VIETNAM IN ASEAN: MULTILATERALISM AND

RELATIONS WITH THE GREAT POWERS

Carlyle A. Thayer *
[Paper to Vietnam on the Road to Development and Integration: Tradition and
Modernity, 2nd International Conference on Vietnamese Studies, National Center
for Social Sciences and Humanities of Vietnam, Vietnam National University, and
the Ford Foundation, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, July 14-16, 2004]

Introduction
This paper explores the role of multilateralism in Vietnam’s foreign
policy throughout the decade of the 1990s until the present. The
paper is organized into five parts. Part 1 provides a definition of
multilateralism. Part two traces the origins of Vietnam’s multi-
directional foreign policy. Part three reviews Vietnam’s experience
as a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Party four reviews Vietnam’s experience with
multilateralism in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. Part five
offers some conclusions arising from Vietnam’s experience with
multilateralism.

Part 1 — Multilateralism

Robert Keohane defines multilateralism as ‘the practice of

coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states
though ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’. 1 This
definition is called the ‘minimalist definition’ because of its
quantitative nature (three or more states) and because multilateral
institutions are defined as simply ‘multilateral arrangements with
persistent sets of rules’. John Ruggie 2 offers a deeper (or maximalist)
definition of multilateralism. Ruggie asks what is it about
international institutions that make them multilateral? He argues
that it is not simply the number of actors involved but the qualitative

* Director UNSW Defence Studies Forum, School of Humanities and Social

Sciences, University College, The University of New South Wales at the Australian
Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
1Robert O. Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’, International
Journal, 45 (Autumn 1990), 731.
2John Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, International
Organization, 46, 3 (Summer 1992), 566-568,
1
2 Carlyle A. Thayer
dimension or character of their coordination.

According to Ruggie, multilateral relations involve three or more

states coming together to tackle a specific issue or set of issues on the
basis of generalized principles of conduct. In other words,
multilateral institutions adopt appropriate conduct for a class of
actions irrespective of particular interests or circumstances. He
identifies three generalized principles that are important: non-
discrimination, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity. The principle
of indivisibility may be illustrated with reference to the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the most-favoured-nation
(MFN) principle. Under GATT and MFN the trade system is an
indivisible whole and all parties agree to treat each other in a like
fashion. Diffuse reciprocity means, with respect to exports for
example, that one party will receive roughly the same amount of
benefit in aggregate over a period of time as all other parties. This
paper adopts Ruggie’s definition when the term multilateralism is
used in this paper.

Part 2 — A Multi-Directional Foreign Policy

During the 1980s, a major transformation took place in how

Vietnam’s policy elite conceptualized foreign policy. The roots of this
transformation were two fold. They lay in domestic circumstances
arising from the socio-economic crisis that confronted Vietnam at
that time. And secondly, they also lay in external influences arising
from the ‘new political thinking’ emanating from Gorbachev’s Soviet
Union. Vietnam turned from a foreign policy framework heavily
structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy
framework that placed greater emphasis on national interest.
Vietnamese analysts now tended to emphasize global economic
forces and the impact of the revolution in science and technology
over military-industrial aspects of power when weighing the global
balance. 3 The old and new foreign policy frameworks are not
mutually exclusive, they can and do overlap and co-exist.

Vietnam’s ideologically-derived world view began to change in

tandem with a re-thinking of Soviet foreign policy. In December
1986, at the sixth national congress of CPV, Vietnam adopted the
policy of doi moi. This policy was mainly concerned with overcoming

3Vu Khoan, ‘Mot so van de quoc te cua dai hoi VII’ and Nguyen Manh Cam, ‘Gia
tri lau ben va dinh huong nhat quan’ in Bo Ngoai Giao, Hoi nhap quoc te va giu
vung ban sac. Hanoi: Nha xuat ban chinh tri quoc te, 1995, 71–76 and 223–230,
respectively.
Vietnam in ASEAN 3
the domestic economic crisis by the adoption of socio-economic
reforms including opening Vietnam to foreign direct investment.

It was not until May 1988, however, that Vietnam’s new foreign
policy orientation was codified. This took the form of Politburo
Resolution no. 13 which stressed a ‘multi-directional foreign policy’
orientation. 4 This resolution is now recognized as a major landmark.
The emphasis was ‘to maintain peace, take advantage of favorable
world conditions’ in order to stabilize the domestic situation and set
the base for economic development over the next ten to fifteen years.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, both Vietnamese and
Southeast Asian leaders began to discuss the prospects of and
conditions for Vietnam’s membership in the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In November 1990, President Suharto
of Indonesia became the first ASEAN head of state to pay an official
visit to Vietnam. In March 1991, Malaysia’s Prime Minister proposed
the initiation of a dialogue between ASEAN and the non-member
states of mainland Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia). This was immediately welcomed by Vietnam which also
signaled its desire to attract investment from ASEAN businessmen.

An important elaboration of Vietnam’s ‘multi-directional foreign

policy’ was adopted by the seventh national party congress in June
1991. 5 Vietnam now sought ‘to be friends with all countries’.
Vietnam’s Strategy for Socioeconomic Stabilization and Development Up
to the Year 2000, declared that Vietnam would ‘diversify and
multilateralise economic relations with all countries and economic
organizations...’ In August, Phan Van Khai, first vice chairman of the
Council of Ministers, speaking at an international symposium in
Hanoi, signaled Vietnam’s desire to cooperate with ASEAN
members. Another Vietnamese official stated that ‘ASEAN can
become the bridge between Vietnam and the world.’ 6 In September,
during the course of a visit to Hanoi by Thailand’s Foreign Minister,
Vietnam expressed its willingness to accede to the 1976 ASEAN
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and then followed up by officially
notifying the Philippines of its intention. 7

4Nguyen Dy Nien, ‘Tiep tuc doi moi va mo cua vi su nghiep cong nghiep hoa,
hien dai hoa dat nuoc’, Tap Chi Cong San, no. 12, June 1996, 47.
5Vu Khoan, ‘Mot so van de quoc te cua dai hoi VII’, op. cit., 75.

6Remarks by Pham Van Tiem, chairman of the State Price Committee quoted by
Andrew Sherry, Agence France–Presse (AFP), Hanoi, 25 August 1991.
7Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Vietnam now casting its eyes towards Asean’, The Nation,
4 Carlyle A. Thayer
The October 1991 Cambodian peace agreement and the collapse of
the Soviet Union in December that year represented a major
watershed in the development of Vietnam’s ‘omni-directional’
approach to foreign policy. The Cambodian settlement meant that
Vietnam was no longer an international pariah state subject to an aid
and trade boycott. After the Cambodian settlement, Vietnam moved
to restore relations with the individual members of ASEAN and
ASEAN as a regional organization.

Vo Van Kiet, then chairman of the Council of Ministers, led a

high-level government delegation to Indonesia, Thailand and
Singapore in October-November 1991. 8 The following year he visited
Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. Kiet’s trips marked a return of
Vietnam into the regional fold and a turning back of the clock to
1976–77 when Vietnam-Southeast Asia relations were at an all time
high. Since Kiet’s ground-breaking visits, Do Muoi, Secretary
General of the Vietnam Communist Party, paid visits to Singapore,
Malaysia, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South Korea and
Myanmar. 9

The end of the Cambodian conflict brought with it an end to

ASEAN’s trade and aid embargo. This led to unprecedented levels of
commercial interaction. ASEAN investment increased ten fold in just
three years (1991–1994), and made up 15 per cent of total direct
foreign investment. ASEAN states became involved in over 147
projects with a paid up capital of US$1.4 billion by the first half of
1994. Thirty-seven development agreements were signed between
Vietnam and ASEAN businesses during this period.

Sixty per cent of Vietnam’s foreign trade was with ASEAN states.
In 1994, Singapore overtook Japan to become Vietnam’s biggest
trading partner. Four of the ASEAN countries ranked among the top
fifteen foreign investors in Vietnam. Singapore and Malaysia ranked
sixth and seventh, respectively, after Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea, Australia and France. 10 The industrializing economies of
Thailand and Malaysia also made them important models for

24 September 1991.
8Murray Hiebert and Michael Vatikiotis, ‘Asean’s embrace’, Far Eastern Economic
Review, 14 November 1991, 19.
9Do Muoi held an informal summit with Thai Prime Minister Chatchai in Chiang
Mai in January 1991.
10Data on foreign investment provided by the State Committee for Cooperation
and Investment as of 11 August 1994.
Vietnam in ASEAN 5
Vietnamese emulation.

Since 1992, in preparation for membership, Vietnam joined six

ASEAN committees and five ASEAN projects on functional
cooperation, including science and technology, environment, health
services, population, tourism, culture, civil aviation and maritime
transportation. In 1992 and 1993, Vietnam attended the annual
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings as an observer. In July 1992 Vietnam
acceded to the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (or
Bali Treaty). By so doing Vietnam renounced the use of force or the
threat to use force in foreign relations. And Vietnam committed itself
to the non-violent resolution of any conflict which might arise under
mechanisms spelled out in the 1976 Bali Treaty. Two years later, at
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, ASEAN officially
invited Vietnam to become its seventh member. Vietnam’s
application was formally approved in late 1994 and it became a
member in July 1995. Vietnam also joined the ASEAN Regional
Forum at this time. 11

Since the seventh party congress, Vietnam succeeded in

diversifying its foreign relations (in 1994 alone, Vietnam received
presidents and prime ministers from Mongolia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Sweden, South Korea, Japan, India and Canada). The
major accomplishments of this new orientation were fivefold:
normalization of relations with China (November 1991), the
restoration of official assistance from Japan (November 1992) and in
1995 normalization of relations with the United States, membership
in ASEAN, and the signing of a framework agreement with the
European Union. For the first time, socialist Vietnam had established
relations with all five permanent members of the UN Security
Council and equally importantly, with the world’s three major
economic centers: Europe, North America and East Asia. Vietnam’s
overall diplomatic relations expanded to include diplomatic ties with
163 countries by the end of 1996. In 1989, Vietnam had diplomatic
relations with only twenty-three non-communist states.

In 1995 Vietnam participated in the fifth ASEAN summit and the

first Asia-Europe Summit Meeting. Vietnam also met its obligations
under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). During 1995
Vietnam exchanged thirty-five major delegations with ASEAN states

11For Vietnamese views on the ARF consult: Vu Tung, ‘Dien dan khu vuc ASEAN
(ARF) va an ninh chau A - Thai Binh Duong’, Nghien Cuu Quoc Te, 3(5), September
1994, 28–33; and Nguyen Phuong Binh, ‘Vai tro cua ASEAN trong viec xay dung
co che an ninh khu vuc’, Nghien Cuu Quoc Te, 4(6), December 1994, 30–34.
6 Carlyle A. Thayer
including the visit of President Le Duc Anh to the Philippines and
the visit of the King of Malaysia to Vietnam. Figures released at the
end of the year revealed that ASEAN states had invested in 234
projects with a total investment capital reaching US$3.2 billion. As of
16th May 1997, these figures had risen to 312 projects with a total
capitalization of US$7.6 billion or 20% of the total foreign direct
investment in Vietnam. Singapore ranked first in both the number of
projects (156) and capital invested (US$5.1 billion). 12

On 15th December 1995, Vietnam signed the protocol acceding to

the agreement on the CEPT scheme as a first step in joining the
ASEAN Free Trade Area. 13 Vietnam is now obligated to extend
most-favored nation and national treatment to ASEAN member
countries. Under the terms of this protocol Vietnam was also
required to provide information on its trade regime and reduce its
tariffs on its immediate inclusion list to 0-5% by January 1996. In
actual fact, all 857 lines on Vietnam immediate inclusion list already
met this requirement.

Vietnam retained 1,189 tariff lines (54% of the total) on its

temporary exclusion list and 26 tariff lines on its sensitive list (1% of
the total). Vietnam was required to phase in tariff reductions on its
temporary exclusion lines in five equal installments beginning in
January 1999 and ending by January 2003. In 2003, ninety-two per
cent of all tariff lines used by Vietnam would fall under the CEPT
scheme. Most of Vietnam’s sensitive list includes unprocessed
agricultural products.

In sum, in both political and economic relations Vietnam

positioned itself quite well to join ASEAN and participate in its
program of regional integration. Upon joining ASEAN, Vietnam
reorganized its bureaucracy by creating a National ASEAN
Committee headed by a Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility
of coordinating all institutions that interacted with ASEAN or
ASEAN-affiliated bodies. An ASEAN Department was created
within the Foreign Ministry. The next part will review Vietnam’s
experience as a member of the Association of South East Asian
Nations until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.

12Le Quoc Phuong, ‘FDI of ASEAN Countries in Vietnam to Increase’, Saigon

Times Daily, 21 May 1997.
13Suthad Setboonsarng, ed., AFTA Reader, vol. 4, The Fifth ASEAN Summit. Jakarta:
ASEAN Secretariat, September 1996, 36–38.
Vietnam in ASEAN 7
Part 3 — Vietnam in ASEAN

Vietnamese officials identify the following major benefits that

Vietnam hoped to gain by membership in ASEAN: enhanced
national security, external support for economic development, and
as a catalyst to its domestic reform process. 14

Vietnam joined ASEAN with the prime strategic objective of

securing of a more peaceful international environment in which to
guarantee Vietnam’s national security against external threat. This
objective had several dimensions. Vietnam specifically sought to
transform its relations with ASEAN states from suspicion to trust
and from competition to partnership by moving to resolve such
problems areas as the repatriation of Vietnamese refugees, 15
demarcation of continental shelves, overlapping territorial claims
(involving Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and fishing
disputes. These legacies of history were seen as irritants that could
impede the development of close ASEAN-Vietnam relations.
Membership in ASEAN provided Vietnam a greater capacity for
political cooperation and dealing with conflicts with its regional
neighbours. For the first time since independence, Vietnam was less
concerned about its borders; and this brought with it the ‘peace
dividend’ of reduced defence expenditures. In other words, long-
term political and strategic objectives were Vietnam’s first priority.

Vietnam also sought membership in ASEAN to enhance its

bargaining position in global affairs, particularly with the major
powers. Good ASEAN-Vietnam relations was expected to lead to
enhanced standing and prestige in the wider Asia-Pacific and the
world. Vietnam could leverage ASEAN’s good standing with the
major powers and would not have to sacrifice any of its external
relationships.

Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea in 1992 served as a

catalyst for ASEAN membership. Membership in ASEAN, in Hanoi’s
view, transformed this particular problem from a bilateral one
between Beijing and Hanoi into a multilateral one involving China
and ASEAN as a group. In other words, bilateral discussions on
territorial disputes between China and Vietnam took on an added

14Doan Manh Giao, ‘Why Vietnam Joins ASEAN’, Paper presented to

international seminar on Vietnam and ASEAN: Business Prospects and Policy
Directions’, Kuala Lumpur, 19 December 1995.
15Kawi Chongkittawon, The Nation, 29 January 1992.
8 Carlyle A. Thayer
dimension because of Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN and
Vietnam’s adherence to ASEAN’s declaratory policy on the
settlement of outstanding disputes. However, as Vietnamese
analysts point out, ‘Vietnamese history shows that one-sided
relations have led to political isolation and economic difficulties....
Therefore, Vietnam’s ASEAN membership should be achieved in a
way that would strengthen instead of harm Vietnam’s relations with
China’. 16

Vietnam also sought membership in ASEAN as a means to

improve its relations with the United States. In Hanoi’s view,
Vietnam was strategically more important to Washington as a
member of ASEAN. In 1994, before Vietnam was a member, it was
still subject to a US-imposed trade and aid embargo. By securing
ASEAN membership, Vietnam hoped it would transform its image
from a ‘communist trouble maker’ to that of an underdeveloped
socialist country striving to develop a ‘market-orientated economy’.
In Hanoi’s view, its conversion into a potential ‘partner for peace’
would be attractive to decision-makers in Washington. Hanoi also
expected that ASEAN membership would provide it some political
support in its dealings with the United States and Europe on such
issues as human rights and democratization. According to one
Vietnamese political analyst Vietnam would be ‘quite happy to hide
behind’ Malaysia and Singapore on those issues. 17

A third objective of ASEAN membership was to secure the most

favorable external conditions for carrying out economic renovation
and integration with the region and global economy. According to
one Vietnamese writer, ‘Politically, due to ASEAN’s high
international prestige, ASEAN membership would enhance
Vietnam’s diplomatic standing and integrate Vietnam’s security with
the security of the whole of Southeast Asia, thus creating an external
environment favorable for economic development.’ 18

Vietnam expected to benefit from increased trade and investment

16Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘Why Hasn’t Vietnam Gained ASEAN Membership’,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 15(3) December 1993, 288–289.
17Quoted by Adam Schwarz, ‘Joining The Fold’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16
March 1995. An article written prior to Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN also
noted the similarity in policy on human rights between Vietnam and ASEAN; see:
Nguyen Phuong Binh, ‘Ve viec Viet Nam gia nhap ASEAN’, Nghien Cuu Quoc Te,
3(5), September 1994, 26.
18Tuan, ‘Why Hasn’t Vietnam Gained ASEAN Membership’, 283.
Vietnam in ASEAN 9
from ASEAN states. 19 Participation in the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) meant gaining familiarity with the norms and practices of
international trade. This in turn would facilitate membership in the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and eventual
membership in the World Trade Organization. 20 Vietnam’s
membership in AFTA did not greatly affect the other ASEAN
economies as trade with Vietnam comprised about 2.5 percent of the
existing intra-ASEAN total.

As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam could also expect to learn from

the developmental experience of its original members and receive
their support in addressing Vietnam economic (and political)
concerns, especially as a developing country. In other words,
membership in ASEAN would act as a catalyst for and further
accelerate domestic reforms in Vietnam.

But participation in AFTA was expected to result in trade creation

and trade diversion benefits for Vietnam. Vietnam expected to
increase its imports from ASEAN, particularly from Singapore.
Thailand was expected to divert its trade by importing more from
Vietnam under AFTA arrangements. Vietnam was to import quality
materials from ASEAN not only for domestic production but for
export. As an ASEAN member, Vietnam enjoyed the Generalized
System of Preferences status in selling to Europe and North America.
Vietnam’s textile, garment, leather and electronic assembly
industries were expected to benefit most.

Vietnam expected that membership in AFTA would result in

increased foreign direct investment to the extent that the ASEAN
region as a whole was seen as a stable and profitable market.
Vietnam also expected to receive high technology transfers from
member states. As of May 1997 three ASEAN countries—Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand—ranked among the ten largest foreign
investors in Vietnam (Indonesia ranked eighteenth, the Philippines
twenty-first). Singaporean investment is concentrated in the fields of
hotel construction and tourism. Malaysia and Indonesia invested in
Vietnam’s oil sector, while Thailand has concentrated on mineral
exploitation and processing. ASEAN investment in Vietnam was
expected to rise as investors sought to exploit Vietnam’s lower labor

19 Bala Ramasamy, ‘The Second Enlargement of ASEAN: The Inclusion of

Vietnam’, ASEAN Economies, 25(2) June 1996, 29–47. Updated figures are from Le
Quoc Phuong, ‘FDI of ASEAN Countries in Vietnam to Increase’, op. cit.
20Vietnam was admitted into APEC in November 1998.
10 Carlyle A. Thayer
costs in resource and labor intensive industries.

How did Vietnam evaluate the attainment of its objectives after a

year of membershp? In September 1996, Foreign Minister Nguyen
Manh Cam said that Vietnam made the right decision to join ASEAN
despite the difficulties it now faced in liberalizing its economy in an
effort to catch up with the other six members. 21 Cam also mentioned
difficulties caused by differences in the political systems, noting in
particular Vietnam’s socialist government, planned economy,
inexperience with the free market, and the lack of English-speaking
officials. Nonetheless, Cam stated, Vietnam would meet its
obligations to open its economy under AFTA by 2006. ‘We want to
strengthen the trend towards regionalism and international
integration. This will promote peace and stability’, he said. Among
the Vietnamese foreign policy elite there too was a general consensus
that the decision to join ASEAN was correct and had been a
success. 22

There were two areas of concern, however. Vietnam joined

ASEAN primarily for the political and strategic benefits it calculated
it would gain vis-a-vis China and the United States. As noted by one
Vietnamese writer, ‘despite announcing its commitment to the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation… Hanoi is not so certain whether
it accepts the rules of the game, that is, accepts all the written and
unwritten norms of the relationship among ASEAN countries
without any exceptions.’ 23 In other words, the major political
disadvantage for Vietnam, long accustomed to asserting its
sovereignty and independence, 24 has been the need to meld
Vietnam’s position to fit in with the ASEAN consensus.

The second area of concern related to Vietnam trade imbalance

and growing deficit with other ASEAN members. Intra-ASEAN
trade expanded and Vietnam reoriented its exports to take

21Lee Kim Chew, Hanoi, ‘Vietnam “Has No Regrets About Joining ASEAN”’, The
Straits Times, 10 September 1996.
22Nguyen Manh Hung, ‘Nhin lai mot nam Viet Nam gia nhap ASEAN’, Nghien
Cuu Quoc Te, no. 13, 1996, 3–5.
23Pham Cao Phong, ‘How Asean’s newest member is coping’, Business Times
Weekend Edition, Trends, 29–30 June 1996.
24See: Truong Giang Long, ‘Mot So Van De Trong Qua Trinh Ho Nhap Viet Nam-
ASEAN’, Tap Chi Cong San, no. 3, February 1997, 57–59, which stresses the need
for Vietnam to maintain its independence and sovereignty as a member of
ASEAN.
Vietnam in ASEAN 11
advantage of this large market. About thirty percent of Vietnam’s
exports went to ASEAN states. Imports from ASEAN accounted for
nearly one-half of Vietnam’s total imports. The volume of trade with
ASEAN countries rose markedly in dollar value terms and resulted
in a situation in which more than half of Vietnam’s trade deficit of
US$3.5 billion (1996 figures) was with other ASEAN countries. These
were Vietnam’s expectations and concerns up until the onset of the
Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997–98.

Part 4 — Vietnam and Multilateralism: An Assessment

This part reviews Vietnam’s experience with multilateralism in the

wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, enlargement, political upheaval
in Cambodia and the impact of reginal haze generated by Indonesian
forest fires. During this period, ASEAN lost some of its unity and
cohesion as some members became preoccupied with internal
stability and sought to recover by emphasizing policies of self-help
over regional cooperation. As a result, ASEAN became less effective
as an organization in dealing with external powers. A gap began to
emerge between the old and new ASEAN members. There were
fears that ASEAN would become a two-tiered organization.

In 1998, Vietnamese officials became alarmed by two

developments affecting ASEAN. The first concerned the impact of
multiple regional crises on Vietnam’s economic and political
stability. ASEAN’s disarray in dealing with these issues also served
to reinforce those voices in Vietnam who urged a go slow approach
to economic integration. The second issue concerned a move by
Thailand, supported by the Philippines, to modify ASEAN’s long-
cherished principle on non-interference in the internal affairs of
other member states. Thailand’s proposal was aimed at Myanmar
whose domestic policies, it was alleged, spilled over and threatened
regional stability. Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister wanted
Cambodia included in this discussion on constructive intervention
(later changed to flexible engagement). Vietnam supported the status
quo. These two developments caused Vietnam to lower its
expectations about the benefits and advantages of multilateralism
through ASEAN membership.

Vietnamese writers assert that the Asian financial crisis

undermined both regional and national resilience. As noted by one
analyst, ASEAN’s inward looking tendency became stronger than its
sense of community as individual countries turned to self-help. The
Asian financial crisis also undermined ASEAN’s collective self-
confidence. As a result, ASEAN became less effective in dealing with
12 Carlyle A. Thayer
the great powers.

There were two immediate impacts on Vietnam. 25 First, some

ASEAN members lowered their expected contributions to Vietnam’s
economic development at intergovernmental and private sector
levels. Second, economic transactions between Vietnam and ASEAN
became less effective as the structure of trade worked against
Vietnam’s national interests. Vietnam now faced stiff competition in
some sectors from its neighbours.

The Asian financial crisis and its aftermath raised serious concerns
about the efficacy of Vietnam’s experience with multilateralism as a
member of ASEAN. Political instability and unexpected leadership
change in neighbouring states not only created an unsettling
environment for Vietnam, but it also meant that their increased
concern with domestic affairs came at the expense of attention to
regional affairs.

As ASEAN’s cohesion came under challenge, Vietnamese leaders

worried that the development gap within ASEAN between old and
new members would widen and create a two-tiered organisation.
Vietnamese concerns were fueled by statements attributed to
officials from the original five members that enlargement had led to
a slow-down in ASEAN decision-making and consensus-building.
These officials also alleged that new members were an economic and
political burden. ASEAN also experienced difficulties in managing
differences among its members on such issues as democratization
and human rights, security perceptions, and attitudes towards the
great powers. In the new circumstances, Vietnam’s expectations of
mutual support among ASEAN members was shaken.

Part 5 — Conclusion

Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN has resulted in more realistic

view of the benefits of multilateralism. Multilateralism tends to work
well when the external environment is stable. But economic set backs
and other strains, such as were experienced in Southeast Asia in the
late 1990s, have taught Vietnam that the principles of non-
discrimination, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity can be
undermined by the clash of national interests.

25Nguyen Phuong Binh and Luan Thuy Duong, ‘Expectations and Experiences of
the New Members: A Vietnamese Perspective’, in Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P.
Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro, eds., Reinventing ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 185-205.
Vietnam in ASEAN 13
Vietnam has reacted to these developments by developing strong
independent bilateral ties with the great powers. In 1999, it signed a
long-term cooperative framework agreement with China that sets
the context of bilateral relation into the first decade of the 21st
century. In 2000, Vietnam signed a long-term Bilateral Trade
Agreement with the United States that will integrate its economy
more closely with the American market. Based on these and other
experiences Vietnam is now seeking membership in the World Trade
Organisation. At the same time, Vietnam continues to emphasize the
importance of relations with individual Southeast Asian states as
well as ASEAN as an organization. Vietnam has been at the forefront
of ensuring that ASEAN adopts socio-economic policies designed to
reduce the development gap between new and old members. In sum,
Vietnam has adopted a more realistic view of ‘the ASEAN Way’ and
the benefits of multilateralism. Vietnam now seeks to pursuing
multilateral and bilateral policies in tandem.