems themselves, in a more radical way than Luhmann conceives, produce complexity, not only in the system but also in the environment.4 This problematic of production and reduction of complexity is expressed in the form of ambivalence. Referring to Spencer Brown, Luhmann constantly states that the basic operation of observation is the drawing of a distinction. But what happens if the object one is observing seems to appear on both sides of the distinction at the same time? What if an object seems to be both an artwork and a non-artwork or if it seems to be neither? In other words, what if the observation is ambivalent? Bauman approaches this problem in an analysis that can be read as a description of what happens in function systems with the emergence of postmodernity:
Through its naming/classifying function, language posits itself between a solidly founded, orderly world t for human habitation, and a contingent world of randomness, in which human survival weapons memory, the capacity for learning would be useless, if not downright suicidal. Language strives to sustain the order and to deny or suppress randomness and contingency. . . .
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52 Theory, Culture & Society 23(5)

The situation turns ambivalent if the linguistic tools of structuration prove inadequate; either the situation belongs to none of the linguistically distinguished classes, or it falls into several classes at the same time. None of the learned patterns could be proper in an ambivalent situation or more than one of the learned patterns could be applied; whatever is the case, the outcome is the feeling of indecision, undecidability, and hence loss of control. The consequences of action become unpredictable, while randomness, allegedly done away with by the structuring effort, seems to make an unsolicited come-back. (Bauman, 1991: 12)5

In Luhmannian terms, what Bauman is describing here is a situation in which the system is confronted with a form of irreducible complexity. When a system is observing a given phenomenon in the environment according to its semantics, the phenomenon may be ambivalent in the sense that logically it can appear on both sides of the systems code of observation, or perhaps on neither side. Postmodernity can be described as a situation where it is becoming increasingly difcult to distinguish unambiguously between the two sides of the systems observations, e.g. art/non-art, profitable/non-protable, healthy/sick. This ambivalence is radical in the sense that it cannot simply be settled through a selection in which the system dogmatically places the phenomenon on one side or the other of the distinction, since such a selection would be inconsistent with the systems own semantics. The problem of ambivalence is treated in systems theory under the headline of paradoxicality. As already noted, Luhmann does admit that paradoxicality is an intrinsic part of life in contemporary society. What separates him from Baumann and other proponents of postmodernity is his belief in the systems ability to cope with paradoxicality. Luhmanns trust in modernity in the form of differentiated function systems may be summarized in his statement: Paradoxicality is not a question of existence for the system (1985: 415). The main argument of the current article may be stated as the precise opposite of this formulation. It is precisely the failure to recognize the extent of the problem that paradoxicality constitutes for the system which prevents Luhmann from being able to fully conceptualize postmodernity. In the Luhmannian conception, a paradox occurs when the conditions of the possibility of an operation are at the same time the conditions of the impossibility of this operation (Luhmann, 1986: 269). However, this is only possible on the level of observation, and therefore paradoxicality always emerges on the level of observation and never on the level of the observed, the level of operation. Luhmann argues in his exposition of the consciousness as a system (which may be generalized to social systems):
With classical logic and epistemology we assume that real processes proceed free of paradoxes. This is also possible in self-referential systems. In the constitution of a paradox, the parallel view of a negation is necessary, i.e. the use of a schema of difference, i.e. observation. The progression from thought
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Bjerg Accelerating Luhmann 53

to thought lets itself be carried by a necessity free of negation. The thought being actual in this very moment disappears anyway. It does not have to be negated. And a subsequent thought takes its place anyway . . . without the negation of the previous thought being necessary for the production of the new thought. This happens unnoticed. Only to the observer of this progression do the thoughts form distinct entities; only to the observer is one thought not the other; only to the observer do the thoughts differ from each other; only to the observer does the single thought attain its unity from being distinguished from other thoughts; therefore, only to the observer can paradoxes occur . . . (1985: 41415)

According to systems theory, the paradox emerges when the system observes itself, thereby realizing its own contingency. But the stream of thoughts constituting the autopoiesis of the system continues, affected only momentarily by the realization of the paradoxicality on the level of selfobservation. Since the paradox emerges on the level of observation, it constitutes only a meta- and not a fundamental or existential problem to the autopoiesis of the system. The system may therefore be able to afford to just ignore the problem and simply continue operation on a lower-order level (Luhmann, 1997: 578). The necessity free of negation will automatically force the system into making a selection on a rst-order level, regardless of the meta-problem constituted by the paradox. One way of continuing may even be a further self-observation, identifying the rst self-observation as a paradox. The paradox is hereby deparadoxicated by being identied as a paradox through a meta-meta-observation, which in itself is an operation and a continuation of the autopoiesis of the system. A paradox may constitute a logical problem, but since the autopoiesis of a system is basically operational and not necessarily logical, a system may overcome a paradox by jumping between orders of observation, thus escaping (or dodging one might say) the paradox without necessarily solving it. It [the system] releases itself from the paradox by moving on to another distinction (Luhmann, 1993: 201). As long as the system just keeps making observations, it avoids being stopped in its operations. The problem of paradoxicality becomes a question of how, and not whether, the system reproduces itself. This is how Luhmann reaches the conclusion quoted above: Paradoxicality is not a question of existence for the system. In the following I will demonstrate how systems in postmodernity are confronted with a peculiar form of paradoxicality. In a radical sense this paradoxicality puts the very existence of the systems at stake, since it does not lend itself to immediate deparadoxication by switching between orders of observation. To illustrate the logic of this paradoxicality I have constructed a kind of Gedankenexperiment in the form of a very simple system. I would like to demonstrate how a paradox emerges as a result of self-observation (Luhmann would probably agree with this part) but also how the paradox cannot necessarily be dissolved by either continuing the operations of the system on a lower order, or escalating to higher orders of selfobservation. The Gedankenexperiment may also be read as a metaphor for
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54 Theory, Culture & Society 23(5)

postmodernity in the sense that it demonstrates the impossibility of modernity in the form of the ambition of being able to rationally process any kind of complexity, eliminate randomness by way of calculation and turn chaos into order. To paraphrase Bauman (1991: 2), the idea is to illustrate the unsolicited come-back of the randomness, allegedly done away with by the structuring effort. Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma Two friends, Max and Sam, have been arrested, convicted and sentenced to the death penalty for a very serious crime.6 They are now sitting in neighbouring prison cells awaiting the execution of their penalty, due by the end of the week. It is now Monday. Through the bars they are discussing how they feel about their impending death. Max is very afraid. Not so much about death itself, but about knowing exactly when it is going to come. He had always hoped to be surprised by death. To help his old friend, Sam now offers to kill Max by strangulation (he can just about t his arms through the bars) in his sleep on one of the nights before the execution on Sunday, thus relieving Max of having to face his own death. Max welcomes the idea, but stresses that to make it work, the murder has to take place on a night that Max cannot anticipate, since Max would not be able to fall asleep knowing that he was going to die on that particular night. If he were able to anticipate his own murder, the crucial element of surprise would be lost. There are six nights until the execution, and Sam immediately starts considering which night to choose to kill Max. He reasons as follows: Saturday night, i.e. the last night before the execution, is out of the question. When Max wakes up alive on Saturday morning, he will then be able to gure out that he is going to be killed the following night, since this is the last possible night before the execution. The element of surprise will be lost and Max will not be able to fall asleep in the evening. But what about Friday night? Sam now continues his reasoning: if Max is able to anticipate the killing if it is to be carried out on Saturday night, then Friday night is not a valid option either. On Friday morning when Max wakes up alive, he can gure out that he is going to be killed the following night, since this is the last possible night before the execution, now that Saturday night has been ruled out. Now Sam is starting to get confused: if both Saturday and Friday night can be ruled out as valid options beforehand, then Thursday night cannot be valid either, since in this case as well, when Max has woken up alive and realized that Thursday night is the last possible night, he will be able to anticipate the time of his death and will therefore not be surprised when Sam starts to kill him. In fact he will not even be able to fall asleep. Sams confusion turns into utter frustration when he realizes, that according to the logic of his reasoning, neither Wednesday, Tuesday nor Monday nights can be used as the time for the killing, since in these cases as well, Max will be able to anticipate the killing on the previous morning, and hence the element of surprise will be lost. But how is it possible that a surprise
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murder is not possible, when initially there are six different nights to choose from? Sam now realizes that in his logical considerations he has been working with a hidden premise, namely that Max is thinking as logically as himself. For instance, Thursday night is only an impossible time for the killing if Max has logically calculated that it cannot be Saturday or Friday night, and is therefore not going to be surprised. This gives Sam a moment of relief, and he considers whether Max is thinking as logically as himself and drawing the same conclusions, or whether he can assume that Max is not thinking as logically about the situation as himself, allowing him to set a random night for the killing. While considering this, he strikes upon another hidden premise in his reasoning. Not only is the validity of his reasoning based on the assumption that Max is thinking logically, but Max also has to assume that Sam is thinking logically and not just setting a random night for the killing without any further speculation. If Max is thinking logically, but is assuming that Sam is not thinking logically, then Max cannot make any predictions, since he cannot be sure that Sam has not simply chosen, for example, Friday night, unaware that this night is actually not possible. Sams momentary relief now again turns into confusion as he realizes that not only must he consider whether Max is thinking logically or not, he also has to consider whether Max believes he (Sam) is thinking logically. And his confusion increases as he thinks about the fact that logical thinking might not be a question of either/or, but rather a question of degree: Max may indeed think as far as to rule out Saturday and Friday nights, but perhaps he does not realize that Thursday night is not possible either, and would therefore be surprised if Sam decided to kill him on Wednesday night. Max may also indeed come to the conclusion that all nights are logically impossible, but he may also assume that Sam is not thinking further ahead than to rule out Saturday and Friday. He might then expect the killing to be on Thursday night, and therefore be surprised if Sam settles on Wednesday night. Sam has now reached a level of confusion that makes him too tired to speculate any more. He decides to stick with his promise to kill Max, but gives up on the ambition of logically nding a night on which he can be sure Max is going to be surprised. Instead he simply throws a die and lets it decide the night of the killing. The die lands on four, and Sam prepares himself for killing Max on the Wednesday night (four nights before Sunday). Before he falls asleep in the evening, he cannot help wondering whether Max is going to be surprised on the night after all. He also thinks about whether his solution to the problem was the most rational or the most irrational. He falls asleep without nding an answer to any of the questions. The Paradox Sams considerations can be viewed as operations in a system. The code of the system is kill on this night/not kill on this night, and the semantics,
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56 Theory, Culture & Society 23(5)

which discriminate the observations, consist in the rule that only a night when Max cannot logically anticipate his own death may be used as a possible night for the killing. The system is confronted with a complex environment with six possible observations in the form of the six nights (in the following, Saturday night will be referred to as N1, Friday night as N2, Thursday night as N3 . . . Monday night as N6). It has to select one of these potential observations and thereby reduce complexity. The paradox is, however, that as soon as the system starts working on the situation to make the complexity-reducing observation, it also starts producing a complexity in the environment that was not there beforehand. Had Sam never become aware of the logical problems involved in nding a proper time, and had he immediately rolled the die or chosen a night to kill Max in a similar random fashion, the problems would never have emerged. The calculations of the system work as a sort of doubling of the environmental complexity. With the realization of the hidden assumptions, entirely new possibilities of observation emerge that the system now has to deal with and select between. Instead of just selecting between the possibilities N1, N2, N3 . . . N6, the system now also has to select whether Max is to be observed as thinking logically or randomly, i.e. between N1ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml and N1mr, N2mr, N3mr . . . N6mr (ml = Max is logical; mr = Max is random). And when the system becomes aware of the second hidden assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sam, we get yet another doubling of the rst row, so that N1ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml becomes N1mlsl, N2mlsl, N3mlsl . . . N6mlsl and N1mlsr, N2mlsr, N3mlsr . . . N6mlsr (sl = Max assumes that Sam is logical; sr = Max assumes that Sam is random). The production of added complexity can go on eternally, since we can add not only the assumption about Maxs rationality and the assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams rationality, but also an assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams assumptions about Maxs rationality, and an assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams assumptions about Maxs assumptions about Sams rationality, and so on. The only way of stopping this process is by appealing to some form of randomness. But when the system makes this move it actually dissolves itself by admitting its own redundancy. If the observation in the last instance can only be made with recourse to a random decision anyway, why even bother to activate the system in the rst place? All that Sam has gained by his logical speculations is half a day of puzzles that make his head ache. He could have saved himself the trouble by doing from the beginning what he eventually ended up doing anyway, namely rolling the die. His considerations have given him neither more nor less condence that Max will be surprised than if he had left his decision to chance from the beginning. And yet! What if the die had landed on one and not on four? Would it not then have been too obvious to plan the killing on the last day? And would not the logical reections have had some value after all in this case? Furthermore, the system and the logical reections are necessary in another way, since it is only by going through these reections that Sam reaches the
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Bjerg Accelerating Luhmann 57

conclusion that he might as well make a random decision regarding the night for the killing. So the system is necessary for the realization of its own redundancy! Acceleration and Repression of Complexity In system-theoretical terms, the paradox in the example may be described as follows: the system is confronted with an ambivalence that threatens its drop in the degree of complexity in relation to the environment. As mentioned above, the precondition for the existence and reproduction of a system is that the degree of complexity within the system is lower than the degree of complexity in the environment. We may express this in the equation: Sc < Ec (Sc = system complexity; Ec = environment complexity). In the Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma Gedankenexperiment we see two types of operations. One we may call acceleration of reection and the other repression of reection. Both types of operations involve not only an element of complexity reduction but also an element of complexity production. (1) As Sam gradually realizes the impossibility of calculating a specic time for the killing (rst he sees that N1, N2, N3 . . . etc. are all impossible and then he discovers the different layers of hidden assumptions in his reections) the operations of the system are, so to speak, accelerated. Layer upon layer of new reections and self-observations are added. These reections are not just system-internal complexity processing. They simply produce a complexity in the environment, which was not there before. The original environment complexity consisting in six possible dates (N1, N2, N3 . . . N6) has now been doubled with the inclusion of the possibility that Max is either thinking logically or randomly (N1ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml or N1mr, N2mr, N3mr . . . N6mr). And this set of possibilities is then doubled again in relation to the assumption about whether Sam is thinking logically or randomly (N1mlsl, N2mlsl, N3mlsl . . . N6mlsl or N1mlsr, N2mlsr, N3mlsr . . . N6mlsr). As mentioned above, this doubling can go on eternally, making it more and more impossible for the system to reduce the complexity, i.e. it becomes more and more difcult for Sam to make a decision. Escalating into higher orders of self-observation does not dissolve the fundamental paradoxicality, on the contrary, it only seems to accelerate it. The system is in a situation homologous to that of the pyromaniac reman who starts a re that grows to such a size that she is subsequently unable to put it out. It produces a complexity in the environment that it is subsequently unable to process. Thus the balance in the complexity drop between system and environment is being inverted, since the system is responsible for part of the complexity in the environment. The environment complexity consists of an original part, and a part produced by the system. The equation Sc < Ec becomes Sc < Eoc + Espc (Eoc = original complexity in the environment; Espc = system-produced complexity in the environment). But since the system is responsible for Espc, one could ask which side of the equation
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Espc should actually belong to. One could, for instance, argue that it should be placed on the system side. We could then imagine a situation where Sc + Espc = Eoc, or maybe even Sc + Espc > Eoc. In this case, the system would have produced as much or even more complexity than it had reduced, and it would be at best redundant and at worst simply counterproductive. In other words, there would no longer be any complexity drop from system to environment. It is exactly this realization that makes Sam terminate his accelerating reections by appealing to randomness and rolling the die. (2) But appealing to randomness is not unproblematic either. This operation can be said to imply an element of repression. By letting his decision be determined by the die, Sam introduces an element of chance, which stops the operations of the system (i.e. his own reections). However, this is an operation of complexity destruction rather than of complexity reduction. The operation does not follow logically from the semantics of the system, but rather constitutes a break with these semantics just as if you ipped a coin to determine whether you were in love with a person or not. The system imposes a kind of Denkverbot on itself. The fact that Sam cannot completely let go of his reections, but is still speculating before falling asleep, illustrates how the system cannot completely obey its own Denkverbot. The operations of the system are unavoidably still processing on a latent level. We cannot, as Luhmann thinks, just ignore the paradoxicality on a meta-order, in the belief that the operations of the system will continue on a lower order of observation driven by a necessity free of negation. We may see this as showing how complexity does not lend itself to destruction but is only being repressed, and how paradoxicality does not lend itself to being ignored. In this way, the system has absorbed a quantity of unreduced, unprocessed complexity. The complexity in the system (Sc) then consists in two parts described in the equation: Srdc + Srpc < Ec (Srdc = reduced complexity in the system; Srpc = repressed complexity in the system). The problem is now the same as in (1). The complexity drop from system to environment is being threatened since we can imagine a situation where Srdc + Srpc = Ec, or maybe even Srdc + Srpc > Ec. These situations occur if the extent of the repressed complexity takes on such dimensions that the system complexity equals or exceeds the environment complexity. In the example of the two prisoners, such a situation would occur if Sams speculations before bedtime become so pressing that he simply cannot sleep and ends up withdrawing his decision to let the die determine the night. He would then get out of bed to resume his reections on the problem only to realize, again, that he has to throw the die to reach a decision. Since the decision to do the killing on Wednesday night is not a logical consequence of the semantics of the system, but rather constitutes a break with these semantics, the decision creates a form of latent unease within the system. Just as we could imagine that if the coin had told us we were not in love with the woman in question, it would still be difcult if not impossible to stop thinking about her, and asking ourselves whether we were not in love with her anyway.7
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The two equations in (1) and (2): Sc + Espc > Eoc and Srdc + Srpc > Ec might actually be seen as two sides of the same coin, since Espc and Srpc express the same thing. The complexity that the system represses, is the complexity that it has itself produced in the environment, and vice versa. We may express this in an aggregated equation: Srdc + Ac > Eoc. Ac is a quantity of ambivalent complexity that may consist of either Espc or Srpc, or a combination of both in which it is impossible to distinguish between the two. In accordance with Baumans account of ambivalence above, Ac is a quantity that may gure on both sides of the difference between system and environment. In fact, we may say that it oscillates between the two sides and, concurrently with this oscillation, the sign of the equation turns back and forth. There is a constant inversion of the relationship between the degree of complexity in the system and the environment, so that it changes from constituting a drop of complexity (Srdc < Ac + Eoc) to a rise in complexity (Srdc + Ac > Eoc) and back again. The complexity drop occurs when Sam succeeds in accepting the random basis of his decision, ceases his speculation and carries out the killing on Wednesday night as planned. In this case, we may say that the system succeeds in reproducing itself. The complexity increase occurs when Sam cannot fall asleep, starts speculating again and changes his decision about when to do the killing. He is then still unable to fall asleep, starts his speculations again and changes his decision again to another night, tries to fall asleep again but fails, starts speculating again, etc. In this case, we may say that the system stutters and is therefore on the edge of breaking down. Towards a Theory of Complexity Production The argument here is not that we should reject systems theory altogether. But, in order to describe systems in their postmodern condition, we have to be able to conceptualize how the occurrence of ambivalent complexity in a radical way threatens the existence and further reproduction of the system. Even though Luhmann talks about ambivalence and terms his systems theory a radical constructivism (1996: 41), I still do not think his theory is sufciently equipped to make this kind of conceptualization. I will therefore supplement systems theory with Baudrillard and his theory of simulation. In a key text in the postmodernism literature, Lyotard denes modernism (based on an analysis of science) as having an inherent teleological belief in the form of some grand narrative, and the postmodern is hence dened as a breakdown of such beliefs and an incredulity toward metanarratives (1979: xxiiixxiv). What Baudrillard has to offer is a theoretical conceptualization of this radical incredulity in postmodernity. Rather than reading him in opposition to the Luhmannian theory of communication, I will read him as an acceleration of the same. Luhmann and Baudrillard agree on the point that communication cannot be seen as a direct representation of a non-verbal reality. But while Luhmann sees communication as a complexity-reducing contingent constructing observation of reality,
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Baudrillard goes one step further by saying that communication is able to simulate reality, thereby producing a hyperreality.8 To maintain his concept of systems as complexity reducing, whereby the system is constituted by a drop in complexity in relation to the environment, Luhmann has to state an absolute difference between communication and reality. The systems observation consists of a selection from a range of possible observations of the environment. So the environmental complexity in the form of the possible observations must be present before the actualization of the observation. Otherwise it does not make sense to speak of selection, and otherwise we cannot be certain that the environment is more complex than the system (see also Bjerg, 2000). This way, Luhmann is working with the conception of a real reality, that is indeed complex and open to an almost unlimited number of possible observations, but still real in the sense that the potentiality exists before the emergence of the system as a complexity-reducing selection. In Husserlian terms, complexity to Luhmann is the noematic correlate of the intentional act of observation. When he then compares the difference between noesis and noema to the difference between self-reference and other-reference (Fremdreferenz) (Luhmann, 1996: 34) he installs an absolute asymmetry in the act of observation in that complexity is always by denition the other. Complexity is always real. Baudrillard, however, does not speak of selection but of a production, whereby communication creates a simulated hyperreality. This is not to say that reality disappears in favour of a simulated hyperreality. Instead, I read Baudrillard as saying that simulation collapses the difference between real reality and simulated reality. This means we cannot uphold the absolute difference between observed and observation (noema and noesis) and therefore, in a Luhmannian sense, between environment and system either. This is not to say that the act of observation does not have both a noetic and a noematic correlate. However, we can never be sure, that the noematic correlate is always an other-reference. Communication is a simulacra producing a simulation of reality so perfect that no instance in the world (neither God, reason nor anything else) is able to distinguish between a simulated and a real reality. And even if we were able to distinguish, we would not be able to make any conclusive arguments as to why the real reality is more real than the simulated one. In other words, there is a perfect symmetry between the observation and the observed, between the system and its environment:
It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say of an operation of deterring every real process via its operational double, a programmatic, metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes. . . . A hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the real and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models and for the simulated generation of differences. (Baudrillard, 1981: 23)

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Luhmann does indeed agree that we cannot make any conclusive arguments as to why one observation of reality is more real than the other, since the relationship between observation and reality is fundamentally contingent. However, this point can be radicalized and accelerated with Baudrillard. With Baudrillard, we might say that the system can not only select between pre-existing possibilities of observation, but out of itself it is able to produce these very possibilities of observation. This process, whereby the system not only selects but also produces possibilities of observation, can also be described exactly as a process whereby the system is not only reducing but also producing complexity in the environment. A radical recursivity is created in which the complexity drop between system and environment can no longer be taken for granted, and in which the very difference between system and environment is in danger of collapsing. This was precisely the problematic I wanted to demonstrate in the Gedankenexperiment above. Baudrillards concept of simulation is a conceptualization of the release of the ambivalent complexity (Ac). In hyperreality, this ambivalent complexity can gure on both sides of the equation, i.e. on both sides of the difference between system and environment. We cannot conclusively determine whether Ac is a real complexity that the system should take seriously and try to reduce, or whether it can be rejected as a merely simulated complexity that the system does best to ignore or just forget. To further illustrate my point I will put forward a couple of examples involving the paradox of ambivalent complexity. These examples also serve the purpose of indicating implications for empirical analyses and thereby demonstrating that the above discussion has concrete relevance and cannot be dismissed as mere theoretical sophistry. Hypochondria as Ambivalent Complexity Let us take the example of a hypochondriac who goes to the doctor with pains in the chest and a conviction that she has heart disease. From a purely Luhmannian perspective this may be described as a complex situation, where the health system has two possibilities: (1) it can observe the patient as being not sick by referring to the fact that she has no symptoms like high blood pressure or anything else that may justify her belief that she has heart disease; or, (2) it can observe the patient as psychosomatically sick, in that her pains may be imagined but nevertheless real. In this analysis, the system only has to select one of the two options, whereby complexity is reduced and the system can continue operating undisturbed. The paradox is solved by way of selection. However, introducing Baudrillards perspective adds yet another dimension to the analysis. The system is still indeed confronted with the same choice, but both options can imply fatal consequences for the continuing existence of the system. If the system selects option (1), it has to ignore the reality that the imagined false pains may have for the patient. This leaves an unanswered question as to how a simulated pain differs from a real pain, and how the
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one can be said to be less real and less relevant to the health system than the other. The system is aware of this problem, but to be able to continue it has to not take it into consideration. The selection implies the abovementioned repression, where the system acknowledges that there is complexity in the environment which it cannot process and reduce, and therefore has to absorb in unreduced form. This constitutes a problem in relation to the maintenance of the difference in complexity between system and environment, and henceforth also in relation to the very maintenance of the system. The greater the share of unreduced complexity compared to reduced complexity in the system, the smaller the drop in complexity from environment to system. In other words, a system with many repressions is approximating the degree of complexity that is to be found in the environment (Srdc + Srpc = Ec). Practically, this means that the doctor can do nothing for the hypochondriac other than sending her away with the diagnosis that her pains are not real according to the health systems denition of real. Unless this diagnosis makes the hypochondriacs pains disappear by themselves, the health system must give up reducing the complexity that the hypochondriac and her pains constitute. As long as the proportion of hypochondriacs in the total number of patients in the health system is fairly modest, the system will still be able to justify itself as complexity reducing by referring to its successful and well functioning observation and treatment of real diseases. But with an increase in the incidence of hypochondria and other psychosomatic diseases, which the system must give up treating, just sending the patients away, this basis of justication will disappear. These patients will constitute an increasing amount of complexity, which the system has to give up reducing beforehand, whereby the systems existence and relevance as an observation system is threatened by a kind of deation. Instead the system might select option (2) and recognize the reality of the simulated pains for the patient. Hypochondria is then recognized as a real disease relevant to the health system. However, another problem then arises. The health system now has to recognize that hypochondria as a disease is not present as a possibility prior to the existence of the health system. Hypochondria is a condition where the patient falsely observes herself as being sick. This observation is only possible when the health system has made its code of observation available to the patients selfobservation. To be a hypochondriac you have to have certain knowledge about different diseases, otherwise you are not able to imagine having them. The health system has not only made it possible that we may observe ourselves as sick or healthy, but it has also made possible a form of observation, which in itself is able to create real disease (i.e. a simulated disease which is impossible to distinguish from a real disease). The hypochondriac is not only sick because the system observes her otherwise undecided condition as sick. She is simply sick because the systems very facilitation of the observation produces her condition of sickness. If the system selects this option (2) and observes the hypochondriac as really sick, it has to
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acknowledge at the same time that the complexity that she constitutes is produced by the system itself. With the production of more and more hypochondriacs, the number of uncured hypochondriacs will approximate the number of patients successfully cured of traditional diseases. In this case, the amount of complexity produced by the system will again approximate the amount of complexity reduced, and the degree of complexity in the system will approximate and possibly exceed that in the environment (Sc + Espc > Eoc). We then have a health system that is unable to justify its own functionality and existence since it produces more disease than it cures. Slashing as Ambivalent Complexity This example from the art system relates an episode that actually happened in the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam. In 1986, an unknown artist named Gerard Jan van Bladeren made a slashing, with a knife, of one of the masterpieces of modernistic art, Barnett Newmans Whos Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III (1967), while it was on show at the Stedelijk. Van Bladeren was arrested and Newmans picture underwent a costly restoration to be brought back to its original state. In 1997, van Bladeren returned to the Stedelijk, but since Whos Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III was not on display at the given time, he attacked another Newman painting, Cathedra (1951), and cut it seven times. Again, from a purely Luhmannian perspective, the art system is faced with a choice between two selections. On the one hand, it may dismiss van Bladerens acts as meaningless vandalism perpetrated by a sick person, i.e. as non-art. This was in fact the reaction from the museum and many others within the conventional art world. On the other hand, instead of seeing the act as destructive vandalism, the system may also choose to see it as a productive work of art constituting an artistic comment on and a break with abstract art. This was exactly van Bladerens own account of his actions. The slashing in itself was an artistic act. The analysis may, however, be expanded with attention to the complexity-producing aspects of either of the two selections. The second interpretation of van Bladerens acts as art is obviously problematic, insofar as it breaks with conventional notions about the integrity and conclusiveness of the artwork, and taken to its extreme it could lead to true anarchy around museums and galleries. But the rst interpretation is not unproblematic either. If the museum management and others reject van Bladerens acts as meaningless vandalism by referring to a notion of the integrity of the original artwork, how can they justify restoring the painting? According to the logic of the argument, the restoration is vandalism against van Bladerens work in the form of the rst slashing. Van Bladeren defends his second slashing (which was actually intended for Whos Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III) precisely by saying that he wanted to restore the damage he believed the conservators had done to his work (the rst slashing). In other words, the slashing constitutes an ambivalent complexity that confronts the art system with a paradox. It can either repress the
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complexity by dismissing the slashing as meaningless vandalism (however, such dismissal would, taken to its full logical consequence, also imply a dismissal of the restoration work of bringing the painting back to its original state. Once the slashing had taken place, the art system would have to accept the integrity of the new artwork in the form of the slashed painting), or the art system can accelerate the complexity by seeing slashing as a legitimate artistic expression. However, this would also imply acceptance of the anarchic situation that would follow from giving up conventional notions of the integrity and inviolability of artwork. The Paradox of Ambivalent Complexity as Catastrophe The purpose of introducing the notion of complexity production is to sharpen the systems theoretical sensitivity to the way in which a certain form of ambivalence throws the system into a state of paradoxicality, a situation of undecidability.9 What may be observed in systems in their postmodern condition is almost a momentary doubling of the system. The system simulates itself. We cannot, however, as systems theory traditionally does, speak of a differentiation of the system into subsystems, since the two sides of the doubling are connected in such a way that they both imply and exclude each other. The situation is comparable to the way light, in quantum mechanics, may be both waves and particles at the same time, while the two states also exclude each other. It is this doubling that makes the system as complex as, and perhaps even more complex than, the environment. Using Baudrillards distinction between crisis and catastrophe, we may say that Luhmann seems to conceive of complexity as putting the system in a state of crisis:
Crisis always brought with it its share of tensions and contradictions; it is the natural movement of our history. But we are no longer in crisis; we are in a catastrophic process not in the sense of a material apocalypse, but in the sense of an overturning of all rules. Catastrophe is the irruption of something which no longer functions according to the rules, or functions by rules we do not know, and perhaps never will. Nothing is simply contradictory or irrational in this state; everything is paradoxical. (Baudrillard, 1999: 18)

Complexity in the form of crisis makes communication improbable, but the functional solutions that we do nd to the crisis by way of selection, develop and move the system forward. [B]eing forced to select means contingency; and contingency means risk (Luhmann, 1984: 25). However, this is only the risk that the system may not select the best solution, not the risk that it will not select at all. Crisis is a problem to the system, but crisis never puts the very existence of the system in danger. In crisis, the system always remains possible. Ambivalent complexity, however, is a catastrophe, since it opens the possibility of the impossibility of the system. Continuation may only be possible as a radical break with the rules of the system (e.g. giving up the ambition of nding a night to kill Max which cannot be foreseen by choosing

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one randomly; ignoring a pain which is real to the hypochondriac patient; or violating the integrity of the art work by restoring it after the slashing). In other words, continuation may only be possible as discontinuity, and therefore exactly impossible. Catastrophe collapses the system by forcing it into selections that produce rather than reduce complexity, thereby tipping the balance of complexity between system and environment, blurring the very distinction that precisely constitutes the existence of the system. Whether an operation leads to a solution to the problem posed by complexity, or whether it instead leads to a doubling of the problem, can never be foreseen, either by us as observers of the systems, or by the systems themselves: the doctor may reject the hypochondriac, telling her that her disease is nothing but imagined, and this might be exactly what she needs to hear to rid herself of this very imagining. Or the doctor may recognize the pains of the hypochondriac and start listening to all of her problems, in the hope of discovering the true psychological cause of her chest pains, only to nd she comes back to his clinic the following week with pains not only in her chest, but now also in her legs. In other words, the system is Anschlussunfhig, since it cannot connect to the following operation by way of a meaningful continuation of the system. Everywhere in the universe, discontinuity alone is probable. . . . Innitesimal as is the passage from one form to another, it is always a jump, a catastrophe (Baudrillard, 1999: 9). Discontinuity opens a void in the autopoiesis of the system, and in the absence of a bridge of meaning the void may only be overcome by a jump. Luhmann may be content to accept the void as a void of randomness and the jump as a jump of contingency. But perhaps the void does contain something, though something that is not a system and therefore not visible in the optics of systems theory. Schopenhauer criticized Kantian epistemology for being too focused on the way in which the world appears as representation, thereby lacking sensitivity to the way in which the world manifests itself as something which is not representation, and therefore also cannot be represented (Schopenhauer, 1818: 17). This critique paved the way for Schopenhauers vitalism in the form of his metaphysics of the will. Perhaps a similar critique of Luhmanns programme of observations of observations would be in place here (Bjerg, 2005). The paradox of ambivalent complexity reveals not only the Anschlussunfhigkeit of the system but also the insufciency of the systems theoretical account of social processes, limited to the observation of observation. Thus the understanding of the reproduction of postmodern society and of the move from one operation to the next in situations of catastrophe, may call for a heightened sensitivity to something outside the realm of allegedly self-sufcient system observations. A vitalism not in the positive form of a Schopenhauerian metaphysics of the will, but in the negative form of a resistance or antithesis to the recurrent possibility of reduction, and to the temptation of premature satisfaction (Greco, 2005: 18) may be required. Baudrillard suggests:
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The act of thinking is an act of seduction which aims to deect the world from its being and its meaning at the risk of being itself seduced and led astray. This is how theory proceeds with the systems it analyses. It does not seek to criticize them, or set limits for them in the real. It maximizes them, exacerbates them, by following their every movement; it seduces them by pushing them to the limit. The object of theory is to arrive at an account of the system which follows out its internal logic to its end, without adding anything, yet which, at the same time, totally inverts that system, revealing its hidden nonmeaning, the Nothing which haunts it, that absence at the heart of the system, that shadow running alongside it. (Baudrillard, 1999: 149) Notes 1. Citations from works by Luhmann not available in English are my own translations. 2. I thank Jakob Demant and Hans Henrik Bruun for helpful comments and suggestions. 3. The English word is connectivity. However, this does not quite catch the sense of it being an ability. I will therefore retain the original Anschlussfhigkeit. 4. It should be noted that the conception of complexity production that I want to propose is not covered by Luhmanns description of the way in which the complexity-reducing operations of one system constitute a production of complexity for another observing system. As will be demonstrated, my concept of complexity production is more radical in the sense that it fundamentally threatens to confuse the difference between system and environment. 5. Bauman continues: The ideal that the naming/classifying function strives to achieve is a sort of commodious ling cabinet that contains all the les that contain all the items that the world contains but connes each le and each item within a separate place of its own (with remaining doubts solved by a cross-reference index). (1991: 2) Isnt this archive exactly Luhmanns famous Settelksten!? 6. As hinted in the title, this dilemma has a certain afnity to the very famous games theory Prisoners Dilemma. Likewise, the set-up of the present dilemma may also appear to be a case of double contingency, such as we nd it in systems theory. However, there is a noteworthy difference between the Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma and the conventional Prisoners Dilemma and the system theoretical conception of double contingency. In the conventional Prisoners Dilemma we have a situation (two prisoners each faced with the choice between confession and nonconfession) of uncertainty and complexity. However, using logical and systematic operations we can calculate the various outcomes of different strategies (generally presented in the 2 by 2 matrix) from which the two prisoners can then choose rationally. Our calculations create an ordered situation, if not one of perfect certainty or unambiguity then at least one of less uncertainty and less complexity. The systematic operations in the form of our rational calculations reduce complexity. The same goes for the concept of double contingency when Luhmann uses it to show how contingency and uncertainty between alter and ego work as a catalyst for the emergence of systems. Double contingency is dened as a problem of complexity, and
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system creation as a complexity-reducing solution (Luhmann, 1984: 10336). The point of the Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma is to pose a situation where the relationship between the complexity and the system is reversible. The dilemma demonstrates that we cannot take for granted that the system in form of our rational reections and calculations will always reduce the immediate complexity of the situation. On the contrary, the system may even produce more complexity, uncertainty and eventually ambivalence, than it reduces, whereby it becomes part of the problem of complexity rather than part of its solution. 7. In his essay, The Dice Man (1999: 5866), Baudrillard makes a deconstructive reading of Luke Rheinhardts novel, The Dice Man, in which he shows that leaving our entire fate to chance in the form of a die can never free us from the freedom of our own will. Even if the die can show us what to do, we will still constantly be confronted with the choice between following the die and not following it. The responsibility of this decision, and the doubt that follows from it, we can never escape. 8. The difference between Luhmann and Baudrillard here is not a question of realism versus constructivism but rather a question of degrees of radicalness in their respective forms of constructivism. We might say that if Luhmann is a constructivist Baudrillard is a productionist. 9. The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged . . . to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules. (Derrida, 1992: 24) And: Undecidability should be literally taken as that condition from which no course of action necessarily follows (Laclau, 1996: 78). References Baudrillard, Jean (1981) Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Baudrillard, Jean (1999) Impossible Exchange. London: Verso. Bauman, Zygmunt (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bjerg, Ole (2000) Hvordan er systemteorien mulig? [How is Systems Theory Possible?], Dansk Sociologi 11(2): 6580. Bjerg, Ole (2005) Die Welt als Wille und System, oder: Eine Schopenhauerische Kritik der Systemtheorie Luhmanns [The World as Will and System: A Schopenhaurian Critique of Luhmanns Systems Theory], Zeitschrift fr Soziologie 3: 22335. Derrida, Jacques (1992) Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, pp. 367 in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. New York: Routledge. Durkheim, mile (1893) Om den sociale arbejdsdeling [The Division of Labour in Society]. Kbenhavn: Hans Reitzels Forlag. Greco, Monica (2005) On the Vitality of Vitalism, Theory, Culture & Society 22(1): 1527. Habermas, Jrgen (1971) Systemtheorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Niklas Luhmann [Systems Theory of Society or Social
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Technology? A Debate with Niklas Luhmann], pp. 142290 in Jrgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie Was leistet die Systemforschung? [Theory of Society or Social Technology: What Can Systems Theory Accomplish?]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Laclau, Ernesto (1996) Emancipation(s). London: Verso. Luhmann, Niklas (1981) Wie ist soziale Ordnung mglich? [How is Social Order Possible?], pp. 195285 in Gesellschaftstruktur und Semantik 2. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (1982) Liebe als Passion [Love as Passion]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas (1984) Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1985) Die Autopoiesis des Bewutseins [The Autopoiesis of Conscience], Soziale Welt 4: 40246. Luhmann, Niklas (1986) Ecological Communication. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1990a) Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft [The Science of Society]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas (1990b) Haltlose Komplexitt [Unsteady Complexity], pp. 5976 in Soziologische Aufklrung 5 [Sociological Enlightenment]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (1990c) Gleichzeitigkeit und Synchronisation [Simultaneity and Synchronization], pp. 95130 in Soziologische Aufklrung 5 [Sociological Enlightenment]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (1993) Die Paradoxie der Form [The Paradox of Form], pp. 197212 in Dirk Baecker (ed.) Kalkl der Form [Problems of Form]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas (1996) Die neuzeitlichen Wissenschaften und die Phnomenologie [Contemporary Science and Phenomenology]. Wien: Picus Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (1997) Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 12 [The Society of Society]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Lyotard, Jean-Franois (1979) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1818) Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 12 [The World as Will and Representation]. Kln: Knemann. Simmel, Georg (1908) Exkurs ber das Problem: Wie ist Gesellschaft mglich? [Excursus on the Problem: How is Society Possible?], pp. 4262 in Gesamtausgabe 11. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Ole Bjerg is postdoc at the Institute of Public Health, University of Copenhagen. He is the author of the dissertation Den mystiske etik Om at vre til i det hyperdifferentierede samfund (Mystical Ethics On Being in a Hyperdifferentiated Society) (2005) and several articles on systems theory. He is now working on a book, Pathology and Postcapitalism.

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