I.

Introduction

A. Basic Principles and Policies Constitutional Provisions related to labor (1987 Philippine Constitution) B. 1. Definitions (Art. 212 L.C.) Department of Labor and Employment

a. National Labor Relations Commission as an attached agency (Art. 213 and 218 in relation to RA 9347) 1. 2. 3. Creation and Composition (Art. 213-214 L.C.) Powers and Duties (Art. 217-222 L.C.) Appeal (Art. 223-224 L.C.)

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL vs. NLRC, GR 130866 (Sept. 16, 1998) FACTS: > petitioner = St. Martin's Funeral Home > private respondent = Bienvenido Aricayos > Aricayos files an illegal dismissal case against St. Martin's > Aricayos alleged that he started working as Operations Manager of St. Martin's on 2/6/95 > no contract of employment, Aricayos' name was not included in the semi-monthly payroll > Aricayos was dismissed in 1996 for allegedly misappropriating P38,000 w/c was intended for payment for VAT > St. Martin's claims that Aricayos was no employee but only the uncle of the company's owner > it was later discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees > although the records purported to show that the same were all paid already > St. Martin's business operations underwent changes > Aricayos was no longer allowed to participate in its management > Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal > > > > > > LA decided in favor of St. Martin's, saying that there (i.e. Aricayos worked not as an employee but only as a Aricayos appealed to the NLRC, which remanded the case kek St. Martin's filed a motion for reconsideration w/ the hence this petition w/ the SC was no ER-EE relationship "volunteer") to the LA NLRC, which was denied

ISSUES: Was the dismissal valid? // Was Aricayos an employee of St. Martins? RULING: *stupid buzzing sound* petition remanded, forwarded, to CA as is called for by procedure and all records thereof

> BP 129, as amended, re: jurisdiction of CA = exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, commissions > ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC > [the use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae since appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts] > all references in the amended S9, BP 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under R65 > all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired

PANUNCILLO vs. CAP Phil. (February 9, 2007) FACTS: > Milagros Panuncillo = petitioner > hired by CAP Phils. as Office Senior Clerk > receiving a P16,180.60 monthly salary > Panuncillo procured an educational plan from CAP > fully paid > the plan was sold to Josefina Pernes for P37K > however, before the actual transfer of the plan to Pernes > Panuncillo pledged it for P50K to John Chu > Chua sold it in turn to Benito Bonghanoy > Bonghanoy sold the plan to Gaudioso Uy for P60K > WOW > Pernes informed CAP that Panuncillo swindled her > but that she was willing to amicably settle provided that Panuncillo pays the amount involved + interest > CAP's Integrated Internal Audit Operations (IIAO) required Panuncillo to explain > the gist of it: "[b]ecause of extreme need of money... I admit, I had defrauded Ms. J. Pernes, but I didnt do it intentionally... I think I am just a victim of circumstances..." > CAP sent Panuncillo's way a show-cause memorandum (to explain why she should not be axed) > Panuncillo did not comply > IIAO recommended administrative action against Panuncillo for violating Sec. 8.4 of CAP's Code of Discipline > and apparently, the IIAO revealed that this wasn't the only rut Panuncillo was in > CAP terminated Panuncillo's services > Panuncillo sought reconsideration, imploring that she be allowed to avail of retirement benefits > motion for reconsideration = denied > Panuncillo filed with the LA an illegal dismissal case > (+ 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, damages, attorney's fees) > LA ruled: dismissal for valid cause, but too harsh > LA ordered Panuncillo's reinstatement to a position one rank lower + 13th month pay + service incentive leave pay > on appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA's decision, finding the dismissal ILLEGAL and ordering Panuncillo's reinstatement > ratio: transaction involving Panuncillo = private; therefore, CAP did not suffer any damage > CAP challenged the decision before the CA via petition for certiorari (R43) > CA reversed the NLRC decision > hence this petition ISSUE: Was the dismissal valid? RULING: YES. > that the [employer] suffered no damage resulting from the acts of [the employee] is inconsequential > deliberate disregard or disobedience of company rules could not be countenanced > any justification that the disobedient employee might put forth would be deemed inconsequential > the heart of the charge is the crooked and anarchic attitude of the employee towards his employer > damage aggravates the charge but its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employees liability > the fact of the matter is that misappropriation was committed by Panuncillo against a client of CAP > the fact of the matter is that Panuncillo repeatedly violated Sec. 8.4 of CAP's Code of Discipline > that being the case, she indeed violated the trust and confidence of CAP and its customers > to allow her to continue with her employment would expose CAP to unnecessary lawsuits from customers like Pernes > MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE = properly exercised

> twin notice rule = complied with > first notice to inform EE of the act/s or omission/s for w/c his dismissal is sought > second notice to inform EE of ER's decision to dismiss him/her > essence of due process = opportunity to be heard, not always in an actual hearing > Panuncillo was given due notice by CAP > Panuncillo did comply > Panuncillo was given a show-cause memo, to w/c she did not reply > memo re: Panuncillo's dismissal = given, in response to w/c Panuncillo filed a motion for reconsideration > no doubt that Panuncillo was given ample opportunity to explain her side > Panuncillo claims that she should be reinstated "under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation" in pursuance of A223, LC, i.e. that the reinstatement-demotion combo ruling by the LA is wrong > of course the LA's ruling is wrong > but not in the way Panuncillo sees it > BECAUSE THE ORDER TO REINSTATE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A FINDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IS FOR A VALID CAUSE (see Colgate vs. Ople) > the NLRC was thus correct in ruling that it was erroneous for the LA to order Panuncillo's reinstatement, even to a position one rank lower than what she held in the past > note that unlike the order for reinstatement of a LA w/c is SELF-EXECUTORY, that of the NLRC is NOT > a writ of execution is needed (see A224, LC) > LA may not issue a writ of execution for an order for reinstatement of the NLRC on basis of judicial courtesy > in w/c case it is as if a TRO was issued > no writ of execution was issued for the implementation of the NLRC order for reinstatement > while under A223 (6), LC, the NLRC decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of 10 calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via petition for certiorari before the CA and then to the SC > if during the pendency of the review, no order is issued by the [higher?] courts enjoining the execution of a decision of the NLRC/LA w/c is favorable to an EE, the NLRC/LA must exercise extreme prudence and observe judicial courtesy when needed > there may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the ER > justitia nemini neganda est HERITAGE HOTEL vs. NLRC, GR 180478-79 (Sept. 3, 2009) FACTS: > Heritage Hotel = petitioner > Rufino Raon, Ismael Villa = respondents > hired by Thai Training and Manpower Services > deployed to work as extra-waiters at the food and beverage section of the Casino Gaming Area of the Heritage Hotel > Raon and Villa filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Heritage > apparently, they were dismissed w/o notice, names no longer included in the December 1997 assignment sked > Heritage denied the existence of an ER-EE relationship, alleging that the ER was Thai Training > LA found out the existence of an ER-EE relationship and held that Raon and Villa were illegally dismissed > also, backwages, unpaid service charges, attorney's fees > Heritage reinstated respondents and appealed to the NLRC, in vain > both parties appealed to the CA > CA dismissed both petitions > Heritage contended that the NLRC should have just resolved said motion, since it was just unable to file the needed bond due to suffering from the effects of the financial recession

> also, Heritage finds fault in the reinstatement order, maintaining that there was no ER-EE relationship ISSUE: Was the appeal filed before the NLRC properly? // Was there no ER-EE relationship? RULING: NO. // THERE WAS. > GR: No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. > XPN: iberal construction of the NLRC rules is allowed only in meritorious cases, where there is substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules by posting a partial bond. > payment of the appeal bond = jurisdictional requisite for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC > that Heritage questioned the computation of the monetary award as the basis of the computation of the amount of appeal bond did not excuse it from posting a bond in a reasonable amount or what it believed to be the correct amount > no exceptional circumstances obtain in the present case warranting the relaxation of the Rules > re: Raons reinstatement = moot, Raon had resigned in the interim GARCIA vs. PAL (Jan. 20, 2009) FACTS: > Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago = petitioners > both employed by PAL > was caught by security along with four co-employees sniffing shabu > inside the Toolroom Section of the Plant Equipment and Maintenance Division (PEMD) of the PAL Technical Center > security seized from them several grams of shabu + aluminum foil + burner + lighter > security also found within the locker of one employee more shabu and other drug paraphernalia + P23,000 > petitioners denied they used shabu, and claimed that they were in the toolroom because they were on duty b. Bureau of Labor Relations (Sec. 16; EO 292 Administrative Code of 1987; Art. 226-233 L.C.) c. 2. National Conciliation and Mediation Board (EO 251) Employer-Employee Relationship

SY vs. CA, 398 SCRA 301 FACTS: > Jaime Sahot = private respondent > worked as truck helper for Vicente Sy Trucking > the trucking company underwent three name changes throughout 36 years > in all of this, Sahot continuously served as truck helper > 4/94 > Sahot was 59 y/o > incurring absences due to various ailments > checked his medical and retirement benefits w/ the SSS > found out that his premium payments have not been remitted by his ER > Sahot filed a week-long leave > in a dilemma > he faced dismissal if he refused to work > but he could not retire either, since his SSS premiums were never paid right > for shame > Sahot filed an illegal dismissal case against Vicente Sy, et al. > Vicente Sy, et al. claimed that Sahot went on leave and was not able to return for work

> due to his refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave = voluntary resignation > LA ruled that there was no illegal dismissal > NLRC modified the judgment of the LA to the effect that there was no abandonment but termination on account of illness > comes w/ P60K separation pay, w/c makes the LA's P15K award peanuts in comparison > hence this petition ISSUES: Was there an ER-EE relationship? // Was Sahot validly dismissed? // Was Sahot entitled to separation pay? RULING: YES. // NO. // YES. > existence of an ER-EE relationship is ultimately a question of fact > findings thereon by the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, deserve not only respect but finality when supported by substantial evidence > while it was very obvious that Sahot did not have any intention to report back to work due to his illness which incapacitated him to perform his job, such intention cannot be construed to be abandonment > same should have been considered as one of those falling under the just causes of terminating an employment > note: Sahot was engaged in the trucking business where physical strength is a requirement > dude was working for YEARS, since he was 23, first as a truck helper, then as a truck driver > A277 (b), LC: burden of proving that the dismissal of an EE was for a valid or authorized cause = on the ER, w/o distinction WON ER admits or does not admit the dismissal requirements: (a) dismissal must be for valid cause; (b) EE must be afforded due process > A284, LC allows ER to terminate employment on the basis of disease > S8, Book VI, Rule I, Omnibus Implementing Rules of the LC: REQUIREMENT = CERTIFICATION by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment > ER clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected > Jaime Sahot is entitled to separation pay > EE who is terminated because of disease is entitled to "separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater" JARDIN vs. NLRC, 326 SCRA 299 FACTS: > petitioners = taxi drivers > boundary system, makes P400 a day > taxi company deducts P30 from the drivers' daily boundary (for car wash fees) > taxi drives opt to unionize in order to protect their interests > taxi drivers were prevented from driving > soon after, a ULP case was filed against the taxi company > taxi company's defense = no ER-EE relationship, but one of lessor and lessee > LA dismissed the case > NLRC reversed the LAs order ISSUE: Was there an ER-EE relationship? RULING: YES. > jurisprudence provides that under the boundary system, relationship is not lessor-lessee but ER-EE > as in the case of jeepney owners/operators and drivers, the former exercises supervisory and control powers over the latter (management, rules, etc.) > also applies to taxi operators and drivers

> petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer Department Order 18-A (Series of 2011) ACEVEDO vs. ADVANSTAR CO. INC., 474 SCRA 656 > Advanstar Company, Inc. = engaged in the sale and distribution of liquor, etc. > Tony Jalapadan = hired as a salesman under Advanstar's employ > Jalapadan was furnished a 6-wheeler truck for the task > Jalapadan was authorized to employ and discharge a driver and other assistants if necessary > HOWEVER, there's a stipulation that the hired hands are to be considered Jalapadan's employees > Jalapadan alone is to be liable for their compensation & actual expenses > Arnulfo Acevedo = hired as driver > Acevedo failed to comply w/ Jalapadan's instructions > Jalapadan lashed out at him, ordered him to alight from the truck, and threatened to leave him behind > Jalapadan later asked the guy to return to work and he (Acevedo) agreed (i.e. they made up) > one day, Acevedo failed to report for work > the day after, Jalapadan berated Acevedo and ordered him to leave > Acevedo did as was told > later, Jalapadan urged Acevedo to go back to work, saying that they were "one big family" > Acevedo refused, and signed a letter informing Jalapadan that he was resigning > Acevedo filed a complaint against Jalapadan, Advanstar, and its general manager for backwages + other benefits > LA judged in favor of Acevedo > LA ruled that the agreement between Jalapadan and Advanstar was a mere subterfuge to for the latter escape its obligations and liabilities to its workers, w/c means that it is NULL AND VOID for being contrary to public policy > NLRC reversed > CA affirmed the NLRC > hence this petition ISSUES: Was Advanstar the employer of Jalapadan? // Was Acevedo an employee of Advanstar? // Did Acevedo properly resign? RULING: SOMEWHAT, NOT REALLY. // YES. // NO. > there is LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING in this case > A106 (4), LC: person supplying workers to ER does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such ER > intermediary = considered merely as an agent of the ER who shall be responsible to the EEs in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him > Jalapadan was NO independent contractor > first, Jalapdan did not have any substantial capital/investment > second, Jalapadan bound himself to work EXCLUSIVELY for Advastar during the terms of the agreement > third, Advastar had the right to control not only the end to be attained but the means to be used in accomplishign it > fourth, Jalapadan was OBLIGED to pay Acevedo's wages and other benefits on Advanstar's dictate > Acevedo did not resign from employment BECAUSE THE LETTER HE SIGNED WAS ADDRESSED TO TANDUAY, NOT TO JALAPADAN 3. Labor Dispute

GOLD CITY vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627 FACTS: > Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. = petitioner > Gold City was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the CDO port > 4/30/85: Gold City's EEs stopped working and went on strike > re: grievances on wages, 13th month pay and hazard pay > the strike paralyzed operations at the port > all EEs involved were members of the Macalajar Labor Union - Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) > MLU-FFW = certified bargaining agent > on the same morning, the EEs filed individual notices of strike with the thenMinistry of Labor > failure of conciliation conferences between Gold City and the strikers = inevitable > Gold City filed a complaint with the LA for illegal strike with prayer for RO/PI > 5/7/85: NLRC issued a TRO > most of the strikers returned to work, leaving private respondents who continued w/ the protest > [apparently, most of the strikers were duped into joining, c/o the 6 respondents who were union officers] > LA found the 4/30 strike to be ILLEGAL > however, the participating EEs will not lose their employment > union officers, to be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from Gold City > upon appeal to the NLRC, the LA's decision was affirmed WITH MODIFICATION > was not really a strike, the NLRC said, but a protest action > huh > all EEs involved are to return to work, indeed, except for the 6 union officers who are to be given 12 months separation pay in lieu of reinstatement (+ 2 years backwages), thanks to the strained relations between them and Gold City > MR filed by Gold City > NLRC modified its previous decision, lowering the backwages to 6 months worth and replacing the backwages award w/ that of P1,000 compensation > both parties filed a petition for certiorari w/ the SC > both alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion > Gold City = for the backwages and separation pay for respondents despite having ruled that the strike was in fact illegal > respondents = for the reduction of separation pay and the deletion of the backwage award > comedy gold ISSUE: Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by the NLRC to participants of an illegal strike? RULING: NO. > STRIKE = most effective weapon of labor > temporary stoppage of work by concerted action of EEs as a result of an industrial/labor dispute > LABOR DISPUTE = any matter/controversy concerning TCs of employment or the association/representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, arranging TCs of employment > strike = ILLEGAL > individual notices of strike = nope > the EEs were represented by a CBA > no compliance w/ secret ballot, cooling-off period, and reporting requirements = all mandatory (see A265, LC) > remaining question: what effect does this have on the EEs involved? > LC qualifies as to its effect on ordinary [union-member] workers and union officers > A264, LC = worker merely participating in illegal strike, MAY NOT BE TERMINATED > only when EE commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status

> striking union MEMBERS amongst the respondents are entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for dismissal

> however, that is all moot, re: union MEMBERS > since all the remaining strikers have ceased to be members of the MLU-FFW > [thanks to a CBA with Gold City containing a union security clause] can no longer be reinstated > FINAL AWARD = one month's salary for every year of service until '85 in the form of backwages > however, since a shitload of time has passed in the interim, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be appropriate, says the SC > striking union OFFICERS will meet a different fate > A264, LC = for knowingly participating in an illegal strike, a union officer may be terminated from employment > illegal strike = more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law >UNION OFFICERS = NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF