The Marketing Review 2004, 4, 211-224 www.themarketingreview.

com
SSN 1472-1384/2004/2/00211 + 13 8.00/0 Westburn Publishers Ltd.

Scott Rankin

Monash University

A Mini Case Study of Product Strategy: The Cypher
Stent From Cordis (A Johnson & Johnson Company)
Cordis Australia is an American company that is a division of Johnson &
Johnson. Cordis manufactures and markets medical devices designed to
treat cardiovascular disease.
The purpose of the mini case study is to describe and evaluate Cordis'
introduction of a new and innovative coronary artery stent called Cypher.
Coronary artery stents are tiny stainless steel 'mesh like' tubes (similar to a
spring from a pen) that are used to open up arteries of the heart after they
have become blocked. This procedure is called angioplasty. Such blockages
of coronary arteries can lead to chest pain and heart attacks.
Cordis were the first firm to develop a stent with a drug coating that
offered superior benefit to patients when compared to plain stainless steel
stents. This product and the market are described as Drug Eluting Stents
(DES).
This case study provides background on Cordis, its competitors and the
cardiovascular market, in particular the market for stents and DES. A
description and analysis will also be undertaken to see how Cordis launched
the Cypher stent and how customers received it. Further more a brief review
of the second competitor to bring a DES to market will be discussed.
Finally this case study will analyse the outcome and what marketing
strategies Cordis did do well or not so well, and any lessons to be
considered.


Introduction: The Firm

Cordis
Cordis a division of Johnson and Johnson manufactures and sells medical
devices used for the treatment of cardiovascular disease. They have been
regarded as an innovator in the industry and have launched highly regarded
products over the past decade. They have manufacturing facilities around
the world including in the U.S. and taly. They employ approximately 10,000
people and sell their products in most countries around the world.
They participate in the biggest individual product market, which is
coronary stents. This market is worth approximately U.S.$2.3 billion. n
2001 the Cordis market share of the coronary stent market would have been
approximately 15 percent, with the market leader Guidant commanding a 45
percent market share.


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212
The Industry

The Business
Cordis participates in the business of supplying medical devices for the
treatment of coronary artery disease and peripheral vascular disease.
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is a major health and economic burden
throughout the world, especially in developed counties. CVD was the leading
cause of death in Australia in 2000, ahead of all cancers and accounting for
49,741 deaths, or 39% of all deaths. (Source: Australian nstitute of Health
and Welfare 2002). CVD refers to coronary heart disease, stroke and blood
vessel disease. The underlying cause of most CVD is a gradual 'clogging' of
the arteries with atherosclerosis (or plaque).
Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) accounts for 49% of all cardiovascular
diseases, and is the single largest cause of death in Australia. (Source:
Australian nstitute of Health and Welfare 2002). t is estimated that coronary
heart disease will become the single leading public health problem for the
world by 2020. (Source: Australian Heart Foundation). n the United States
(U.S.) more than 5 million people are known to have CAD, which is the
leading cause of death for both men and women. Each year an estimated
1.1 million Americans will have a new or recurrent coronary attack (heart
attack) and more than 40 percent of the people experiencing these attacks
will die from them. (Source: www.cypher.com)
CAD restricts blood flow through the arteries, due to an increased build-up
of plaque. When this happens, the heart muscle may not receive enough
oxygen, and chest pain (angina) may result.

f left untreated, CAD may result in a myocardial infarction (M), commonly
known as a heart attack. A myocardial infarction creates irreversible damage
to heart tissue/muscle by cutting-off oxygen to the heart muscle from the
coronary arteries.
CAD can be treated very effectively through angioplasty, a procedure that
uses balloons and stents to open the blocked/partially blocked arteries.
Balloons and stents are expanded inside the artery to re-establish blood flow.
Unfortunately in about 20% of patients undergoing angioplasty, restenosis (a
type of scarring) occurs which re-blocks the treated artery. This means that
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213
the patient needs a repeated procedure, but options start to become limited
as there is already a stent in place and to insert another stent increases the
risk of a third occlusion occurring.
The 2003 market for stents in Australia was approximately 30,000 stents
(Meridith 2003). The average price for stents is $900 a stent, thus the market
is worth approximately $27 million. The U.S. market for stents is worth
U.S.$2.6 billion. The worldwide markets in stents have seen double-digit
growth in sales for the past decade.

The Competitors

Boston Scientific
Boston Scientific Corporation is a developer, manufacturer and marketer
of less-invasive medical devices. The company's products are used in
interventional medical specialties, including interventional cardiology,
peripheral intervention, neurovascular, electrophysiology, vascular surgery,
gastroenterology, gynaecology, oncology and urology
(http.bostonscientific.com).
Boston Scientific was the second major competitor to launch a DES into
the Australian market. Their Taxus stent, which is coated with the drug
Paclitaxel, has similar clinical results to Cypher, as shown in the clinical trials
Taxus 1, 2 & 4. Many regard the Boston stent, the Express 2, as being a
superior stent in terms of deliverability and conformability, both regarded as
important features of any stent by nterventional Cardiologists.

Guidant
Guidant was the world leader in terms of market share; the design and the
development of coronary artery stents until DES were launched. Guidant
was incorporated in 1994, and since has grown to $3.2 billion in revenue and
more than 11,000 employees. Guidant's two main divisions are Vascular
ntervention, which manufactures and sells products to treat CAD, and the
Cardiac Rhythm Management Division, which manufactures and sells
implantable pacemakers and defibrillators.
t was initially expected that Guidant would be the first manufacturer with a
DES product for the market, however clinical trials did not go to plan and they
are now expected to be the third or fourth manufacturer with a DES.

Other Competitors
Other manufacturers of stents include Medtronic (U.S. firm), Terumo
(Japanese firm) and Biotronik (German firm). Overall there are
approximately 20 different manufacturers of stents, however the bulk of the
business is shared between the main four firms of Boston Scientific, Cordis,
Guidant and Medtronic.



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214
The Life Cycle
The medical devices industry in general is characterised as being an
industry in maturation. The distinctive traits of maturing markets can easily
be identified in the medical devices arena:

Decreasing product differentiation
ndustry consolidation
Slower Growth
ntensifying competition.
(Smith B. Page 153)

The cardiovascular device segment is relatively young, beginning in the late
70's and consisting of a number of key advancements between then and
now. The industry is driven by innovation. The coronary angioplasty
products seem to be in a growth phase driven by innovative products.

The Basis of Competition in the Stent Market
Product innovation seems to drive business, with advancement in stent
design almost expected annually. Guidant Corporation has managed to hold
dominant market share in stents of around 45% globally since 1997 by
launching six different innovative stents between 1997 and 2002.
Another important aspect of driving business is relationships with
customers. Sales representatives spend a lot of time with the Cardiologists
in the Catheter Laboratory educating, selling, providing service and building
relationships. Strong relationships, with good products and service, win
business.
An innovative and differentiated stent is essential for successful sales, so
rather then relying solely upon their Research & Development departments,
larger firms are forced to make acquisitions of smaller start up firms in order
to speed the process of new product development.

The TechnoIogy

Since 1977 Cardiologists have been conducting balloon angioplasty on
patients suffering from coronary artery disease. The introduction of stenting
in the late 80's and early 90's saw re-intervention rates drop from 30-40% for
balloon angioplasty to 15-20% with stents. The problem of restenosis
remained. Restenosis is where a re-narrowing or blockage of an artery
occurs at the same site where it was previously opened with a stent or
balloon. Thus trying to lower or prevent 'restenosis' has been the focus of
many clinicians and firms for many years.
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215


n-stent restenosis is an inflammatory action to the stent (essentially a foreign
body) being implanted into the artery wall. The stent expansion can cause
injury to the vessel wall and the body's response is a proliferation of smooth
muscle cells and matrix synthesis (Waksman 2003). Typically in-stent
restenosis occurs within 4-6 months of the initial angioplasty procedure,
meaning the patient is left with the same life threatening narrowing or
blockage of their coronary artery.



Autopsy of a coronary artery showing 'in-stent restenosis':

Until recently the only options for the treatment of restenosis within a stent
were for another stent to be implanted, Coronary Artery By-pass Surgery,
Brachytherapy or management of the patient simply with medication.
A second stent implanted raises the likelihood of in-stent restenosis
occurring a second time, and the idea of creating a mesh of metal in a
coronary artery is something no cardiologist wants to do. By-pass surgery is
major surgery involving general anaesthesia and use of a heart-lung
machine. Length of stay in hospital is usually 6 days and the recovery time is
about 6-8 weeks. Such surgery comes with its own risks and is something
that should be avoided if there is a minimally invasive option. Brachytherapy
is where radiation is delivered internally to the artery via a catheter. The
radiation to the in-stent restenosis has shown to be a relatively effective way
of reopening the blocked vessel.


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216
The Innovation

Whether it's restenosis or in-stent restenosis, the end result is a narrowing in
the artery that may eventually block the flow of blood to a portion of the heart.
The most promising recent technology for the prevention of restenosis has
been the Drug Eluting Stent (DES). A DES is a stent that has a drug coating
placed on it with a process that allows the drug to be released over time.
The drug is designed to prevent the inflammatory reaction of the vessel wall
to the stent from occurring.

The Innovation:

Cordis were the first company to
successfully design a DES. The
'Cypher' Sirolimus eluting
coronary stent consists of a
stainless steel stent with a thin
coating of the drug Sirolimus on
its surfaces. The drug is located
within a polymer coating. The
action of the drug Sirolimus is
intended to limit the overgrowth of
normal tissue or inflammation.

The role of a DES (Cypher) is simply to lower the likelihood of in-stent
restenosis occurring. And although a number of competitors were also
working on a DES, Cordis were the first ones to launch a highly regarded
product.
n terms of Rogers characteristics of new products (Baker and Hart 1999),
the Cypher stent measures favourably (as discussed below):

Relative Advantage (the economic benefit of a new product) The
Cypher Stent showed a significant advantage over normal stainless
steel stents. n clinical trials the Cypher stent showed a drop in the
restenosis rate from around 30% for the control arm (stainless steel
stent) to 9% for the Cypher stent. Such a lowering in the restenosis
rate results in better outcomes for patients with less reinterventions,
larger diameter arteries and lower hospital costs (in terms of
readmissions).

Compatibility (of a new product with the existing method) The
Cypher stent must be judged as highly compatible as it is designed to
be used in exactly the same way as existing stents mounted on to a
catheter and delivered to the coronary artery via a guidewire. The
guidewire and guiding catheter is placed into the femoral artery (the
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217
groin) and manoeuvred around the aorta and is placed into the
entrance of the coronary artery.

Complexity (the degree of difficulty associated with full understanding
of the product) the complexity must be regarded as low, as the only
feature new about this product was the pharmacological action of the
Sirolimus coating and the polymer coating. The customers being
cardiologists already have an excellent understanding of the
pharmacological action of Sirolimus as an anti-proliferative agent that
acts on the smooth muscles cells of the vessel wall, inhibiting cell
proliferation (Waksman 1999, p.228). The polymer coating was
simply there to ensure a prolonged release of the drug.

Divisibility (the extent to which it is possible to try an innovation before
coming to a final adoption/rejection decision) The decision of the
cardiologist as to whether they should use the Cypher stent or a
standard stent is a decision that can be made on sound clinical
knowledge based on three clinical trials of the Cypher stent. The
largest trial called Sirius, had over 1000 patients and was significantly
powered to show excellent clinical outcomes for the patients who
received the Cypher stent as opposed to those who received a
traditional stent.

Communicability (the degree of difficulty associated with
communicating the benefits of an innovation to prospective users)
The ability to communicate the benefits of the Cypher stent to
customers was easy, as all doctors were aware of its benefits before
the product was actually released. Many customers became
'disciples' for the product convincing their colleagues of its superb
clinical performance.

Analysts predict that the worldwide DES market in 2003 was worth
approximately 2.5 billion U.S. dollars, and that by 2008 the market will have
grown to 6.3 billion U.S. dollars. t is predicted that the DES market will grow
at 24% compounded annually over the next 4-5 years. This growth will come
from new entrants into the market, increased reimbursement by third-party
payers and high adoption rates in the U.S. (Rosenberg 2004).

The Marketing Strategy

The launch of the Cordis Cypher Stent was highly anticipated. Cardiologists
had been hearing of the astonishing clinical results of the Cypher stent from a
series of clinical trials. These results were being presented at all major
cardiology meetings around the world. Clinical trials such as 'First in Man',
'Ravel' and 'Sirius', involved hospitals all around the world, and the principal
investigators were well respected and highly regarded cardiology
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218
interventionalists. Dr. Antonio Colombo from taly was the principal
investigator of the Ravel trial and Dr. Martin Leon for the Sirius trial. Both
doctors were heavily involved in presenting a series of results from these
trials as they became available. Such trials run for at least a year and
typically involve 30 day, 6 and 9 month results and usually conclude with 12
month results.

The key elements of Cordis' launch of the Cypher stent involved:

The actual product and its performance
The pricing of the Cypher stent
The distribution & placement of the Cypher stent
The promotion

Product - The Cypher Stent and its Performance
The Cypher stent as already discussed in detail offered significant clinical
advantages above non-DES stents.
The only problem was that the range of Cypher stents was very limited
when first launched. Stents normally come in a range of diameters and
lengths so that doctors can choose the most appropriate stent for a particular
coronary artery and size of lesion (plaque). Diameters typically range from
2.5-4.0 mm and lengths of the stents usually range from 8mm to 30mm. The
Cypher stent was limited to diameters of 3.0 and 3.5 with a limited range in
lengths for about 6 months.

Price - The Pricing of the Cypher Stent
A non-DES in Australia before the launch of Cypher would cost
approximately $1600 for a private patient and $900 for a Public patient. All
companies would offer a two-tiered pricing structure for public and private
patients.
Cordis launched Cypher at a premium price of $4850. They did not offer a
discounted price for public patients. t would seem an initial high price could
be appropriate for Cypher because it clearly offered clinical advantages, they
were first to the market and competitive products seemed at the very best at
least 9 months away (plus competition would be limited to only Boston
Scientific for at least 1-2 years).
Launching at a premium price would allow for a greater recovery of
development costs. Cordis maintained the premium priced strategy for
Cypher around the world, with Cypher typically being sold for more than
double a non-DES.

Placement and Distribution of the Cypher Stent
Before Cypher arrived in Australia all firms would 'consign' stents to
hospital catheter laboratories. This would mean that the stock belonged to
the supplier until it was actually used. This saved hospitals money, as they
did not need to pay for thousands of dollars worth of stents and only paid for
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219
what they used. This allowed hospitals to have a compete range of stents on
consignment from three or four manufacturers giving doctors greater
choices of treatment. t also meant that doctors could always treat patients
immediately because stock was always available.
Cordis decided that Cypher would not be consigned and that it had to be
purchased upfront by hospitals if they wanted to use the stent. This meant
that a typical hospital that required a range of 25 stents would need to spend
$121,250 to purchase Cypher upfront.
The other option for hospitals, would be to complete an angiogram on a
patient and estimate the size of the stent required, then order the Cypher
stent and rebook the patient in for an angioplasty the following day when the
correct sized Cypher stent had been delivered.

The Promotion of the Cypher Stent
Cordis adopted a heavy promotion of the Cypher stent through advertising
at cardiology conferences and in cardiology journals. They created a website
that detailed the features of Cypher in terms that patients could clearly
understand, and thus promotion for the first real time included the patients as
customers. Typically it is the cardiologist who decides which stent to treat a
patient with and the customer would have no involvement with the decision.
The selling of stents is predominantly done through personal selling by the
Clinical Sales Specialists that visit the catheter laboratories. As such it was
the sales specialists from Cordis that had to promote and sell Cypher and
answer any concerns of cardiologists.
The Cypher stent also made mainstream news services and business
news services as it was an innovative product that could save patients lives,
and have a significant impact on Cordis revenue and Johnson & Johnson
share price.

The ResuIt

n June 2002 the Cypher Stent was approved for sale in Europe and
Australia. t was not approved by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for
sale in the US until April 2003. n Australia, Cordis' market share of the
private hospital stent market grew from 5-10% (before Cypher), to 85%
market share by December 2002 (Meridith 2003). n European markets the
uptake of the Cypher stent was similar. n countries and individual hospitals
where private health insurance or public health services covered the cost of
the Cypher stent, Cordis quickly gained up to 90% market share.
n the U.S., Cordis' stent sales rose by 600% to US$675 million in the
second quarter of 2002, sales in the first quarter were only $52 million.
(Rosenberg 2003).
Cordis had released a truly innovative product and they dominated the
'private patient' stent market. Many patients were aware of the product
Cypher and would ask their doctor to be treated with a Cypher stent this
was the first time that patients actually new in advance the brand name of a
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220
coronary stent and it was placing pressure on doctors to use Cypher for all
cases (even if the expense could not be economically justified in all cases).

The Issues in Regard to the Marketing of the Cypher Stent
Customers (doctors and hospitals) were unhappy with a number of issues
in regards to the marketing of the Cypher stent. Firstly they were unhappy
with the product range, with very limited sizes available for the first 6 months
and often experienced delays in receiving ordered stock. The cardiologists
also felt that the premium price of $4850 could not be justified and that
without options they had no other choice but to use Cypher. Many also
disliked Cordis for not offering a two-tiered pricing structure that would make
Cypher more affordable for public patients in public hospitals who could really
benefit from being treated with Cypher.
The Cordis decision not to consign Cypher was also received poorly as it
limited the service hospitals and cardiologists could offer. They either had to
rebook a patient in for another procedure in 24-48 hours or the hospital had
to outlay thousands of dollars to have a reasonable range of Cypher stents
on hand to allow for immediate angioplasty of patients.
Many customers were grumbling, they were wishing for competitors to
bring DES to the market so that service would improve and prices would
become more competitive. Their perceptions of Cordis were that they were
behaving arrogantly, with inflexibility and lack of concern for customers.

The Second PIayer

n June 2003 Boston Scientific launched a DES called Taxus. Boston was
the second player into the markets of Europe and Australia. The FDA
approval for the sale of the Taxus stent in the U.S. only occurred on
Thursday, 4
th
of March 2004.
t is expected that the 3
rd
and 4
th
entrants into the DES market will be
Guidant and Medtronic. Both have DES products in trials at the moment, and
all going well both plan to launch products into the European and Australian
markets in the first quarter of 2005.

Boston Scientific - The Taxus Stent
The Taxus stent is similar to the Cordis Cypher stent in that it is a DES,
however the actual stent platform called Express 2 is regarded as a better
stent being more 'deliverable' and 'conformable' - both features that are
highly regarded by cardiologists. The actual drug on Taxus is called
Paclitaxel, which is an anti-cancer drug that acts on the vessel wall to lower
the rates of restenosis. The clinical results from trials of the Taxus stent
delivered similar results to the Cordis Cypher stent.

The Marketing Strategy
Boston's aim seemed to be to address all the grumblings of customers
about Cordis' marketing of their Cypher stent.
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221
They offered a two-tiered pricing structure and lowered prices. Taxus was
priced at $3,600 for private patients and $2,400 for public patients. They
offered more flexible pricing by 'bundling' with other products such as
coronary balloons. They consigned Taxus to hospitals meaning customers
did not need to purchase them upfront. They offered an increased range in
diameters and lengths of stents. Boston advertised and promoted Taxus in a
similar way to Cordis' promotion of Cypher.

The Result
Boston Scientific swept the private market by winning virtually overnight
70-85% of the business. Cordis was left with 15-30% of the private market
share, where they previously had 90-95% market dominance. Boston
Scientific expanded the market into the public sector, as hospitals now were
willing to pay $2,400 for a Taxus stent for a public patient who could really
benefit from a DES. Boston soon won 30-35% of the public sector market as
well (most State Health Authorities limited DES usage to 30-35% and to
Taxus stents only).
This result in Australia has been mirrored around the world, and in the
U.S. the biggest market, where Taxus has just been launched; analysts are
predicting the same impact. Boston expects to exit 2004 with a DES market
share in the U.S. of 70% (they expect to grab the market share in 70-100
days). (Rosenberg 2004).

Commentary

Cordis the innovator and first mover has failed to capitalise on their
opportunity. They have a great stent with clinical results to match their
competitors' but they have nowhere near the 50% (or higher) market share
you may expect for a firm with the first mover advantage.
What makes things even worse is that this is not the first time that Cordis
had been in such a situation.

Dj vu for Cordis
n 1994 Cordis introduced the 'Palmaz-Schatz' Balloon expandable stent
for coronary arteries. t was hailed by Cardiologists as a breakthrough for
CAD. n just 37 months after introducing this new stent Cordis had $1 billion
worth of stents and had captured more than 90 percent of the profitable stent
market. n early 1997 Guidant Corporation introduced a competing product
the MultiLink stent. n just 45 days Guidant captured 70 percent of the
market. Other competitors also moved in and by the end of 1997 Cordis'
share had fallen to just 8 percent.
Phillip Kotler (2003) offers his insight into what went wrong for Cordis.

"For one thing Cordis were so focused on getting the product to market
that it devoted little time or resources to the next generation of the stent.
The other stumbling block was its refusal to budge on price or offer
discounts. At U.S.$1,595, the device was an expensive buy at a time
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222
when managed care was putting tremendous pressure on health care
providers to keep costs down. With no comparable options on the market,
doctor's felt gouged.

So Cordis had failed to learn from a very expensive lesson the first time
round. So what should they have done differently? Remembering that
they had no idea of the price Boston would launch Taxus at.
Cordis' marketing strategies again seemed short-term focused. They
launched too early without having adequate supply of product, they were
forced to provide poor customer service by not consigning stock (they did not
have enough product to consign) and were often placing products on back
order again letting customers down.
They set a price that was deemed too expensive by customers and Cordis
therefore excluded an entire segment of the market public patients - by not
offering a two-tiered structure. Susan Hart and Nikolaos Tzokas (2000) offer
this warning for firms that have first mover advantages with product
advantage that adopt a premium pricing strategy: "The tendency towards
shorter life cycles and decreasing time lags between first movers and early
"me-too" products has caused a re-think in pricing strategy for new
products..there is an argument for employing penetration pricing, to hinder
competitive product launches and benefit from increasing economies of scale
as volume sales of products increase along with diffusion. This view
necessitates a longer term perspective of the recovery of development costs
which itself may be dependent upon the stage of the product market life
cycle.
Cordis were viewed by their customers as being arrogant and greedy.
With premium and inflexible pricing they damaged the most important aspect
of their business the customer relationship. As Bob Wayland states "the
paradigm has shifted. Products come and go. The unit of value today is the
customer relationship. (Cited Kotler 1999, p.121).
Cordis is now on the back foot, they've completely missed the opportunity
of being defensive in their marketing strategies - they now have to try to fight
to hang onto 15% market share. Even if they match Boston's pricing of
Taxus or better it, the market seems unwilling to reward Cordis now for such
strategies and customers have long memories.
So what can Cordis do? They must improve relationships, improve
service, develop new and innovative products, and differentiate. Guidant
Corporation set the example with their constant production of new and
innovative non-DES stents in the late 1990's and early part of this century,
their strong sales and marketing divisions, and their strong customer
relationships. Whoever wants to win market share must be successful in all
of these factors.
The future challenge for the DES market is for firms to avoid the failure to
differentiate one DES from a competitor's DES. As Ted Levitt stated in his
book 'Thinking about Management', "Differentiation is one of the most
important strategic and tactical activities in which companies must constantly
A Mini Case Study of Product Strategy

223
engage. It is not discretionary. And everything can be differentiated, even so
called "commodities" such as cement, copper, wheat, money, air cargo and
marine insurance.

References

Baker, M. and Hart, S. (1999), Product Strategy and Management, Prentice
Hall, p.53
Boston Scientific, (2003), "Boston Scientific announces CE Mark for its Taxus
Paclitaxel Eluting Stent System, Boston Scientific Press Release, 21
st
January
Hart, S. and Tzokas, N. (2000), "New product launch 'mix' in growth and
mature product markets, Benchmarking, Bradford, Vol. 7, (5)
Kotler, P. (1999), "Kotler on Marketing: How to create, win and dominate
markets, Free Press
Kotler, P. (2003), Marketing Management 11
th
Edition, Prentice Hall
Meridith, . (2003), "Global Perspectives in DES Use Australia and New
Zealand, Presented at TCT, September
Rosenberg, D. (2004), "Boston Scientific Approval changes face of US
Market, Dow Jones News Service, 5
th
March, p.3
Smith, B. (2003), "An empirical investigation of marketing strategy quality in
medical markets, International Journal of Medical Marketing, April
Steenhuysen, J. (2004), Stent wars heat up as Guidant, J&J form pact,
Reuters, 24
th
February
Trout, J. (2000), Differentiate or Die, John Wiley & Sons
Waksman, R. (2003), "Drug eluting stents from bench to bed,
Cardiovascular Radiation Medicine, 24
th
March, p.226, 228

nternet Sites:

1. http://www.guidant.com
2. http://www.cordis.com
3. http://www.cypher.com
4. http://www.bostonscientific.com
5. http://www.ptca.org



About the Author

Scott Rankin has always worked in the healthcare industry, and remains
committed to this area of industry because of its altruistic rewards. His
undergraduate qualifications are Nursing and a Bachelor of Applied Science
in Health nformation Management, both of which were undertaken at La
Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia.
After university he worked for six years at the Royal Victorian Eye and Ear
Scott Rankin

224
Hospital in Melbourne as a Casemix Analyser. This role involved managing
the introduction of a new healthcare funding system for the hospital. This
classification and payment system was based on similar cases receiving
similar amounts of funding from the State Health Department. The role also
included administrative, educative and analytical components.
Needing a career change, he joined the Australian arm of Carl Zeiss
(German Precision Optics Manufacturer), where he worked in the role of
Product Specialist for their range of surgical microscopes and neurosurgery
navigation systems. After four years at Zeiss he wanted to broaden his
experience in clinical sales and joined Guidant Australia, a division of
Guidant Corporation (US Manufacturer of Cardiovascular Devices), as a
Clinical Sales Specialist for their Vascular ntervention Division.
While working at Zeiss and Guidant over the past four years he has
undertaken and recently completed a Masters of Business Administration at
Monash University in Melbourne. Besides completing the core subjects he
has chosen electives that have furthered his knowledge in the field of
marketing. With his MBA only recently completed he is enjoying his
newfound freedom and time with his wife and two daughters.