Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S.

Embassy
Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02)

NOTE: Jody Woods conducted a follow-up telephone interview with Ms. Pratt on 5/7/02. Her responses
during the conversation appear below in blue.

%OU I iL-' Name: Elizabeth "Susie" Pratt

Date: April 18, 2002 Post: Beirut

Ms. Pratt began her position in Beirut on September 21. 2001. Prior to arriving in Beirut, she held positions in the
Washington fraud prevention offices, the Africa regional office, Sao Paulo, Mozambique, and Hong Kong.

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NIV application and approval process since September
11, 2001? (Check all that apply)

No N/A

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me aid date of birffi«mo4tailte}i^
of Sir* relumed by CLASS (be^ TOnailarofficm JuE
rexpicstefor rSecurity A ^^—••'*~t~^-*-r
s-'availability of p«fSdaal;aRf*arancc'

d,;Increased the percentage of NIV appHcaats-wrKj s

e. pffifcr fjiteaatfspecify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Because of the extreme security situation in Beirut and limited access to the Embassy compound, Beirut only
interviews students and humanitarian emergency cases. Beirut stopped normal NIV services in 1984. We are
planning resumption of full NIV services in December and have just started construction of a secure facility
to permit us to do so.

The absence of our ability to interview in Beirut (see below) requires that we rely on courier services to be
able to process some visas, particularly renewals and those over 60 years of age. However, if we decide that
those submitting through our Personal Appearance Waiver (PAW) AKA "courier services" require an
interview, they are asked to continue their application elsewhere; usually they go to Damascus or Nicosia.
Since September 11, NTV applications have dropped about 55%. Since that oeriod, our refusal rate for
students (F! visas) is aboutl p., as compared to B1/B2 for the same period (j f/o).

In the past months, we revised the courier guidelines and have restricted those who may apply this way. All
first time applicants, and those who hold visa petitions (such as L and H's), those who have had limited visas
or those whose visas expired over ten years ago, must now seek an interview elsewhere.

When I arrived I also limited our internal referral policy and refused to accept "referrals" from those outside
the Embassy who presumed to have "special access"

Legitimate and Illegitimate applicants: Ms Pratt .stated that Beirut only sees those applicants who have had visas
before, are students, employees of American businesses, and diplomats. All other Lebanese applicants must receive
their visas from Damascus or Nicosia. Beirut considers bankers, doctors, graduate medical students, and students
with degrees from recognized universities as strong cases. They see bad students, people who have not completed
their military training as bad cases. She emphasized that just because the students may receive an 1-20 from the
university does not mean they will receive a visa.

Anti-fraud efforts: Ms. Pratt stated that since her arrival, she has really cut back on referrals. With only a few
exceptions, referrals are now required to go through the same procedures as others and apply in Damascus or
Nicosia. She has also increased refusal rates to students and has stopped granting applications from certain
American universities which report their students are not showing up. They have also cut back on their courier
program, and now only receive about 60 passports per week, down from 300. The post used to accept all application
that had previously received visas, even if they hadn't traveled to the U.S. since 1982. She also stopped allowing
families to apply after one member got a visa in Damascus. She did note, however, that she felt many of her
applicants were being honest about their past travel.

New procedures: Of the qualifying applicant pool for the 20-day wait, 99% also require condors.

CLASS matches: Ms. Pratt stated that she would send in a CLASS match in Beirut if the first and last name
matched or were synonymous spellings, and if the d.o.b. was within a few years. She stated that one of the problems
they see, however, is that much of the CLASS information does not include a date or place of birth. When in doubt,
she stated that they send in hits.
2) About what percent of NTV applicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 months prior to September 11,
2001, and (b) since September 11, 2001?

a. 12 months prior to September 11, 2001

b. Since September 11, 2001

Please provide additional comments, if any

Because we only interview students and have not kept statistics that indicate walk-in/interviews we broke
down the information as follows and have extrapolated accordingly. You will note that renewals for student
visas were allowed to apply using the courier system prior to September 11. This is no longer the case and all
must come in person now. What we cannot capture is how many presented themselves for interview based on
humanitarian reasons, but on the whole, in my experience, it would not be more than a low percentage. You
will also note the difference in the number of cases processed in Beirut in the 12 months prior to September
10,2001 (18,202); Since September 1, 2001 to April 18,2002 we processed only 4,573 cases. Much of the fall
in demand, of course, was due to the drop off of interest in travel to the United States in the aftermath of
September 11.

I ran NIV reports for the following periods:

a) 10 Sep 2000 to 10 Sep 2001:

Total NIV cases processed: 18, 202

Total Fl, F2, Jl, J2, Ml and M2: 3,425

The percentage would come up to 19%, however during that time Fl, F2, Jl, J2, Ml and M2s
were able to apply through the courier for renewals. We were only interviewing first-time
applicants. It is hard to estimate how many of the 3425 cases were first time issuances who
came in for interview or those who were able to renew using the courier;

b) 11 Sep 2001 to 18 Apr 2002:

Total NIV cases: 4,573

Total Fl, F2, Jl, J2, Ml and M2: 847

The percentage is 18.52%. For this period we can assume all of the 847 cases came in for
interview.
3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the following security procedures and requirements help your post's
consular officers identify potential terrorists?
(Please check one box m each row.)

Great extent Some extent No extent Not sure No basis to judge

a) Security Advisory X
Opinion for selected
individuals from States
Sponsoring International
Terrorism (see State
109933)
b) Visas Viper Committees X

c) CLASS name check s X

d) The 20-day waiting X

period for selected
applicants (see State
196355)
e) Requirement that X
applicants provide
information on the DS-157
form
f) The Visas Condor X
process (see State 015702)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

(a) - we received very few applications that need these SAO's for individuals of certain countries.
(b) Visas viper—Ms. Pratt stated that she meets quarterly with the visas viper committee. She noted one case in
which she ran names from a local arrest report through other colleagues from law enforcement agencies. She
stated that since people serve for only I year in Beirut, it is hard to maintain continuity in cooperation matters.
She could not speak to cooperation pre 9/11, but estimated that her colleagues are both receiving more
information on potential terrorists, and providing more information to consular affairs. In the past, she felt
there was some reluctance to enter names into CLASS on shaky information, because of the fear if the
information was bad, it would preclude that person from ever getting a visa.
(d) (e) and (f) My responses to d, e and f as "unsure" reflect that, although most of our male applicants in the
age 16-45 category are subject to these procedures, we have never received any adverse information on
these applicants as a result of this process or been asked to not issue a visa or seek further information.
Ms. Pratt stated that the only information she has received from Washington are based on CLASS check
information, which should would have received regardless of the new procedures. In addition, the
supplemental questionnaire, the DS 157 does not request all the information we are required to capture
for the cond«l*|MWCcdures. For example, the form asks for ten years of travel, but condor requires all
travel to certiilr areas be reflected, if applicable. We did submit suggestions for modifications to the DS
157 via e-maff fetlte Visa Office, as I believe they are looking at revising the form. DS-157: Ms. Pratt
stated that she would like to see more space on the DS-157 for applicant answers, particularly the feiled that
asks for prior travel She also stated that some information that does not appear to be useful, like spelling their
name in their native alphabet, should be removed.
 4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would the following proposed changes to the NTV application process
help identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box in each row.)

a. 50%
(Ifyou cheek veiryor j^m»whaf helpful; please
indicate theg^genfagfe^ "'* ''
b. Interview all applicants 50%
c. Fingerprint a percentage of an applicants (If you 100
check very or somewhat helpful please indicate the
percentage
d. Fingerprint all applicants • 50
e. Improve training for coasular officers in identifying 100
suspected terrorists, cooperating with,other agencies/
internatii " ' "
100
function (If yott check in the

. „??*!»..**• tfoiwiernatn
within State or be
100%

i. Other (please specify) .;.*' 5;'' •

Please provide additional comments, if any.

(a) (b) It is very difficult to estimate what any of this would do to improve the visa process - what we really
need is better information sharing.. Other agencies that have information are often unwilling to share it -
for whatever reason, I am not sure, but the consular officer on the line are left out to dry, because we are
reviewing the visa applications - and if everything looks in order and the case is not an intending immigrant
and there is no "hit" in the name check function, where are we?. We can interview an applicant in a visa
waiting room, but we can't read an applicant's mind. Ms. Pratt stated that the trend within State recently has
been to move away from nterviewing applicants, but she also stated that often she cannot adjudicate cases on
documents alone.

(c) and (d) This would certainly help in cases where people change identities; while good fraud work can
produce effective results, it cannot deter everything - such as when a sovereign state issues a bone fide
passport to a known male fide individual who is seeking to circumvent a system in which only a name/place
and date of birtb are known - and changes identity accordingly. Fingerprints - and rapid search for matches
might be an effective deterrent, but I shudder to think what that will do to our own citizens in other
countries. Countries to respond accordingly and "reciprocity" is the name of the game, would be a very
effective deterrent. But will we correct the right fingerprints - they identify people after the fact, not before.
If we collect at the interview, it would certainly be effective for locating and tracking individuals who have
applied for visas; but we have to consider the workload, space implications - and what host countries would
think of us fingerprinting their citizens. What about photo/facial recognition technology. Where are we on
that? Ms. Pratt also expressed concern that fingerprint information would not be used properly or might not be used
at all.

(e) Better and MORE training is always important - particularly from law enforcement and other agencies;
but again, they must have the confidence in us that we know how to use the information wisely and
 \d
our borders. Information is of no use if it cannot be applied.

As for "cultural sensitivity" -1 am not sure what is meant by this; we live in the environment, interview folks
every day, have been trained in the language and are predisposed to learn and adapt quickly by the very
calling to be a Foreign Service Officer. Good and more training is always important, but what we learn in
dealing with the "clientele" every day is invaluable - in fact consular officers often have a better handle on
society because of our constant daily contact and the questions we ask.

Training—Ms. Pratt stated that she would also like to see more time training new officers to interview, giving them
a chance to interview in Washington, and possibly even allowing them to view airport operations. She also
supported the idea of getting periodic briefings on terrorism trends. Overall, she emphasized that training should be
given a higher priority, since workflow is often so demanding that officers aren't really given a chance to focus on
the train ing.

(f) No, I absolutely do not think that the visa function should be a law enforcement function. This assumes
that consular officers do not know what they are doing, which I believe is a wrong assumption - and, by
extension assumes that "law enforcement" will make better judgements, be more sensitive and aware of
cultural issues, etc. It is training, that is required, not shifting the responsibility. Making the visa function a
law enforcement role would assume that we are going to change the whole concept of who gets a visa to travel
to the US - and I am not sure that is what we want to do either. For instance, why is it that we still get
congressional requests to process visas and we still get cables that say "our doors are open" to encourage
students. We need to seek a balance between security and understanding that we will and must continue to
have legitimate visitors to the US.

We also have to acknowledge, that law enforcement exists at the Port of Entry. INS inspectors and border
patrol agents are law enforcement and they have the final word on who gets in. The consular function is to
issue visas - but that does not guarantee entry into the United States - that is up to INS.

(H) it all gets down to better information - neither consular officers nor law enforcement can
operate effectively in a vacuum.

Other- Ms. Pratt stated that main State must better define expectations in light of 9/11. For example, she
stated that if ensuring border security is the top priority, State should announce that long waiting lines are
o.k. if that's what it takes. She expressed concern that since 9/11 State has sent mixed messages. She
noted one example that at the same time they were receiving information on new security requirements,
they also received a cable encouraging student visa iasuances. When asked if historically she felt pressure
to issue visas. Ms. Pratt stated that while no manager ever told her to issue a visa, there was a general
feeling that issuing visas should be promoted. She blamed part of this on congressional constituent letters
and part on mixed messages coining from the Department.
5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to the NIV process?
(Please check one box in each row.)

Very • ^ - « Some- j--' -"' -' Not Not

feasible what feasible sure
feasible
. 1. , , . , - , , . , .
a Interview a greater percentage of all applicants (If X
you check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate
the percentage %)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage' ,%) Si
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying „ ;! X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/ *
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity •* • :-
t "BtaMlJ&vi^procesi^ X
g. Institute a secure travel document that incorporates a ' X
biometric such as fingerprints 1_~-
h. Other (please specify) , "r;*

LOfljflr (please specify) ,7^1

Please provide additional comments, if any.

(a) (b) and (c) - the only reason I check "not feasible" is the particular security constraints of Beirut; if we
decide to interview all applicants, we would simply have to send them elsewhere, such as Damascus or Nicosia
and eliminate accepting visa applications here; in the future when we have a visa facility, we could move in
that direction. At this point we are simply not equipped to interview those other than humanitarian
emergencies or students.

Ms. Pratt stated that any changes like fingerprinting would require drastic resource shifts.
6) Would any of the following factors make it difficult for your post to fully implement the proposed changes listed
in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

Yes, to a great Yes, to some No Not sure

extent extent
a. Consular staffing shortages X
b. Lack of space, facilities X
c. An adverse effect-on U.S. interests X
in the host country (please elaborate
in comments section)
d Host country would require same X
of U.S. citizens (reciprocity)
e. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Any recommended changes would demand a high increase in staffing and space for processing. Already
condor cables take up a significant amount of work, for example. We currently lack the space and facility to
implement changes as suggested, although an NIV section is being constructed. As it is, I worry about
staffing for a new visa section; any new security regulation, as we have seen in the past few months in Beirut,
even with limited visa services, requires new bureaucratic tracking procedures, new cables and a public
information campaign. The latest requirement to capture all photos refused applicants adds another step to
our procedure - more staff time and equipment (e.g. cameras). I don't disagree with the requirement, and
think it is a good change, but from a management perspective any increase in internal visa procedures
requires more staff and leaves us less time to deal with applicants. We always seem to be under pressure to
do more with less.

As for the host country (Lebanon) requiring the same of US citizens, I think we may see the possibility that it
will be more difficult for Americans to travel to this area of the world if we layer on increasing security
procedures (like fingerprints) for their own citizens. Already we are seeing a decline in interest by potential
travelers to go to the United States from here (a 55% decline in visa applications over last year, as I
mentioned earlier). While Lebanon would like to increase its tourism revenue, American citizens are not
necessarily the most important target group; tourists from neighboring Arab countries and the Gulf states
provide far more revenue to Lebanon. Any changes in visa policy will always have reciprocal results - and
also may be a reason for Arab League states to band together and reciprocate. As we become more law-
enforcement minded and apparently seek to limit travel to the United States, are we not reversing the trend of
globilization and the need to interact in a global environment?