False Belief in the "Theaetetus" Author(s): Gail Fine Reviewed work(s): Source: Phronesis, Vol. 24, No.

1 (1979), pp. 70-80 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182057 . Accessed: 31/03/2012 12:28
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False belief in the Theaetetus

GAIL FINE

1. It is often supposed that Plato regards knowledge as some kind of acquaintance,so that knowingconsistsin some sort of graspingor hitting, the only altemativeto which is not hitting,or missing.Knowledgeis an all or nothing, hit or miss affair. It is also often assumed that this model of knowledge underliesor explains Plato's supposed inability to accommodate false belief in dialogues prior to the Sophist.Eitherone "hits"what one is talkingabout, and so has knowledge,not false belief;or else one fails to grasp, and so has said nothing, and hence again does not have false
belief.'

A major source of evidence adduced in support of this view is the discussionof false belief. That discussionends at an impasse, Theaetetus' is and it often allegedthat Plato fails to explainin what false belief consists because of an underlyingacquaintancemodel.2With this claim I shall not quarrel.I shall argue,however,that Plato is not committedto the underlying acquaintancemodel that occurs here. Rather,he uses it to buttress just before the discussionof false belief Theaetetus'suggestion,presented (at 187b),that knowledgeis truebelief. When,at the end of the discussion, Socrates rejects Theaetetus' suggestion (20la-c), he also rejects the acquaintancemodel that had made Theaetetus'suggestionlook plausible and that also precludes a satisfactoryexplanation of false belief. This strategy, in addition to freeing Plato from any commitment to the acquaintancemodel here, also shows that the discussionof false belief is not, as is usually supposed, an irrelevantdigression, awkwardlysandwiched between Theaetetus' definition and its refutation.3Rather, the discussionis an integral part of Plato's attack on that definition. I shall returnto these generalmoralsat the close of the paper.First,however,it is necessaryto understandSocrates'generalprocedure. Socrates presents two puzzles designed to show that false belief is impossible, and three models that attempt, but fail, to overcome the puzzles.I shall here consideronly the firstpuzzle,what I shall call K, and I argue firstthat the firstmodel of false belief, allodoxiaor otherjudging.4 K rests on a strong acquaintanceview. I then argue that allodoxia is not defectivein any of the ways usually proposed,but that it matchesPlato's accountof falsityin the Sophist.It fails here only becauseof its relianceon
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K. But since Plato is not committedto K, this does not show thathe cannot handle the subtletiesof allodoxia.Rather,allodoxia'sfailureto explainin what false belief consists is an indirect argument that Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as true belief is faulty, since that definition accountof requiresK in its support,and K in turn precludesa satisfactory false belief. 2. I turn first to the first puzzle (188 a-c), what I call K. Socratesargues that: (1) For any x, either one knowsx or one does not know x. (2) For any x such that one has a belief about x, either one knows x or one does not know x. (3) It is impossiblefor one both to know and not to know the same thing. He then arguesthat (I)-(3) rule out false belief: (4) If one has a false belief that x is y, either (a) one knows x and y; or (b) one knows x or y, but not both; or (c) one knows neitherx nor y. (5) None of (4) (a)-(c) is possible. (6) Thereforethere is no false belief. Two questions arise immediately.First, why is none of the cases describedin (4) possible?(I)-(3) seem simplyto be instancesof logicallaws,(1) and (2) of the law of the excluded middle, and (3) of the principle of noncontradiction;it is then difficult to see how they could rule out false belief.5Second, even if (5) follows, why does (6) follow?(5) seems at most to rule out false identitybeliefs; (6) rules out all false beliefs.6 Socratesdefends (5) in this way: if one believes that x is y, but x is not y, then one is ignorantof x and y (188b4-6).But if one is ignorantof x and y, one cannot have any beliefs about them, and hence no false beliefs about them (188b6-c4). Otherwise put, whichever option in (2) obtains, false belief is impossible. If one does not know x, one cannot have any beliefs about x; but if one does know x, one cannot have any false beliefs about x, since knowledgeprecludeserror.If one is to have a belief aboutx, then, one must know x: (2a) For any x such that one has a belief about x, one knows x. Read one way, (2a) is innocuous enough. If I have a belief about something, I must know it in at least the minimal sense that I could identify or recognizeit; I do not have beliefs, for example,about personsI have never met or heardof. (2a) then sufficesto ruleout (4b) and (4c); in them I do not know, that is, could not identify or recognize,one of the items in a pur-

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portedbelief. If I am totallyignorantof one of these items,it is reasonable to suppose that I cannot hold the belief in question. But this still leaves (4a). Suppose I know Gerald Ford; I've heard him, seen picturesof him, could easily recognizehim, and so forth.Still, I might have the false belief about him that he was born in Boston; (2a) is not strongenough to yield (5). Other readingsof (2) are possible, however.We might note, first, that for 'x' areall of persons.We mightthen supposehe has Plato'ssubstitutions in mind some sort of acquaintanceprinciple: (2b) For any x such that one has a belief-aboutx, one is acquaintedwith is taken in the ordinarysense in which I can x. However,if 'acquaintance' it is still not strongenough.I may have 'know'a personor thing(connaitre), met Gerald Ford, and so 'know'him or be acquaintedwith him; nonethewill less, I might still thinkhe was born in Boston.Connatre-acquaintance not rule out false belief, as Plato attemptsto do.7 Russell once held a principle like (2b), claiming that "whenever a relationof judging or supposingoccurs,the termsto which the supposing orjudging mind is relatedby the relationof supposingorjudging must be Russellexplained termswith which the mind in question is acquainted."8 with anythingof whichwe furtherthat "Weshall say we have acquaintance
are directly aware ... no further knowledge of [such a thing] is even

Acquaintance,in this sense, confers total knowltheoreticallypossible."9 edge; it is, moreover,a hit or miss, all or nothing, affair. Either one is acquaintedwith something,and so knows all there is to know about it, or else one is not acquaintedwith it, and so has total ignorance.(2b) then becomes: (2c) For any x such that one has a belief about x, one either knows everythingabout x or is totallyignorantof x. And (2c) does yield (5). If I am ignorantof x, I have no beliefs about x, as aboutx, I can have no false (2a) plausiblyclaimed;but if I knoweverything beliefs about x. Although (2c) yields (5), (I)-(3) are now no longer innocuous.

3. The answerto oursecondquestion,of why Platomovesfrom(5) to (6), of the firstmodel of false belief, allodoxiaor emergesfrom a consideration othejudging. Socratessuggeststhat a false belief occurswhen one "saysin his thought that somethingof the things that are is, having interchanged some other thing for it. For then he alwaysjudges somethingthat is, but one thingin place of another,and sincehe misseswhathe was aimingat, he can rightlybe said to be judging falsely."(189c1-4)Theaetetussuggestsas one thinksugly in place of beautiful,or beautifulin an example"whenever
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place of ugly." (68av ya,p TlS &VTi xotXoi 0aGxpbv Ii &VTi axWXpovxnaX6v bott-n 189c5-6). Theaetetus'exampleis an instanceof the generalschema'thinkingthatx is not x but somethingelse, y'. But thereare at least fourways in which this schema can be read and, correspondingly,at least four ways in which Theaetetus'examplecan be parsed.One difficultyarisesover Plato'suse of such phrases as 'the beautiful' (to kalon). The phrase can refer to the propertyof beauty;but it can also be used as an adjective,as 'the beautiful ', with a properor common name filling the blank.A seconddifficulty ariseswhen we note that Theaetetus'examplecan be taken to be either an of a belief; it might be a verbatim representation opaque or a transparent reportof a belief, or it mightbe a descriptionof a belief thatdoes not report it verbatim.'0Thus one way we might read Theaetetus'exampleis: (7) Theaetetusthinks that uglinessis beauty. In (7) 'ugliness'refersto the propertyof ugliness,and Theaetetus'example of a belief - the termsit contains is taken to be an opaque representation also occur explicitly in the believer's belief, and the example is a direct reportof that belief. The belief is also an identitybelief, involvinga mix-up of conceptsor properties. Now (7) is a readingoften proposedfor allodoxia."'But if (7) is the right reading of Theaetetus'example, it is unclearwhy Theaetetusneeds such lengthy persuadingthat allodoxia is implausible- for on (7) allodoxia is obviously implausibleand unintelligible.Nor is it plausibleto supposethat allodoxia, so construed,is a generalmodel for false belief; it is not at all obvious that every false belief involves the explicit mix-up of concepts or propertiesthat occursin (7). Yet Socratesintroducesallodoxiaas thoughit is a generalmodel of false belief, and, moreover,as thoughit is a plausible one. As Ackrillnotes, we should be justly disappointedif (7) is all allodoxia discusses.12 Otherreadingsof allodoxiaare possible,however.Theaetetus' ratherthan opaquely,as a description, examplecan be read transparently ratherthan as a verbatimreport,of Theaetetus'belief: (8) Theaetetusthinksof ugliness that it is beauty. In (8) 'ugliness'is still taken to refer to the propertyof ugliness. But now Theaetetus does not explicitly say 'ugliness is beauty'. Rather, he is describedas believing that uglinessis beauty,but his actualbelief would be, for example, 'gaudinessis beauty'.Now some instancesof allodoxia,construedon the model (8) provides,may be unintelligible.Theaetetus'belief mightbe so far wrongthatwe would say, not thathe has a false belief about beauty, but that he fails to have the concept at all (for example,he might
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believe 'whatdisguststhe beholderis beauty').But aside fromthis limiting case, many instancesof the allodoxasticschema,construedas in (8), will be intelligible. For example, 'being brightly colored is beauty' is false but intelligible;and so (8) is an instanceof the allodoxasticschemathat is not unintelligible. (7) and (8) restrictthemselves to considerationof properties.But the schemaSocratesprovidescan also accommodatebeliefs concerningparticulars: (9) Theaetetus thinks that the ugly thing (for example, Socrates) is beautiful. (10) Theatetusthinksof the ugly thing (for example, Socrates)that it is beautiful. thing In (9) and (10) 'ugly'functionsas an adjective,and some particular of the is affirmedto be beautiful.(9), like (7), is an opaque representation belief, and it is similarlyunintelligible.Theaetetushere explicitlyaffirms somethinglike 'uglySocratesis beautiful',and it is difficultto construethis representation belief so thatit is intelligible.13 (10), like (8), is a transparent sentence. of the belief, and it is a prima facie plausiblesubject-predicate Theaetetus'explicit belief would be, for example, 'Socratesis beautiful'. 'beautifi" This belief is still allodoxastic,since Theaetetushas substituted for 'ugly';but the belief, althoughfalse, involvesno mix-upof conceptsor properties. Now (8) and (10) togethershow how allodoxiacan be a plausiblemodel of false belief, and one thatis perfectlygeneral.They showthatinstancesof the general schema are neither restrictedto identity beliefs nor to beliefs of beliefs; rather, involving only propertiesnor to opaque representations judgments. the schemawill even accommodate ordinarysubject-predicate (8) and (10) show how Platocan move from(5) to (6). For Correspondingly to identity althoughthe beliefs describedin K may appearto be restricted is unnecessary there,too. For beliefs, (8) and (10) show that the restriction K's schema for false belief is also 'thinkingthat x is not x but something else, y' (cf., e.g., 188b3-5),and (8) and (10) show that instances of this schema are not restrictedto identity beliefs. (8) and (10) also match the Sophist'saccount of falsity, where false statementsare analyzedas cases where one says of somethingsomethingother than what is true of it (cf., e.g., 263b7-13). (8) and (10) are then prima facie plausible false beliefs; they show how allodoxia can accommodateall false beliefs; they explain K's seeming restrictionto identitybeliefs; and they matchPlato'saccount of falsity in the Sophist.14 But although they are possible readingsof the allodoxasticformula for representingfalse beliefs, this does not by itself
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show that they are the readingsPlato intends. All I have argued so far is that if(8) and (10) are the readingsPlatointends,allodoxiais more general and more plausible than on any other reading; but does Plato intend allodoxiato be generaland plausible9 Theaetetus'opening commentssuggestthat he does. But Socrates'concluding comments,in which allodoxiais rejected,rathersuggest(7) or (9). Socrates asks Theaetetus to 'try to recall whether you have ever said to yourselfthat assuredlywhat is ugly is beautifulor thatwhatis unjustis just. Or again, in general, consider whether you have ever tried to persuade
yourself that assuredly one thing is another thing ...' (190b2-8). The

attemptis takento be absurd;but since neither(8) nor (10) is absurd,(7) or (9) should be assumedhere. Now it is usuallysupposedthatsince Socratesclearlyinvokes(7) or (9) in his rejectionof allodoxia, either they are all he considershere, or, alternatively, that he somehow confuses them with (8) or (10).15The first For if (7) or (9) are all Platoconsiders,it is, as I alternativeis unattractive. have alreadynoted, difficult to understandwhy Theaetetusinitially takes allodoxia to be a plausible model of false belief, or why he needs such lengthy persuadingthat it is not. Perhaps,then, Plato confusesthe various possibilities,tradingon the plausibilityof(8) and (10) to secureTheaetetus' agreement,but using (7) or (9) to show the absurdityof allodoxia. An equally plausible interpretation that avoids attributingconfusion to Plato is to be preferred, however,and I think such an interpretation is available. I shall arguethat Socratesbeginswith the plausible(8) or (10) and hence Theaetetusacceptsallodoxiaas a plausiblemodel of false belief- but that Socratesthen argues that (8) or (10) can be reduced to (7) or (9), respectively; the argumenthe presentsis valid, however,and does not trade on any confusion. The key to this interpretation lies in the interveningdiscussionbetween Theaetetus' initial example and Socrates'criticism of it, where Socrates proposes that thinking is a sort of silent speech, 'speech the mind goes throughwith itself about whateverit is considering.'(189e6-7).In likening belief to speech, Socratesis saying that they are equally propositional,or involve a completesentencefor theirexpression.Uttering'beautiful'alone, for example,is not the expressionof a belief, but 'Socratesis beautiful'is. Socrates then insists that in any belief 'both things'(189el-2) must be involved,and uses this claim to turn all cases of otherjudging into cases of (7) or (9). Now 'both things'clearly refersto 'beautiful'and 'ugly'; but as (7)-(10) make clear, thereare differentways in which both thingsmight be in the mind. For example,Socratesmightbe insistingthatwhen onejudges
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of an ugly thing that it is beautiful,one's belief must explicitlycontain the terms'ugly'and 'beautiful',so that even (10) involvesan explicitmix-upof concepts.If this is meant,it will be difficultto acquitSocratesof foul play. But anotherreadingof the requirement that 'both things'be in the mind is possible. Socratesmight only be insisting that any judgment affirming one thing to be anothermustinvolveboth itemsin some way, so as to yield a complete sentence in satisfactionof the logos model of belief. But the ugly can be in the mindwithoutbeing thereunderthe description 'theugly' if Socrates,for example,is an ugly thingand is in the mind.Both things,on this view, might be Socrates(who is the ugly thing) and beautiful.Taken this way, Socrates'requirement does not illicitlyrequireself-contradiction (as in (7)) in every belief, but only insists, plausibly, that complete sentences represent beliefs: something must be affirmed to be beautiful. The requirement, then, is consistentwith (8) and (10). Using this plausible claim, however, Socratescan now validly reduce
(10) to (9)
-

given K.

If 'Socrates'and 'beautiful'figurein one'sjudgment,one must, by (2c), know Socratesand beautiful.But if one knowsSocrates,one knowsthathe is ugly. If one does not know this, he is ignorantof Socrates,and so cannot have any beliefs about him. If, though,one knowsthat Socratesis ugly,yet claims that he is beautiful,it is as if he said that ugly Socratesis beautiful. And such a belief is absurd. We can schematizePlato'sargumentlike this: (I1) Theaetetusthinksthat Socratesis beautiful(10). (12) Socratesis ugly. (13) ThereforeTheaetetusthinksthat ugly Socratesis beautiful. The move from(1 1) and (12) to (13) can be validatedwith the aid of K: (14) Theaetetus knows Socrates and beauty, since they figure in his judgment (2c). (15) Theaetetus,since he knows Socrates,knowsthat he is ugly. (16) Theaetetus thinks (a) Socrates is ugly (15), and (b) Socrates is beautiful(1 1). (17) ThereforeTheaetetusthinksthat ugly Socratesis beautiful(13). Plato has not simply confused (10) and (9); he has argued validly that, given K, (10) reducesto (9). 4. I have argued so far that otherudging is a plausible model of false belief, endorsedby Plato in the Sophist;it fails here not because of any of its intrinsicfeatures,nor becausePlatocannotyet handleits subtleties,but because, given K, it can be reduced to absurdity.But this pushes our problemback a step: why endorseK?
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K offers us, with (2c), a purportedlyexhaustivedichotomyof knowing all about or being totally ignorantof a thing, a dichotomygeneratedby a particularmodel of acquaintance. The way to dispel K is simply to attack that acquaintance model, or to point out that the dichotomy is not genuinely exhaustive. It is not the case that, for any x, either I know everything about x or am totally ignorant of it; I might be in the intermediate position of having knowledge-independent beliefs. Why does Plato not mention this simple refutationof (2c)? We might think the answeris that he endorsesK, that he believes that any graspof a thing confers total knowledge of it, and that the only alternativeis total ignorance.Knowledgeis a hit or miss,all or nothingaffair.Thereis a better explanationof K's presencehere, however,if we recallthe context within which K is offered. Theaetetusproposesthatknowledgeis truebelief; Socratesthen turnsto a discussion of false belief and, when he fails to explain it, argues that Theaetetus'definition is faulty; "it is impossibleto know what [falsebelief is] until one knows what knowledge is." (200d). This suggests that the discussionof false belief is relativeto Theaetetus'definitionand that, since the discussionended in failure,the definitionthat guides it is defective. Now the failure to explain false belief resulted from K's strong acquaintancemodel, which precludedany distinctionbeween true belief and knowledge:on thatmodel, any graspof a thingamountsto knowledge, and so true belief, since it involves a graspof a thing, is knowledge.But of courseTheaetetusshouldwelcomethis result,since he suggeststhatthereis no distinction between knowledge and true belief. Thus, the underlying acquaintancemodel, although it precludes a satisfactoryexplanation of false belief, supportsTheaetetus'suggestion,by obliteratingany distinction betweenknowledgeand truebelief.16 K occurshere,then, not because Plato is vulnerable to it, but because it follows from the acquaintance model introducedin supportof Theaetetus'suggestion. I do not claim that Theaetetus'definition entails the conundrumsof K. Rather,I claim thatthe acquaintancemodel that underliesK is a sufficient condition of Theaetetus'definition.If the acquaintance model is accepted, Theaetetus generates the conundrums of K, and prevents us from the consequences of accepting the support used to make Theaetetus' definitionlook plausible.17 But there is a problem: the acquaintance model used to support Theaetetus generates the conumdrums of K, and prevents us from accommodatingfalse belief. The supportused for Theaetetus'definition leaves no room for false belief. But since thereis false belief, theremust be
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somethingwrongwith Theaetetus'definition;as Plato says,theirinability to explain false belief shows that they do not know what knowledge is, either. If the resultof pressingTheaetetus'definition,throughits support of acquaintance,is to precludefalse belief, then that is an indirectargument that that definitionis faulty. Looked at in this way, the discussionof false belief is not an irrelevant digression; rather, it reveals the difficulties created by acceptance of Theaetetus'definition.Since these difficultiesare intolerable,Theaetetus' definitionis to be rejected. Plato thus has a two-prongedstrategy against Theaetetus'suggestion that knowledge is true belief. At 20la-c he refutesit directly.In the discussion of false belief he criticizesit indirectly,by showingthat its support leads to intolerableresults.The discussionof false belief is then an integral partof the considerationof Theaetetus'definition,not a meredigression. 5. If this is right,thereis anotherpoint worthmaking.It is often claimed that Plato endorsesK, that he thinksof knowledgeas a sortof grasping,or acquaintance.But if what I have said so far is right, at least this passage does not supportthat view. For the same two-prongedstrategyPlatoused againstTheaetetusworksas well againstK. First, K's inabilityto accommodate false belief is an indirectargumentthat it is faulty.Second,201a-c rejectsK by a simple applicationof modustollens.Plato arguesthere that knowledgeis not true belief, and so Theaetetus'definitionis wrong.But if K entails Theaetetus' definition, the rejection of Theaetetus'definition carrieswith it the rejectionof K. To be sure, those who ascribean acquaintancemodel of knowledgeto just Plato can appeal to other passages.But if the modustollensargument sketched is right, they should be wary: for Plato consistentlydenies that knowledgeis truebelief (see, e.g., Meno98a; Gorg.454d; Rep.477a). If the rejection of that view here counts against acquaintance,it may do so elsewhereas well.18
Cornell University

For this view, cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-being" in Plato, vol 1, ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), esp. 245; 262-5; J. McDowell, Plato: Theaetetus(Oxford, 1973); J. McDowell, "IdentityMistakes:Plato and the Logical Atomists",PAS 70 (1970) 181-196; (Cambridge, 1962). W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology 2 Cf. n. 1. 3 For this view, see J. McDowell, Plato: Theaetetusp. 194; F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge(New York, 1957), p. 110. McDowell does suggest two rather
1

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tenuous links, (a) that the discussion considers knowledge, the central topic of the Tht., and (b) if there is to be true belief, there must also be false belief with which it can be contrasted.(b) is also suggested by F. A. Lewis, "Two Paradoxesin the Theaetetus" in J. M. E. Moravcsik,ed., Patterns in Plato's Thought(Dordrecht, Holland, 1973), 123. (a) does not explain why false belief should be consideredat this point in the dialogue, rather than elsewhere. (b) gets Plato'sargumentback to front. At 200d he claims that they must know what knowledge is beforethey can know what false belief is. The link I suggest later preservesthis priority. 4 The second puzzle (188c9-189b8) is essentially the same as K. The second and third models of false belief (the wax tablet and the aviary),like allodoxia, fail because of their reliance on K. For further defense of these claims, see my unpublished Ph. D. thesis, "Plato and Acquaintance"(Harvard, 1975).
5 Lewis, op. cit., Lewis defends this view; I reject it.
6

Lewis, op. cit., 124; McDowell, Plato: Theaetetuspp. 185-195; McDowell, "Identity Mistakes:Plato and the Logical Atomists",PAS 70 (1970) 181-2;and J. L. Ackrill,"Plato on False Belief: Theaetetus187-200."Monist 50 (1966) 385-7 agree that(5) considersonly identity beliefs; I argue later that this restrictionis unnecessary,and that (5) does entail (6). 7 McDowell, "Identity Mistakes",argues that connaitreis all that is involved. He considers the strongerclaim I later press, but rejectsit on the groundsthat it rules out all false beliefs and not merelyidentitybeliefs. The strongerview does have thatconsequence, but I think it is a consequence Plato intends. In his book, McDowell vacillates between endorsing the connaltreinterpretation("Acquaintanceis a relationof the ordinarysort", p. 197) and the strongerview ("therewould seem to be nothing between blank ignorance ... and the unqualified or complete obtaining of knowledge",p. 197);but these views are obviously quite distinct. 8 B. Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description",reprinted in Mysticismand Logic (1918), 220-1. The parallel is noticed and pressed by McDowell, Theaetetus,p. 196, and "IdentityMistakes", passim. 9 B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York, 1912), 46-7. Cf. Mysticism and Logic, 202-3, and Logic and Knowledge,204. 10 C. J. F. Williams, "Referential Opacity and False Belief in the Theaetetus" The PhilosophicalQuarterly22 (1972) 289-302, also distinguishesthe opaque from the transparent readings of allodoxia. He argues, however, that Plato confuses the two readings, whereas I go on to argue that he does not. 11 Cf., e.g., Ackrill,op. cit., 388-389. 12 Ibid. 13 Although not impossible.The early and middle dialogues, for example, often consider cases of the compresenceof opposites; Socratesmight be beautiful in one way and ugly in another. But that view does not seem to be relevanthere. 14 This paragraphlargely agrees with Williams, op cit., McDowell, Theaetetus,p. 203, considers two purported differences beween allodoxia and the Sophist's later account; but if the analysis of allodoxia I offer here is correct, neither of these purported differences is relevant. 15 For a defense of the first claim, see Ackrill,op. cit. 388-9; for a defense of the second claim, see Williams,op. cit., 291ff. and McDowell, Theaetetus, pp. 204 ff. Ackrill'sview is well criticized by Williams. From now on I shall largely focus on (10); but most of my remarksapply equally well to (8).

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16 This line of reasoningshows that therecannot be knowledge-independent true beliefs; but could there not be false belief? I think Plato would say that if, for any x, I have only false beliefs about x, then I in effect have ignorance,as describedhere. If a false belief is to be about x, it cannot be all we intend to say about x; for a false belief to attach to a referent, it must be linked to other true beliefs. If all I can say of justice is that it is a vegetable, this does not count as a belief about justice at all; it displays ignorance of justice. To count as a false belief about x, a claim must be linked to other beliefs that manage to referto x. In this sense, false beliefs requirethere to be true beliefs, but K does not allow this sort of interdependence.For, by (3), one cannot both know and not know the same thing. Our only options, then, are all true beliefs, which here amount to knowledge, or all false beliefs, which then plausibly reduce to ignorance. Plato thus rejectsthe Kripkeanview that all my beliefs about somethingcould be false. 17 I have suggestedso far that the acquaintancemodel is usedto supportTheaetetus;but is it necessary?Plato seems to place the burden on the defender of Theaetetusto find an accountof knowledge which (a) unlike the acquaintancemodel does not entail K; and (b) supportsTheaetetus'failure to distinguishknowledge and true belief. 18 An earlier version of this paper was read at the meetings of the A.P.A. Eastern Division, December 1976. I wish to thank Donald Zeyl for his helpful commentson that version. The present versions was accepted for publication by the editor of Phronesisin May 1977.

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