G.R. No.

L-8346

January 22, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PROCESO BINSOL, ET AT., defendants, PROCESO BINSOL, TOMAS PELLERVA and ROMAN PEROLINA, defendants-appellants. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for appellee. Justo R. Albert for defendant Proceso Binsol. Jose R. Nalasco, Pedro L. Albino and Pedro Dinglasan for appellants Tomas Pellerva and Roman Perolina. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Proceso Binsol, Tomas Pellerva, Roman Perolina, Marciano Fenol, Nazario Hernandez, Jorge Ligsa, Pampilo Leoncio, Victor Nolasco de Castro, Eusebio Doe, Crispin Doe and Ismen Orioso were charged with kidnapping before the Court of Instance of Cavite. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, Marciano Fenol was discharged from the complaint. Of the twelve accused, eight were never apprehended although three of them were reported killed or dead. The trial proceeded with respect to Proceso Binsol, Tomas Pelleva and Roman Perolina after which the court found them guilty of the crime charged and sentenced each of them to suffer life imprisonment, to indemnity Dr. Severo Siasoco, jointly and severally, in the sum of P10,000, and to pay a proportionate share of the costs. From this decision, the three convicts took the present appeal. The evidence shows that Dr. Severo Siasoco was kidnapped by a group of men from a place in his Buck Estate situated in Cavite. His apprehension and detention were effected for the purpose of ransom as in fact his family parted with the sum of P10,000 to secure his release. These facts are undisputed. The only question to be determined is whether or not appellants participated in the commission of the crime. This requires a discussion of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the most important of which is the testimony of Isabelo Jeciel. This witness testified in substance as follows: In the morning of February 20, 1953, while he was in his house, a jeepney arrived occupied by Proceso Binsol, Nazario Hernandez and Felipe de la Cruz who asked him to go with them to Naic. Upon arriving at the municipal building, the four alighted and proceeded to the office of the justice of the peace where Binsol told the three of his plan to kidnap Dr. Severo Siasoco and obtain from him a ransom of P150,000. Asked by Binsol what they thought of the plan, the three agreed that it was a good propositing. Jeciel and Hernandez told Binsol that they did not have any firearm, but Binsol promised that they would be provided. Accordingly, Jeciel was given a garand rifle and Hernandez a carbine. Felipe de la Cruz already had a firearm of his own. In that same conference, Binsol told Jeciel that he would write a letter addressed to the family of Dr. Severo Siasoco demanding a ransom of P150,000 and warning them not to ask for help from any peace officer to effect his rescue as otherwise he would be killed. The letter was dictated by Binsol himself. It was agreed that they would meet again on Saturday, which they did at Palaque, Naic, from where they proceeded to Alfonso, Cavite, on foot. There they met six persons who guided them to a certain place one kilometer farther where they met Tomas Pellerva and Roman Perolina. Then they proceeded to the house of Pellerva in barrio Matakbak arriving there at 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Pellerva and Perolina left the group for a short time to go to a nearby forest in a barrio and afterwards returned, but left again saying that they were getting some more men. It was 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day that Pellerva and Perolina returned with two companions and thereafter they instructed the group to go ahead their mission. Jeciel was told to head the group. Those who were in the group, among others, were Felipe de la Cruz, Nazario Hernandez, Eusebio alias Eboy, Zosimo and Esmeraldo. Pellerva and Perolina instructed them that upon arriving at the Buck Estate, they should stay in a place where they could be seen as there be a man who would serve them as a guide.

While Pellerva and Perolina told Jeciel that Dr. Siasoco used to go to his estate at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, on that occasion the doctor failed to show up so that they moved to a place where there were houses, and while they were eating, three persons arrived, one of them wearing a sun helmet who turned out to be Dr. Siasoco. They greeted him and the doctor answered the greeting, and then he invited them to his house where they had lunch together. After the luncheon, Jeciel told Dr. Siasoco to assemble all his men so that they could be introduced to one another, and the doctor acceded. After the men were assembled, Jeciel and his companions immediately surrounded them and confiscated the grease gun and rifle with which some were provided, after which they took with Dr. Siasoco and one of his companions. They brought the two first to Bailen, then to Alfonso, and later to Palangue, Naic. It was here where Jeciel wrote a note addressed to the family of Dr. Siasoco demanding the sum of P150,000. This letter was given to the wife of Dr. Siasoco's encargado by the name of Abdon Concepcion. Dr. Siasoco and his companion were held captive for ten days during which they were guarded. Jeciel at first fed the doctor and his companion with money he took from the doctor himself and when this was spent, he bought the food out of the money he got from Binsol. The money that was given as ransom for the release of Dr. Siasoco was received by Felipe de la Cruz and Nazario Hernandez from one Mariano Criste, which was later turned over to Binsol in the presence of Jeciel. Prior to the release of Dr. Siasoco, it was made to appear in accordance with a previous understanding that it was Binsol who rescued the doctor, and to do this they had to simulate an actual fighting which consisted in firing shots in the air. At the time of the rescue, Binsol was accompanied by some special agents of the provincial governor. When Dr. Siasoco was released, Jeciel told him upon instruction of Binsol that he was being released without mediating any ransom money. Abdon Concepcion, encardo of Dr. Siasoco, corroborated the testimony of Isabelo Jeciel about the incident from the time the kidnappers went to the house of Dr. Siasoco in Alfonso until he (witness) was ordered to return and get a certain note left by Jeciel with his wife. According to this witness, the letter was delivered to the family of Dr. Siasoco by the latter's drive, Dominador Caimul. Doctor Severo Siasoco corroborated the story told by Isabelo Jeciel regarding his kidnapping on February 22, 1953 until he was released. He testified that he was moved from one place to another until March 3, 1953 when he first met his nephew, Mariano Criste, accompanied by Commander Ronquillo. It was Felipe de la Cruz who accompanied him for the meeting with Criste and on said occasion Criste informed him that they were bargaining the amount of ransom to P8,000, which he said was too much and nothing was agreed upon that night. Before they separated, Dr. Siasoco whispered to his nephew that the amount should not go beyond P10,000 because it would be hard to pay it back. On March 3, 1953, Dr. Siasoco was brought back to the same shack where he was first taken and on the following day, March 5, he was told that the final arrangement for his release was to be consummated but nothing happened on that day. On March 5, 1953, Felipe de la Cruz returned to the place where the doctor was brought with a note written by Criste informing the doctor that he was unable to come Wednesday because he was being followed by the PCS. After supper, Felipe de la Cruz came and told the doctor that everything was settled. At about 10:00 o'clock that evening, the doctor was asked to cross a creek and Commander Ronquillo advised him that some policeman are coming together with the chief of police, referring to Binsol, to whom he was be delivered. They rode on a jeepney and he was taken to the house of Governor Camerino at Imus and from there he was finally released. During all this time, Binsol was with the group. Dominador Caimul, driver of Dr. Asiasoco, declared that he drove the doctor from his home in San Juan, Rizal in the morning of February 22, 1953 to his land in Alfonso, Cavite, arriving there between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that same morning. He identified the ransom note Exhibit A. He corroborated the testimony of Dr. Siasoco and of other prosecution witnesses as regards the kidnapping from the time of the doctor's arrival at his land in Alfonso, Cavite, to his capture by the kidnappers. Mariano Criste, nephew of Dr. Siasoco, testified that in the afternoon of February 22, 1953, he was at the latter's residence in San Juan, Rizal. Dominador Caimul, driver of the doctor, arrived and delivered to him the ransom note Exhibit A. He read it and went to talk with the wife of the doctor to inform her that the doctor was kidnapped and was held for ransom in the amount of P150,000. On the same evening, he went to Dasmarias to ask for the help of Mayor de la Cruz, but as it was already late, he was told to return the following morning. When he returned, he was

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accompanied by Mayor De la Cruz to the Office of the Mayor of Alfonso to request the latter to help in locating the victim. On March 3, 1953, Manuel Arguelles and Melanio Baul came to the house of Dr. Siasoco bringing a note of the doctor wherein he was asking for help of Mrs. Avendao. At 10:00 in the morning, Criste and Arguelles went to Naic and stayed in the house of Baul and about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Arguelles came to tell him that the kidnappers were ready to talk terms with him. Criste and Arguelles were then brought to a field in barrio Halang and there they taked to Felipe de la Cruz and Isabelo Jeciel. When the latter informed Criste that they wanted the amount of P150,000, he answer that he had only P8,000 which he got from the family of Dr. Siasoco. He then requested to be brought to Dr. Siasoco so that he could talk to him about the ransom money. After two hours, Dr. Siasoco was brought to him and, on that occasion, the kidnappers reduced the amount to P35,000 and he was told to come back the next morning. Criste returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of March 4, but returned to Naic in the afternoon on that same day with P10,000 which he left with Mrs. Avendao. He met again the representatives of the kidnappers, Felipe de la Cruz and Isabelo Jeciel, and told them that he could not get the amount of P35,000 but only P8,000 telling them further that he would try to borrow P2,000 in order to complete the amount of P10,000. He was then informed that there were four groups working for the release of Dr. Siasoco, namely, the group of Mayor Dela Cruz of Dasmarias, the group of Governor Camerino, the group of Mrs. Avendao, and the group of Chief of Police Proceso Binsol of Naic. He was warned by Jeciel and De la Cruz not to tell the people that they were demanding ransom money for the release of Dr. Siasoco and was informed that they would make it appear that he was rescued and saved. Criste said that the plan was alright provided that Dr. Siasoco was released. Jeciel and De la Cruz told him however that as Chief of Police Binsol was then in Manila, nothing definite could be done and so they postponed the decision to March 5, 1953. In the evening, Criste went to Naic via Tagaytay Mendez to the house of Mrs. Avendao where he took the money and with Arguelles went to Haland where they met Felipe de la Cruz, who was then accompanied by two persons. Criste asked De la Cruz how the money would be given and he was told that they would go to the place where hiding Dr. Siasoco and would hide among the bushes, and when they see Dr. Siasoco being delivered to Chief of Police Binsol, Criste would turn over to them the ransom money. Felipe de la Cruz then left and after a while returned and told them that the plan was changed saying that they had just to give him the money and then wait for the passing of the jeepney that would carry Dr. Siasoco. They gave the money and proceeded to the highway where they met Jeciel who accompanied them to the camp where Dr. Siasoco was. There the release of Dr. Siasoco was effected. From the highway, Dr. Siasoco, accompanied by the governor, was taken to his home in the early morning of March 6, 1953. Proceso Binsol, one of the accused, testified that he was the chief of police of Naic since June 1, 1952 to April 15, 1953 when he was arrested in connection with the case. On March 2, 1953, Governor Camerino asked him to contact Isabelo Jeciel who was reportedly holding Dr. Siasoco in captivity to obtain his release without paying any ransom. While he realized that he and Jeciel not exactly friends, Binsol promised the governor that he would do his best, and since the task is rather tough and he could not do it alone, on March 3, 1953, he organized a posse of trusted and courageous policemen in the persons of Leonardo Apay, Prudencio Ledesma and Antonion Pino. They first rode in a jeep to barrio Central where he asked his godson, one Domingo Consumo, to contact Isabelo Jeciel. Consumo left and returned to inform Binsol that Isabelo Jeciel and Felipe de la Cruz were willing to have a "powwow" with him, and so on March 4, 1953, Binsol and his policemen, accompained by barrio lieutenant Dalmacio Consumo, set out to contact Isabelo Jeciel in his hideout. Binsol asked Consumo to tell Jeciel that Governor Camerino wanted the release of the doctor without ransom, and if Jeciel is agreeable the whole matter would be forgotten. Consumo returned and told Binsol that Jeciel wanted to confer with him in person. At about 5 p.m. of that day, Binsol and his companions took the road leading to Indang and when they were between barrio Halang and Central, they proceeded westward where Binsol told two of his policemen to stay behind. Upon reaching a path they stopped and then crossed a creek where they met another path and it was then that one Asiong pointed to them the place where Jeciel and his men were hiding. There they saw a man waving his hat signalling them to approach but Binsol told Asiong that it would be better if that man should approach them instead unarmed. After some time and as neither Asiong nor Jeciel advanced, policeman Ledesma left and came back with Jeciel

unarmed. Binsol told Jeciel that he better release Dr. Siasoco without ransom for he might be hunted by the government hand he would be surely caught, to which Jeciel answered that he was really embarrased about the whole thing but that he had companions from Alfonso who had to be deceived if the doctor should be freed without paying any ransom money. At this juncture Binsol advised Jeciel to talk the matter over his men and that he would return the next day. After contacting Jeciel, Binsol went to see Governor Camerino to report all what was going on telling him that he was meeting Jeciel again in the afternoon. The governor told Binsol that he was sending his men to conduct Dr. Siasoco after his release. And between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock that afternoon (March 5), some agents of the governor arrived in a jeep and proceeded to Halang with the policemen where they asked Consumo to contact Jeciel again. Jeciel then proposed that they should engage in a sham battle so that Dr. Siasoco may have the impression that he was being rescued, to which Binsol agreed, it being understood however that no ransom money would be paid. Jeciel left at once and told them to wait for his return. At about 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock that night, they proceeded with the governor's men to Halang. Upon their arrival, Jeciel walked ahead and when they were about 100 meter from the road, they saw some men and when they came near each other, they started firing in the air after which they proceeded to rescue Dr. Siasoco. After the rescue, they proceeded to the governor's house in Imus arriving there in the early morning of March 6, 1953. They awoke the governor and when he asked Dr. Siasoco whether ransom is paid, the doctor said that all that was taken from him was P20. From the house of the governor they proceeded to the house of Atty. Sarayba and from there they conducted Dr. Siasoco to his house. Binsol denied the imputation of Jeciel that he was the mastermined of Dr. Siasoco's kidnapping intimating that this is a mere concoction of Jeciel who wanted to get even with him for having effected his arrest after promising him that nothing would happen to him in connection with the kidnapping. Binsol also claimed that Jeciel wanted to eliminate him to remove from the scene a potential avenger of the author of the death of Binsol's father whom he is suspecting to be Jeciel. Tomas Pellerva, on his part, testified that he was a member of the police force of Alfonso, Cavite, when he was arrested on April 15, 1955 for complicity in this case. In the afternoon of February 20, 1953, he was in thepoblacion of said town when he was ordered by the chief of police to reinforce the policemen assigned at Sinaliw in connection with the local fiesta there. He arrived there at 8:00 o'clock in the evening with Sgt. Olarve and Pat. Aviante. He left them there at 6:00 o'clock the following morning when he returned to the poblacion. Upon arriving there he proceeded to the mayor's residence as he was assigned to accompany him where ever he went, and the mayor and he went to Velasco Clinic in Silang to visit the former's sick child. They stayed there until 4:00 o'clock when they returned to Alfonso arriving there at 6:30 p.m. He was schedule to proceed again to Sinaliw on orders of his chief but the mayor detained him for sometime so he did not actually reach Sinaliw until about 9:00 o'clock that evening where he again joined Sgt. Olarve and Pat. Aviante whom he met near the barrio chapel where they attended a stage show of some kind in between their patrolling stints. He took his supper that night in the house of Simeon Dimacuba. He also met his chief there twice. At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day, February 22, 1953, he left for the poblacion to accompany the mayor to Silang, and this time they brought rice and firewood for the mayor's family who were then staying in Dr. Velasco's Clinic. In the afternoon he accompanied the mayor to the local cockpit where they spent some time and at about 4:30 p.m., they left arriving at Alfonso at 6:30 p.m. He denied all the imputations made against him by Jeciel which he branded as fabrication. He recalled that Jeciel had a verbal tiff with him during the Tayawanak barrio fiesta in January, 1953. It seems that Jeciel was being pointed to as the one responsible for the loss of local carabaos some of which belonged to the father and brother-in-law of Pellerva's fellow-policeman, Roman Perolina, so he decided to corner Jeciel telling him to make himself scarce in the place as otherwise there will be scarcity of animals thereabouts. Jeciel was visibly irked by this apparent hostility which, according to Pellerva, caused Jeciel to nourish a resentment against him and his co-accused Perolina. In fact, according to Pellerva, he was about to come to grips with Jeciel were it not for the intervention of Pat. Aviante. Roman Perolina also testified in his defense. He was also policeman of Alfonso when he was implicated in this case. He said that on February 21, 1953, at 8:00 o'clock a.m., he began his assignment as guard in the municipal building of Alfonso, his tour of duty being twenty-four full hours, that is, up to 8:00 a.m. of the next day. He and Pat. Angeles Mojica took turns while on duty that night, that is, while one slept the other was on guard. A third policeman, Nilo Herrera, acted as the desk sergeant on that date. In the afternoon of February 21, 1953, Perolino saw police chief Bernardo Capupus waiting for some transportation to Sinaliw and it was he who finally found some vehicle for him. He was out of the municipal building that evening for only 30 minutes, which time he consumed in going home for supper and returning to his post. When the chief of police returned from Sinaliw at about midnight, he and Mojice

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were awake and chatting. When he was relieved the next day, February 22, he went home for breakfast and returned right away to the municipal building for the customary Sunday drill. Perolino denied having met Jeciel personally before except during the first days of the trial of this case, but that he has heard about Jeciel's unsavory reputation as a cattle rustler. He stated that he had been persuading his relatives to prosecute and testify against Jeciel for his cattle-rustling activities even way back in 1951 but somehow they were afraid to do so. Governor Camerino took the witness stand twice, first as a direct witness for the defense and second as a surrebuttal witness of the accused Binsol. He said that he utilized Binsol to effect the rescue of Dr. Siasoco from the kidnappers because Binsol knew Jeciel whom he considered as the mastermined of the kidnapping. So when the case was filed against Binsol without including Jeciel he was surprised. He also said that from the very start of his intervention he suspected that ransom money was involved and this was strengthened when he learned that Jeciel was constructing a new house. On cross-examination Governor Camerino informed the court that he has given Fiscal Tengco the gosignal to prosecute anyone whom he believed to be responsible and when Fiscal Tengco informed him that Binsol was involved, he told the fiscal to go ahead and prosecute him. The first thing that strikes the attention of the court in connection with this appeal is the fact that the main witness of the prosecution, Isabelo Jeciel, appears to have taken an important part in the commission of the kidnapping and yet he has not been included by the government prosecutor in the information filed against the accused for which reason, when apprised of this situation, the trial court ordered his prosecution although it allowed his testimony to stand in the present case. And because that attitude of the government prosecutor runs counter to his duty to include in the complaint or information when an offense is committed by more than one person all those who according to the evidence appear to be responsible therefor (Rule 106, section 1 and 5, Rules of Court), the defense now contends that it is an error for the lower court to have allowed said witness to testify as witness for the prosecution, for the proper procedure would have been to include him in the information as one of the accused and if he appears to be the least guilty, for the fiscal to file later a motion for his discharge to be utilized as a witness for the prosecution, for only in that way can the defense be given an opportunity to help the court in determining that all the elements required by the rule to warrant such discharge are present (Rule 115, section 9). It is true that our Rules of Court require that all persons who have participated in the commission of a crime should be included in the complaint or information, and that a person included in the complaint or information can only be discharged to be used as a witness by the government when in the judgment of the court the conditions prescribed in Section 9, Rule 115, are present; but the fact that a person has not been previously charged or included in the information even if he appears to have taken part in the commission of the crime does not, and cannot, prevent the government prosecutor from utilizing him as a witness if he believes that he is the best witness that can testify as to the commission of the crime. In the discharge of his duties, a government prosecutor is free to choose the witness or witnesses he deems more qualified or competent to testify for the prosecution and there is nothing either in the law or in the rules that would require him to first include him in the information and then later secure his discharge before he could present him as a government witness. This is what he said in a number of cases wherein we made it emphatic that such a step is not indispensable nor can effect the validity of the proceedings provided that the testimony of the witness is competent and there is enough circumstantial evidence to corroborate it. Thus, in U. S. vs. Enriquez, 40 Phil., 603, this Court, after discussing the provisions of the law which authorize the court to discharge an accused so that he may be used as a government witness, reached the conclusion that before such discharge may be authorized "it is neither requisite nor necessary that said persons be previously charged in the information even if it appears that they had taken part in the commission of the crime", stating the following as the reasons for such conclusions: The fiscal is free to produce as witnesses for the prosecution all the persons who had been present at, and cognizant of, the perpetration of the crime and who he believes can testify to the truth hereof. To do this, neither is it requisite that there be circumstantial evidence or presumptions showing that they or some of them were accomplices or might have taken part in the crime, nor is it necessary and indispensable that they be previously charged or included in the information so that, upon being afterwards excluded, they might testify as witnesses for the prosecution against the accused.

The fiscal may not have sufficient evidence to prosecute a definite person who, according to information received by him, had a participation or took part in the commission of a crime; and under such circumstances he does not violate any procedural law by producing said person as witness for the prosecution without previously charging him in the information and afterwards excluding them therefrom, provided he is qualified to testify in the proceeding. Any witness who has testified for the prosecution or for the accused may afterwards be charged in an amended complaint and be brought to trial after the cause is decided. To do this, it is no obstacle that said witness in the same cause for the prosecution or for the accused taking always into consideration the fact that the testimony of a co-author of a crime, who in turn admits and confesses his own guilt, is perfectly valid and binding against his co-accused so long as said testimony appears substantially corroborated at the hearing by circumstantial evidence. The sole and principal object of the law is, not to restrain and limit the action of the prosecuting officer, but especially to impose conditions whereby an accused, already charged in the information, may not be arbitrarily and capriciously excluded therefrom, as must have happened more than once, and to remedy the evil consequence of an unreasonable and groundless exclusion which produce the real impunity perhaps of the most guilty criminal and subject to prosecution the less wicked, who have not found protection in whims and arbitrariness unlike others who have secured unfounded and unjust exclusion when they really deserved severe punishment. We may therefore restate the rule relative to the right of government prosecutor to utilize a person who has participated in the commission of a crime as a witness for the prosecution, as follows: (1) when an offense is committed by more than one person, it is the duty of the fiscal to include all of them in the complaint or information (section 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court); (2) if the fiscal desires to utilize one of those charged with the offense as a government witness, the fiscal may ask the court to discharge one of them after complying with the conditions prescribed by law (section 9, Rule 115): (3) there is nothing in the rule from which it can be inferred that before a person can be presented as a government witness that he be first included as a co-accused in the information, for the fiscal is free to produce as a witness anyone whom he believes can testify to the truth of the crime charged (U.S. vs. Enriquez, supra); and (4) the failure to follow the requirements of the rule relative to the use of a person, himself particeps criminis, as a government witness does not violate the due process clause of the constitution, nor render his testimony ineffectual if otherwise competent and admissible (People vs. Castaeda and Fernandez, 63 Phil., 480). We cannot therefore discard the testimony of Isabelo Jeciel simply because he appears to be equally guilty of the crime charged and has not been included in the information as required be section 5, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, it appearing that said testimony is admissible and competent and has been corroborated in some material respects by other evidence of the prosecution. Moreover, the rule has been substantially complied with when upon order of the court Isabelo Jeciel was charged by the fiscal with the same crime in a separate proceeding even if it was later dismissed when the very complaining witness, Dr. Siasoco, lost interest in prosecuting him after a judgment of conviction had been against his companions, now defendants-appellants in the present case. Nor can we dispute the motives that had led the fiscal in choosing Jeciel as a witness in lieu of any of the herein appellants for in our opinion the same appear warranted by the circumstances of this case. Said motives are reflected in the following paragraph of the petition for dismissal filed by the fiscal in the case against Jeciel: 3. That it is really very difficult in this province to eliminate the mastermined and principal kidnapper because of their influence in the community, and in this case. Motivated by his desire to get the principals if the crime and the man who mastermined the business, he has resolved to look for one like Isabelo Jeciel who would willingly help the government in its crusade to discourage this kind of crime. As to the responsibility and danger to society between Proceso Binsol, chief of police of Naic, Tomas Pellerva and Roman Perolino both policemen of Alfonso, on one side, and Isabelo Jeciel, a private citizen on the other, this representation believes that the latter is of lesser harm the former. For this reason, in the interest of

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justice, and for the purpose of promoting peace and order on this province, this representation deemed it wise to utilize Isabelo Jeciel as witness against all other accused. We will now come to the merits of the case. We will begin by stating that, while the conviction of appellants as regards the plan to kidnap Dr. Siasoco and the manner it was carried out is merely predicated on the testimony of Isabelo Jeciel, however, in some material respects, the same appears corroborated by the testimony of the other witnesses, to wit, Abdon Concepcion, the encargado of the victim, Dr. Siasoco, Dominador Caimul, his driver, and Mariano Criste, his nephew, who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the payment of the ransom money to appellants. The issue therefore is one of credibility. This is the main concern of the trial judge. Well known is the rule that appellate courts do not generally disturb the findings of the court a quo considering that it is in a better position to decide the question having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the hearing, unless it is shown that it has overlook certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Here no such showing has been made. On the contrary, a perusal of the decision of the trial court would at once reveal the painstaking care taken by it in analyzing the testimony of Jeciel precisely because he is one whose conscience is not free from blame and it wanted to be sure that he told the truth even if by doing so he was exposing himself to a sure prosecution. Remember that when he took the witness stand there was still no promise of immunity given him, nor was he discharged to be utilized as a witness as required by the rule. In spite of all that he was found trustworthy by the trial court, judging from the following observation: In other words, all the pertinent facts testified to by Isabelo Jeciel on direct examination were not only reiterated, but even made clearer by Isabelo Jeciel upon protracted cross--examinations by the three attorneys for the defendants. Out of these answers above quoted as given by the witness on cross-examination, and who answered all those questions freely, supontaneously, without difficulty and in a neutral manner, the Court was impressed by Isabelo Jeciel that the facts he divulged to the Court, not only during the trial of this case but also in the preliminary investigation conducted before Judge Antonio G. Lucero, are true and correct. The more the Court scrutinized the testimonies of the witnesses including those of the three accused, the more the Court is convinced of the reality of the story revealed by the principal witness, Isabelo Jeciel, who is now also accused in a separate information of this crime of kidnapping. The fact that Isabelo Jeciel has a previous understanding with no less than the Chief of Police of Naic and the policemen of Alfonso, made him bold enough to execute the acts, according to plan. If he had squealed later on, it was probably due to his arrest and he must have thought that if he would be punished for the kidnapping with ransom he should better divulge the real architects who made the plan. After all according to him, he only received a small share out of the P10,000 and probably thought that those, who must have gotten the lion's share, should also be made to pay for it. We have not failed to notice the contradiction and inconsistencies which the defense attributes to the testimony of Isabelo Jeciel in an effort to impeach his credibility, but we find, that, aside from being minor in nature, they are more apparent than real. They can be reconciled and harmonized without destroying the substance of his testimony. Thus, it cannot be disputed that Jeciel knew personally appellant Binsol and that on the certain occasion he and his coaccused went to the house of Jeciel to broach to him their scheme and thereafter they proceeded to the office of the justice of the peace of Naic where they discussed more in detail their plan. The exact date and time of the meetings would therefore appear immaterial. The important thing is that the meetings actually took place. Even the defense itself has intimated that said contradictions are seemingly trivial matters and can only be due to mere "slips of the memory." As regards the defense of alibi set up by appellants, we notice that it is merely supported by testimonial evidence. Here again comes into play the rule that the personal observation of the trial judge is important. Here the trial court has also made such observation, and with more reason considering that alibi is the weakest defense that can be set up in a criminal case. Generally, such defense cannot prevail when the identity of the accused has been established, and here this appears clearly in the record. The following is what the trial court said on this matter: The three accused in accordance with their evidence and their memoranda interposed the defense of alibi. Of course, it is not unusual that comrades in arms should protect each other if any of them is in bad fix, so,

that explains the testimonies of the Chief of Police of Alfonso, the sergeant of police of both Alfonso and Naic and several other policemen of the two municipalities. It should also be borne in mind that according to Pellerva himself, he is residing in the barrio of Matakbak during those dates, February 20 to February 22, 1953, and his house is only three (3) kilometers from the barrio of Sinaliw and the same house would be passed by one coming from the poblacion of Alfonso in going to the barrio of Sinaliw. So, it is very probable that before the two accused policemen went to the fiesta of barrio Sinaliw, they first passed thru Pellerva's house at Matakbak to give the necessary instructions to the assigned kidnappers of Dr. Siasoco. As to the claim of Perolino that he stayed more than 24 hours in the municipal building of Alfonso from morning of February 21 to the following morning of February 22, 1953, the Court cannot easily accept such alibi. As to the nature of the liability of appellants, we agree with the Solicitor General that said appellants committed the crime with a common design as shown by the following circumstances: (1) that Binsol actually proposed to Jeciel the plan to kidnap Dr. Siasoco in order to extort ransom money from him and his family; (2) that Tomas Pellerva and Roman Perolino likewise told Jeciel to proceed with that mission to kidnap Dr. Siasoco; (3) that Pellerva and Perolino gave instruction to Jeciel as to the time and place where Dr. Siasoco could be found; (4) that Jeciel in fact contacted the men of Pellerva and Perolino the very day when Dr. Siasoco was kidnapped from his farm on the day in question; and (5) that Binsol took an active part the release or rescue of Dr. Siasoco although part of his original scheme was to make it appear that he had nothing to do with kidnapping. These circumstances establish conspiracy and subject appellants to equal degree of responsibility. Considering that the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence, we hereby affirm the same in toto, with costs against appellants. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 83530 : December 18, 1990.] 192 SCRA 342 CRISTITO AUSTRIA y RODIS, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents-Appellees. DECISION SARMIENTO, J.: The petitioner, the accused below, challenges the decision of the respondent, the Court of Appeals, 1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 03441 thereof, entitled "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus CRISTITO AUSTRIA, Accused-Appellant," an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, sitting in Pasig, presided over by Hon. Milagros Caguioa. The petitioner had been charged with murder, arising from the fatal shooting of Roberto Miranda on June 28, 1980, inside the San Miguel Magnolia Poultry farm compound, in Alfonso, Cavite. The evidence shows that: It appears from the integrated testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, namely, Nemesio Matalog, the security guard, Ronnie Japlo, Farm Supervisor, Desiderio Moraleda, Chief of the Medico-Legal Branch of the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, Policeman Silvino Aviante of Alfonso, Cavite, Policeman Angel Lucero of the 212 PC Company in Tagaytay City, Doroteo Magero, Philippine Constabulary Firearms Examiner of the PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and Florita Fenol Vda. de Miranda, widow of the victim that at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of June 28, 1980, the accused Cristito Austria (appellant herein) was at the guardhouse located inside the compound of the Magnolia Poultry and Dairy Farm at Barrio Amayong, Alfonso, Cavite. He was at that time the Officer-in-Charge of the Security Force of Sentinel Watchman and Security Agency assigned at the Poultry and Dairy

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Farm of San Miguel Corporation performing his duty between the hours of 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. (pp. 25-26, TSN, January 26, 1982; pp. 7-8, TSN, October 12, 1983).:-cralaw While the said accused was at the guardhouse, Roberto Miranda, a driver of the Poultry and Dairy Farm of San Miguel Corporation arrived driving a company wagon. Nemesio Matalog, another security guard, opened the gate and allowed Miranda to enter the company's compound (pp. 9-10, TSN, October 12, 1983). Thereafter, accused and Roberto Miranda were seen exchanging fist blows (p. 36, TSN, January 26, 1982). Security Guard Matalog and a farm supervisor of the Poultry Farm by the name of Ronnie Japlo tried to pacify and separate the two protagonists with Japlo holding Miranda while Matalog holding the accused (pp. 38-44, TSN, ibid). Matalog then brought accused Austria to the guardhouse (pp. 45-46, TSN, ibid) while Japlo brought Miranda down the guardhouse. While Matalog was getting the trip ticket of Miranda, accused Austria took a shotgun near the guardhouse (pp. 51, TSN ibid). He went down the guardhouse where Miranda was and fired at the latter (pp. 52-53, TSN, ibid). As a result, Miranda was fatally hit and died (p. 60, TSN, ibid). Japlo who was very near Miranda ran away towards the grassy portion (p. 62, TSN, ibid). A policeman was called and arrived at the scene of the shooting. Policeman Aviante of Alfonso, Cavite took the gun from the accused while the victim was brought to his house. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 2-3). Pat. Silvino Aviante, of Alfonso, Cavite testified on what transpired between him and the accused when he arrived at the scene of the shooting incident. Following is the narration of what was told him by the accused: Q What did you find out? A Sinabi sa akin ni TETONG AUSTRIA na nabaril niya si BERTO. Q Who is that BERTO you are referring to? A Si ROBERTO MIRANDA po yong namatay. Q And after you were informed that he shot ROBERTO MIRANDA, what did you do? A Kinuha ko ho ang baril niya at ibinigay naman niya sa akin." (pp. 107-108, TSN, March 2, 1982). Desiderio Moraleda, physician, Chief of the Medico-Legal Department, PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, examined the cadaver of the victim. His examination reveals that the victim Roberto Miranda sustained several gunshot wounds on the right side of the neck, and also lacerations on the right side of the lungs and also on the shoulders (pp. 33-34, TSN, December 9, 1981).:-cralaw The accused denied having shot the deceased. His defense and theory was that the shotgun accidentally fired while he and the victim were grappling for the possession therefor. Following in brief is his version: As OIC of the Sentinel Security Agency assigned at the Poultry and Dairy Farm of San Miguel Corporation, he was at the guardhouse of the Poultry and Dairy Farm of San Miguel Corporation when the deceased, as driver of the said farm, arrived in a company wagon. His co-guard, Nemesio Matalog, opened the gate for the deceased who entered the company's premises and stopped at the guardhouse where he alighted and went near the accused who was then situated at the guardhouse. Approaching the accused, Roberto Miranda (now deceased) shouted to him saying: "Supladong OIC, bagay sa iyo patayin," after which the deceased suddenly grabbed the service shotgun of the accused, and they grappled for the possession of the firearm for 20 seconds with the deceased holding the muzzle of the gun and the handle, after which the gun went off. When the gun went off, the deceased fell on the ground, more or less ten meters away from the guardhouse. Upon request of the accused to his supervisor, Mr. Tonja, Police Officers Macario Mojica and Pat. Silvino Aviante came about ten o'clock in the evening, and he voluntarily surrendered himself and his service firearm to Pat. Silvino Aviante. Accused claims that he was not investigated at the Alfonso Police Headquarters but instead was brought to the 212 PC Company at Tagaytay City where he was detained and investigated. He presented in evidence a Guard Report prepared by Nemesio Matalog in his own handwriting stating that he saw the deceased and the accused grappling

for the firearm. He saw the deceased trying to grapple for the possession of the gun from the accused and, after a while, the gun fired and he saw the deceased fell (Exhs. 1-B, 1-C). In addition, the accused presented in evidence a portion of a written statement of Matalog given at about 10:00 o'clock of June 28, 1980 before Investigator Dante Moral wherein he stated, among others, that he was with the accused at the gate of San Miguel Poultry Farm when Roberto Miranda arrived and after opening the gate for him and alighting from the pick-up that he was driving, the accused uttered some words directed to the deceased, after which they wrestled with each other. He told them to stop and tried to pacify them when he heard a gunshot, after which he saw the deceased lying face down. Finally, the accused likewise presented Tito Cedeo, Operation Officer at Sentinel Watchman and Security Agency who claimed to have received the Guard Report from the security guard Nemesio Matalog and brought it to the Manila Office so that their investigator can investigate it. (Exhibit 1). The other witness for the accused, Mr. Benbenoto Emelo, testified that sometime on February 1, 1982, Mr. Matalog called him and requested him to pass the message to the accused that the latter should not be angry with him for having testified against him because there was some persons whom he cannot refuse. 2 He was held guilty, however, of only homicide: Originally charged with the crime of murder before the Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District for the slaying of Roberto Miranda, the accused Cristito Austria was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and, applying in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, he was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the amount of P10,000.00, by way of moral damages, P8,475.00 as actual damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. 3 The case was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite in the defunct Circuit Criminal Court (CCC) 4 sitting in Pasig, presided over by the late Luis Pea, and docketed as CCC-VII-3207. Following, however, Judge Pea's disability (and later, death), and the reorganization of the courts on August 14, 1981, 5 creating the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and abolishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, 6 the same was referred to Pasig, 7 presided over by Hon. Eutropio Migrio, and subsequently, upon the appointment of Judge Caguioa, to her sala. The petitioner now assails the jurisdiction of the Caguioa court to try the case and to render judgment thereon. He insists that upon the abolition of the Circuit Criminal Courts, jurisdiction should have been assumed by the Regional Trial Court, sitting in Cavite (Trece Martires City, Tagaytay City, or Cavite City), admittedly, the venue where the crime was committed.chanrobles virtual law library On March 15, 1989, the Court gave due course to the petition. The Court assumes that Judge Pea, as Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court, of the seventh judicial district, in Rizal, took cognizance of CCC-VII-3207 upon the authority granted by this Court, per its Resolution of May 16, 1972, empowering that court to try "cases that may be filed [therein] from the province of Cavite and its three cities, at Pasig, Rizal." 8 The question, however, is whether or not it should have been referred to the Cavite RTC upon the phasing out of CCCs, and whether or not the Pasig RTC had jurisdiction to try and entertain the same. The transfer of cases from the abolished courts to the proper tribunals is governed by the following provision: SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President/Prime Minister. The Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President/Prime Minister. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel.

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The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. 9 The Court agrees that after the CCCs ceased to function, the case should have been coursed to the Cavite RTC, the (alleged) crime having been committed in Alfonso, Cavite. 10 The Court finds, however, circumstances that argue against the setting aside of the Pasig RTC proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. In People v. Lakandula, 11 this Court sustained the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, although the offense involved took place in Kalookan City, over which the Pasig CCC exercised no jurisdiction. The Court, speaking through Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., held: . . . But, since this case had been transferred, We can only assume, as the Solicitor General stated, that, in the absence of any other showing in the records, the transfer of the case to the Circuit Criminal Court was effected in accordance with the long standing practice followed by judges of moving cases from one branch to another branch of the same court, if they are agreed that such a step would best promote the ends of justice, as in this case, which had been pending for a long time in the Court of First Instance without being heard although the accused was detained. 12 There can be no debate that this case has been pending for the last nine years. The Court cannot indeed imagine the unsettling consequences, should the same be tried anew, in terms of the expeditious administration, especially, of criminal justice. The Court finds that the ends of speedy trial will be subserved better if the proceedings before Judge Caguioa were left alone.:-cralaw Moreover, the records show that the petitioner had pursued vigorously the case before the lower court, on the supposition that it had jurisdiction, and had asked it to render a judgment of acquittal, as he in fact requests this Court to set aside its decision (as well as the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals). It is a behavior that forces him to accept the jurisdiction of the Pasig court; because if the latter lacked jurisdiction, it cannot act, much less render a decision, whether of a conviction or acquittal. Surely, he cannot rightfully maintain an attack on the trial court's competence after having accepted and invoked it. 13 Estoppel is an impediment against any attack. The petitioner's next assigned errors pertain to facts, thus: III THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE USING ITS OWN DEDUCTION AND INFERENCES WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER SUPPORTS THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT THE VICTIM WHEN FIRED ON WAS ABOUT TEN METERS AWAY FROM THE ACCUSED WHO WAS AT THE GUARD HOUSE, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND TESTIMONY OF THE MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER (Pages 5, 11, 12, Decision of Hon. Court of Appeals). IV THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATIONS THAT THE WOUND WOULD BE LEVELLED AS CONTACT FIRE AND NOT AS A NEAR CONTACT FIRE IF THE APPELLANT WAS INDEED GRAPPLING WITH THE VICTIM FOR POSSESSION OF THE SHOTGUN. (Pages 5, 11, Decision of Hon. Court of Appeals) V THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS SEATED AT THE GUARD HOUSE WITH A COCKED RIFLE (Page 13 Decision Ibid) IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE FIREARM IS IN A STATE OF SAFETY THOUGH LOADED AND UNLOCKED AND WENT OFF IN THE COURSE OF THE GRAPPLING FOR THE POSSESSION BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND VICTIM. VI THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DEDUCTION THAT ACCUSED AS A MAN OF AUTHORITY, A FORMER ARMY CORPORAL, PROVINCIAL WARDEN, FORMER BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND

OIC OF SENTINEL SECURITY AGENCY, USED TO HAVING HIS ORDERS OBEYED, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DECEASED IN DENYING HIS REQUEST TO SLOW DOWN IN DRIVING, MUST HAVE CUT DEEP TO HIS EGO, THUS DELIBERATELY WAITED FOR THE DECEASED TO HAVE CONFRONTATION IN VIEW OF THE EARLIER INCIDENT, IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE VICTIM GOT MAD TO (sic) ACCUSED BECAUSE HE (VICTIM) FAILED TO ATTEND TO HIS MEETING IN MANILA AND WAS REEKING IN LIQUOR AT THE TIME HE SHOUTED "SUPLADONG OIC, DAPAT SA IYO PATAYIN" AND AFTER WHICH THE VICTIM SUDDENLY GRABBED THE SHOTGUN OF THE ACCUSED.:- nad VII THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VOID DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 165, AND EVEN INCREASED THE INDEMNITY IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH DOVE-TAILED WITH THE NECROPSY REPORT OF MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER AND WHO WAS ABLE TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WAS PURELY ACCIDENTAL AND BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VICTIM HIMSELF. 14 Well-established is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is confined to legal errors, and as a rule, that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court. 15 The rule is, however, subject to firmly settled exceptions, among them: (a) when the same are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion; (d) its judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;(e) it went beyond the issues of the case and its findings contravene admissions of the parties; (f) its findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (g) the same are conclusions without citation of specific evidence; (h) the facts set forth in the appellant's brief are not disputed by the appellee; and (i) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence or are in fact contradicted by the evidence on record. 16 In finding against the petitioner, the respondent Court of Appeals observed: The defense is correct in pointing out that the finding of the lower court that the accused shot the victim ten meters away is not supported by the evidence. This is a mere conclusion drawn from the fact that the deceased fell and was found ten meters away from the guardhouse. What appeared as improbable to the Court is the version of the accused that he and the deceased were grappling for the possession of the firearm at the guardhouse when the gun accidentally fired. If this were so, why then did the victim fall ten meters away from the guardhouse? As observed by the court, there is no iota of evidence adduced by the defense to show that within the twenty seconds of the alleged grappling for the possession of the firearm, a distance was traversed by the protagonists. This does not, however, mean that the deceased was shot by the accused ten meters away from the guardhouse. It simply lends credence to the evidence of the prosecution that after pacifying the deceased and the accused who was brought to the guardhouse, the accused got hold of the shotgun and went towards the victim and shot him.:- nad This was the declaration of the prosecution witness Ronnie Japlo, the Farm Superintendent, who testified that after pacifying the protagonists, he took the victim somewhere at the gate while accused was brought to the guardhouse. He then saw the accused holding the shotgun going towards him and the victim Roberto Miranda. So he shouted to Miranda, "run," while he ran to a grassy place leaving Miranda behind when he heard the shot from the direction where he left the victim Roberto Miranda. Nemesio Matalog likewise confirmed the testimony of Japlo. He testified that appellant took the shotgun and went to Miranda who was down the guardhouse and fired the shot there (pp.- 5253, Jan. 26, 1982). 17 In short, the petitioner was supposed to have returned to the guardhouse (after engaging the deceased in a fist fight), waited there for the deceased with a shotgun, and upon sighting him, gunned him down. This contradicts the version of the accused, that while he admitted having armed himself with a shotgun, the deceased died as a result of an accidental firing when the latter attempted to wrest the firearm away from him. In discarding the petitioner's story, the respondent Court relied foremost, on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Nemesion Matalog, a co-security guard of the petitioner at the compound, and Ronnie Japlo, the farm superintendent, who both testified that the petitioner did have a shotgun with which he shot the deceased. The Appellate Court was also perplexed why the latter was found lying ten meters away from the guardhouse, where the

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petitioner claimed they grappled for possession of the shotgun, if truly he (the petitioner) shot him while they fought for it. The fact, finally, that the deceased's wound was classified by Dr. Desiderio Moraleda, a medico-legal officer, as one brought about by "near contact fire", rather than "contact fire", convinced the Court of Appeals that the petitioner shot him while a considerable distance separated them, which would not have been possible if the two were indeed grappling for the rifle. This Court is not convinced that on the strength of these pieces of evidence, the petitioner is indeed, guilty, whether of murder, as charged, or of homicide, as found. This Court finds shreds of evidence in the records that the respondent Court did overlook, as the petitioner so insists, that would have indeed exculpated him on account of reasonable doubt. This Court notes that Nemesio Matalog had previously entered in the guard book report, following the incident in question, the following inscription: . . . humigit kumulang ika-pito ng gabi dumating si BERTO MIRANDA ng isinasara ko ang gate, nakita ko na lang na inaagawan ng baril si OIC Cristeto Austria at maya-maya pumutok ang baril at nakita ko bumagsak si Berto" (Italics supplied). 18 The above statement was entered by Matalog himself in compliance with company procedure requiring guards to put down unusual incidents occurring while on duty. Apparently, Matalog inscribed that as a result of what he noted on the night in question. The above written evidence substantiates the petitioner's claim that he and the deceased were fighting for possession of the shotgun, and while this does not per se prove that the shooting was accidental, it casts a shadow of doubt on the prosecution's version that he had deliberately shot the deceased after waiting for him at the guardhouse, and that he had killed him in cold blood. Hence, the fact that the evidence for the defense is itself weak (because the petitioner had not shown that the shooting was accidental) that cannot militate against the petitioner for the simple reason that the prosecution itself has no evidence, to justify a conviction. Verily the prosecution cannot rely on the infirmity of the accused's evidence, but must depend on the strength of its own. 19 The existence of Matalog's guard book report was never denied by the prosecution. Although the latter sought to repudiate it upon Matalog's own recantation a recantation the Court of Appeals accepted this Court finds that it is too late for any retraction without necessarily making a liar out of Matalog. This Court does not buy, so to speak, purely and simply, Matalog's excuse why he testified otherwise in court (other than what he claimed in the guard book report), as follows: Narrating the circumstances surrounding its execution, witness Matalog testified that the guard report was prepared by him at the instance and upon the order of the accused-appellant (p. 48, tsn, September 7, 1984). The said witness was emphatic in saying that accused was the one who dictated the entry in the report which were all lies (pp. 44-45, tsn, March 2, 1982) and because the latter told him that he (accused-appellant) already killed eight (8) persons (pp. 49-50), tsn, March 2, 1982) he became afraid and was left with no choice except to follow him (p. 56, tsn, March 2, 1982). However, he did not submit the said guard report but instead kept it in a cabinet because its contents were not true (pp. 57-58, tsn, September 7, 1984). 20 We can not, as we said, accept this explanation. First it rests on Matalog's barren say-so. Second, we have difficulty believing that the petitioner had to resort to subtle threats ("I have killed eight persons already") to make him record the statement in question because the petitioner could have simply trained his shotgun on him, and succeed with better facility. To say that he, anyway, "became afraid" is to say that the petitioner's threats, idle as they were, were truly so overpowering to make him, Matalog, put in his book report a false entry, one involving the death indeed of a fellow company employee. The Court is plainly incredulous.:-cralaw A recanter's testimony should be accepted with caution and weighed carefully against the presumption of innocence the accused enjoys under the Constitution. 21 As we stated, Matalog's on-the-spot report puts a cloud on the case for the prosecution. As a consequence, we cannot accept the farm superintendent's, Ronnie Japlo's testimony that the petitioner did shoot the deceased deliberately. Arrayed against his testimony is the very report, sustaining the petitioner's story. Between his mere assertions and a forthright written statement, the latter must be made to prevail.

The fact that the deceased's cadaver was found lying ten meters away from the guardhouse cannot point to the petitioner's guilt. Ordinarily, it would have spoken against the defense's claim that the accused and the deceased were tete-a-tete in a tug-of-war over a rifle in the vicinity of the guardhouse. The evidence, however, reveals that the deceased's remains were ten meters away from the guardhouse because the spot was sloping and in all probability, the deceased had rolled over after the shotgun had gone off. The fact that the deceased died on sloping terrain is not disputed by the parties, the prosecution, the trial court, the Court of Appeals, or the Solicitor General. It is also substantiated by Exhibit "M" a photograph submitted to the trial court. The Court of Appeals need not therefor have been puzzled why the deceased lay ten meters from the guardhouse. The Court of Appeals, as we likewise indicated, was of the opinion that because the deceased's gunshot wounds were brought about by a "near contact fire", which implies, in the testimony of the medico-legal officer, a distance of not more than three inches 22 between the wound and the muzzle of the firearm, rather than by "contact fire", which implies, in his opinion, that the muzzle of the firearm had been touching 23 a part of the victim's body, it means that there was no struggle for the possession of the rifle. The Court is not persuaded that just because the deceased's injury was not by "contact fire" no such a struggle could have possibly occurred as claimed. For, what the deceased's wound suggests (caused by "near contact fire") that the deceased and the accused were at any rate close to each other (by not more than three inches), and this does not, in the court's view, foreclose the possibility of a struggle in fact going on between the two protagonists. The fact is that the deceased was shot at close range (though not necessarily by contact fire), a fact that cannot by itself dissipate all claims that a grappling for the rifle had preceded the shooting. Needless to say, the Court of Appeals' recital leaves a reason able doubt on this Court's mind that the petitioner had shot the deceased deliberately, and other than by accident as the latter suggests. It is true that the petitioner's story is as already noted by itself self-serving, that alone cannot overcome the presumption of innocence with which no less than the fundamental law of the land consecrates accused persons. What is significant is that the prosecution has shown no sufficient evidence essential for conviction.:-cralaw The Court finds no necessity in delving further on the fifth, sixth, and seventh errors the petitioner assigns. We are quite convinced that the respondent Court of Appeals' above error is sufficient to justify this reversal. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is ACQUITTED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Endnotes 1. Twelfth Division, Herrera, Oscar J., ponente; Ejercito, Bienvenido and Torres, Jr., Justo, JJ., concurring. 2. Rollo, 72-75. 3. Id., 72. 4. Id., 94. 5. Per Batas Blg. 129. The statute came into effect on January 17, 1983. See People v. Court of First Instance, L-64050, September 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 58; see, however, Enriquez v. Fortuna Maricullum Corporation, No. L-77869, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 151. 6. Supra, sec. 47. 7. Branch 165. Upon the abolition of the Circuit Criminal Court, Judge Pea was assigned to Branch 166. Branch 165 is Branch 166's pairing sala. See rollo, id., 15. 8. In re: Petition for authority to hear cases in Pasig, Rizal, Onofre Q. Villaluz, Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Petitioner, M-19-23 May 16, 1972. See Tolentino v. Villaluz, Nos. L-36906-07, July 27, 1987, 152 SCRA 299. (Judge Pea succeeded Judge Villaluz.) See also People v. Maranan, Nos. L-47228-32, L-46587, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 243, in which the Court held that

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"the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the then 7th Judicial District (with station at Pasig, Rizal) has jurisdiction to decide cases involving offenses that took place in Cavite." (At 249). 9. Batas Blg. 129, sec. 44. 10. RULES OF COURT, Rollo, 110, sec. 15, par. (a). 11. No. L-31103, July 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 415. 12. Supra, 422. 13. See Lee v. Municipal Trial Court, No. L-68789, November 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 408. 14. Rollo, id., 13-14. 15. Guico v. Mayuga, 63 Phil. 328 (1936). 16. Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31471, November 12, 1987, 155 SCRA 547. 17. Rollo, id., 78. 18. Id., 20, exhibit "1"; emphasis supplied. 19. People v. Saavedra, No. L-48738, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 610. 20. Rollo, id., 79. 21. See Moniza, Jr. v. People, No. L-72719, September 18, 1986, 144 SCRA 182. 22. Rollo, id., 58. 23. Id.

petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon. Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for murder[2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact. Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, [3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4] After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the case. On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. [7] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,[9] theSandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (pa ragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 [13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997. Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996. On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads: After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999] PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents. ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors. DECISION MARTINEZ, J.: The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows: In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between theKuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1] However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein

Page 8 of 25

xxx

xxx

xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases. To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied] Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that: a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate th e exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975) b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural due process c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-onesubject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. [17] For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18]They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court. Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petitionin-intervention be dismissed. This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides: SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provision in Article XI, Section 4: Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 [21] created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22]Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, [23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, theSandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) (d) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

Page 9 of 25

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. xxx xxx x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states: SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied) The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides: SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) (d) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided inBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

(e)

(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

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(3)

Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not ot herwise covered by the preceding enumeration. xxx xxx xxx In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them. xxx x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is notparagraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in theSandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34] It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) (2) (3) (4) it must rest on substantial distinction; it must be germane to the purpose of the law; must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]

all of which are present in this case. The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, [37] it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. [39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted,

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads: SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the word accused appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, [29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249. A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), [30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

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deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines. On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40] Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975. Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one (a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed, (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. [43] (e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.[44] This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. [45]

In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome.[56] Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it defines the Sandiganbayanjurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title[57] is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. [58] Such rule is severally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60] There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, [61] and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62] As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.[66] As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates: SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied) As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards theSandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times[50] considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]

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nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[68] The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69] The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied) It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[70] Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders. In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads: AMENDED INFORMATION The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows: That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G.

LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. CONTRARY TO LAW While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an es sential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of accuseds official duties. In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled: the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court the not the not the and

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial. In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information alleged Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.

Page 13 of 25

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial. In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan. WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] [2] [3] [35]

Rollo, p. 43. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, Annex B, Petition; Rollo, pp. 32-34, 44. Their motion states that they have been deprived of their right to file their respective motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans final resolution. [4] Annex C, Petition Sandiganbayan Order dated November 27, 1995, Rollo, pp. 37-38. [5] Annex D, Petition, Rollo, pp. 39-41. [6] Inspector Alvarez. [7] Entitled An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. [8] Annex E, Petition, Rollo, p. 42. [9] Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated March 26, 1996. [10] Annex F, Petition; Rollo, pp. 113-123. [11] Annex F-1, Petition; Rollo, pp. 124-134. [12] Annex G, Petition; Rollo, pp. 135-145. [13] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, pp. 28, [14] Rollo, pp. 162-171. [15] March 5, 1997. [16] Rollo, pp. 214, 216-219. [17] Petition, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 10-11. [18] Petition-In-Intervention, p. 9; Rollo, p. 236. [19] Dated December 15, 1998.

[45]

Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in Padilla v. Court of Appeals and People, 269 SCRA 402, citing Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30. [21] Took effect on June 11, 1978; See Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 229 [1994]. [22] Took effect on December 10, 1978; Republic v. Asuncion, Ibid. [23] Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. (See also Natividad vs. Felix, 229 SCRA 685-686 [ 1994]. ) [24] Took effect on January 14, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, Ibid. [25] Took effect on March 23, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, Ibid. [26] Approved on March 30, 1995 and took effect on May 16, 1995; People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 224 [1995]; Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 757 [1997]. [27] Approved on February 5, 1995. [28] This is the rank stated in paragraph c (second par.), Section 2 of R.A. 7975, while in paragraph a (1) (e) of said Section 2, the rank is chief superintendent or higher. [29] Section 4, P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and 8249. [30] Items (a), (b), and (c) are taken from paragraph a, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. [31] Paragraph c, Section 4, R.A. 8249. [32] The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint charges him either as a coprincipal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. [33] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law nor shal l any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution). [34] Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703; Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988). [36] Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164. [37] See Fabian v. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998. [38] Senator Raul Roco and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia. [39] Petition, p. 17. [40] Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. [41] No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted (Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution). [42] Penned by Chief Justice Chase (3 Dall. 386, 390.); Black, Constitutional law, 595, cited in Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 ed. P. 247. [43] Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1903) and U.S. v. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 770, cited in Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, Part II, 1991 ed., p. 513. [44] This kind of ex post facto law appeared in Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5 (Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 520) cited in People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241. En Banc cases of In Re Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970); Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457; Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686; People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241. [46] Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341; Juarez v. CA, 214 SCRA 475; Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344; See also Katigbak v. Solicitor General, 180 SCRA 540 citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 6 SCRA 1059; Republic v. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579, and dela Cruz v. Better Living, Inc., 78 SCRA 274. [47] Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937). [48] Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102; [49] Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 346. [50] Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63; Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433; De Guzman v. People, December 15, 1982. [51] Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, supra. [52] People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186. [53] Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680. [54] Oas v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 261.

[20]

Page 14 of 25

[55] [56]

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 cited in Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, supra. Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63. [57] Section 26 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution reads Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. [58] Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208. [59] Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291. [60] Sec. 2, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution provides: The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprived the Supreme Court of it jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. [61] People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 222 [1995], citing Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211 [1994]. [62] People vs. Magallanes, Ibid., citing U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366 [1913]; People vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 [1935]; People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218 [1978]. [63] Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, pp. 232-233 People vs. Magallanes, supra. p. 220 [64] 108 Phil. 613 [1960]. [65] See also Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 233 [1994] and People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 221 [1995]. [66] See Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, and People vs. Magallanes, supra. [67] People vs. Cosare 95 Phil 657, 660 [1954] [68] People vs. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 743. [69] 3 Phil. 223, 226 [1904] See also Matilde v. Jobson, 68 SCRA 456. [December 29, 1975]; People v. Labado, 98 SCRA 730, 747 [July 24, 1980] cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. 1 1987 Edition, p. 386. [70] Francisco The Revised Rules of Court Criminal Procedure, p. 77, cited in Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 115 SCRA 739 [1982]. [71] The eleven (11) amended informations were couched in uniformly except for the names of the victims. [72] 249 SCRA 212, 222-223 [1995]
[73]

Inc., a private corporation, of which the said Mariano F. Ocampo IV is an incorporator and stockholder, under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the government the same being interest-free, without collateral, and without, a definite date of repayment. On 28 June 1991, Mariano F. Ocampo IV filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reinvestigation which was granted by the said court on 8 August 1991. After conducting the reinvestigation of the cases, Special Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano, Sr. and Rodolfo F. Reynoso of the Office of the Special Prosecutor found that Mariano F Ocampo IV did not connive with his father, Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III in the two loan transactions in question between LTFI and IMCOR since "it was the responsible officers of IMCOR who were more directly involved in the questioned loan transactions, namely, Federico Reyes, Jr. and Honorio C. Bulos, Jr. the latter having been at one time the Chairman of the Board of said corporation" and that there is a very strong probability that herein petitioner (Ocampo IV) was "merely being used by his father, Gov. Ocampo to complete the organization set-up of IMCOR for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission." The special prosecutors recommended that the informations filed in Crim. Case Nos. 16801 and 16804 against Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III and his son Mariano F. Ocampo IV be dismissed and that the corresponding motions to withdraw them be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 1 But the Ombudsman, in a memorandum to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, dated 27 November 1991, disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutors. 2 As a result, Mariano Ocampo IV filed the present petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the said memorandum on the ground that the same was rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to luck of jurisdiction. Required to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General submitted a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that since "it will be just matter of determining whether the mere fact that the petitioner was an incorporator and stockholder of the firms with which his father transacted as Governor of Tarlac taints the act of the father, the stockholder son in person need not be impleaded" and "should not be made to suffer the pain of going through trial as it is already ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to his guilt." 3 The respondent Ombudsman, upon the other hand, maintains that his disapproval of the recommendation of the prosecuting officers cannot be branded as an abuse of discretion, but an excercise of a prerogative expressly conferred upon him by law since he found sufficient evidence to indict the petitioner and his father. Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or, a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: (1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub-judice; (4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

Section 20 B.P. Blg. 129 provides "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter." See also People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 223 [1995]

G.R. Nos. 103446-47 August 30, 1993 MARIANO F. OCAMPO, IV, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. Carmencita Caingat, Jose S. Dizon & Dennis E. Chua for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. RESOLUTION PADILLA, J.: Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III and his son, herein petitioner Mariano F. Ocampo IV, were charged with violation of Sec. 3 (h) of Republic Act. No. 3019, as amended, in two (2) separate informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed therein as Criminal Case Nos. 16801 and 16804, in that on 1 September 1988 and 30 August 1988, the said Mariano Un Ocampo III, being then the governor of the province of Tarlac and at the same time President-Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI), in connivance with his son, Mariano F. Ocampo IV, loaned the amounts of P5,476,031.00 and P7,000,000.00 out of the National Aid for Local Government Funds (NALGF) of the province of Tarlac to the IMCOR, now the New Territory Manufacturing,

Page 15 of 25

(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; (11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. 4 Consistent with the foregoing is the rule that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation of the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form. 5 Deliberating upon the issues raised in the present petition for certiorari, the arguments in support thereof, as well as the comments of the respondents thereon and the reply thereto, we find that the petition fails to show a grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction or the part of to be respondent Ombudsman. The said respondent's act of disapproving the recommendation of the special prosecutors to dismiss the informations filed in Crim. Case Nos. 16801 and 16804 against Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III and his son, Mariano F. Ocampo IV, is not whimsical nor capricious. Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or arbitrariness. He disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutors because he sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict both accused. This is an exercise of the Ombudsman's powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court, or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 6 It should however be reiterated that, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed without the approval of the said court. 7 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 27 2 Ibid., p. 24 3 Rollo, p. 137 4 Brocka vs. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 183. 5 Tabujara vs. Office of the Special Prosecutor, G.R. No. 87912, January 18, 1990. 6 Sesbreno vs. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 92789, March 21, 1991. 7 Dungog vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 77850-51, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 145.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 116294. August 21, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO TONY, accused-appellant. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: CHAVEZ y ESTAMANTE alias

This is an appeal from the February 24, 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 32,[1] in Criminal Case No. 10499 finding herein appellant Antonio Chavez y Estamante alias Tony guilty of the crime of murder committed against the person of one Bernabe Jaos and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, interment expenses of P10,000.00, moral damages of P16,000.00 and the costs of suit. The information[2] for murder was filed against appellant on November 26, 1992. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.[3] As the accused was then on probation for the crime of robbery, [4] his probation was revoked by the trial court.[5] The prosecution, through its principal witness Agripina Ablejina, sought to establish the following facts: The victim, Bernabe Jaos, 23 years old,[6] lived with his common-law wife, Agripina Ablejina, in Sitio Tampaga, Barrio Mantiquel, Siaton, Negros Oriental. Their nearest neighbor was Efraim Navarez whose wife was the sister of Jaos. The house of Jaos was about two (2) meters away from that of Navarez so that from there, one could look down on the front door of Navarez who sold goods to his neighbors. At around 8:00 oclock in the evening of October 18, 1992, Agripina was standing by the window of her home, where she could observe the Navarez household. Her husband Jaos was buying cigarettes at the house cum store of Navarez. Agripina saw that Efraim Navarez was with his wife and younger brother. Navarez and Jaos were smoking and conversing with each other when appellant, first cousin of Navarez, arrived and stabbed Jaos with a knife. Jaos was stabbed above his umbilical cord, causing his blood to spurt and his intestines to come out. The victim was then squatting near the door inside the house of Navarez. Chavez pushed Jaos, who fell to the ground. Chavez then ran to the house of his mother. Agripina went to Jaos and removed the knife which was left sticking out of his body. She delivered the knife to the PNP station in Mantiquel. When she was investigated at the police station, Agripina could not finish her statement[7] because her child was crying. She then requested Navarez to finish her statement.[8] His body was brought to the Siaton morgue.[9] Dr. Mitylene B. Tan, municipal health officer, was also presented as a witness. Dr. Tan testified that she conducted a postmortem examination on the body of Jaos at the morgue of the Siaton District Hospital at 8:00 p.m. of October 19, 1992. She found the body rigid and had been dead for approximately fifteen (15) hours. Her examination revealed that the victim had sustained a perforating 2 1/2 inches long stab wound with intestinal herniation at the mid-upper abdominal region.[10] PO3 Marcial Dingal in his testimony stated that he reflected the stabbing incident on the police blotter[11] in the afternoon of October 19, 1992. He identified the weapon used, a 10-inch long bolo,[12] which was surrendered by CAA[13] Atanacio Caminade who was also a member of the CAFGU.[14]

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The defense interposed denial. Appellant testified on his behalf, and his version of the events that transpired on October 18, 1992 is as follows: At around 6:30 in the evening of October 18, 1992, he went to Navarezs place to buy bread. With Navarez then were Melvin and Henry Jaos, a first cousin of the victim. Navarez invited appellant to take a meal. While appellant was eating, Jaos arrived and, addressing Navarez said, Its good that you are here, let us finish each other. Having heard Jaos utterance, Navarez pulled out a weapon and stabbed Jaos stomach. As Jaos fell downstairs, appellant stood up and at this juncture, Navarez faced him and stabbed him in the right arm. Appellant leaned on the wall, parried the blows and kicked Navarez, hitting his chest. Then appellant jumped downstairs and ran to the house of his elder brother, Sebastian Chavez, Jr., who was at home with their sister, mother and appellants wife. Appellant told his brother, Nong, please help me because Bernabe was killed. However, appellant did not report the incident to the police because it is very far. That same evening, PNP members came for appellant. They told him that he was responsible for the death of Jaos. Appellant informed the police that it was Navarez who killed Jaos but the police replied, Just go with us and relay the incident to our higher up.[15] Appellants story was corroborated by Melvin Quimada. Quimada, who was from Sitio Saksak, Malabuhan, claimed that he had gone to Mantiquel to help out in the harvest of crops and was staying with his uncle, Agapito Quimada. In the evening of October 18, 1992, Melvin was in the house of Navarez when he heard Jaos shout at Navarez, You have eluded before and ran away but now I will kill you. Jaos made one step and shouted, I will kill you. Navarez got a knife, went to the front door and stabbed Jaos. As Jaos fell to the ground, appellant and Melvin both tried to jump from the house. However, appellant was stabbed by Navarez so that Melvin stepped back to hide behind the door. When he noticed that he had a way out, Melvin jumped out of the door and ran to the house of his uncle. He learned the following day that Jaos was dead. Melvin did not report the incident to the police because he knew that they would not believe him.[16] Appellants brother, Sebastian Chavez, Jr., testified that he let appellant into his house and applied herbal medicine to his right arm. Later, CAFGU members fetched appellant because Navarez had reported that appellant was responsible for the stabbing of Jaos. Sebastian protested that his brother was even wounded during the incident but the CAFGUs did not listen to him. Instead, they took appellant to the CAFGU headquarters. Sebastian, who accompanied his brother, saw Navarez at the headquarters,[17] sitting with Agapito Quimada. Agapito investigated Navarez and then, after the investigation, informed everyone that since appellant had run away from the crime scene, the matter should be investigated by the police. Sebastian reiterated that it was Navarez who stabbed the victim but Agapito repeated the standing order that both appellant and Navarez should be brought to the police station. He did not accompany appellant to the police station because he had fever then. [18] On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Agapito Quimada, father-in-law of Sebastian Chavez, Jr., Agapito testified that it was Antonio Merlo and Navarez who had requested for appellants arrest at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, as they had presented to him the letter[19] of Serafin Sibol, a barangay councilman, requesting such arrest. Agapito arrested appellant at the house of his brother and later conducted an investigation at the crime scene. He saw the body of the deceased near the house of Navarez which was around one (1) meter away from the house of the victim. Agapito even made a sketch of the two houses.[20] Agapito likewise denied that his nephew, Melvin Quimada, went to his place in Mantiquel. When Agapito went to the crime scene, the victims wife and Serafin Sibol were around. A double-bladed knife, the weapon used in the crime, was surrendered to him by Agripina but it was Tating (Atanacio Caminade) who gave it up to the police. According to Agapito, the bolo marked as Exhibit E was not the murder weapon.

On his own volition, Agapito drew the sketch[21] of the crime scene showing the victim lying between the houses of Jaos and Navarez. At the house of Sebastian Chavez, Jr., Agapito asked appellant why he stabbed Jaos. Appellant answered that he was ganged up. It was in the house of Sebastian that he arrested appellant. On the trial courts initiative, Agripina was recalled to the witness stand. The court verified from her as to whom she surrendered the knife she had pulled out of the victims body. Agripina told the court that she gave the knife to Agapito Quimada and that the bolo labelled as Exhibit E was not the murder weapon.[22] Atanacio Caminade, a member of the CAFGU, surrendered the weapon to the police. Another CAFGU member, Antonio Fabillar, had given it to him. The weapon that he surrendered was not a bolo but a hunting knife. Upon learning that a bolo was brought to the court and identified as the murder weapon, he confronted policeman Marcial Dingal. According to Caminade, the weapon wrongly brought to the court by Dingal was the bolo used in the killing of a certain Sayson in Mantiquel. Caminade saw how the killer in that case himself surrendered the bolo but it was he (Caminade) who surrendered the hunting knife used in killing Jaos. [23] Once again recalled to the witness stand, Agripina testified that she pulled the knife out of Jaos body in the presence of the barangay councilman, Serafin Sibol and Elsa Quitay. She gave the knife to Agapito Quimada, a CAFGU, who was then in the company of Nelson Apostol, Benedicto Trumata and Antonio Sombilon.[24] As a surrebuttal witness, Sebastian Chavez, Jr. claimed that while it was true that he and his father-in-law, Agapito Quimada, used to be in good terms with each other, their relationship turned sour when Agapito sided with his son, Toribio, with whom Sebastian had an altercation when Toribios horse nibbled Sebastian s rice and corn plants. When he himself returned to the witness stand, Melvin Quimada insisted that he was in Mantiquel in the month of October, 1992, harvesting rice. He had gone there to harvest several times already. When he returned to Cama after the incident which resulted in the death of Jaos, Agapito went to his house. Agapito murmured to him, asking why he (Melvin) had become a witness in this case. Melvin answered that he only wanted to tell the truth.[25] Not satisfied with the trial courts decision, appellant appealed to this Court assigning the following errors: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE. II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ANTONIO CHAVEZ Y ESTAMANTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[26] Considering that the parties presented contradictory facts, the issue in this appeal boils down to credibility. As this Court has time and again said, the trial courts evaluation on the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect by appellate courts. The trial court is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportm ent on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies.[27] Its findings on the issue of credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and respect on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered might affect the result of the case.[28] After a careful scrutiny of the records and evidence of the case, we find no persuasive reason to depart from this well entrenched rule on credibility as to warrant a reversal of the decision of the trial court. Nevertheless, the issues raised by the appellant should be faced squarely. Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court accorded great weight to the testimony of the common-law wife of the victim. Appellant posits that she could hardly be considered as an eyewitness as she was in her house at the

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time of the killing, while there were other persons at the scene of the crime, who were not even presented as witnesses.[29] This is argument has no basis in fact and in law. In the first place, it is the prosecution which determines who among the witnesses to a crime should testify in court. The prosecutor handling the case is given a wide discretion on this matter. It is definitely not for the courts, much more the defense, to dictate what evidence to present or who should take the witness stand at the trial of a case. [30] Secondly, the trial court did not err in finding that Agripina was a credible witness whose testimony should be deemed as nothing but the truth. The appellant himself admitted that there was no reason why she should testify against him.[31] Well-settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that such witness was not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[32] Thirdly, simply because Agripina was a common-law wife of the victim, it does not necessarily follow that her testimony is biased, incredible or self-serving. This Court has held that there is no legal provision that disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying, being otherwise competent, regarding the facts and circumstances of the crime. Mere relationship of witnesses to the victim of a crime, whether by consanguinity or affinity, does not necessarily impair their credibility as witnesses. This is specially so when the witnesses were present at the scene of the crime.[33] Lastly, the defense further attacks Agripinas credibility on the ground that her affidavit before the police, does not even mention the stabbing incident itself.[34] This omission was, however, explained by Agripina when she testified that she could not finish her statement because she had to attend to her crying child.[35] Affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.[36] Appellant points out that Agripinas testimony is not credible because her claim that her house was elevated and therefore higher than that of Navarez, was contradicted by prosecution witness Agapito Quimada. However, both the testimony of Agripina and Agapitos sketch show that the window of the victims house faced the front door of the Navarez residence. In other words, Agripina had an unobstructed view of the incident. This is the material aspect of the prosecutions case which the defense failed to disprove satisfactorily. Another matter which appellant stresses as indicative of Agripinas incredulous testimony is the fact that while she claimed that the murder weapon was a knife, the police presented a bolo. The mistake on the part of witness Dingal in presenting the wrong murder weapon was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. That it was not Dingal himself who rectified the error on the stand[37] is of no moment. It would not be amiss to point out that the production of the murder weapon is not even essential for a conviction. This, the Court emphasized in People v. Bello,[38]when it said: For the purposes of conviction, it is enough that the prosecution establishes by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the author thereof. The production of the weapon used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of such burden, for the same may not have been recovered at all from the assailant (People v. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992]). Appellant attempts to support his denial of guilt by asserting that he informed the police that it was Navarez who killed Jaos but the police appeared to have been bent on pinning him down as the culprit. [39] This bare assertion, unsupported as it is by other evidence, is simply self-serving and deserves scant consideration. Moreover, appellants claim that Navarez had a motive for harming Jaos because the latter allegedly disallowed (Navarez) to use the carabao in plowing the fields[40] cannot be appreciated in the absence of independent proof thereon duly presented at the trial. Furthermore, the positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime may not be overturned by his denial. It is well-settled that between the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused-appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are, therefore, entitled to greater evidentiary weight. [41] Appellants last-ditch effort towards exoneration is his allegation that the trial court was biased against him because it was the same court which convicted him of robbery in Criminal Case No. 9958 and, hence,

there existed in the mind of the court that the accused-appellant who is under probation would be prone to commit the act imputed against him.[42] The Court finds this assertion misplaced. If indeed there was reason for the appellant to doubt the courts impartiality, his counsel could have sought the inhibition of the presiding judge from hearing the case. The trial court correctly qualified the killing to the crime of murder as treachery was duly established by the prosecution. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness is significant on this matter: Q A Q A Q A Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. xxx And when Tony Chavez arrived at the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez, what happened next? He then stabbed Bernabe Jaos. Have you seen the act of stabbing? Yes, I really saw it. And when you saw the act of stabbing, what weapon was used by Tony Chavez in stabbing Bernabe Jaos? A knife. xxx Now, when Tony Chavez stabbed your common-law husband, was your common-law husband hit? Yes, he was hit. Where was your common-law husband hit? He was hit above the umbilical cord. And when your husband was hit above the umbilical cord, did you see blood spurting? Yes. What else have you seen aside from blood spurting? His intestine. And since you saw the act of stabbing, did you not warn your husband that there was an impending assault on his person? No, because the stabbing of Tony Chavez was so sudden. When your husband was hit, blood spurting, the intestine came out, what happened to your husband? He died right away. When Tony Chavez stabbed your husband, what was the position of your husband, was he sitting or he was standing. He was sitting. On what was he sitting? He was squatting. Was he talking with a friend Ephraim (sic) Navarez at that time? Yes, they were talking. Was Ephraim (sic) Navarez also squatting? Yes, he was also squatting. And when Tony Chavez delivered that stabbing blow on your common-law husband, where particularly in the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez was your husband situated? Near the door. When you said near the door, was he inside the store or outside the the store of Navarez? He was inside the store. When your husband was sitting and he was on a squatting position, what happened to your husband, did he remain squatting of did he attempt to rise? He fell down because he was pushed by Tony Chavez. Will you clarify that, he fell to the ground of he fell to the floor? He fell to the ground. You mean to say the store at the house of Ephraim (sic) Navarez is elevated from the ground? Yes, about two (2) feet. You have seen also how Tony Chavez pushed your common-law husband? Yes. And when your husband fell to the ground, what happened? He was lying on the ground.

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Q. A. Q. A.

xxx After Tony Chavez pushed your husband and your husband fell to the ground, what did Tony Chavez do next? He ran. Towards where did he ran? Towards their house. xxx.[43]

[18] [19]

Treachery clearly characterized the commission of the crime. In this case, the assault was undoubtedly made not only suddenly but also while the victim was defenseless. The fact that the victim was attacked frontally does not negate the existence of treachery. The situation in this case is similar to that obtaining in People v. Saliling[44] where the victim was conversing with another person when the accused emerged from behind them, stabbed the victim twice and quickly ran away. In holding that there was treachery, the Court brushed aside the appellants contention that by the location of the wounds inflicted upon the victim, the attack was frontal and, therefore, not treacherous. It held that even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed.[45] In the absence of proof of other circumstances attending the commission of the crime, whether mitigating or aggravating, the penalty that should be imposed upon the appellant for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the herein decision of the trial court finding Antonio Chavez guilty of murder is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] [2]

Presided by Judge Eleuterio E. Chiu.

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor hereby accuses ANTONIO CHAVEZ y ESTAMANTE, alias Tony, a resident of Sitio Tampaga, Barangay Mantiquel Siaton, Negros Oriental, of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows: That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of October 18, 1992, inside the house of Efraim Navarez at sitio Pampanga, barangay Mantiquel, Siaton, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is a probationer, with intent to kill, and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ATTACK and STAB with a knife, with which he was armed at that time, one BERNABE JAOS, hitting the latter on and causing a mortal wound at the abdomen, which injury caused the instantaneous death of said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the same Bernabe Jaos.
[3] [4]

TSN, June 4, 1993, pp. 2-4. Exhibit F. [20] Exhibit G. [21] Ibid. [22] Id., at 23-24. [23] TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 4-6. [24] Id., at 12-14. [25] TSN, November 22, 1993, pp. 8-10. [26] Appellants Brief, p.1. [27] People v. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663, 671 (1996). [28] People v. Vallador, 257 SCRA 515, 522-523 (1996). [29] See note 26. [30] People v. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535, 546 (1995). [31] TSN, February 5, 1993, p. 17. [32] People v. Garcia, 258 SCRA 411, 419 (1996) citing People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993). [33] People v. Patamama, 250 SCRA 603, 611 (1995), citing People v. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632; People v. Galendez, 210 SCRA 360; De Leon v. People, 210 SCRA 151. [34] See note 26. [35] TSN, January 21, 1993, pp. 21-22. [36] People v. Fulinara, 245 SCRA 733, 743 (1995). [37] See note 26. [38] 237 SCRA 347, 352 (1994). [39] See note 26. [40] TSN, February 5, 1993, p. 16. [41] People v. Padre-e, 249 SCRA 422, 427 (1995). [42] See note 26. [43] TSN, January 21, 1993, pp. 13-17. [44] 249 SCRA 185 (1995). [45] Id., at 188 citing People v. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469 (1996).

G.R. No. L-1701

December 22, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO ESQUIVEL AND AMADO DIZON (Alias AMADO BASCO), defendants-appellants. Alfonso G. Espinosa for appellant P. Esquivel. Herminio E. Algas for appellant A. Dizon. Assistant Solicitor General Inocencio Rosal and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee. TUASON, J.: On July 28, 1946, two jeeps respectively driven by Rosalio Paje and Benigno Valenzuela and owned by Mauro Buing were "hired" by a group of hoodlums on Azcarraga Street, Manila, purportedly to bring rice from San Miguel, Bulacan. When they reached San Miguel, the drivers, over their objection, were directed to proceed to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. In the latter town, their hands were bound and in the latter part of the day they were marched up to a thicket and murdered, after which their bodied were thrown into the river. The next day the jeeps were sold in Cabanatuan, without the route signs and the spare tires which were left in San Isidro, and were recovered by members of the MPC detachment in that town.

Record, p. 24. Criminal Case No. 9958. For the crime of robbery in this case, appellant was imposed the penalty of six (6) months to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day imprisonment. [5] Decision, p. 7. [6] Exhibit A. [7] Record, p. 10. [8] Id., at 9. [9] TSN, January 21, 1993, pp. 11-12. [10] Exhibit A; TSN, January 21, 1993, pp. 3-7. [11] Exhibit D. [12] Exhibits D and E. [13] Citizens Active Auxiliary. [14] TSN, January 28, 1993, pp. 3-7. [15] TSN, February 5, 1993, pp. 3-6. [16] TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 3-8. [17] Id., at 26-28.

Page 19 of 25

Only five of the malefactors were arrested, three of whom-Amado Basco alias Amado Dizon, Ben Pascual aliasBernabe Pascual, and Pablo Esquivel-were brought to trial, and two Gorgonio Rivera and Simplicio Navarro turned state's evidence. These last two were not included in the complaint or information and at the time of trial were still in the hands of the Philippine Constabulary. The rest of the culprits, although named in the complaint filed with the justice of the peace, had not been arrested on the dates the case was tried in the Court of First Instance. The three accused who were put on trial were found guilty of robbery with double homicide and were sentenced jointly and severally to pay the owners of the jeeps P4,000, the heirs of Rosalio Paje P2,000 and the heirs of Benigno Valenzuela equal sum. They were also sentenced to pay the costs and the accessories of the law. From this judgment, Dizon and Esquivel have appealed, Ben Pascual having abided by the judgment. All of them set up alibi as a defense. Following is a brief summary of the testimony of Simplicio Navarro, 17 years old, residing at 1324 Juan Luna, Tondo, Manila: On or about the 24th of July, about one o'clock in the afternoon, he and Mariano Jacutan (from Nueva Ecija), whom he had known before, met on Juan Luna street, and Jacutan asked him if he wanted to come along to Nueva Ecija. Having answered yes, he went to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija on the 27th. In San Isidro he saw Jacutan and was introduced by the latter to Amado Basco, one named Naong Malingit, another small fellow whose name he did not remember, Pablo Esquivel, Ben Pascual, one Turong, one Rading and the latter's father. On the same day (but apparently at another meeting)the plan was made to commit the robbery. Those who were present in that meeting were Mariano Jacutan, Amado Basco, Gorgonio Rivera, Turong, Rading and the witness. It was agreed that the witness, Gorgonio Rivera and Amado Basco would come to Manila to "hire" a jeep to fetch rice from San Miguel. The three of them came to Manila and met, on Juan Luna Street, Lolet and Carding whom they invited to join them. On Sunday morning, July 28, they went to Azcarraga Street with Lolet and Carding and succeeded in "hiring" two jeeps as planned. In going to Nueva Ecija, the witness and Basco rode in one jeep and the rest in the other. In San Miguel, in a gas station, they found Fred who got into the jeep wherein Lolet and Rivera were riding and came along to San Isidro. In San Isidro, in front of Mariano Jacutan's house, their jeeps stopped and the passengers went upstairs to eat, as they had not taken their breakfast yet. The chauffeurs were told to follow them but they said they were going to eat in the jeeps. Nevertheless the drivers were persuaded at last to come, but they stopped at the porch. When the chauffeurs insisted o remaining on the porch, the witness heard someone say that who ever refused would be shot. Upon this, the drivers stepped inside and sat on two chairs. Thereafter Amado Basco, who was carrying a .45 automatic, told Gorgonio Rivera to tie them and Rivera obeyed. Later, Jacutan told Turong that it would be better to take the chauffeurs away from the house and Turong said it was a good idea. Then Turong selected the men who were to remove the drivers, and those men were Fred, Nanong Munti, and one of Captain Baguisa's men whom he did not know. Gorgonio Rivera followed the executioneers just named and the drivers at about two o'clock in the afternoon. Gorgonio Rivera, 22 years old, resident of Carmen, Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija testified in substance that on July 27, 1946, he came to Manila with Amado Basco and Simplicio Navarro. In Manila, they met Carding and Lolet, and Amado Basco talked with them and said they were to "hire" a jeep. They were able to contract two jeeps and came back to San Isidro therein. In one jeep he, Carding and Lolet rode, and Amado Basco and Simplicio Navarro rode in the other. It was Sunday and they arrived in San Isidro at eleven o'clock in the morning, having left Manila at about eight o'clock. In San Isidro they stopped in front of Mariano Jacutan's house and Amado Basco told the drivers to get off and come up the house. Afterward Lolet, Lopez and Turong drove the jeeps and kept them in a bamboo thicket. Amado Basco told him(witness) to look for a piece of rope and tie the drivers. He complied with this order and while tying the drivers Basco was aiming his .45 at them. The tow drivers were later taken to the bank of the river where there were bamboo trees. Those who conducted the drivers were Amado Basco, Fred, Mariano Jacutan and Carding. Before that, coming from a hukbalahap parade, he found Pablo Esquivel saying, "If we leave those two chauffeurs alive they will denounce us," and Amado Basco commented that was true and they should be killed. The two drivers were led to the bank of the river. Basco and Esquivel as well as Ben Pascual each signed and swore to a confession written at the MPC headquarters. Both repudiated these statements alleging they had been forced to sign them through violence. The

charge of maltreatment was not denied although there was a chance for the prosecution to do so. Moreover, there is a stamp of truth in the charge of torture. It will be seen that the evidence against Esquivel, apart from his alleged confession, consist of Simplicio Navarro's testimony that he came to know this defendant in Jacutan's house and Gorgonio Rivera's testimony that Esquivel suggested the liquidation of the two drivers. The prosecution does not claim that Esquivel made the trip to Manila or that he accompanied the men who murdered the drivers. And Rivera's and Navarro's testimony does not pretended to show that Esquivel took part in the devising of the scheme to entice jeeps to Nueva Ecija. From what we can gather from the confused evidence, it does not even say that Esquivel was around at any moment at any moment from the time the jeeps arrived to the time the drivers were removed to a secluded spot. That Esquivel suggested the elimination of the drivers, as Gorgonio Rivera asserted, was contradicted by the other witness, Simplicio Navarro, who said that it was Jacutan from whom the idea came and that it was Turong, not Basco, who seconded it. Esquivel's presence in Jacutan's house when Simplicio Navarro arrived from Manila the first time is the only point on which the two witnesses agree. But that presence alone does not constitute proof that Esquivel was a party to the criminal conspiracy. We do not say that Gorgonio Rivera committed an intentional falsehood. His testimony on the whole impresses us as true. The imputation by Rivera to Esquivel of the above-quoted utterance may have been an honest mistake. We can discern the possibility that Rivera mistook Jacutan or another for Esquivel when the speaker made a proposal to do away with the drivers.lawphil.net Whatever the case, a thorough analysis of the record discloses that Esquivel's conviction rests on a slender and shaky foundation. The case for the prosecution was not presented with the care and thoroughness which the gravity of the offense demanded. The evidence was presented in a slipshod manner. No efforts seems to have been exerted to amplify and cement with positive and unequivocal assurances and details what appeared to be casual and loose references to the accused's supposed intervention in the crime. In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state. Amado Basco's participation in the crime as revealed by Rivera's and Navarro's testimony is such as to be beyond any possibility of misapprehension. The witnesses' credibility is put in issue as a question of black and white. The trial court stated as its firm conviction that this appellant was a co-author of the heinous crime. Our review of the evidence leads us beyond doubt to the same conclusion. Over contradictions on some details, the two principal witnesses are agreed and categorical in the affirmation that Basco shared in the planning of carrying out the robbery; that he was on of the co-conspirators who came to Manila and enticed the victims into Nueva Ecija, riding in one of the jeeps; and that it was he who ordered that the drivers' hands be tied, and he was one of the gang who killed them. The fact that the witnesses refrained from implicating Esquivel in the same manner that they did Basco, with no discoverable interest in shielding the former and putting more blame on the latter than was his, underscores their even temper and restraint from exaggeration. The Solicitor General recommends the maximum penalty. The writer of his opinion agrees with this recommendation, but majority of the Court voted for unqualified affirmation, but majority of the Court voted for unqualified affirmance of the sentence imposed on Basco by the trial court. Hence, the judgment as to Basco will be and it is affirmed, with one-half of the costs of appeal, except that the indemnity for each set of heirs shall be P6000 instead of P2,000. The judgment against Esquivel is reversed with one-half of the costs charged de oficio. Moran, C.J. Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-30146 February 24, 1981 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEPH CASEY alias "Burl" and RICARDO FELIX alias "CARDING TUWAD", defendants-appellants. GUERRERO, J.: Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI -6 Rizal (1 7857), imposing upon Joseph Casey alias "Burl" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" the capital punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. The dispositive portion thereof, states: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Joseph Casey alias "Buri" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad", GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the commission of the crime of Murder, under Article No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in an Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the PENALTY OF DEATH, with accessory penalties as prescribed by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Alfredo Valdez, in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000) PESOS, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs. On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information for Murder against accused-appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death. Contrary to law. 1 On June 24, 1968, upon arraignment, said accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said complaint. Then, sometime in September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as an accused, stating as follows: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a knife, together with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then armed with a firearm, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death. Contrary to law. 2

On October 15, 1968, accused Ricardo Felix entered the plea of not guilty upon being arraigned and trial was accordingly had. Mercedes Palomo, 28, resident of 242 Mahinhin Street, San Juan, Rizal, testified that on March 31, 1968, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, while in the house of her aunt, she heard a shot coming from the pool room located near her aunt's place. She then looked towards the direction of the pool room and saw three men coming out, one of them being pursued by the two others. She recognized the man being pursued as Alfredo Valdez alias "G.I." She, however, did not know the names of the pursuers but described one of them as a short man, with curly black hair and black complexion while the other as having a fair complexion. When asked as to whether she can Identify them, she answered in the affirmative and pointed to Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix. 3 Continuing her testimony, she said that she saw the one with curly hair overtake and stab the victim several times, while in the meantime, Ricardo Felix stood nearby holding a gun which he later fired once at the victim. 4 Jose Rivera, 57 years old, a policeman, was presented by the prosecution to testify on the investigation he conducted before Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio on April 1, 1968 involving the accused Joseph Casey. He submitted in evidence the extrajudicial statement of the said accused, contained in a two page sworn statement wherein said accused narrated having a rendezvous with the accused Ricardo Felix and with another person named Rudy at Cubao Rotonda, Quezon City at about nine o'clock in the morning of March 31, 1968 and thereafter proceeding to Barrio Halo-Halo, San Juan, Rizal at about three o'clock in the afternoon, where the incident happened. 5 Patrolman Honorio Carritero, 46 years old, also a policeman, testified that in the afternoon of March 31, 1968. he was awakened by noise that somebody was stabbed and shot. Upon going out to investigate, he saw the victim lying down near the toilet with stab wounds but still alive, hovering between life and death. He then called for a jeep and brought him to a hospital. 6 Finally, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, 32 years of age, a physician, was presented to testify on the Necropsy Report No. 58425 of Alfredo Valdez, herein quoted as follows: Marked paleness of lips, nailbeds, and integument. Abrasion, 1.5 x 0.7 cm., right scapular region of back, 12.0 cm. from posterior median line. Stab wounds: (1) 1.1 cm. long, spindle shape, located at left hypochondriac region of abdomen, 11.0 cm. from anterior median line, level of 8th intercostal space; long axis is oriented horizontally, medial extremity sharp, lateral extremity contused, edges clean-cut and slightly gaping, with bevelled lower border; attract is directed backward upward medially, entering abdominal cavity and perforating along its track the greater momentum, body of stomach, body of pancreas, and partly severing the abdominal aorta at the level of 12th thoracic vertebra; approximate depth, 10.0 cms. (2) 1.1 cm. long, spindle shape, located at umbilical region of abdomen, 2.3. cm. to the left of anterior median line, 6.0 cm. above the level of navel; long axis oriented horizontally, medial extremity sharp, lateral extremity contused, edges clean- cut and gaping, with bevelled lower border; track is directed backward upward and medially, entering abdominal cavity and perforating along its track the greater momentum, pylorus of stomach and body of pancreas; approximate depth, 10.0 cms. (3) 1.0 cm. long, spindle shape, located at left infra scapular region of the back, 8.5 cm. from posterior median line, level of 9th rib; long axis is oriented slightly downward and laterally, lateral

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extremity sharp, medial extremity contused, edges clean-cut and gaping with bevelled upper border; track is directed downward slightly forward and medially taking a deep intra-muscular route at left posterior lumbar region to a depth of 9.0 cm. (4) 1.2 cm. long, slightly curvilinear in shape, located at right posterior lumbar region, 8.0 cm. from posterior lumbar region, 8.0 cm. from posterior median line, 12.0 cm. above iliac crest convexity of wound is directed upward, medial extremity sharp, lateral extremity contused, edges clean-cut and gaping, with bevelled upper border; track is directed downward slightly forward and laterally, taking a subcutaneous route at right lateral lumbar region to a depth of 6.5 cm. Hemoperitoneum 840 cc. Hematomas, retroperitoneal, severe, bilateral. Heart and its big vessels, almost empty of blood. Brain and other visceral organs, markedly pale. Stomach, filled with dark fluid and clotted blood about 800 cc. 7 Case of Death: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds of abdomen. On the other hand, the evidence for the defense consisted of the testimonies of the two accused. Joseph Casey, when called to testify on his behalf, admitted having stabbed the victim, Alfredo Valdez but alleged that he did so in self-defense. His version of the incident was that on March 31, 1968, he went to the house of Ricardo Felix but was told that he was not in. So he proceeded to the pool room, located around two or three meters away from the residence of Ricardo Felix. At the start, he simply witnessed those playing pool and when they were through, he himself played. While playing, he accidentally bumped the victim with the pool cue (tako). He accordingly asked for apoloy but the victim simply ignored him and left the place immediately. 8 When he was through playing, he went out and saw the victim waiting for him outside, accompanied by six or seven persons holding pieces of wood. As the place had no other exit, he proceeded on his way together with one person named "Rody." While passing by, the victim suddenly drew a "balisong" and lunged it on him. But he was able to parry the thrust. He then took hold of the victim's right hand and grappled with him. In the process, he successfully wrested the knife from him. He then used the weapon against him, hitting him about two or three times. While he was contending with the victim, the latter's companions joined in and hit him with pieces of wood, inflicting "gasgas" or abrasions on his back. 9 The other accused, Ricardo Felix, testified that he did not see Joseph Casey on March 31, 1968. Likewise, he said that he knew the victim, Alfredo Valdez; that he last saw him alive in a store on the same day that he was killed when he was about to leave for Manila; and that he learned that he was dead when he returned home. 10 On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. It found that two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, namely: employing or taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditation, one of which qualified the killing to murder. Hence, this automatic review. The able counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant raised the following assignments of errors in a well-prepared brief: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended information without arraignment, and in finding him guilty after such illegal trial.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in holding that the appellants acted with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and in qualifying the crane committed as aggravated murder. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in holding that the appellants had forged a conspiracy to kill the victim, Alfredo Valdez. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in holding that both appellants were liable for the death of Alfredo Valdez; if any crime had been committed at all, the only person responsible therefore was appellant Casey, and, at that, only for homicide, instead of murder. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in discounting appellant Casey's defense that he acted in legitimate selfdefense. SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in discounting the defense of alibi interposed by appellant Felix. SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The Court a quo erred in not acquitting both appellants.
11

We do not find merit in the first assignment of error. The lack of arraignment under the amended information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be a violation of such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to his rights. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. 12 A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. 13

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We, however, find the second assignment of error of accused- appellants meritorious. The lower court erred in its findings and conclusions, herein quoted below, that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime: In the morning of March 31, 1968, from the evidence on the record, the two (2) accused, Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix, had rendezvous in Cubao, Quezon City, and planned to kill the victim, Alfredo Valdez. (Evident premeditation and conspiracy) There was superior strength that was used because the victim, Alfredo Valdez, was alone, being pursued by the two accused, who were both armed. The two accused did not waste time in planning the killing of the victim on March 31, 1968. They clung to their determination of killing the victim. From 9:00 o'clock in the morning, they had the firm conviction and strong determination of killing the victim up to the time of the execution of their evil motive. (People vs. Caushi, G. R. No. L16495) 14 Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an extrajudicial sworn statement that he met accused-appellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy in Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day. However, there is no showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to plan the killing of the victim. In fact, the following questions and answers in the said sworn statement show that there was no preconceived design to kill the victim: 7. T Sino ang sinasabi mong binaril at sinaksak mo? S Hindi ko po kilala dahil noon ko po lamang nakita ang nasabing tao. 8. T Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari? S Kami po ay nagkita nila Carding Tuwad at isang nagngangalang Rody sa Cubao, Quezon City, ng mga alas 9:00 ng umaga, Marzo 31, 1968, at kami ay nag-inuman. Matapos kaming mag-inuman, ng mga mag-aalas 3:00 ng hapon ng araw ding iyon, nagyaya po si Carding doon sa kanila sa Barrio Halo-Halo, San Juan, Rizal, at sa paglalakad namin doon sa daang Mahinhin, San Juan, Rizal, nakita ni Carding ang isang lalaki, at ang ginawa ay nilapitan niya. Ng makita ng lalaki si Carding, tumakbo po, at ang ginawa ni Carding ay kanyang hinabol. 15 The subsequent portions of the said sworn statement further militate against the existence of evident premeditation. Thus, when accused-appellant Casey was asked why Ricardo Felix shot the victim, he answered: "Noon pong nakasakay na kami sa jeep, tinanong ko siya kung bakit nangyari ang away na yaon at ang sabi ni Carding ay. DATI KO NANG NAKAENKWENTRO YAONG TAO" (Question No. 28). And when asked why he stabbed the victim, he replied: Dahilan kasama ko po si Carding kaya ko po nasaksak ang tao. Hindi ko kusang kagustuhan na saksakin ang tao kung hindi dahil sa nakasama ko si Carding. (Question No. 29) There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender or when he had previously prepared the means which he had considered adequate to carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider and accept the final consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan. 16 It has also been held that to appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. 17 From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep thought. It was just a spontaneous decision reached when the victim started to run away upon being approached by accused-appellant Ricardo Felix. Evident premeditation cannot, thus, be considered in this case. The Solicitor General himself agrees with the defense that

this circumstance has not been duly proved (People's Brief, p. 8). Hence, the crime committed is simple homicide (Article 249, Revised Penal Code). There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case charged with the murder of not one victim but superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that the aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength." 18 In the case of U.S. vs.. Devela, et al.,19 there were two accused who were armed with a bolo and a dagger. But the circumstance of abuse of superiority was not taken into consideration because the mere fact, according to this Court, of there being a superiority of number is not sufficient to bring the case within this provision. There must be proof of the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party; 20 or proof that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. 21 As likewise held in People vs. Trumata and Baligasa, 22 the mere fact that the two accused may have inflicted fatal wounds on the deceased with their respective bolos does not justify a finding that advantage was taken of superior strength in the absence of proof showing that they cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority of strength. Thus, in the face of the evidence on record showing that although the victim was pursued by both of the accusedappellants 23 and that he was unarmed 24 while the accused-appellants were both armed, one with a gun and the other with a long pointed weapon, 25 since it is also duly proved that it was only accused-appellant Casey who assaulted and inflicted stab wounds on him as the other accused-appellant merely stood nearby toying with his gun, abuse of superiority cannot be said to have attended the commission of the crime. The third essential issue to be resolved is whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused in the commission of the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 26 This agreement need not be in writing or be expressly manifested. 27 It is sufficient that there is a mutual implied understanding between the malefactors as shown by their concerted action towards the fulfillment of the same objective. In People v. Cadag, 28 it was held: "Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; from the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution." To the same effect is the ruling in other cases decided by this Court. 29 Pursuant to this uniform and consistent jurisprudence on the existence of conspiracy by the mere proof of community of design and purpose on the part of the accused, We hold that conspiracy exists in this case, True enough that there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired together, but their acts and the attendant circumstances disclose that common motive that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. In People vs. Peralta, 30 it was held that such overt act may consist in actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, in lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or in exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. In the case at bar, Ricardo Felix's overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the latter inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased. From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that Ricardo Felix was the moving factor of the evil act perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it was Joseph Casey who inflicted the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victim, he did so out of his perverted sense of friendship or companionship with Ricardo Felix. Hence, it would be incongruous to acquit Ricardo Felix and put all the blame of the killing on Joseph Casey when it was the latter who merely joined the former in his criminal resolution. The fact that he did nothing but toyed with his gun when Joseph Casey successively stabbed the victim means that he concurred with the wife of Casey to do away with the victim. For this reason, he should also be held accountable, notwithstanding the fact that his shot did not hit the victim and that the cause of death of the victim is the stab wounds inflicted by Casey. In People vs. Peralta, 31 it was held that the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the

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felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. The above discussion also disposes of the fourth assignment of error of accused-appellants. So We proceed with the fifth assignment of error. We find that the respondent court correctly disregarded Joseph Casey's claim of self-defense. Besides being unworthy of credence, said claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testimony of the eyewitness, Mercedes Palomo. The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds while the accused complained merely of abrasions on his back indicates the falsity of the claim. The accused failed to present a medical certificate for the bruises he allegedly sustained. He likewise failed to present anybody to attest to the truth of his allegations. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the elements of self-defense are present. On the other hand, the prosecution had not only one but several eyewitnesses to the crime as shown by the different affidavits attached to the records of the case. Although only one of the eyewitnesses was presented in court, her lone testimony on what actually transpired, negating the claim of self-defense, is more credible than the version of Joseph Casey. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact the events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. 32 We likewise find that respondent court correctly denied the defense of alibi of Ricardo Felix. Alibi, in order to be given full faith and credit must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt as to its plausibility and verity. 33 In the case at bar, said accused-appellant failed to show clearly and convincingly that he was at some other place about the time of the alleged crime. He merely said that he was at home and that he went to Manila. 34 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, he did not even specify the exact place at Manila where he had gone and the purpose for going there. Then, while said defense was corroborated by Joseph Casey, the latter's testimony lacks that character of trustworthiness since it is very apparent that he was merely attempting to assume full and exclusive responsibility for the crime. Finally, said defense is unavailing when there is positive Identification. Prosecution witness, Mercedes Palomo, gave distinct attributes of Ricardo Felix in her sworn statement that leave no iota of doubt that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without any attending circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) jointly and severally, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Fernando, CJ., concurs in the result. Separate Opinions AQUINO, J., dissenting.

I agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed is murder qualified by abuse of superiority. The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Makasiar, J., concur. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: The trial court correctly convicted the accused for the crime of murder, the killing having been attended by the qualifying circumstance of superior strength. The fact that the two accused pursued and overpowered their victim and one of them, Casey, inflicted several fatal stab wounds on the victim's abdomen while the other, Felix, stood nearby with a gun clearly shows the accused's abuse of superiority which insured impunity and weakened any defense on the part of the victim. The murder having been committed without any attending circumstances, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Makasiar, J., concur. Footnotes 1 Original Records, p. 17. 2 Ibid, p. 75. 3 T. S. N. December 13, 1968, pp. 1-4. 4 Ibid, pp. 5-7. 5 T.S.N., December 16, 1968, pp. 2-6. 6 Ibid, pp. 6-10. 7 Original Records, p. 139. T.S.N., December 18, 1968, pp. 4-5. 9 Ibid, pp. 5-8. 10 Ibid, pp. 24-26. 11 Brief for the Appellants, pp. 44-45. 12 42 C.J.S., Sec. 240, pp. 1249-1250. 13 U.S. vs. De la Cruz, et al., 3 Phil. 331; U.S. vs. Alabot, 38 Phil. 698; Castro, et al. vs. Ozaeta, 65 Phil. 335; Regala vs. Court of First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil, 684; Caparas vs. Gonzales, 7 SCRA 182. 14 Rollo p. 10. 15 Original Records, p. 5. 16 U.S. vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457. 17 People vs. Lim, 71 SCRA 249; People vs. Bodoso, 60 SCRA 61; People vs. Manangan, 59 SCRA 31; People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245; People vs. Diva, et al., 23 SCRA 332; People vs. Beralde, L-32832, June 29,1979; People vs. Corachea, L-30101, July 16, 1979. 18 People vs. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 365; People vs. Calucer, 94 Phil. 1048; People vs. Abang, 110 Phil. 454; People vs. Guarnes, 110 Phil. 379. 19 3 Phil. 625. 20 People vs. Bustos, et al., 51 Phil. 385. 21 People vs. Rubia, et al., 52 Phil. 172. 22 49 Phil. 192. 23 T.S.N., December 13, 1968, p. 4. 24 Ibid, p. 12. 25 Ibid, pp. 5 and 6. 26 Article 8, Revised Penal Code. 27 People vs. Ging Sam, et al., 94 Phil. 13 9. 28 2 SCRA 288. 29 Cf People vs. Clarit, 3 SCRA 331; People vs. Bollena, 3 SCRA 792; People vs- Villanueva, 5 SCRA 672; People vs. Simon, 10 SCRA 280; People vs- Castro, 11 SCRA 699; People vs. Tiongson, 12 SCRA 402; People vs. Bautil, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. Reyes, 17 SCRA 309; People vs. Akiran, 18 SCRA 239; People vs. Estrada 22 SCRA 111; People vs. Fontillas, 23 SCRA 74; People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759; People vs. Magcamit, 27 SCRA 450; People vs. Tarrayo, 27 SCRA 953; People vs. Tapac, 28 SCRA 191; People vs. Pagaduan, 29 SCRA 54.

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30 Supra. 31 Supra. 32 People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451. 33 People vs. Segario, 14 SCRA 468; People vs. Pasilan 14 SCRA 694; People vs. Dayday, 14 SCRA 935. 34 T.S.N., December 18, 1968, pp. 24-25.

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