INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

FOR TOM DA VIES

1 p.m., Tuesday, December 2, 2003
GSA, Room 5125 Conference Room

1. Provide a detailed account of what you did on Sept. 11, 2001, and in the days immediately
following.

a. Your personal story and observations

b. Identify any outstanding strengths and weaknesses in the response effort
c. With regards to the response effort, what was supposed to happen?
d. What actually happened?
e. Was there a difference?
f. What can we learn from this?

2. FEMA's top 3 priorities at the WTC site included: rescue operations, by providing US&R
teams; assessment of infrastructure damage; and debris management. What were the
priorities at the Pentagon?

a. Were there other priorities?

b. How did these priorities change over the first 10 days?

3. Comment on your situational awareness when you arrived at the Pentagon.

The second and third full site-clearing evacuations were based on invalid threat
information obtained during the period of time when there was not a senior FBI presence
at the ICP. Accurate information should have been available, given the presence of the
FBI, FEMA, the military, and the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Fire
Department, (p. A-30)

4. What was the status of communications and how did this impacted FEMA's response
operations?

a. To what extent did the Mobile Emergency Response Sytems (MERS) overcome these
problems? (2200 hours, 14 Sep)

5. Provide your observations and thoughts on FEMA's coordination with Arlington County.

a. What were the strongest and weakest links?

b. The Recovery ETG was activated on September 12. Its initial task was to work with
the FEMA Disaster Field Office, which would occupy some 20,000 square feet of
rented office space to complete its work during the weeks immediately following the
attack, (p. D-15)

6. FEMA representative on Unified Command: While the ACFD would retain final
decisionmaking authority, the Unified Command team would include command-level
representatives from the ACFD, ACPD, FBI, DoD, FEMA, and the leader of the Incident
Support Team (1ST), (p. A-28)
Unified Command team meetings were scheduled 4 times a day, including the
Incident Command staff and liaison personnel from the military, FBI, ACPD,
FEMA, and the 1ST leader representing the US&R teams, (p. A-29)
7. FEMA representative at Arlington County EOC?

8. When did the US&R teams, emergency supplies, and Incident Support Team arrive at the
Pentagon?

a. Was there a delay due to the grounding of commercial air transport?

b. How did these FEMA assets reach the Pentagon?
c. If there was a delay, what impact did it have on response operations?
d. How might this be troubleshooted or prevented in the future?

9. What flights, if any, were conducted over the disaster area with sensors?

a. What types of data did these flights gather?

10. How did FEMA coordinate with EPA for environmental and sampling support?

a. Were environmental or air quality reports provided to you?

b. Were there any concerns?

11. Following the Pentagon operations, some responding mutual-aid jurisdictions experienced
difficulty getting reimbursed for their costs. Delays stemmed from concerns on the part of
FEMA regarding the mutual-aid pacts between those jurisdictions and Arlington County, (p.
A-50)

a. Time and attendance records: It was not until the second week of the response that the
ACPD learned that FEMA also required a description of the duties performed by each
officer during the recorded time period. Sergeant Morris and the administrative staff
had to recreate all of this information, (p. C-24)
b. Mutual-aid agreements should be reviewed with the Virginia Department of
Emergency Management and FEMA to ensure responding jurisdictions will be
reimbursed in a reasonable fashion. (FD-063) (p. A-52)

12. Describe FEMA's Individual Assistance programs.

a. Was FEMA able to avoid duplication of assistance?

13. Describe FEMA's role in donations management.

a. Was FEMA involved in leasing warehouse space?

b. Was FEMA involved in establishing a transportation routing network?

14. Describe FEMA's role in volunteer coordination.

a. Who had the lead for this support?

15. Was FEMA involved with debris removal?

16. How did indemnification issues affect FEMA?

17. How did database/information sharing and privacy act issues affect FEMA's operations?
2
18. Were there security clearance issues that needed to be resolved, either within FEMA or
between FEMA and state and local agencies?

19. In your professional judgment, is there a need to enhance FEMA's US&R capabilities in
cases where buildings or other large structures collapse and trap individuals?

[According to CFR Report, June 2003, "The FEMA teams' needs were estimated to be
around $56 million a year for effective training and mobilization exercise development
and for equipment maintenance."]

20. In your professional judgment, should FEMA-maintained caches contain a larger amount of
personal protective equipment, so that local responders and supplemental units could be fully
equipped and replenished with new gear as needed?

a. Or is the current amount of equipment appropriate?

[According to RAND Report, Vol. 1, 2002, "Firefighter panelists recommended that

caches contain ample supplies of boots, gloves, PAPRs (Powered Air-Purifying
Respirators), and lighter-weight clothing, such as coveralls.]

21. In your professional judgment, should incoming FEMA US&R teams be prepared to bring in
a supply of equipment for local responders who are already on the scene, especially in
smaller jurisdictions that might not have sufficient supplies on hand?

22. Title VI of the Stafford Act (P.L. 106-390) authorizes the Director of FEMA to coordinate
federal and state emergency preparedness plans, has this authority been applied sufficiently
to ensure adequate levels of coordination and planning between and among federal, state, and
local jurisdictions?

23. Do state and local emergency management agencies lack the resources to develop and
maintain critical emergency management capabilities?

a. What more needs to be done to encourage and facilitate mutual aid and other cross-
jurisdictional agreements that pool resources, minimize costs, and enhance national
preparedness?

24. If the events of Sept. 11 have changed the way America responds to disasters, what changes
would you recommend that are not already being implemented?
FEMA - PENTAGON TIMELINE

9/11
1100 FEMA US&R VA-TF 1 (Fairfax County) activated for the Pentagon
FEMA US&R VA-TF 2 (Virginia Beach) activated for the Pentagon
1155 Members of a FEMA 1ST depart Lincoln, NE to drive to the Pentagon
1200 Pentagon Incident Commander calls for US&R and NMRTs
FEMA activates Emergency Response Team
1330 FEMA US&R VA-TF 1 deploys to the Pentagon
1350 FEMA US&R VA-TF 1 arrives at the Pentagon
1400 FEMA US&R MD-TF 1 deploys to the Pentagon
FEMA US&R VA-TF 2 deploys to the Pentagon
1410 VA-TF 1 deploys search and recon teams into the Pentagon
1500 Arlington County Board ratifies emergency declaration
1800 FEMA US&R TN-TF 1 deploys to the Pentagon
1900 VA-TF 2 enroute to the Pentagon
2200 VA-TF 2 arrives in Arlington from Virginia Beach

9/12
0600 JOC opens at Fort Myer
0800 FEMA US&R 1ST is established at the Pentagon
0800 FEMA US&R TN-TF 1 arrives at the Pentagon
0845 FEMA files notice of Presidential Declaration of an Emergency for Virginia (effective 12
Sept)
1000 3 evacuation order of Pentagon site due to approach of "unidentified aircraft"
1300 Pentagon indicates it will handle medical/mortuary needs
1400 Arlington County requests Major Disaster Declaration
FEMA ERT-A is on-site in Arlington County
FEMA Region III Liaison Officer in VEOC
MD-TF 1 arrives at the Pentagon
TN-TF 1 staged
1530 VA-TF 2 on-scene at Pentagon, assigned to work night shifts with VA-TF 1

9/13
0700 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieved by MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1
1400 Federal Emergency Declaration issued for Arlington County, effective 9/11
1700 FEMA announces that the president has ordered emergency aid to support immediate
response efforts in Virginia
1900 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieve MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1

9/14
0700 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieved by MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1
1900 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieve MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1
2200 MERS completes installation of telecommunications equipment brining FEMA DFO and
Arlington online

9/15
0700 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieved by MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1
1900 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieve MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1
9/16
0700 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieved by MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1
1700 FEMA US&R NM-TF 1 activated for deployment to the Pentagon
1900 VA-TF 1 and VA-TF 2 relieve MD-TF 1 and TN-TF 1

9/17
0800 NM-TF 1 arrives at the Pentagon
NM-TF 1 deploys to the Pentagon
TN-TF 1 redeploys from the Pentagon
1200 Pentagon reports 124 personnel dead or unaccounted
1900 Metro-Dade, Florida rescuers stop at the Pentagon while enroute to NYC

9/18
0700 NM-TF 1 relieves VA-TF 1 and MD-TF 1
1200 VA-TF 1 deactivated from Pentagon
1400 VA DFO holds disaster human services coordination meeting
1800 MD-TF 1 deactivated from Pentagon

9/19
2359 VA-TF 2 deactivated from Pentagon

9/20
1600 NM-TF 1 completes last shift
2359 Only one US&R TF is still operating at the Pentagon

9/21
0700 Final US&R TF (NM-TF 1) deactivated from Pentagon
FEMA DFO Arlington ceases 24-hour operations
1900 President Bush a Major Disaster Declaration for Arlington County

9/22
1730 Incident Response Team at Pentagon released

9/24
1200 FEMA DFO receives 17 requests for public assistance
Pentagon reports 125 building occupants dead for missing

9/26
1600 ESF-10, NMRT and MST deactivated from the Pentagon
Pentagon reporting 125 killed or missing, 64 killed in the aircraft

9/28
1200 FEMA DFO Arlington has received 39 requests for public assistance