EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5365. April 27, 2005.] Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J :
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Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case
Before us is a verified Petition 1 for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment 2 on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003, 3 the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties' respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners' Memorandum, 4 the case was considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
aCTHEA

The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000. 5 Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to

respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future. 6 On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt, 7 herein quoted as follows:
"August 31, 1999 Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes. (Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre 8-31-99 P10,000.00 PNB Check No. 46241-8/15/99"
8

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively. 9 On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000. 10 Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two o'clock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000. 11 Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places. 12 Petitioners averred that many of their office mates among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent. 13

In his Comment, 14 respondent denied petitioners' claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to "ACCOUNT CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
SICDAa

Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:
"In his affidavit-complaint . . . executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that: 2.That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES . . ., personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture. "Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that: 2.That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES . . ., personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture. "The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus: ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q.Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct? A.Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks. Q.These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that correct?
caCEDA

A.I will consult my records, You Honor, because it's quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic). COMM. DULAY: Which are the first two checks? ATTY. DECIEMBRE: The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor. ATTY. PUNZALAN: Q.Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241 and 0046242 . . . have been issued to you? A.I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00. Q.This was issued to you in what particular place? A.Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. Q.Is that your house? A.No, it's not my house. Q.What is that, is that your law office? A.That is my retainer client. Q.What is the name of that retainer client of yours? ATTY. DECIEMBRE: Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question? ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. That's why I am asking your client. . . COMM. DULAY: The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What building? ATTY. DECIEMBRE: AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor. COMM. DULAY: What is the materiality of knowing the name of his client's office? ATTY. PUNZALAN: Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client? COMM. DULAY: Your answer. ATTY. DECIEMBRE: A.It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building. Q.And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct? A.Yes. Q.So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon? A.That is correct, sir. "Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.
aSIDCT

"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondent's version of the transaction. "Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid . . . Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondent's version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondent's filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions." 15

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.
HEcSDa

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. 16 It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. 17 "A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader." 18 By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. 19 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession. 20

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. xxx xxx xxx "Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xxx xxx xxx "Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar. 21 Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. 22 The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. 23 In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondent's assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.
DACTSH

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes' testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him, 24 he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their blank checks. 25 It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent's full knowledge that the loan

supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months 26 because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar. Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. 27 Good moral character includes at least common honesty. 28 No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. 29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30 Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. 31 Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; 32 they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. 33 Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. In Eustaquio v. Rimorin, 34 the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell another's property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
DHCcST

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondent's personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4943. January 26, 2001.] DIANA D. DE GUZMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, respondent.

Homobono A. Adaza for complainant. Lourdes I. De Dios for herself.

SYNOPSIS This is a complaint for disbarment against respondent for representing conflicting interest and for acquiring property in litigation. Evidence disclosed that complainant engaged the services of respondent in forming a hotel and restaurant business. Thereafter, Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) came into being. Complainant became the majority stockholder having subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to P2,980,000 and her paid subscription amounted to P745,000.00. Respondent, thereafter, received a monthly retainer fee of P5,000 from the former whom she even represented in a case. The unpaid 745 subscribed shares of complainant was later declared delinquent, sold and acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the company's incorporators. Out of the 745 shares conveyed to Del Rosario, respondent purchased 100 shares. She later became the president of the company. Respondent denied the existence of attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. The IBP ruled in her favor. The Court found that there was an attorney-client relationship between the parties and there was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent in ousting complainant from the corporation. Respondent's purchase of shares of stock originally owned by complainant constitutes conflict of interest. Respondent as a lawyer is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. Her acts clearly violated her oath. She was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. SYLLABUS 1.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; MUST CONDUCT THEMSELVES WITH HONESTY AND INTEGRITY IN A MANNER BEYOND REPROACH. Lawyers must conduct themselves,

especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 2.ID.; ID.; COUNSEL SUSPENDED FOR 6 MONTHS FOR REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTEREST. Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate. The Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios remiss in her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar and hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will be dealt with more severely. 3.ID.; ID.; LAWYER'S OATH; SOURCE OF OBLIGATION AND VIOLATION THEREOF IS GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY SANCTION. As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action. RESOLUTION PARDO, J :
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The case before the Court is a complaint 1 for disbarment against Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests, and of Article 1491 Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation. In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in order to form a corporation, which would engage in hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo City. On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. de Dios, complainant registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2 Complainant paid respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00. On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant to pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock amounting to two million two hundred and thirty five thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or before December 30, 1997. On January 29, 1998, 3 complainant received notice of the public auction sale of her delinquent shares and a copy of a board resolution dated January 6, 1998 authorizing such sale. 4 Complainant soon learned that her shares had been acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted complainant from the corporation completely. While respondent rose to be president of the corporation, complainant lost all her life's savings invested therein.

Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. de Dios and believed that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with the management of the corporation. Complainant pointed out that respondent appeared as her counsel and signed pleadings in a case where complainant was one of the parties. 5Respondent, however, explained that she only appeared because the property involved belonged to SBHI. Respondent alleged that complainant misunderstood the role of respondent as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. Respondent manifested that her appearance as counsel for complainant Diana de Guzman was to protect the rights and interest of SBHI since the latter was the real owner of the land in controversy. Respondent further said that the land on which the resort was established belonged to the Japanese incorporators, not to complainant. The relationship of the complainant and the Japanese investors turned sour because complainant misappropriated the funds and property of the corporation. To save the corporation from bankruptcy, respondent advised all concerned stockholders that it was proper to call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the delinquent shares. These led to the auction of the unpaid shares of complainant and hence, the ouster of complainant from the corporation.
aAcHCT

Meantime, Mr. del Rosario transferred one hundred (100) shares to respondent in payment of legal services as evidenced by a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Corporate Shares of Stock. On October 22, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution 6 finding that the acts of respondent were not motivated by ill will as she acted in the best interest of her client, SBHI. The IBP found that complainant failed to present convincing proof of her attorney-client relationship with respondent other than the pleadings respondent filed in the trial court where complainant was one of the parties. We disagree. We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts presented before us that created doubt on the propriety of the declaration of delinquent shares and subsequent sale of complainant's entire subscription. Complainant subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to two million nine hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P2,980,000.00). She was the majority stockholder. Out of the subscribed shares, she paid up seven hundred forty-five thousand pesos (P745,000.00) during the stage of incorporation. How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount she had invested in it is beyond us. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, what happened to her original shares? This, at least, should have been explained. Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. The claim has no merit. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.

There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of directors now included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director. 7 The present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent. Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 8 We said:
"To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, 'of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,' it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession. " 9

Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 10 As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, 11 or other disciplinary action. 12 The acts of respondent Atty. de Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios remiss in her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6270. January 22, 2007.] HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, respondent. DECISION

CARPIO, J :
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The Case This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed by the heirs of the late spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spouses Villanueva), namely: Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V. Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado, and Herminigildo Ylhi (complainants). The Facts During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them. On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication 1 (affidavit of adjudication) stating that as "the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic)" of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 2 (deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale. Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as were descendants of the other children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent had been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the time of their birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their family. Complainants accused respondent of knowing the "true facts and surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties of the spouses Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares in the property. In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to comment on the complaint. In her Comment, 3 respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso to dispose of fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed the two documents under the following circumstances:
That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided equally among their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for themselves one titled lot, the subject now of the complaint . . . That said titled property was the only property left by the old couple, to answer for their needs while they are still alive until their deaths . . . Alfonso [and his wife] were tasked to take care of the old couple, as they were the ones living in the same compound with their late parents.

This fact was and is known by the other compulsory heirs, and they never questioned the said act of their parents, as they already had their own share on the estate of the late [spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across the street from our house and I was requested to the house of the old man when he gave said title to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were still alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in their old house to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the parents died, it was [Alfonso and his wife] who took charge of the funeral and all other acts relative thereto. xxx xxx xxx That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death of the old man, when the spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money to finance the schooling of their children, it was then that they thought of disposing the land . . . and said land was sold by them to one Adriano Villanueva of which in both documents, I notarized the same (sic). xxx xxx xxx I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said documents, it was done in good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to help, assist and to guide people who come to me for legal assistance, as contained in my oath as a lawyer when I passed the bar. . . . 4 (Emphasis supplied)

According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonso's co-heirs filed their objections at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication proved that most of the properties of the spouses Villanueva had earlier been distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs had agreed to abide by the intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to Alfonso. Respondent asserted that "the personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the core of the ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public document . . . ." On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which designated Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his report and recommendation on, the complaint. The IBP's Findings In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid found that respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the spirit and intent of the notarial law when she notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir of the spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent on respondent's part, IBP Commissioner Villadolid held that respondent "engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in the legal system." Thus, he recommended suspension of respondent's notarial commission for one year. He further recommended that respondent be reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for up to six months.

The Court's Ruling We sustain partly the IBP's findings and recommendations. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a document. The notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. 5 Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. 6 As early as Panganiban v. Borromeo, 7 we held that notaries public must inform themselves of the facts to which they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal transactions. They must guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. 8 On its face, Alfonso's affidavit does not appear to contain any "illegal or immoral" declaration. However, respondent herself admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonso's statement that he was the "sole heir" of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document while fully aware that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonso's assertion of status as sole heir. The affidavit of adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his parents' estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed took basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication. Respondent never disputed complainants' allegation of her close relationship with the Villanueva family spanning several decades. Respondent even underscored this closeness by claiming that Lucas himself requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the conversation between them. Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time Alfonso executed the affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their respective shares from the estate of the spouses Villanueva. However, we are not concerned here with the proper distribution of the spouses Villanueva's estates. Rather, respondent's liability springs from her failure to discharge properly her duties as a notary public and as a member of the bar. Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent's conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
DTAIaH

We also view with disfavor respondent's lack of candor before the IBP proceedings. The transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied preparing or notarizing the deed of sale, 9 when she already admitted having done so in her Comment. WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we REVOKE the commission of respondent Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY her from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We further SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality of this decision. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5439. January 22, 2007.] CLARITA J. SAMALA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, respondent. RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J :
p

Before us is a complaint 1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2 The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months. In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year. We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty. On serving as counsel for contending parties. Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7 In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband " for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000, 8Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK. But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 986804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17 One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18 The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19 An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23 We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26 In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former

client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled " Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
aCIHcD

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,

27 citing

the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,

28

we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30 From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32 On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.
SACHcD

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times. Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership. Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba. In Young v. Batuegas, 37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." 38 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. 41

On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees. Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling. As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42 Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling. We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children. We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children. During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52 In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the

commissioner that he has two houses in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession. Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability. ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records. SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia andVelasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7204. March 7, 2007.] CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, respondent. RESOLUTION CHICO-NAZARIO, J :
p

Before Us is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality. Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties. On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly. Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car. In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows: Sent by complainant-forget the case. I decided to At 5:33:46 pmrefer it with other lawyer replied by respondent-"does this mean I can not c u at 6:16:11 pmanymore" (Does this mean I cannot see you anymore) sent by complainant-I feel bad. I can't expect that u at 6:17:59 pmwill take advantage of the situation. Follow-up message-wrong to kiss a girl especially Sent by complainantin the lips if you don't have At 6:29:30 pmrelationship with her.

Replied by respondent-"I'm veri sri. It's not tking At 6:32:43 pmadvantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (I'm very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of feeling) Follow up message-I'm s sri. Il not do it again. by respondentWil u stil c me s I can show u at 6:42:25 pmmy sincerity" (I'm so sorry. I'll not do it again. Will you still see me so I can show you my sincerity) On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don't know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don't know what to do so you may forgive me. I'm really sorry. Puede bati na tayo). Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I'm really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I'm really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt. 2

In his answer, 3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him. By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondent's fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant. A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation, 4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. 5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent's actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
CcEHaI

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I . . . Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xxx xxx xxx Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law. 6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr., 7we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. 8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol 9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 10 In Bar Matter No. 1154, 11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
DcCASI

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 12 In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips. In his Answer,
13 respondent

confessed, thus:

27.When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right

face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car. xxx xxx xxx 35.When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA: That time in February, we met . . . I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said . . . she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said . . . it's about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let's go. So when I said let's go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I . . . should I say tilted her face towards me and when she's already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, that's it. COMM. FUNA: February 10 iyan. xxx xxx xxx ATTY. MACABATA: Okay. After that were through so I said let's go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down, before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA: Pardon? ATTY. MACABATA: I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and that's it. . . . . 14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. 15 In Zaguirre v. Castillo, 16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
SAHIDc

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct: In Toledo v. Toledo, 17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. In Dantes v. Dantes, 19 respondent's act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant's testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. In Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred." In Tucay v. Tucay, 23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondent's disbarment. In Villasanta v. Peralta, 24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar. In Cabrera v. Agustin, 25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law. Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 26 Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, 27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
aSIETH

Complainant's bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, 28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. 29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove." 30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui

negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.

In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 32
31

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out. Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent's acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension. The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. 34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public. The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer's duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of Darell Adams, 38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
aICHEc

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent's first offense, reprimand would suffice. We laud complainant's effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence. WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Nachura, JJ., concur. Callejo, Sr., J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6968. August 9, 2006.] ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, respondent. ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J :
p

The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public

Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994. As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon's move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latter's claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests. The suspects' lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning.
AScTaD

The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346. Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373. The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as follows:
1.Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility. 2.Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she "acted within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance with the school's substitute parental authority" and "within the bounds of the law as the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest." With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in "recklessly tr[ying] to arrest" the suspects without warrant.
CDHacE

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and approved the Commissioner's Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution, together with the records of the cases which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006. As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons of Professional Ethics in "refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon." When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated onCertiorari and Prohibition, this Court addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:
(1)Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1829. . . ., 1

held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students "cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional," 2 they having "a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal." 3 Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizon's administrative complaint against her must then be dismissed.
IcDCaS

Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that "[f]or the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements, . . . their attempt to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a warrant was illegal." 4 In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI "to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require" 5 and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to

make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be "in accordance with existing laws and rules."
Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers, and as such have the following powers: (a)To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules. 6 xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. xxx xxx xxx Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).

WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED. Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and isREPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
TSDHCc

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Justice. SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5700. January 30, 2006.] PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, represented by Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr., complainant, vs. ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG, respondent. DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J :
p

Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment filed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) against Atty. Dante A. Carandang. The complaint alleges that Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a private corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a "Grant of Authority to Operate Bingo Games." Article V of this document mandates Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its gross sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and 5% franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14 as of November 15, 2001. Instead of demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo Royale and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly installment of P300,000.00 from July 2001 to June 2003. Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent. However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by reason of Bingo Royale's "Closed Account." Despite PAGCOR's demand letters dated November 12 and December 12, 2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints for violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent. PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for serious misconduct, violation of the Attorney's Oath and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and prays that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
SEDaAH

In his "Opposition" to the complaint, respondent averred that he is not liable for issuing bouncing checks because they were drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so "is not related to the office of a lawyer." Respondent explained that since the start of its operations, Bingo Royale has been experiencing financial difficulties due to meager sales. Hence, it incurred arrearages in paying PAGCOR's shares and failed to pay the amounts of the checks. On November 20, 2001, PAGCOR closed the operations of Bingo Royale. This prompted the latter to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, a complaint for damages against PAGCOR, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1671.

Subsequently, Bingo Royale became bankrupt. Respondent now maintains that the dishonor of the checks was caused by circumstances beyond his control and pleads that our power to disbar him must be exercised with great caution. On February 24, 2003, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 1 In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Doroteo B. Aguila, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, made the following findings and observations:
Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a choice for an individual (especially one learned in the law), whether in a personal capacity or officer of a corporation, to do so after assessing and weighing the consequences and risks for doing so. As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, the company he runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as they fell due. The desire to continue the operations of his company does not excuse respondent's act of violating the law by issuing worthless checks. Moreover, inability to pay is not a ground, under the Civil Code, to suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondent contends that because of business reverses or inability to generate funds, BRI should be excused from making good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors will merely state that they no longer have the capacity to pay and, consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree with this contention. As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an offense that involves public interest. In the leading case of People v. Taada, the Honorable Supreme Court explained the nature of the offense, thus xxx xxx xxx The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment . . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. xxx xxx xxx The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and the legal processes. It also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01). By issuing the bouncing checks in blatant violation of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility (Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang deserves to be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Consistent with the ruling in this Castillo case, suspension for one year is the deserved minimum penalty for the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern for the property rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility. Moreover, conviction for the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for disbarment (De Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619).
ACDIcS

Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-177 adopting and approving Commissioner Aguila's Report and Recommendation with modification in the sense that the recommended penalty is reduced to suspension of six (6) months, thus:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and promote respect of law and the legal processes, and also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 2

Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check on behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still respondent is liable. In People v. Tuanda,
3

we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment . . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B. P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. In Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 4 we defined misconduct as follows:
Misconduct has been defined as "wrong or improper conduct;" and "gross" has been held to mean "flagrant; shameful" (Webster). This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

In Lizaso v. Amante, 5 we held that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity, thus:
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. . . . So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the principles which his license and the law confer upon him. (Underscoring supplied)
SEIcAD

Respondent likewise violated the Attorney's Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws; and the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the following provisions:
Cannon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. As

recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the land for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to spread a copy of this Decision on the personal record of Atty. Carandang. SO ORDERED.

Puno, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur. Corona, J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-06-2177. April 13, 2007.] RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR RESOLUTION CORONA, J :
p

In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93. 1 We ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000 for his transgression. The matter did not end there, however. Because his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in compliance with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a government lawyer. In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the court's safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit. Atty. Kho's apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a

breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities 3 and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
HcaDIA

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. RULE 1.01.A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility for these are a lawyer's foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer's responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. 4 This, in fact, is what a lawyer's obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. 5 By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. 6 It does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it. 7 Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. Atty. Kho's conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to gain and the fact that this is his first offense should temper his culpability considerably. Under the circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice.
ICcaST

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorney's Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000 within ten days from receipt of this resolution. The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to deduct from Atty. Kho's accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this resolution and in the resolution dated June 27, 2006.
CcTIAH

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.The pertinent portions of OCA Circular No. 8A-93 dated April 21, 1993 read: Effective March 1, 1993, all Clerks of Courts of lower Courts are hereby DIRECTED to deposit all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections, upon receipt thereof, following the same guidelines laid out in Circular No. 13-92 of this Court dated March 1, 1992, with the LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), the authorized government depository bank for the Judiciary. In localities where the LBP has no branches, the Clerk of Court shall deposit all collections with any Rural Bank in the area furnishing the ACCOUNTING DIVISION, SUPREME COURT, the selected Rural Bank. Where there is no LBP branch at the station of the judge concerned, the collections shall be sent by postal money order payable to the Chief Accountant of the Supreme Court, at the latest before 3:00 P.M. of that particular week. xxx xxx xxx Strict compliance is hereby enjoined. 2.Infra. 3.Attorney's Oath. This is substantially reiterated in Sec. 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Sec. 20.Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney: (a)To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines. 4.See AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 18 (2001 ed.). 5.CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 1.01, supra. 6.BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1705 (4th ed.). 7.Id.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 7136. August 1, 2007.] JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent. DECISION

PER CURIAM :
p

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
CcHDSA

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene, By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
HCDAac

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again. Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2 Eternally yours, NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. In his ANSWER, 3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the abovequoted letter was handwritten.
aTICAc

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14.Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C. 4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the

matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco. 5(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15.Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they are. 6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5.Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
SCEDaT

5.1Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene. xxx xxx xxx 5.5Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract. 7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted 8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18.The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19.Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with

his wife, and degrades the legal profession. supplied),

10 (Emphasis

and underscoring

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7.Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
CSTHca

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, 12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital. Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply." 15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. 16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant. 17 After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven. The Commissioner thus recommended 19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01:A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03:A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
DTIcSH

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 CBD Case No. 02-936 Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. 20 (Italics and emphasis
in the original)

Hence, the present petition 21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of the Rules of Court. The petition is impressed with merit. Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows. Respondent contends, in his Comment 23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him. 24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent. It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
HaAIES

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irenethere is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje. 25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void." 26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies ishaving flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families." In other words, respondent' denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted. 27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate 29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted,respondent never denied being the father of the child.
HTCISE

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit 30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer. 31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required. 33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27.Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
IDTcHa

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.

34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334.Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods.

xxx xxx xxx,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere. "Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal: 36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
aDcHIC

xxx xxx xxx While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifestsdeliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 37(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:

38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. 39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any

groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2.Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
SAEHaC

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." 40 Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation 41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn. The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken." 42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. 43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
ECaAHS

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant. It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje. 45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
IDATCE

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,

46 viz:

. . . The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of . . . criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,

48

held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. This Decision takes effect immediately. SO ORDERED.
AEaSTC

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6593. February 4, 2010.] MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, respondents. DECISION PER CURIAM :
p

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit 1 and a supplemental affidavit 2 for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana. P. Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1.That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes . . . 2.That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat * Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel

Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3.. . . 4.That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson's Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona *

Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively . . .

5.. . . 6.That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
HITAEC

7.That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence . . . 8.That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints. xxx xxx xxx That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; . . .

In his Counter-Affidavit, 3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea's charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all

his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. 4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer. In her Counter-Affidavit, 5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her. In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings

in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petitions for Declaration of Nullity 7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
6
THaCAI

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss

the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion. 9
8

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the

respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. 10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. 11

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents' disbarment. 12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
. . . finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
TcICEA

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007. Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules. Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation. In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year-old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido. THE COURT'S RULING After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. 13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. 14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. 15 The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the

continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 17 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. 19
cAHIST

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5 (5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court's examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido). Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. 21 We

make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 22 In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages. In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent's pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent. In Villasanta v. Peralta, 24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent's act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar. Similar to Villasanta was the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
EaTCSA

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and

during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already

married to Constancia. 26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the

subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional

implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death
of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not

then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong
in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had
sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the

position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.
EHTADa

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer's oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession. He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. 27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer's oath, 28Section 20 (a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 30 all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession "; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, " [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships. The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 33Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 34

Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
. . . The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was voidab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility . . . Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar. 35
TECIHD

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. 37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other. Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido's admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential

advice was sought by another with respect to the latter's family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other person's feelings and affection from his wife and family. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido's marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido's advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia's presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law. We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia's expressed belief that Atty. Garrido's second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief. The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia's claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong 39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia's perverse sense of moral values.
SHTEaA

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia's actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia's conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the community's sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family

build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage. We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. 40 In Barrientos v. Daarol, 41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason. In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 42 We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties' pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido's plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
CAIaHS

In like manner, Atty. Valencia's behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1)DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer's Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2)DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama and Perez, JJ.,concur. Abad, J., is on wellness leave. Mendoza, J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7241. October 17, 2011.] ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J :
p

The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint 1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property. The antecedent facts are as follows: Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters,

located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001. Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation 2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainant's husband died on July 29, 2003.3 Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 4 and issued a new TCT No. 29251 5 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco. Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. In his Answer, 6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo. Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.
ISCDEA

Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses. However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same. On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003. During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003. 7 Respondent,

likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. 8 On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation, 9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco "personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood." The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years. On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215, 10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment. 12 In her Compliance, 13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions. On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication. RULING The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.
cCaSHA

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. 14Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 15 Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. 16 For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 17 Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in

damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon, 19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty. WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
DTcHaA

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5325. October 19, 2011.] NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN, complainants, vs. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J :
p

The Case This administrative case arose from an Affidavit/Complaint filed by spouses Nemesio (Nemesio) and Caridad (Caridad) Floran against Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty. Ediza) for unethical conduct. The Facts

Spouses Floran own an unregistered 3.5525 hectare parcel of land, particularly described as Cad. Lot No. 422-A, Pls-923 and situated in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The land is covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal (Epal), a relative, who gave the property to the Spouses Floran. On 9 August 1996, a certain Esteban Valera filed an action 1 for judicial foreclosure of mortgage on the house situated on the land owned by the Spouses Floran with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 41. The action for foreclosure involved an amount of P7,500.
TcIHDa

Spouses Floran sought the assistance of Atty. Ediza. On 24 September 1996, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On 23 October 1996, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case without prejudice based on noncompliance with barangayconciliation procedures under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare or 10,910 square meters of their 3.5525 hectare land to Phividec Industrial Authority (Phividec) for P25 per square meter totaling to the amount of P272,750, payable in three installments (1) P55,132; (2) P120,000, and (3) P97,618. The installments were paid and released within the months of June to July 1997. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Undertaking of Lot Owner executed by Nemesio and Phividec's representative and notarized by Atty. Ediza on 31 March 1997. Phividec then required the couple to execute a waiver in Phividec's favor. The Spouses Floran again sought the help of Atty. Ediza for the preparation and notarization of the waiver. Atty. Ediza informed the Spouses Floran to have the original owner of the land, Epal, sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for Epal to sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and acquired her approval and expressed assent to the conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor of Nemesio for P2,000. On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Out of the total amount of P272,750, which Phividec paid and released to the Spouses Floran, Atty. Ediza received the amount of P125,463.38 for the titling of the remaining portion of the land, other expenses and attorney's fees. Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the title. However, Atty. Ediza failed to fulfill his promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still unregistered, the Spouses Floran asked Atty. Ediza for the return of their money. Atty. Ediza refused. Thus, Spouses Floran presented their complaint before the chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental.
TEAcCD

The IBP called the Spouses Floran and Atty. Ediza to a conference. During the dialogue, Atty. Ediza refused to return the money but promised to tear a document evidencing sale by the Spouses Floran to him of one hectare land of their property for P50,000. The Spouses Floran claimed that they had no knowledge that they executed such document in favor of Atty. Ediza

and suspected that they might have signed a document earlier which Atty. Ediza told them not to read. Afterwards, the Spouses Floran filed their formal complaint before the Supreme Court. In the Complaint/Affidavit dated 8 September 2000, Caridad alleged that Atty. Ediza gave them certain documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale, for Epal to sign in order to transfer the land in their name. However, the Spouses Floran later discovered that one of the documents given by Atty. Ediza is a deed of sale for a one hectare land in the same property executed by Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza for a consideration of P2,000. When the Spouses Floran confronted Atty. Ediza, he initially denied the document but then later promised to tear and destroy it. In his Comment dated 23 January 2001, Atty. Ediza claimed that the Spouses Floran voluntarily gave him one hectare of the 3.5525 hectare land as payment for handling and winning the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza explained that the Spouses Floran did not find the lot interesting, lacking in good topography. He also stated that the property only had an assessed value of P23,700 at the time it was presented to him. Thereafter, towards the end of 1996, when Atty. Ediza learned that Phividec was interested to buy a hectare of the Spouses Floran's land, and considering that he has a hectare of undivided portion in the property, he suggested to the Spouses Floran that both of them sell half a hectare each and equally share in the proceeds of the sale. After Phividec made its full payment, Atty. Ediza gave fifty percent of the proceeds to the Spouses Floran and he kept the other half. Thereafter, Atty. Ediza wanted his remaining share in the land consisting of 4,545 square meters be titled in his name. Atty. Ediza conveyed this to the Spouses Floran and volunteered to take care of titling the land, including the Spouses Floran's remaining share, with no cost to them. Atty. Ediza stated that since Phividec had not yet applied for a separate tax declaration which would segregate its portion from the remainder of the property, he thought of holding in abeyance the separate survey on the remainder of the land. Also, Atty. Ediza was in a hurry to have the land titled with the intention of selling it so he informed the Spouses Floran to just follow up with Phividec. At the IBP conference, Atty. Ediza stated that he only agreed to return the 4,545 square meter portion of the land to amicably settle the case with the Spouses Floran. He asserted that the Deed of Sale signed by the Spouses Floran in his favor served as payment for the dismissal of the case he handled for the Spouses Floran. Atty. Ediza denied that the money he received was intended for the titling of the remaining portion of the land. Atty. Ediza claimed that the complaint against him stemmed from a case where he represented a certain Robert Sabuclalao for recovery of land. The land was being occupied by the Church of the Assembly of God where Nemesio Floran serves as pastor.
CIAacS

In a Resolution dated 7 March 2001, the Court resolved to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation On 14 August 2008, the investigating commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP submitted his Report and found that Atty. Ediza (1) failed to meet the standards prescribed by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 15, and (2) violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP recommended that Atty. Ediza be imposed the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law. In finding Atty. Ediza guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
After careful evaluation of the claims of the parties vis-a-vis the documents available, the version of the complainants appear to be credible while that of the respondent is shot through with inconsistencies. xxx xxx xxx b.The foreclosure case of complainants involved only P7,500.00 and respondent Ediza filed only a single motion and attended only two hearings. Thus, it is highly incredible [that] complainants whom respondent Ediza claims were destitute will voluntarily and generously donate to him 1 hectare of their land valued at P50,000.00. As it turned out, the 1 hectare portion is worth not only P50,000.00 [but] more than P200,000.00.
DCcAIS

c.The deed of sale of a portion of complainants' land to respondent Ediza is admittedly simulated because while it states that the consideration for the sale is P50,000.00, neither party claims that any money was paid by respondent Ediza to complainants. d.As a lawyer, Atty. Ediza must be aware that a deed of sale involving real property must be notarized to be enforceable. The document was unexplainably never notarized. Thus, this Commission finds that respondent Ediza must have caused the complainants to unknowingly sign the deed of sale of a portion of their property in his favor. It may further be noted that in their complaint, complainants allege that they saw in the files of respondent Ediza a copy of deed of sale of a property executed by Sartiga Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza which he promised to destroy when confronted about it by complainants. This was never denied by Atty. Ediza. Such conduct fails to come up to the standard prescribed by Canon 1.01 that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct" and Canon 15 that "A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transaction with his client." On the second issue, . . . the claim of the complainants that they agreed to give P125,000.00 of the proceeds of the sale of their property to respondent Ediza to register the remaining portion also appears to be more credible for the following reasons:

1.There is no credible reason for complainants to expect and demand that respondent Ediza undertake the registration of their property except that they have paid for it. If they were aware that they gave 1 hectare of their property to respondent Ediza for handling their civil case and that they are not paying respondent Ediza to register their property, it is not likely that simple folks like them would be so bold to demand for such valuable service from him for free.
AcTDaH

2.There is no credible reason for respondent to willingly undertake for free for complainants the not so simple task of registering an untitled property. 3.As previously stated, the P125,000.00 given to respondent Ediza by complainants is obviously too generous for simply having handled the civil case involving only P7,500.00. There must have been another reason for complainants to willingly pay the said amount to respondent and the registration for their remaining property appears to be a credible reason. It should also be noted that respondent Atty. Ediza does not even allege that he has taken any step towards accomplishing the registration of the property of the complainants prior to the filing of this complaint. Whether or not he agreed to do it for free or for a fee, respondent Ediza should have complied with his promise to register the property of complainants unless he has valid reasons not to do so. He has not also given any credible explanation why he failed to do so. Such conduct of respondent Ediza violates Canon 18.03 that "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 26 June 2011, in Resolution No. XIX-2011433, the Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the findings of the investigating commissioner. The resolution states:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-401 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.
TcEDHa

The Court's Ruling After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings of the IBP and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Ediza administratively liable. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in

accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. . . . CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
TcEaDS

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, the Spouses Floran assert that they had no knowledge that they signed a deed of sale to transfer a portion of their land in favor of Atty. Ediza. They also insist that Atty. Ediza failed to comply with his promise to register their property despite receiving the amount of P125,463.38. On the other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the land from the Spouses Floran because of their "deep gratitude" to him in the dismissal of the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza further claims that the amount of P125,463.38 which he received was his rightful share from the sale of the land. It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza also did the same to Epal when he gave Caridad several documents for Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza made it appear that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the Spouses Floran. Moreover, when the sale of the Spouses Floran's land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount from the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the land. Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the navet of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside from giving adequate attention, care and time to his client's case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and honest in protecting his client's rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
IEHDAT

In Santos v. Lazaro 3 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, 4 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a moral and legal obligation as well. The Court will not tolerate such action from a member of the legal profession who deliberately and maliciously did not protect his client's interests. In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. Atty. Ediza is directed to return to the Spouses Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the spouses and Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza is also directed to return the amount of P125,463.38, representing the amount he received from the proceeds of the sale of the land belonging to the Spouses Floran, with legal interest from the time of the filing of the administrative complaint until fully paid. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He isDIRECTED to return to the Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the spouses and Sartiga Epal to sign. He is further ORDERED to pay Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran, within 30 days from receipt of this Decision, the amount of P125,463.38, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let other copies be served on the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
TSacID

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,

JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6246. November 15, 2011.] [Formerly CBD No. 00-730] MARITES E. FREEMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES, respondent.

DECISION PER CURIAM :

p

Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages. In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant alleged that her husband Robert Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October 18, 1998. She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that she had to personally go to London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of P47,500.00 for service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her a Cash/Check Voucher, 2 issued by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the notations in the amount of "P50,000.00" and the date "12-5-98" were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she acceded into giving respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt 3 bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18, 1998, she went to see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter asked for the additional amount of P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary Receipt 4 bearing said date, issued by respondent's law firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa applications, respondent told her, "Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at banned ka sa Embassy." (It is difficult to railroad the process of securing visa, because you are blacklisted and banned by the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her that to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell out P18,000.00 as "panlagay" or "grease money" to bribe some staff of the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her that the ban was lifted, but the visas would be issued on a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue resident visas instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that to expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again give P20,000.00 and a bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as "grease money" to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After several weeks, respondent told her that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and that another amount of P18,000.00 was needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary Receipt, 5 dated April 19, 1999, to be used for booking the former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal costs, per Temporary Receipt 6 dated May 13, 1999, to cover the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts were issued by respondent's law firm.
IcEaST

Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead, she received a picture of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the deceased. She later learned that respondent left for London alone, without informing her about it. Respondent explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her husband's insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a letter 7 dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the arrangements for the funeral and that her late husband was covered by three insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society (Account Number 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No. PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512). 8 Respondent offered to help and assured her that representations with the insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance proceeds soon. According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 9 dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the respondent to follow-up the insurance claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not notarized, but another SPA, 10 dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came across a similar copy of the SPA, 11 dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time, additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and consent, respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with the insurance companies in London. Complainant discovered that in an undated letter, 12 addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made representations that her husband left no will and that she had no verified information as to the total value of her husband's estate and the existence of any property in London that would be subjected to Grant of Representation. Said letter requested that complainant be advised on the value for probate in the amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its entitlement. Respondent added therein that "As to the matter of the installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central District, Quezon City, Philippines under the account name: Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further notice." Subsequently, in a letter 13 dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial Group (PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the "Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the complainant], per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999]," replied that she had appended the documents required (i.e., marriage certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter, 14 dated April 20, 1999, to the said insurance company; that pursuant to an SPA 15 executed in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant should be forwarded to her law firm; that she sought clarification on whether complainant is entitled to death benefits under the policy and, if so, the amount due and the requirements to be complied with; and that in the absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having left no will), she "enclosed an alternative document [referring to the

Extrajudicial Settlement 16 dated June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their sole child (Frank Lawrence Freeman)." In the same letter, respondent reiterated that complainant "requests that any amount of monies due or benefits accruing, be directly deposited to Account No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further notice." Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to return her passport and the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of the visa applications. Not heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa applications, but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On the supposed rescheduled appointment with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech Travel and Tours, and introduced her to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who assured her that he would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez made her sign an application for visa and demanded the amount of P3,000.00. After a week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to ask respondent to return the total amount of P200,000.00. In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer 17 dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998, complainant, accompanied by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina Bauzon and another woman whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the inheritance of her deceased husband, a British national. 18 She told complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate of their son, and other documents to support her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before she accepted the case, she explained to complainant that she would be charging the following amounts: acceptance fee of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional amount of P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these rates and, in fact, readily paid her the said amounts. With an SPA, 19 dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], having been executed in her favor, she made preliminary communications with the insurance companies in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received communications from said insurance companies, she stated that complainant offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for London in May 1999 and, upon her return, she updated the complainant about the status of her claims.
CHEDAc

As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked her why she had not left for London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the embassy had duped her. She explained to complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle the visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed. She stated that when complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in December 1999, to a travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that complainant's previous visa applications had been denied four times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter, complainant was able to secure a visa through the help of the travel consultant, who charged her a "professional fee" of P50,000.00. She added that she

had no participation in the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the said travel consultant. With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the existence of the same, and declared that the SPA, 20 dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis for communications with the insurance companies in London. She stated that in her absence, complainant, through wily representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary, and never returned the same, despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of the loss of the case folder as she then had no immediate need of it. She also said that her secretary failed to immediately report about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of absence, so as to attend to the financial obligations brought about by her mother's lingering ailment and consequent death. 21 Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to return the case folder and, thus, the law firm was prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that through complainant's own criminal acts and machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively pursuing her claims. Between January to February 2000, she sent complainant a billing statement which indicated the expenses incurred 22 by the law firm, as of July 1999; however, instead of settling the amount, the latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade payment of her obligations. On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with Comments on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter 23 dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon return from abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements with the insurance companies in London that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, not solely for her insurance claims, which explained why the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely made a handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA [referring to the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount of 10,546.7 [should be 10,960.63], 24 or approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never turned over to her, nor was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she never executed any SPA that would authorize respondent to receive any money or check due her, but that the only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court proceedings. Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint 25 for malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent), for allegedly barging into the law office of the former and, with the use of a pair

of scissors, cut-off the cords of two office computer keyboards and the line connections for the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in an estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the Resolution, 26 dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The case was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence and for failure of respondent to appear during the preliminary investigation of the case. 27 Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the Resolution 28 dated October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated February 8, 2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information. 29 Consequently, in the Order 30 dated November 27, 2002, the trial court granted the withdrawal of the information, and dismissed the case.
TSEAaD

In the Report and Recommendation 31 dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the approximate amount of P200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant the amounts she received from the London insurance companies. On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003166, 32 adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification that respondent be disbarred. The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 33 A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the

Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 34 Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts. In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her in securing visa applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her deceased husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the scope of authority of respondent to represent the complainant. A perusal of the [first] SPA, 35 dated November 6, 1998, which was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized respondent to represent her and her son, in order to protect their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the possibility of any amicable settlement, relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both in the Philippines and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA, 36 dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, in addition to the foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear and represent the complainant, in connection with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury warrants, checks arising from said claims, deposit the same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the successful pursuit of the claims. The [third] SPA, 37 also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of the second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the parties and made integral parts of the records of the case, were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their genuineness and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of respondent in her behalf with regard to the insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that she received payment from complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. 38 Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent the complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all money or

property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a client when due or upon demand.
cSaATC

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. 39 In the present case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount of P167,000.00 40 from the complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter's case. Respondent admitted having received money from the complainant, but claimed that the total amount of P120,000.00 41 she received was in accordance with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to an agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence of a formal contract of legal services. Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose of assisting her in claiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry Clearance, 42 dated December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary purpose in traveling to London was to attend the International Law Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the gall to take advantage of the benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into believing that she needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving "grease money" or lagay, in the total amount of P43,000.00, 43 to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal bank account, as shown by the monthly transaction report (covering January to December for the years 2000-2001), 44 respondent never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory explanation, as to why she failed to render an accounting, on the proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the complainant vis--vis the correspondence by the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following amounts to the respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per letter 45 dated November 23, 2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services Department of Lincoln Financial Group, addressed to complainant, stating, among others, that "An amount of 10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27th September 2000)," and per letter, 46 dated April 28, 2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays, stating, among others, that "I can confirm that a death claim was made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when an amount of 471.06 was

sent by International Moneymover to the client's legal representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon City, Philippines." Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of 10,489.57 and 471.06 were remitted to respondent through other means of international transactions, such as the International Moneymover, which explains why no direct remittance from the insurance companies in London could be traced to the personal bank account of respondent, per monthly transaction report, covering January to December for the years 2000-2001. A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. 47Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 48 and 2, 49 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already dismissed is of no consequence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a fullblown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal of the criminal case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
CSEHcT

In Velez v. De Vera, 50 the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. 51 Indeed, lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. 52 In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for breach of trust and confidence pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. In Manzano

v. Soriano,

therein respondent, found guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his client) and malpractice, represented therein complainant in a collection suit, but failed to turn over the amount of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their agreement and, to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at the same time, the notary public. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., 54therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, received the check corresponding to his client's insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed the same, and appropriated the proceeds.
53

Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 55 Respondent's repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory. Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of the respondent. Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of the insurance policies remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.
THSaEC

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur. Corona, C.J. and Bersamin, J., took no part. Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relationship to a party. Leonardo-de Castro and Del Castillo, JJ., are on official leave.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 7940. April 24, 2012.] RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE RULES OF COURT, vs. ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM :
p

This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
acSECT

The Facts and the Case In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas' letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team. Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas' letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement. Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document. 1 On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction. 2 Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The Issue Presented The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.
cTACIa

The Court's Ruling In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to the IBP was "factually infirmed" 3 and contained "factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation," 4 and was "too adventurous." 5 To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas' letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of the falsified Abastillas' letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. 6 This Court's decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, 7 the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become final. The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do. This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. 8 Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 9

Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin? As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. 10 Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. 11
DAHCaI

Here, Atty. Pactolin's disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. 12 This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law. 13 The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 14 WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes andPerlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 8391. November 23, 2010.] [Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631] MANUEL C. YUHICO, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM :
p

Before us is a Complaint 1 dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case. On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client. On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to P60,000.00. 2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:
I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking advantage of our friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week from my client Ogami from Japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its release is delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by me on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.

Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:
As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.

However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment. Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December 2005. Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number and promised to deposit his payment there, but he never deposited the payment. On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter but to no avail.
3

to Gutierrez to pay his debts,

Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against him. 4
aDcETC

In his Answer, 5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in gratitude for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He, however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition improves. On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions. On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers. Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel attended. There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez. In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, 6 had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks. Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment. In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or

multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar. On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest. We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations. We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
HTDCAS

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, 8 the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks. In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT,is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
EcHIDT

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Brion, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza andSereno, JJ., concur. Del Castillo, J., is on official leave.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 9608. November 27, 2012.] MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM :
p

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 1 Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint 2 for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct." In her complaint, complainant alleged that

2.The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines. . . . 3.In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself. . . .
TDcCIS

4.After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002. . . . 5.Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur. . . . 6.The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to [the Department of Justice], by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department of Justice. xxx xxx xxx 8.The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURAas hereinbefore stated clearly constitute . . . "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement 3 that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the maid's room at respondent's house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent's poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.
CAcEaS

In her Supplemental-Complaint, 4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted,

but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile. Respondent alleged in his Answer
5

that

2.Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutor's Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years. . . . xxx xxx xxx 5.Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute . . . grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that [the] act of respondent in having sex with complainant was done [with] mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submit[s] that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute . . . gross[ly] immoral conduct. There is no human law that punishes a person who [has] sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant [accepts] compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct. . . .
SEcAIC

xxx xxx xxx 6.The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and [had a grudge] against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding. . . . 7.The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent. . . . 8.To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back [at] respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount [of] P2,000,000.00[;] otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case [for] rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura [sent word] to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she [can] get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;

9.Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact [that] Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414. . . . xxx xxx xxx

SIcEHD

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?

Attached to respondent's Answer is his Counter-Affidavit 6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked him if he could use the latter's hut. The farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut. Inside the farm worker's hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motugan" meaning, she's not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is no longer a virgin. It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction. 7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.
DcaECT

Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance. 8 Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed. 9 In its Report and Recommendation 10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty. On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victim's guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. 11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was then staying at respondent's residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege which his license confers upon him. Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be imposed. 12 Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainant's mother even testified that her daughter stayed at respondent's house only until February 2002. He further stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.
IScaAE

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxx xxx xxx CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. xxx xxx xxx Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
aHIDAE

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. 15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
IATHaS

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. 17 From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondent's act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession. In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13year-old minor, 19 who for a time was under respondent's care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter's consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. 20 Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting 21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, inDumadag v. Lumaya, 22 the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
CcEHaI

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no moment. Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. 23 Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances. 24 In this case, respondent's gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. 25 The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and

character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. 26 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. 27 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. This Decision takes effect immediately. SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur. Brion, J., is on leave. Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., are on official leave.