Plato Philebus

Plato, Philebus http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/philebus.html

Provided by The Internet Classics Archive. See bottom for copyright. Available online at http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/philebus.html

Philebus y Plato Translated by en!amin "o#ett

Persons of the $ialogue S%C&AT'S P&%TA&C()S P(I*' )S ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Socrates. %bserve, Protarchus, the nature of the position #hich you are no# going to ta,e from Philebus, and #hat the other position is #hich I maintain, and #hich, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the t#o sidesProtarchus. y all means. Soc. Philebus #as saying that en!oyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings a,in to them, are a good to every living being, #hereas I contend, that not these, but #isdom and intelligence and memory, and their ,indred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all #ho are able to parta,e of them, and that to all such #ho are or ever #ill be they are the most advantageous of all things. (ave I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the t#o sides of the argumentPhilebus .othing could be fairer, Socrates. Soc. And do you, the position #hich is assigned to youPro. I cannot do other#ise, since our e/cellent Philebus has left the field. Soc. Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be ascertained. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Shall #e further agree+ Pro. To #hatSoc. That you and I must no# try to indicate some state and disposition of the soul, #hich has the property of ma,ing all men happy. Pro. 0es, by all means. Soc. And you say that pleasure and I say that #isdom, is such a statePro. True.

Soc. And #hat if there be a third state, #hich is better than eitherThen both of us are van1uished+are #e not- ut if this life, #hich really has the po#er of ma,ing men happy, turn out to be more a,in to pleasure than to #isdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of #isdom. Pro. True. Soc. %r suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to #isdom, then #isdom con1uers, and pleasure is defeated2+do you agreePro. Certainly. Soc. And #hat do you say, PhilebusPhi. I say2 and shall al#ays say, that pleasure is easily the con1ueror2 but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus. Pro. 0ou, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matterPhi. True enough. .evertheless I #ould dear myself and deliver my soul of you2 and I call the goddess herself to #itness that I no# do so. Pro. 0ou may appeal to us2 #e too be the #itnesses of your #ords. And no#, Socrates, #hether Philebus is pleased or displeased, #e #ill proceed #ith the argument. Soc. Then let us begin #ith the goddess herself, of #hom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. Pro. 3ery good. Soc. The a#e #hich I al#ays feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human+it e/ceeds all other fears. And no# I #ould not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss2 let her be called #hat she pleases. ut Pleasure I ,no# to be manifold, and #ith her, as I #as !ust no# saying, #e must begin, and consider #hat her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you #ould imagine that she is one2 and yet surely she ta,es the most varied and even unli,e forms. 4or do #e not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance+that the fool is pleased #hen he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the #ise man has pleasure in his #isdom- and ho# foolish #ould any one be #ho affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally ali,e5

Pro. 6hy, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. 4or must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely li,e pleasure+that is, li,e himselfSoc. 0es, my good friend, !ust as colour is li,e colour2+in so far as colours are colours, there is no difference bet#een them2 and yet #e all ,no# that blac, is not only unli,e, but even absolutely opposed to #hite: or again, as figure is li,e figure, for all figures are comprehended under one class2 and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And #e might find similar e/amples in many other things2 therefore do not rely upon this argument, #hich #ould go to prove the unity of the most e/treme opposites. And I suspect that #e shall find a similar opposition among pleasures. Pro. 3ery li,ely2 but ho# #ill this invalidate the argumentSoc. 6hy, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a no# predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good2 no# although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as #e are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good2 but you call them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to ac,no#ledge that they are unli,e. And so you must tell us #hat is the identical 1uality e/isting ali,e in good and bad pleasures, #hich ma,es. you designate all of them as good. Pro. 6hat do you mean, Socrates- $o you thin, that any one #ho asserts pleasure to be the good, #ill tolerate the notion that some Pleasures are good and others badSoc. And yet you #ill ac,no#ledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes opposedPro. .ot in so far as they are pleasures. Soc. That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so #e are to say 7are #e-8 that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all ali,e2 and the e/amples #hich have !ust been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but #e go on arguing all the same, li,e the #ea,est and most ine/perienced reasonersPro. 6hat do you meanSoc. 6hy, I mean to say, that in self+defence I may, if I li,e, follo# your e/ample, and assert boldly that the t#o things most unli,e are most absolutely ali,e2 and the result #ill be that you and I #ill

prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing2 and the argument #ill be blo#n a#ay and lost. Suppose that #e put bac,, and return to the old position2 then perhaps #e may come to an understanding #ith one another. Pro. (o# do you meanSoc. Shall I, Protarchus, have my o#n 1uestion as,ed of me by youPro. 6hat 1uestionSoc. As, me #hether #isdom and science and mind, and those other 1ualities #hich I, #hen as,ed by you at first #hat is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case #ith the pleasures of #hich you spo,e. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. The sciences are a numerous class, and #ill be found to present great differences. ut even admitting that, li,e the pleasures, they are opposite as #ell as different, should I be #orthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I #ere to say 7as you are saying of pleasure8 that there is no difference bet#een one science and another2+#ould not the argument founder and disappear li,e an idle tale, although #e might ourselves escape dro#ning by clinging to a fallacyPro. 9ay none of this befall us, e/cept the deliverance5 0et I li,e the even+handed !ustice #hich is applied to both our arguments. *et us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences. Soc. And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences bet#een my good and yours2 but let us bring them to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may sho# #hether pleasure is to be called the good, or #isdom, or some third 1uality2 for surely #e are not no# simply contending in order that my vie# or that yours may prevail, but I presume that #e ought both of us to be fighting for the truth. Pro. Certainly #e ought. Soc. Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on #hich the argument rests. Pro. 6hat principle-

Soc. A principle about #hich all men are al#ays in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their #ill. Pro. Spea, plainer. Soc. The principle #hich has !ust turned up, #hich is a marvel of nature2 for that one should be many or many one, are #onderful propositions2 and he #ho affirms either is very open to attac,. Pro. $o you mean, #hen a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single :me: into many :mens,: and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other #aysSoc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and ac,no#ledged parado/es about the one and many, #hich I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought2 and no more favour is sho#n to that other pu;;le, in #hich a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his o#n #ords: 6hy, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one. Pro. ut #hat, Socrates, are those other marvels connected #ith this sub!ect #hich, as you imply, have not yet become common and ac,no#ledgedSoc. 6hen, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances #hich #e #ere giving, for in those cases, and #hen unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I #as saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed2 but #hen the assertion is made that man is one, or o/ is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest #hich attaches to these and similar unities and the attempt #hich is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy. Pro. %f #hat natureSoc. In the first place, as to #hether these unities have a real e/istence2 and then ho# each individual unity, being al#ays the same, and incapable either of generation of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the #orld of generation, or as still entire and yet divided from itself, #hich latter #ould seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for ho# can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many things- These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to #hich they relate2 they are the source of great perple/ity if ill decided, and the right determination of

them is very helpful. Pro. Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these 1uestions. Soc. That is #hat I should #ish. Pro. And I am sure that all my other friends #ill be glad to hear them discussed2 Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and #e had better not stir him up #ith 1uestions. Soc. <ood2 and #here shall #e begin this great and multifarious battle, in #hich such various points are at issue- Shall begin thusPro. (o#Soc. 6e say that the one and many become identified by thought, and that no#, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every #ord #hich is uttered, and that this union of them #ill never cease, and is not no# beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting 1uality of thought itself, #hich never gro#s old. Any young man, #hen he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of #isdom2 in the first enthusiasm of his !oy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, no# rolling up the many into the one, and ,neading them together, no# unfolding and dividing them2 he pu;;les himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to pu;;le his neighbours, #hether they are older or younger, or of his o#n age+that ma,es no difference2 neither father nor mother does he spare2 no human being #ho has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian #ould have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found. Pro. Considering, Socrates, ho# many #e are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that #e and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us- 6e understand #hat you mean2 but is there no charm by #hich #e may dispel all this confusion, no more e/cellent #ay of arriving at the truth- If there is, #e hope that you #ill guide us into that #ay, and #e #ill do our best to follo#, for the en1uiry in #hich #e are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant. Soc. The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever #ill be a better than my o#n favourite #ay, #hich has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need. Pro. Tell us #hat that is. Soc. %ne #hich may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy

of application2 it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts. Pro. Tell us #hat it is. Soc. A gift of heaven, #hich, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a ne# Prometheus, and there#ith a bla;e of light2 and the ancients, #ho #ere our betters and nearer the gods than #e are, handed do#n the tradition, that #hatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the finite, and infinite implanted in them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the #orld, #e too ought in every en1uiry to begin by laying do#n one idea of that #hich is the sub!ect of en1uiry2 this unity #e shall find in everything. (aving found it, #e may ne/t proceed to loo, for t#o, if there be t#o, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity #ith #hich #e began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite number2 the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate bet#een unity and infinity has been discovered+then, and not till then, #e may, rest from division, and #ithout further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allo# them to drop into infinity. This, as I #as saying, is the #ay of considering and learning and teaching one another, #hich the gods have handed do#n to us. ut the #ise men of our time are either too 1uic, or too slo#, in conceiving plurality in unity. (aving no method, they ma,e their one and many anyho#, and from unity pass at once to infinity2 the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is #hat ma,es the difference bet#een the mere art of disputation and true dialectic. Pro. I thin, that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should li,e to have a clearer notion of #hat you are saying. Soc. I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, #hich you #ere made to learn as a child. Pro. (o# do they afford an illustrationSoc. The sound #hich passes through the lips #hether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. And yet not by ,no#ing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite are #e perfect in the art of speech, but the ,no#ledge of the number and nature of sounds is #hat ma,es a man a grammarian. Pro. 3ery true.

Soc. And the ,no#ledge #hich ma,es a man a musician is of the same ,ind. Pro. (o# soSoc. Sound is one in music as #ell as in grammarPro. Certainly. Soc. And there is a higher note and a lo#er note, and a note of e1ual pitch:+may #e affirm so muchPro. 0es. Soc. ut you #ould not be a real musician if this #as all that you ,ne#2 though if you did not ,no# this you #ould ,no# almost nothing of music. Pro. .othing. Soc. ut #hen you have learned #hat sounds are high and #hat lo#, and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, #hich our fathers discovered, and have handed do#n to us #ho are their descendants under the name of harmonies2 and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human body, #hich #hen measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures2 and they tell us that the same principle should be applied to every one and many2+#hen, I say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect2 and you may be said to understand any other sub!ect, #hen you have a similar grasp of it. ut the, infinity of ,inds and the infinity of individuals #hich there is in each of them, #hen not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite ignorance2 and he #ho never loo,s for number in anything, #ill not himself be loo,ed for in the number of famous men. Pro. I thin, that #hat Socrates is no# saying is e/cellent, Philebus. Phi. I thin, so too, but ho# do his #ords bear upon us and upon the argumentSoc. Philebus is right in as,ing that 1uestion of us, Protarchus. Pro. Indeed he is, and you must ans#er him. Soc. I #ill2 but you must let me ma,e one little remar, first about

these matters2 I #as saying, that he #ho begins #ith any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and no# I say conversely, that he #ho has to begin #ith infinity should not !ump to unity, but he should loo, about for some number, representing a certain 1uantity, and thus out of all end in one. And no# let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. Some god or divine man, #ho in the 'gyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that the human voice #as infinite, first distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vo#els, and then other letters #hich had sound, but #ere not pure vo#els 7i.e., the semivo#els82 these too e/ist in a definite number2 and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters #hich #e no# call mutes, #ithout voice and #ithout sound, and divided these, and li,e#ise the t#o other classes of vo#els and semivo#els, into the individual sounds, told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters2 and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond #hich in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters. Phi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of #hich I !ust no# complained. Soc. Are you going to as,, Philebus, #hat this has to do #ith the argumentPhi. 0es, that is a 1uestion #hich Protarchus and I have been long as,ing. Soc. Assuredly you have already arrived at the ans#er to the 1uestion #hich, as you say, you have been so long as,ingPhi. (o# soSoc. $id #e not begin by en1uiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and #isdomPhi. Certainly. Soc. And #e maintain that they are each of them onePhi. True.

Soc. And the precise 1uestion to #hich the previous discussion desires an ans#er is, ho# they are one and also many =i.e., ho# they have one genus and many species>, and are not at once infinite, and #hat number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity. Pro. That is a very serious 1uestion, Philebus, to #hich Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider #hich of us shall ans#er him2 there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to ans#er, and therefore imposing the tas, upon you, #hen I have underta,en the #hole charge of the argument, but if neither of us #ere able to ans#er, the result methin,s #ould be still more ridiculous. *et us consider, then, #hat #e are to do:+Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is as,ing #hether there are not ,inds of pleasure, and #hat is the number and nature of them, and the same of #isdom. Soc. 9ost true, % son of Callias2 and the previous argument sho#ed that if #e are not able to tell the ,inds of everything that has unity, li,eness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us #ill be of the smallest use in any en1uiry. Pro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. (appy #ould the #ise man be if he ,ne# all things, and the ne/t best thing for him is that he should ,no# himself. 6hy do I say so at this moment- I #ill tell you. 0ou, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing #ith you, and are ready to assist us in determining #hat is the best of human goods. 4or #hen Philebus said that pleasure and delight and en!oyment and the li,e #ere the chief good, you ans#ered+.o, not those, but another class of goods2 and #e are constantly reminding ourselves of #hat you said, and very properly, in order that #e may not forget to e/amine and compare the t#o. And these goods, #hich in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true ob!ects of pursuit, are mind and ,no#ledge and understanding and art and the li,e. There #as a dispute about #hich #ere the best, and #e playfully threatened that you should not be allo#ed to go home until the 1uestion #as settled2 and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And no#, as children say, #hat has been fairly given cannot be ta,en bac,2 cease then to fight against us in this #ay. Soc. In #hat #ayPhi. $o not perple/ us, and ,eep as,ing 1uestions of us to #hich #e have not as yet any sufficient ans#er to give2 let us not imagine that a general pu;;ling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if #e are unable to ans#er, do you ans#er, as you have promised. Consider, then, #hether you #ill divide pleasure and ,no#ledge according

to their ,inds2 or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and #illing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy. Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the #ords :if you are #illing: dispel all my fear2 and, moreover, a god seems to have recalled something to my mind. Phi. 6hat is thatSoc. I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and #isdom, #hether a#a,e or in a dream I cannot tell2 they #ere to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them #as the good, but some third thing, #hich #as different from them, and better than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure #ill lose the victory, for the good #ill cease to be identified #ith her:+Am I not rightPro. 0es. Soc. And there #ill cease to be any need of distinguishing the ,inds of pleasures, as I am inclined to thin,, but this #ill appear more clearly as #e proceed. Pro. Capital, Socrates2 pray go on as you propose. Soc. ut, let us first agree on some little points. Pro. 6hat are theySoc. Is the good perfect or imperfectPro. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. Soc. And is the good sufficientPro. 0es, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. Soc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything #hich its not accompanied by good. Pro. That is undeniable. Soc. .o# let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of #isdom, and pass them in revie#.

Pro. (o# do you meanSoc. *et there be no #isdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of #isdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to #ant anything, but if either is sho#n to #ant anything, then it cannot really be the chief good. Pro. Impossible. Soc. And #ill you help us to test these t#o livesPro. Certainly. Soc. Then ans#er. Pro. As,. Soc. 6ould you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the en!oyment of the greatest pleasuresPro. Certainly I should. Soc. 6ould you consider that there #as still anything #anting to you if you had perfect pleasurePro. Certainly not. Soc. &eflect2 #ould you not #ant #isdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar 1ualities- #ould you not at any rate #ant sightPro. 6hy should I- (aving pleasure I should have all things. Soc. *iving thus, you #ould al#ays throughout your life en!oy the greatest pleasuresPro. I should. Soc. ut if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor ,no#ledge, nor true opinion, you #ould in the first place be utterly ignorant of #hether you #ere pleased or not, because you #ould be entirely devoid of intelligence. Pro. Certainly. Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you #ould not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor #ould the slightest recollection of the pleasure #hich you feel at any moment remain #ith you2 and if you had no true opinion you #ould not thin, that you #ere pleased

#hen you #ere2 and if you had no po#er of calculation you #ould not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life #ould be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be other#isePro. .o. Soc. ut is such a life eligiblePro. I cannot ans#er you, Socrates2 the argument has ta,en a#ay from me the po#er of speech. Soc. 6e must ,eep up our spirits2+let us no# ta,e the life of mind and e/amine it in turn. Pro. And #hat is this life of mindSoc. I #ant to ,no# #hether any one of us #ould consent to live, having #isdom and mind and ,no#ledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and #holly unaffected by these and the li,e feelingsPro. .either life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is li,ely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. Soc. 6hat #ould you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that #as made out of the union of the t#oPro. %ut of the union, that is, of pleasure #ith mind and #isdomSoc. 0es, that is the life #hich I mean. Pro. There can be no difference of opinion2 not some but all #ould surely choose this third rather than either of the other t#o, and in addition to them. Soc. ut do you see the conse1uencePro. To be sure I do. The conse1uence is, that t#o out of the three lives #hich have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal. Soc. Then no# there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one #hich had #ould certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that #as able to live such a life2 and if any of us had chosen any other, he #ould have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his

o#n free #ill, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. Pro. Certainly that seems to be true. Soc. And no# have I not sufficiently sho#n that Philebus, goddess is not to be regarded as identical #ith the goodPhi. .either is your :mind: the good, Socrates, for that #ill be open to the same ob!ections. Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my :mind:2 but of the true, #hich is also the divine mind, far other#ise. (o#ever, I #ill not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mi/ed life2 but #e must come to some understanding about the second place. 4or you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mi/ed life2 and in that case although neither of them #ould be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the element #hich ma,es this mi/ed life eligible and good, is more a,in and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my o#n mind, attain even to the third. Pro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall2 in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid lo#. I must say that mind #ould have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to sho# discretion in not putting for#ard a similar claim. And if pleasure #ere deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she #ould be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them #ould she still appear as fair as before. Soc. 6ell, but had #e not better leave her no#, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting herPro. .onsense, Socrates. Soc. 6hy- because I said that #e had better not pain pleasure, #hich is an impossibilityPro. 0es, and more than that, because you do not seem to be a#are that none of us #ill let you go home until you have finished the argument. Soc. (eavens5 Protarchus, that #ill be a tedious business, and !ust at present not at all an easy one. 4or in going to #ar in the cause of mind, #ho is aspiring to the second pri;e, I ought to have #eapons of another ma,e from those #hich I used before2 some, ho#ever, of

the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argumentPro. %f course you must. Soc. *et us be very careful in laying the foundation. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. *et us divide all e/isting things into t#o, or rather, if you do not ob!ect, into three classes. Pro. )pon #hat principle #ould you ma,e the divisionSoc. *et us ta,e some of our ne#ly+found notions. Pro. 6hich of themSoc. 6ere #e not saying that <od revealed a finite element of e/istence, and also an infinitePro. Certainly. Soc. *et us assume these t#o principles, and also a third, #hich is compounded out of them2 but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration. Pro. 6hat do you mean, my good friendSoc. I say that a fourth class is still #anted. Pro. 6hat #ill that beSoc. 4ind the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others. Pro. And #ould you li,e to have a fifth dass or cause of resolution as #ell as a cause of compositionSoc. .ot, I thin,, at present2 but if I #ant a fifth at some future time you shall allo# me to have it. Pro. Certainly. Soc. *et us begin #ith the first three2 and as #e find t#o out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see ho# in each of them there is a one and many.

Pro. If you #ould e/plain to me a little more about them, perhaps I might be able to follo# you. Soc. 6ell, the t#o classes are the same #hich I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite2 I #ill first sho# that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed. Pro. I agree. Soc. And no# consider #ell2 for the 1uestion to #hich I invite your attention is difficult and controverted. 6hen you spea, of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those 1ualities- $oes not the more and less, #hich d#ells in their very nature, prevent their having any end- for if they had an end, the more and less #ould themselves have an end. Pro. That is most true. Soc. 'ver, as #e say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less. Pro. 0es. Soc. Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be infinite. Pro. 0es, Socrates, that is e/ceedingly true. Soc. 0es, my dear Protarchus, and your ans#er reminds me that such an e/pression as :e/ceedingly,: #hich you have !ust uttered, and also the term :gently,: have the same significance as more or less2 for #henever they occur they do not allo# of the e/istence of 1uantity+they are al#ays introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a more or a less e/cessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or less, 1uantity disappears. 4or, as I #as !ust no# saying, if 1uantity and measure did not disappear, but #ere allo#ed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last #ould be driven out of their o#n domain. 6hen definite 1uantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a :hotter: or a :colder: 7for these are al#ays progressing, and are never in one stay82 but definite 1uantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. 6hich proves that comparatives, such as the hotter, and the colder, are to be ran,ed in the class of the infinite. Pro. 0our remar, certainly, has the loo, of truth, Socrates2 but these sub!ects, as you #ere saying, are difficult to follo# at first. I

thin, ho#ever, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or t#ice, there #ould be a substantial agreement bet#een us. Soc. 0es, and I #ill try to meet your #ish2 but, as I #ould rather not #aste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me ,no# #hether I may not assume as a note of the infinite+ Pro. 6hatSoc. I #ant to ,no# #hether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the #ords :e/ceedingly,: :gently,: :e/tremely,: and the li,e, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, #hich is their unity, for, as #as asserted in the previous argument, all things that #ere divided and dispersed should be brought together, and have the mar, or seal of some one nature, if possible, set upon them+do you rememberPro. 0es. Soc. And all things #hich do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, e1uality, and the e1ual, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure+all these may, I thin,, be rightly rec,oned by us in the class of the limited or finite2 #hat do you sayPro. '/cellent, Socrates. Soc. And no# #hat nature shall #e ascribe to the third or compound ,indPro. 0ou, I thin,, #ill have to tell me that. Soc. &ather <od #ill tell you, if there be any <od #ho #ill listen to my prayers. Pro. %ffer up a prayer, then, and thin,. Soc. I am thin,ing, Protarchus, and I believe that some <od has befriended us. Pro. 6hat do you mean, and #hat proof have you to offer of #hat you are sayingSoc. I #ill tell you, and do you listen to my #ords. Pro. Proceed.

Soc. 6ere #e not spea,ing !ust no# of hotter and colderPro. True. Soc. Add to them drier, #etter, more, less, s#ifter, slo#er, greater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument #e placed under the unity of more and less. Pro. In the class of the infinite, you meanSoc. 0es2 and no# mingle this #ith the other. Pro. 6hat is the other. Soc. The class of the finite #hich #e ought to have brought together as #e did the infinite2 but, perhaps, it #ill come to the same thing if #e do so no#2+#hen the t#o are combined, a third #ill appear. Pro. 6hat do you mean by the class of the finiteSoc. The class of the e1ual and the double, and any class #hich puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates harmony and proportion among the different elements. Pro. I understand2 you seem to me to mean that the various opposites, #hen you mingle #ith them the class of the finite, ta,es certain forms. Soc. 0es, that is my meaning. Pro. Proceed. Soc. $oes not the right participation in the finite give health+in disease, for instancePro. Certainly. Soc. And #hereas the high and lo#, the s#ift and the slo# are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the #hole frame of musicPro. 0es, certainly. Soc. %r, again, #hen cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction of them ta,e a#ay e/cess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmonyPro. Certainly.

Soc. And from a li,e admi/ture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of lifePro. 9ost true. Soc. I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: % my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methin,s, seeing the universal #antonness and #ic,edness of all things, and that there #as in them no limit to pleasures and self+indulgence, devised the limit of la# and order, #hereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul+6hat thin, you, ProtarchusPro. (er #ays are much to my mind, Socrates. Soc. 0ou #ill observe that I have spo,en of three classesPro. 0es, I thin, that I understand you: you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of e/istences2 but #hat you #ould ma,e the third I am not so certain. Soc. That is because the ama;ing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear friend2 but there #as not this difficulty #ith the infinite, #hich also comprehended many classes, for all of them #ere sealed #ith the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. Pro. True. Soc. And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and #e ready ac,no#ledged it to be by nature onePro. 0es. Soc. 0es, indeed2 and #hen I spea, of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by the measure #hich the limit introduces. Pro. I understand. Soc. Still there #as, as #e said, a fourth class to be investigated, and you must assist in the investigation2 for does not everything #hich comes into being, of necessity come into being through a causePro. 0es, certainly2 for ho# can there be anything #hich has no cause-

Soc. And is not the agent the same as the cause in all e/cept name2 the agent and the cause may be rightly called onePro. 3ery true. Soc. And the same may be said of the patient, or effect2 #e shall find that they too differ, as I #as saying, only in name+shall #e notPro. 6e shall. Soc. The agent or cause al#ays naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follo#s itPro. Certainly. Soc. Then the cause and #hat is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but differentPro. True. Soc. $id not the things #hich #ere generated, and the things out of #hich they #ere generated, furnish all the three classesPro. 0es. Soc. And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them+and may therefore be called a fourth principlePro. So let us call it. Soc. ?uite right2 but no#, having distinguished the four, I thin, that #e had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order. Pro. y all means. Soc. Then the first I #ill call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited2 then follo#s the third, an essence compound and generated2 and I do not thin, that I shall be far #rong in spea,ing of the cause of mi/ture and generation as the fourth. Pro. Certainly not. Soc. And no# #hat is the ne/t 1uestion, and ho# came #e hither- 6ere #e not en1uiring #hether the second place belonged to pleasure or #isdom-

Pro. 6e #ere. Soc. And no#, having determined these points, shall #e not be better able to decide about the first and second place, #hich #as the original sub!ect of disputePro. I dare say. Soc. 6e said, if you remember, that the mi/ed life of pleasure and #isdom #as the con1ueror+did #e notPro. True. Soc. And #e see #hat is the place and nature of this life and to #hat class it is to be assignedPro. eyond a doubt. Soc. This is evidently comprehended in the third or mi/ed class2 #hich is not composed of any t#o particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound do#n by the finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the con1ueror life. Pro. 9ost true. Soc. And #hat shall #e say, Philebus, of your life #hich is all s#eetness2 and in #hich of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed- Perhaps you #ill allo# me to as, you a 1uestion before you ans#erPhi. *et me hear. Soc. (ave pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class #hich admits of more and lessPhi. They belong to the class #hich admits of more, Socrates2 for pleasure #ould not be perfectly good if she #ere not infinite in 1uantity and degree. Soc. .or #ould pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element #hich imparts to pleasure some degree of good. ut no#+admitting, if you li,e, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite+in #hich of the aforesaid classes, % Protarchus and Philebus, can #e #ithout irreverence place #isdom and ,no#ledge and mind- And let us be careful, for I thin, that the danger #ill be very serious if #e err on this point.

Phi. 0ou magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. Soc. And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess2 but still I must beg you to ans#er the 1uestion. Pro. Socrates is 1uite right, Philebus, and #e must submit to him. Phi. And did not you, Protarchus, propose to ans#er in my placePro. Certainly I did2 but I am no# in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to be our spo,esman, and then #e shall not say anything #rong or disrespectful of your favourite. Soc. I must obey you, Protarchus2 nor is the tas, #hich you impose a difficult one2 but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you #ith my playful solemnity, #hen I as,ed the 1uestion to #hat class mind and ,no#ledge belongPro. 0ou did, indeed, Socrates. Soc. 0et the ans#er is easy, since all philosophers assert #ith one voice that mind is the ,ing of heaven and earth+in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. ut still I should li,e to consider the class of mind, if you do not ob!ect, a little more fully. Phi. Ta,e your o#n course, Socrates, and never mind length2 #e shall not tire of you. Soc. 3ery good2 let us begin then, Protarchus, by as,ing a 1uestion. Pro. 6hat 1uestionSoc. 6hether all this #hich they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and #isdom. Pro. 6ide asunder are the t#o assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that #hich you #ere !ust no# saying to me appears to be blasphemy2 but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is #orthy of the aspect of the #orld, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the #hole circle of the heavens2 and never #ill I say or thin, other#ise. Soc. Shall #e then agree #ith them of old time in maintaining this doctrine+not merely reasserting the notions of others, #ithout ris,

to ourselves,+but shall #e share in the danger, and ta,e our part of the reproach #hich #ill a#ait us, #hen an ingenious individual declares that all is disorderPro. That #ould certainly be my #ish. Soc. Then no# please to consider the ne/t stage of the argument. Pro. *et me hear. Soc. 6e see that the elements #hich enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, #ater, air, and, as the storm+tossed sailor cries, :land: =i.e., earth>, reappear in the constitution of the #orld. Pro. The proverb may be applied to us2 for truly the storm gathers over us, and #e are at our #it@s end. Soc. There is something to be remar,ed about each of these elements. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. %nly a small fraction of any one of them e/ists in us, and that of a mean sort, and not in any #ay pure, or having any po#er #orthy of its nature. %ne instance #ill prove this of all of them2 there is fire #ithin us, and in the universe. Pro. True. Soc. And is not our fire small and #ea, and mean- ut the fire in the universe is #onderful in 1uantity and beauty, and in every po#er that fire has. Pro. 9ost true. Soc. And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal firePro. That is a 1uestion #hich does not deserve an ans#er. Soc. &ight2 and you #ould say the same, if I am not mista,en, of the earth #hich is in animals and the earth #hich is in the universe, and you #ould give a similar reply about all the other elementsPro. 6hy, ho# could any man #ho gave any other be deemed in his sensesSoc. I do not thin, that he could+but no# go on to the ne/t step.

6hen #e sa# those elements of #hich #e have been spea,ing gathered up in one, did #e not call them a bodyPro. 6e did. Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, #hich for the same reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same elements. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. ut is our body nourished #holly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the 1ualities of #hich #e #ere !ust no# spea,ingPro. That again, Socrates, is a 1uestion #hich does not deserve to be as,ed. Soc. 6ell, tell me, is this 1uestion #orth as,ingPro. 6hat 1uestionSoc. 9ay our body be said to have a soulPro. Clearly. Soc. And #hence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, #hich contains elements li,e those in our bodies but in every #ay fairer, had also a soul- Can there be another sourcePro. Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. Soc. 6hy, yes, Protarchus2 for surely #e cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the t#o, and the cause, the fourth, #hich enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self+management, and of healing disease, and operating in other #ays to heal and organi;e, having too all the attributes of #isdom2+#e cannot, I say, imagine that #hereas the self+same elements e/ist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest thingsPro. Such a supposition is 1uite unreasonable. Soc. Then if this be denied, should #e not be #ise in adopting the other vie# and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an ade1uate limit, of #hich #e have often spo,en, as #ell as a presiding cause of no mean po#er, #hich orders and arranges

years and seasons and months, and may be !ustly called #isdom and mindPro. 9ost !ustly. Soc. And #isdom and mind cannot e/ist #ithout soulPro. Certainly not. Soc. And in the divine nature of Aeus #ould you not say that there is the soul and mind of a ,ing, because there is in him the po#er of the cause- And other gods have other attributes, by #hich they are pleased to be called. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. $o not then suppose that these #ords are rashly spo,en by us, % Protarchus, for they are in harmony #ith the testimony of those #ho said of old time that mind rules the universe. Pro. True. Soc. And they furnish an ans#er to my en1uiry2 for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four #hich #e called the cause of all2 and I thin, that you no# have my ans#er. Pro. I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had ans#ered. Soc. A !est is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, #hen it interrupts earnest. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. I thin,, friend, that #e have no# pretty clearly set forth the class to #hich mind belongs and #hat is the po#er of mind. Pro. True. Soc. And the class to #hich pleasure belongs has also been long ago discoveredPro. 0es. Soc. And let us remember, too, of both of them, 7B8 that mind #as a,in to the cause and of this family2 and 7C8 that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class #hich neither has, nor ever #ill have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its o#n.

Pro. I shall be sure to remember. Soc. 6e must ne/t e/amine #hat is their place and under #hat conditions they are generated. And #e #ill begin #ith pleasure, since her class #as first e/amined2 and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain ever Pro. If this is the road, let us ta,e it. Soc. I #onder #hether you #ould agree #ith me about the origin of pleasure and pain. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mi/ed class. Pro. And #ould you tell me again, s#eet Socrates, #hich of the aforesaid classes is the mi/ed oneSoc. I #ill my fine fello#, to the best of my ability. Pro. 3ery good. Soc. *et us then understand the mi/ed class to be that #hich #e placed third in the list of four. Pro. That #hich follo#ed the infinite and the finite2 and in #hich you ran,ed health, and, if I am not mista,en, harmony. Soc. Capital2 and no# #ill you please to give me your best attentionPro. Proceed2 I am attending. Soc. I say that #hen the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. Pro. That is very probable. Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allo#ed to spea, in the fe#est and shortest #ords about matters of the greatest moment. Pro. I believe that you are right, Socrates2 but #ill you try to be a little plainerSoc. $o not obvious and every+day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration-

Pro. 6hat phenomena do you meanSoc. (unger, for e/ample, is a dissolution and a pain. Pro. True. Soc. 6hereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasurePro. 0es. Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry Place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. And the unnatural free;ing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And #ould not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, #hich, as I #as observing before, ma,e up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their o#n nature is pleasurePro. <ranted2 #hat you say has a general truth. Soc. (ere then is one ,ind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the t#o processes #hich #e have describedPro. <ood. Soc. *et us ne/t assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure #hich is s#eet and refreshing, and an e/pectation of pain, fearful and an/ious. Pro. 0es2 this is another class of pleasures and pains, #hich is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by e/pectation. Soc. &ight2 for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed #ith pain and the pains #ith pleasure, methin,s that #e shall see clearly #hether the #hole class of pleasure is to be desired, or #hether this 1uality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes #hich have been mentioned2 and #hether pleasure and pain, li,e heat and cold, and other things of the same ,ind, are not sometimes to be desired

and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good. Pro. 0ou say most truly that this is the trac, #hich the investigation should pursue. Soc. 6ell, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us no# as, #hat #ill be the condition of animated beings #ho are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind #hat you say: I as, #hether any animal #ho is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or smallPro. Certainly not. Soc. Then here #e have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of painPro. 3ery true. Soc. And do not forget that there is such a state2 it #ill ma,e a great difference in our !udgment of pleasure, #hether #e remember this or not. And I should li,e to say a fe# #ords about it. Pro. 6hat have you to saySoc. 6hy, you ,no# that if a man chooses the life of #isdom, there is no reason #hy he should not live in this neutral state. Pro. 0ou mean that he may live neither re!oicing nor sorro#ingSoc. 0es2 and if I remember rightly, #hen the lives #ere compared, no degree of pleasure, #hether great or small, #as thought to be necessary to him #ho chose the life of thought and #isdom. Pro. 0es, certainly, #e said so. Soc. Then he #ill live #ithout pleasure2 and #ho ,no#s #hether this may not be the most divine of all livesPro. If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either !oy or sorro#. Soc. Certainly not+there #ould be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. ut #hether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point #hich may be considered hereafter if in any

#ay relevant to the argument, and #hatever is the conclusion #e #ill place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first. Pro. "ust so. Soc. The other class of pleasures, #hich as #e #ere saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. I must first of all analyse memory, or rather perception #hich is prior to, memory, if the sub!ect of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up. Pro. (o# #ill you proceedSoc. *et us imagine affections of the body #hich are e/tinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected2 and again, other affections #hich vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shoc, to both and to each of them. Pro. <ranted. Soc. And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the secondPro. ?uite true. Soc. 6hen I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense2 for forgetfulness is the e/it of memory, #hich in this case has not yet entered2 and to spea, of the loss of that #hich is not yet in e/istence, and never has been, is a contradiction2 do you seePro. 0es. Soc. Then !ust be so good as to change the terms. Pro. (o# shall I change themSoc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, #hen you are describing the state in #hich she is unaffected by the shoc,s of the body, say unconsciousness. Pro. I see.

Soc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion #ould be properly called consciousnessPro. 9ost true. Soc. Then no# #e ,no# the meaning of the #ordPro. 0es. Soc. And memory may, I thin,, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousnessPro. &ight. Soc. ut do #e not distinguish memory from recollectionPro. I thin, so. Soc. And do #e not mean by recollection the po#er #hich the soul has of recovering, #hen by herself, some feeling #hich she e/perienced #hen in company #ith the bodyPro. Certainly. Soc. And #hen she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or ,no#ledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscencePro. 3ery true. Soc. There is a reason #hy I say all this. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. I #ant to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they e/ist in the mind only, apart from the body2 and the previous analysis helps to sho# the nature of both. Pro. Then no#, Socrates, let us proceed to the ne/t point. Soc. There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and #hole comple/ion of pleasure. At the outset #e must determine the nature and seat of desire. Pro. Ay2 let us en1uire into that, for #e shall lose nothing. Soc. .ay, Protarchus, #e shall surely lose the pu;;le if #e find the

ans#er. Pro. A fair retort2 but let us proceed. Soc. $id #e not place hunger, thirst, and the li,e, in the class of desiresPro. Certainly. Soc. And yet they are very different2 #hat common nature have #e in vie# #hen #e call them by a single namePro. y heavens, Socrates, that is a 1uestion #hich is, not easily ans#ered2 but it must be ans#ered. Soc. Then let us go bac, to our e/amples. Pro. 6here shall #e beginSoc. $o #e mean anything #hen #e say :a man thirsts:Pro. 0es. Soc. 6e mean to say that he :is empty:Pro. %f course. Soc. And is not thirst desirePro. 0es, of drin,. Soc. 6ould you say of drin,, or of replenishment #ith drin,Pro. I should say, of replenishment #ith drin,. Soc. Then he #ho is empty desires, as #ould appear, the opposite of #hat he e/periences2 for he is empty and desires to be fullPro. Clearly so. Soc. ut ho# can a man #ho is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of #hich he has no present or past e/periencePro. Impossible. Soc. And yet he #ho desires, surely desires something-

Pro. %f course. Soc. (e does not desire that #hich he e/periences, for he e/periences thirst, and thirst is emptiness2 but he desires replenishmentPro. True. Soc. Then there must be something in the thirsty man #hich in some #ay apprehends replenishmentPro. There must. Soc. And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptiedPro. 0es. Soc. The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory2 as is obvious, for #hat other #ay can there bePro. I cannot imagine any other. Soc. ut do you see the conse1uencePro. 6hat is itSoc. That there is no such thing as desire of the body. Pro. 6hy soSoc. 6hy, because the argument sho#s that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. Pro. 0es. Soc. And the impulse #hich leads him to the opposite of #hat he is e/periencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. Pro. True. Soc. And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us to#ards the ob!ects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. Pro. 9ost true.

Soc. The argument #ill not allo# that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar e/perience. Pro. ?uite right. Soc. *et me ma,e a further observation2 the argument appears to me to imply that there is a ,ind of life #hich consists in these affections. Pro. %f #hat affections, and of #hat ,ind of life, are you spea,ingSoc. I am spea,ing of being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as #ell as of the pain #hich is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure #hich succeeds to it. Pro. True. Soc. And #hat #ould you say of the intermediate statePro. 6hat do you mean by :intermediate:Soc. I mean #hen a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures #hich, if they #ould only return, #ould relieve him2 but as yet he has them not. 9ay #e not say of him, that he is in an intermediate statePro. Certainly. Soc. 6ould you say that he #as #holly pained or #holly pleasedPro. .ay, I should say that he has t#o pains2 in his body there is the actual e/perience of pain, and in his soul longing and e/pectation. Soc. 6hat do you mean, Protarchus, by the t#o pains- 9ay not a man #ho is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be 1uite in despairPro. 3ery true. Soc. And has he not the pleasure of memory #hen he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in painPro. Certainly. Soc. Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure

and painPro. I suppose so. Soc. ut #hen a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there #ill be the double e/perience of pain. 0ou observed this and inferred that the double e/perience #as the single case possible. Pro. ?uite true, Socrates. Soc. Shall the en1uiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a 1uestionPro. 6hat 1uestionSoc. 6hether #e ought to say that the pleasures and pains of #hich #e are spea,ing are true or false- or some true and some falsePro. ut ho#, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and painsSoc. And ho#, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false e/pectations, or true and false opinionsPro. I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures. Soc. 6hat do you mean- I am afraid that #e are raising a very serious en1uiry. Pro. There I agree. Soc. And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus@ boys, the point to be considered, is, #hether the en1uiry is relevant to the argument. Pro. Surely. Soc. .o tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allo#ed2 #hat is said should be pertinent. Pro. &ight. Soc. I am al#ays #ondering at the 1uestion #hich has no# been raised. Pro. (o# soSoc. $o you deny that some pleasures are false, and others truePro. To be sure I do.

Soc. 6ould you say that no one ever seemed to re!oice and yet did not re!oice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or #a,ing, mad or lunaticPro. So #e have al#ays held, Socrates. Soc. ut #ere you right- Shall #e en1uire into the truth of your opinionPro. I thin, that #e should. Soc. *et us then put into more precise terms the 1uestion #hich has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinionPro. 0es. Soc. And such a thing as pleasurePro. 0es. Soc. And an opinion must of somethingPro. True. Soc. And a man must be pleased by somethingPro. ?uite correct. Soc. And #hether the opinion be right or #rong, ma,es no difference2 it #ill still be an opinionPro. Certainly. Soc. And he #ho is pleased, #hether he is rightly pleased or not #ill al#ays have a real feeling of pleasurePro. 0es2 that is also 1uite true. Soc. Then, ho# can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both e1ually realPro. 0es2 that is the 1uestion. Soc. 0ou mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain 1uality2 and this is #hat you thin, should be e/amined-

Pro. 0es. Soc. And further, even if #e admit the e/istence of 1ualities in other ob!ects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of 1ualityPro. Clearly. Soc. ut there is no difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain as #ell as opinion have 1ualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity2 as #as indeed said long ago by us. Pro. ?uite true. Soc. And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then #e should spea, of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasurePro. ?uite true, Socrates. Soc. And if rightness attaches to any of them, should #e not spea, of a right opinion or right pleasure2 and in li,e manner of the reverse of rightnessPro. Certainly. Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might #e not say that opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opinedPro. Certainly. Soc. And if #e see a pleasure or pain #hich errs in respect of its ob!ect, shall #e call that right or good, or by any honourable namePro. .ot if the pleasure is mista,en2 ho# could #eSoc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion #hich is not true, but falsePro. Certainly it does2 and in that case, Socrates, as #e #ere saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false. Soc. (o# eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure5 Pro. .ay, Socrates, I only repeat #hat I hear. Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, bet#een that pleasure #hich is associated #ith right opinion and ,no#ledge, and that #hich is often found in all of us associated #ith falsehood and ignorance-

Pro. There must be a very great difference, bet#een them. Soc. Then, no# let us proceed to contemplate this difference. Pro. *ead, and I #ill follo#. Soc. 6ell, then, my vie# is+ Pro. 6hat is itSoc. 6e agree+do #e not-+that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinionPro. 0es. Soc. And pleasure and pain, as I #as !ust no# saying, are often conse1uent upon these upon true and false opinion, I mean. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion al#ays spring from memory and perceptionPro. Certainly. Soc. 9ight #e imagine the process to be something of this naturePro. %f #hat natureSoc. An ob!ect may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may #ant to determine #hat it is #hich he sees. Pro. 3ery li,ely. Soc. Soon he begins to interrogate himself. Pro. In #hat mannerSoc. (e as,s himself+:6hat is that #hich appears to be standing by the roc, under the tree-: This is the 1uestion #hich he may be supposed to put to himself #hen he sees such an appearance. Pro. True. Soc. To #hich he may guess the right ans#er, saying as if in a #hisper to himself+:It is a man.:

Pro. 3ery good. Soc. %r again, he may be misled, and then he #ill say+:.o, it is a figure made by the shepherds.: Pro. 0es. Soc. And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and #hat #as before an opinion, has no# become a proposition. Pro. Certainly. Soc. ut if he be #al,ing alone #hen these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfre1uently ,eep them in his mind for a considerable time. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. 6ell, no#, I #onder #hether, you #ould agree in my e/planation of this phenomenon. Pro. 6hat is your e/planationSoc. I thin, that the soul at such times is li,e a boo,. Pro. (o# soSoc. 9emory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to almost to #rite do#n #ords in the soul, and #hen the inscribing feeling #rites truly, then true opinion and true propositions #hich are the e/pressions of opinion come into our souls+but #hen the scribe #ithin us #rites falsely, the result is false. Pro. I 1uite assent and agree to your statement their Soc. I must bespea, your favour also for another artist, #ho is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul. Pro. 6ho is heSoc. The painter, #ho, after the scribe has done his #or,, dra#s images in the soul of the things #hich he has described. Pro. ut #hen and ho# does he do thisSoc. 6hen a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the

sub!ects of them2+is not this a very common mental phenomenomPro. Certainly. Soc. And the images ans#ering to true opinions and #ords are true, and to false opinions and #ords false2 are they notPro. They are. Soc. If #e are right so far, there arises a further 1uestion. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. 6hether #e e/perience the feeling of #hich I am spea,ing only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future alsoPro. I should say in relation to all times ali,e. Soc. (ave not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones2 from #hich #e may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do #ith the futurePro. 9ost true. Soc. And do all those #ritings and paintings #hich, as #e #ere saying a little #hile ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the futurePro. To the future, very much. Soc. 6hen you say, :3ery much,: you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future, and that man,ind are filled #ith, hopes in every stage of e/istencePro. '/actly. Soc. Ans#er me another 1uestion. Pro. 6hat 1uestionSoc. A !ust and pious and good man is the friend of the gods2 is he notPro. Certainly he is. Soc. And the un!ust and utterly bad man is the reverse-

Pro. True. Soc. And all men, as #e #ere saying !ust no#, are al#ays filled #ith hopesPro. Certainly. Soc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions #hich e/ist in the minds of each of usPro. 0es. Soc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us2 a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a li,eness of himself mightily re!oicing over his good fortune. Pro. True. Soc. And may #e not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false picturesPro. Certainly. Soc. The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as #ell as the good2 but I presume that they are false pleasures. Pro. They are. Soc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasuresPro. $oubtless. Soc. Then upon this vie# there are false pleasures in the souls of men #hich are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar characterPro. There are. Soc. And did #e not allo# that a man #ho had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things #hich had no e/istence either in the past, present, or futurePro. ?uite true.

Soc. And this #as the source of false opinion and opining2 am I not rightPro. 0es. Soc. And must #e not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory characterPro. (o# do you meanSoc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure2 #ho is pleased #ith anything or anyho#2 and he may be pleased about things #hich neither have nor have ever had any real e/istence, and, more often than not, are never li,ely to e/ist. Pro. 0es, Socrates, that again is undeniable. Soc. And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the li,e2 are they not often falsePro. ?uite so. Soc. And can opinions be good or bad e/cept in as far as they are true or falsePro. In no other #ay. Soc. .or can pleasures be conceived to be bad e/cept in so far as they are false. Pro. .ay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth2 for no one #ould call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to #hich they are liable. Soc. 6ell, of pleasures #hich are and caused by corruption #e #ill hereafter spea,, if #e care to continue the en1uiry2 for the present I #ould rather sho# by another argument that there are many false pleasures e/isting or coming into e/istence in us, because this may assist our final decision. Pro. 3ery true2 that is to say, if there are such pleasures. Soc. I thin, that there are, Protarchus2 but this is an opinion #hich should be #ell assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. Pro. 3ery good.

Soc. Then no#, li,e #restlers, let us approach and grasp this ne# argument. Pro. Proceed. Soc. 6e #ere maintaining a little #hile since, that #hen desires, as they are termed, e/ist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul+do you rememberPro. 0es, I remember that you said so. Soc. And the soul #as supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, #hile the body #as the source of any pleasure or pain #hich #as e/perienced. Pro. True. Soc. Then no# you may infer #hat happens in such cases. Pro. 6hat am I to inferSoc. That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously2 and there is a !u/taposition of the opposite sensations #hich correspond to them, as has been already sho#n. Pro. Clearly. Soc. And there is another point to #hich #e have agreed. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites. Pro. Certainly, #e said so. Soc. ut ho# can #e rightly !udge of themPro. (o# can #eSoc. It is our intention to !udge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasurePro. 0es, such is our intention, and #e shall !udge of them accordingly.

Soc. 6ell, ta,e the case of sight. $oes not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and ma,e us opine falsely2 and do #e not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and painsPro. 0es, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. Soc. Then #hat #e are no# saying is the opposite of #hat #e #ere saying before. Pro. 6hat #as thatSoc. Then the opinions #ere true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains #ith their o#n falsity. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. ut no# it is the pleasures #hich are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and sub!ected to comparison2 the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement #hen placed side by side #ith the pains, and the pains #hen placed side by side #ith the pleasures. Pro. Certainly, and for the reason #hich you mention. Soc. And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element #hich ma,es them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you #ill ac,no#ledge that this element is illusory, and you #ill never say that the corresponding e/cess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true. Pro. Certainly not. Soc. .e/t let us see #hether in another direction #e may not find pleasures and pains e/isting and appearing in living beings, #hich are still more false than these. Pro. 6hat are they, and ho# shall #e find themSoc. If I am not mista,en, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by gro#th and decayPro. 0es, that has been often said. Soc. And #e have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state

is pleasurePro. &ight. Soc. ut no# let us suppose an interval of time at #hich the body e/periences none of these changes. Pro. 6hen can that be, SocratesSoc. 0our 1uestion, Protarchus, does not help the argument. Pro. 6hy not, SocratesSoc. ecause it does not prevent me from repeating mine. Pro. And #hat #as thatSoc. 6hy, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may as, #hat #ould be the necessary conse1uence if there #erePro. 0ou mean, #hat #ould happen if the body #ere not changed either for good or badSoc. 0es. Pro. 6hy then, Socrates, I should suppose that there #ould be neither pleasure nor pain. Soc. 3ery good2 but still, if I am not mista,en, you do assert that #e must al#ays be e/periencing one of them2 that is #hat the #ise tell us2 for, say they, all things are ever flo#ing up and do#n. Pro. 0es, and their #ords are of no mean authority. Soc. %f course, for they are no mean authorities themselves2 and I should li,e to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you ho# I mean to escape from them- And you shall be the partner of my flight. Pro. (o#Soc. To them #e #ill say: :<ood2 but are #e, or living things in general, al#ays conscious of #hat happens to us+for e/ample, of our gro#th, or the li,e- Are #e not, on the contrary, almost #holly unconscious of this and similar phenomena-: 0ou must ans#er for them. Pro. The latter alternative is the true one.

Soc. Then #e #ere not right in saying, !ust no#, that motions going up and do#n cause pleasures and painsPro. True. Soc. A better and more une/ceptionable #ay of spea,ing #ill be+ Pro. 6hatSoc. If #e say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither. Pro. That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of spea,ing. Soc. ut if this be true, the life to #hich I #as !ust no# referring again appears. Pro. 6hat lifeSoc. The life #hich #e affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of !oy. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. 6e may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third #hich is neither2 #hat say youPro. I should say as you do that there are three of them. Soc. ut if so, the negation of pain #ill not be the same #ith pleasure. Pro. Certainly not. Soc. Then #hen you hear a person saying, that al#ays to live #ithout pain is the pleasantest of all things, #hat #ould you understand him to mean by that statementPro. I thin, that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain. Soc. *et us ta,e any three things2 or suppose that #e embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third #hich is neither. Pro. 3ery good. Soc. .o#, can that #hich is neither be either gold or silver-

Pro. Impossible. Soc. .o more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spo,en or thought of as pleasant or painful. Pro. Certainly not. Soc. And yet, my friend, there are, as #e ,no#, persons #ho say and thin, so. Pro. Certainly. Soc. And do they thin, that they have pleasure #hen they are free from painPro. They say so. Soc. And they must thin, or they #ould not say that they have pleasure. Pro. I suppose not. Soc. And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are #rong. Pro. ut they are undoubtedly of distinct natures. Soc. Then shall #e ta,e the vie# that they are three, as #e #ere !ust no# saying, or that they are t#o only+the one being a state of pain, #hich is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, #hich is of itself a good, and is called pleasantPro. ut #hy, Socrates, do #e as, the 1uestion at all- I do not see the reason. Soc. 0ou, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus. Pro. And #ho may they beSoc. Certain persons #ho are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, #ho deny the very e/istence of pleasure. Pro. Indeed. Soc. They say that #hat the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

Pro. And #ould you, Socrates, have us agree #ith themSoc. 6hy, no, I #ould rather use them as a sort of diviners, #ho divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and e/treme detestation #hich a noble nature has of the po#er of pleasure, in #hich they thin, that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence is declared by them to be #itchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use #hich you may ma,e of them. And #hen you have considered the various grounds of their disli,e, you shall hear from me #hat I deem to be true pleasures. (aving thus e/amined the nature of pleasure from both points of vie#, #e #ill bring her up for !udgment. Pro. 6ell said. Soc. Then let us enter into an alliance #ith these philosophers and follo# in the trac, of their disli,e. I imagine that they #ould say something of this sort2 they #ould begin at the beginning, and as, #hether, if #e #anted to ,no# the nature of any 1uality, such as hardness, #e should be more li,ely to discover it by loo,ing at the hardest things, rather than at the least hard- 0ou, Protarchus, shall ans#er these severe gentlemen as you ans#er me. Pro. y all means, and I reply to them, that you should loo, at the greatest instances. Soc. Then if #e #ant to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, #e should not loo, at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most e/treme and most vehementPro. In that every one #ill agree. Soc. And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as #e have often said, are the pleasures of the bodyPro. Certainly. Soc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater, #hen #e are sic, or #hen #e are in health- And here #e must be careful in our ans#er, or #e shall come to grief. Pro. (o# #ill that beSoc. 6hy, because #e might be tempted to ans#er, :6hen #e are in health.: Pro. 0es, that is the natural ans#er.

Soc. 6ell, but are not those pleasures the greatest of #hich man,ind have the greatest desiresPro. True. Soc. And do not people #ho are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely- Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper #ant and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their #antPro. That is obvious as soon as it is said. Soc. 6ell, then, shall #e not be right in saying, that if a person #ould #ish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and loo,, not at health, but at discase- And here you must distinguish:+do not imagine that I mean to as, #hether those #ho are very ill have more pleasures than those #ho are #ell, but understand that I am spea,ing of the magnitude of pleasure2 I #ant to ,no# #here pleasures are found to be most intense. 4or, as I say, #e have to discover #hat is pleasure, and #hat they mean by pleasure #ho deny her very e/istence. Pro. I thin, I follo# you. Soc. 0ou #ill soon have a better opportunity of sho#ing #hether you do or not, Protarchus. Ans#er no#, and tell me #hether you see, I #ill not say more, but more intense and e/cessive pleasures in #antonness than in temperance- &eflect before you spea,. Pro. I understand you, and see that there is a great difference bet#een them2 the temperate are restrained by the #ise man@s aphorism of :.ever too much,: #hich is their rule, but e/cess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and #antons becomes madness and ma,es them shout #ith delight. Soc. 3ery good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and pains #ill clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not in a virtuous state. Pro. Certainly. Soc. And ought #e not to select some of these for e/amination, and see #hat ma,es them the greatestPro. To be sure #e ought. Soc. Ta,e the case of the pleasures #hich arise out of certain disorders. Pro. 6hat disorders-

Soc. The pleasures of unseemly disorders, #hich our severe friends utterly detest. Pro. 6hat pleasuresSoc. Such, for e/ample, as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching, #hich is the only remedy re1uired. 4or #hat in (eaven@s name is the feeling to be called #hich is thus produced in us-+Pleasure or painPro. A villainous mi/ture of some ,ind, Socrates, I should say. Soc. I did not introduce the argument, % Protarchus, #ith any personal reference to Philebus, but because, #ithout the consideration of these and similar pleasures, #e shall not be able to determine the point at issue. Pro. Then #e had better proceed to analy;e this family of pleasures. Soe. 0ou mean the pleasures #hich are mingled #ith painPro. '/actly. Soc. There are some mi/tures #hich are of the body, and only in the body, and others #hich are of the soul, and only in the soul2 #hile there are other mi/tures of pleasures #ith pains, common both to soul and body, #hich in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains. Pro. (o# is thatSoc. 6henever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man e/periences t#o opposite feelings2 for e/ample, #hen he is cold and is gro#ing #arm, or again2 #hen he is hot and is becoming cool, and he #ants to have the one and be rid of the other2+the s#eet has a bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction. Pro. That description is very true to nature. Soc. And in these sorts of mi/tures the pleasures and pains are sometimes e1ual, and sometimes one or other of them predominatesPro. True. Soc. %f cases in #hich the pain e/ceeds the pleasure, an e/ample is afforded by itching, of #hich #e #ere !ust no# spea,ing, and by the

tingling #hich #e feel #hen the boiling and fiery element is #ithin, and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected2 then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts, #hich contrasts and mingles #ith the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts2 and this is due to the forcible separation of #hat is united, or to the union of #hat is separated, and to the !u/taposition of pleasure and pain. Pro. ?uite so. Soc. Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight undercurrent of pain ma,es him tingle, and causes a gentle irritation2 or again, the e/cessive infusion of pleasure creates an e/citement in him,+he even leaps for !oy, he assumes all sorts of attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is 1uite ama;ed, and utters the most irrational e/clamations. Pro. 0es, indeed. Soc. (e #ill say of himself, and others #ill of him, that he is dying #ith these delights2 and the more dissipated and good+for+nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every #ay2 of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest2 and he rec,ons him #ho lives in the most constant en!oyment of them to be the happiest of man,ind. Pro. That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of the ma!ority about pleasures. Soc. 0es, Protarchus, 1uite true of the mi/ed pleasures, #hich arise out of the communion of e/ternal and internal sensations in the body2 there are also cases in #hich the mind contributes an, opposite element to the body, #hether of pleasure or pain, and the t#o unite and form one mi/ture. Concerning these I have already remar,ed, that #hen a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. ut no# I must further add #hat I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in #hich body and mind are opposed 7and they are innumerable8, pleasure and pain coalesce in one. Pro. I believe that to be 1uite true. Soc. There still remains one other sort of admi/ture of pleasures and pains. Pro. 6hat is that-

Soc. The union #hich, as #e #ere saying, the mind often e/periences of purely mental feelings. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. 6hy, do #e not spea, of anger, fear, desire, sorro#, love, emulation, envy, and the li,e, as pains #hich belong to the soul onlyPro. 0es. Soc. And shall #e not find them also full of the most #onderful pleasuresneed I remind you of the anger 6hich stirs even a #ise man to violence, And is s#eeter than honey and the honeycomb- And you remember ho# pleasures mingle #ith pains in lamentation and bereavementPro. 0es, there is a natural connection bet#een them. Soc. And you remember also ho# at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tearPro. Certainly I do. Soc. And are you a#are that even at a comedy the soul e/periences a mi/ed feeling of pain and pleasurePro. I do not 1uite understand you. Soc. I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recogni;ing this mi/ture of feelings at a comedy. Pro. There is, I thin,. Soc. And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable the e/amination of it because the difficulty in detecting other cases of mi/ed pleasures and pains #ill be less. Pro. Proceed. Soc. I have !ust mentioned envy2 #ould you not call that a pain of the soulPro. 0es Soc. And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at #hich he is pleased-

Pro. Certainly. Soc. And ignorance, and #hat is termed clo#nishness, are surely an evilPro. To be sure. Soc. 4rom these considerations learn to ,no# the nature of the ridiculous. Pro. '/plain. Soc. The ridiculous is in short the specific name #hich is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit2 and of vice in general it is that ,ind #hich is most at variance #ith the inscription at $elphi. Pro. 0ou mean, Socrates, :Dno# thyself.: Soc. I do2 and the opposite #ould be, :Dno# not thyself.: Pro. Certainly. Soc. And no#, % Protarchus, try to divide this into three. Pro. Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. Soc. $o you mean to say that I must ma,e the division for youPro. 0es, and #hat is more, I beg that you #ill. Soc. Are there not three #ays in #hich ignorance of self may be sho#nPro. 6hat are theySoc. In the first place, about money2 the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is. Pro. 0es, that is a very common error. Soc. And still more often he #ill fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person #hich he really has not. Pro. %f course. Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods

of the mind2 they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. Pro. 0es, that is by far the commonest delusion. Soc. And of all the virtues, is not #isdom the one #hich the mass of man,ind are al#ays claiming, and #hich most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of #isdomPro. Certainly. Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil conditionPro. 3ery evil. Soc ut #e must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if #e #ould see in envy of the childish sort a singular mi/ture of pleasure and pain. Pro. (o# can #e ma,e the further division #hich you suggestSoc. All #ho are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, li,e the rest of man,ind, into t#o classes+one having po#er and might2 and the other the reverse. Pro. Certainly. Soc. *et this, then, be the principle of division2 those of them #ho are #ea, and unable to revenge themselves, #hen they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those #ho can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable2 for ignorance in the po#erul is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but po#erless ignorance may be rec,oned, and in truth is, ridiculous. Pro. That is very true, but I do not as yet see #here is the admi/ture of pleasures and pains. Soc. 6ell, then, let us e/amine the nature of envy. Pro. Proceed. Soc. Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous painPro. 9ost true. Soc. There is nothing envious or #rong in re!oicing at the misfortunes

of enemiesPro. Certainly not. Soc. ut to feel !oy instead of sorro# at the sight of our friends@ misfortunes+is not that #rongPro. )ndoubtedly. Soc. $id #e not say that ignorance #as al#ays an evilPro. True. Soc. And the three ,inds of vain conceit in our friends #hich #e enumerated+the vain conceit of beauty, of #isdom, and of #ealth, are ridiculous if they are #ea,, and detestable #hen they are po#erful: 9ay #e not say, as I #as saying before, that our friends #ho are in this state of mind, #hen harmless to others, are simply ridiculousPro. They are ridiculous. Soc. And do #e not ac,no#ledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortunePro. Certainly. Soc. And do #e feel pain or pleasure in laughing at itPro. Clearly #e feel pleasure. Soc. And #as not envy the source of this pleasure #hich #e feel at the misfortunes of friendsPro. Certainly. Soc. Then the argument sho#s that #hen #e laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling #ith envy, mingles #ith pain, for envy has been ac,no#ledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant2 and so #e envy and laugh at the same instant. Pro. True. Soc. And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life2 and so in endless other cases. Pro. I do not see ho# any one can deny #hat you say, Socrates, ho#ever

eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. Soc. I mentioned anger, desire, sorro#, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as e/amples in #hich #e should find a mi/ture of the t#o elements so often named2 did I notPro. 0es. Soc. 6e may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorro# and envy and anger. Pro. I see. Soc. Then many other cases still remainPro. Certainly. Soc. And #hy do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admi/ture #hich ta,es place in comedy- 6hy but to convince you that there #as no difficulty in sho#ing the mi/ed nature of fear and love and similar affections2 and I thought that #hen I had given you the illustration, you #ould have let me off, and have ac,no#ledged as a general truth that the body #ithout the soul, and the soul #ithout the body, as #ell as the t#o united, are susceptible of all sorts of admi/tures of pleasures and pains2 and so further discussion #ould have been unnecessary. And no# I #ant to ,no# #hether I may depart2 or #ill you ,eep me here until midnight- I fancy that I may obtain my release #ithout many #ords2+if I promise that to+morro# I #ill give you an account of all these cases. ut at present I #ould rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters #hich remain to be settled, before the !udgment can be given #hich Philebus demands. Pro. 3ery good, Socrates2 in #hat remains ta,e your o#n course. Soc. Then after the mi/ed pleasures the unmi/ed should have their turn2 this is the natural and necessary order. Pro. '/cellent. Soc. These, in turn, then, I #ill no# endeavour to indicate2 for #ith the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I #as saying, I use them as #itnesses, that there are pleasures #hich seem only and are not, and there are others again #hich have great po#er and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled #ith pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.

Pro. Then #hat pleasures, Socrates, should #e be right in conceiving to be trueSoc. True pleasures are those #hich are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of of those #hich arise from smells2 those of sound, again, and in general those of #hich the #ant is painless and unconscious, and of #hich the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed #ith pain. Pro. %nce more, Socrates, I must as, #hat you mean. Soc. 9y meaning is certainly not obvious, and I #ill endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, #hich the many #ould suppose to be my meaning2 but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane solid figures #hich are formed out of them by turning+lathes and rulers and measurers of angles2 for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, li,e other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, 1uite unli,e the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours #hich are of the same character, and have similar pleasures2 no# do you understand my meaningPro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you #ill try to ma,e your meaning dearer. Soc. 6hen sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated #ith them. Pro. 0es, there are such pleasures. Soc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admi/ture of pain2 and all pleasures, ho#ever and #herever e/perienced, #hich are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. (ere then are t#o ,inds of pleasures. Pro. I understand. Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of ,no#ledge, if no hunger of ,no#ledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them. Pro. And this is the case. Soc. 6ell, but if a man #ho is full of ,no#ledge loses his ,no#ledge, are there not pains of forgetting-

Pro. .ot necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, #hen he feels grief at the loss of his ,no#ledge. Soc. 0es, my friend, but at present #e are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do #ith reflection. Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of ,no#ledge is not attended #ith pain. Soc. These pleasures of ,no#ledge, then, are unmi/ed #ith pain2 and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very fe#. Pro. ?uite true. Soc. And no#, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those #hich may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures #hich are in e/cess have no measure, but that those #hich are not in e/cess have measure2 the great, the e/cessive, #hether more or less fre1uent, #e shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, #hich pours through body and soul ali,e2 and the others #e shall refer to the class #hich has measure. Pro. ?uite right, Socrates. Soc. Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. 6hen you spea, of purity and clearness, or of e/cess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in #hat relation do these terms stand to truthPro. 6hy do you as,, SocratesSoc. ecause, Protarchus, I should #ish to test pleasure and ,no#ledge in every possible #ay, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for !udgment, and then they #ill be more easily !udged of by you and by me and by all of us. Pro. 9ost true. Soc. *et us investigate all the pure ,inds2 first selecting for consideration a single instance. Pro. 6hat instance shall #e select-

Soc. Suppose that #e first of all ta,e #hiteness. Pro. 3ery good. Soc. (o# can there be purity in #hiteness, and #hat purity- Is that purest #hich is greatest or most in 1uantity, or that #hich is most unadulterated and freest from any admi/ture of other coloursPro. Clearly that #hich is most unadulterated. Soc. True, Protarchus2 and so the purest #hite, and not the greatest or largest in 1uantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautifulPro. &ight. Soc. And #e shall be 1uite right in saying that a little pure #hite is #hiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mi/ed. Pro. Perfectly right. Soc. There is no need of adducing many similar e/amples in illustration of the argument about pleasures2 one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed #ith pain. is al#ays pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another ,ind. Pro. Assuredly2 and the instance you have given is 1uite sufficient. Soc. ut #hat do you say of another 1uestion:+have #e not heard that pleasure is al#ays a generation, and has no true being- $o not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not #e to be grateful to themPro. 6hat do they meanSoc. I #ill e/plain to you, my dear Protarchus, #hat they mean, by putting a 1uestion. Pro. As,, and I #ill ans#er. Soc. I assume that there are t#o natures, one self+e/istent, and the other ever in #ant of something. Pro. 6hat manner of natures are theySoc. The one ma!estic ever, the other inferior.

Pro. 0ou spea, riddles. Soc. 0ou have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them. Pro. I should thin, so. Soc. Search the universe for t#o terms #hich are li,e these t#o and are present every#here. Pro. 0et a third time I must say, e a little plainer, Socrates. Soc. There is no difficulty, Protarchus2 the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sa,e of something else 7relatives8, and that other things are the ends to #hich the former class subserve 7absolutes8. Pro. 0our many repetitions ma,e me slo# to understand. Soc. As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning #ill become clearer. Pro. 3ery li,ely. Soc. (ere are t#o ne# principles. Pro. 6hat are theySoc. %ne is the generation of all things, and the other is essence. Pro. I readily accept from you both generation and essence. Soc. 3ery right2 and #ould you say that generation is for the sa,e of essence, or essence for the sa,e of generationPro. 0ou #ant to ,no# #hether that #hich is called essence is, properly spea,ing, for the sa,e of generationSoc. 0es. Pro. y the gods, I #ish that you #ould repeat your 1uestion. Soc. I mean, % my Protarchus, to as, #hether you #ould tell me that ship+building is for the sa,e of ships, or ships for the sa,e of ship+buildingand in all similar cases I should as, the same 1uestion. Pro. 6hy do you not ans#er yourself, Socrates-

Soc. I have no ob!ection, but you must ta,e your part. Pro. Certainly. Soc. 9y ans#er is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are given to us #ith a vie# to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sa,e of, some being or essence, and that the #hole of generation is relative to the #hole of essence. Pro. Assuredly. Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sa,e of some essencePro. True. Soc. And that for the sa,e of #hich something else is done must be placed in the class of good, and that #hich is done for the sa,e of something else, in some other class, my good friend. Pro. 9ost certainly. Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, #ill be rightly placed in some other class than that of goodPro. ?uite right. Soc. Then, as I said at first, #e ought to be very grateful to him #ho first pointed out that pleasure #as a generation only, and had no true being at all2 for he is clearly one #ho laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good. Pro. Assuredly. Soc. And he #ould surely laugh also at those #ho ma,e generation their highest end. Pro. %f #hom are you spea,ing, and #hat do they meanSoc. I am spea,ing of those #ho #hen they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at the process as if it #ere pleasure2 and they say that they #ould not #ish to live #ithout these and other feelings of a li,e ,ind #hich might be mentioned. Pro. That is certainly #hat they appear to thin,.

Soc. And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generationPro. Certainly. Soc. Then he #ho chooses thus, #ould choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in #hich, as #e #ere saying, #as neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought. Pro. (e #ho #ould ma,e us believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities, Socrates. Soc. <reat, indeed2 and there is yet another of them. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure2 and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a good-+and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he #ho has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time #hen he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men2 and again, that he #ho has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at the time #hen he is pleased, in that degree e/cels in virtuePro. .othing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this. Soc. And no#, having sub!ected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not appear to be too sparing of mind and ,no#ledge: let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until #e have found out #hat in them is of the purest nature2 and then the truest elements both of pleasure and ,no#ledge may be brought up for !udgment. Pro. &ight. Soc. Dno#ledge has t#o parts+the one productive, and the other educationalPro. True. Soc. And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more a,in to ,no#ledge, and the other less2 and may not the one part be regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure-

Pro. Certainly. Soc. *et us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of them. Pro. 6hat are they, and ho# do you separate themSoc. I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and #eighing be ta,en a#ay from any art, that #hich remains #ill not be much. Pro. .ot much, certainly. Soc. The rest #ill be only con!ecture, and the better use of the senses #hich is given by e/perience and practice, in addition to a certain po#er of guessing, #hich is commonly called art, and is perfected by attention and pains. Pro. .othing more, assuredly. Soc. 9usic, for instance, is full of this empiricism2 for sounds are harmoni;ed, not by measure, but by s,ilful con!ecture2 the music of the flute is al#ays trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mi/ed up #ith much that is doubtful and has little #hich is certain. Pro. 9ost true. Soc. And the same #ill be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry and piloting and generalship. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. The art of the builder, on the other hand, #hich uses a number of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of accuracy than the other arts. Pro. (o# is thatSoc. In ship+building and house+building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, and a most ingenious machine for straightening #ood. Pro. 3ery true, Socrates. Soc. Then no# let us divide the arts of #hich #e #ere spea,ing into t#o ,inds+the arts #hich, li,e music, are less e/act in their results, and those #hich, li,e carpentering, are more e/act.

Pro. *et us ma,e that division. Soc. %f the latter class, the most e/act of all are those #hich #e !ust no# spo,e of as primary. Pro. I see that you mean arithmetic, and the ,indred arts of #eighing and measuring. Soc. Certainly, Protarchus2 but are not these also distinguishable into t#o ,indsPro. 6hat are the t#o ,indsSoc. In the first place, arithmetic is of t#o ,inds, one of #hich is popular, and the other philosophical. Pro. (o# #ould you distinguish themSoc. There is a #ide difference bet#een them, Protarchus2 some arithmeticians rec,on une1ual units2 as for e/ample, t#o armies, t#o o/en, t#o very large things or t#o very small things. The party #ho are opposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every other unit. Pro. )ndoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science2 and there may be reasonably supposed to be t#o sorts of arithmetic. Soc. And #hen #e compare the art of mensuration #hich is used in building #ith philosophical geometry, or the art of computation #hich is used in trading #ith e/act calculation, shall #e say of either of the pairs that it is one or t#oPro. %n the analogy of #hat has preceded, I should be of opinion that they #ere severally t#o. Soc. &ight2 but do you understand #hy I have discussed the sub!ectPro. I thin, so, but I should li,e to be told by you. Soc. The argument has all along been see,ing a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to as, #hether one sort of ,no#ledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another. Pro. Clearly2 that #as the intention.

Soc. And has not the argument in #hat has preceded, already sho#n that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of certaintyPro. 3ery true. Soc. And !ust no# did not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term, thus ma,ing us believe in the unity of that art2 and then again, as if spea,ing of t#o different things, proceed to en1uire #hether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by non philosophers, has more of certainty and purityPro. That is the very 1uestion #hich the argument is as,ing. Soc. And ho#, Protarchus, shall #e ans#er the en1uiryPro. % Socrates, #e have reached a point at #hich the difference of clearness in different ,inds of ,no#ledge is enormous. Soc. Then the ans#er #ill be the easier. Pro. Certainly2 and let us say in reply, that those arts into #hich arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others2 and that of these the arts or sciences #hich are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. Soc. Then this is your !udgment2 and this is the ans#er #hich, upon your authority, #e #ill give to all masters of the art of misinterpretationPro. 6hat ans#erSoc. That there are t#o arts of arithmetic, and t#o of mensuration2 and also several other arts #hich in li,e manner have this double nature, and yet only one name. Pro. *et us boldly return this ans#er to the masters of #hom you spea,, Socrates, and hope for good luc,. Soc. 6e have e/plained #hat #e term the most e/act arts or sciences. Pro. 3ery good. Soc. And yet, Protarchus, dialectic #ill refuse to ac,no#ledge us, if #e do not a#ard to her the first place. Pro. And pray, #hat is dialectic-

Soc. Clearly the science #hich has to do #ith all that ,no#ledge of #hich #e are no# spea,ing2 for I am sure that all men #ho have a grain of intelligence #ill admit that the ,no#ledge #hich has to do #ith being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. ut ho# #ould you decide this 1uestion, ProtarchusPro. I have often heard <orgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every other2 this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their o#n free #ill. .o#, I should not li,e to 1uarrel either #ith you or #ith him. Soc. 0ou mean to say that you #ould li,e to desert, if you #ere not ashamedPro. As you please. Soc. 9ay I not have led you into a misapprehensionPro. (o#Soc. $ear Protarchus, I never as,ed #hich #as the greatest or best or usefullest of arts or sciences, but #hich had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest amount of truth, ho#ever humble and little useful an art. And as for <orgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to man,ind, he #ill not 1uarrel #ith you for saying that the study of #hich I am spea,ing is superior in this particular of essential truth2 as in the comparison of #hite colours, a little #hiteness, if that little be only pure, #as said to be superior in truth to a great mass #hich is impure. And no# let us give our best attention and consider #ell, not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the po#er or faculty, if there be such, #hich the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sa,e of it2 let us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then #e shall be able to say #hether the science of #hich I have been spea,ing is most li,ely to possess the faculty, or #hether there be some other #hich has higher claims. Pro. 6ell, I have been considering, and I can hardly thin, that any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. Soc. $o you say so because you observe that the arts in general and those engaged in them ma,e use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion- 'ven he #ho supposes himself to be occupied #ith nature is really occupied #ith the things of this #orld, ho# created, ho# acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort

of en1uiry in #hich his life is spentPro. True. Soc. (e is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things #hich are becoming, or #hich #ill or have become. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. And can #e say that any of these things #hich neither are nor have been nor #ill be unchangeable, #hen !udged by the strict rule of truth, ever become certainPro. Impossible. Soc. (o# can anything fi/ed be concerned #ith that #hich has no fi/ednessPro. (o# indeedSoc. Then mind and science #hen employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truthPro. I should imagine not. Soc. And no# let us bid fare#ell, a long fare#ell, to you or me or Philebus or <orgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. Pro. 6hat pointSoc. *et us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do #ith the things #hich are eternal and unchangeable and unmi/ed, or if not, at any rate #hat is most a,in to them has2 and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. And of the names e/pressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest thingsPro. That is natural. Soc. And are not mind and #isdom the names #hich are to be honoured mostPro. 0es. Soc. And these names may be said to have their truest, and most e/act

application #hen the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true beingPro. Certainly. Soc. And these #ere the names #hich I adduced of the rivals of pleasurePro. 3ery true, Socrates. Soc. In the ne/t place, as to the mi/ture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and #isdom, and #e may be compared to artists #ho have their materials ready to their hands. Pro. 0es. Soc. And no# #e must begin to mi/ themPro. y all means. Soc. ut had #e not better have a preliminary #ord and refresh our memoriesPro. %f #hatSoc. %f that #hich I have already mentioned. 6ell says the proverb, that #e ought to repeat t#ice and even thrice that #hich is good. Pro. Certainly. Soc. 6ell then, by Aeus, let us proceed, and I #ill ma,e #hat I believe to be a fair summary of the argument. Pro. *et me hear. Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at #hich all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the t#o names :good: and :pleasant: are correctly given to one thing and one nature2 Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are t#o, and that #isdom parta,es more than pleasure of the good. Is not and #as not this #hat #e #ere saying, ProtarchusPro. Certainly. Soc. And is there not and #as there not a further point #hich #as conceded bet#een us-

Pro. 6hat #as itSoc. That the good differs from all other things. Pro. In #hat respectSoc. In that the being #ho possesses good al#ays every#here and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else. Pro. '/actly. Soc. And did #e not endeavour to ma,e an imaginary separation of #isdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure #as #holly e/cluded from #isdom, and #isdom in li,e manner had no part #hatever in pleasurePro. 6e did. Soc. And did #e thin, that either of them alone #ould be sufficientPro. Certainly not. Soc. And if #e erred in any point, then let any one #ho #ill, ta,e up the en1uiry again and set us right2 and assuming memory and #isdom and ,no#ledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider #hether he #ould desire to possess or ac1uire+I #ill not say pleasure, ho#ever abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of #hat he feels, nor any recollection, ho#ever momentary, of the feeling,+but #ould he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties #ere #anting to him- And about #isdom I as, the same 1uestion2 can you conceive that any one #ould choose to have all #isdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than #ith a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of #isdom, rather than #ith a certain degree of #isdomPro. Certainly not, Socrates2 but #hy repeat such 1uestions any moreSoc. Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of themPro. Impossible. Soc. Then no# #e must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as #e #ere saying, that the second place may be duly assigned.

Pro. &ight. Soc. (ave #e not found a road #hich leads to#ards the goodPro. 6hat roadSoc. Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in #hat house he lived, #ould not that be a great step to#ards the discovery of the man himselfPro. Certainly. Soc. And no# reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that #e should see, the good, not in the unmi/ed life but in the mi/ed. Pro. True. Soc. There is greater hope of finding that #hich #e are see,ing in the life #hich is #ell mi/ed than in that #hich is notPro. 4ar greater. Soc. Then no# let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to $ionysus or (ephaestus, or #hoever is the god #ho presides over the ceremony of mingling. Pro. y all means. Soc. Are not #e the cup+bearers- and here are t#o fountains #hich are flo#ing at our side: one, #hich is pleasure, may be li,ened to a fountain of honey2 the other, #isdom, a sober draught in #hich no #ine mingles, is of #ater unpleasant but healthful2 out of these #e must see, to ma,e the fairest of all possible mi/tures. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Tell me first2+should #e be most li,ely to succeed if #e mingled every sort of pleasure #ith every sort of #isdomPro. Perhaps #e might. Soc. ut I should be afraid of the ris,, and I thin, that I can sho# a safer plan. Pro. 6hat is itSoc. %ne pleasure #as supposed by us to be truer than another, and

one art to be more e/act than another. Pro. Certainly. Soc. There #as also supposed to be a difference in sciences2 some of them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable2 and #hen !udged by the standard of truth, the latter, as #e thought, #ere truer than the former. Pro. 3ery good and right. Soc. If, then, #e #ere to begin by mingling the sections of each class #hich have the most of truth, #ill not the union suffice to give us the loveliest of lives, or shall #e still #ant some elements of another ,indPro. I thin, that #e ought to do #hat you suggest. Soc. *et us suppose a man #ho understands !ustice, and has reason as #ell as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other things. Pro. 6e #ill suppose such a man. Soc. 6ill he have enough of ,no#ledge if he is ac1uainted only #ith the divine circle and sphere, and ,no#s nothing of our human spheres and circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a housePro. The ,no#ledge #hich is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous in man. Soc. 6hat do you mean- $o you mean that you are to thro# into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art #hich uses the false measure and the false circlePro. 0es, #e must, if any of us is ever to find his #ay home. Soc. And am I to include music, #hich, as, I #as saying !ust no#, is full of guess#or, and imitation, and is #anting in purityPro. 0es, I thin, that you must, if human life is to be a life at all. Soc. 6ell, then, suppose that I give #ay, and, li,e a door,eeper #ho is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door #ide, and let

,no#ledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle #ith the impurePro. I do not ,no#, Socrates, that any great harm #ould come of having them all, if only you have the first sort. Soc. 6ell, then, shall I let them all flo# into #hat (omer poetically terms :a meeting of the #aters:Pro. y all means. Soc. There+I have let him in, and no# I must return to the fountain of pleasure. 4or #e #ere not permitted to begin by mingling in a single stream the true portions of both according to our original intention2 but the love of all ,no#ledge constrained us to let all the sciences flo# in together before the pleasures. Pro. ?uite true. Soc. And no# the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, #hether #e shall in li,e manner let them go all at once, or at first only the true ones. Pro. It #ill be by far the safer course to let flo# the true ones first. Soc. *et them flo#, then2 and no#, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there #ere arts and sciences necessary, must #e not mingle themPro. 0es, the necessary pleasures should certainly be allo#ed to mingle. Soc. The ,no#ledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful al#ays2 and if #e say of pleasures in li,e manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, #e must let them all minglePro. 6hat shall #e say about them, and #hat course shall #e ta,eSoc. $o not as, me, Protarchus2 but as, the daughters of pleasure and #isdom to ans#er for themselves. Pro. (o#Soc. Tell us, % beloved+shall #e call you pleasures or by some other name-+#ould you rather live #ith or #ithout #isdom- I am of opinion that they #ould certainly ans#er as follo#s: Pro. (o#-

Soc. They #ould ans#er, as #e said before, that for any single class to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible2 and that if #e are to ma,e comparisons of one class #ith another and choose, there is no better companion than ,no#ledge of things in general, and li,e#ise the perfect ,no#ledge, if that may be, of ourselves in every respect. Pro. And our ans#er #ill be:+In that ye have spo,en #ell. Soc. 3ery true. And no# let us go bac, and interrogate #isdom and mind: 6ould you li,e to have any pleasures in the mi/ture- And they #ill reply:+:6hat pleasures do you mean-: Pro. *i,ely enough. Soc. And #e shall ta,e up our parable and say: $o you #ish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones- :6hy, Socrates,: they #ill say, :ho# can #e- seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us2 they trouble the souls of men, #hich are our habitation, #ith their madness2 they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children #hich are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded2 but the true and pure pleasures, of #hich you spo,e, ,no# to be of our family, and also those pleasures #hich accompany health and temperance, and #hich every 3irtue, li,e a goddess has in her train to follo# her about #herever she goes,+mingle these and not the others2 there #ould be great #ant of sense in any one #ho desires to see a fair and perfect mi/ture, and to find in it #hat is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine #hat is the true form of good+there #ould be great #ant of sense in his allo#ing the pleasures, #hich are al#ays in the company of folly and vice, to mingle #ith mind in the cup.:+Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, #hich mind has made, both on her o#n behalf, as #ell as on the behalf of memory and true opinionPro. 9ost certainly. Soc. And still there must be something more added, #hich is a necessary ingredient in every mi/ture. Pro. 6hat is thatSoc. )nless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist. Pro. Impossible.

Soc. ?uite impossible2 and no# you and Philebus must tell me #hether anything is still #anting in the mi/ture, for to my #ay of thin,ing the argument is no# completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal la#, #hich is going to hold fair rule over a living body. Pro. I agree #ith you, Socrates. Soc. And may #e not say #ith reason that #e are no# at the vestibule of the habitation of the goodPro. I thin, that #e are. Soc. 6hat, then, is there in the mi/ture #hich is most precious, and #hich is the principal cause #hy such a state is universally beloved by all- 6hen #e have discovered it, #e #ill proceed to as, #hether this omnipresent nature is more a,in to pleasure or to mind. Pro. ?uite right2 in that #ay #e shall be better able to !udge. Soc. And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause #hich renders any mi/ture either of the highest value or of none at all. Pro. 6hat do you meanSoc. 'very man ,no#s it. Pro. 6hatSoc. (e ,no#s that any #ant of measure and symmetry in any mi/ture #hatever must al#ays of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the mi/ture, #hich is then not a mi/ture, but only a confused medley #hich brings confusion on the possessor of it. Pro. 9ost true. Soc. And no# the po#er of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful2 for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the #orld over. Pro. True. Soc. Also #e said that truth #as to form an element in the mi/ture. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then, if #e are not able to hunt the good #ith one idea only,

#ith three #e may catch our prey2 eauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these ta,en together #e may regard as the single cause of the mi/ture, and the mi/ture as being good by reason of the infusion of them. Pro. ?uite right. Soc. And no#, Protarchus, any man could decide #ell enough #hether pleasure or #isdom is more a,in to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and men. Pro. Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end. Soc. 6e must ta,e each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them2 for #e ought to see to #hich of the t#o they are severally most a,in. Pro. 0ou are spea,ing of beauty, truth, and measureSoc. 0es, Protarchus, ta,e truth first, and, after passing in revie# mind, truth, pleasure, pause a#hile and ma,e ans#er to yourself+as to #hether pleasure or mind is more a,in to truth. Pro. There is no need to pause, for the difference bet#een them is palpable2 pleasure is the veriest impostor in the #orld2 and it is said that in the pleasures of love, #hich appear to be the greatest, per!ury is e/cused by the gods2 for pleasures, li,e children, have not the least particle of reason in them2 #hereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most li,e truth, and the truest. Soc. Shall #e ne/t consider measure, in li,e manner, and as, #hether pleasure has more of this than #isdom, or #isdom than pleasurePro. (ere is another 1uestion #hich may be easily ans#ered2 for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity #ith measure than mind and ,no#ledge. Soc. 3ery good2 but there still remains the third test: (as mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the t#oPro. .o one, Socrates, either a#a,e or dreaming, ever sa# or imagined mind or #isdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, present, or future. Soc. &ight.

Pro. ut #hen #e see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action ma,es us ashamed2 and so #e put them out of sight, and consign them to dar,ness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day. Soc. Then, Protarchus, you #ill proclaim every#here, by #ord of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and #ide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the li,e, the eternal nature has been found. Pro. 0es, that seems to be the result of #hat has been no# said. Soc. In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all #hich are of that family. Pro. True. Soc. And if you rec,on in the third dass mind and #isdom, you #ill not be far #rong, if I divine aright. Pro. I dare say. Soc. And #ould you not put in the fourth class the goods #hich #e #ere affirming to appertain specially to the soul+sciences and arts and true opinions as #e called them- These come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more a,in to good than pleasure is. Pro. Surely. Soc. The fifth class are the pleasures #hich #ere defined by us as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as #e termed them, #hich accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. Pro. Perhaps. Soc. And no#, as %rpheus says, 6ith the si/th generation cease the glory of my song. (ere, at the si/th a#ard, let us ma,e an end2 all that remains is to set the cro#n on our discourse. Pro. True.

Soc. Then let us sum up and reassert #hat has been said, thus offering the third libation to the saviour Aeus. Pro. (o#Soc. Philebus affirmed that pleasure #as al#ays and absolutely the good. Pro. I understand2 this third libation, Socrates, of #hich you spo,e, meant a recapitulation. Soc. 0es, but listen to the se1uel2 convinced of #hat I have !ust been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, #hich is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind #as far better and far more e/cellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure. Pro. True. Soc. ut, suspecting that there #ere other things #hich #ere also better, I #ent on to say that if there #as anything better than either, then I #ould claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure #ould lose the second place as #ell as the first. Pro. 0ou did. Soc. .othing could be more satisfactorily sho#n than the unsatisfactory nature of both of them. Pro. 3ery true. Soc. The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both #anting in self+sufficiency and also in ade1uacy and perfection. Pro. 9ost true. Soc. ut, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more a,in to the nature of the con1ueror than pleasure. Pro. Certainly. Soc. And, according to the !udgment #hich has no# been given, pleasure #ill ran, fifth. Pro. True.

Soc. ut not first2 no, not even if all the o/en and horses and animals in the #orld by their pursuit of en!oyment proclaim her to be so2+although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures ma,e up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better #itnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy. Pro. And no#, Socrates, #e tell you that the truth of #hat you have been saying is approved by the !udgment of all of us. Soc. And #ill you let me goPro. There is a little #hich yet remains, and I #ill remind you of it, for I am sure that you #ill not be the first to go a#ay from an argument. T(' '.$ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Copyright statement: The Internet Classics Archive by $aniel C. Stevenson, 6eb Atomics. 6orld 6ide 6eb presentation is copyright 7C8 BEEF+BEEG, $aniel C. Stevenson, 6eb Atomics. All rights reserved under international and pan+American copyright conventions, including the right of reproduction in #hole or in part in any form. $irect permission re1uests to classicsHclassics.mit.edu. Translation of :The $eeds of the $ivine Augustus: by Augustus is copyright 7C8 Thomas ushnell, S<.