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Sociology of Sport Journal, 2004, 21, 302-321 2004 Human Kinetics Publishers, Inc.

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Tuning into Ones Self: Foucaults Technologies of the Self and Mindful Fitness
Pirkko Markula
This article explores the application of Michel Foucaults technologies of the selfpractices of freedom that are characterized by ethics of self-care, critical awareness, and aesthetic self-stylization. Foucaults argument states that the technologies of self can act as practices of freedom from disciplinary, discursive body practices. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, this study examines the intersections of Foucaults theory with commercial fitness practices to identify possibilities for changing the dominant, feminine body discourse. The focus is on fitness practices collectively defined as mindful fitness and specifically one hybrid mindfulfitness form that combines Pilates, yoga, and Tai Chi with western strength training. Through in-depth interviews with the instructors of this hybrid form, this study analyzes the possibilities for mindful fitness to act as a practice of freedom by detailing what can be meant by critically aware, self-stylized fitness professionals for whom ethical care of the self translates to ethical care of the others. Cet article porte sur une application du concept des technologies du moi de Michel Foucault, les pratiques de la libert (qui sont caractrises par lthique du soin de soi), la conscience critique et lauto-stylisation esthtique. Les arguments de Foucault sont leffet que les technologies du moi peuvent agir comme pratiques libres des pratiques discursives et disciplinaires du corps. Fonde sur un travail de terrain de type ethnographique, cette tude examine les intersections entre la thorie de Foucault et les pratiques commerciales de conditionnement physique dans le but didentifier des possibilits de changer le discours dominant sur le corps des femmes. Ltude est centre sur les pratiques de conditionnement physique dites conscientes et en particulier sur une de ses formes hybrides qui combine le Pilates, le yoga, le tai chi et lentranement en force occidental. Par le biais dentrevues avec les instructeurs, cette tude prsente une analyse des possibilits lies au conditionnement physique conscient en tant que pratique de libert. Ltude dtaille aussi ce que peut signifier un professionnel du conditionnement physique conscient pour lequel le soin thique du moi se traduit par un soin thique des autres.

Introduction
Recently Foucaults poststructuralism has flourished in the field of sport sociology (e.g., Andrews, 1993; 2000; Chapman, 1997; Cole, 1993; Heikkala, 1993; Rail & Harvey, 1995; Shogan, 1999; Smith, 2002; Theberge, 1991). Along with several feminist sport sociologists (e.g., Cole, 1998; Duncan, 1994; Eskes, Duncan, & Miller, 1999; Smith, 1999), I, too, have examined fitness from a Foucauldian perspective to demonstrate its discursive construction (Markula, 1995, 2000, 2001).
The author is with the Qualitative Research Unit, School of Sport and Health Sciences, University of Exeter, Heavitree Road, Exeter, EX1 2LU, UK.

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This research has demonstrated that exercise practices can effectively discipline participants into docile bodies. In addition, exercise practices such as aerobics provide contradictory experiences when women struggle to find a balance between following the dominant discourses and resisting the suffocating, oppressive exercise practices (Markula, 2003a, p. 71). My analysis of womens resistant experiences, however, was not informed by a Foucauldian reading of an individuals role within changing power relations. In his later years, Foucault did advocate the concept of the technologies of the self that he used to understand how modern individuals could experience themselves as subjects of sexuality (Foucault, 1985). This study is a result of my involvement with Foucaults work on the history of sexuality, and how it inspired me to analyze in more detail the way exercisers experience themselves as subjects of fitness. In his study on the history of sexuality, Foucault was concerned with the change in sexual ethics: what was now considered appropriate sexual conduct and how individuals behavior shaped this change. The current field of fitness, I would observe, is undergoing a rapid change as mindful-fitness forms such as Pilates, Tai Chi, and yoga gain popularity over aerobics, step classes, and indoor cycling. I became interested in what kind of change these fitness forms could bring into the discursive construction of fitness and how individuals might act as initiators of this change. In this article, therefore, I trace how individual women transgress the discursive domination of the feminine body ideal. In my previous research on fitness, I discovered that many women struggled to cope with the requirements of the ideal body shape in a rather contradictory manner: although aware of its limitations, they could neither ignore nor change the ideal. Foucault argues, however, that power relations can change through the actions of an individual, and in this article I explore how such transformation might actualize through fitness practices. More precisely, I aim to detect how mindful-fitness instructors might engage in practices of freedom to shape the discursive body ideal. I examine the intersections of Foucaults theory with womens physical activity through an ethnographic study of one commercial fitness club based in London, England. My initial discussion in this article derives from an earlier, more in-depth exploration of Foucaults theory of practices that lead to transgression of domination (Markula, 2003b), and, therefore, I would like to first revisit Foucaults concept of the technologies of the self to frame this empirical analysis. Then I further analyze the possibilities of one mindful-fitness practice, which I label here as Hybrid, to act as the technologies of the self for womens fitness.

Foucaults Technologies of the Self

It is generally acknowledged that Foucaults later work, particularly his three volumes on the history of sexuality, outlines his concept of the technologies of the self. One of his latest and probably most often used definitions for these technologies is that they permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault, 1988b, p. 18)

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Foucaults verb transform is often translated to mean that the technologies of the self materialize in resistant practices, which an individual uses to change the power relations. It is also my intention to observe how the technologies of the self might function as practices of freedom for feminist politics. Foucaults work, however, does not indicate that engagement in the technologies of the self necessarily leads to a transformation of power relations. In order to clarify when the technologies of the self act as practices of freedom, I will outline how Foucault developed this concept in his trilogy of the history of sexuality. After an engagement with his work, several features, such as aesthetics of existence, the ethics of the care of the self, and critical thought, begin to characterize the practices of freedom. In this section, I will first revisit Foucaults understanding of the construction of the disciplined modern individual into a true self to map how Foucaults technologies of the self as practices of freedom enable a creative reconstruction of this self.

The True Self as a Subject of Control

Foucault argues that the individual has always been the major target of his analysis: My objective . . . has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects (Foucault, 1983a, p. 208). This individual, according to Foucault, is made subject within the relations of power: power that controls the individual by creating a certain identity. It is important to recognize what Foucault means by the concept subject: he is subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his [sic] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault, 1983a, p. 212). This implies, first, that Foucaults notion of a subject does not imply a subject freed from the control of power, and second, that the notion of a subject is not the same as the self. The individual self is always a subject to power that shapes the individuals understanding of his or her identity, and all of Foucaults work centers around the modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects (Foucault, 1983a, p. 208). He identified a clear shift from his early work of how scientific knowledge objectivizes human beings into normal, docile bodies to the analysis of the relationship of the self to power and truth in his later work: I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself [sic], in the technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988b, p. 19). Foucaults interest in the power/truth/self nexus leads to his three volume history of sexuality. Through systems of thought concerning sexuality, he traced how the modern deep self was constructed within the games of truth between coercive practices and practices of self-formation that individuals used to understand themselves as human beings (Foucault, 1988a). In History of Sexuality 1, Foucaults (1990) object was to demonstrate how sexual discourse, as a form of a polymorphous technique of power, reaches the most tenuous and individual modes of behavior . . . how it penetrates and controls every pleasure (p.11). This volume, then, focused on how the self turned into a subject controlled by power through the discursive construction of sexuality. In the next two volumes, The Use of Pleasure (1985) and The Care of the Self (1988c), Foucault shifts from examining the discourse of sexuality to an analysis of the techniques of the self. His main attention

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was now on what were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals (Foucault, 1985, p. 7). Therefore, Foucault does not set out to examine how individuals resisted the games of truth to form other identities, but focused instead on a hermeneutics of the self: a detailed genealogy of how the current deep self was historically formed through the understanding of desire.

The Aesthetics of Existence

In his genealogy, Foucault (1985) located the areas of experience and the forms in which sexual behavior was problematized, becoming an object of concern, an element for reflection, and a material for stylization (pp. 23-24). Furthermore, he identified how sexual behavior came to be conceived as a domain of moral experience (p. 24). Morality here refers first to a moral code of conduct (a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals). Second, morality consists of the actual behavior that individuals engage in based on a moral code. Foucault discovered that the moral code, what is forbidden and what is not in terms of sexuality, was actually very similar in Ancient Greece, early Christianity, and today. What changed over the centuries was the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code (p. 26). This individual ethical conduct is a central theme in the technologies of the self. Foucaults (1985) examination of ethical conduct included four tenets: the ethical substance (the parts that are prime material for moral conduct), mode of subjection (a recognition of a relation to moral rules and establishment of an obligation to put them into practice), elaboration of ethical work (an attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of ones behavior), and telos (the actions that not only comply to rules, but establish an individual as an ethical personthe mode of being). Foucault then measured the difference in ethical conduct over the centuries based on these four main points. For example, in Ancient Greece, the ethical substance was aphrodisia (the practices of sexuality), and people were invited to recognize their moral obligations by building a beautiful existence; it was an aesthetic mode, based on personal choice. The Greeks elaborated their aesthetics of existence by engaging in self-forming activities Foucault titled as asceticism. By doing this, the Greeks aspired to, as the highest mode of moral being, absolute self-mastery. During Christianity, Foucault demonstrated, the ethics changed. Now desire and flesh became the ethical substance, the material for moral conduct. Christians established their relation to these issues through divine law that dictated their behavior rather than the personal choice of opting to live a beautiful life. To elaborate themselves as ethical beings, the Christians turned to selfdeciphering rather than self-forming activities. The ultimate ethical person now aimed for immorality and purity of thought through self-examination. In summary, so far, Foucaults history of sexuality focuses on examining how ethical conduct of sexuality, as based on the ethical subject, mode of subjection, ethical work, and telos changed over several centuries from the Ancient Greeks to early Christianity to the 16th century to modern society. In Greek society the moral code of conduct was based on the ideal of the aesthetics of existence: how to live a beautiful life. An individuals behavior, sexual behavior included, was then structured according to this code. Adherence to the code was an individuals choice.

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In modern society, on the other hand, the code of moral conduct is grounded in religious, legal, and scientific norms that dominate the self: we embrace an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on (Foucault, 1983b, p. 231). Whereas Foucault (1990), in the first volume of History of Sexuality, demonstrated how powerthrough discursive knowledge of sexualitylocked us into a continuous search for the true desiring self, he does not claim that sexual practices from other eras are more liberating. Historicizing the formation of the modern deep self, however, might create a possibility for a new ethical subject that is free from the disciplinary scientific discourse. Therefore, the Greek technologies of the self, based on the conduct of a beautiful life through the maintenance of an aesthetics of existence, is not the solution for our era but can problematize the present ethical substance. After identifying these differences in sexual ethics, Foucault turned his attention to the activities that men in Ancient Greece used to transform themselves into ethical beings. He analyzed these practices in the third volume of his history of sexuality, The Care of the Self (1988c).

The Care of the Self

According to Foucault (1988c), the care of the self in Ancient Greece implied specific attention, knowledge, and techniques. The goal of the care of the self was to make ones life into an object for a sort of knowledge that could only be achieved by a training of oneself by oneself. In Greece, one obtained self-knowledge by taking care of oneself, as opposed to today, when knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle (Foucault, 1988b, p. 22). In other words, the ancient practice of the care of the self avoided the self-absorbed investigation of ones inner self that characterizes the confessional mode of todays practices of self-understanding. The care of the self included such techniques as writing letters to friends to disclose ones self; the examination of the self and the conscience to review the best practice; askesis (training through meditation for imaginary situations and training in real situations to practice the appropriate art of living); and interpretation of dreams (Foucault, 1988b; Foucault, 1988c). In the ethics of the care of the self, Foucault also saw a possibility for practices of freedom for the present day and he elaborated this thought in his later interviews (Foucault, 1983b; Foucault,1988a).

The Ethics of Self-Care as a Practice of Freedom

The previous section demonstrated that, in Greek and Roman societies, practices of self-formation of the subject had a much greater importance and autonomy than today, when they are laid siege to by religious, pedagogical, medical, and psychiatric institutions (Foucault, 1988a, p. 2). Therefore, Foucault advocates a need for disengaging the current self from the domination of these institutions. A different, active self can be created by observing the ancient principles of the care of the self. Foucault (1988a) does not, however, translate these practices of selftransformation as liberation because this would assume an existence of a true self needing liberation. Although Foucault clearly acknowledged that domination exists, the problem of domination is not solved by liberating ones self from power because it

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constitutes a moral problem: how will one practice ones liberty to use power? How can one practice freedom? Therefore, he argued, practices of freedom aim for a deliberate practice of liberty. In antiquity, ethics, as a deliberate practice of liberty, was manifested in the care for oneself. One took care of ones self to discover the ethical dimension of freedomto learn how to practice freedom ethically. The Greeks ethical self-care implied a relationship with others: the care for the self was always aimed at the good of others because it was designed for administering ones power in a nondominant manner. In this sense the ethical care of the self can be understood as a conversion of power, because it is the power over self which will regulate the power over others (Foucault, 1988a, p. 8). Consequently, todays individuals can play the games of power with a minimum of domination by engaging in care for the self. By doing this, they can replace the disciplinary search for self-fulfillment with some other ethical substance, possibly similar to the Greek ethical substance of a beautiful life. The Greek focus on aesthetics of existence as a goal and the idea also that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure greatly inspired Foucault (Foucault, 1983b, p. 235). An aesthetics of existence means, however, that we now have to actively construct the self instead of searching for it under layers of domination. Foucault saw art as a means for creative reconstruction of the self toward an ethical self.

Aesthetic Self-Stylization
According to Foucault, thinking of art as a grounding for an ethical self could provide possibilities for self-formation that are currently obscured in our society: What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something that is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something that is specialized or that is done by experts who are artists. But couldnt everyones life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life? (1983b, p. 236) He is also fascinated by the Greek practice of thinking of ones self, including the body (or bios) as a piece of art: an individual recreates him- or herself as a work of art. This takes place through a complex and difficult process of stylization, and, therefore, ones relationship to ones self is more like a creative activity, a constant process of invention (Foucault, 1983b). Foucaults idea here is that art has the capacity to give birth to new life forms directly; if we think of our lives as works of art, we regain the ability to think creatively and challenge the limitations of the natural identities formed through the games of truth. Aesthetic stylization of the self denotes a self that is open to change and the constant re-creation of changing conditions in society. It is important to recognize that, according to Foucault, any practice can serve as ethical self-care: No practice in itself is good or bad, but its ethical value depends on how it is used. Foucault (1988a) asserts first that ethical self-care does not necessitate new, invented practices, but it does require the folding of existing every day practices to create a self. Second, ethical self-care enables the individual to create a self in an active fashion. There are, however, a multitude of

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self-aestheticization practiceswearing the latest fashion, make-up, hair style, or building a new body in yoga classesthat individuals use to produce a self in contemporary society, but they do not all produce a creatively reconstructed ethical self. On the contrary, constant self-surveillance and obsessive exercise habits can turn into disciplinary techniques. It is important, therefore, to assess whether a practice of self-care is used merely to comply with the dominant discourses or to actively increase the understanding of ones self as an ethical being. Foucaults concept of critical awareness might further help identify practices that individuals can use as practices of freedom.

Critical Awareness
In his work as a philosopher, Foucault was primarily interested in how people learn to problematize their identities by becoming more self-reflexive (Foucault, 1984; 1985). Only critical self-reflection can result in a change to ones condition. To be able to think differently creates an opportunity to question the limitations of ones freedom instead of merely coping with ones situation. The critically selfaware individual constantly questions what is seemingly natural and inevitable in ones identity and, as a result, creates an identity of his or her own. Through this interrogation of the limits of ones subjectivity, the possibility of transgression emerges and thus, the potential for creating new types of subjective experiences. Moya Lloyd (1996) has discussed the premise of Foucauldian critical self-awareness in relation to the feminist analysis of transgressive practices for women. From a feminist perspective, Lloyd (1996) reads Foucaults conceptualization of emancipation as an individuals freedom to invent a self (p. 252). Through self-awareness individuals create new types of experiences that can lead to transgressive practices. These practices further establish a chance for public impact by provoking confusion about the present discourse of femininity, out of which grows a problematizationa questioning, critical thought (p. 258). Consequently, Lloyd argues that feminists should find such a chance to bend, disrupt, or undermine gender norms very seductive. Accordingly, Lloyd (1996) promotes the dimension of critical awarenessan individuals ability to question the limits of ones natural identityto distinguish practices of freedom from the ones that perpetuate the dominant discursive construction of gender. Particular practices of femininity have the potential to operate transgressively (p. 250) when embedded in the double act of critical self-stylization. Therefore, building a new body in a Pilates class does not, in itself, serve as a technology of the self. If an individual woman consciously engages in critical efforts to make a political statement through, for example, her improved core strength, she can provoke a critical, querying reaction (p. 258) about the ways the fit body is constructed. By doing this, she has potentially problematized womens present cultural condition and can have an impact on power relations. In sum, ethical self-care, when invested in a doubled trajectory of critique and self-aestheticization, can motivate political activity and transgress womens condition. In terms of my research interest, I conclude that, if fitness practices provide an avenue for ethical self-care, they will potentially act as womens practices of freedom. To further understand how the technologies of the self can create freedom from the discursive construction of fitness, I entered the field of commercial fitness.

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The Research Setting

On entering the fitness industry, my purpose was to analyze how fitness practices might act as practices of freedom and thus generate change. My ethnographic fieldwork was based in a London health club that is a member of a midpriced UK chain. The club offered not only a variety of group exercise classes, such as aerobics and step, but also mindful-fitness classes such as Pilates, yoga, and a hybrid class combining exercises from Pilates, yoga, and Tai Chi. I began my fieldwork by participating in all types of mindful-fitness practices, but soon concentrated on examining the class that combined several pure mindful forms. This class that I label here as Hybrid was very popular among the members of the club (significantly more popular than yoga or Pilates), and, thus, I explore how Hybrid, particularly, could provide a setting for practices of freedom. After informing the clubs management about my research, I conducted participant observation by attending four classes weekly during 1 year. The club had four instructors for this class, and, in order to get a broad understanding of the meaning of Hybrid, I participated in sessions taught by all the different instructors. I wrote detailed field notes regarding the format of the class, the instructors teaching styles, and the participants reactions to the class. Moreover, I engaged as often as possible in informal discussions with the participants and the instructors before and after class. In addition to participating in the classes, I conducted semistructured, indepth interviews with the Hybrid instructors in the club (3 women and 1 man). The participant-observation phase was integral for defining the structure of my interview guide. Although I had immersed myself in the theory of Foucaults technologies of self, I had to have experience in the practice of Hybrid to conceptualize what the ethics of self-care, critical awareness, and aesthetic self-stylization might mean in a practical sense. Therefore, although my interview guide centered around these three theoretical concepts, I had to become familiar with the exercises in the Hybrid class in order to discuss them constructively with the instructors. Before conducting the interviews I approached each interviewee to inquire as to her or his willingness to take part in my study. I identified myself as a university researcher (they already knew me as a regular participant in their classes) and explained the purpose of my research. During these interviews, the instructors also advised me to contact the woman who created Hybrid. They indicated that she would be able to tell me everything there was to know about it. Following their recommendation, I initiated contact via e-mail because she was working in the head office of the fitness chain in central London. I interviewed her in her office to deepen the information I gained from the Hybrid instructors. All the interviewees were White and their ages ranged from the midtwenties to midthirties. Having worked in the fitness industry between 3 and 10 years, all the instructors had fitnessindustry qualifications. In addition, two of them had university degrees in the sport sciences. To protect their anonymity, they are identified by pseudonyms in this article. In my study, I chose to focus on the instructors rather than the participants views of the activity, and I now briefly return to Foucaults understanding of power to explain my decision to focus on the instructors. In every relationship, Foucault (1988a) insists, all parties have a certain amount of power, and, therefore, the resistance that arises from the ethical use of power by the individuals involved is always a possibility. He adds, however, that

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certain power relations are more asymmetrical than others and, consequently, the margin for resistance varies depending on each individuals situation. Foucault relates his principle directly to womens situation: in the traditional conjugal relation in the society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we cannot say that there was only male power; the woman herself could do a lot of things: be unfaithful to him, extract money from him, refuse him sexually. She was, however, subject to a state of domination, in the measure where all that was finally no more than a certain number of tricks which never brought about a reversal of the situation. (Foucault, 1988a, p. 12) For example, although all exercisers are part of creating fitness discourses, participants in group exercise classes are not necessarily the key creators of change because they have only a limited freedom and knowledge to shape the actual classes, and, consequently, their margin of resistance is rather small. I reassigned myself to examine how instructors or program developers might practice their freedom, ethically, through engagement in the technologies of the self. Before analyzing how Hybrid might act as the technologies of the self, I explain briefly what characterizes this exercise class.

Hybrid as an Exercise Form

As its name indicates, a Hybrid class is a mixture of different exercise forms. Its creator, Lydia, describes the premise of the class: Briefly . . . it is a mixture of the principles of yoga for flexibility, the principles of Pilates for posture alignment, and the principles of western strength training for muscle strength, and the principles of Tai Chi for relaxation and clarity of mind. The instructors in the club align Hybrid with other commercially viable products such as Body Balance by Bodyworks, Equilibrium by Nike, or Natural Stretch by Reebok that are also modifications of the three mindful-fitness forms. The interviewees further describe Hybrid as an infusion of popular fitness practices, but attribute its success to its combination of the best of western and eastern training principles. The main characteristic that distinguishes Hybrid from western resistance training is the slow, controlled manner in which each movement is performed. Breathing becomes an integral part of the execution of the exercises as it facilitates control and sets the pace of each movement. The instructors indicate that the slow pace, controlled with breathing, makes one concentrate on the actual exercises, and this concentration, combined with the physical effort, creates the distinctive mindbody element of the class: Thats why they call it a mindbody class: if you can incorporate your mind into the way you are working, you do it perfectly. But as soon as your mind wanders off, you mess up your movement completely. (Pauline) Like in a yoga class, the actual movements are prechoreographed into sets of combinations titled salutations. Each movement pattern aims to facilitate concentration on the movement performance. Hybrid instructors play background music,

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but the salutations are not performed to the beat of the music because this would disrupt concentration on the actual execution of the movement. Each session contains about five to six salutations that target different muscle groups in the body (e.g., upper body, lower body, core). All the salutations are performed on a mat and thus, unlike an aerobics class, there is not much movement in space. The focus is on flexibility, stability, balance, muscle strength, and endurance rather than cardiovascular conditioning. All the instructors also mentioned that, in a Hybrid class, it is possible to modify the salutations to suit participants with different fitness and experience levels. This is an advantage that Hybrid offers over other group fitness classes they teach: You can work at different levels, so its quite easy to modify these exercises. I think Hybrid is so popular, because it can be easy or you can make it incredibly hard . . . you can basically modify to any level of participant, fit or unfit. (Larry) A Hybrid class contains, therefore, a built-in progression: one can begin with the easier options and progress to a harder version of the same movement. In sum, Hybrid is an infusion of mindful fitness with western resistancetraining principles that can accommodate a wide variety of exercisers with an easily modifiable movement vocabulary. Mary provides a fitting summary of a Hybrid class by focusing on its differences from other mainstream group exercise classes: What makes Hybrid different is that it is the only type of class which is slow and focuses on stretching; focuses on thinking about oneself rather than focusing on what the instructor is doing or the class around you is doing, or how high one can get ones knees. . . . Its a personal development type of class, [the participants] tune into themselves, [and work at] their own level. Based on Marys summary, it is possible to conclude that Hybrid class provides a substantial alternative to other group fitness classes, but does this fitness practice provide possibilities for the technologies of the self?

Mindful Fitness as the Technologies of the Self

Foucaults concept of the technologies of the self is grounded in an individual practice of the ethics of self-care. This involves a process of active selfreflection on how one can act as an ethical being: to use ones power ethically by caring for oneself as well as others. Only through this ethical dimension can practices of self-care become practices of freedom with the potential to change the discursive, disciplinary practices of power. To act as practices of freedom, mindfulfitness practices, such as Hybrid, should increase ones understanding of ones self as an ethical being and, consequently, facilitate ways of using power ethically. In addition to ethical self-care, the practices of freedom actualize as an aesthetic selfstylization of the body that is based on critical awareness of the discursive limitations of the self. To detect whether the fitness instructors engaged in the ethics of care, I ask first, do they test the limits of their identities through aesthetic selfstylization? Second, do they have a critical awareness of the dominant fitness discourses, and do they consciously reconstruct these discourses by building their own bodies differently? Third, do they reflect on themselves as fitness instructors and, as a result, use their practices and, thus, their power, ethically?

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Aesthetic Self-Stylization Through the Practices of Hybrid

Any everyday fitness practice has the potential to become a practice of freedom by which an individual, through self-understanding, transforms him- or herself. In addition, most fitness practices can be seen as practices of aesthetic self-stylization as they constantly shape, create, and modify our body shapes. Indeed, when I asked the instructors about the benefits of this particular class, they indicated that Hybrid has changed their body shapes. The body benefits, however, were not necessarily on the top of everybodys list of fitness benefits from Hybrid. All the instructors refer to the Hybrid class as a place to relax and calm down from their otherwise hectic work lives. For example, Larry finds that Hybrid class is chill out time because teaching it provides him with an hour to relax and destress. Similarly, Mary remarks, [The Hybrid class is] calming after a really hectic day. You can do an hour . . . of Hybrid and you come out feeling wonderfully stretched, nice and tall, and in peace. Both Larry and Mary mention that teaching a Hybrid class has particularly improved their flexibility. Based on their comments, the Hybrid body aesthetics emphasizes body alignment (feeling tall), flexibility, and a calmer, relaxed mind. Other instructors talked about how Hybrid has actually changed their body shapes. Lydia, who created this product, found her body taking significantly and visibly different shape after her involvement with this activity: When I was teaching aerobics and step classes and doing a lot of personal training, I felt very tired, very heavy all the time, although I was super fit. Probably cardiovascularly more fit than I am now, but, although I was happy and strong, I wasnt quite the shape I wanted to be. I wanted to be lithe, I wanted to run but found running very difficult because I had too much muscle. As soon as I started to teach Hybrid . . . I lost weight immediately, because I learned to lengthen my muscles with the movement and I learned to work without weight. . . . I felt so much stronger, but I looked leaner and taller and people commented how I lost weight. Other instructors also emphasized the toning benefits provided by their involvement in Hybrid. Pauline actually replaced her weight training with Hybrid because she gained strength more effectively but without muscle tightness: I used to weight train . . . but now I dont do any weight training . . . because in Hybrid you get more toned and defined and faster. In Hybrid youve got all your weight on your arms or legs. It also helps with everyday living like keeping good posture . . . if you loosen your muscles, like in Hybrid, you lengthen them, so you get more toned and defined. Paulines comment is interesting because she does not favor Hybrid to necessarily obtain leaner looking muscles, but to gain strength in a more functional manner that utilizes the mass of her own body. Larry felt that, in addition to relaxation and de-stressing, Hybrid helped to tone his mid-section: [the benefit] to me, personally, is core stability. Im quite weak in that area, so I feel that Im helping myself, toning myself, getting stronger in the core. I like to challenge myself, so I enjoy doing that even if that part of the exercise is hard. It is obvious that Hybrid can

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help to build an ideal body: the toned and thin feminine body and the tightly packed mid-section of the masculine body. Can this type of body, then, be considered as an innovative manifestation of a recreated self? To a certain extent the Hybrid aesthetics redirects the emphasis from the looks of the body to other, less visible exercise benefits, such as relaxation and better alignment. This decreases the disciplinary gaze directed to the exercisers body shape. On the other hand, Hybrid effectively reproduces the disciplinary thin and toned feminine ideal. Is this the same contradiction reported by several previous studies of womens exercise practices (e.g., Dworkin, 2003; Haravon Collins, 2002; Loland, 2000; McDermott, 2000): do women build better posture and a relaxed mind as long as these are framed by the ideally toned, slim body? The Hybrid body appears to contour the parameters of the disciplinary discourse of femininity rather than breaking free from the dominant fitness truth game. Nevertheless, it is important to remember Foucaults assertion that no practice, and also no body shape, is in essence oppressive or liberating, but what matters is how the practice is used. Therefore, it is not feasible to picture in advance which feminine practices reflect the internalization of discursive femininity and which are stages of self-aestheticization. For example, practices that seem at first sight to cooperate with the dominant discourse of femininity, such as dieting and toning, are not in themselves oppressive. Similarly, practices that seem to openly challenge this discourse, such as weight training, are not necessarily empowering. What makes a difference, here, is Foucaults insistence on critical awareness: for what purpose has the individual engaged in a particular practice? Therefore, the dimension of critical awareness distinguishes practices of freedom from the ones that perpetuate the dominant discursive construction of gender. Did Hybrid simply build a fashionable body or did it evoke a political statement toward changing the fitness discourse? To answer this question, I next attempted to understand the instructors critical awareness of the underlying meaning or philosophy of Hybrid.

Critical Awareness
Lydia, Hybrids creator, was clear about the concept behind it: whereas its immediate benefits were flexibility, posture realignment, strength, relaxation, and clarity of mind, Hybrids ultimate purpose was to prepare us to react to every day life situations: [Hybrid] make[s] us reflect on habitual movement patterns or habitual thought [patterns]. When we are in our offices, we dont think how we move, how we walk, how we breathe. Its making people aware of how they live their lives. This awareness is then needed to improve how we function in every day situations, and, in a Hybrid class, muscles are trained based on functional goals. Lydia explains: One of the goals of Hybrid is to train the real-life muscle function of every single muscle. You dont see sit-ups in a Hybrid class, purely because [situps] just work the rectus abdominus and there is no function in everyday life that works the rectus. . . . This is what we are trying to teach people . . . real life muscle strength and the ability to react to life.

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Lydia quite categorically dismisses the role of the rectus abdominus in our everyday movement patterns, but does not openly state why it is so relentlessly trained in most other fitness sessions. (The rectus abdominus is the most superficial of the abdominal muscles and is often referred to as the six pack. It is usually trained for better looks rather than for functional purposes.) She is similarly critical of weight-training machinery that, according to her, does not improve everyday functionality. All the machines we have, that multimillion-pound industry, thats all in straight lines, but when do you ever walk through a door like that? You dont; you are in an angle, you walk through diagonally. Again, she does not comment on why resistance-training machines are so popular and why many people prefer to isolate specific muscle groups to train them in straight lines rather than adopting the more multidimensional movement patterns she advocates in Hybrid training. Lydia consistently talks about the functional rather than body-shaping benefits of Hybrid. With the improved functionality, people can also become healthier and are able to prevent painful conditions created by habitual tensions and previous injuries. Lydia cites one of her clients who felt that Hybrid had significantly reduced the pain caused by her fused lower vertebrae. Similarly, Lydia feels Hybrid is a very useful exercise form for the aging population. Our older clients absolutely love Hybrid because its balance work and helps prevent falls and accidents. The everyday functionality, however, is not limited to the workings of the body but incorporates the mind. In Hybrid, a balanced everyday functionality is achieved through exercises that train both the neurological and muscular systems: the synergy of the mind with the body. Lydia, interestingly, looks for support for the integrated self from the physiological, scientific research: Its not just a muscular program . . . but also works the synergy of the neuromuscular system and messages from the brain to the muscles. For example, if you seek to perform a basic lunge and balance . . . they [the clients] wobble all over the place because theyve not done that movement before . . . the brain is not firing the right muscle fibers at the right time to do that movement smoothly. Based on these principles of the integrated self, Lydia choreographs all of the Hybrid sessions used in the fitness-club chain. To ensure the quality of each session, Lydia tests the choreography in her own classes before releasing it to the other instructors. To educate the instructors about the functional philosophy behind Hybrid, Lydia has devised a training system to qualify Hybrid instructors. Once the instructor is qualified she or he receives a new Hybrid choreography every 3 months. Based on her carefully planned program and thoroughly executed training, Lydia is confident that the instructors understand the principles of each salutation in the Hybrid sessions. All of the instructors that I interviewed are familiar with the training structure and have either obtained qualifications or are in the process of training. Despite Lydias detailed information about the functional principles of each salutation, however, the instructors do not necessarily internalize the meanings of these exercises. Pauline, for example, states that no one in her club knows exactly what each salutation is for or what the exact idea is behind Hybrid:

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Im just putting everything together. . . . I think you are supposed to [have a structure] . . . but I keep mixing it, I get bored and annoyed doing the same thing over and over. So, I keep adding stuff . . . but you stick to some of the choreography and nobody in this club knows . . . what it is supposed to be like. As long as you do your Hybrid some way . . . then they are happy with it. Becky suspects that the entire Hybrid concept is based on commercialism: Because everyone loves yoga, everyone has heard of or tried Pilates, its the in thing to do. . . . They [the clubs management] came up with it basically to save in budget, because they couldnt afford yoga and Pilates teachers. It sounds terrible, but thats basically the gist of it. Similar to Becky, Mary thinks that Hybrid is yet another fashionable industry trend that a fitness club has to adopt to survive: its just following the fashion with Geri Halliwell doing ballet Ashtanga.. . . Its following a trend, but I think its a good trend. Mary, interestingly, does find Hybrid a positive fad, although a fad, nevertheless. When asked about the actual principles behind Hybrid, she directs me to ask Lydia directly. It seems that the instructors do not necessarily promote Hybrid as an alternative exercise form and have not entirely internalized Lydias functional Hybrid philosophy. They do not emphasize the functional philosophy behind having to perform moves in a particular way, and, though some of them mentioned improved quality of every day life, none of the instructors used the term functionality when addressing the outcomes from Hybrid. From the instructors point of view, Hybrid is a persuasive way of making people work harder when they are first seduced to the class by media created fads. Do they, then, refer to the possibility of obtaining a beautiful body when addressing Hybrid? The instructors are reluctant to talk about Hybrid as a class for improved body shape. For example, Larry recommends Hybrid for anyone who wants to get stronger, more stable, pretty much anyone really. Becky feels that it is better to attend other types of classes for toning benefits, whereas Hybrid is a little bit broader. She is, however, unsure how Hybrid differs from toning classes such as Legs, Tums, and Bums other than being slower and not done to music: You dont have to work with beats of music. Hybrid is a lot more floor work, whereas, in the other type of classes, like aerobics and toning classes, you spend a lot of time standing up, maybe you use some equipment, weights, barbells, whereas in Hybrid you rarely use any kind of equipment. The instructors, interestingly, felt that the participants sought the same old body benefits from Hybrid. Larry, for example, has discovered that strengthening up the back and stomach, thats usually the selling point of Hybrid. People always want to have a nice strong, flat tummy, and Becky finds that people like it because it [Hybrid] gets you toning . . . definitely our members here wanna work on that more than anything else. All my interviewees also felt that the media exposure of the celebrities practicing yoga, such as Madonna and Geri Halliwell, were the major incentives for clients interest in yoga, Pilates, and Hybrid. Larrys comments illustrate the instructors conviction that the participants are there to obtain the toned celebrity look.

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People see all these pop stars, Geri Halliwell, Madonna, do all these types of classes, and think Oh, maybe if I do that Im gonna look like them.. . . People actually believe they are going to turn into these [famous] people if they do these classes. Its not really going to happen, or may well happen . . . but thats dedication, very, very hard work, very, very strict eating patterns, hard weight training, as well as doing this style of exercise. . . People refer to the great physique of Madonna, she is now 40, what ever she is, has great figure, has done a lot of yoga, or so we know. Again, I can only suggest that if it works for them, it can work for anyone, but you have to put a lot of hard work and dedication into it to get there. You cant just come to one Hybrid class once a week and then all of the sudden you turn into a Madonna lookalike or Geri lookalike. Larry is reluctant to use the improved body shape as the main selling point for Hybrid, but neither does he openly challenge the pursuit for the ideal body. Instead, he normalizes it by reverting to the disciplined bodywork required for obtaining such an ideal. Although the instructors themselves do not want to sell Hybrid as a means for a better body, they claim that, for the participants, at least initially, that provides the main attraction. The participants, then, appear to have the least critical awareness of the problematic discourse of the ideal body. But did fitness instructors use aesthetic self-stylization and critical awareness to reflect on their identities as fitness instructors and the way they use their power?

Ethical Care of the Self

At the first sight, the Hybrids body aesthetic resembles the oppressive thin and toned body ideal. Following Foucault, however, a body shape itself is not oppressive: what matters is how this shape has been used to discipline individual women. Every body shape has the potential to create a reconstructed self as long as the body practices needed for its creation are embedded in a critical awareness of the discursive conditions surrounding us. Therefore, the Hybrid body, if it is based on the conscious effort to challenge the discursive domination of the body ideal, could act as an innovative, political statement. This way, Hybrid could become an aspect of the ethics of care. Active care of the self allows for a responsible use of power, and consequently, we can escape a domination of truth, not by playing a game that was a complete stranger to the game of truth, but in playing it otherwise (Foucault, 1988a, p. 15). This could mean that a fitness instructor should use her or his power position ethically by, for example, carefully delivering fitness practices that, instead of exposing the participants to the dominating, disciplinary discourse, would foster critical awareness and self-reflection. The instructors who operated at the level of teaching practice, however, did not seem to have a deep critical awareness of the discursiveness of their practices and ended up actually functioning in the discourse of the body beautiful rather than stretching its boundaries. Because they were unaware of the exact functional meaning of each Hybrid salutation, the instructors did not follow Lydias advice too carefully in their classes. As superfit people, they did not actively seek alternative fitness practices such as Hybrid. As a matter of fact, given a choice, they would not choose to participate in

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such a class. For example, Larry noted: I must admit . . . Im more of a fast, more energetic style instructor. I do like the step classes and spinning classes . . . just to get in cold and do a Hybrid class, I probably wouldnt enjoy so much as doing another form of class. None of the instructors I interviewed turned to Hybrid because they thought it was a more beneficial class to participants than other group exercise classes. They became Hybrid instructors because of vacancies left by previous instructors or Hybrid classes being added to the timetable by the clubs management. For example, when I asked how Pauline came to teach Hybrid classes, she explained: I was forced to do it. Remember Andrea? She used to teach the class and was off abroad and they [the management] told me I need to do it. And I didnt know what it was and so, I said, Give me the file and Ill read it and learn what Im supposed to do. In this sense, the instructors did not actively seek alternative practices to the traditional fitness modes. This does not imply, however, that they did not care about the quality of their instruction. On the contrary, they creatively rearranged their classes to make them progressively more difficult. For example, Pauline said: Fitness is my passion, so I put everything into it. I try to make it interesting plus give you the workout that you want. In conclusion, teaching a Hybrid class, it seems, did not significantly increase the instructors awareness of discursive fitness practices and thus, they did not particularly reflect on their selves or their practices to create themselves as more ethical users of their power. It was difficult to assess the extent to which the instructors were aware of their power to influence fitness practices on a larger scale. Although they modified the content of their classes and, thus, challenged fitness practices at some level, they were not necessarily aware of the power that provided them with the possibility to change the premise of fitness. In many ways they did not feel that a deeply grounded transformation in fitness was needed and assumed that practices such as Hybrid were media-hyped creations for a new way of getting an ideal body. Therefore, they did not exhibit a critical, conscious awareness of the problematic discourses in the fitness industry. Neither did they advocate that a change was needed to create practices that would free the participants from the conventional fitness truth game. Lydia, the creator of the Hybrid program and the most experienced instructor, offered quite a different story. Lydia indicated that she comes from a traditional fitness background and has a degree in movement studies (Becky was the only other instructor who had a university degree in Sport Science). Like the instructors I interviewed, she had taught a wide range of group exercise classes such as aerobics, step, and spinning. At the time of the interview, Lydia was a Reebok master trainer and worked for the fitness chain as a fitness consultant for new trends. She recalls that after about 6 years in the fitness industry, she became bored with the traditional stuff and thought that there is nothing in this, this isnt new. Theres got to be more to a studio than a grapevine, theres got to be more to bike than just pedaling as hard as you can and sweating and being very uncomfortable. She began to seek alternative ways of fitness and qualified as a Pilates instructor and an Ashtanga yoga instructor. Although she embraced the principles of each form, she learned that Pilates and yoga in their pure forms did not attract participants: I thought maybe there is a way of marketing something that takes the principles of Pilates and principles from yoga and the principles of strength

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training and put a little bit Tai Chi in there for relaxation and clarity of mind and then people dont associate it against Pilates or against yoga . . . they are coming to Hybrid. Although Lydias rationale for Hybrid is partly driven by the commercial realities of the fitness industry, she was actively seeking new practices that would give the participants what they need before they know what they need. In this sense, Lydia, more than the other instructors, was aware of a need for change in the fitness industry and is also in a position of power to make such changes happen. Although Lydia readily acknowledged having an impact, she felt her influence extended mainly to individual instructors and participants with whom she has direct contact in a class setting: Pirkko: Dont you think you have a big impact on what people do? Lydia: Oh yeah, definitely, thats why I always went into what I do because I train staff . . . when you are training in a class setting, you get 30 or more participants and that to me is a bigger impact [than doing personal training]. She defined herself as being in the forefront of the industry (presenting in conferences, traveling internationally) but more to obtain new ideas for practice rather than actively seeking a position as an advocate for mindful-fitness forms. Unlike the other instructors, however, Lydia had actively reflected on the meaning of the fitness practices she was involved in and strongly believed that Hybrid as a fitness form provided a viable alternative to other group fitness forms. Her practice of self-care then translated into creating an exercise class that de-emphasized the looks of the body in favor of the functional benefits of fitness, and, therefore, she did use her power to initiate change in her fitness chain. In the larger scale of global fitness, however, Lydia, as the instructors stated, was following a fashionable trend. To expect her to function on such a global level, however, is perhaps unreasonable, particularly considering that Foucault understood the technologies of the self as localized practices of freedom. In this sense, Lydia has managed to create a successful change in her operating field, even though she might not have been able to divorce Hybrid entirely from the influence of the dominating discourse of feminine body ideal.

Conclusion
It is obvious that Foucaults concept of the technologies of the self is complex, and it is difficult to determine what practices of freedom might mean for a critically aware, self-stylized fitness leader for whom ethical care of the self translates to ethical care of the others. According to Foucault, the technologies of the self permit an individual to transform him- or herself by becoming recuperated, rather than disciplined, through power relations and relations of knowledge. In my study, Hybrid appeared to offer that possibility, but only if its practice was accompanied by critical awareness. For example, when ones knowledge of the fitness industry was used critically toward ethical self-care, a possibility for alternative fitness practices emerged. It is interesting to note, however, that the ultimate decisions about the fitness forms offered in this health club chain were made by the marketing department, not necessarily the fitness experts. Lydia explains that although she brainstorms new ideas for fitness classes, these ideas are discussed

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by a panel consisting of the fitness chains chief executive, marketing brand director, and a few other people in marketing. This panel decides which of Lydias ideas are viable products for the company. Their ethics of care or their critical awareness of the discursive construction of fitness would be an interesting topic for a future examination of the fitness industry. Did Hybrid then act as a practice of freedom? The exercises in Hybrid classes could easily turn to service the dominant body ideal, and many participants, no doubt, began the classes with that goal in mind. The focus on functionality, however, can provide a more multidimensional goal that allows for a practice of the ethics of self-care. Therefore, Hybrid can act as a practice of freedom for the individuals, instructors, and participants alike who embed their practices in critical awareness. It is important to emphasize that the role of Hybrid, or any other fitness practice, as a practice of freedom depends on how it is used: no movement practice embodies an essential ability to provide freedom to construct a self untied to the disciplinary fitness truth game. Therefore, it is not my intention to claim that mindful-fitness forms are more liberating than, for example, aerobics or weight training. Any fitness form can act as a practice of freedom by expanding the limitations of the discursive feminine identity. Fitness practitioners, however, need to engage in critical practice of the ethics of self-care in order to transgress disciplinary bodily practices. The ethical practice of ones freedom does not need to derive from practices that emphasize everyday functionality, but such a refocus can offer a way to play the fitness truth game differently. Any fitness form through which the participants can problematize the dominant discursive construction of gender and actively reconstruct their selves can transgress the limitations of the natural (feminine) identity. In this article, I have focused on how Hybrid might recreate the truth game that constructs the fit body. The fitness-industry functionality, however, obviously operates as a constellation of several discourses that interact with each other. One such discourse regards the construction of health, rather one-sidedly, as an illnessfree existence and fitness as an economical solution to the increasing cost of taking care of disease in western societies. Often the biomedical model is used to support the strict model of exercise practices, following this discourse, and effectively assigns individuals the responsibility of societal problems regarding ill-health. Lydia, interestingly, referred to the biomedical model to explain the need to engage the mind with Hybrid exercises. Such a justification can easily turn into a disciplinary practice where participation in mindful fitness becomes an individuals responsibility for reducing such mental-health problems as stress, depression, and anxiety, but leaves the underlying social origins for these problems untouched. My research indicated that the present Hybrid practice advocated mindfulness, rather than an absence of mental illness, as a way of increasing body awareness: concentrating on a correct execution of exercises improves everyday functionality. To summarize, I have found Foucaults concept of technologies of the self very helpful in terms of sketching how change might take place in the present condition of the fitness industry. It is evident that individuals critical awareness of the discursive fitness practices is a central aspect of this process: the more critical awareness, the greater the possibility of practices of freedom emerging. The question now is how to evoke this critical awareness in fitness consumers at all levels of the fitness industry? This question points to my role as a researcher of fitness. Based on this study, knowledge and experience embedded in critical awareness

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seem to translate into the technologies of the self and, thus, create the foundation for transformation in the discursive condition of the fitness industry. As a feminist researcher in this field, I actually possess significant knowledge of and experience in fitness. What was my ethics of care, my responsibility in changing fitness practices? How did I use my critical awareness to initiate localized practices of freedom? Although the interviewees knew that I worked at a university, I did not mention my own background in the fitness industry. Consequently, as I regularly attended Hybrid classes, the instructors thought of me as a normal participant rather than a fitness expert. Although I perhaps practiced selfcare by creating an aesthetics of better posture, I did not instigate any change in the fitness discourse despite my relative power position. I continue to be troubled by my own (non-)engagement with the possibilities offered by the technologies of the self. It is, perhaps, timely to engage in a research project where I assume a more active role in the fitness truth game by consciously evoking the critical awareness of exercising women. Through such a project it is perhaps possible to further analyze the transgression of womens fitness discourse; currently I am exploring a range of possibilities along these lines of research. Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Nancy Theberge for her support and the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments regarding this article. I also want to thank Jim Denison for his valuable assistance in the process of writing this work.

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