1.

Engineering Design Principles

Learning Goals
After you have read and studied this chapter, you should be able to: Explain the importance of engineering design in solving real-world problems Show how product design impacts society Draw a flowchart that explains the design process Describe each element of the design process Illustrate each element with a case study example Show that the design process is iterative using an example

1.1 Introduction
Design is a central activity in engineering. Design problems are typically openended and ill-structured. That is, there are usually many acceptable solutions and the solutions cannot normally be found by routinely applying a mathematical formula in a structured wayi. Engineers have to use both engineering and business principles such as cost, schedule, risk, and safety in the design process. Engineers must also work with people both within and outside their organization to bring the design to fruitionii. They typically use engineering drawings, text, templates, or models to communicate their design ideas to the people within and outside their organizationiii. If the design specifications are in error, the companys profit may suffer or, more importantly, people may be injured or even killed.

Engineering Design (Definition): This is the process of devising a system, component, or process to meet desired needs. It is a decision making process (often iterative) in which the basic sciences, mathematics, and engineering sciences are applied to convert resources optimally to meet a stated objective. Among the fundamental elements of the design process are the establishment of objectives and criteria, synthesis, analysis, construction, testing, and evaluation. It is essential to include a variety of realistic constraints such as economic factors, safety, reliability, aesthetics, ethics, and social impact.
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET, 1996).

1.2 Elements of the Design Process

Design has always been a characteristic of human survival, as illustrated by primitive societies fashioning basic tools or making sheltersiv. In the past, "designing" was inextricably linked to the "making" of the primitive implements - that is there was no separate, discernible modeling process. This approach to design constitutes that of a craft. In contrast, an engineering designer does not typically produce the final end-product; rather, he/she produces a set of fabrication specifications for that product. The specification must be such that the fabricator can make the product in question without talking to the designer. The specification must be both complete and specific; there should be no ambiguity and nothing can be left out. Design is thus a primary component of product development. The attention given to a product during the design stage has a direct bearing on the future costs and the performance of a product. Good design includes mechanisms to predict and correct failures before their occurrence. With no investment of time and money in engineering design, the costs associated with failure escalate rapidly. Design is one of the primary tasks that engineers undertake and it is expected to take as much as 30% of an engineer's time on the job. To be competitive in todays global marketplace, products must be developed and introduced to markets faster, with unprecedented demands for high performance and low costv. Even if the engineers position is not purely a design position, design skills are still needed in order to manufacture useful products.

Example of Importance of Design: The 1981 collapse of Kansas City's Hyatt Regency Hotel occurred because a contractor, unable to procure threaded rods long enough to effectively suspend a second-floor walkway from a roof truss, hung it instead from a fourth-floor walkway, using shorter rods. However, the supports of the fourth-floor walkway were not designed to carry the weight of the second-floor walkway in addition to its own dead and live loads. During a tea dance in the lobby in 1981, the walkways were crowded with spectators. The load this placed on the structure proved to be too much, and the nuts under the top walkway were pulled through the walkway structure. The bottom walkway crashed to the ground and the top walkway fell onto it. In total, 114 people died and over 200 were injured in what is now considered one of the worst structural tragedies to take place in the United States. Had the designer been able to communicate with the fabricator while the design was in progress, he would have learned that no company manufactured rods in the lengths needed to hang the secondfloor walkway from the roof truss and would then have been forced to develop another solution to the problem.
Source: http://www.taknosys.com/ethics/cases/ec02.htm

The designer needs to keep profitability in mind, while at the same time remaining abreast of emerging technologies so that he/she may maintain and enhance his/her value to the company and produce valuable products. For example, Boeing Corporation designed its 777 aircraft in a paper-less mode. Boeing integrated its Computer Aided Design (CAD) systems so that the 777 design team could access the designs from anywhere in the world and create virtual instead of physical mock-ups. Boeing distributed 2,200 computer terminals to its overall 777 design team. The terminals were connected to one of the largest grouping of IBM mainframe computers in the world. This provided key participants in the design process, ranging from airframe manufacturers in Japan to engine manufacturers in the U.K. and U.S., immediate access to the data. The systems also allowed all involved in the process to be aware of changes as they were made and confirmed. The new design process allowed Boeing to cut its traditional 60 month development time to less than 48 monthsvi. For more information on Boeings design process for the 777 project, please refer to Appendix A at the end of this chapter.

Figure 1 - Steps involved in a Design Process

Simply designing a product or system is often no longer sufficient. The design process must be iterated often in order to improve quality, reduce costs, and prevent failure. The safety of a product or a system must be considered, as should public opinion. If the design process is not taken seriously, products will not sell, businesses will collapse, and competitors will thrive. To compete effectively with others, good design techniques must be implemented as a tool of continuous improvement. The design process consists of several distinct steps which are shown in the flow chart in Figure 1. In this chapter, we will illustrate in detail the elements of the design process taking the reader through the design steps used by NASA to design, test, and fly space shuttles. This example will show that engineering design is an iterative process and that periodic redesigns of product and processes are necessitated when products fail.

1.2.1 Real World Connection I: Redesign of the space shuttle

NASA developed the space transportation system (STS) in the 1970s as the method U.S. astronauts would use to explore space. The major components of the space transportation system include the orbiter, external tank, solid rocket booster, main engine, and orbital maneuvering system engines (Figure 2). The shuttle is made up of three major elements: two solid rocket boosters, an external fuel tank, and the orbiter that houses the astronauts. Figure 3 shows the screen shot describing where you can find more information on the early development of the space shuttle in the case study CDROM.

External Fuel Tank

Solid Rocket Boosters

Orbiter
Figure 2 - Line Drawing of the Space Shuttle

Figure 3 - Links to the CD explaining the early developments of the shuttle

The components of the space shuttle are designed and inspected by various NASA divisions including the Earth Sciences Division, Microgravity Science & Application Division, Material Science Division, and the Computer Science Division. (Information about these divisions can be found at NASAs website www.nasa.gov.) Designing and building a space shuttle is a time consuming process. NASA, along with several other contractors, designs and manufactures the components of a space shuttlevii. Although the mission profile and shuttle design were intricately planned, the fiscal environment of the 1970s was austere and the planned five-orbiter fleet was reduced to four. These budgetary issues were compounded by engineering problems that contributed to schedule delays and the initial orbital test flights were delayed by more than two years. The first test craft was the orbiter Enterprise, a full size model of the space shuttle without the engines and other systems needed for orbital flight. The Enterprise was used to check the aerodynamic and flight control characteristics of the orbiter in atmospheric flight. The Enterprise was carried atop a modified Boeing 747 and released for a gliding approach and landing at the Mojave Desert test center. Five of these test flights were used to validate the orbiters systems. After the Enterprise test flights were completed in 1977, extensive shuttle ground tests followed. These tests included vibration tests of the entire assembly and tests of the various shuttle parts. In 1977, Morton Thiokol Inc., (MTI) carried out an important hydroburst test that evaluated the safety margin in the design of the steel case segments. Hydroburst tests consist of pressurizing the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) case with water to 1 times the maximum expected pressure of the motor at ignition. Although the test showed that the steel case segments met their strength requirement, some joint rotation (gap opening) was discovered.

William Leon Ray was an engineer with Science and Engineering in the Solid Motor Branch at the time and it was his job to pursue any possible problems with the SRB. He became concerned about joint rotation after the hydroburst tests and sent numerous memos in the late 1970s to his manager, Robert Glenn Eudy, urging him to develop a solution to the problem. In 1977, Leon Ray recommended several solutions to fixing the joint rotation problem in a memo, but engineers at Marshall and Thiokol agreed that although the performance of the field joint deviated from expectations, it was an acceptable risk and implemented a few of the recommendations. The Columbia was launched successfully on April 12, 1981. During 1981 to 1986 many more flights were performed until the Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986, stopped the flights and required a thorough reexamination of the design of the shuttle, in particular the SRB. The SRB joint was completely redesigned and flights were resumed on Sept. 29, 1988 with the launch of Discovery. With the completion of Space Shuttle Mission STS113 on December 7, 2002, a total of 112 mission had been flown since the first flight in April 1981. On Feb. 1, 2003, however, the space shuttle Columbia was lost on reentry. This necessitated another thorough redesign of the space shuttle. Discovery was launched during July 2005 and returned but with lingering problems. This example shows the importance of redesigns in engineering design. Each redesign of the shuttle components took more than 2 years. The budget for NASAs space shuttle was about $3.7 billion during 2003, $3.9 billion during 2004, and $4.3 billion during 2005. The major activities during these years were undertaken to ensure that the space shuttle can return to flight. Further details about the design of the space shuttle will be provided throughout this chapter as we discuss the engineering design process.

1.2.2 Step 1: Problem Definition

The inspiration for a product is most often the result of meeting a particular need or problem that existing products are not able to satisfy. For example, staples are used to hold papers together. In this case, it is designed to solve a single problem whereas other products can be designed tio solve a multitude of problems: automobiles are capable of transporting both people and equipment for many different purposes, whether for business or leisure. When defining a problem requiring a new design, it is crucial that the critical characteristics or constraints be determined and documented. For example if a team is asked to design a car navigation system, they need to know the physical size constraints before the design process can proceed. The team may believe that the ideal location for this device is in the dashboard of the car. However, the initial models of the navigation system might be too large for the dashboard. Therefore, steps must be taken to either reduce the size of the navigation system or relocate pieces of it to other areas of the vehicle. Without a consideration of these constraints early on, significant amounts of time and money may be wasted.

1.2.2.1

Real World Connection II:

Problem Definition: Identify Joint rotation problem

The problem facing NASA and its subcontractors on January 28, 1986, was that the space shuttle Challenger had exploded 74 seconds after lift-off. Subsequent investigations revealed that the engineers had opposed the launch of the shuttle on January 27th based on the expected cold weather conditions for which the field joint was not certified. The problem was found to be caused by blowby, where hot gases eroded the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) allowing a flame path to develop that destroyed the entire booster and the space shuttle itself, resulting in the loss of life of seven astronauts and the reputation of NASA for safe flights. Please consult the CD-ROM for further details about the discussions on January27th. In the following sections, we will look at the design history of the space shuttle and discuss whether NASA had identified this problem of joint rotation earlier and, if so, what steps it took to address this problem during 1971-1985. Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI), a subcontractor of NASA, designed and manufactured the Solid Rocket Motor. The Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) is the principal component of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) (Figures 4, 5 & 6). The SRBs are the Shuttles main source of propulsion during initial launch. Consisting of a stack of cylindrical segments, each SRB is 149.16 ft long and 12.17 ft in diameter, and weighs approximately 1,300,000 lbs. at launch. The individual cylindrical sections are identical up to the aft segment.

Figure 4: Solid Rocket Booster Assembly

Figure 5 - Solid Rocket Booster: Photo

The cylindrical sections are assembled into casting segments referred to as the forward segment with igniter, the forward mid segment, the aft mid segment, and the aft segment with nozzle. This four casting segmented design allows the boosters to be easily transported by rail between MTIs complex in Utah and the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, where the segments are assembled vertically for the mission. After each launch, the booster is retrieved and split into four casting segments for shipping to Utah, where the solid rocket propellant is replaced. The segments are then shipped back to Florida for reuse in the next flight. Figure 6: Cross section of the solid Rocket Motor The SRM is the most important part of the SRB because it contains the propellant for the booster. Each segment of the SRM is attached to the next at in Kennedy Space Center using three field joints (the forward field joint, center field joint, and aft field joint). These field joints not only hold the booster together but also seal the hot gases of the burning propellant within the steel casing of the booster. If gases leak through the joint, an immediate explosion of the booster is likely, resulting in the loss of the vehicle and all those on board. The Morton-Thiokol field joint design, based upon the Air Forces Titan III solidfuel rocket field joint, is illustrated in Figure 6. The lower edge of the top segment has a protruding tang that fits into the 3- inch deep clevis of the upper edge of the bottom

segment. A total of 177 steel pins go through the tang and clevis to hold the segments together at each joint. The field joints maintain the structural integrity of the Solid Rocket Booster during launch. Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Booster, the pressure within the booster reach a peak of 10041016 lbs. per square inch (psi) in less than six tenths of a second. The burning propellant creates hot gases that are at a temperature of 5800F. There are two O-rings on the inner flange of the clevis that seal the field joint, containing the pressure of the hot gases from the burning propellant. These O-rings are about 1/4 inch in section diameter and are made from heat resistant Viton rubber. However, an extremely small gap of 0.005 +/- 0.004-inch will remain between the tang and the inside leg of the clevis. Zinc chromate putty is placed between the insulation at the joint to protect the O-rings from direct exposure to the hot gases. As the combustion gas pressure displaces the putty in the space between the motor segments, a mechanism is created that forces the O-ring to seal the casing. The displacement of the putty acts like a piston and compresses the air in front of the primary O-ring, forcing the O-ring into the gap between the tang and clevis. If hot gases are able to "blowby" the putty and primary Oring, the secondary O-ring is expected to provide a redundant sealing function. As the segments are stacked during assembly, leak-check ports test the O-rings sealing ability and verify both the presence of the seals and the lack of debris around the seals. In 1977, Thiokol carried out an important hydroburst test that evaluated the safety margin in the design of the steel case segments. In these tests, the SRM case was pressurized with water to 1- times the maximum expected pressure of the motor at ignition. Although the test showed that the steel case segments met their strength requirement, joint rotation (gap opening) was discovered. Joint rotation (Figure 7) is a movement of a joints tang and inner clevis flange with respect to each other, causing the joint gap to increase. Before ignition, the SRBs walls are vertical and both O-rings are in contact with the tang and clevis. However, at the time of ignition, the internal pressure of 1004 - 1016 pounds per square inch (psi) swells each booster sections case by 0.7 inches in diameter. Since the joints are stiffer than the case, each section bulges slightly. The O-ring measurements taken during the hydroburst test showed that as a result of the swelling, the tang and clevis inner flanges bend away from each other instead of toward each other. This joint rotation enlarges the gap that the O-ring must seal and reduces the O-ring compression between the clevis and the tang (Figure 7). Further tests established that this joint rotation could be disastrous. As Figure 8 shows, the primary O-ring is pushed into the gap
Figure 7 - Joint Rotation

between the tang and the clevis. This pushing caused by distortion of the O-rings is known as extrusion. Joint rotation may also eliminate the secondary O-rings sealing ability. Since it is possible that neither O-ring will seal correctly, a momentary drop in air pressure around the O-rings may occur. The seal of highly compressed air, which was supposed to equalize the pressure inside the booster, may not exist for a few hundred milliseconds during the initial pressure surge during launch. Without the pressure seal, the hot combustion gases from the propellant could cause blowby through the putty Figure 8 - Joint Rotation and erode the O-rings. Erosion is the decomposition, vaporization, or significant eating away of an O-rings cross-section by combustion gases. If this erosion became widespread, a flame path could develop and the booster could burst at the joint, destroying the entire booster and the space shuttle itself. The consensus of the Presidential Commission and participating investigative agencies was that the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motorviii. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that were intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor. The evidence assembled by the Commission indicated that no other element of the Space Shuttle system contributed to this failureix. Figure 9 shows the screen in the CD-ROM containing animation and textual material and videos that describe the joint rotation problem. Please refer to the CD-ROM to see photographs of the erosion of O-rings.

Figure 9 - Screenshot from the CD-ROM explaining the joint rotation problem

1.2.3 Step 2: Concept Formation

Once the problem has been identified, engineers must develop different concepts/alternatives to solve the problem. These concepts could be derived by creatively applying their knowledge of science and engineering theories to generate valid solutions to the problem. Not only is the acquisition of the technical theories important, the engineers imagination is also essential in the design process. One well established method of developing valuable ideas is through brainstorming, an extremely useful tool for idea generation. This allows a team of people to rapidly suggest and reject ideas in a manner that inspires and encourages all involved. At this stage, no ideas should be evaluated in detail. In order for brainstorming to bring successful results, there are a few guidelines that must be adhered to. First, all team members must have a positive outlook. Negative thoughts or comments should be restricted. Participants must be willing to hear any and every idea despite its possible absurdity. The selection of a facilitator or session coordinator who is responsible for hindering the stating and development of negative comments is very helpful. The facilitator also coordinates idea development by establishing a sequence around the room which allows everyone the opportunity to speak. This speaking sequence, if properly enforced by the session coordinator, ensures the equalization of overpowering or outspoken team members. During this brainstorming session, the ideas mentioned must also be captured using videotapes, audiotapes, or well-written notes. These captured concepts will be evaluated at another time in detail. Abiding by these guidelines will create an atmosphere of encouragement and acceptance.

1.2.3.1

Real World Connection III:

Concept Formation: Identification of five alternatives

William Leon Ray was an engineer with Science and Engineering in the Solid Motor Branch at NASA and it was his job to pursue any possible problems with the SRB. He became concerned about the joint rotation problem and wrote numerous memos to his manager, Robert Glenn Eudy. On October 21st 1977, Ray presented five ideas to alleviate the joint rotation problem through a memo. Figure 11 shows the screen shot of the actual memo, which can also be found on the CD-ROM along with videos that describe the alternatives. In this memo, Ray presented five options to alleviate the joint rotation problem (Figures 10 and 11). First, the engineers could decide to consider no change or alteration of the joint. However, Ray considered that this option was unacceptable since it could result in seal leakage and O-ring extrusion. Ray also suggested that they utilize oversized O-rings. Once again, this alternative was considered unacceptable since during assembly there was a high probability of O-ring or clevis damage. As an acceptable short-term solution, he recommended changing the size of the shim that is used in the joint, although this would require an increase in assembly time and the possibility of an error in the calculation of the appropriate shim size. Another option to resolve this joint rotation problem is a complete redesign of the tang and a reduction of the clevis tolerances. He saw this option as a long term solution which would eliminate the use of shims and reduce calculation errors. Finally, he suggested a combination of the redesign option and the size alteration of the shims, noting that the shims may be required in instances where the redesigned portions are paired with the initial hardware. Once all of the hardware had been redesigned, however, the shims would no longer be needed.

Figure 10 - Screenshot from CD explains Leon Ray Memo

Figure 11 - Leon Rays five options for fixing the joint rotation problem

1.2.4 Step 3: Concept Evaluation

Having developed some apparently feasible ideas for solving a problem, these ideas must be reduced in number based on factors such as cost, technological limitations, legal issues, environmental impacts, and time. This is an important step in estimating the value of the solutions the team has come up with. Without some estimate of how much money the company can earn from the product, many ideas may not be excluded as they should be. For example, a company may estimate that a new product design could generate revenues of $1 million over its lifetime. If it costs more than $10 million to produce, then the net loss on the product will be $9 million and the idea is not feasible. In other instances, certain technologies may need to be developed before the product can be made economically. The costs associated with research and development of the technology may exceed the value of the product. However, an idea that was conceived years ago might become economically viable with new technology and can benefit the company at the present time. Mobile Phones:
AT&T conceived the idea of car phones during the 1960s and sold this service to consumers. The overall demand was low since the product was bulky and took a lot of space in the front and trunk of a car. The company withdrew the product during the late 1960s. By the 1990s, wireless phones had become compact and could be held in the palm of a hand. The prices decreased dramatically and consumers started to use them a lot more. The miniaturization of circuits and advances in processors has made handheld wireless phones popular with people all around the world.

1.2.4.1

Real World Connection IV:

Concept Evaluation: evaluation of alternatives

Following the release of Leon Rays memo (Figure 11), NASA conducted numerous tests to identify solutions to the joint rotation problem during 1978-79. Figure 12 shows a screen shot from the enclosed CD-ROM that shows the types of tests performed as part of the attempt to solve the joint rotation problem. In 1979, Ray visited the manufacturers of the O-ring, who recommended that tests which more closely simulate actual conditions (of flight) should be done. Marshall and Thiokol engineers followed this advice and continued tests into 1980. NASA had to consider factors such as cost, technological limitations, legal issues, environmental impacts, and time in evaluating the five alternatives put forward by Leon Ray. The cost of implementing the five alternatives varied greatly, from the no change option that cost very little to the complete redesign that would cost millions of dollars. In addition, the available technologies at a particular point in time limit which alternatives could be pursued; another issue is whether the engineers on site have knowledge about the current technologies that might solve the problem. Frequently, this is a major issue since practicing engineers might not be aware of new materials that have only recently become available. Retraining and visits to industry conferences are

essential for professional engineers to keep up with latest technological improvements. Legal issues are another factor that influences engineers in the evaluation of alternatives. Another factor is the environmental factors will it be safe to pursue a solution? Time is always an important factor constraining engineers: NASA was under considerable pressure to start manned space flights during 1981. A complete redesign might have taken many years and the management was not willing to wait that long.

Figure 12 - Screenshot from the CD explaining the types of tests performed by Thiokol and Marshall Engineers working on the joint rotation problem

1.2.5 Step 4: Concept Selection

Based upon the evaluation of the material developed during concept evaluation, a concept/product idea will be selected for implementation. It is expected that this concept will resolve the problem. Deciding which concept should be used is typically a group decision made by management based upon an evaluation of criteria produced by participating engineering, sales, and marketing teams. The approved concept will then move to the detailed design stage.

1.2.5.1

Real World Connection V:

Concept Selection: Selection of option 2 and option 3

In the case of the problem with the field joint rotation, successful test results and the upcoming deadlines to launch the shuttle during 1980 forced Marshall and MTIs engineers to decide against redesigning the entire joint (which was Option 4 in Mr. Rays

memo). Instead, they decided to use thicker shims (Option 2 from the same memo) and larger o-rings (Option 3 in the same memo) on the field joint. A shim is a thin wedge of material that can be driven into crevices. It is placed in between parts to make a better fit. Figures 13 show the location of the shims in a field joint and details of the field joint.

Figure 13 - Detailed view of the field joint, tang, clevis, and the location of U-shaped shims

1.2.6 Step 5: Detailed Design

Once several feasible ideas have been evaluated, the best concepts are selected. An enormous amount of time is spent on determining the specific characteristics of each piece of the product. The anticipated specifications are usually communicated through the use of engineering drawings and specification sheets (often called spec sheets). Engineering drawings are typically drafted using computer aided design (CAD) software. Before CAD software became a standard tool in the design process, similar drawings were hand drawn with pencil and paper. CAD software typically includes the option to draw in two dimensions and label the dimensions. More sophisticated CAD packages, such as Computer graphics Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA) and Electronic Preassembly in the Computer (EPIC), allow three dimensional and solid modeling. A sample CATIA production drawing example is shown in Figure 14

Figure 14 - Detailed Design Example

Solid modeling offers many benefits, which become more important with increasing product complexity. A few of these benefits are: a) pieces can be assembled to check for possible interference, b) the drawing can be rotated and viewed from all angles, and c) material properties can be assigned to pieces for further engineering analysis and simulation. It is imperative that the engineering student becomes comfortable with CAD software for todays job market. Future professional engineers should note also that information technology (IT) is linking departments in a company together electronically in ways that were not previously possible. For example, Boeing used IT to reduce their design time for the 777 by linking engineering, accounting, suppliers, customers, communications, and management together using a common information system. Boeing also avoided creating a physical prototype for this project, a bold and unorthodox step8x. (For more information on Boeing and the creation of the 777 please refer to Appendix I at the end of this chapter.)

1.2.6.1

Real World Connection VI:

Detailed Design: Design of field joint

Based on the option selected, a final drawing was created of the field joint. Figure 16 provides the specifications of the field joint and Figures 15 and 17 show the specifications of the SRM. The use of a consistent documentation process that organized data graphically allowed engineers to specify the parts of the SRM in a methodical manner. It was also important that fabricators understood the schematic to ensure the correct reassembly of the SRB because of the safety issues involved and the reusable nature of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). The design process is guided by function, form (appearance), materials, construction, and safety factors. Here, function defines the purpose of the O-ring; namely to seal in the hot gases. Form defines how the object looks: does the ring look black, green, or some other color, which may be important for those conducting visual

inspections, and how does it look when assembled with the other parts. Materials govern the selection of heat resistant Viton rubber as the appropriate medium for construction of the O-ring, although there might be many other materials that provide similar or better sealing properties. Construction deals with how difficult or easy it is to make the parts and mate them together. Safety factors determine whether there needs to be one or two O-rings and which other mechanisms should be included to provide safe operations. All these design factors were taken into account in making the choice of the best alternative and the eventual design of the SRM. The design intent of the joint is to allow the SRM to be transported in sections. After assembly, the joint is responsible for preventing the hot gases used to propel the space shuttle from escaping through the joint by sealing the joint with heat resistant Zinc Chromate putty and two O-rings. Figure 16 shows a two-dimensional design of the field joint and Figure 18 shows a three-dimensional drawing. CAD/CAM provides the ability to draw three-dimensional drawings; in addition, it is possible to animate the components and find out how well they fit together.
SOLID ROCKET MOTOR CHARACTERISTICS:

LENGTH DIAMETER PROPELLANT WEIGHT TOTAL WEIGHT AVERAGE THRUST ACTION TIME
Figure 15 - Specifications of the SRM

126.12 FT 12.17 FT 1,110,000 LB 1,256,000 LB 2,402,000 LB 123.4 SEC

Figure 16 - Specifications of the Field Joint

Figure 17 - Detailed schematic showing the design of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) joint

Figure 18 - A CAD Model of a Field Joint

Source: NASA: http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v4index.htm

1.2.7 Step 6: Prototyping

With detailed drawings and specifications completed, the product can be submitted to the prototype stage. During prototyping, either full-size, scaled, and/or virtual models of the product are built to further determine the merit of the idea and to test different aspects of the design. Questions concerning applicable engineering theories, costs, construction time, etc. need to be answered. Often, paper ideas leave out many details and address few of the problems associated with the physical construction of the product; however, the incorporation of CAD software within the design phase has greatly reduced the likelihood of this problem. If a product transitions directly from the drawing board to the production line without prototyping, the results may not be successful. Prototyping allows the company to evaluate the product and discover problems before investing the resources required to begin full scale production. Computer software now allows much of the prototyping process to be done without a physical model. This is referred to as Virtual Prototyping. Using the CAD model built during the detailing stage saves significant time and resources. Software vendors are standardizing the way different programs communicate with each other so that only one computer model is required. Computer techniques such as Finite Element Analysis and Computation Fluid Dynamics can be used to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a design before it is ever built.

Rapid Prototyping employs automated manufacturing to generate physical models. This technique of prototype construction can be faster and more precise than human fabrication. In many cases a part can be made within hours of deciding to build it. Not all parts can be made to final specifications using this method, but simply having the geometry of a part can be useful. If a device is being retrofitted, a designer may not have control over all specifications or even a precise set of measurements of conditions as they exist. Questions involving all aspects of the product should be answered at this stage.

1.2.8 Step 7: Testing

Testing of the prototypes is the next phase. Prototypes may go through several design iterations before the final prototypes are made. The final prototypes should be very close to the target product. Characteristics such as appearance, materials, and performance will be matched closely with the expected production line item. To check product performance, testing must be conducted to ensure that the product meets explicit specifications. Specifications give the testing process the benchmarks necessary to evaluate the product. For example, a car navigation systems display may produce glare depending on how the driver sits. A tilting display may provide a larger range of perspectives for the drivers position. This tilt angle must be specified, as well as the expected perspectives of the vehicles drivers, depending on their height and preferred seat positions. During testing, the final prototype will be checked to see if it can achieve the specified angles to eliminate the glare problem. If the adjustments do not reduce the glare problem, the prototype must be redesigned or the specifications reevaluated. Physical performance specifications include product life, safety, speed, power consumption, and efficiency. Note that the improper use of specifications will lead to wasted time during quality inspections (increasing the product cost) and frustration from the staff. Continual testing well into the production stage is important to ensure that the product meets all specifications. A quality testing program is usually carried to the point of product failure. This requires predicting when and how a product will fail. Two methods that are useful in this regard are Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). FTA (Figure 23) uses a combination of Boolean algebra and flowchart diagrams to predict scenarios for failure. FMEA assigns a numerical value to three categories that help assess the risk of failure of a product with a Risk Priority Number (RPN). The three categories used by FMEA to determine an RPN are Severity, Occurrence, and Detection. The severity number for a product failure that reduces its effectiveness is low (Severity=2), while a life threatening situation is high (Severity=10).

Figure 19 - Fault Tree Analysis

The Occurrence factor predicts how often a failure will occur, while detection quantifies how difficult it is to identify the failure. The categories are multiplied together to determine the RPN for the failure event. In this way, the different aspects of possible failure can be prioritized. FMEA can be used in both the design and production phases.

1.2.8.1

Real World Connection VII:

Testing: Testing leads to designation of the SRM as criticality 1R

Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI) used extensive testing during the prototyping phase to ensure safe operation of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM). After many tests, NASA and MTI felt confident in the primary O-rings sealing ability since it performed its function in more severe conditions than expected during launch operations. When they purposely failed the primary O-ring, engineers found that pressure at ignition activated the secondary O-ring, which sealed the joint, and fulfilled the redundant function. Additional testing proved that the joint seals achieved adequate compression values after three aspects of the field joint were alteredthickening the shim size, reducing the joint metal tolerances, and increasing the O-ring size. At the completion of these tests, engineers at NASA and MTI unanimously agreed that although the performance of the field joint deviated from expectations, it was a reasonable risk. Shortly after the certification, on November 24, 1980, the SRM field joints were classified on the Solid Rocket Booster Critical Items List as criticality category 1R. NASA defines Criticality 1R as any subsystem of the shuttle that contains redundant hardware, total element failure of which could cause loss of life or vehicle. The use of R, representing redundancy, meant that NASA believed the secondary O-ring would pressurize and seal the gap if the primary O-ring did not work (Refer to Figures 20, 21, 22 and 23).

Figure 20 - Screenshot from the CD gives more information on Criticality 1R

Figure 21 - The above screenshot links to the Shuttle Testing information provided in the CD-ROM

Figure 22 - A test being performed on the SRB

Figure 23 - O-Ring Failure Analysis

1.2.9 Step 8: Send to Production

If testing proves that the product is of acceptable quality, then the product can enter the production phase. Thoughts of the production phase likely begin during the detailed design stage. As engineers become more experienced, they will consider not only the design of the product components, but also how the components will be made. Given two equal possibilities for product construction, the one that is proven or easier to manufacture might be the best alternative. Developing some idea of how a product should be manufactured, often as early as the design stage, can help to speed up the design process. Early in the production phases, engineers decide exactly how each part should be made, the equipment required, manufacturing or processing time needed, and the necessary materials. If there is no current method to fabricate a part as specified, a process must be devised or the component redesigned. Also during this phase, engineers decide how they will ensure that the parts and the final product will meet quality standards and design specifications. After the production-planning phase is complete, the actual production processes begins. During early production, problems inevitably arise and need to be addressed

either by the manufacturing staff or the design staff, depending on the problem. With time and effort, production will generally become smoother and more efficient.

1.2.9.1

Real World Connection VIII:

Production: Production of shuttles and successful operations

On April 12, 1981, the world watched the orbiter Columbia climb into space (Figure 24).. After nine years of design effort, engineers and managers throughout the United States celebrated its first flight. NASA had been working with several contractors since 1972 to produce the space shuttle as a new, more cost-effective way of transporting people and material into orbit. The roar of Columbias solid rocket boosters signified a huge success for the space shuttle team. The ascent of Columbia in 1981 marked the first of four test flights of the space shuttle system. These test flights were conducted between April 1981 and July 1982 and involved over 1,000 tests and data collection procedures. The landing of STS-4 (Space Transportation System 4) in July 1982 concluded the orbital test flight program, with 95% of the objectives accomplished. At this point, NASA declared the Space Shuttle operational and a heavy launch schedule was planned Figure 24 Shuttle Columbia launch for the future. An early plan called for an eventual rate of one space mission per week, but realism forced revisions. In 1985, NASA published a projection calling for an annual rate of 24 flights by 1990. However, this seemed to be an ambitious goal since NASA worked hard to complete nine missions in 1985. William P. Rogers, Chairman of the Rogers Commission, explained: the attempt to build up to 24 missions a year brought a number of difficulties, among them the compression of training schedules, the lack of spare parts, and the focusing of resources on near-term problemsThe part of the system responsible for turning the mission requirements and objectives into flight software, flight trajectory information and crew training materials was struggling to keep up with the flight rate in late 1985It was falling behind because its resources were strained to the limit The routine attitude toward shuttle operations not only strained resources, but also created a sense of security among the shuttle team. Rogers explained this trend: Following successful completion of the orbital flight test phase of the shuttle program, the shuttle was declared to be operational. Subsequently, several safety, reliability, and quality assurance organizations found themselves with

reduced and/or reorganized functional capabilityThe apparent reason for such actions was a perception that less safety, reliability, and quality assurance activity would be required during routine shuttle operations. In other words, NASAs focus had shifted from developing effective space transportation to using space transportation effectively. Figure 25 summarizes the eight elements of the design process and how these processes were used to design the space shuttle between 1971 and 1980.

Figure 25 - First stage design iterations for the space shuttle

1.2.10

Step 9: Redesign

In many cases, the production phase is the final phase of the design process. However, there may be instances where the incorporation of the product in a process or use of the product within its desired application results in tragedy. Alternatively, the

development team may realize that a crucial component was poorly designed as a result of consumer complaints or suggestions. In such cases, there is often a recall of the product. If this is necessary, the product once again proceeds through the design process to correct the problem and prevent further damage. In the following sections, we will illustrate this process by describing the procedures involved in the redesigns of the space shuttle after the Challenger space shuttle (STS 51-L) accident in 1986 and the Columbia space shuttle (STS 107) accident in 2003.

1.2.10.1 STS 51-L Challenger disaster and redesign

The new NASA focus led to the achievement of many shuttle feats in its twentyfour missions between 1982 and 1986. The orbiter Columbia made seven trips into space, the Discovery six, the Atlantis two, and the Challenger nine. In these 24 missions the shuttle demonstrated its ability to deliver a wide variety of payloads, to serve as an orbital laboratory, to serve as a platform to erect large structures, and to help retrieve and repair orbiting satellites. These accomplishments effectively met NASAs goals for the space shuttle. All flights were successful except the seemingly random hot gas erosion of ORings in the SRB field joint on some flights, while other flights performed without any seal damage. During tests conducted in 1982, it was revealed that the dual O-rings were not a completely redundant system; therefore the criticality classification of the field joint was reclassified as Criticality 1. Further test results on O-ring erosion and putty during 1980-1986 are shown in the CD-ROM. On January 15, 1986, NASA held a Flight Readiness Review for Challenger shuttle flight STS 51-L. Jesse Moore, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, issued a directive on January 23rd that the Flight Readiness Review had been conducted and that 51-L was ready to fly pending closeout of any open work. No problems with any shuttle components were identified in the directive. The L-1 Mission Management Team meeting was conducted on January 25th. No technical issues were brought up in the meeting and all Flight Readiness Review items were closed out. The only remaining issue facing the Mission Management Team at the L-1 review was the approaching cold front, with forecasts of rain showers and temperatures reaching only the mid-sixties Fahrenheit. There had also been very heavy rain since the Shuttle was rolled out onto the launch pad. At 2:30 p.m. EST on January 27th, Robert Ebeling, a MTI engineer, convened a meeting to discuss concerns about the cold weather predicted at launch time. After the meeting a teleconference was scheduled for later that evening. At 8:00 p.m., engineers and managers from Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Center, and MTI participated in the teleconference. During the teleconference, the issue was raised that the cold weather was outside the scope of available data on the O-ring joint sealing mechanism. The engineers were trying to say, We cant be certain the SRM will work, but management interpreted that as We cant be certain the SRM will fail. Further details about the teleconference are available in the CD-ROM (Figure 26).

Figure 26 - Screenshot explains the decision made on 27th January 1986

Following the discussion between MTI engineers, NASA and MTI management, NASA decided to proceed with the plan to launch Challenger on January 28, 1986 despite the predicted weather conditions (Figures 27, 28 and 29). On January 28, 1986 weather conditions were extremely cold as predicted. Although there was a 2 hour delay due to ice, lift-off continued as planned. Immediately following lift-off, photographic data revealed the presence of small gray puffs of smoke from the field joint on the right solid rocket booster (SRB) within 0.678 seconds of liftoff. Between 0.836 and 2.5 seconds, multiple smoke puffs emerged. The black color of the smoke indicated that the hot propellant gases were burning and eroding the grease, joint insulation, and rubber O-rings found in the joint. At 58.788 seconds, the first small flame became visible. This flame continued to grow and was forced to the rear of the shuttle by aerodynamics. Suddenly the flame color changed which indicated the gas leaking from the SRB was mixing with hydrogen leaking from the external fuel tank. The structural failure of the hydrogen tank resulted in a 2.8 million pound forward thrust, which caused the hydrogen tank to be pushed into the intertank structure. Simultaneously, the right side SRB collided with the intertank structure and liquid oxygen tank, and both failed at 73.137 seconds after lift-off. The explosion of the liquid hydrogen and oxygen tanks led to the total destruction of the Challenger space shuttle and its crew. The CDROM has details of the timeline of the design, teleconference and copies of the slides that were used at the teleconference.

Figure 27 - Ice on the launch complex. The launch was delayed by two hours because of this

Figure 28 - The iced-up control box which was used on the launch pad

Figure 29 - Challenger explosion after launch

1.3 Field Joint redesign: Second Iteration

1.3.1 Steps 1, 2, 3, And 4: Problem Definition
On February 3, 1986, President Reagan appointed a committee made up of highly qualified individuals to investigate the cause of the Challenger accident. The committee gathered all of the data, reports, and records available concerning the accident. In addition, they orchestrated tests, analysis, and experiments among NASA, government agencies and other contractors. Their thorough analysis concluded that the main cause of this accident was the failure of the field joint. Although it was possible to utilize the Orings at the temperature of the flight, the minimum qualified temperature had been 53F. The committee also stated that the contributing factors to the field joint failure included physical dimensions, temperature effects on the joint, material characteristics, and the consequences of dynamic loading. They also stated that the breakdown of communication between NASA and MTI management and engineering teams was unacceptable and needed to be changed. For nearly three years, the manned space program was put on hold as engineers evaluated every aspect of the SRB design.

1.3.2 Step 2: Concept Formation

Concept formation is a very important step in the engineering design process and different methods may be utilized to analyze a concept to determine whether it will be suitable for a particular product or not. Among these is Fault Tree Analysis. Fault Tree Analysis is a logical, structured process that can help identify potential causes of failure before the failure actually occurs. Fault trees are powerful design tools that can help ensure that product performance objectives are met. Fault tree analysis can be applied in the design of manufacturing equipment, automotive subsystems, aircraft, nuclear power plants, etc. The benefits of this tool are as follows: Identifies possible system reliability or safety problems during the design stage Assesses expected system reliability or safety during operation. Improves understanding of the system Identifies components that may need testing or more rigorous quality assurance scrutiny Identifies the root causes of equipment failure

Capabilities Design for reliability Design for safety

At the Marshall Space Flight Center, Frank Adams, Deputy Manager for boosters, and his team of engineers used Fault Tree Analysis to determine what actually went wrong with the design of the field joint that was used in STS 51-L. Figure 30 shows a fault tree for the SRM hot gas lead failure scenario. Just after lift-off at .678 seconds into the flight, photographic data (Figures 31 and 32) shows a strong puff of gray smoke spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster. Based on extensive testing, engineers identified three problems with the STS 51-L joint design which combined to cause the joint failure. The slow, low-temperature dynamic response (resilience) of the O-ring seals, The inability of the putty placed between mating segments of the insulation upstream of the O-rings to reliably effect a pressure seal, and The mechanical design of the metal components of the joints themselves, which allowed the gap that was sealed by the O-rings to increase by as much as 50 mils during the initial pressurization of the motor, which took place over a period of about 0.6 seconds.

The O-ring failure was the principle source listed as the cause of the Challenger explosion as this was the last line of defense against joint failure. Three components were designed to prevent field joint failure in a sequential manner: the heat resistant putty followed by the primary and secondary O-rings. The O-rings were made of a type of

material known as fluoroelastomers. The properties of this material made it suitable due to its ability to resist the pressures and temperatures experienced during launch. As the joint moved and adjusted under the initial forces of the launch, this material was expected to deform to maintain the joint seal. However, the cold weather on the morning of the Challenger launch made the O-ring too stiff to deform properly. Inspection records indicated service wear was present in the aft field joint (where the SRB began to outgas). This joint was found to have been out of round from repeated uses. While the actual deviation was small (0.008 of an inch with average gap of 0.004 of an inch), the changes were sufficient to produce non-uniformity in the seal, which could have aggravated the known problem of joint rotation.

Figure 30 - Fault Tree Analysis

The arrow in Figure 31 points to the puffs of smoke coming out of the aft field joint at the right of the SRB. The black smoke suggests that grease, joint insulation and rubber O-rings were being burned at this point and was an indication that the aft field joint was not sealed correctly. Figure 32 shows the damage and the flames emerging 6 seconds after launch.

Figure 31 - Field Joint Failure At Launch

Figure 32 - Flames emanating from between Challenger and the Solid-Rocket Booster

1.3.3 Steps 3, 4, And 5: Concept Evaluation, Selection, and Detailed Design

After the accident, engineers discussed a complete redesign of the field joint. However, this approach was expected to be both costly and time consuming. They also felt that new and unknown problems would arise if this task was undertaken. Therefore, they decided to only redesign the areas or structures where the problem occurred, namely the blow holes found in the putty, O-ring erosion, joint rotation, and poor resilience between the O-ring and gap opening. All these areas were selected for redesign to ensure complete reliability of the field joint. After the decision was made to improve the existing SRM field joint assembly, it was necessary to determine which improvements would or could be made. The technical problem centered around three sources of error in joint sealing, namely O-ring seating, service wear, and overall joint performance. During testing, O-rings made of fluoroelastomers could only be relied on at temperatures above 75 F. Several other materials were examined to see if they could be used to replace the fluoroelastomers. Silicone and Nitrile elastomers were shown to reliably deform down to 50F. However, the alternate materials were incompatible with the grease used in the joint, and did not resist high temperature flames well.

A complete redesign of the tang and clevis mechanism was called for. The new design added a new groove as shown in Figure 33. A more important facet of the design was how the whole system would perform together. Many of the original tests of the SRM and joint9 subsystems were performed at low temperatures. The redesign of the joint mating process was not limited to the geometry of the metal casing of the SRM. The non-uniform nature of how the O-ring pressurized was a contributing factor in the poor joint performance. The interface of the insulation on the inside of the SRM presented another choice to be made. Two options were explored. The first called for allowing a gap in the insulation between the separate SRM sections. This gap would allow the gases to expand, and thus reach the outer metal casing. Upon reaching the outer casing this small amount of gas would have become stagnant in the gap and would then cool to prevent heat from reaching the O-rings. This method would have also allowed the first O-ring to experience uniform pressure when it seated, helping form a more consistent seal. The second option utilized an adhesive or pressure seal to join the insulation. This added an extra layer of safety between the gases and the O-rings, but also meant that failure of this component would once more endanger the seal with non-uniform pressures. This design choice shows how the arrangement of the whole system under operating conditions is as important as each subcomponent. The SRM field-joint metal parts, internal case insulation and seals were redesigned and a weather protection system was added10. In the STS 51-L design, the application of actuating pressure to the upstream face of the O-ring was essential for proper joint sealing performance because large sealing gaps were created by pressureinduced deflections, compounded by significantly reduced O-ring sealing performance at low temperatures. The major change in the motor case was the new tang capture feature that was designed to provide a positive metal-to-metal interference fit around the circumference of the tang and clevis ends of the mating segments. This interference fit limited the deflection between the tang and clevis O-ring sealing surfaces caused by motor pressure and structural loads. The joints were designed so that the seals would not leak under twice the expected structural deflection and rate. The new design, incorporating the tang capture feature, the interference fit, and the use of custom shims between the outer surface of the tang and inner surface of the outer clevis leg, controls the O-ring sealing gap dimension. The sealing gap and the Oring seals were designed so that a positive compression (squeeze) is always exerted on the O-rings. The minimum and maximum squeeze requirements include the effects of temperature, O-ring resiliency and compression set, and pressure. The clevis O-ring groove dimension had been increased to ensure that the O-ring never fills more than 90 percent of the O-ring groove and pressure actuation is enhanced. The new field joint design also includes a new O-ring in the capture feature and an additional leak check port to ensure that the primary O-ring is positioned in the proper sealing direction at ignition. This new or third O-ring also serves as a thermal barrier in case the sealed insulation is breached. The field joint internal case insulation was

modified to be sealed with a pressure-actuated flap called a J-seal, rather than with putty as in the STS 51-L configuration. Longer field-joint-case mating pins, with a reconfigured retainer band, were added to improve the shear strength of the pins and increase the metal parts' joint margin of safety. The joint safety margins, both thermal and structural, were tested over the full range of ambient temperature, storage compression, grease effect, assembly stresses and other environments. External heaters with integral weather seals were incorporated to maintain the joint and O-ring temperature at a minimum of 75F. The weather seal also prevents water intrusion into the joint.

Figure 33 - Field Joint Redesign

1.3.4 Step 6: Prototyping

All aspects of the joint were examined again once the redesign configuration was selected. Computer Aided Design with Finite Element Analysis (a process of analyzing the structure of complex shapes) showed that the original pin design was generating concentrated forces around the connection points. The iterative nature of design allowed problems to be discovered that had previously gone unnoticed. In addition to virtual modeling, plastic and metal models of the SRM were made. Multiple models of each part were made for a variety of tests. During this phase, it was sometimes necessary to build unique equipment to perform tests, and one such device was constructed to test joint eccentricity.

1.3.5 Step 7: Testing

During the redesign of the SRM joint, an extensive battery of tests were performed on both the new design and the old design in an effort to determine the value of the improvements. Many NASA engineers felt that the original design came from conventional practice and experience, with minimal theoretical considerations. In the second design iteration a more complete study was performed. Emphasis was also placed on how the systems interacted as a whole. Table 1 describes all the tests that were performed on the SRM during 1986 to 1988. A greatly enhanced Non-Destructive Evaluation program for the field joint was used. The enhanced non-destructive testing procedures included ultrasonic inspection and mechanical testing of propellant and insulation bonded surfaces. All segments were to be X-rayed for the first flight and nearterm subsequent flights. Table 1: Tests conducted by NASA on SRM during 1986- 1988: Test no: 1A title: Characterization of SRM Joint Seal Materials O-ring Defect Analysis results: Thermal and mechanical properties did not vary much between different O-ring batches. High density, low density and surface defects did not alter the physical and mechanical characteristics of the O-ring material. Some joint seal materials produced white or light grey smoke in inert atmospheres and black smoke in an air environment.

1B

Burn (Smoke) Tests

3A 3B 3C 3D 3E

Dial Indicator Rebound Resiliency Test O-ring Resiliency Investigation Short Term Resiliency Testing of O-rings Long Term Resiliency Testing of O-rings Dial Indicator Rebound Resiliency Test of Defect Orings Conoco Grease Blow through Test Randolph Putty Blow through Test Sealing vs. Temperature Transparent Putty Behavior Sealing vs. Temperature of O-ring Static Fixture Randolph Putty Blow through Evaluation Test Scenario 4B. Ice Effects on Joint Seal O-ring Resiliency Investigation- Composition Variations SRM O-ring Stacking Damage Test Ground Truth Photo Test Water does not have to be in contact with the secondary O-ring prior to freezing in order to unseat the O-ring. -No Data-

Temperature played a dominant factor in controlling initial O-ring resilience. O-ring materials exhibited a significant loss of resiliency between 25F and 75F

4A 4B 4D 4E 4J 5

Same results as Test no.3 -No Data-No Data-

8 9

Source: http://www.msfc.nasa.gov

1.3.6 Step 8: Production

Every launch of the space shuttle is part of the production phase of the project. It is also important to remember that the product design is not complete until it incorporates the production process, including management approval of the design. The assumptions made by managers at NASA were frequently different from the engineers views. Dr. Richard Feynman, in his investigation of the Challenger accident, noted that field engineers involved with the shuttle program estimated the failure probability of the shuttle as about 1 in 100 from data they collected, while managers estimated the failure probability at about 1 in 100,000. The problems were fixed, the NASA administration was changed, and the Space Shuttle Discovery was launched on Sept. 29, 1988. It proved to be successful in its mission. 1.3.6.1 Successful Missions and the Columbia Disaster during 2003 During the period 1988 to 2003, 24 missions with the orbiter Atlantis, 19 missions with Endeavour, 21 missions with Columbia, and 24 missions with Discovery were flown successfully. With the completion of Space Shuttle Mission STS-113 on December 7, 2002, a total of 112 missions had been flown since the first flight in April 1981. The STS-107 mission with orbiter Columbia progressed well right up until reentry. However, a Space Shuttle contingency was declared in Mission Control, Houston, as the result of a loss of communication with the Space Shuttle Columbia at approximately 9 a.m. EST Saturday, Feb. 1, 2003 as it descended toward a landing at the Kennedy Space Center, Fla. It was scheduled to touchdown at 9:16 a.m. EST, but communication and tracking of the shuttle was lost at 9 a.m. EST at an altitude of about 203,000 feet in the area above north central Texas. At that point in its descent, the shuttle was traveling at approximately 12,500 miles per hour (Mach 18). No communication and tracking information were received at Mission Control after that time. The shuttle was lost taking with it the lives of seven astronauts. The Columbia Accident Investigation Boardxi concluded during August 2003, The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the external tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of reinforced carbon-carbon panel number 8. During re-entry this breach in the thermal protection system allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the orbiter, there was no possibility for any of the seven-member crew to survive.

The organizational causes of this accident were rooted in the Space Shuttle programs history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and the lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: a reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; the lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an information chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organizations rules. The report concluded with a series of recommendations, some of which were specifically identified and prefaced as before return to flight. These recommendations reflect both the Boards strong support for a return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Boards conviction that operation of the space shuttle, and all human space flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.

The design of the space shuttle was being comprehensively reviewed during 2003-2005 to allow the shuttle Discovery to be safely launched during 2005. The shuttle Discovery was launched during July 2005xii. A budget of $3.9 billion and $4.3 billion was allocated for the development and operations of the space shuttle during 2004 and 2005. Of this, the development costs were about $96 million during 2004 and $87 million during 2005xiii. NASA, which has spent $1.5 billion in a 2 1/2 -year effort to correct the problem that led to Columbia's destruction, admitted it is uncertain when the manned space shuttle will fly againxiv. Griffin, NASAs chief administrator told the Senate during 2005 that the shuttle was deeply flawed and My opinion is that it was. It was a design which was extremely aggressive and just barely possiblexv. The shuttles phase out is planned for the end of the decade, following completion of its role in the International Space Station (ISS) assembly.

1.4 Summary
This chapter has emphasized the importance of effective engineering design in the real world. In the near future, you will be taking many courses that concentrate on the classroom applications of engineering theory such as sizing a shaft or determining its torsional characteristics. However, when considering whether or not to build a shaft out of titanium or aluminum, you may want to consider that in the workplace, aluminum may be the material of choice from a basic cost perspective, but titanium may be necessary in order to prevent catastrophic failure (at increased cost). In this chapter, we also discussed the eight steps in the design process and elaborated it through the space shuttle STS 51-L case study. Appendix II provides an

example of a possible project to design a tennis ball thrower. This example details how the concepts learned in this chapter can be applied in the design of a product. You will have the opportunity to design many more exciting and important products throughout your career. Please remember that good design is an iterative process, and without iteration and careful consideration of design faults and consequences, the impact of failure can be immense.

1.5 Short Essay Questions

1) What is the definition of engineering design? 2) What are the fundamental elements of the design process? 3) What does the engineering designer produce? 4) What is the primary component of product development? 5) What are the specifications of a product? 6) What is important when defining a problem? 7) Why did the Kansas Citys Regency Hotel disaster in 1981 occur? 8) What is brainstorming? 9) Explain concept evaluation? 10) Define concept selection. 11) How are the design specifications communicated? 12) What do you understand by CAD? 13) What are the benefits of solid modeling? 14) What is the prototype stage? 15) How is the product performance checked? 16) What is the production phase? 17) What are the decisions during production phase? 18) What is CATIA? 19) What is the role of information technology in engineering design? 20) What was the design intent of the joint? 21) What is the role of heat resistant Zinc Chromate putty O-rings? 22) What is virtual prototyping? 23) Name the eight elements of the design process?

1.6 Student Assignment

1.6.1 Individual Exercises
Pick a basic item in the room in which you are sitting (with a minimal amount of parts). List the parts and make notes of the design features that stand out as selling points (comfort, color, style, materials, etc.). Describe how you think these might increase the cost of a product (does the process required to make it appear precise, is the product difficult to assemble, is the product impossible to resist purchasing, etc.)

1.6.2 Team Exercises

1. Select a simple item in the room and brainstorm about the potential failures associated with it. Try to estimate figures for severity and frequency (occurrence) to achieve a total risk factor. Describe what could be done to reduce this risk. 2. Select another item and try to determine the critical considerations (measures to reduce risk) that might have been considered when designing the product.

1.6.3 STS 51-L Case Study Engineering Design Principles Exercise

Learning Objectives: 1. To show students how to evaluate several elements of the design process. 2. To help students use technical information and physics concepts to evaluate a real-world design problem. Materials: Personal computer with CD-ROM drive, STS 51-L Case Study CD-ROM, writing materials, PowerPoint Assignment Participation: 4-person team exercise Time: 1 hour to build presentation, then either 10 minutes per team to present or submit the PowerPoint slides, depending on instructor's choice Pages to look at in the CD-ROM: 1. Problem Statement

2. A typical shuttle mission 3. Joint Rotation Page (with 4 sub-pages): About SRB, SRM, Discovery of Joint Rotation, About Joint Rotation 4. Stresses and Strain 5. Leon Ray's Memo 6. Shuttle Testing (1978-79) 7. MTI's decision: O-ring/shim decision, about the o-ring, shims 8. Glossary of terms used in this exercise Assignment: Your team should evaluate the problems that occurred with the O-ring as a result of joint rotation. Evaluate the first 4 parts of the design process: 1. Problem Definition: Define the problem that existed with O-rings in the SRB as a result of joint rotation, include information about how stress and strain on the O-ring was caused by joint rotation. Discuss how stress and strain might cause fatigue problems with the O-ring. Define the elastic modulus and chart how this modulus may have changed with increased stress and strain on the O-ring, discounting all other factors. Finally, explain what would happen to a space shuttle if the O-ring became distorted. 2. Concept Formulation: Read and discuss the five solutions that Leon Ray put forward. 3. Concept Evaluation: Evaluate the feasibility of each of the design alternatives that Leon Ray proposed. Which design alternative would your team have expected NASA to choose? Why? Which design alternative would your team have chosen based on his recommendations and your own analysis? Why? 4. Concept Selection: Explain why NASA chose the alternative that they did. Include feasibility issues and risk acceptability. Does your team agree or disagree with NASA's decision? Why? Teams should develop a 10-minute PowerPoint presentation with at least two slides per design process element. Present your ideas in a chronological fashion first stating the problem NASA was faced with and ending with an evaluation of NASA's concept selection. Grading Criteria: Organization: Presented information in a chronological fashion. Content of Presentations: Presented accurate and relevant information for each design process element. Understanding: Thoughtfully considered the problem and also explained the technical concepts in the assignment. Presentation: Effectively presented ideas in an easy to understand manner. Questions to Consider after the Assignment: 1. How is the design process relevant to the STS 51-L case? 2. What factors affect concept selection beyond simple technical effectiveness?

3. Is it ethical to consider monetary and feasibility issues in making a concept selection? 4. How did feasibility issues effect NASA's design decision? How did this impact the Challenger accident in 1986?

1.6.4 Della Case Study Engineering Design Principles Exercise

Learning Objectives: 1. Describe some elements of the design process (problem definition, concept formulation, concept evaluation, concept selection). 2. Illustrate each element with an example. 3. Implement the design process in development of an actual product. 4. Identify how errors in implementing the design process might cause major problems/accidents. Materials: PC with CD-ROM Drive, Della Steam Plant Case Study CD-ROM, PowerPoint Assignment Participation: 4-person team exercise Time: 1 hour to develop presentation, 10 minutes per team to present results Pages to look at in the CD-ROM: 1. Description of Della 2. Maintenance Procedures at Della 3. Della Problem Statement 4. Problem Statement Video 5. Maintenance Assignment: After the restart and vibration incident, Della has decided to make modifications to their equipment in order to avoid future vibration problems. Using the design process described in the text, form a new design to remedy this problem from "problem definition" to "concept selection" steps, justifying all steps. 1. Problem Definition: Teams should define the problem with the turbine-generator described in the case study. Be sure to identify possible constraints that the design has to meet. 2. Concept Formulation: Teams should develop possible solutions to the problem through a brainstorming session. One member of the team will act as a facilitator. Teams are encouraged to be innovative. Be sure that there is no evaluation of concepts during the brainstorming session.

3. Concept Evaluation: Teams should evaluate the feasibility of their design. How much will the design cost Della? How much time will it take to make the changes? What are the potential financial gains for each modification? 4. Concept Selection: Teams should choose the design that they deem most feasible, appropriate, and financially beneficial to Della. Be sure to justify your decision and identify any unknowns that would be addressed in later design stages.

Teams should develop a 10-minute PowerPoint presentation. Grading Criteria: Organization: Presented information in a chronological fashion. Content: Presented accurate and relevant information for each design process element. Understanding of Concepts: Thoughtfully considered the problem and explained the technical concepts in the assignment. Presentation Execution: Effectively presented ideas in an easy to understand manner. Questions to Consider after the Assignment: 1. Is the design an appropriate consideration in resolving this problem? 2. What is the relationship between the maintenance of machines and engineering design?

1.6.5 Lorn Case Study Engineering Design Principles Exercise

Purpose: To show students how to implement the design process in the development of an actual product. To show how possible errors in the design process may have caused problems in the Lorn case. Materials: Personal Computer with CD-ROM drive, Lorn Case Study CD-ROM, writing materials, PowerPoint Time: Typically, 8 minutes per four person team Procedure: Students should be allotted time to look over necessary pages in the Lorn CD-ROM. The instructor should then divide the class into four person teams. Each team will be faced with a scenario and go through each assigned element of the design process, finally developing a presentation on the design that they create. Pages students need to look at in the CDROM: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Problem Statement Video Jim Russells account of the accident Lap Winders Limit Switches Lock Out/Tag Out Procedures Highlights of Dr. Kevin Taylors Deposition Highlights of Evan Morrisons deposition Electrical Schematic

1. Assignment: The following scenario is given to students. After Jim Russells accident Lorn Manufacturing has decided to remodel their Lap Winder machines to have an appropriate guard for maintenance workers. Each student team is a design team for the new Lap Winder machine. Students ought to go through the design process: 1. Problem Definition: Teams should define the current problem with the Lap Winder machine. This would be a good place for students to gain a basic knowledge of what safety problems the Lorn Lap Winder has based on the material given, namely the lack of a limit switch, so nothing except a door keeps workers from dangerous exposure to an open machine. 2. Concept Formulation: Teams should then develop possible solutions to the problem. Encourage students to think of ideas beyond simple limit switches. Ask teams to brainstorm with one member of the team acting as the facilitator of ideas. Encourage teams to be innovative and creative. Other innovative solutions may be incorporated in the Lap Winder machine, such as a light that would flash on the machine when the door guard was open for maintenance or a whistle that would alert a maintenance worker that someone is near the power switch when the door guard is open. 3. Concept Evaluation: Teams should then evaluate the feasibility of their design: how much their design might cost Lorn, how much time it would take to install the new device, possible money that could be gained using the design and thereby decreasing future lawsuits. 4. Concept Selection: Teams should choose the design that they find the most feasible and most appropriate to solve the Lap Winder problem. Teams should justify their decisions. 5. Detailed Design: Teams should then draw a rough sketch of their design using the electrical schematic as a guideline. 6. Prototyping/Testing: Teams should consider how they would develop a model of their design and how they would test their design with users, for example by testing the design with different maintenance workers at different skill levels, and testing the design at a company with Lock Out/ Tag Out procedures and one without Lock Out/ Tag Out procedures. 7. Send to Production: Teams should finally consider possible problems that assembly line workers might or might not have in constructing their design. Teams should develop a PowerPoint presentation with at least one slide per design process element. This does not include the detailed design area where teams can present their sketch on paper. Students should present their ideas in a chronological fashion, first stating the problem they were faced with and end with how they could implement their design in production. Grading Criteria: Organization: Students presented information in a chronological fashion Content of Presentations: Students presented accurate and relevant information for each design process element.

Understanding: Students thoughtfully considered the problem and used the design process to develop a creative solution. Presentation: Students effectively presented their ideas in an easy to understand manner. Possible Questions to ask or assign and then discuss: 1. What errors may have occurred in the design process of the Lap Winder? 2. What elements of the design process did original designers overlook? 3. How would you use the design process to fix the problems of the Lap Winder? Discuss student questions about the exercise and engineering design.

APPENDIX I: THE DESIGN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE OF OF THE BOEING 777

Boeing designed its 777 aircraft in a paper-less mode through the integration of Computer Aided Design (CAD) systems. This allowed the 777 design team to access specifications from anywhere in the world and create virtual mock-ups instead of physical mock-ups. The modified design process allowed Boeing to cut its traditional 60 month development time to less than 48 monthsxvi. In the following section, we will illustrate the engineering design process using the design and manufacturing procedures that were applied to the Boeing 777 aircraft. In Boeings case, the problem was defined by its competitors. During 1990, the leaders in the commercial airplane industry were Boeing, Airbus Industries, and McDonnell Douglas. In 1986, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas were both building new planes - the A-330/340 and MD-11/12 - to carry between 300 to 400 passengers. Airbus and McDonnell-Douglas had modified their internal systems and were effectively producing new products in a shorter developmental cycle than Boeing. Both were using new techniques and procedures, leveraged with the use of telecommunications, in an attempt to erode Boeings dominant position in the marketplace. These planes were designed for airlines that wanted to fill the gap between the 200 passengers that a Boeing 767 could carry and 425 passengers that a Boeing 747 could carry. In 1992, United Airlines placed a multibillion-dollar order with Airbus instead of Boeing, its historical supplier. Boeing was thus forced to design the Boeing 777 to fill this gap in its product line and to cover the market for aircraft carrying between 300 to 400 passengers. Since Boeing was already late in entering the 300-400 passenger aircraft market, it was under considerable pressured to reduce the Boeing 777 developmental cycle from the traditional 60 months down to 48 months. Boeing used Information Technology (IT) to reduce their design time for the 777 by linking engineering, accounting, suppliers, customers, communications, and management together through a common information system. Boeing distributed 2,200 computer terminals to its worldwide 777 design team. The terminals were connected to

the largest grouping of IBM mainframe computers in the world. This provided key participants in the design process, ranging from airframe manufacturers in Japan to engine manufacturers in the U.K. and U.S., immediate access to the data. The systems also allowed all involved in the process to be aware of changes as they were made and confirmed. Boeing also avoided the need to create a physical prototype for this project, a bold and unorthodox step for Boeing by using two CAD systems, Computer graphics Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA) and Electronic Preassembly in the Computer (EPIC) in order to automate its design processes. CATIA was used to design specific components and was based on a Dassault/IBM system that was introduced to Boeing in 1986. This system allowed engineers to design components in three dimensions and ensured that they would fit together and operate correctly before they were physically produced. Use of the virtual mock-ups significantly reduced the effort associated with systems integration for aircraft manufacture compared to that involved with physical mock-ups. Boeing Chief Project Engineer for digital product design, Dick Johnson, stated, With the physical mock-ups we had three classes: class 1, class 2, and class 3. The engineer had three opportunities at three levels of detail to check his parts, and nothing in between. With CATIA, he can do it day in and day out over the whole development of the airplane, and so its a tremendous advantage. EPIC allowed the different components of the aircraft to be designed and integrated into a computer simulation of the whole plane. This was a system designed by Boeing for initial implementation in the 777 project. It allowed engineers to integrate all the systems on the aircraft to ensure that there were no interferences, and that all components interacted appropriately. Engineers using this system could view individual parts from varying perspectives, as well as operate the component as it was projected to be built. These components were then linked in a virtual mock-up for systems integration. The introduction of the EPIC system made possible a direct link between the computer description of the design of a component and the instructions that a machine tool would need to make it. This eliminated the earlier habit of throwing the design over the wall and letting production worry about creating the parts. The apparent freedom to change parts until they became final could have led to absolute confusion as engineers constantly tinkered with their systems. Boeing countered this by imposing periodic design freezes where engineers would be forced to resolve any conflicts their parts or systems had created with all other systems. Resolving conflicts was especially critical in the design of the rudder, fuselage doors, the fuselage, and engines, since all these components were produced by subcontractors, mainly outside the continental United States. For example, the rudder for the 777 was produced by ASTA in Australia, using Boeing carbon-fiber technology in a German-built autoclave. Changes in the rudder design had to be fed to ASTA in Melbourne to meet production deadlines in the United States. At one point, an analysis of the rudder design revealed that there would be some aerodynamic flutter, which required a change in the design of the component. ASTAs representative liaising with the rudder design-build teams provided constant input to her parent company, enabling production deadlines to be met.

Although CATIA was expensive to introduce and initially cumbersome to use, the system helped Boeing eliminate 65% of the change errors and rework typically needed by the traditional design process, 15% better than the target goal. CATIA also saved Boeing from having to make expensive engineering mock-ups of the 777 before it built the real aircraftxvii Digital mock-ups provided engineers with the physical reassurance of a design before they committed the design to production. However, Boeing actually did make one mock-up, the nose of the 777, to verify that digital pre-assembly would work. Boeing used its prototype 777 nose to check the performance of "Catia-man," a computer-generated human model. The prototype was built to confirm that airline crews could be as agile in the 777 nose as "Catia-man". Boeing devised a giant laboratory that contained every system used on the aircraft. The $370 million Integrated Aircraft Systems Laboratory linked engineering versions of every 777 system in real time, allowing full "flights" to be enacted on the ground. Up to 57 major aircraft systems, 3500 line replaceable units and 20,000 parts were tested and integrated with other parts. Once the main aircraft systems were successfully "talking" to each other in the lab, testing moved to the three big integration labs. One lab tested avionics with real-time simulations of the aircraft in flight. A second lab validated the fly-by-wire flight control system. The third test lab simulated the cockpit. With the completion of every test in the project, the prototype 777 was cleared for flight testing in record time. The test program was designed to facilitate certification for 180-minute extended-range twin operations (ETOPS). This extended service allowed airlines to fly routes that involved long flights across water, three hours (180 minutes) away from the nearest airport. After passing a series of rigorous tests during the year following the first test flight on June 12, 1994, the FAA approved the 180-minute ETOPS for the Boeing 777 on May 30, 1995. The first commercial flight of the Boeing 777 from London to Washington D.C. on June 7, 1995, was successful and trouble-free. The first increased-gross-weight, longer-range 777-200 was delivered in February 1997. This model was capable of flying the same number of passengers up to 8,860 miles. Boeing also developed a stretched version of the 777, providing three-class seating for 368 to 386 passengers on routes up to 6,720 miles. This high-capacity 777-300 entered service with launch customers Cathay Pacific Airways of Hong Kong. By June 2002, Boeing had orders for 600 Boeing-777s and more than 400 were already in service around the world, each costing between $137 to $185 million. Although Boeing may not receive a reasonable rate of return for the capital spent on the building of the 777, a major payoff has come from applying the lessons learned from the 777 program to the production of the 737 Boeings longest running and most successful transport programxviii. The core of the wing, the shape of the chord for the 737, had been changed to apply the advanced aerodynamics of the 777 wing for improved performance at cruise speeds. Another feature of the 737-600/-700/-800 models is maintaining crew commonality with the flight deck of over 1,800 current generation 737s

that have already been ordered. Even though Boeing recognizes that the markets served by the different kinds of aircraft are different, its design methodology for Boeing-777 has been very effective in reducing unnecessary inventory and aircraft redesign. The Boeing 777 received the 2002 Airline Technology Achievement Award from Air Transport World magazine for pioneering improvements in the development process.

APPENDIX II: DESIGN PROJECT OF A TENNIS BALL THROWER

Objective: To build and characterize the performance of a catapult. The thrower operator must be a minimum of four (4) feet from the machine when it is in operation. The thrower operator must not be placed in the line of the tennis ball trajectory. The thrower cannot use any form of combustion or chemical reaction to propel the tennis ball. Electrical batteries are allowed, as the chemical reactions inside batteries do not result in explosions with normal use. All safety precautions for the use of lead-acid (car) batteries must be observed. All devices and substances needed for a shot must be on or contained within the thrower. The thrower may be supplied with needed substances or energy from containers or devices that are not part of the thrower between shots. This is allowed since a pneumatic device could be pressurized by a hand pump that is integral to the thrower but it would take more time than is reasonable. The objective of this project is for the student teams to assemble a basic catapult and then determine its performance. The teams should vary the adjustable points of the catapult, and then observe the changes in the catapults performance. Translating the catapults performance into recordable data (ideally, graphically represented) in various configurations is encouraged, as there will be a competition which tests the teams accuracy at hitting targets at various distances. There will also be a competition to see which team can launch a tennis ball the maximum distance. The cost of the thrower may not exceed $75. The market value cost of all scrap or salvaged materials used in the thrower must be included in the budget. In real life even scrap costs money. Your labor is not to be counted against the $75, but keep up with how much time you put in. The cost of parts made in the machine shop is not to be counted against the $75. In addition to the 100 accuracy points, 25 bonus distance points will be awarded for the thrower which throws a tennis ball the furthest. The number of bonus points received for the second, third, and so on will be awarded by dividing 25 by the number of competing teams. Last place will receive one of the fractions of 25 points, second to last will receive two fraction of 25, and so on up to 2nd place. In the case of a tie the teams will receive the same score based on the place of the throws in the distance rankings.

Project Description: This project should be introduced to the students with a brief talk about the history of catapults. This discussion can cover topics such as the different types of catapults and their function. The students may discuss the definition of various terms (see Appendix II-A). For those who need it, a step-by step procedure for assembling the catapult is presented in Appendix II-B. Formulate that are needed to assemble a catapult is discussed in Appendix II-C. A data sheet that can be used by the student teams is provided in Appendix II-D. A set of questions that could be used to test the students is shown in Appendix II-E. Upon completing the catapult assembly, students are usually anxious to start shooting things, so an area should be designated for testing at the outset. Rules must be established and strictly enforced regarding horseplay and firing objects other than the tennis ball. Tennis balls should not be handed out until the rules are explained and understood. The ranges will also be necessary for the competition. The teams should vary the position of the hooks, catapult arm, etc. and become familiar with the variables and the effect they have on the performance of the catapult. Students should look up the subjects of catapult, trebuchet and onager in the library or on the Internet. Design Constraints: The catapults are furnished in kit form and only the modifications shown on the assembly drawing furnished with these instructions may be used. The catapult will not be used to throw any other projectile other than the tennis ball. The construction of the catapult is shown in the assembly drawing furnished with these instructions (Appendix IIB) Different Models of Tennis Ball Thrower Define the working concept of each model and determine which of the following is the most suitable model for the given problem statement. Figure 34 provides a flowchart of the design process and figure 35 provides an example of a catapult build by a student team.

Concept Formation: At the beginning of the concept development process, the whole group should come up with ideas on how to throw a tennis ball a long way, accurately. At this point, everyone should sketch their own ideas on different pieces of paper. After this, the papers should be arranged on a wall in different categories. The ideas should also be discussed

openly to introduce new ideas to everyone in the group. After discussion, the process starts again from the beginning. This may result over 10-15 ideas for how to build a catapult.
Problem Statement Catapult Model Tennis Ball Launcher Potato Canon Slingshot

No

Does it meet Requirem ent?

No

Yes Build Prototype Modify Prototype Testing of Prototype

No

Yes

Do you have Enough Time and Resources?

No

Is it working properly?

Yes Send to production

Figure 34: Design Process Concept Selection: After generating plenty of concepts, groups may divide the problem and the human resources into smaller pieces and start to work on different aspects. This may include, for example, storing the energy and aiming the catapult. This may also result in many approaches that are applicable to most of the main concepts. After many iteration rounds and combination of ideas, groups should have two to three different concepts to select from. Every one of these concepts should be carefully investigated. The group should rank their three concepts and finally choose a concept containing all the features stated in the problem statement. The concept selected by the group should be supported by a sound reasoning process.

Figure 35 - Figure shows a model of the tennis ball thrower

Appendix IIII-A: DEFINITION OF TERMS

Trajectory: The path or curve described by a body (as a planet or projectile) under the action of given forces. Potential Energy: The kind of energy that a body has by virtue of its position. When a body is raised to a higher level, it is able to do a certain amount of work in falling back again, and hence receives a certain amount of potential energy due to being raised. Kinetic Energy: The energy that a body has by virtue of its motion. Energy Storage: If a spring is compressed, and then is forced to stay in that compressed configuration, the spring is said to have stored energy. Once the spring is released, it will return to its original configuration (usually expending the stored energy as rapidly as possible). The same goes for stretching a spring; when released, it will collapse back to its original configuration. Trigger: The device used to release the catapult once it has been loaded and charged to fire the projectile. Ballistics: The science of projectiles. Range: Distance for which a projectile can be thrown.

Appendix IIII-B: Assembly Kit Information

Figure 36: Assembly Kit Notes: Prior to assembly, mark the centerline of each side. These points should match up when mounted to the base. Do not drill holes for screws or screw eyes. Use an awl for starting Items 5 & 6 may be moved anyplace on the arm to adjust the flight path No more than two of item 12 may be used One of item 7 is mounted anywhere through the side as a stop for the arm. Assembly Instructions: (Reference Assembly Drawing) 1) Mark the measurements on the board for cutting to desired size

Figure 37: Measurements on the Board 2) Bases & hardware kits (The kit should contain hammer, nails, nuts and bolts, saw, universal glue, etc.) should be used for this purpose. 3) Have teams mark the center line down the length of the base (1 3/4 from each side) 4) From the front end, make four marks 1 apart on the centerline.

5) From the back end make four marks 1 apart, but make the first mark 2 from the end. 6) Teams may have to put starter holes in the base using an awl or center punch. 7) Pass out the sides. 8) Teams align sides by ensuring the top center holes in both sides are exactly opposite each other. An easy way to do this is insert one of the 4 machine screws through the holes, and hold the sides in place so that the machines screw is perpendicular to both sides and the base. Top center hole

(Fulcrum point for the arm) FRONT X X X REAR Figure 38: Design Details 9) Mark with a pencil or pen the three screw locations on each side of the base (front, back and middle as shown by the X in the drawing). 10) Remove six dry wall screws from hardware pack. Screw the sides to the base. Once the sides are on, remove the bolts, nuts and lever arm from the hardware kit. 11) Install the lever arm with the bolts & nuts as shown in the Assembly Drawing Section A-A. The 3 outer nuts provide rigidity and support for the catapults sides, and the 2 inner nuts ensure the lever arm remains centered between the sides. 12) The additional bolt is for use as a stop for the arm. 13) Remove hook eyes and 1 length of chain with a hook attached and one hook eye. 14) Install the hardware in appropriate locations (variable). For screwing in hook eyes on the lever, use an awl as a starter rather than drilling (as a safety measure, the length of jack chain with the gate-hook and attached string which acts as a trigger device should always be mounted on the catapult base, with the separate gate-hook eye ONLY being mounted on the catapult arm. At no time should the jack-chain with the gate-hook attached be flying through the air in an arc at the end of the catapult arm each time the catapult is triggered). 15) Install cup on the lever arm (used to hold the tennis ball). 16) Install rubber bands and pass out tennis balls.
NOTE: WARN CLASS THAT THE ONLY ITEM TO BE USED IN THE CATAPULT AS A PROJECTILE IS THE TENNIS BALL. USE OF ANY OTHER MATERIAL WILL RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OF THE TEAM.

17) Instruct class about safety procedures. 18) Test and adjust catapults for the competition.

Catapult Variables: Front end of catapult 1) 2) 3) 4) Use of 1 or 2 rubber bands. Use of thick (# 64) or thin (# 32) rubber bands. Location of hook on base. Location of hook on catapult arm.

Back end of catapult 5) Location of anchor screw on base for trigger chain 6) Location of eye on catapult arm for trigger hook. 7) Link position on chain used for attachment of gate-hook (the length of the trigger mechanism may be varied). Catapult Arm 8) Position of pivot pin through catapult arm. 9) Location of cup holding projectile on catapult arm. 10) Cup modifications (e.g. size, holes in sides, shaping ,etc.) 11) Location of pivot pin through sides. 12) Location of stop through sides.

Appendix II-C: Formulae

Motion of projectiles is composed of two forces, one is uniform (gravity) and the other is variable (acceleration). These are the two forces required by the study of ballistics to determine the range of a projectile and to project and trace its path.

Figure 39: Depiction of Forces A gun fires a projectile at a velocity v in a direction degrees upward from the horizontal. The first step is to resolve the projectile velocity into a vertical and a horizontal component. The time of flight is determined by the vertical component of the velocity and the acceleration due to gravity, and can be found using the following expressions: vf = v0 + gt (1)

X = v0t+gt2 vf2 = v02 + 2gX

(2) (3)

Where: vf = Final velocity, feet per second v0 = Initial velocity, feet per second t = Time in seconds g = Acceleration due to gravity at 32.2 ft/sec2 X = Distance in feet The vertical component of the projected velocity is v sin and its horizontal component is v cos () as shown above. If t is the time of flight, as yet unknown, the horizontal distance traversed will be the range. X = v*t* cos () To find the time of flight, use equation (1) above, selecting some direction, say upward, as positive. First find t1 in which the projectile reaches the top point of its flight, where its vertical velocity is zero, from the expression v sin = gt1. During this period t1 the projectile rises to a height given by equation 2) which can be written: h = 1/2 *g *(t1)2 The time t2 required for the projectile to return to the ground is then found from: -h = - 1/2 *g* (t2)2 and since h in the last two equations represents the same height, it follows that t1 = t2, or the time of flight to reach maximum elevation, is the same as the time to drop from that level to the reference plane. The total flight time is therefore t = 2t1. Combining this result with the first two equations of this derivation, gives the range of the projectile as: X = v*t *cos() = 2*v*t1 *cos() = 2*v*(v sin() / g)* cos() or X = (v2 / g) sin 2()

Further, by eliminating t1 from the equations v sin () = gt1 and h= 1/2gt1 the height reached by the projectile is found to be: h = (v2/ 2g) sin2 ()

It should be noted that to achieve the maximum distance, the release angle of the projectile should be 45 degrees.

Appendix II-D: Variable Data Sheet (Catapult)

Objectives: 1. To assemble a basic catapult 2. To characterize the performance by varying adjustable points on the catapult and observing the change in performance Variables: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1 or 2 rubber bands Thick or thin rubber bands Location of hook on base Link position on chain used for catapult arm attachment Position of pivot pin through catapult arm Position of cup holding projectile Location of pivot pin through sides 8. Location of stop through sides

Figure 40: Data Sheet Design Project Report: Document the creation and construction of the Tennis Ball Thrower. The report will explain the choices your group made in designing your thrower, detailed specifications of the thrower, design drawings, detailed budget, list of parts, and problems your group experienced in producing the thrower. The report is to be both concise and complete. Design Project Presentation: Each group will make a presentation to their lab section covering the information in the report. Each group member will give a part of the presentation.

Appendix II-E: Questions To Be Discussed

Some of the questions relate specifically to the project, others, though related, may go well beyond the project The intent is to provide discussion material at the completion of the hands-on project. It is suggested that questions be handed out at the first session and then discussed by the students and facilitators at the final session. It would also be a good idea to give the students the questions with the answers after the discussion. Answers to these questions can be found in a number of books. 1. Name the various forms of energy involved in the catapult. 2. If one were to use a golf ball instead of the tennis ball, would the ball go farther, everything else being equal? 3. If you were to do the project on the moon, which of the the two balls (i.e golf or tennis) would you expect to go the shortest distance? 4. If the ball left the cup going parallel with the ground would the time in the air be longer with two rubber bands as compared to one? 5. If you didnt have air friction, using what angle with the Earths surface would give the greatest distance? 6. If you tried to fire the catapult exactly the same every time, would you expect the ball to fall in the same place each time or in some pattern that would have a specific mathematical meaning? 7. If the ball leaves the catapult with a velocity V, what are the vertical and horizontal components? 8. If there is no air resistance, how high will the ball rise? 9. How far would the ball go with no air friction in question 9? 10. Show that the maximum distance will be achieved with a 45-degree angle.

Dym, C.L., Engineering Design: A Synthesis of Views , Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, UK, 1994. ii Ertas, ,A. and Jones, J.C., The Engineering Design Process, John Wiley and Sons: New York, 1996. iii Bertoline, G.R. Introduction to Graphics Communications for Engineers, McGraw-Hill, New York: 2002. iv Voland, G. Engineering by Design, Prentice-Hall Publishers: Upper Saddle River, NJ: 2004. v National Academy of Engineering, Approaches to Improve Engineering Design, http://www.nap.edu/books/NI000469/html/3.html, 2002. vi Snyder, C., Snyder, C., and Sankar, C., The Use of Information Technologies in the Process of Building the Boeing 777, The Journal of Information Technology Management, Vol. IX, No. III, 1998, pp. 31-42 vii During 2004, the orbiter is built by Rockwell International's Space Transportation Systems Division, Downey, Calif., which also has responsibility for the integration of the overall space transportation system. Both orbiter and integration contracts are under the direction of NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. The SRB motors are built by the Wasatch Division of Morton Thiokol Corp., Brigham City, Utah, and are assembled, checked out and refurbished by United Space Boosters Inc., Booster Production Co., Kennedy Space Center. Cape Canaveral, Fla. The external tank is built by Martin Marietta Corp. at its Michoud facility, New Orleans, La., and the Space Shuttle main engines are built by Rockwell's

Rocketdyne Division, Canoga Park, Calif. These contracts are under the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala. viii A list of the committee members and their brief biographies are located at http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commision. ix http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Chapter-4.txt x Snyder et al., ibid. xi http://caib.nasa.gov/ xii http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/schedule/schedule.htm; http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/sts-90/vrtour/checkpoint.html xiii http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55412main_29%20SSP.pdf xiv http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/space/sts114/3303874 xv http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20050928/1a_bottomstrip28.art.htm. xvi Snyder et al., 1998. xvii Guy, N., Boeings Seventh Wonder, IEEE Spectrum, 32(10): Oct. 1995, pp. 20-23. xviii Brown, K., Ramanathan, K.V., Schmitt, T.G., and McKay, M., The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group: Design Process Evolution, 1997 Decision Sciences Institute Conference, p. 1341, Also available from ECCH Publications, 397-037-1.