Casals vs. Cusi, Jr.

F: Upon the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment within ten days from notice. Atty. Delante asked for at least three motions for extension to file the comment. After the lapse of over 6 months, he asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the answer [which] he will try his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973. The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. I: Is Atty. Delante guilty of willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney? H: Yes. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." The Court thus finds unsatisfactory the attorney's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith. The unsatisfactory explanation given by the lawyer as against the pleadings of record evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement. It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts and their clients. The Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3)

months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Montecillo vs. Gica

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool"), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo and a case for damages arising from the same incident. Montecillo was acquitted and the Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica. Francisco Gica appealed but the decision was affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, moved for a reconsideration with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the RPC on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When it was denied, it was observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will be interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines." Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent to explain why he should not be punished for contempt of court. Respondent made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. Not content with that move, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance

with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. I: Is Atty. del Mar guilty of contempt of court? H: Yes. To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals. It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practising lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances. Atty. Quirico del Mar, for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

Commission on Elections vs. Noynay

F: COMELEC resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. Respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129. Petitioner filed a special civil action. It contends that public respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arg uing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses. I: Should the respondent judge and the counsel for petitioner be admonished? H: Yes. It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration norAlberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA. Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.

Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel

F: After the decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. The following statements are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto: They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called scattershot desperation; Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.; The herein petitioners xxx opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. MacArthurs third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, contain: xxx; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners counsel.; x x x Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the right to reject any and all bids) can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud xxx and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. The motion to inhibit filed by same lawyers asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof. The motion charges [t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant

appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision was rendered in this case. They also cited that there exists an unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was unjudicial favoritism in favor of petitioners I: Are the lawyers for the petitioner guilty of contempt of court? H: Yes. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out the duty of an attorney to the courtsobserve and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics pronounces that it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity to the courts. The duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, it has been said of a lawyer that as an officer, of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a civ -ilized, democratic tribunal, but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Courts decision as false, erroneous and illegal and accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners including the Presidentconstitute disrespectful language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice. It ill behooves an attorney to justify his disrespectful language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as

many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. It has been said that a lawyers language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is the lawyers duty as a member of the Bar to abstain from an offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In this case, it was necessary for attorney to accuse petitioners of having made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur; to describe a proposition of petitioners as corrupt on its face, laying bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners; and to charge petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote. In this case, deliberately misquoted Section 1, Rule 51 by intentionally omitting the qualification which should not have been done. A lawyer has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes be within his knowledge and responsibility. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should remind a lawyer that a lawyer should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should remind a lawyer that a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrong doing the lawyer should terminate their relation. Also, the deletion of paragraph 6 which contained disrespectful language did not erase the fact that it has been made. It does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield against the charge of indirect contempt.