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WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON G.R. No.

L-23851 March 26, 1976 Facts: Lee Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate by virtue of a decision rendered in a civil case and of the membership fee certificate issued by the deputy clerk of court of the CFI of Manila in 1963 as the transfer agent of the Wack Wack Country Club and the Peoples Bank & Trust Company. On the other hand, Bienvenido Tan claims to be the lawful owner of the said certificate by virtue of a membership fee certificate issued to him pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by Swan, Culbertson and Fritz, the original owner of the said certificate, in 1950. Wack Wack Country Club claims that it has no interest whatsoever in the said certificate and that it has no means of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof. However, it alleges that the membership fee certificate issued by the deputy clerk of court is null and void as it violates its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate before issuance of a new one which must be signed by its president and secretary. It also alleges that the decision in the civil case is not binding upon Tan since the latter was not made a party thereto. Due to the foregoing facts, Wack Wack Country Club prayed that an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. The TC dismissed the complaint finding that Wack Wack Country Club has been barred by the prior judgment (res judicata) in the civil case where Won was declared to be the owner of the membership fee certificate and for lack of cause of action. CA affirmed. Issue: w/n Wack Wack Country Club is barred to file an interpleader suit Held: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing.

The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. The procedure under the Rules of Court differs from the Code of Civil Procedure wherein in the former, the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation. A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter. PRAXEDES ALVAREZ vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-45315 February 25, 1938 Facts: Plaintiffs alleged that they are bringing an action in behalf of themselves and 5 thousand other persons in that they are in possession for many years of lots on which they now have their houses and agricultural land. These lands are found within Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. They do not claim to be owners of the said lands but rather only of the improvements thereon. They allege that they are entitled to occupy the same because it is where they have lived as well as their predecessors in interest and that they recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay reasonable rent over their occupation and that the true owner is the government by any heir and his 2 minor daughters not leaving any heirs also. Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young are claiming the estate. However, defense alleged that Colegio de San Jose, through the Jesuits, had practiced Substitucion Pupilar and had administered and managed the estate until they succeeded to appropriate the same, considering it as part of the temporal property of the church. But after the Jesuits were expelled, it was confiscated by the Spanish government and after the Philippine government passed laws, the ownership of such lands passed on to the current government and that the municipality of San Pedro has a right to a hacienda for the exclusive benefit of its inhabitants; and that the Colegio de San Jose should render an accounting of the rentals which it has been collecting from the hacienda, which should not be less than P60,000.
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Issue #1 alleged that an interpleader is a petition, hence cannot be subject to demurrer. The action of interpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. Hence, demurrer is proper. Philippine Commonwealth Government cannot be compelled to litigate without its consent, which also holds true in an action for interpleader. There is no substantial difference between making it defend itself against it will in a case where it is a defendant and compelling it, without its consent, to interplead in an action commenced by another person. In one and the other case it is compelled, without its consent, to maintain a suit or litigation, and this is what the legal principal prohibits. Issue #3 alleged that Colegio de San Jose, Municipality of San Pedro and the Government are contending over the right of collecting the rents over the hacienda, hence interpleader was proper. An action of interpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for lack of the basis of reason relied upon by the plaintiffs in their complaint, namely, that there are two entities, the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the Colegio de San Jose, contending over the hacienda and claiming to be entitled to collect the rent or canon coming therefrom. Carlos Young is not included because according to his own admission, he is a mere lessee of the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and does not claim any right of ownership adverse to the latter. It also appears from the allegations said complaint of interpleader that the municipality of San Pedro also admits that the Commonwealth of the Philippine is the owner of the hacienda by transfer and right of escheat. Issue #4 has to do with the holding of the court that the complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is premature inasmuch as there has been no order yet that the defendant litigate among themselves. In the opinion of the court it is necessary that there be a declaration to this effect before the defendant truth requires such and good practice demands that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or complaint of interpleader until after the court has ordered that they should litigate among
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themselves. This procedure will do way with groundless suits, and will save the parties time, inconvenience, and unnecessary expenses.

JOSE A. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION G.R. No. L-25138 August 28, 1969 Facts: Appeal on purely questions of law from an order of dismissal of the complaint for interpleader, on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, as certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. We affirm the dismissal on the ground that where the defendants sought to be interpleaded as conflicting claimants have no conflicting claims against plaintiff, as correctly found by the trial court, the special civil action of interpleader will not lie. Plaintiffs are occupants of housing units at Project 4 under lease from the PHHHC and are paying monthly rentals to PHHC. PHHC announced that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHC debts to it. PHHC informed tenants that they will be entitled to purchase units and that 30% of the rentals they had paid will be credited as downpayment. Some of the tenants accepted and these payments were turned over by the PHHC to GSIS. However, PHHC through its new Chairman-General Manager refused to recognize all agreements and undertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice. Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendantscorporations caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthly amortizations or payments. Issue: w/n the filing of an interpleader suit was proper Held: Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. It requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in
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part is not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone. ZOILA CO LIM vs. CONTINENTAL DEVELOPTMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. L-41818 February 18, 1976 Facts: Continental Development Corporation filed a complaint for interpleader against the defendants Benito Gervasio Tan and Zoila Co Lim alleging that: 1. In the books of the plaintiff, there appears the name of the defendant Tan as one of its stockholders initially in 1975 with 50 common shares, and subsequently credited with 75 shares by way of dividends or an outstanding total stockholding of 125 common shares of the par value of P250.00 each. 2. Defendant Tan has since 1972 been demanding the release to him of the certificates stock but which the plaintiff has not done so far and is prevented from doing so because of the vehement and adverse claim thereto by the other defendant, Zoila Co Lim. Issue: w/n the filing of interpleader suit was proper Held: It is patent from the pleadings in the lower court that both defendants Tan and Lim assert conflicting rights to the questioned shares of stock. Petitioner Continental Development Corporation expressly stated in the complaint that both defendants, through their respective lawyers, threatened to take punitive measures against it should it adopt any steps that may prejudice their respective interests in the shares of stock in question; and that it is not sufficiently informed of the rights of the respective claimants

and therefore not in a position to determine justly and correctly their conflicting claims. Since there is an active conflict of interests between the two defendants over the disputed shares of stock, the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for interpleader, which practically decided ownership of the shares of stock in favor of defendant Tan. The two defendants should be given full opportunity to litigate their respective claims. Rule 63, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court only requires as an indispensable requisite: that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. GREGORIO R. SY-QUIA vs. THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR and FILADELFO DE LEON G.R. No. L-22807 October 10, 1924 Facts: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of the Province of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale. Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their mercantile, establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, as security for a debt. When the debt fell due and no payment was made, petitioner, in writing, requested the sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under the provisions of section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents and fixed the date of the sale at. In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon presented an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia was given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was executed and that, therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect. The sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims, suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead.

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Plaintiffs allege that the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the sale was a ministerial one and praying that the sheriff be commanded to proceed. Issue: w/n the sheriff may be compelled by mandamus despite the filing of an interpleader suit Held: Though it, perhaps, would have been better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that the facts shown do not justify our interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event. In these circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader seems justified. MARCELO A. MESINA vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986 Facts: Respondent Jose Go purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's Check for P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy, who had then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone. When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not in his folder and nowhere to be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which suggestion Jose Go immediately followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to the police to report the loss of the check, pointing to the person of Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it. The records of the police show that a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro demanded payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his client. He however refused to reveal the name of his client and threatened to sue, if payment is not made. Respondent bank, in its letter replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in the bank and is laying claim to it. Unsure of what to do on the matter, respondent Associated Bank filed an action for Interpleader naming as respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bank received summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain
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Marcelo A. Mesina from the RTC of Caloocan City. Respondent bank moved to amend its complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe. Simultaneously, respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy, informed Cpl. Gimao of the Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the possession of Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner. When Cpl. Gimao went to Marcelo Mesina to ask how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further. An information for theft was instituted against Alexander Lim. Mesina, instead of filing an answer to the interpleader suit, filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personality to sue The trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner Mesina and ruling that respondent bank's complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for interpleader. Subsequently, respondent judge issued an order declaring petitioner in default since his period to answer has already expired. Issue: w/n IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner as in default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader complaint Petitioner argues in his memorandum that this order requiring petitioner to file his answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging that since he is presumably a holder in due course and for value, how can he be compelled to litigate against Jose Go who is not even a party to the check? Held: Such argument is trite and ridiculous if we have to consider that neither his name or Jose Go's name appears on the check. Following such line of argument, petitioner is not a party to the check either and therefore has no valid claim to the Check. Furthermore, the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. What else is the purpose of a law suit but to litigate? The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details in support of its action for Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader, respondent bank took an precautionary and necessary measures to bring out the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances
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known to him and now that private respondent bank brought these circumstances out in court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light of these facts), petitioner charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these nonissues." Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed an abuse of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and reasons why respondent Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case. Both parties were given an opportunity to present their sides. Petitioner chose to withhold substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to present their side-this is the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the petition. IAC decided the question by considering both the facts submitted by petitioner and those given by respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the scope of the remedy sought in the petition.

Held: The depositary, says the Civil Code, cannot use the thing deposited without the permission of the depositor. (Art. 1766 Spanish Civil Code, Article 1977, Civil Code of the Philippines), as a corollary, it cannot dispense to other use. The end for which they deposit the amount claimed by the defendants is frustrated if one or two of them utilize it for their advantage. MENZI & COMPANY, INC. vs. FRANCISCO BASTIDA G.R. No. L-42278 March 25, 1936 Facts: In a civil case (Francisco Bastida vs. Menzi & Co.), final judgment was rendered ordering Menzi & Co., Inc., to pay to Francisco Bastida the sum of P21,633,20 with legal interest thereon. Prior to the issuance of a writ of execution of the final judgment so rendered, Menzi & Co., Inc., received written notices from Levy Hermanos, Inc., The Bank of Philippine Islands, Manuel Bustamante, Filipinas Lumber Co., Inc., the Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc., Claro M. Recto, Jose M. Casal, Alberto Barretto and Manuel Nieto alleging that they were Francisco Bastidas creditors in the amounts specified by each of them and that, their respective claims, being preferred claims, they asked to be paid with preference. In order that the courts might finally determine the alleged preferences and the order in which they should be paid and to avoid subsequent responsibilities, Menzi & Co., Inc., brought an action of interpleading against all the said creditors and deposited the sum of P29,774.49 with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Pending the appeal and before it was considered, the creditor and appellee Claro M. Recto filed a motion withdrawing his claim on the ground that being now a member of this court he does not desire to intervene as litigant in any case pending before it, preferring to collect his credit for professional services directly from the then plaintiff Francisco Bastida. The motion was favorably acted upon and therefore said creditor has ceased to be an appellee in this case. Judgment was rendered in said case ordering that the credits be paid in the order and preference as follows: Levy Hermanos, Inc., Claro M. Recto, Jose M. Casal or to his assignee Macondray & Co., Alberto Barretto, the sum of P100 as attorneys fees and P76.04 as judicial expenses to Harvey and OBrien, and the balance to the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Jose M. Casal was one of the attorneys for Francisco Bastida in civil case No. 31956 and on September 9, 1933, he filed a notice of attorneys lien for the sum of P6,000 with the records and notified Menzi & Co., Inc., thereof; on the 12th of said month this court, in a resolution, made said attorneys lien of
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CLARO RIVERA vs. HON. FELICISIMO OCAMPO G.R. No. L-5968 August 5, 1953 Facts: Atkins, Kroll & Co. filed an interpleader suit requesting that the Court decide who among the defendants are entitled to the sum of P21, 792.49 which the former deposited in court clerkship. This amount represents the value of the second batch of steel rails sold to the applicant Atkins, Kroll & Co. Inc. by Cathay Ceramics, Inc., under a contract existed between the two. Jesus L. Uy preemptively claimed on the amount of the second batch excluding S. Rivera and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., on the other hand, claimed that the amount be paid to Rizalina S. Rivera and the balance is paid to it. One day after the case is filed, the Cathay Ceramics, Inc. filed an urgent motion asking to withdraw the deposit and to replace it with a bond, but was opposed to by Rizalina S. Rivera and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc CFI rendered a decision authorizing the clerk of court to deliver a certain amount of the deposit to defendant Uy and the balance to defendant Cathay Ceramics upon filing by Cathay Ceramics of a P25,000 surety bond. Issue: w/n the removal of the deposit is allowed pending an interpleader suit
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record. Attorney Casal later transferred all his interest in said attorneys lien to Macondray & Co., Inc., who substituted him in this appeal. Alberto Barretto is one of the attorneys who defended Francisco Bastida. He filed a notice of attorneys lien in the case and notified Menzi & Co., Inc., thereof. This court, in a resolution of the 19th of said month ordered that the attorneys lien be attached to the record. Said attorney claimed 10% of the funds on deposit. The court, however, reduced it to P1,000. The Bank of the Philippine Islands claims that in the appealed judgment the court erred: (3) in holding that Alberto Barrettos credit enjoys preference over its claims; (4) in also giving preference to Jose M. Casals credit over its claim; (5) in also giving preference to Claro M. Rectos credit over its claim; (6) in granting to the attorneys for the herein plaintiff fees in the sum of P100 and in considering said fee as preference credit over its claim In its third assignment of error, according to section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which Attorney Barretto bases his claim, a lawyers lien on judgments and decrees for the payment of money and the preference thereof arise only from the date on which the right is caused to be entered upon the records and the adverse party notified thereof. We therefore hold that the third assignment of error is well founded and that the credit of the Bank of the Philippine Islands is superior and has preference over that of Attorney Barretto. In the fourth assignment of error, the generally accepted doctrine is that an attorneys lien may be assigned or transferred without the preference thereof being extinguished, with the exception that the doctrine does not extend to cases where the assignment carries with it a breach of the attorneys duty to preserve his clients confidence inviolate. Although an attorney cannot assign a contract for his services to be rendered, and substitute another attorney in his place, without the consent of his client, he may assign a debt substantially due for services rendered; and where a firm of attorneys was to receive a certain compensation for their services, provided they should accomplish certain results, the surviving partner may, after the services which they promised to render, and the ends which they agreed to accomplish, were all practically rendered and accomplished, assign all the right and title of the firm in the contract for such services, and all the moneys due or to become due thereunder, and the assignee may recover upon the contract. We hold, therefore, that the mere assignment of the attorneys lien did not result in extinguishing the preference. However, it appears that Attorney Casals lien was caused to appear in the records and notice thereof to the adverse party was made only on September 9, 1933, long after the mortgage executed by Bastida in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, which was registered on December 3, 1932. Resolving Attorney Barrettos claim we stated that pursuant to the provisions of section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attorneys lien enjoys preference only from the time it is entered upon the records and notice
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thereof served on the adverse party. This provision is applicable to the case of Attorney Casal and therefore his claim is inferior to the mortgage credit of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and cannot be paid preferentially. We hold, therefore, that the fourth assignment of error is likewise well founded. In its fifth assignment of error, the Bank of the Philippine Islands questions Attorney Claro M. Rectos credit and the preference thereof. In a resolution of March 18, 1936, said claimant was eliminated as party to the case and in view thereof, and because he is no longer interested in any judgment to be rendered therein, it is unnecessary to pass upon this fifth assignment of error. In its sixth assignment of error, Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure which authorizes the bringing of an action of interpleading contains no provision relative to fees of the attorney for the plaintiff in such actions. However, taking into consideration the purpose of an action of interpleading, it seems just that the fees of an interpleaders attorney be defrayed with the funds sought to be distributed, unless there be some reason justifying payment thereof by some of defendants in the case. According to many authorities, complainant is entitled, as a part of his costs, to an attorneys fee commensurate with the services of his counsel in the cause, eventually to fall on the claimant who was in the wrong and made the litigation necessary, and this is expressly provided by the statute in some jurisdictions. In any case, the allowance for the attorneys fees should be limited to a reasonable fee for necessary services. It appears that the amount of the fees granted is not questioned nor is it claimed that it is exorbitant or unreasonable. Truly, the sum fixed is very reasonable and proportionate to the amount and quality of the professional services rendered. As to the order of payment of these fees, the law is likewise silent; but being in the nature of costs, according to the American doctrine referred to above, they should be paid in preference to all claims and at the same time as judicial costs. LEONARDO R. OCAMPO vs. LEONORA TIRONA G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005 Facts: Ocampo bought the subject parcel of land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, tenant of Breton, was informed of this arrangement and started paying Ocampo rent. Some months thereafter, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo Law Office stating that Tirona will stop paying rent because the area has been declared under area for priority development. Ocampo then wrote a demand letter for payment of rental. Despite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to heed Ocampos demands. Ocampo then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before the MTC. Tirona answered by asserting that Dona Yaneza was the owner, not Ocampo. Tirona subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend her answer because a lawyer did not assist her in her initial answer. In her amended
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answer, Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land. MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo because of non-payment of rent and because of the termination of Tironas right to possess and occupy the subject land. Tirona changed theory in the RTC and raised that it was Rosauros sister Ma. Lourdes who could validly sell the land to Ocampo. The court did not believe her and still ruled in favor of Ocampo. CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio as a prerequisite to Ocampos action so it reversed the decision of the MTC and RTC. Issue: Who has the right of possession of the subject land? What should have been filed by Tirona to show good faith of Tirona in not paying rent? Held: The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION CORPORATION G.R. No. 127913. September 13, 2001 vs. METRO CONTAINER

prompting RCBC to institute extrajudicial foreclosure LEYCON as a response, filed an action for Nullificatoin of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC but eventually RCBC was able to consolidate its ownership over the property due to LEYCONs failure to redeem. Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property from LEYCON was demanded by RCBC to make rental payments. LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN. METROCAN, meanwhile, filed a complaint for Interpleader against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals. In the Interpleader case, an amicable settlement was made between METROCAN and LEYCON with respect to back rentals. However, in the Unlawful Detainer case, METROCAN was order to pay LEYCON whatever rentals were due. METRPCAN claims interpleader case is moot and academic because of amicable settlement. RCBC alleges, however, that the decision of the lower court in the ejectment case cannot render the Interpleader action moot and academic. Issue: W/N the Party who initiates the interpleader action may be compelled to litigate if he is no longer interested to pursue such cause of action? Held: It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action because LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals as lessor and RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in its name. The Supreme Court said that the unlawful detainer case involves issue of material possession and not of ownership, therefore, the reason for the interpleader ceased when the lower court rendered judgment ordering METROCAN to pay LEYCON. This was made clear when the trial court, in denying RCBC's "Motion for Inclusion as an Indispensable Party" declared that "the final determination of the issue of physical possession over the subject premises between the plaintiff and the defendant shall not in any way affect RCBC's claims of ownership over the said premises, since RCBC is neither a co-lessor or colessee of the same, hence he has no legal personality to join the parties herein with respect to the issue of physical possession vis--vis the contract of lease between the parties." As aptly pointed by the MeTC, the issue is limited to the defendant LEYCON's breach of the provisions of the Contract of Lease Rentals. Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment in Civil Case whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. Because there was already a judicial fiat to METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with the interpleader case. Thus, METROCAN moved for
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Facts: Sept. 1990, Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from RCBC in the amount of P30 million which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a Valenzuela property. LEYCON failed to settle its obligations
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its dismissal not because it is no longer interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue such cause of action. It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indespensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. The decision in Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.

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