Specpro Case Digests

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73
RULE 73 SANDOVAL v. SANTIAGO (83 Phil 784) VDA DE MANZANERO v. CFI of BATANGAS (61 Phil 850) FACTS: 1. Esteban Manzanero (Esteban) died in the provincial hospital of Albay. 2. His brother, Fortunato filed a sworn application with CFI of Batangas (CFI) praying for a summary settlement of Estebans estate. He likewise alleged that Esteban had no property except a life insurance policy worth PhP5,000 and that Esteban was indebted to him for PhP500. More importantly, he alleged that Esteban had legal residence in Batangas. 3. CFI issued an order for hearing and directed that notice be published in a newspaper in Batangas. 4. Petitioner (wife of Esteban) did not appear at the scheduled hearing. Nevertheless, the judge ruled that Esteban was a resident of Batangas, and that his property (insurance policy worth PhP5,000) be distributed after payment of PhP500 to Fortunato. 5. Thus, Filipinas Assurance Company was directed to pay the heirs of Esteban, the proceeds of his insurance policy. Net proceeds of the insurance policy were sent to the heirs, pursuant to the order. 6. Petitioner prayed that the money be returned and delivered to her. ISSUE: Whether questions of jurisdiction by reason of residence may be raised by means of certiorari RULING: (Not for this case.) 1. Under Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the jurisdiction assumed by CFI for settlement of the estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the person or location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. 2. The want of jurisdiction, in this case, does not clearly appear from the pleadings and records of the CFI. 3. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Albay stating that Esteban was a registered voter therein, and that he resided there before his death, does not form part of the record of the CFI. 4. Since lack of jurisdiction does not appear from the records, certiorari does not lie. 5. Under the law, petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the enforcement of her rights. BENEDICTO v. JAVELLANA (10 Phil 197) Facts: MAXIMO Jalandoni- testator; will provides: Hacienda Lantad- divided, to Maximo and other to sisters. On the entire estate, an obligation was imposed that all debts shall be paid, provided that of the products which each parcel may yield shall be devoted to the payment of debts and should the be insufficient, 2/3 or total amount shall be applied; in
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)
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case of balance of such products, it shall remain with the administrator for settlement of other charges. MAXIMINO- petitioned the administrator Javellana that he be directed to pay MAXIMINO a sum in lieu of land donated to him; products of the land had already been applied to payment debts and liabilities Issue: W/N MAXIMINO is entitled to payment in lieu of land donated? Held: The will of MAXIMO must be complied with. All those who are benefited have not received from the testator a universal succession to his estate but merely as legatees without right to receive their share of the property of the deceased until after his debts have been paid. Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within same special proceedings, not in a separate action. CASIANO v. MALOTO (70 SCRA 232) Facts: - Adriana Maloto Died in Iloilo City on 10/20/63 her place of Residence, and her niece and nephews (Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino) commenced intestate proceedings believing their aunt died intestate.
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The niece and nephews executed an extra-judicial partition of Adrianas estate which was approved by the court on 3/21/64, and each got share each On 4/1/67 a document dated 1/3/40 surfaced purporting to be Adrianas Will, which shows that the niece and nephews still as heirs, but with Aldina and Constancio getting a bigger share (w/ Asiso de Molo, Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor as devisees/legatees) Aldina and Constancio (together w/ the other devisees/legatees of the Will) filed an MR to the previous special proceedings No. 1736 for annulment of such proceedings and allowance of the Will, this of course was opposed by the other 2 nephews Panfilo and Felino The court denied the MR for being filed out of time, and the petitioners (Adriana, Constancio etc.) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus which was likewise denied by the SC because the more appropriate remedy is to initiate separate proceedings for the probate of the alleged will in question Thus, the petitioners filed for the probate of the will, now special proceedings No. 2176, and the oppositors contested claiming the testatrix had revoked and destroyed the will, and the previous intestate proceedings constitute res judicata. The Probate Court dismissed the proceedings on the ground of res judicata, and the finding of the court in the previous special proceeding No. 1736 that the will had been destroyed and revoked.
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Issue: Whether the court in intestate, special proceeding No. 1736 had jurisdiction to rule on the discovered will? Whether the finding that the will was revoked and destroyed in special proceeding No. 1736 constitutes res judicata in special proceeding No. 2176? Held: No to Both. This Petition is meritorious. The motion to reopen proceedings was filed out of time, and it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will had been revoked, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate of the alleged will. Thus, the finding in special proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition, and the lower court is directed to proceed to hear the petition in special proceeding No. 2176 CUIZON v. RAMOLETE (129 SCRA 495) BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367) Facts: Eusebio Capili died before her wife Hermogena Reyes. Eusebios will was admitted to probate wherein he left his properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then during the pendency of the probate proceedings died intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor of Eusebios estate
Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with the will of Eusebio which however was opposed by Hermogenas relatives. They submitted their own project of partition claiming that of the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio on the theory that the properties belonged not to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This was questioned by Bernardo claiming that the properties belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her half share of such partnership. The probate court then issued an order declaring the donation void as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects of partition, ordering the executor to file another dividing the property of Eusebio according to the will noting that such properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses. Issue: Whether the probate court erred in applying the exception to the general rule that it has no power to adjudicate title in a probate proceedings? Held: NO Ratio: The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except when one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
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determination in a separate action. It has also been held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. Provided that interests of third persons are not prejudiced. In this case the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnerships or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the state of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs including of course the widow represented by her collateral relatives upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested are all heirs claiming title under the testator. URIARTE v. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (33 SCRA 252) Facts: Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.
Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court.
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Held: 1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344 - NO While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all matters of probate" is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a nonresident alien (like the deceased) the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts - province and city where the deceased left considerable properties. In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it that the decedent had left a last
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court - NO Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will executed by Don Juan since 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; Vicente Uriarte likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
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51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. This Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child. PCIB v. ESCOLIN (56 SCRA 266) FACTS: - CHARLES Hodges and LINNIE Hodges were spouses. - Both executed similar wills, whereas the decedents entire estate shall go to the surviving spouse and that spouse may do
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whatever s/he pleases, with the condition that when the surviving spouse likewise passes away, the residual estate shall pass on to the surviving brothers/sisters of the (first) decedent [and if brother or sister dies, the corresponding heirs shall represent, etc.] - LINNIE Hodges died ahead of CHARLES. CHARLES was the named administrator in LINNIEs will. - As administrator, CHARLES was allowed by the probate court to do several acts of administration, including continuing the business run by CHARLES and LINNIE. - CHARLES made annual reports to the probate court and at some point he allegedly renounced all the inheritance he got from LINNIE *in favor of LINNIEs siblings+. - Shortly after this alleged renunciation, on December 25, 1962, CHARLES died. - CHARLES died without having ever liquidated or closed or distributed LINNIEs estate. - Upon CHARLES death, AVELINA Magno was named administratrix of LINNIEs estate and as Special Administratrix of CHARLES estate. Nothing else happened in LINNIEs estate henceforth. (AVELINA was assigned because she was the one employee closest to the spouses and she had been with them for more than a decade.) - AVELINA carried on acts of administration in both estates until she was joined by CHARLES brother, JOE Hodgens, as coadministrator in CHARLES estate. - AVELINA and JOE were subsequently replaced by several other individuals until only PCIB was appointed sole administrator (there were no records of why the changes took place and why PCIB ended up the sole admin)
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- Both proceedings in LINNIEs and CHARLES estates proceeded independent of each other AVELINA acting as admin for LINNIEs estate and PCIB for CHARLES. - Both administrators hired lawyers and eventually had to pay substantial amounts out of the estate. Both proceedings went on independently until such time that conflicts arose between administrators with respect to safekeeping the properties, liquidating the estate, etc. - The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by PCIB against the court which handled both estate proceedings. The judge (ESCOLIN) kept approving motions apparently from both estates, which led to confusing or even conflicting issues. ISSUE: (1) Whether there exists, still, LINNIEs estate (on the theory that her estate is practically closed since she bequeathed everything to her husband)? (2) If so, how much does she still have that would go to her siblings? Are the siblings entitled to anything (on the theory that the will contained substitutions)? RULING: (1) Yes, LINNIEs estate still exists and the proceedings therefor have not closed. While it is true that LINNIE adjudicated her entire estate to CHARLES, she still had her own estate for which the proceedings in which AVELINA is administratrix could proceed. LINNIEs estate consists of those properties which are her part in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky factual circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination which of the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to LINNIEs estate.
(2) LINNIEs siblings (or representatives) are entitled to LINNIEs estate which should not be less than one-fourth of the community estate at the time of her death , minus whatever CHARLES may have gratuitously disposed of during his administration and as sole heir. If CHARLES sold the properties for consideration, such consideration shall continue to form part of LINNIEs estate. With regard to the alleged substitutions, there was no legal substitution to begin with. CHARLES being named by LINNIE as her sole heir (they had no other heirs), albeit subject to the condition that LINNIEs relatives would inherit whatever is left, but CHARLES not having to preserve anything for the subsequent heirs this setup is not the substitution contemplated under the Civil Code. Neither is this prohibited by law. The Supreme Court stated that two hanging issues are better left to the trial court since these are issues of fact: (a) whether CHARLES indeed renounced LINNIEs inheritance and (b) whether there is a conflict of applicable laws (laws of the Philippines and that of Texas, where the couple has properties), applying the renvoi doctrine and Art. 16 of the Civil Code. For the meantime, the Supreme Court advised both the administrators to act in conjunction with the other and never proceed with one estate independently. DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652) FACTS:
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- RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and FLORENCIA Arcega (wife) in 1933. - RAMON died intestate and FLORENCIA administered the conjugal properties. - FLORENCIA acquired other properties using the fruits of the conjugal ones. - After RAMON died, his intestate was not commenced and the conjugal properties were not liquidated until FLORENCIA died, after which the latter's testamentary proceedings were initiated and are now in progress. - The heirs of both spouses brought this action to recover their share not only in the conjugal properties left by RAMON but also in those acquired by FLORENCIA with the products of said properties. - A demurrer (by other heirs) was interposed to the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause of action; that there is a defect of party plaintiffs and party defendants, and that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. - The (probate) court sustained this demurrer and dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was taken. ISSUE: Whether granting the demurrer was proper. RULING: Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed.
Whatever law might be applicable the intestate of RAMON del Rosario not having been commenced upon his death in 1895 until his widow FLORENCIA Arcega also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of FLORENCIA Arcega having been subsequently initiated, wherein, among other things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the deceased RAMON del Rosario should be made the pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At any rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses . DOLAR v. ROMAN CATHOLIC (68 Phil 727) FACTS: 1. The deceased had two wives. He had 5 children from his first marriage, and another 4 children from the second. 2. He left a will, setting out his properties and distributing the same to wife #2 and his children by both marriages. He also left a legacy of PhP8,000 to be spent for the altar of the church in Dumangas, ordering that the sum be taken from the fruits of all the properties before partition. 3. Wife #2 was appointed administratix. She filed a project of partition which was not approved because of opposition of certain heirs. Another project of partition was filed which was also not approved because of the opposition of the Bishop of Jaro, who represented the Church of Dumangas. It should be
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noted that the second project of partition was not concurred in by the heirs of the first marriage. 4. In disapproving the 2nd project of partition, the court ordered Wife #2 to take immediate possession of all the properties and pay from the proceeds thereof, the legacy of PhP8,000. Wife #2 and the heirs (by the 2nd marriage) appealed the disapproval of the project of partition. ISSUE: Distribution of the estate RULING: 1. Unless wife #2 and the heirs by both marriages, as well as the Bishop of Jaro and other creditors of the estate, come to an agreement, the partition should be made with the intervention of all the interested parties according to law. 2. Thus a. All debts and administration expenses shall first be paid b. Conjugal properties of 1st marriage must be liquidated to determine the shares of the children (as heir of wife #1) and the deceased. c. Conjugal properties of 2nd marriage must also be liquidated to determine the share of wife #2 and that of the deceased. d. Properties corresponding to the deceased (from process (b) and (c)) constitute his estate. e. Estate shall be partitioned among the ff heirs i. Children by 1st and 2nd marriage ii. Wife #2
f. As there are forced heirs (yeah!), the legacy should be taken from the free portion only (remaining 1/3). The heirs may deliver to the legatee (Bishop of Jaro) properties equivalent to the 1/3 free portion since the legacy is by way of usufruct. g. The fruits of the property already received or to be received shall answer for the legacy with respect to 1/3 portion only. The remaining 2/3 shall accrue to the heirs. h. The legal usufruct of wife #2 shall be taken from the third available for betterment. 3. After partition, the properties corresponding to the heirs as legitime shall be delivered. 4. As to the free third, it shall belong to all the forced heirs in equal parts, subject to the legacy as to its fruits. ALFONSO v. NATIVIDAD (6 Phil 240) Facts: Alfonso: administrator of the estate of Pedro ANGELES; sued NATIVIDAD and FLORES for the recovery of 2 separate parcels of land NATIVIDAD land: - ANGELES and wife obtained a loan from NATIVIDAD and as security pledged the title deed. Upon death of ANGELES and subsequently the wife, NATIVIDAD waited for heirs to appear and pay the debt. - Claims that the property belonged wife
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FLORES land: - Land belonged to conjugal partnership. Land was sold to Alejandro with right to repurchase. ANGELES failed to exercise right of repurchase. After his death, wife (TOMASA) repurchased land and sold to FLORES. Issue: W/N Alfonso is entitled to maintain the action for the recovery of the lands? Held: FLORES land: the repurchase of land by TOMASA gave her the sole ownership; heirs of husband acquired no rights by her repurchase. NATIVIDAD land: in the absence of proof that money with which land was bought belonged to the wife, declared to be conjugal property. o Conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of the husband. As to settlement of partnership affairs: debts and obligations of the partnership affairs shall be discharged, then of the net proceeds be considered as the exclusive property of the deceased spouse. It is necessary to that the executor or administrator appointed is the one entitled to the custody of the property while settlement is being made o No lien in favor of NATIVIDAD over the land nor entitle him to retain it until his debt was paid all other property of the partnership will be held for payment of debts.
CRUZ v. DE JESUS (52 Phil 870) Facts: - This is an appeal made by the petitioners (including the surviving husband) in which the court denied their complaint to liquidate and partition the property left by the deceased Juliana Nabong - The petitioners claim that Juliana Nabong left no debts, and partition is asked for in the regular court - This court ruled that the proper action for property belonging to the conjugal partnership (especially since the surviving spouse is a party) should be in an intestate/testate proceeding for the settlement of the deceaseds estate Issue: Whether or not an action lies for the liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of the wife, said property having been in the possession of the surviving spouse for many years, without his having made any inventory thereof, nor liquidated and partitioned it, and it not appearing that there is any debt to pay? Held: Yes, an action lies for liquidation and partition. Sec 685 of Act No. 190 established two methods of liquidating the property of a conjugal partnership, if the marriage is dissolved by the death of one of the spouses: a) by testate/intestate proceedings
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b) by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition When the marriage is dissolved by death of the wife, the husbands power of management ceases and is shifted to the administrator in the testate/intestate proceedings to the end that there are any debts to be paid. If there are no debts, as in this case the liquidation and partition may be made in ordinary proceedings for that purpose. DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (7 Phil 745) VILLACORTE v. MARIANO (89 Phil 160) Facts: Leon Calimon married thrice. With his first wife Adriana Carpio he had three children Canuta, Tranquilina, Maria and Enriqueta. He then married Venacia Inducil who has a child by previous marriage, Tiburcio Villacorta. Venancia and Leon did not have any children. Leon thenafter married Macaria Mariano, they did not have any children as well. Petitioners here are the widow and daughter of Tiburcio seeking to recover 38 parcels of land from Canuta and her sisters and Macaria Mariano. Mariano in her answer claimed that the lots were owned exclusively by Leon Calimon but later on filed another answer asserting that all the realities has been acquired during her coverture with Leon and she also filed a cross claim against Canuta and her sisters demanding the recognition of her rights as surviving spouse. She claimed that through deceit, the sisters made her sign three documents assigning to her a riceland, a fishpond and 2,400 and renouncing her interest and rights in the estate of Leon as
well as her participation in the conjugal partnership with him. The sisters then after partitioned the properties, this was also thumbmarked by their stepmother Macaria. he Court then concluded that the three documents were valid and binding and that as a consequence the Calimon sisters are entitled to continue possessing the land and properties assigned to them. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in finding that the properties belong to the sisters without previously requiring an inventory and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the deceased Leon and Macaria. Held: NO Ratio: It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory and make the liquidation because the parties interested the widow and the children, already reached a compromise. Macaria cannot get away from her commitment and claim that she did not know the contents of the documents she signed. The said documents are valid and binding, and it was shown that only when there was delay in the delivery of one of the properties assigned to her did she question the validity of the documents. CALMA v. TANEDO (68 Phil 594) Facts:
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The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of a certain property. They were indebted to Esperanza Taedo, and these debts were chargeable against the conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed a suit for collection against Eulalio Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the conjugal property was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an action to ask that the sale made by the sheriff of the property be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof. Held: The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit. The probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176: SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property. In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made. The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife
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Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims. OCAMPO v. POTENCIANO (89 Phil 160) FACTS: 1) Edilberto Ocampo, husband of Paz Yatco (plaintiff Ocampo), executed a deed of sale w/ pacto de retro on a town lot w/ house in favor of Conrado Potenciano (defendant) and his wife. Edilberto also made a document where vendees where leasing to him house and lot during the redemption period. 2) House and lot conjugal property in reality, even if reg in husband's name only 3) One year repurchase period was "extendible to another year" but extensions were granted. Period lapsed w/o repurchase so defendant Potenciano consolidated title w/ RD of Laguna. 4) Potenciano gave plaintiff Paz Ocampo option to repurchase property w/in 5 years + 5 yr lease. Paz sought to exercise option by tendering payment to Potenciano but tender was rejected. Paz deposited money in court and brought action as administratrix of husband's estate to have property reinstated to them.
5) Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, intervened by filing cross-complaint alleging that option to purchase null and void as to share of their dead mom because they inherited her share and as to their dad, Victor and Lourdes were exercising right of redemption as co-owners of property. 6) Paz amended complaint: a) pacto de retro sale was really a mortgage b) option agreement was really extension of the mortgage c) valid tender of payment w/in the period 7) CFI gave judgment in favor of Paz and kids (sub after her death). CA found that pacto de retro sale was really a mortgage so Potencianos had no right to consolidate title over the property. However, CA said that mortgage novated by option agreement for the repurchase of mortgaged property. Potenciano siblings argue that this was error because Potenciano dad had no authority to enter into agreement after wife's death. SC agrees. ISSUE: W/n CA erred in supposing that surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of conjugal estate?
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1) The decisions laying down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs, are now
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HELD: YES, CA erred, Potenciano dad no authority to enter into option ag'mt.
obsolete. PRESENT RULE: when the marriage is dissolved by death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidate in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Rule 75, Sec. 2) 2) Option agreement was nothing more than mere extension of time for payment of mortgage debt since the real transaction was the equitable mortgage 3) Tender and consignation of Paz must be held to produce their legal effect, to relieve debtor from liability. 4) Thus, Victor and Lourdes (appellant children) Potenciano acquired nothing because ownership of property never passed to their parents PRADO v. NATIVIDAD (47 Phil 776) DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (25 Phil 437) Facts: The plaintiff Agueda charged her husband with adultery and prayed for a divorce, alimony pendente lite and division of the conjugal partnership. Defendant Esteban denied the charge of adultery and countered by charging his wife with adultery as well. Judgment was rendered in favor of Agueda granting her the sum of P81,042.76 as her share in the conjugal share. Upon appeal to SC of the Phils, the decision was overturned based on the reasoning that the evidence showed both spouses were guilty of adultery and therefore divorce was not available to either party.
Appeal to the SC of US resulted in upholding the decision of the lower court as to granting the divorce prayed for by the plaintiff. However, as to the other issues (alimony, share in the conjugal partnership) the case was remanded back to the SC of the Phils for further proceeding. Plaintiff insists that SC of the Phils should merely affirm the judgment of CFI as per SC of US judgment. Defendant on the other hand states that error was incurred in fixing the amount of the half of said alleged conjugal property at P81,042.75, without having examined the necessary antecedents and data
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Held: SC of US merely decided on the issue of adultery and did not touch on the issue regarding division of the conjugal partnership. It remanded the case to SC of Phils precisely to decide on the issues it did not address. CFI erred in fixing the amount at P81,042.75. Article 1418 provides, except in certain cases, an inventory shall at once be made. We have held in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad that when the partnership is dissolved by the death of the husband this inventory must be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. In the case of Prado vs. Lagera we ruled that the inventory thus formed must include the bienes parafernales of the wife. It is very evident from the provisions of the Civil Code that the inventory includes the capital of the husband, the dowry of the wife, the bienes parafernales of the
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wife, and all the property acquired by the partnership during its existence. After this inventory has been made it is provided by article 1421 that there shall be first paid the dowry of the wife, in the second place the bienes parafernales of the wife, in the third place the debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership, and in the fourth place the capital of the husband Conjugal property which is to be divided when the partnership is dissolved is determined not with reference to the income or profits which may have been received during the partnership by the spouses, but rather by the amount of the actual property possessed by them at such dissolution after making the deductions and payments aforesaid. This is positively provided by article 1424. An examination of the decision of the Court of First Instance shows that no attempt was made to comply with any one of these statutory provision. (No inventory, no paying of the wifes bienes parafernales, etc.) and their decision was based on the profits made by conjugal partnership after its formation. The theory of the Civil Code is that the conjugal property is the actual property which is left at the dissolution of the partnership. It can, therefore, never be determined by adding up the profits, which had been made each year during its existence, and then saying that result is the conjugal property. The case is remanded to the court below for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership
FULGENCIO v. GATCHALIAN (21 Phil 252) Facts: Plaintiff Josefa Fulgencio was the administratrix of the intestate estate of Dionisio Fulgencio (deceased). Defendant Gatchalian was the second wife of deceased. Gatchalian and the other defendants had control of the properties of the deceased and were sued by Fulgencio in order to be compelled delivery of the said properties to the latter (Fulgencio, who was the administratrix). Fernando Fulgencio, legitimate son of the deceased by the latters first marriage, intervened in the suit in order to protect his rights in the estate of the deceased. Gatchalian claimed that she should not be compelled to deliver the entirety of the properties demanded because some of it were her own and not part of the conjugal partnership. Note that there was an agreement between the parties conceding that certain properties (drygoods store, bakery, cigar and cigarette stand, bazaar) were paraphernal properties of the deceased. Issue: Whether Gatchalian could be compelled to deliver all the properties demanded from her. Held: YES. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: All the property of the marriage shall be considered as partnership property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
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If it be not proven conclusively that the property claimed by the administratrix is paraphernalia and belongs exclusively to the defendant Benita Gatchalian, it must be deemed to be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the conjugal partnership, and therefore, by virtue of the preinserted agreement, the administratrix has a right to be placed in possession of the same for the purpose of its inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the rights of the widow Benita Gatchalian in relation to her own property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has been made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the exclusion of the property belonging to her exclusively and that of the nature of paraphernalia. LUKBAN v. REPUBLIC (98 Phil 574) Facts: Petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on Dec. 10, 1933. On dec. 27 of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarreland since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She believes that he is already dead for he has been absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she be relieved of any liability under the law. A petition was filed in the Court of first instance of Rizal for a declaration that petitioner Lourdes is the widow of her husband Francisco who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. Issue: Whether or not the petition filed be Petitioner Lourdes has merit.
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Held: No. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding, much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is presumed to be dead. The philosophy behind this ruling of the Court is that judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executor, would still be prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. It is therefore clear that a judicial declaration that a person presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Regarding Petitioners reliance on the Hagans vs. Wislizenus, alleging that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present proceedingwhile it is true that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status, right of a party or a particular fact, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a declaration to that effect.
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RULE 74 UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302) Facts:

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate leaving his spouse
Held: There was no need for appointment of administrator

As a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave
Leona and 3 children Juan, Patrocinio and Luz During the pendency of the administration proceedings of the fathers estate, Luz died w/o any legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were her mother and husband Pablo Utulo The only property Luz left was her share in her fathers estate Pablo Utulo commenced the judicial administration of Luzs estate; he asked the court to be the administrator Leona opposed saying that since the deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for judicial administration; and if there is, she had better right Pablo claims that it was necessary for him to be named the administrator so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan Pablo was named administrator; Leonas appeal was granted; thus the petition
a will or he had left one but failed to name an executor, the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator Exceptions: (1) when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate of the deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition of the property without instituting the judicial administration; (2) where the property left does not exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator In these instances, the heirs are not bound to submit the property to judicial administration or to apply for the appointment of an administrator in court it is costly, superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs own the property from the moment of death of the decedent Pablos appointment as administrator was not necessary in order that he may have standing in the proceedings of Juans estate; he could appear by right of representation HERNANDEZ v. ANDAL (78 Phil 196) Facts: -PF (Cresencia Hernandez), intervenors (Maria and Aquilina Hernandez) and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not
Issue: whether there was a need for appointment of administrator
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)
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parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common from their father a parcel of land. -Intervenors sold 1800 sq. m. of this parcel to DF Zacarias Andal and his wife for P860. This portion purports to be the combined share of the intervenors in the larger parcel pursuant to an alleged verbal partition among the siblings. -After the sale, PF attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal offering P150 which she said was the amount DF had paid for intervenors shares, but it is alleged that DF refused. -PF filed a supplemental complaint wherein she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase said property for P860 plus expenses. -However, on a certain date, DF executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of intervenors. -In trial, when asked whether the land described in PFs complaint was the object of partition among the co-owners, PFs counsel objected on the ground that the best evidence was the document of partition itself, asserting that under ROC, agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. -Court ruled that under Rules 73 and 123 of the ROC (statute of frauds) and art. 1243 of Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible. It declared that the resale of the land by DF to intervenors were illegal and in bad faith. To this, DF and intervenors appealed. Issues: [1.]W/N lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the ground that it was not admissible.
[2.]W/N appeal should be dismissed since the findings and conclusions in the appealed decision were not assigned as errors. Held: [1.] Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the SOF is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. -the law has been uniformly interpreted to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. Performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. SOF does not declare the contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance. -On gen. principle, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. -Sec. 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of the creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Hence, the intrinsic validity of the partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not affected when there are no creditors or the rights of the creditors are not affected, as in this case.
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[2.] No. An unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. -in this case, the evidence on parol partition tendered by DF and intervenors was ruled out and the complain of this exclusion as error. In this manner, the assignment of error squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. An analysis of the case will show that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire litigation and on the validity depends in turn the competence of the excluded evidence. TORRES v. TORRES (10 SCRA 185) FACTS: - PAZ E. Siguion Torres died intestate on December 18, 1959. - ALBERTO S. Torres (petitioner), claiming to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz, petitioned to be administrator of the properties left by the decedent (aggregate value of about P300,000.00). He also claimed he was not aware of any debt left by the decedent. - ALBERTOS petition was opposed by CONCHITA Torres, one of the heirs, on the ground that on January 27, 1960, the heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 74. - The extrajudicial deed of partition of the estate contains the following provisions:
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1. That they (ALBERTO, ANGEL, EDUARDO and CONCHITA, all surnamed Torres) are the only legitimate children who survive the deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres; xxx xxx xxx 3. That the said decedent died without leaving any will and her only surviving heirs are the aforementioned parties who are her legitimate children; 4. That the deceased left no debts; xxx xxx xxx 6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and in view of the difficulty of making a physical division of the above properties, the parties have agreed to settle the aforementioned estate by continuing the co-ownership on all the above properties in the following proportion: ALBERTO Torres undivided interest ANGEL Torres undivided interest EDUARDO Torres undivided interest CONCHITA Torres undivided interest (Emphasis supplied.) - ALBERTO, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing the court's intervention. He also claimed that some properties of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial partition. In another pleading, he claimed that the decedent had an outstanding debt of P50,000.
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- On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed ALBERTOS petition. ISSUE: Whether administration or a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is necessary.
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RULING: No. The claim of the decedents debts is unsubstantiated. ALBERTO did not specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted. The bare allegation that "the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of action. If other properties are not included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, the questions such as the titles and their partition if proven to belong to the intestate can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition and not in an administration proceeding. Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either extra-judicially or through an ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for court intervention in view of the heirs' failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically, the heirs still have the remedy of an ordinary action for partition under Rule 74.
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ARCILLAS v. MONTEJO (26 SCRA 197) FACTS: 1. 2 petitions were filed in relation to the LOT owned by the decedent Arcillas. 2. Petition #1 was filed by Geronimo (one of the heirs) in order to cancel the TCT covering said LOT and the issuance of a new TCT in the names of the heirs in the corresponding portions alleged in the petition. This petition was based on a claim that several other heirs executed separate sales of their respective shares and participation in said LOT to Vicente (one of the private respondents). 3. Petition #2 was filed by the other children of the deceased praying for issuance of letters of administration in favor of PETITIONER preparatory to the final settlement of the deceaseds estate. 4. PETITIONER opposed Petition #1 inasmuch as the subject matter thereof was included in the estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration was awaiting resolution (Petition #2). 5. Geronimo, on the other hand, opposed Petition #2 arguing that inasmuch as the LOT was the only property of the deceased, and that the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper. 6. Court denied Petition #2 and instead, gave due course to Petition #1. 7. PETITIONER filed for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the administration proceedings (Petition #2), upon the averment that the estate left no debts and all the heirs are of age, was properly dismissed 2. Whether the cadastral action (Petition #1) was the more proper proceeding under the circumstances RULING: The Special Proceeding (Petition #2) should be reinstated. 1. No. Section 1, Rule 74 provides that if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves by means of a public instrument filed in the Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. The aforementioned rule is not mandatory or compulsory, as may be seen from the use of the word may. Thus, the rule does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings despite the fact that the estate left no debts and that all the heirs are of legal age. 2. No. Petition #2 was premised on Section 112 of Act 496, which authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate have terminated and ceased.
However, said relief can only be granted if a. There is unanimity among the parties, or b. There is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any interested party Absent the foregoing, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359) Facts: Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by heirs MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate. ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and his wife. Issue: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil action? Held: The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons with the least loss of time. o Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of administrator
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Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate; properly ventilated in an independent action and probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit). Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens CARREON v. AGCAOILI (1 SCRA 521) Facts: - During the marriage of Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina Dauag the registered land subject of this case was acquired. After the death of Carreon, his widow Celerina executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself alone the said land - She declared she was the only heiress of her husband. The OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in her name. - There was however annotated on her certificate a lien to the effect that her title was subject to Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (if within 2 years an heir deprived of his share in the estate reappears such heir may compel settlement) - Celerina mortgaged the property for 1,200 to PNB, when her loan was due she sold the property for 3,000 to Agcaoili, thus the mortgage was paid and the land transferred to herein respondent - the children of Celerina with the deceased husband filed a complaint against the spouses Agcaoili seeking to have the deed of sale executed by their mother
declared as one of mortgage and to recover one half pro-indiviso of the land described in the complaint, they claimed that Agcaoili was in bad faith knowing that Celerina was not the only heir of her husband, and thus he was holding the land in trust for them Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment upon the plea that the main averments of the complaint even if admitted do not constitute a cause of action and supported their plea with certain documentary evidence. The court ruled in favor of Agcaoili stating the petitioners averments had no basis
Issue: Was Agcaoili a buyer in bad faith? Using Sec 4 Rule 74, do the petitioners have a lien on the title? Held: No to Both Agcaoili is not expected to know Celerinas relatives even if he is a townmate. There is no clear proof he knew of the existence of petitioners. The lien petitioners speak of is effective only for a period of two years. From September 28, 1946, when a TCT was issued to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two years had elapsed The right to have such lien cancelled became vested on appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus oficio. Also, there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of Agcaoili, nor proof that he knew of any legal infirmity in the
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title of his vendor, he is not deemed to be holding the land in trust for the children of Celerina Dauag McMICKING v. SY CONBIENG (21 Phil 211) FACTS: - When Margarita JOSE died, his estate was administered by PALANCA with Dy CUNYAO and Mariano Lao SEMPCO as sureties. - When Mariano LAO SEMPCO died, his estate was administered by Doroteo VELASCO, and Mariano VELASCO and BARRETO were the sureties. - When BARRETO died SY CONBIENG administered his estate. - Along the way PALANCA absconded with about 4/5 of JOSEs estate. - The court then appointed MCMICKING who then tried to claim on the surety LAO SEMPCO. - But since LAO SEMPCOs estate cannot pay, MCMICKING brought an action to claim against LAO SEMPCOs surety BARRETO (whose estate is administered by SY CONBIENG). - Trial court ruled in favor of SY CONBIENG and dismissed MCMICKINGs claim. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether MCMICKING can claim from BARRETOs estate. HELD: No. The court based its ruling on these: SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity,
and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court. SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made. We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
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- For the court ruled that VELASCO having performed his original obligation partitioning the estate was from that point on free from liability; and so it follows that his sureties were also free. - And that any new claim arising within the two years necessitates the appointment of a new administrator and new sureties. For the original sureties secured only one obligation and not two. - The court then explained that MCMICKING seemed to argue that if the estate has any outstanding debts after partition that the partition itself is invalid. It is not so. In answer the court explained: as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration, the claim must be presented within two years [it was presented in 5] from the date of the partition and distribution. Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so far as the validity of the partition is concerned. We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is of no importance so far as the validity of the partition is concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which we have already adverted and left undecided. We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an
administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered and presented within two years. The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The sections under discussion make no distinction between claims. The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of OCAMPO very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities that OCAMPO'S estate might be called upon to respond for the failure of PALANCA to perform his duty as administrator. It was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of OCAMPO to be partitioned and distributed without protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it had been distributed. PERIERA v. CA (174 SCRA 154) Facts: Andres Periera died intestate, with no debts. He was survived be his wife of 10 months Victoria Periera who is a nurse in London and his sister Rita Nagac. Rita instituted as special proceeding for the issuance of letters if administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased which is said to include his death benefits from PAL, bank accounts in PNB and PCIB and a 300 sq mt land in Las Pinas. Victoria filled a motion to dismiss the petition alleging that there is no estate of the
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deceased for purposes of administration or that if there is an estate letters of administration be issued in her favor as surviving spouse. The trial court appointed Rita as administrator which Victoria is now questioning. Issue: Whether a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent as in this case? Held: NO Ratio: As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will or in case he left one should he failed to name an executor. An exemption to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for appointment of an administrator. Section 1 of Rule 74 however does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
It has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age of not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. In this case, the only two surviving heirs are the spouse and sister who are both or age. They admit that there are no debts. The estate is also not substantial. What is apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms and that Rita wants to administer the estate because she wants to take possession of the properties, this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. JEREZ v. NIETES (30 SCRA 905) Facts: In 1960 Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before the CFI of Iloilo, and his widow, Lucrecia Jerez, was appointed as administratrix. In 1966, a project of partition and final accounting was submitted, and the respondent Judge Nietes approved the same. Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
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preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Judge Nietes allowed intervention and reopened the proceedings to permit the movants "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." The widow and legitimate children of Nicolas Jalandoni filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, which denied such petition to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge. Held: Judge Nietes is directed to require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before such sala. Doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention: rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been approved. Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared to be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of partition. However, the verified motion on the part of private respondents (Lucilo and Victoria) did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention.
There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited."
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULES 75 to 77
RULES 75 76 FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428) FACTS: 1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate of purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. (oppositors) filed opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent, laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale. 2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was unrevoked by deeds of sale. 3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of opportune appeal, that it was appealable independently of issue of revocation, affirmed CFI. ISSUES: 1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack of appeal? 2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final? 3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds of sale? HELD: 1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final. Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and unenforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable, and it is so recognized by express provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appeal may be taken in specpro) 2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel cannot be raised in probate proceedings: The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership and right of dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not , the defense is patently meritorious. 3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any change from original intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent alienations made in favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no consideration whatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property to legatee, testatrix Benedicta merely intended to comply in advance with her testament, rather than a departure therefrom.
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MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215) FACTS: Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of will of deceased wife Ines Basa. Without any opposition and upon testimony of witness Gabino (attesting witness), admitted to probate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parte to reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because of ex parte. Second filing of the motion to open the proceeding, again denied. SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL, intervenor Basa de Leon filed with Justice of Peace of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint against Mercado for falsification or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainant withdrew complaint. THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercado for same offense in Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was dismissed after investigation, at the instance of complainant due to his poor health. NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person. This time filed by fiscal of Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of Mexico. Case dismissed after investigation because will was already probated. Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga for reinvestigation. CFI Granted. FOURTH TIME, Mercado was arrested. Mercado filed a demurrer on ground of probate. Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction. CA issued injunction.
1. Whether the probate of petitioners deceased wifes will is a bar to prosecution of forgery. YES. 2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy trial. YES. HELD: Several foreign decisions were cited. Can go either way. Others saying that can be impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code of Civil Procedure said that in an action or special proceeding, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration or condition or relation of the person provided that only be a prima facie evidence of the death of the testator conclusive as to its DUE EXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont. Conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world (in rem), reason why publication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that judgment or order of a court when declared by this Code of Civil Procedure are conclusive. State v. McGlynn (U.S. case). Although in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside the probate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A SUBTLE DISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and declaring probated will to be forgery. You would still disturb the decree. No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Court chose the most consistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is discovered after probate and prosecution before the prescription. Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adversely affected by probate application for relief within reasonable time but no case exceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.
Criminal action will not lie against forger of a will which had been admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. SUMILANG v. RAMAGOSA (21 SCRA 1369) Facts: Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of alleged last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa. The petition was opposed by two sets of oppositors, appellants herein, who questioned the due execution of the document. After petitioner presented evidence and rested his case, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that decedent revoked his will by implication of law six years before his death by selling the parcels of land described therein to his brother. On the other hand, petitioner moved to strike out oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors have no interest in the probate of the will as they have no relationship with the decedent within the fifth degree. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that the allegations of the oppositors goes to the very intrinsic value of the will and since the oppositors have no standing to oppose the probate of the will as they are strangers, their pleadings are ordered stricken out from the record. Held: The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid) To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings . . . for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila) True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. iThe first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.
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BALANAY v. MARTINEZ (64 SCRA 452) Facts:
Testator Leodegaria Julian (Julian) died at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband and six children. In her will, she stated that: (a) That she was the owner of the southern half of 9 conjugal lots; (b) That she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father; (c) That it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. (d) That after her husbands death, that her paraphernal and all conjugal lands be divided in the manner set forth in the will. In effect, Julian disposed of in her will her husbands conjugal assets. Her son, Felix Balanay, Jr. (Balanay Jr.) filed a petition for probate of the will. This was opposed by his father (Balanay Sr.) and Avelina Antonio on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and preterition. Balanay Sr. later withdrew this opposition through a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights wherein he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. The probate of the will was further opposed by Atty. Montaa (who purported to be a lawyer of Balanay Jr) and two others, saying that the will was void because it effected a compromise on future legitimes and that no notice to creditors were issued. The probate court listened to them and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
Issue: 1. Whether it was correct to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity. 2. Whether the probate court was correct in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. 3. Whether it was correct to issue notice to creditors without first appointing an executor or regular administrator. Held: 1. YES. The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal val idity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. 2. NO. The will should have been upheld, considering that its alleged defects have been cured by the husbands conformity. The husbands conformity had the effect of validating the will, without prejudice to the rights of creditors and legitimes of compulsory heirs. The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will.
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Thus, with respect to provision (a) above, the illegal declaration does not nullify the will. It may be disregarded. As to provision (c), it would at most be effective only from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the co-ownership. 3. NO. A notice of creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed. PASTOR v. CA (122 SCRA 885) Facts: the deceased Alvaro Pastor Sr. Was survived by his wife, two legitimate children, Pastor Jr. and Sofia and an illegitimate child, Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will of the deceased. The will contained only 1 testamentary disposition, which was a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of the $2% share of Pastor Sr. In the operation of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. Of some mining claims. Quemada was appointed special administrator. As such, Quemada filed an action for reconveyance against Pastor Jr. and his wife, regarding some roperties allegedly forming part of Pastor Sr.s estate, including the property subject of the legacy. Pastor Jr. and his wife files their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator. However, the probate court admitted the will to probate in 1972. In 1980, the probate court set a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will and required the parties to submit their position papers as to how the inheritance would be divided.
While the action for reconveyance was still pending, the probate court issed an order of executionand garnishment on August 20 1980, resolving the issue of ownership of the royalties payable to Atlas and granting the legacy to Quemada. The probate court issued an order on Nov. 1980 declaring that the probate order of 1972 indeed resolved the issue of ownership and the intrinsic validity of the will. Issue: whether or not the probate order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity as stated in the Nov. 1980 order Held: No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, that is whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities required by law. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is only provisional and not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Without a final authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose the estate of Pastor Sr. In the face of conflicting claims involving properties not in the name of the testator and in the absence of a resolution as to the intrinsic validity of the will, there was no basis for the probate court to hold that the 1972 probate order that Quemada is entitled to payment of the questioned legacy.
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US v. CHIU GUIMCO (36 Phil 917) Facts: Joaquin Cruz (aka Piaua) lived as a Chinese merchant in the municipality of Gingoog , Misamis In 1898, he visited China wherein he was married to a Chinese woman Uy Cuan and had one child In 1902, after his return from China , he was married to a Filipino Maria Villafranca In 1910, Joaquin again visited China , leaving his brother, defendant Chiu Guimco, in charge of his property and his business; he died during this visit to China Apparently, before he left for China , he executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named executors The executors filed a petition for the probate of the will. However, the will itself was not produced and nothing further was done in the matter of the probate Chiu Guimco entered into an agreement with Maria whereby in consideration of the conveyance of a certain property she relinquished in favor of other persons interested in the estate all her other claims In 1914, Uy Cuan came to the Philippines for the settlement of Joaquins estate; it was agreed that Uy Cuan and her child were to receive 40 percent of the estate, 40 to Chiu Guimco and 40 to another brother in China named Chiu Tamco They also entered into a contract wherein Chiu Guimco shall pay P350 per quarter for the rental of Uy Cuans interest in the real estate of Joaquin
In 1915, Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan and her child, made inquiries and urged Chiu Guimco to produce the will When he refused to do so, a criminal complaint against him, was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure The court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine and imprisonment until he delivers the will Issue: whether the judge had jurisdiction to impose the sentence of imprisonment on the accused Held: Judge had NO jurisdiction 629 can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons Where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under 629, should require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under 629 appropriate Furthermore, it is not permissible in a prosecution under 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed in 629 And, the order for the accused to produce the will is an infringement of the right against self-incrimination the mere production of the will by him would be conclusive
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that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint RODRIGUEZ v. BORJA (17 SCRA 418) Facts: -Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan (respondents) delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testatment of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 9, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriquez (petitioners), through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. On March 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the CIF of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On same day, (March 12), defendants filed a petition for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4. -petitioners contend that the intestate proceedings in the CIF of Rizal was filed at 8:00AM on March 12, while the petition for probate in the CIF of Bulacan at 11AM, so the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. -defendants contend that CIF of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery of the will, hence the case in this court has precedence over petitioners. -CIF of Bulacan denied MD of petitioners. MR denied. Issue: Which court has jurisdiction? CIF of Bulacan Held: -The jurisdiction of the CIF of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of the Fr. Rodriquez on March 4 even if no
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petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: When a will is deliver to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published xxx -where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of Bulacan on March 4 while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable -As to petitioners objection that the Bulacan court did not have jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal, court ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s estates is conferred by law upon all CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court. -Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in Bulacan court ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73. -Court also held that petitioners, in commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. -Lastly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid and operative will (Art. 960 of Civil Code).
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TEOTICO v. DEL VAL (13 SCRA 406) FACTS: - MARIA Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. - She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence. - She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. - Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses. - In said will the testatrix stated that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate. - MARIA left P20,000.00 to RENE A. Teotico, husband of her niece JOSEFINA Mortera. - JOSEFINA was also instituted as the sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. - On July 17, 1955, VICENTE B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Hearing was set after publication and notice were made. - ANA del Val Chan claiming to be an adopted child of FRANCISCA Mortera (deceased sister of MARIA) as well as an acknowledged natural child of JOSE Mortera (deceased brother of the MARIA) filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear; and that (4) the will is inoperative as to the share of RENE Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. - VICENTE B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. - The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of FRANCISCA Mortera. - After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of RENE Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. ISSUES: (1) Has oppositor ANA del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding? (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?
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(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. RENE Teotico? RULING: With the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. (1) No, the oppositor has no right to intervene. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. Under the terms of the will, oppositor ANA del Val Chua has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator. She is also not a legal heir because her adoption only created a
relationship between her and her adoptive parents. She does not have a relationship with the decedent. (2) Yes the will has been duly admitted to probate. All three instrumental witnesses testified, among other things, that it was the testatrix herself who asked that they act as witnesses to the will and that it was the testatrix who first signed the will and they signed successively in the presence of each other and of the testatrix. This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law. The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. The mere claim that JOSEFINA Mortera and her husband RENE Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own. The
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burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses. (3) The pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. RENE Teotico in the will must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. The Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in a probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason. FERNANDO v. CRISOSTOMO (90 SCRA 585) FACTS: 1. Hermogenes Fernando (GUARDIAN) was appointed as guardian of Crisostomo and his minor children. 2. When Crisostomo died, GUARDIAN filed a motion for the approval of an extrajudicial settlement of the minor childrens parents (Crisostomo and his wife, who also died). 3. The court denied the motion and the extrajudicial settlement was declared null and void. (ORDER 1) 4. Germano Crisostomo (brother of deceased and one of the private respondents) filed a petition to open the instate proceedings of the deceased spouses and the appointment of himself and his sister as co-administrators of the estate. 5. GUARDIAN (ever bibo!) opposed and moved for the dismissal of the instate proceedings, arguing that the properties left by the deceased spouses were already in his possession as guardian. The court denied his motion to dismiss. (ORDER 2) 6. Germano Crisostomo and his sister were appointed coadministrators of the estate of the deceased spouses. 7. GUARIAN appealed from ORDER 1 and ORDER 2. ISSUES: 1. Whether the court should have denied the petition for the opening of the intestate proceedings (or dismissed the same upon motion of GUARDIAN)
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2. Whether the project of partition submitted by GUARDIAN should have been approved RULING: 1. The Court had actually issued several resolutions which constitute res judicata with regard to the present appeal, to wit a. The judge acted within his jurisdiction in appointing petitioners (Germano and sister) as administrators, inasmuch as said petitioners have interest, as next of kin, to petition for letters of administration. The guardian of the minor children of the deceased is not, as such, administrator of the estate of the deceased until and after said estate has been acquired by or adjudicated to the minors by proper proceedings. b. The jurisdictional facts are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. The name and competency of the person(s) for whom letters of administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional fact. The guardian of the minors has no right to administer the properties of the deceased until said properties have been adjudicated or awarded to them either by extrajudicial or judicial partition. Since no partition has yet been made, the properties of the deceased have never been placed under the administration of the guardian of his minor children.
2. There is no error in the appointment of German Crisostomo and his sister as co-administrators, no evidence having been presented by the GUARDIAN why they should not be appointed, either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral qualifications. 3. The claim of GUARDIAN, by virtue of the previous resolutions of the court, that the instate proceedings should be dismissed, has to be denied. ARAUJO v. CELIS (6 Phil 459) Facts: ROSARIO: inherited hacienda Pangpang and other property from her mother; subsequently married Jose; died leaving no descendants or ascendants but only collateral relatives CELIS: father-in-law of ROSARIO; in possession of property claiming that ROSARIO bequeathed all her property to husband and he died without a will so CELIS succeeded to all his property, lawfully acquiring that the belonged to ROSARIO o Presented parol evidence claiming that the original had been lost ARAUJO: claiming as heirs Issue: W/N ROSARIO executed a valid will entitling CELIS to the land? Held: Witness Delgado: an action was brought against her by Jose Araujo involving the hacienda and as solicitor there came into possession a copy of the will duly recorded and
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probated; never saw the original because it was retained by the notary; signed by two witnesses only; loss due to burning of the papers and archives of the court of Pototan by insurgents o Will signed by two witnesses could not be valid under the law in force at the time and could not have been probated and recorded Testimony was absolutely insufficient to establish satisfactory manner of loss of alleged will and the court should not have allowed secondary evidence introduced as to the contents of the will. LIM BILLIAN v. SUNTAY (63 Phil 793) Facts: On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz with whom he had several children (including Apolonio, Respondent herein) and the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son. Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the deceased by his first marriage, filed for intestate proceedings Later, and in the same court, Maria Lim Billian (Petitioner & 2nd wife) also instituted the present proceedings for the probate of a will allegedly left by the deceased. Lim Billian claimed that before the deceased died in China he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing his will and, also another document (Exhibit B of the petitioner) said to be a true copy of the original contained in the envelope.
The will was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go Toh, Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. On August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in-fact of the petitioner, arrived in the Philippines with the will in the envelope and its copy Exhibit B. While Go Toh was showing this envelope to Apolonio Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of the deceased, they snatched and opened it, after getting its contents and throwing away the envelope, they fled. Respondents deny that they have the will.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged will was lost? And if can still be probated? Held: Yes to both The evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document contained in the envelope. Respondents' answer admits that, according to Barretto (attesting witness) he prepared a will of the deceased to which he later became a witness together with Go Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. (Also Go Toh and Lopez corroborated the statement that the brothers Suntay took the contents of the envelope, and the brothers did not adduce evidence to the contrary) In court there was presented and attached to the case an open and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto,
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Go Toh and Manuel Lopez. It is undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the deceased and drafted by Barretto. The loss of the will justifies the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal formalities. BASA v. MERCADO (61 Phil 632) FACTS: - The estate of Ines Basa was allowed in probate by court, and eventually adjudicated it in favor of the administrator who was also the sole heir. - The petitioner contests the jurisdiction of the probate court alleging that there was failure to comply with the notice requirements in Sec. 630. - Sec. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses. - They allege that notice was only published for the first two weeks and the hearing conducted on the third. ISSUE: Whether the probate court had jurisdiction over the estate.
HELD: Yes, it had. It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing on the administrators final account was set for December 19 of that year, only 15 days after the date of the first publication. In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in Sec. 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing . DE ARANZ v. GALING (161 SCRA 628) Facts: Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate and allowance of the last will and testament of Monserrat RInfante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the petitioners as lagatees and devisees. The probate court then issued an order setting the petition for hearing. This order was published in Nueva Era a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then allowed to present evidence ex-parte and was appointed executor. The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no notices were sent to them as required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition. This was denied.
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Issue: Whether or not the requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 is mandatory and the omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? Held: YES Ratio: It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated, or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such place of residence be known. In this case, there is no question that the places of residence of the petitioners are known to the probate court. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON (39 Phil 156) Facts: Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he emigrated to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately afterwards left for the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live in the Philippines. In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate
of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila. In Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibaez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also had 2 children with Simeona Ibaez: Eleonor and Alberto. He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will. This will, signed by himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses, was not executed in conformity with Philippine law. A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here. The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator of the estate. The will gives to his brother Victor shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother, P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, P5,000; to Alejandra Ibaez, P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibaez, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children - Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto. About three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in
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her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. Held: 1. Whether the court had jurisdiction YES The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated. "The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." (Citing In re Davis) 2. Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. NO
The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. 3. Whether the will should not have been probated because it was void NO (will was validly probated) The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights
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and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate." ABUT v. ABUT (45 SCRA 326) FACTS: 1) Generoso Abut (petitioner), child of deceased Cipriano from 2nd marriage, executor in deceaseds alleged will, filed a petition for approval of will and letters testamentary. Court set hearing. 2) Opposition was filed by Felipe Abut (oppositors) and other children from 1st marriage . Generoso Abut died before Court could start formal hearing so Gavina Abut (sister) asked Court to substitute her. 3) Court dismissed Generosos petition w/o prejudice to filing another pursuant to Rules of Court. ISSUE: w/n the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original petitioner (executor Generoso) died before the petition could be heard and/or terminated (did death of Generoso divest the court of jurisdiction on the theory that amended petition of substitute sister required new publication)? HELD: NO, probate court incorrect in dismissing petition. 1) When court vested w/ jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance with Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of Rules of Court 2) Jurisdiction of the court continues until termination of the case and remains unaffected by subsequent events. Parties who could have come in and opposed the original petition as what Felipe, et. al. did, could still come in and oppose, having already been
notified of the pendency of proceeding by the publication of the notice. 3) Jurisdiction over persons interested, how acquired: A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. All that sec. 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs (additional heirs names in the amended petition but not included in the original petition) be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either mail or personally. 4) Effect of absence of notice to individual heirs: Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not advised -- the decree allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction
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RODELAS v. ARANZA (119 SCRA 16) FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with CFI Rizal for probate of holographic will of Bonilla and issuance of letter of administration to her. It was opposed by the appellees on grounds that stopped from claiming deceased left a will after failing to produce will within 20 days as required by RULE 75, alleged copy does not contain a disposition and not a will, only a copy of the holographic will (using Gan v. Yap), deceased left no will. Petition to dismiss saying that the will was proved using secondary evidence unlike ordinary will. MTD denied. ISSUE: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. YES. HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the only and best evidence is the handwriting of the testator in the said will. Comparison is necessary. But a photostatic copy or Xerox may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of decedent. Footnote 8 of Gan v. Yap says perhaps it may proved by a photographic or photostatic copy Order of the lower court (dismissing order) was set aside.
GAN v. YAP (104 Phil 509) Facts: Fausto Gan initiated probate proceedings on the holographic will of Felicidad Yap. Idelfonso Yap, husband of decedent opposed the proceedings on the ground that his wife never executed a will. The holographic will was never presented in court. Instead a description of its contents was testified by the decedents niece along with the following narration: o Felicidad confided in her cousin Vicente that she desired to make a will without the knowledge of her husband. Upon consultation with a law student, Felicidad found out that it could be done by without any witness, provided the document was entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated by her. So Felicidad made a holographic will in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra. Felicidad let Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will. o When Felicidad was confined in the hospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later, the Felicidads husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to him but not before she
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had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time. The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence as to the existence of a holographic will on the following grounds: (these grounds were upheld by the SC upon appeal) o if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary o in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and read the will several times; o it is improbable that the decedent would have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; o it is also improbable that her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her husband; o if it is true that the husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
Issue: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? Held: No! The Rules of Court (1940) allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made here. Holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them. the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
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up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6 Why may ordinary wills be proved by testimonial evidence unlike holographic wills? Ordinary Wills The gurantee of aunthencity is the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; Holographic Wills The only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way
Action to obtain probation of the will of Miguel Mamuyac. Francisco Gago presented a petition for the probate of the will (dated 1918) of Miguel Mamuyac. This petition was denied on the ground that the deceased executed a second will (dated 1919). The petition for probation of the second will was disallowed on the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. It was also proven that the said second will presented to the court for probate was a mere carbon copy of its original which remained in the possession of the testator, who revoked it before his death. There were also testimonies and other evidence to establish that Mamuyac executed another will in 1920 (purportedly a third will). Issue: Whether the second will can be denied probate on the ground that it has been revoked and cancelled. Held: YES. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
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GAGO v. MAMUYAC (49 Phil 902) Facts:
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the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. ALDANESE v. SALUTILLO (47 Phil 548) Facts: Salome Avila, a widow and resident of Cebu, died in the Province of Rizal on May 4, 1924. The subject will in the case is dated May 3, 1924, which appears to be executed in due form and is witnessed by Moreta, Borromeo and Rafols, all residents of the City of Manila. The deceased left no descendants not ascendants and under the will, the greater part of the estate will go to Petitioner Vicente Aldanese and his sister Enriqueta. The petition for probate of the will was presented in the CFI of Cebu and was set down for hearing by order the court. After due publication of the order, Canuto, Teodora, Feliciano, and Raymundo, all surnamed Salutillo and Valeria Llanos appeared as opponents. The petitioner presented a motion asking the court to
authorize the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will on the ground that being residents of the City of Manila, said witnesses were unable to appear personally before the CFI of Cebu. The motion was granted. This was opposed by the filing of the opponents of a motion asking that the order authorizing the taking of the depositions be revoked. Such motion was granted, revoking the first order which allowed the taking of the deposition on the ground that it has not been sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the witnesses to appear personally before the court, therefore, their depositions would be inadmissible as evidence. Issue: Whether or not the depositions were admissible as evidence Held: The depositions in question would appear to be in due form and would ordinarily be admissible. But the record indicates that the failure of the opponents to be represented at the examination of the witnesses was due to the fact that they were mislead by the petitionera action in seeking special authorization from the court for the taking of the sdeposition. In the interest of justice, the court thinks that the deposition should be retaken and the opponents given another opportunity to examine the witnesses. It is true that the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a will is contested, the attesting witnesses must be called upon to prove the will or a showing must be made that they cannot be had, but that does not necessarily mean that they must be brought bodily before the court. It is their testimony which is needed and not their actual personal presence in the courtroom. When an attesting witness to a will resides outside of the province where the will is offered for probate and 30 miles or more from
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the place where the probate proceedings are held, his testimony may be taken in the form of a deposition in accordance with sec. 406 of the Code of Civil Procedure. CABANG v. DELFINADO (34 Phil 291) Facts: Martin Delfinado appeared through his attorney and files an opposition to the allowance of the will of his father Celestino Delfinado alleging that the will was not signed by the deceased nor by any other person, in his presence and by his express direction, and the attestation does not comply with law Petitioner, widow of the deceased, presented as witnesses herself, Antonio Flor Mata (a justice of the peace of Tayug) and Paciano Romero; Opposition had only 1 witness- Martin The will was probated despite the fact that 2 of the witnesses were not present Issue: whether the court erred in admitting the will to probate without having 2 of the subscribing witnesses called, although they were living within the jurisdiction of the court or for not requiring any showing why they were not produced Held: Court erred in probating the will? Our code provides that noncontested wills may be admitted to probate upon the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in which they shall be proved when contested
Provisions are also made for supplying the testimony of the 3 subscribing witnesses when they cannot be called. The provisions of the Vermont Statutes are essentially the same. And as such, we may therefore call to our aid the decisions of the SC of that State and the law upon which those decisions rest in determining the intention of the Philippine Legislature The rule that the attesting witnesses must be called to prove a will for probate is one of preference; not to be confused with quantity Where the will is contested, it is necessary that the 3 subscribing witnesses be present to testify as to the due execution of the will; exceptions are that the witnesses were dead, beyond the jurisdiction of the court or insane There was failure to explain the absence of the other 2 witnesses to the will AVERA v. GARCIA (42 Phil 145) Facts: -In the probate proceedings instituted by Avera for the will of Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marno Garcia and Juan Rodriquez. During hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities and that the testatpr was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. The witness was collaborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced nor their absence accounted for. On the other hand, opponent introduced a single witness who testified that at the time the will was made, the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. Trial court found
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that testator was of sound mind and the will was properly executed, hence admitted will to probate. Issues: [1.]W/N a will can be admitted to probate upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the others [2.]W/N the will is rendered invalid due to the fact that the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page instead of the left margin. Held: [1.] Yes. When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the proponent should introduce all three of the attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation of the failure to produce the other two. Nevertheless, where the attorney for the contestants raised no question upon this point in the court below either at the hearing upon the petition or in the motion to rehear, as in this case, the objection to the probate of the will on this ground cannot be made for the first time. -reasons why appellate courts are disinclined to permit questions raised for the first time in the second instance: (a) it eliminates the judicial criterion of the CIF upon the point there presented and makes the appellate court in effect a CIF with reference to that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial; (b)if permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is
placed, while they are engaged in other discussions more simulated than real. [2.]No. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses appear in the right margin instead of the left. -The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of the wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. So when an interpretation already given assures these ends, any other interpretation that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testators last will, must be disregarded. SOLIVIO v. CA (182 SCRA 119) Facts: -This case involves the estate of the Esteban Javellana, Jr., novelist, who died a bachelor and survived by the ff relatives: (1) Petitioner, his maternal aunt; (2) Private Respondent, sister of his deceased father. - Esteban Jr. was raised by his mother and petitioner. When his mother died, she left all her properties to her only child, Esteban Jr. and titles to the properties were transferred to the latter in due time. -During his lifetime, Esteban Jr. expressed to petitioner his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without fulfilling such. -Petitioner filed Spl. Proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Jr., and later filed an
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amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; the she be declared the sole heir; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her. After due publication and hearing, she was declared sole heir. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay for taxes and proceeded to set up the foundation. -4 months later, Defendant filed an MR o the courts order declaring petitioner as sole heir because she too was an heir of the deceased. MR was denied for tardiness and instead of appealing, Defendant filed case for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. Court rendered judgment in favor of defendant, and upon the latters motion, court ordered the execution of judgment pending appeal and required petitioner to submit inventory and accounting of estate. -in her MR, petitioner averred that the properties were already transferred to the foundation. MR denied. On appeal, CA affirmed TC judgment. Hence this petition. Issues: [1.]W/N RTC Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain civil case for partition and recovery of defendant;s share of the estate even while probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23. [2.] W/N defendant was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proceeding through extrinsic fraud *3.+W/N decedents properties were subject of reserve troncal in favor of defendant [4.]W/N defendant may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the foundation Held.
*1.+ No. Branch 26 lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendants action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate while probate proceedings for settlement of the estate were still pending in Branch 23 of same court, there being no orders yet for the submission and approval of the administratrixs inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings. It is such order that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and relieves the administrator from his duties. -the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. [2.] No, but the charge of extrinsic fraud was unwarranted: (1) Defendant was aware of the Spl. Proceeding intended to be file by petitioner as admitted in her complaint. Evidently, she was not prevented from intervening but she stayed away by choice. (2) Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing is required to be published. The publication was constructive notice to the whole world. Defendant was not deprived of her right to intervene for she had actual and constructive notice of the same. [3.] No. The property of the deceased is not reservable property for he was not and ascendant, but the descendant of his mother from whom he inherited the properties in question. Reserva Troncal (Art.891) applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or a sister. -Since the deceased died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews,
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nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code. Hence, the CA correctly held that petitioner and defendant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral lines, each shall succeed to the estate without distinction and is entitled to share and share alike. [4.] No. However, in as much as defendant agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation, as confirmed and ratified in her motion to reopen and/or reconsider order which she filed, she is bound by that agreement. Though it is true that she did not waive her inheritance in favor of petitioner but she did agree to place all of the estate to the foundation. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement. MANALO v. PAREDES (SEE case under JURISDICTION) Facts: Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of decedent, filed for an application for letters of administration of the estate left by Villegas, who, according to the application, died intestate Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas. Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the probate of the will
Subsequently, Laureana and Justina submitted to the court an agreement which stated that Justina is withdrawing her application for probate and that said will be held not allowable to probate. Justina acknowledged that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance with said agreement. The court on October 25, 1924, approved said agreement and rendered judgment accordingly. On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new application for the probate of the same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
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Held: The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the publication ordered by the lower court of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in the supposed will, including Gelacio Malihan All the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed,
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and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error; especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him. RIERA v. PALMAROLI (40 Phil 105) Facts: Juan Pons y Coll, a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines, died in Manila. Palmaroli, the Consul General for Spain in the Philippines, filed a petition to admit his will for probate. An order admitting the will to probate was entered on May 20, 1918. Riera, the widow of Pons, was residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands at the time of the death of Pons. She only learned of the probate proceedings on November 14, 1918. Her lawyers appeared in the CFI on November 29, 1918 and moved that the order of probate be set aside to allow Riera to enter opposition, invoking Sec. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was denied by the CFI on the ground that more than six months had elapsed since the date of the probate. Riera questioned the formal validity of the will, and that the document produced was not the original. Issue:
Can a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased person, and who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from opposing the probate of the will, obtain from the Supreme Court, under Sec. 513 of the Code of CivPro, an order for rehearing in the CFI, it being alleged that the will was not executed with the formalities required by law and hence was improperly admitted to probate? Held: NO. The reliefs provided by Sec. 513 are not applicable to probate proceedings. Sec. 513 reads: Sec. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and the CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have such judgment set aside. Upon default Though the action taken by a CFI in the probate of a will is properly denominated as a judgment, it is not a judgment rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose the probate. By fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed, or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his
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desires with regard to the disposition of his property. But if fraud had been allegedas, for instance, if it were alleged that the purported will is a forged documentthe remedy, if any exists, would not be found in a proceeding under Sec. 513, but in an original action in the CFI. The CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court The Supreme Court will not entertain a petition filed under Sec. 513 to set aside a judgment and obtain a new trial in a CFI where the latter court can still grant relief upon the same state of facts under Sec. 113. The jurisdiction of the SC depends upon the lack of remedy in the CFI. When, however, the CFI has, be the expiration of six months, lost the power to relieve from its own judgment under Sec. 113, the remedy conceded by Sec. 513 may be resorted to, under conditions stated in that section; and apart from the restriction that the petition shall be filed within sixty days after the party aggrieved first learns of the rendition of judgment, there is no positive limitation as to the time within which the petition may be filed in the SC. Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot grant relief because the remedy conceded in Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to orders admitting wills to probate. MANAHAN v. MANAHAN (58 Phil 448) Facts: Petitioner Tiburcia Manahan, niece of the testatrix, instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan. She was named
as the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was published accordingly. On the hearing day, no opposition was filed, and after the presentation of evidence, the court admitted the will to probate. 1 yr. And 7 months later, Appellant Engracia Manahan, deceaseds sister, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will be declared null and void. It was denied. Appellant Manahan then appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate. She alleged that (1) she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will, (2) that the court, in its order, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication and (3) the will is void on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by law were not complied with. Issues: 1. Whether or not Appellant was an interested party, thus, should have been notified of the probate 2. Whether or not the court did probate the will and not just limit itself to decreeing its authentication 3. Whether the will is void Held: 1. No. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will neither had she the right to expect it for she was not an interested party. The testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted as heir and
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not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right. 2. Yes. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will, which is only the pronouncement required of the trial court by law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with law. Authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. 3. No. It is valid, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to its validity can no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.
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RULE 77 SUNTAY v. SUNTAY (95 Phil. 500) Facts: Jose B. Suntay died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy. He was survived by hi children by the first marriage (9) and his surviving widow (2nd wife). Years after Joses death, Silvino (son) filed a petition for intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will. The will was in Chinese characters executed on January 4, 1931 and was allegedly filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court. The CFI of Bulacan disallowed the probate. Issue: Whether or not the will should be probated. Held: No. The fact that the municipal district court in Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. In this case, there is no proof on these points. Therefore, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. FLUEMER v. HIX (54 Phil. 610) Facts: A.W. Fluemer, special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix filed a petition for the probate of the latters last will and testament allegedly executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925. Fluemer submitted a copy of Section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c.84 as found in an annotation of the West Virginia Code. Issue: Whether or not the submission of the will and the copy of the annotation is sufficient to allow probate of the will. Held: No. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do nor prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as a fact. Here the requirements of the law were not met. First, there is no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed and published under the authority of the State of West Virginia. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. Lastly, it was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his dominical in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. All of these are required to be proved under the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure. MICIANO v. BRIMO (50 Phil. 867) Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo filed a scheme of partition with the Philipppine Courts. Andre Brimo, of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it, saying that the partition puts into effects the provision of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The court, however, approved it.
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Issue: Whether or not the scheme of partition should be approved. Held: Yes. The fact is that Andre did not prove that said testamentary disposition are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence o n such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. There is therefore no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. LEON & GHEZZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (90 Phil. 459) Facts: Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in New York leaving a will which was duly probate in the Surrogates Court of New York country on August 3. The estate having been settled, the proceedings were closed. The will devised his estate and personal effects to Mercedes de Leon (residing in the Philippines) but since Mercedes is not of sound judgments and discretion in handling of money (she is a minor at the time she became devisee), she will only be given a sum o fmoney sufficient for her current needs. James Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity from Manufacturers Life Insurance where a monthly payment of $57.60 will be given to Mercedes during her lifetime. On September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butlers will for probate in the CFI of Manila. Mercedes and the appointed administrator (Ghezzi) filed a motion for the citation of the manager of Manufacturers Life Insurance , Manila Branch to render a complete accounting of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed
this petition for probate so that she can get hold at once of the entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court denied the motion. Issue: Whether or not the administratrix (Ghezzi) can administer the properties of Butler. Held: No. The general rule is that the administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted. Hence, the funds in question (annuity) are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country, Canada is the situs of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butlers estate and is beyond the control of the court because it has passed completely in the hands of the company by virtue of the contract of annuity.
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RULES 78 to 87 GUERRERO v. TERAN (13 Phil 212) Facts: Guerrero, (as guardian of the minors Munoz) commenced an action against Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. The amount represents the amount due by the estate of Antonio Munoz, which Teran had been the administrator, to the minors Munoz. The lower court found from the evidence that the estate of Antonio Munoz owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46. Issue: Whether Teran is liable. Held: No Teran is not liable. Teran was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez and guardian of the minors Munoz only for the period September 17, 1901 to March 17, 1902. However, from March 18, 1902 to October 6, 1906, Teran was replaced by Maria Munoz as the guardian of the minors Munoz. Therefore, Maria Munoz is responsible to said minors for the administration of their interest in the estate of Antonio Sanchez from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on March 18, 1902 up to the time of her removal on October 6, 1906 based on the ground that she was not a resident of the Philippines. If during this time she allowed other persons to
handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. However, she may have a right of action against such persons for any loss occasioned by their negligence or corruption. Since the record did not disclose that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiff arose during the time while the said defendant was administering their interest therein, only the sum of P188.39 (the amount acknowledged by defendant in the lower court as his liability) Side issue: Appointment of Resident Administrators or Guardians There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
NAVAS v. GARCIA (44 Phil. 711) Facts: Navas is the surviving spouse of Geronima Uy. He is contesting an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar which appointed Jose Garcia as the administrator of the estate of Geronima Uy. He maintains that he should be appointed as administrator instead of Jose Garcia. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not appointing him as administrator.
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)
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Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error. It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential right is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a persons suitability as administrator rest, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. In the present case, it appeared on record that appellant had adverse interests in the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
The heirs of Maria, Telesfor and Ceasaria opposed the order appointing Father Mercado as executor. Their opposition was based on the alleged unfitness and incapacity of Father Mercado to discharge his duties as executor for the following reasons: (1) Notwithstanding their opposition, Father Mercado contracted the services of 2 lawyers to represent him in these proceedings for the sole purposes of repaying the obligations he owed to one of the lawyer. (2) He cannot be impartial because the church of San Nicolas is one of the legatees named in the will. (3) The estate has no debts and the heirs are all of age and are willing to secure payment of all the legacies, thus there is no necessity of making the estate incur unnecessary expenses such as executors fees. (4) Appellants are better able to protect the interest of the estate. (5) Atty. Revilles, husband of Cesarea is willing to render services free of charge. Issue: Whether the lower court committed an error in denying the opposition to appoint Father Mercado as executor.
MERCADO v. vda. de JAEN (64 Phil. 75) Facts: Monsignor Gorordo, a retired bishop of Cebu, died leaving a will instituting his sister Maria as the universal heir to his estate, and in case of her death, his nieces Telesfor and Cesarea. He named Father Mercado as executor, and in the absence of the latter, Father Espina. The will of Monsignor Gorordo was probated and the Court of First Instance of Cebu confirmed the appointment of Father Mercado as executor.
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Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error. The reasons advances by the appellants do not seem to carry sufficient weight to warrant the reversal of the appealed orders. The evidence shows that when the deceased bishop made his will naming said priest in preference to anybody else, he was in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under the circumstances, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with his last will because it is to be assumed that he had good reasons for so doing. While the court should not be deprived of its power not to appoint, in certain cases, one who is unworthy of the trust, notwithstanding the fact that he was named as such by the testator; it is also true that for this to be done, the unworthiness,
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incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary. With regards to the reasons espoused by the heirs, the court ruled that: Reason 1 The court accepted the explanation of Father Mercado as to why he engaged the services of the lawyers (i.e., he has confidence in them). Reason 2 The parish of Father Mercado is not a legatee in the will. Moreover, the will does not give Father Mercado, as executor, even the right to intervene in the distribution and disposition of the P10,000 legacy. Reason 3 There is a necessity to name an executor since the will contains so many provisions and it is premature to assert that the estate has no obligation to pay. Reason 4 and 5 The heirs and Atty. Revilles is not in a better position to protect the estate since it would be no more immune from irregularities. In addition the interest of the legatees is more than that of the heirs.
heirs. The court then appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs, as special administrator. Subsequently, the court admitted the will to probate and appointed Ozaeta as regular administrator. Pending the appeal of the order admitting the will to probate, the court appointed BPI as special administrator. Ozaeta claims that the reason why the judge refuses to appoint him as special administrator is due to his personal dislike of him. However, the judge contends Ozaeta as biased to one group of heirs. Issue: Whether a probate court, which had already admitted a will to probate, may appoint as special administrator any person other than the executor named in the will. Held: No, the executor named in a will should be appointed. Rule 81 of the Rules of Court grants discretion to the probate court to appoint, or not to appoint, a special administrator. It is silent as to the person who may be appointed as special administrator, unlike Rule 79 which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons who may be appointed regular administrator. The appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. But the fact that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. And there is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of the special administrator.
OZAETA v. PECSON and BPI (93 Phil. 416) Facts: Carlos Palanca died leaving a will appointing Roman Ozaeta, former associate justice of the SC, as executor if Manuel Roxas fails to qualify. Upon Palancas death, and Roxas having died previously, Ozaeta presented a petition for the probate of the will, at the same time praying that he be appointed special administrator. Some of the heirs of Palanca opposed the petition. The court then appointed Philippine Trust Company, a non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings special administrator. Later on, Philippine Trust Company presented a petition to resign as special administrator due to incompatibility of interest since it had granted a loan to Angel Palanca, one of the
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Based on US Jurisprudence, since the will appointing him regular administrator has been admitted to probate by the trial judge, he should now be appointed special administrator during the pendency of the appeal against the order admitting the will to probate. Mandamus lies to compel such appointment.
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DE GUZMAN v. LIMCOLIOC (68 Phil. 673) FACTS: This is a case regarding the intestate estate of PROCESO de Guzman, which was substantially comprised of fisheries situated in the provinces. The heirs of PROCESO NICOLASA and APOLINARIO have been appointed as co-administrators of the estate. The court ordered APOLINARIOS appointment but he shall not receive compensation for his services. The instant case (procedurally) is an appeal by oppositorappellant ANGELA Limcolioc (de Guzman childrens half-sibling) from the said order of the court. She assails APOLINARIOs fitness as co-administrator. She alleges that APOLINARIO is not trustworthy (because when PROCESO was alive, PROCESO filed a complaint against APOLINARIO on the ground that the latter, as administrator of PROCESOs estate, misappropriated from P12,000 to P15,000 to buy a fishery, a De Soto sedan, and a duck farm in Los Baos, and loaned money and made deposits in the Philippine National Bank). ANGELA also alleged that APOLINARIO has a great interest in PROCESOs estate. In the case of Nicolas de Guzman vs. Angela Limcolioc, G.R. No. 46134, wherein the parties are the same as those in this case, this court, in a judgment rendered on April 18, 1939, stated as follows:
The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one be appointed as such administrator. This is the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor falls to the ground. RULING: Appeal denied. Trial Courts appointment of APOLINARIO is upheld. The lower court having been of the opin ion that APOLINARIO de Guzman deserves appointment of coadministrator, and it being discretionary on its part to determine who should be appointed administrator of the properties of a deceased person, We believe it unjustified for us to meddle in the exercise of such discretion, it not appearing that said court has committed a grave abuse thereof. The same reasons are applicable to the case under consideration, inasmuch as the appointed co-administrator, Apolinario de Guzman as brother of Nicolasa de Guzman whom the latter needs to help her in the administration of the properties left by their deceased father, many of which consist in
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fisheries situated in the provinces is as interested as his sister in that said properties be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs. It is true that Apolinario de Guzman's father, Proceso de Guzman, in life, filed a complaint against his son on the ground that the latter, as administrator of his father's estate, misappropriated from P12,000 to P15,000 to buy a fishery, a De Soto sedan, and a duck farm in Los Baos, and loaned money and made deposits in the Philippine National Bank, but said complaint was dismissed at the instance of the father himself. In the present case, aside from the fact that Apolinario de Guzman, as co-administrator, will administer properties in which he has a greater share than that of the oppositor, the childless widow of the deceased by a second marriage, and will act merely as a helper of his sister, there is no ground to believe that he would squander said properties and the products thereof.
3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file their opposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed the removal of GONZALES. 4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled. It was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES to manage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate. 5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied. ISSUE: Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALES should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court RULING: Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated. 1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from removal
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GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112) FACTS: 1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of her four children GONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices. 2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband who was receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as coadministratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.
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without just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legally before it, in order to justify a removal. 3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified in OLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges brought against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact that conflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the former had been absent from the country for a little less than a year. 4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties (sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from Land Bank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. 5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish to reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.
JOHANNES v. HARVEY (43 Phil. 175) Facts:
Theodora Johannes died intestate in Singapore. Husband, brothers and sister remainedall were residents of Singapore except for Alfred (brother) who lives in Manila. B.E. Johannes (husband) was named as administrator of the property within the jurisdiction of the Straits Settlements [under the British Law, the husband is entitled to the whole of the estate of his wife if she die intestate Upon petition, Alfred was appointed administrator of the Manila estate consisting of sum in the Manila banks. B.E. contends that the appointment of Alfred was in excess of its jurisdiction and administration in Manila jurisdiction is unnecessary. Issue: w/n the appointment of Alfred was made in excess of the Manila courts jurisdiction? Held: No. It is often necessary to have more than one administrator of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. Principal administration: that which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedents last domicile; other administration, subsidiary to the principal administration is called ancilliary administration A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted Ancilliary administration: proper whenever a person dies leaving in a country other than that of domicile, property
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to be administered in the nature of assets, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among heirs o PROPER PROCEDURE: ancilliary administrator to pay claims of creditors, settle accounts and remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction Universal rule giving surviving spouse preference when an administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons the spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility (nonresidence is a factor to be considered)
Issue: Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the appellants to intervene? Held: No. The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon, granting that they are illegitimate children, are not incapacitated to take property under the will of their father. The CC provides that a person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire. The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the testator, once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case and protect their interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case of this character.
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GUTIERREZ de OCAMPO v. VALERA CALDERON (59 Phil 631) Facts: - Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at the time he made his will was residing temporarily in France and that at the time of his death he left no ascendants. - The appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of the deceased and have filed an opposition to the project of partition of their deceased brother Calderon, the lower court denied their intervention - Appellants are not the deceaseds forced heirs. Article 763 of the Civil Code reads: "Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. . . . - The appellants contend that the beneficiaries (respondents herein) under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon are illegitimate children and that they are not qualified to inherit from the deceased, but are only entitled to support.
TRILLANA v. CRISOSTOMO (89 Phil 710)
GUTIERREZ v. VILLEGAS (5 SCRA 313)
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DURAN v. DURAN (20 SCRA 379) Facts: Pio Duran died intestate. His alleged heirs are Josefina Duran (surviving spouse) and brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces. Cipriano Duran, Pio's brother, executed a Deed of Assignment renouncing his hereditary rights to Pio's estate in favor of Josefina. He filed a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. He also filed an ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator. Josefina opposed, saying Cipriano is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation; she asked to be appointed administratrix. In response, Cipriano alleged that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife and that the deed of assignment was procured thru fraud. Another brother, Miguel Duran, filed a petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved to strike as an improper attempt to intervene in the case. CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate, based on the deed of transfer executed by Cipriano. The court declared itself without power to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it rescissible or voidable. Miguel's petition was also dismissed. Cipriano and Miguel appealed to the SC. Held: SC affirmed the dismissal order.
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings. Also, since there was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied. Difference with Santos doctrine: Santos case held that the assigning heir remains an interested person. That case involved an assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings. Given that the settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate, any assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And since the approval the court is not deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is given. In the instant case, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject
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matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
De GUZMAN v. ANGELES (162 SCRA 347)
GARCIA FULE v. CA (supra, Rule 73)
Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix Respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased.
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ROXAS v. PECSON (82 Phil 407) Facts: Upon Pablo Roxas death, Maria his sister and Pedro his brother (private respondents in this case), filed a petition for the administration of Pablos estate in a special intestate proceeding in Bulucan. Maria was appointed special administratrix However, a few days later, Natividad the widow (petitioner of this case) filed a petition for the probate of Pablos alleged will and for her appointment as executrix of his estate. The intestate proceedings were dismissed upon agreement of the parties. Maria and Pedro opposed probate of the will and objected to the appointment of Natividad as special administratrix. However, since she qualified, the widow was appointed to the position. CFI refused to admit the will to probate on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator. The case is now pending on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas? Held: YES It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the present case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only
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Carlos Gurrea died, leaving a will in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor, and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son. Pijuan instituted proceedings for the probate of the will, and he was thereafter appointed special administrator of the estate.
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after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the present case, in every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only one. As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81)
Q: Is the preference accorded by Sec 6 of Rule 78 in the appointment of an administrator applicable to the appointment of a special administrator? A: It may not be amiss to note that preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the ROC refers to the appointment of a regular administrator not to the special administrator and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the Probate Court.
PIJUAN v. vda. de GURREA (18 SCRA 898) Facts: Maria Ruiz Vda. De Gurrea (Mrs. Gurrea) married Carlos Gurrea in Spain. They had one child, Teodoro. Carlos abandoned Mrs. Gurrea and went to the Philippines with their son Teodoro. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez. When Mrs. Gurrea came over, Carlos refused to admit her to his residence so Mrs. Gurrea stayed with Teodoro in Bacolod City. Mrs. Gurrea then instituted a case for support and annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal party in favor of Rizalina. In due course, the court granted her a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000, which was later reduced to P1,000.
Mrs. Gurrea opposed the probate proceedings, saying that as widow, she claims a right of preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said preference exists if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate. Mrs. Gurrea also moved that in light of the suspension of the support and annulment case by reason of Carloss death, support previously awarded to her should be continued pending the final determination of the case. The lower court denied both motions by Mrs. Gurrea. Issues: 1. Whether Mrs. Gurrea should be appointed as administratrix of the estate. 2. Whether support previously awarded to Mrs. Gurrea should be continued. Held: 1. NO. None of the conditions stated in the Rules obtains in the case at bar. Carlos Gurrea has left a will, so it cannot be said that he has died intestate. Said document names Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. He has not only not refused the trust, but has also expressly accepted it by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
administrator, and that order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable. 2. YES. The lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator. Precisely, however, on account of such lack of proof thereon, the Court is bound by law to assume that the estate of the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one of the compulsory heirs.
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TAN v. GO CHIONG LEE ((46 Phil 200) FACTS: During the lifetime of the deceased Go Bung Kiu (Kiu), defendant Go Chiong Lee (Lee) was his encargado. In 1920, Kiu died and Lee was appointed as special administrator of the estate, with Liok, Changco, Manuel Go as sureties on his bond in the sum of P30,000. Subsequently, Lees status changed to that of administrator. Lee continued continued to discharge his duties as administrator until he was relieved by Plaintiff Maximina Tan (Tan). Lee filed 3 reports all in all covering the periods within which he acted as the administrator. The committee on claims rendered its report, admitting as proved, claims amounting to P69,029.91. The court issued an order stating that administrator Lee is ordered to pay out of the funds of the estate of deceased Kiu to each of the persons mentioned in the report of the said committee. Plaintiff Tan sought to recover from defendant Lee
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and the latters sureties on four causes of action, amounts totalling to P54,700.39. The trial court awarded the plaintiff the sum of P42,849.08 but limiting the liability of the sureties to P30,000. Defendants appealed. Issue: Whether or not the defendant Lee and his sureties are liable to pay the amount of P54,700.39 to plaintiff? Held: No. The plaintiff shall only have and recover from the defendants jointly and severally the amount of P6,375 with legal interest from the date when the complaint was presented. The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best measured as in essence the responsibility of the bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for waste, conversion or embezzlement. But where an administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses incurred. The supreme court found that the personal responsibility of the former administrator Lee and the sureties on his bond for losses incurred by the estate during his administration, has not been proved. LIZZARAGA HERMANOS v. ABADA (40 Phil 124) FACTS: Francisco Caponong died owing the plaintiffs Sociedad de Lizarraga a sum of money Seven years after the death of Francisco, plaintiffs filed a suit against Felicisima personally and as administratrix of Franciscos estate for the collection of money
Guardian of the minor children of Francisco asked permnission to intervene wherein he alleged that the estate of Francisco did not owe the plaintiffs anything An amicable settlement wherein the defendants shall (1) recognize the indebtedness of the estate (2) mortgage all the property of Francisco and of Felicisima and (3) mortgage the carabaos was reached The settlement was approved by the court but was not recorded in the registry of property up to the time of the institution of the suit Plaintiffs filed the present action (1) for failure of defendants to pay 2 installments (2) for refusal of defendants to mortgage the carabaos and (3) on the allegation that defendants were about to transfer their property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs Attachment order was granted by the court; on appeal, judge decided in favor of defendants and ordered plaintiffs to pay damages ISSUE: whether the amicable settlement was binding: NO whether the court could approve such an agreement: NO court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate debts it never owed to give effect to the compromise as written would result in great wrong and destroy every chance the minor children had to participate in the inheritance of their father whether the estate owed the plaintiffs the amount being claimed: NO
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the estate owed the plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the commissioners passed on their claim part of which has already been paid where the plaintiffs, originally holding a claim originally for less than P13,000 let the administratrix have money and effects till their claim grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to charge this amount as expense of administration (they may be allowed to charge the same to the current revenue of the hacienda) administration expenses would be the necessary expenses of handling the property, of protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and possibly producing a crop whether the administratrix can mortgage estate properties no mortgage can be placed by an administrator on the estate of descendant, unless it is specifically authorized by statute (no such statute in the Philippines) the mortgage of the properties is foreign to the policy and purpose of administration; it aims to close up, not to continue an estate
conditions of her bond (i.e. failed to file inventory, failed to pay approved claim of plaintiff, failed to render a true and just account of her administration); and that defendant, as surety failed to pay plaintiff notwithstanding the latters demand. -CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff P6000, P900attys fees + costs. ISSUE: [1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability of defendant under the bond in question [2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the deceased administratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. HELD: [1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it is only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty. -Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture or enforcement of an administrators bond, the same matter may be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the Court of First Instance. -Though nominally payable to the Rep. of the Phils, the bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned. [2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga
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WARNER BARNES v. LUZON SURETY (95 Phil 924) FACTS: -Plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., filed a complaint in the CFI against defendant, Luzon Surety, for the recovery of P6000, plus costs and P1500 for attorneys fees. The basis for the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Interstate Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No. 452of the CFI of Negros Occidental. -The complaint alleges that plaintiff had a duly approved claim against the estate of P6,485.02; that administratrix violated the
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in conformity with Sec.6 of Rule 87 providing that where the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the state to recover contribution from the other debtor. -Apart from the fact that this defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it appears that even as the present complaint was filed, there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate. Where there are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased administrator, the creditor may enforce his bond against the surety which bound itself jointly and severally in the case where the bond was filed.
Pertinent objection is that Wilson was neglectful and imprudent and he committed waste and should therefore be held liable. Issue: Whether or not Wilson should be held liable for the loss in the estate. Held: Yes. When Wilson was appointed special administrator, he never made any report or file any account of any kind until 1927. Neither did he apply to or obtain an order from the court of any nature during that period to settle the debts of Charles Rear, which, at the time of his death amounted to P1,300.00. It was the legal duty of Wilson to at one apply to the court for an order to sell the property to pay the debts of the deceased and the expenses of administration. If the property of the state had been promptly sold, when it should have been, and sold for its appraised value, all the debts of the deceased and the court costs and expenses of administration would have been paid and the estate would have a balance left, instead of going negative. Instead of doing that, and without any order, he continued the operation of the plantation and employment of a manager, the net result of which was that all of the property of the estate was consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit against the estate. (other salient parts of the case might help) When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator to administer, settle, and close the administration in the ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary delay. Neither does he, in particular, without a specific showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to continue the operation of the business in which the
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WILSON v. REAR (55 Phil 44) Facts: Charles Rear was murdered by some Moros on his plantation in Cotabato on July 14, 1925. J.J. Wilson qualified as special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925. Later, the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800.00 of which the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also signed by Wilson. ON January 4, 1927, the commissioners made and filed a report of claims against the estate but by reason of the fact that it was claimed and alleged that the administrator did not have any funds to pay, the court ordered the administrator to sell a portion of the property. Later, a petition was made for authority to sell all the property of the estate with a view of closing the administration which was granted by the court. Public sale took place and the property was sold for P7,600.00. Wilson filed his final account which was approved by the court despite objections.
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deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment of operation expenses. Exception when the continuing of the business is necessary to settle the estate of the deceased. The law does not impose upon the administrator a high degree of care in the administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In this case, the court said Wilson should have wound up the estate within 8 months from the date of his appointment. In the end, Wilson was made liable for the loss in the amount of P3,839,22. LUZON SURETY v. QUEBRAL (127 SCRA 295) Facts: - petitioner Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in 2 testate proceedings - In consideration of the suretyship, respondent Quebrar, executed two indemnity agreements, agreeing jointly and severally to pay petitioner P300 in advance as premium thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof, this ... or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect and to indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount involved in any litigation, for attomey's fees - Respondent paid for the 1st year; however, for the succeeding years, respondent failed to pay the premium
Petitioner files suit for the payment of premiums from the 2nd year until 8 years later, when the respondent petitioned the court to cancel the bonds since all the heirs have received their inheritance
Issue: w/n the bonds were in effect from the 2 nd year onwards considering the respondents failure to pay premium, and that the court has approved the plan of partition as early as the 2nd year of the administration of the estates Held: yes Ratio: - The proper determination of the liability of the surety and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon the language of the bond itself. - The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. - While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is required by statute, said statutory bonds are construed in the light of the statute creating the obligation secured and the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed in the statute. - The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed by the statute. - Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust.
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COSME DE MENDOZA v. PACHECO (64 Phil 134) FACTS: -Manuel SORIANO was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme.
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Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. An estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants. It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over the administration proceedings and it cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the every purpose for which it was filed. The contention then of the defendants-appellants that both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project of partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the non-payment of the stated premiums, is without merit. Such construction of the said contracts entered into would render futile the purpose for which they were made. To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements by non-payment of the premiums would ultimately lead to giving the administrator the power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability under the Administrator's Bonds. As already stated, this is contrary to the intent and purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of the creditors, heirs, legatees, and the estate.
-He filed a bond for P5,000, with Januario PACHECO and Raymundo CORDERO as sureties. -SORIANO'S account, upon approval, showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21. -Unable to turn said amount over to the estate upon demand of the new administratix ROSARIO Cosme, the CFI ordered the execution of SORIANOs bond after notice was served upon the sureties. -Sometime later, the CFI approved a settlement had between ROSARIO and SORIANO, whereby SORIANO ceded certain real properties to the estate, thereby reducing his indebtedness to the estate from P23,603.21 to P5,000. -Subsequently, ROSARIO had the public sale thereof to collect this amount of P5,000. -Separate motions to be discharged from the bond were filed by PACHECO and CORDERO. -Both motions were denied, as well as an MR therefor. -This dismissal was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the SC dismissed (according to the SC, the order for executing the bond was made in 1932 and the motion for discharge was filed in 1933: LATE!) -Upon resumption of the case in the lower court, PACHECHO and CORDERO filed a motion challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order for executing the bond. -CFI denied. Thus, the instant case. ISSUE: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the execution of SORIANOs bond, given that the trial court was only sitting as probate court.
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RULING: Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction. It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term. It is thus clear that a CFI, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a CFI in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. It should be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an administrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may not unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from such proceedings.
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We take the view that the execution of an administrator's bond clearly stands upon a different footing and is as necessary a part and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing of such bond or the fixing of its amount. Particularly is this true in the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is conceded on all sides, and all that the trial court had to do was to see that said amount was turned over to the estate. Justice Villareals Dissent Chapter XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is headed "Wills and the allowance thereof, and duties of executors", contains no provision concerning the enforcement of the liability of an executor or administrator on his bond and of that of his sureties. According to Art. 1853 of the Civil Code, "the guarantor may set up against the creditor all the defenses available to the principal debtor and which may be inherent in the debt; . . . ." In an administration bond the executor or administrator stands in the place of the principal debtor; his sureties may, therefore, set up all the defenses to which he may be entitled, and which are inherent in the obligation. The procedure by which such defenses may be set up is the ordinary one established by the said Code of Civil Procedure by means of an action in court wherein may contain general or special denial, a special defense or a counterclaim. The said Code has not established any special procedure by which an executor or administrator with a mere notice to his sureties does not afford them an adequate opportunity to set up the defenses which the law guarantees to them. To enforce the liability of an administrators and require them to file an adequate bond is not only ultra vires but a violation of the constitutional inhibition
that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property without due process of law. "The usual method of enforcing the liability on an administration bond is by an action brought on the bond in a court of law, although in some jurisdictions other forms of remedy are provided by statute, . . . ." The only procedure by which the liability of an executor or administrator and his sureties be enforced on their bond is, therefore, by an ordinary action in court. The failure of the sureties to appeal from the order of summary execution issued by the court below on their bond after a mere service of notice did not legalize said summary procedure and the order of summary execution issued by the lower court, which were otherwise illegal and ultra vires. The order appealed from ordering the summary execution of the bond filed by the sureties-appellants, together with the former administrator Ramon Soriano, was issued not only in excess of jurisdiction but without it, because it was not authorized by law.
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GUSTILO v. SIAN (53 Phil 155) FACTS: 1. GUSTILO was appointed administrator of the estate of his deceased father. He filed his accounts (as administrator) for the years 1923 to 1925. 2. The widow, along with other heirs, sought to remove GUSTILO as administrator, alleging that he was negligent, inefficient and self-serving, and that he falsely included in the accounts exorbitant and illegal expenses. 3. GUSTILO subsequently filed a motion asking for a salary of PhP3, 000 annually. He also presented therewith the
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4.
5.
6.
7.
accounts for the years 1925-1926 and 1926-1927. In both of these accounts, there appeared to be a deficit (around PhP400 for the former and PhP3, 000 for the latter). One of the creditors of the estate (Leocadia Majito) opposed the accounts presented as well as the salary sought to be granted. Later, Majito included in his opposition the allegation that certain debts of the estate were charged twice with no adequate vouchers. Court of Iloilo (where the intestacy proceedings were held) disapproved the accounts and ordered GUSTILO to file amended accounts. Despite the extension of time granted to him, GUSTILO failed to file these amended accounts. Rather, GUSTILO presented the old accounts without change. Later on, another judge of the same court (other judge was absent) reconsidered the disapproval of the previous accounts. Two of the accounts filed by GUSTILO were then approved. Creditors of the estate did not seem to receive due notice of this approval. A creditor, SIAN then filed a motion to reconsider the approval of the accounts as well as for the removal of GUSTILO as administrator and the forfeiture of his bond. This motion was denied.
not in fact administered it so far with due regard to the rights of other persons in interest. 2. GUSTILO should be removed and required to render his accounts as administrator.
DEGALA v. CENIZA and UMIPIG (78 Phi 791) Facts: UMIPIG was appointed special administrator of the estate of Placida Mina. DEGALA is complaining claiming the UMIPIG should be removed as special administrator for: o Adverse interest; stranger to the estate, not being a beneficiary in the will; failed to include some property in the inventory; failed to pay taxes due from the estate; failed to render accounting Issue: w/n UMIPIG should be removed as special administrator based on the claims? Held: No. the removal of an administrator lies with the appointing courts discretion. Sufficiency of any ground for removal should be determined by the appointing court. Adverse interest: any interest of the previous administrator (lawyer of UMIPIG) is exclusively personal, UMIPIG can have nothing to do with it; not beneficiary: can represent his father as trustee under the will; other grounds: not willful omissions
ISSUE: Whether the decision approving the accounts filed by GUSTILO was proper RULING: No 1. The activities revealed in the case of GUSTILO, as administrator, convinces the court that he is not a fit person to be administrator of the estate and that he has
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CHUA TAN v. DEL ROSARIO (57 Phil 411) Facts: Benedicta Santa Juana, as adminsitratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Piaco, instituted a civil case against Lucita del Rosario as adminsitratirx of the intestate estate of Chua Toco. Said action was a petition for the rendering of an accounting of certain funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the late Chua Piaco to his adopted son, the late Chua Toco. The CFI dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the SC on appeal. Subsequently, the presumptive heirs of the late Chua Piaco instituted a 2nd petition against the same defendant Lucita del Rosario, this time for partition between the same funds together with its fruits which was allegedly delivered by Piaco to Toco in trust. The heirs alleged that the sum of 20,000 which was deposited in a bank bearing interest was not the exclusive property of Toco but the exclusive property of Piaco and Toco, Father and son. The LC dismissed this 2nd petition on the ground of res judicata as having been already decided by the SC in the civil case. Issue: What is the duty of the administrator? WON the 2 nd petition is barred by res judicata Held: It is the duty of the executor or administrator to present an inventory of the real estate and of all the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which have come into his possession or to this knowledge in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to manage them according to Sec. 643 of the code of civil procedure; and in order that he may have in his power and under his custody all such property, sec 702 of the aforesaid code authorizes him to bring such actions for the purpose of obtaining possession thereof as he may deem
necessary. Sec 643 of the aforesaid code in providing for the appointment of an administrator where there is no will or the will does not name an executor seeks to protect not only the estate of the deceased but also the rights of the creditors in order that they may be able to collect their credits, and of the heirs and legatees in order that they may receive the portion of the inheritance or legacy appertaining to them after all the debts and expenses chargeable against the deceaseds estate have been paid. Under the provisions of the law, therefore, the judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate or intestate estate, but also of the creditors, and heirs and legatees inasmuch as he represents their interest in the estate of the deceased. A final judgment upon the meals rendered against the judicial administratrix of an intestate estate (Chua Piaco), as such in a case where she is a plaintiff and the administratrix of another intestate estate (Chua Toco) as such, is the defendant, in which she seeks to secure an accounting of funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the deceased to the other deceased, constitutes res judicata in another case where the heirs of the supposed trustee (Chua Toco) is defendant and in which the partition of the same funds and the products thereof is sought between the heirs of both, under the same allegation of trust, the alleged trustee being the adopted son of the donor.
ADAPON v. MARALIT (69 Phil 383) Facts: On December 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the last will and testament of his deceased father, Rudocindo Adapon in the CFI of Batangas. The will was admitted to probate and
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Pedro was appointed as administrator by the court. He then filed an inventory of the property and assets of the estate. However the surviving spouse of the deceased from a 2nd marriage, Felisa Maralit, filed to the court to order the administrator to pay her a monthly allowance of P50 as well as to include certain properties to the inventory which was omitted from the inventory (1k cavans of palay, credit in favor of deceased, carabaoes etc.) The Administrator in his answer, claimed ownership over the properties. Thus the oppositor Maralit, during the hearing moved that in view of the claims of ownership made in the answer, the administrator should be relieved of his duties and another be appointed to act in his place. LC ruled that the allegations in the motion of the oppositor widow is not sufficient to warrant the removal of the administrator. The court however ordered the administrator to include certain properties in the inventory, To this the administrator appeals, contending that the court erred in ordering the inclusion of such properties. Thus this case. Issue: WON the probate court could, upon petition of oppositor to include certain properties in the inventory prepared by the administrator, to some of which the said administrator had laid claims of ownership determine the question of ownership and thereby meet the issues as thus presented. Held: No. It is not seen how the probate court can determine the respective merits of the conflicting claims made by the
administrator and the oppositor without necessarily declaring the lawful ownerhip of the properties involved. Such a declaration is necessary and inevitable and without it the probate court cannot properly proceed and dispose of the petition submitted by the oppositor. However under Sec 599 of the code of civil procedure, the probate jurisdiction of the CFI only relates to matters having to do with the settlement of estates and probates of wills of deceased persons the appointment and removal of guardians and trustees and the powers, duties and rights of guardians and wears, trustees and cestuis que trust. As may have seen the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding.
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MOORE & SONS MERCANTILE CO. v. WAGNER (50 Phil 128) FACTS: Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the settlement proceedings petitioned the court to require the administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter Avelina Allen an allowance of P80. The special administrator appointed in the case objected to the allowance of the widow upon the ground that the estate is insolvent, in view of the claims presented and approved by the committee on appraisal and claims. Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several creditors also entered his opposition to said order. There is no question that the estate is insolvent. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate, the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5,
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1925, citing in its support article 1430 of the Civil Code and section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow and daughter valid? HELD: NO RATIO: Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or income. As to the question of granting allowance from an insolvent estate, The SC of Spain had rendered a decision granting allowance to the widow from the general inventoried estate at the time of the death of the husband until the delivery of her share. Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May 28, 1896, wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the
partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality. The judge or the administrator, as the case may be, must grant the support referred to in article 1430, when the same is requested, and if the creditors believe that they are prejudiced by such an action, by separating from the estate a part of its income, they can appeal to the court therefrom, by satisfactorily proving that there is no property or asset that may, in any case, be allotted to the interested parties. In this case, it appears from the record that the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property to the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of an advance payment to be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when there is no property to be partitioned, lacks the legal basis provided by article 1430.
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SANTERO v. CFI CAVITE (153 SCRA 728) FACTS: Pablo Santero had 3 illegitimate children with Felixberta Pacursa (Princesita, Federico and Winy) while he also had 4 illegitimate children with Anselma Diaz (Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel). A Motion For Allowance filed by Anselma (as guardian of V,R,A,M) for support which included educational expenses,
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clothing and medical necessities. The oppositors contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They also alleged that the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance. Anselma admitted some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances, citing Art. 290 of the Civil Code: Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. The court granted the motion and the children were given an allowance. Later, the children (V,R,A,M) filed another Motion for Allowance to include an additional 3 children (Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito). The court granted the motion. Anselma clarified that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and her first three (3) children who were then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. But an Order was issued by the court directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three additional recipients or children of Anselma. Felixberta's children (P,F,W) filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that Anselma's children are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married. They also
said that the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero did not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance. Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the assailed order. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows: Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according tothe social position of the family. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. The fact that Anselma's children are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
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distinction. Hence, Anselma's children (V,R,A,M) are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code (substantial law) gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
CONCEPCION JOCSON de HILADO v. NAVA (69 Phil 1)
SAN DIEGO v. NOMBRE (11 SCRA 165) JARODA v. CUSI JR. (28 SCRA 1008) Facts: An intestate proceeding was commenced by Antonio V. A. Tan (private respondent in this case) for Carlos Abrilles estate. One of the properties left by Abrille was his 19% share in the co-ownership known as Juna Subdivision. Tan was appointed special administrator by the court. Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of the sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from PNB, which sums were not listed in his petition for administration as among the properties left by the deceased. He alleged that these sums were deposited in the name of the
deceased but that they actually belong to, and were held in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The court granted the petition. Later, Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the subdivision. Only after this was he issued letters of administration. Now as a regular administrator, Tan filed a petition with the respondent court, alleging that the deceased was the manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and that he had been engaged in the business of selling the lots, and praying for the approval by the court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, and appointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots. The court granted the petition. Petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders granted by the court: 1. Allowing the withdrawals from PNB and 2. Approving the power of attorney.
Issue 1: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name of the decedent? Held: Yes. In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator. (Check Sec 2, Rule 80 for powers and duties)
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In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the coowners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly claiming the same. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice was given, and without it the court's authority is invalid and improper.
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Issue 2: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by approving the power of attorney executed by Tan appointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots?
Held: Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. Section 4 of Rule 89 of ROC requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice. It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her testator's estate as a trustee It is equally well settled that an executrix will not be permitted to deal with herself as an individual in any transaction concerning the trust property Note that auto-contracts may be permissible but should not be made to apply to administrators of a deceased estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it. In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan to be an agent or attorney-in-fact for two principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other. This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
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Q: What acts can the executor or administrator NOT perform validly? A: 1. Art 1491 (3) of the NCC prohibits the executor or administrator to buy property under his administration. 2. He cannot borrow money even if it is for the benefit of the estate. 3. Nor can he continue the business in which the deceased was engaged in at the tome of his death without order of the court as his duty is to settle the estate as soon as possible and not to prolong his administration. 4. He has no authority to speculate with funds of the estate or place them where they may not be withdrawn at once by order of the court. This is true even if said funds would have to be deposited in a low or no interest earning account (current account) as compared to a high earning interest account (fixed account). Q: What is the extent of the powers of an executor or administrator? A: An executor or administrator has all the powers necessary for the administration of the estate and which powers he can exercise without leave of court. The constitution of a lease over a property of the estate is an act of administration and leave of court is not required. Any interested party who desires to impugn the same must do so in an ordinary civil action as the probate court has no jurisdiction over the lessee. It has been broadly stated that an administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. The executor or administrator cannot buy property under his
administration nor can he borrow money without authority of the court even if it is for the benefit of the estate. He has no authority to speculate with funds of the estate or place them where they may not be withdrawn at once by order of the court. The deposit by an administrator of the funds of the estate in a current account with a bank instead of a fixed account at a high rate of interest, with a view to having such funds subject to withdrawal at a moments notice is NOT improper and he is not answerable for the low rate of interest thus obtained. An administrator, without order of the court, has no authority to continue the business in which the deceased was engaged in at the time of his death. If he does so with the funds of the estate, he is chargeable with all the losses incurred thereby without allowing him to receive the benefits of any profits that he may make. The administrator of a deceased spouse shall also administer, liquidate, and distribute the community property, because the estate of a decease spouse consists not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of the assets of the conjugal partnership, if any, which pertain to the deceased. Q: What is the care required in the management of the estate by the executor or administrator? A: The law does not impose upon an executor or administrator a high degree of care in the administration of the estate but an ordinary and usual care for the want of which he is personally liable. Q: When is the property of the executor or administrator liable for his debts? A: In case of death of an executor or administrator who has contracted debts, his own property which he left at death is
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directly liable for payments of such debts. The creditor may direct his action against said executors or administrators heirs. For until all the creditors of a deceased person have been paid, there can be no net inheritance divisible among the heirs. Q: What if a lease contract exceeds one year? A: If the lease contract exceeds one year, the same is no longer considered a mere act of administration and leave of court is required. A view held however, that Art. 1878 of NCC on agency should not apply to leases entered into by an executor under the theory that they represent not only the estate but also the parties interested therein, that they are required to file a bond, and that their acts are subject to specific provisions of the law and orders of the probate court, which circumstances are not true with respect to agents. (look at San Diego v Nombre, 11 SCRA 165).
Garcia brought an action seeking to be declared as heirs; to have the properties under Escudero delivered to them; and to order Escudero to render an accounting of the properties in the latters custody. The trial court granted these reliefs, but Escudero only rendered an accounting and asked for stay of execution for the other judgments. In his statement of accounts, he explained that: 1. Certain personal properties were destroyed by fire (supported by evidence). 2. Cattle died due to rinderpest of 1898. 3. Coconut lands were seized by revolutionists during a certain period. 4. He charged for Sundries for travelling expenses. Garcia impugned the statement of accounts submitted by Escudero, and the trial court ordered Escudero to be responsible for such properties, i.e., that Escudero should pay for the items which were not properly (based on the trial courts opinion) accounted for. Issue: W/N the administrators (Escuderos) explanations were sufficient to absolve him from liabilities over the properties under his administration. Held: YES. The account rendered by defendant should be approved. As to the first item: It was not shown that such properties were destroyed by the negligence of Escudero. As to the second item: Although no written evidence of the death of such cattle was introduced in accordance with the laws then in
GARCIA v. ESCUDERO (43 Phil. 437) Facts: Verdejo died, leaving an open will wherein he named as heirs his three sisters (Garcia, et al), and Escudero and Marasigan as administrators. Intestate proceedings were commenced in the justice of the peace court of Dolores for the settlement of the deceaseds estate undisposed of by will , and testamentary proceedings leading to the settlement of the estate covered by his will were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas by whose order said justice of the peace delivered to administrator Escudero the properties of the deceased, such as furniture, jewelry, cattle (1 black horse, 1 black mare, 5 female carabaos), coconut lands.
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force on large cattle, the fact of the death of those animals was proven by the testimony of Escudero based on personal knowledge, and that such testimony was not timely objected to. As to the third item: There was evidence proving such seizure, and that it was also proved that there were no substantial produce after possession was reverted to Escudero. As to the fourth item: duly proven by evidence, not overthrown by contrary evidence.
orders, decrees and judgment in the record on appeal alleges as a ground thereof that they constitute the best evidence of the services rendered by him and his attorney. What section 779 of the code of Civil Procedure requires to be transmitted to the court in case of an appeal from a decree or order approving or disapproving the accounts of an administrator, in accordance with the provisions of sec. 778, is a certified transcript of the appeal, order, decree or judgment appealed from and of the accounts embraced in the order, the inclusion of any other order, decree or judgment from which no appeal has been taken being unnecessary and superfluous. The accounts partially disapproved from the appealed order are those submitted by Domingo, which accounts appear in the record on appeal, as amended by the order of the court. Thus, the court a quo did not commit any error in ordering the elimination from the record on appeal of the other pleadings, decrees, orders or judgments not appealed from, which, according to Domingo, are nothing more than evidence of the services rendered by him and his attorney. As regards the alleged error that the court a quo erred in not submitting Domingo to an examination under oath and in not holding a hearing on his accounts, records show that upon calling for hearing the accounts of exadministrator Domingo, the latter appeared in his own behalf and a certain Palarca opposed the approval thereof. Under the heading PAYMENTS in Domingos alleged errors, which include money advanced to attorney Bartolome D. P400, Partial payment of the debt of deceased in favor of Julian and also to Commissioner Gabriel, and expenses
NICOLAS v. NICOLAS (63 Phil 332) FACTS: What is involved in this case is the intestate estate of the deceased Santiago Nicolas. Ex-administrator Domingo Nicolas appealed from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, which provided that the court approved the two accounts submitted by Domingo with amendments and with a balance of P726.01 in favor of the administration, which sum said Domingo must turn over to the administrator Protasio Santos, through the clerk of court. In case of non-compliance, the bond given by Domingo will be attached to satisfy the payment due him. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo committed the errors alleged by Domingo in its order in question NO HELD: The first assignment of alleged error consists in that the court erred in disapproving the record on appeal presented by the appellant and in ordering the amendment thereof by eliminating certain pleadings,
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incurred during the anniversary of the deceased, the supreme court ruled that the court a quo correctly rejected them on the ground that they had not been authorized by said court and because they had already been discussed in Judge Ocampos order, from which no appeal was taken. The item consisting in expenses incurred by Domingo on the occasion of the anniversary of the deceased cannot be considerd a part of the funeral expenses nor as the erection of a mausoleum which forms part of the sepulture of the deceased, because it bears no relation to the funeral. The law only authorizes the administrator to collect for his services as such the sum of P4 for every day actually and necessarily spent by him in the administration and care of the estate of the deceased, not for every act or task he might perform, as indicated by the great majority of the tasks performed by him. Thus, P4 is reasonable. (18 days was granted to Domingo to serve as administrator)
Almost 2 months later, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, sons and only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration on the ground that he was not notified of the motion for allowance and the grant thereof; denied Yangco gave notice of his intention to appeal Meanwhile, Panis, through Wijangco, filed a motion for execution of of the P15,000; he claims that since Bruno Uy was already dead, his share will go to his father (petitioner) who did not appeal the decision of the court and consequently, only the share of Pedro Uy should be withheld Yangco objected but the judge ordered the payment of of P15,000 ISSUES, HELD and RATIO: Whether the orders were valid and final court said that they need not be determined in the case at hand, but they are appealable there is no provision of law authorizing the lower court to enforce the immediate execution of such orders in probate proceedings after an appeal has been perfected what is the character of liability for attorneys fees in probate proceedings? the attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator the services for which fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust; thus, liability for the payment of
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UY TIOCO v. IMPERIAL (53 Phil 802) FACTS: Respondent Panis, counsel for the administration of estate of the deceased, before final settlement of the accounts, moved for the allowance of attorneys fees in the sum of P15,000 The judge, over the objection of the petitioner administrator Uy Tioco, granted the same; Uy Tioco did not appeal
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attorneys fees rests on the executor or administrator (if the fees are beneficial to the estate, then executor or administrator is entitled to reimbursement from the estate)
was approved by the court. The heirs of Bienvenida excepted to such decision, hence this appeal. Issues: [1] W/N the administrator of the estate is entitled to the reimbursement of counsel fees. [2]W/N the administrator is entitled to per diem compensation for his services Held: [1] No. The fees being claimed by the administrator all relate to services rendered for the benefit of the administrator himself and for that of the other natural children of Justiniano Dacanay and not for the benefit of the estate. In this case, the administrator deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified documents (i.e. inventory) for the purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs of the deceased and through his own breach of trust, brought the litigation for which he now demands reimbursement for counsel fees. -The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel fees arising out of litigation between the beneficiaries thereof among themselves or in the protection of the interests of particular persons, but an administrator may employ competent counsel on questions which affect his duties as administrator and on which he is in reasonable doubt, and reasonable expenses for such services may be charged against the estate subject to the approval of the court. -An administrator who brings on litigation for the deliberate purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit is not entitled to reimbursement for counsel fees incurred in such litigation.
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DACANAY v. HERNANDEZ (53 Phil 824) Facts: -Justiniano Dacanay died, leaving only one legitimate child, Bienvenida, and three acknowledged natural children, Hermenigilda, Tirso, and Paulina. Bienvenida married Silverio and died leaving three children. -Deceased Justiniano left a will naming Tirso as the executor/administrator. It greatly favored the natural children at the expense of Bienvenida. -Will was duly probated; Tirso qualified as administrator; various schemes of partition were submitted by commissioners. Even both parties, Tirso and Silverio, submitted their own plans of partition but the Court found all of them unsatisfactory. Therefore, Judge rendered own decision which provided for a complete and apparently fair distribution of the estate. -Tirso filed a motion for new trial on the ground that such decision was contrary to law but was denied. Appeal was perfected but Tirso filed a motion for reopening the case on the ground of newly discovered evidencean inventory of property alleged to have been donated to Bienvenida on occasion of her marriage. SC granted motion and ordered remand of case to the CFI. -CFI Judge found that inventory was genuine and directed commissioners of partition. Several plans of partition were again submitted, but the last one which was submitted by the estates administrator pursuant to the parties stipulation in open court,
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[2]No. the prolongation of the settlement of the estate was due entirely to the efforts of the administrator to defraud the legitimate heirs, and the Court cannot allow him to profit by his own fraud. Moreover, his services for the period in question would have been unnecessary if he had not, by his fraudulent acts, prevented the settlement of the estate. -Where an administrator is acting as such for his own benefit and not for that of the estate, he is in a position analogous to that of bailee for his own sole benefit and is bound to exercise great care and attention in the conservation of the property under administration and will be held liable for losses. Per diem compensation of an administrator can only be allowed for necessary services, and where the prolongation of the settlement of the estate is due entirely to the efforts of the administrator to defraud the heirs, he is not entitled to compensation for the services rendered in connection therewith.
Held: No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Second, The Rules of Court provides that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executors or administrators commissions, and never as attorneys fees. Where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs and not from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
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Issue: Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees.
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LACSON v. REYES (182 SCRA 729) Facts: Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as counsel for the heirs and as executor under the will. Granted. He then filed a motion for attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging that the heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered the sum of P68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and alleged that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00 which was already paid. Lower court granted the motion.
ROSENSTOCK v. ELSER (48 Phil 708) Facts: - Upon the death of Henry W. Elser, petitioner C. W. Rosenstock filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate of Elser's will, and that he, Rosenstock be appointed as executor of the estate. - Petitioner files a motion asking for a monthly allowance of P1,000 considering that the work of administering the above-entitled estate is such as to require an unusual amount of time of the executor, owing to the size and involved condition of the estate and all parties involved in the case agreed that this amount was just a reasonable; the court approves allowance. - 2 years later, the widow of the deceased filed a petition asking that the order for P1,000 allowance be revoked and that the compensation of the executor should be based upon the provisions of section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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Court revokes the order and fixes the compensation of the executor of P400 per month. - From this order the widow appeals contending that the trial court erred in failing to reduce the compensation of the executor to the statutory amount allowed under section 680. Issue: w/n the courts erred in fixing the compensation contrary to Sec. 680 Held: no Ratio: - The record speaks for itself. At the time of his appointments all parties agreed that the executor should have and receive P1,000 per month for his services. - The order fixing the allowance at P1,000, among other things recites the agreed facts, and is largely founded upon that stipulation. - The present order reducing the executor's fee to P400 per month from which both parties have appealed was made more than nineteen months after the original order was made, Rosenstock had been acting as executor of the estate for more than nineteen months and as such had been administering the affairs of the estate with the ultimate view of winding up may have existed for allowing him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the time of his appointment have ceased to exist. - During that period all of the assets and liabilities of the estate should have been legally ascertained and determined. - In other words the character and class of the work which devolves upon the executor is of a very different type and nature now than at the time of his appointment. -
Although by mutual consent his compensation was fixed at P1,0000 per month at the time of his appointment that was not valid or binding contract continuous throughout the whole administration of the estate. It was always subject to change and the approval of the court and to either an increase or decrease as conditions might warrant The original order and the last order were both made in the court in which the probate proceedings were pending, and all matters pertaining to the estate were peculiarly within the knowledge and province of that court, by which all orders were made and in which all accounts were filed. That is to say from the date of the appointment of the executor until the 2nd order was issued, the lower court had before it all of the records orders and proceedings growing out of the administration of the estate. Based upon such records it found as a fact that under all of the existing circumstances the fee of the executor from June 1, 1925 should be P400 per month.
JOSON v. JOSON (2 SCRA 83)
PHIL. TRUST CO. v. LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122) Facts: PICARD was appointed as administrator of the Intestate Estate of James Burt; filed an administrators bond with LUZON SURETY as his suretysubsequently dismissed and replaced by Philippine Trust Co.
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Court issued an order for PICARD to account for an amount with the PNB as part of the inventory of the estate of Burt. PICARD was found guilty of estafa for having disbursed funds of the estate without authority. Court ordered LUZON SURETY to show cause why the administrators bond should not be confiscated. Issue: w/n the probate court can order the confiscation of the administrators bond? Held: Yes. The probate court may have the bond executed in the same probate proceeding. A probate court is possessed with all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount and executing or forfeiting the administrators bond; execution or forfeiture of the bond- necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings Surety is bound upon the terms of the bond of the principal, as Picard failed to faithfully execute the orders and decrees of court, the obligations remains in full force and effect; surety- not entitled to notice in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator, privy to the proceedings against his principal.
The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon long before the present intestate proceedings were commenced the administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the estate's twoforths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00; and on the rice land, P2,100.00. Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action." Dela Cruz the administrator appealed
Issue: Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided upon by the Probate Court? Held: No. It must be decided in a separate action The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental over the subject matter herein is beyond debate. However, acting as a probate court, said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim for rentals allegedly due. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to
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DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (16 SCRA 886) Facts: - Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-fourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental.
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defeat the administrator's case and should be threshed out in a full trial on the merits. Also, Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches us that: "When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person."6 The line drawn in the Escay case gives us a correct perspective in the present. The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by the more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters affecting property under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced"
accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment. Before defendant can answer the complaint, he died. The plaintiffs amended their compliant to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the court on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein. ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint? HELD: NO
QUIRINO v. GOROSPE (169 SCRA 702) RATIO: AGUAS v. LILEMOS (5 SCRA 959) FACTS: Francisco Salinas and spouses Felix and Maria Aguas filed a compliant for recovery of damages from Hermogenes Llemos averring that Hermogenes served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00 a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila Rule 87 provides for actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied" which according to Leung Ben vs. O'Brien include all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
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Rule 88 on the other hand enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class.
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MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (179 SCRA 196) Facts: A passenger bus owned by the Felicidad Balla and driven by Domingo Casin swerved to the left lane and collided head-on with a Ford Fiera (a service jeep) owned by Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from the opposite direction. The bus swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on with another passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades. Felicidad Balla and Domingo Casin died on the spot. Drivers Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Prades also died. The spouses Oscar Prades and Victoria Prades, the only surviving forced heirs of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla for damages. The spouses Prades alleged that Casin drove in a reckless and imprudent manner which was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the incident which resulted to the death of Fabian Prades, and that the estate of deceased Felicidad Balla should be held liable for damages, since Felicidad Balla allowed her driver Casin to drive recklessly and not observing the required diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee, despite her
presence in the passenger bus. Felicidad's children moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold the children liable for the alleged negligence of their deceased mother. They said what was proper was to sue the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last portion of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means that the creditor should institute the proper intestate proceedings wherein which he may be able to interpose his claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Important note: there were no intestate proceedings to settle Felicidad's estate. Felicidad's children filed a MR. The spouses Prades filed their comment and motion to admit amended complaint together with an amended complaint, amending the title of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla as represented by the children named in the original complaint. The court issued an order denying the MR and admitting the amended complaint. Felicidad's children then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the MTD.
Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the assailed order. Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are abated by death are: (1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent; (2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
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sickness of the decedent; and (3) Judgments for money against the decedent (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]). It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated. Actions for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive the death of the latter. The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an executor or administrator. The rule provides: Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate proceedings exist for the reason that her children had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of her estate, claiming that Felicidad Balla left no properties. Thus, while Felicidad's children may have correctly moved for the dismissal of the case and the spouses Prades have forthwith corrected the deficiency by filing an amended complaint, even before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to dismiss, the action under Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which allows the suit against the legal representative of the deceased,
that is, the executor or administrator of his estate, would still be futile, for the same reason that there appears to be no steps taken towards the settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad Balla, nor has an executor or administrator of the estate been appointed. From the statement made by Felicidad's children that "many persons die without leaving any asset at all", which insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that Felicidad's children will not take any step to expedite the early settlement of the estate, judicially or extrajudicially if only to defeat the damage suit against the estate. (Note however the deceased Balla apparently left the bus). Under the circumstances the absence of an estate proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the place of the deceased. Thus, in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of the estate or in case where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased. PAJARILLO v. IAC (176 SCRA 340)
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BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367) Facts: Eusebio Capili died before his wife Hermogena Reyes. Eusebios will was admitted to probate wherein he left his properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then during the pendency of the probate proceedings died intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor of Eusebios estate.
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Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with the will of Eusebio which however was opposed by Hermogenas relatives. They submitted their own project of partition claiming that of the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio should be awarded to them as those properties did not belong to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This was questioned by Bernardo. He claimed that the properties belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her share of such partnership. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation as void as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects of partition. The court ordered the executor to file another project partition dividing the property of Eusebio according to his will, however noting that such properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses. Issue: Whether or not the probate court had jurisdiction to determine that the properties belonged to the conjugal partnership? Held: YES The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except when one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. It has also been held that when the parties interested are all heirs of
the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. Provided that interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. In this case the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnerships or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the state of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs including of course the widow represented by her collateral relatives upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
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Q: When may an heir sue to recover his share? A: Where there is an order of the court assigning a particular land to an heir or devisee or when the time allowed for payment of debts has expired, such or for the damaged done. In other words, there must first be a partition of the estate and delivery of latter to the heir. Q: What is the reason behind the above rule? A: The reason for this rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran as follows: An executor or administration who assumes trust, takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the purpose of paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the heirs and devisees. Consequently, before distribution is made or before any residue is known, the heirs or devisees have no cause of action against the executor or administration for recovery of the property left by the deceased. Q: May the heirs attack the validity of a project of partition duly approved by the court? A: No. The court has stated that where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had been fully carried out and the heirs has received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any part of the partition (barred further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and supervision of the court for proper distribution in accordance to the tenor of the partition). The parties cannot attack the partition collaterally.
Q: Does the probate court have jurisdiction to pass upon questions of ownership of real properties forming part of the estate of the deceased? A: No. Note the following rulings: However, the ownership of the disputed parcel of land cannot be said to be res judicata, for a probate court has no right to determine with finality the ownership thereof. (Ortega v CA) The case was instituted for the purpose of having Yap declared owner of the parcel of land in Leyte, asserting her title as against decedent Ortega himself. The subject matter being beyond the jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu sitting as a probate court, it was proper that the issue of ownership of a specific property was raised in a separate ordinary action. (Cuizon case)
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GUANCO v. NATIONAL BANK (54 Phil 244) FACTS: -Guanco obtained credits from PNB and as security pledged 250 shares of the capital stock of Binalbagan Estate and 6,196 shares of capital stock of Hinigaran Sugar Plantation. -After Guancos death, the administrator of his estate filed a petition in the intestate proceedings asking that the CFI issue an order requiring the manager of the bank to appear in court for examination as regards the shares of the Binalbagan Estae under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure. -The Court ordered the manager of the bank to appear but he did not, instead the attorney of the bank filed an answer and it was asserted that the pledge of shares was still in force as security for the debts of Guanco and the Hinigaran Estate.
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-Thereupon, the Court in the same proceedings and without any trial, ordered the manager of the bank to deliver the said shares to the administrator of the estate within 30 days from notice of the order. ISSUE: -W/N the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery of the shares to the administrator in a proceeding under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure. HELD: -YES. Section 709 only provides a proceeding for examining persons suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away property of the deceased or withholds information of documentary evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the deceased to such property or to disclose the possession of his last will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit evidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court to enforce delivery of possession, recourse must be had to any ordinary action. -The bank maintains that the pledge is still in force. It may have documentary evidence to that effect, and it was not under obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a third party, on the strength of a citation under section 709. The possession of the certificates of the shares in question is a part of that evidence and it is obvious that if they are surrendered to the administrator of the estate and possibly disposed of by him, the bank will lose its hold on the shares as a pledge. The bank, hence, is entitled to its day in court, and its rights can only be determined in a corresponding action.
ALAFRIZ v. MINA (28 Phil 137) Facts: Gregorion Navarro died. Upon a petition presented for that purpose, Prospero Alafriz was appointed as administrator of the estate. After qualifying as administrator, he presented a motion in the CFI alleging that Pia Mina had in her possession a certain document or paper or receipt for certain jewelry deposited by Gregorio Navarro before his death as security for a loan. The court issued a n order citing Pia Mina to appear in court and to deliver to the clerk of the court the paper or document mentioned. Mina presented her exception to the order alleging that she and her mother were the real owners of the jewelry pawned. After the document was delivered to the clerk, the court directed the clerk to redeem the said jewelry and to keep it deposited in his office until the final settlement of the estate. Mina presented a motion asking that the jewelry be excluded from the inventory presented by Alafriz. Issue: Whether or not the court can order Mina to appear in court. Whether or not the jewels can be included in the inventory. Held: Yes. Section 709 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that the court may cite a suspected person to appear before it, and may examine him on oath on the matter of the complaint. However, the lower court also ordered the administrator to pay to the clerk the sum of P160, with which to redeem the jewel. This was done without permitting Mina to be heard upon the question of her alleged ownership. Nothing in Section 709 justifies the second order for it does not authorize the court to take possession of the property, if any should be found in
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the possession of the defendant or of the person cited. In the present case, Mina was entitled to retain possession of the pawn ticket, until the question of ownership of the jewels should be determined in the proper way. The court had no right to deprive her of her evidence relating to the property until the question of ownership had been settled. Yes, the jewels can be included. Placing them in the inventory does not in any way deprive Mina of her property therein. She is entitled to be heard upon the question of her ownership, when that question is properly presented to the court. It in no way prejudices the rights of Mina in her property.
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HEIRS OF GREGOIRE v. BAKER (51 Phil 75) Facts: - One J.H. Ankrom died; respondent Administrator included in the estate a tract of land worth P60,000 - Petitioners Heirs of Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for about P70,000, which was allowed - Later on the respondent administrator discovers that Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to secure that company from liability on a note in the amount of P20,000.00, of the same date, upon which it had made itself contigently liable; Two days after this mortgage had been executed Ankrom appears to have made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations.
In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above mentioned. - The courts initially ordered the inclusion of the land considering that without it the estate would be insolvent, but later on reversed - Petitioners appeal, claiming that the assignment to Jung by Ankrom of the equity of redemption of the latter in the tract of land above mentioned was affected in fraud of creditors, and that it was the duty of the administrator to retain the possession of this tract of land and thereby place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, the burden of instituting any action that may be necessary to maintain the rights of the transferee under said assignment. Issue: w/n the contentions of the petitioners are correct; what is the remedy of the creditors? Held: yes Ratio: - The precise remedy open to the appellants in the predicament above described is clearly pointed pout in section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his lifetime such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has -
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not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors.
VELASQUEZ v. GEORGE (125 SCRA 456)
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

RULE 74 UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302) Facts:

Held: There was no need for appointment of administrator

Issue: whether there was a need for appointment of administrator

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULE 74

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULES 75 to 77

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULES 75 to 77

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULES 75 to 77

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH 3D (2008-2009)

BALANAY v. MARTINEZ (64 SCRA 452) Facts:

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests RULES 75 to 77