TORTS: MEETING 1 CASES

CASE 1 DULAY VS CA: security guard intentionally killed a lawyer; Art. 2176 includes intentional acts FACTS Keywords: Barilan sa Big Bang sa Alabang; liability of company for a criminal act done deliberately while on duty FACTS An altercation occurred between Atty. Napoleon Dulay (deceased) and Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty, and the latter shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his employers, Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc. (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela, Safeguard and Superguard (as alternative defendants) o The complaint alleged that the incident was due to the concurring negligence Torzuelas wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him Safeguard and/or Superguards failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the supervision and control of its employee o Maria Dulay prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Maria Dulay opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action is based upon their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code: o The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. xxx Meanwhile, an Information, charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide,was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. RTC Judge Rginogranted Safeguards motion to dismiss and Superguards motion for exclusion. HELD YES. RATIO -Although Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide, Maria Dulay still has the right to file in independent civil action to recover damages for the fatal shooting of Atty. Dulay. -Section 1, of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedurei that a civil action may be separately instituted when the party expressly reserves the right to do so or when it is instituted prior to the criminal action. -Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals: The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation. - This is precisely what the Maria Dulay opted to do. However, the Safeguard and/or Superguard opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasidelict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. - There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Codeii to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. o Elcano v. Hill (echoed by Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court): "Fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. A separate civil action lies against the offender, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores. - Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the Civil Codeiii applies only to injuries intentionally committed1 and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. o Physical injuries is discussed in jurisprudence, to wit: It includes bodily injuries causing deathiv. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.v o Marcia V. CA: No independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence. However, since Torzuela is charged with homicide, and not with reckless imprudence, a civil action based on Article 33 lies. -Safeguard and/or Superguard further contend that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. And their liability (if any) would only be subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code. -Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court: Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Codevi when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. o The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it ISSUES AND RATIO ISSUE WoN Maria Dulay has cause of action against Safeguard and/or Superguard to hold them liable for the criminal act of Torzuela.

Marcia v. CA

CAAffirmed.

2.AIR FRANCE VS CARASCOSO

Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.vii -Therefore, it is incumbent upon Safeguar and/or Superguard to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. -[Side issue] Whether the complaint states a sufficient cause of action o General rule: allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. o Elements of a cause of action: A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. -The Court finds, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and Safeguard and/or Superguard. o This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Such question would be better resolved after trial on the merits. Issue and Holding WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES Ratio On CA's decision Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. SC says that so long as CA's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense. On the seat issue If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what security can a passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the stipulations in the ticket and say that there was a contrary verbal agreement. There was no explanation as to why he was allowed to take a first class seat before coming to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a better right to it. On contract to transport, QD, etc. This is different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with kindness, respect, courtesy, consideration. What happened was a violation of public duty by Air France--a case of QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited wherein it was said that although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual in origin and nature, the act that breaks the K may be also a tort. On the issue of award of damages Air France assails CA's award of moral damages, claiming that since Carrascoso's action is based on breach of contract, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith in order to avail of said award. While there was no specific mention of "bad faith," it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence. Allegations in the complaint on this issue:

There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran leg 2. This K was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transpo at Bangkok 3. There was bad faith when the manager compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after he was already seated and to transfer to the tourist class, thereby making him suffer inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, etc. bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purposes See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219 (10), moral damages are recoverable. Exemplary damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives the court power to grant such in K and QK, with the condition that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 3.LOURDES VILORIA vs. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.: non-refundable tickets from travel agency Fernando agreed to buy airline tickets on board CAI after Margaret Mager of Holiday Travel (HT) agency informed him that there were no available seats at Amtrak. Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight. Mager informed him that flights to Newark, New Jersey, USA via CAI were fully booked and offered the alternative flight via Frontier Air. Since alternative flight would be more costly and would mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager denied his request as said tickets were nonrefundable. When Fernando saw an Amtrak station nearby, he made inquiries and was told that there were seats available anytime. Fernando confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into buying CAI tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager denied it. Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding a refund. Continental Micronesia denied his request and advised him that he may take said tickets to any CAI ticketing location for re-issuance of new tickets. When Fernando went to CAIs ticketing office to have the tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles under his name, he was informed that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor. Sps. Viloria filed a complaint against CAI. CAI interposed, among other things, that it should not be liable for Magers acts because she was not a CAI employee. Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, RTC-Antipolo City ruled that Mager was CAIs agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed RTC-Antipolo Citys decision and ruled that CAI cannot be held liable for Magers act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and HT, as the contract was not an agency but that of a sale. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not a principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and Holiday Travel; and assuming that an agency relationship existed between the two, would CAI be bound by the acts of HTs agents and employees such as Mager? HELD Yes. SC ruled that there was principal-agent relationship because all the elements of an agencyviii existed between CAI and HT. The first and second elements were present as CAI did not deny that it concluded an agreement with HT, whereby the latter would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on CAIs behalf. The third element was present as it was undisputed that HT merely acted in a representative capacity and it was CAI and not HT who was bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by the latter on its behalf. The fourth element was also present considering that CAI had not made any allegation that HT exceeded the authority that was granted to it. In fact, CAI consistently maintained validity of the contracts of carriage that HT executed with Sps. Viloria and that Mager was not guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. SC, as early as 1970, had already formulated the guidelines that would aid in differentiating the two contracts. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Constantino, SC extrapolated that the primordial differentiating consideration between the two contracts is the transfer of ownership or title over the property subject of the contract. In an agency, the principal retains ownership and control over the property and the agent merely acts on the principals behalf and under his instructions in furtherance of the objectives for which the agency was established. On the other hand, the contract is clearly a sale if the parties intended that the delivery of the property will effect a relinquishment of title, control and ownership in such a way that the recipient may do with the property as he pleases. That the principal is bound by all the obligations contracted by the agent within the scope of the authority granted to him is clearly provided under Article 1910 of the Civil Code and this constitutes the very notion of agency. As to the subsequent issue on whether or not CAI would be bound by the acts of HTs agents, SC mentioned that an examination of its pronouncements in China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et al. [264 Phil 15 (1990)] will reveal that an airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agents employees. A prior determination of the nature of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the passengers cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline companys agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct

1.

committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline companys agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agents employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agents employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principals own fault or negligence. On the other hand, if the passengers cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline companys fault or negligence. As SC stated in China Air Lines, "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier." Torts and Damages Element Quasi Delicts David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age. One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye. The 3 went to Manuels house and performed a little experiment. They opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied it on the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessies neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of Davids eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages. Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence. SC denied the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages. HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries. Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while

4.TAYLOR VS MANILA ELECTRIC CO :childen picked up blasting cpas

5.JARCO MARKETING Co. v. CA ;6 year old pinned out gift wrapping store of a structure

Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6 years old. Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision.

it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. Issues: (1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence (2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises Held: (1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence. (2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to

impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her. 6. ONG VS. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT | BAUTISTA ANGELO ; drowning in public swimming pool Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara, Quezon City It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its pools Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to the pools along with his 2 brothers He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers that he would get something to drink. His brothers left him and went to the Deep pool Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was swimming to long under water Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ongs lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried to revive the boy. Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in water (pagkalunod) The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the last clear chance to revive Ong. It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety measures in place: they had a male nurse, six lifeguards, ring buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full- time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligence W/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this case HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. Metropolitan is not negligentMetropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency. The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death he Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this case The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. ISSUE:

7.CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMIN VS CA ; petitioner slipped to an elevation 4 high

Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the incident was the Honorary Consul Geileral of Israel in the Philippines. In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other persons went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a better view of the incoming

Whether or not CAA was negligent

HELD: CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but

passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private respondent slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the far end of the terrace. As a result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for about three hours. Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasidelict with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII against petitioner Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport ... ." [Sec. 32 (24), R.A. 776]. Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills, consequential damages for the expenses of two lawyers who had to go abroad in private respondent's stead to finalize certain business transactions and for the publication of notices announcing the postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding which had to be cancelled because of his accident [Record on Appeal, p. 5]. Judgment was rendered in private respondent's favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for, Reconsideration but this was denied.

to drain water on the floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport. Responsibility of CAA The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the public. Contributory Negligence Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918): The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813] The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. "WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."

8. VALENZUELA VS. CA| KAPUNAN: lady driver who stopped car due to flat tire

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed she had a flat tire and stopped at a lighted place to solicit help if needed. She parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendants car. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee). She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance. Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He said he was travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the rightlane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright lights. Temporarily blinded, he swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plain tiffs car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorlylighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiffs car was protruding as it was then at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiffs witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver. C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation Area in Tondo, Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority though it was completed in 1994. On 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive a report that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35 a.m. he tried to seek shelter but it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power barge Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel to avoid the collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the incident. C & A construction demanded payment of the damages from

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the court should sustain the version of plaintiff or defendant W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of Valenzuela W/N Alexander Commercial Inc. can be held solidarily liable with Li

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Sustain Plaintiff The version presented by defendant could not be sustained as witnesses in the area testified that he was driving very fast and zigzagging. Also the facts as he narrated are highly unprobable seeing as the street was actually well lighted. Had he been traveling at a slow speed, he would have been able to stop in time so as not to hit the plaintiff even if the road was wet. The only reason why he would not have been able to do so would be if he was intoxicated which slows down reactions. No Li contends that Valenzuela should not have parked on the side of the road and looked for a parking space. The court rationalized using the emergency rule which states An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Valenzuela could not have been expected to go to a side street where the chances of finding help would have been lower. No Although the Li was an employee of American, no proof was adduced as Li claimed, that he was out late that night on a social call in the exercise of his functions as assistant manager.

9. DELSAN TRANSPORTATION VS. C&A CONSTRUCTION, INC. ; vessel hit in typhoon deflector

Issues: (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent. (2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for QuasiDelict. Held: (1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight (8) hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the danger where Captain Jusep found himself

Capt. Jusep but the latter refused to pay due to the cause of the incident was by a fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep was not guilty of negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken necessary precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed & set aside the decision of the trial court. Captain Jusep was found guilty of negligence in transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21,1994 and held liable for damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transfering the vessel to sought shelter.

was caused by his own negligence. (2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage to another, it instantly arise a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the care and diligence of supervision of his employee. In Fabre ,jr. v Court of Appeals held that due diligence requires consistent compliance of rules & regulation for the guidance and actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to give any evidence that its rule are strictly implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is therefore liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27 due earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the decision.

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
i

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ii

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. iv Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines v Madeja v. Caro vi Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
iii

xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. vii Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado
viii

The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. Agency is basically personal, representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He who acts through another acts himself." As categorically provided under Article 1869 of the Civil Code, "[a]gency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority."