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TUMALAD v.

VICENCIO, 41 SCRA 143 FACTS: Vicencio and Simon executed a Chattel Mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan, payable in one (1) year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at the public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter will vacate the house as they were the proper owner. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the mortgage be the object of a chattel mortgage. HELD: Though there is no specific statement referring to the subject house or personal property, by ceding, selling or transferring a property, through chattel mortgage could only meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

PRUDENTIAL BANK v. PANIS, 153 SCRA 390 FACTS: Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank secure payment; they executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same property. The Secretary of Agriculture issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgage to the bank. The Spouses failed to pay the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction. The respondent court held that the REM was nulled and void. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage are valid. 2. Whether or not mortgage made after issuance of Sales Patent and OCT prohibited. HELD: 1. As to the first REM, it is valid as REM can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code only meant that the building itself is an immovable property. The original mortgage on the building and right to occupy the land was executed before the issuance of the sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. It is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building was a valid mortgage. 2. As to the second mortgage it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus prohibited under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

MAKATI LEASING v. WEAVER TEXTILES MILLS, 122 SCRA 296

FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Weaver Textile Mills discounted and assigned several receivables with the former under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivable assigned, Wearever Textile executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as machinery. Upon Wearevers default, Makati leasing filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties Mortgage to it. The sheriff enforced the order to seize the mortgaged properties after the petitioner applied for replevin. The CA set aside the orders of the lower court and ordered the return of the drive motor seized, ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machinery can be the subject of a chattel mortgage. HELD: The characterization of the subject machinery as chattel is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. Chattel Mortgage treating real property as personal property is valid, as long as third parties are not prejudiced. The doctrine of estoppels also applies. There is reason why they should be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming that the machine is real property.

SERGS PRODUCTS, INC V. PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC. 338 SCRA 499 FACTS: PCI filed a case of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the seizure of machineries. Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be the subject or a writ of seizure. ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by Sergs become real property by virtue of immobilization. HELD: Although the machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, they are still proper subject for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently stopped from claiming otherwise.

TSAI v. CA and EVER TEXTILES MILLS, 366 SCRA 324 FACTS: Evertex secured a loan from PBC, guaranteed by a real estate and chattel mortgage over a parcel of land where the factory stands and the chattels located therein, as included in a schedule attached to the mortgage contracts. Another loan was obtained secured by a chattel mortgage over properties with similar descriptions listed in the first schedule. During the date of execution of the second mortgage Evertex purchased Machineries and equipment. Due to business reverses, Evertex filed for insolvency proceedings. It failed to pay its obligation and thus, PBC initiated extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. PBC was the highest bidder, making it the owner of the properties. It then leased the factory premises to TSAI. Afterwards, Evertex sought the annulment of the sale and conveyance of the properties to PBC as it was allegedly a violation of the Insolvency Law. The RTC

held that the lease and sale were irregular as it involved properties not included in the schedule of the mortgage contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries can be the subject of a chattel mortgage. HELD: While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contact of REM and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. The trial and appellate courts show that the intention was to treat the machineries as movable or personal property. Assuming that the properties were considered immovable, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppels.

MERALCO v. CBAA, 114 SCRA 260 FACTS: Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and assembled on the spot. Their bottom rest on a foundation consists of compacted earth, sand pad as immediate layer and asphalt as top layer. The tanks merely sit on its foundation. The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks, based on the report of the Board of Assessors. MERALCO wished to oppose the assessment as they averred that the tanks are not real property. ISSUE: Whether or not the storage tanks fall within any kind of real property enumerated in Article 415 of the Civil Code. HELD: While tanks are not embedded in the land, they may be considered improvements on the land. It is undeniable that the tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles. For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things which should not be and generally regarded as personal property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property.

CALTEX v. CBAA, 114 SCRA 296 FACTS: This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by CALTEX in its gas stations located on leased land. The City Assessor characterized the items in gas stations of petitioner as taxable realty. These items included underground tanks, elevated tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, etc. These items are not owned by the lessor of the land wherein the equipments are installed. Upon expiration of the lease agreement, the equipment should be returned in good condition. ISSUE: Whether or not said machines and equipments are personal property not subject to realty tax. HELD: The equipment and machinery as appurtenances to the gas station buildings or shed owned by Caltex and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them, the 3

gas station would be useless, and which have been attached and fixed permanently to the gas station or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and Real Property Tax Code.

GO v. UCPB, GR NO. 156187, 11 NOV. 2004

SECRETARY OF DENR v. YAP, GR NO. 167707, 8 OCTOBER 2008 FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation No. 1801 issued by President Marcos declared Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves. However, respondent-claimants question the constitutionality of the said proclamation alleging therein that it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. Furthermore, they claimed that they themselves, or through their predecessors-ininterest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They even posited that Proclamation No. 1801 did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man; hence, it is susceptible of private ownership. Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 1801 is valid and constitutional. HELD: The Proclamation did not convert the whole Boracay into an agricultural land and there was no also evident that made the Island an agricultural. Thus, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.

HEIRS OF PALANCA v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 151312, 30 AUGUST 2006 FACTS: The heirs of Pedro Palanca filed an application to bring the pieces of land they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration Act. They acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly and continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934. The CFI (now RTC) of Palawan declared the petitioners as the owners in simple of the two parcels of land in question. After almost 23 years, respondent Republic filed with the CA an action for annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of registration of tile and reversion. It argued that the decision was null and void because the two parcel of land were unclassified public forest land, and as such, were not capable of private appropriation. The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI decision as null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not a person who has been long in possession of a forest land can register it under his name.

HELD: NO. If the land is a public forest, the land registration has no jurisdiction to decree its registration, otherwise, the title is null and void. The reason for this is that public forests are inalienable public lands. The possession of public forests, however losses, cannot convert the same into private property. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 179987, 29 APRIL 2009 FACTS: Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land. He claimed that he purchased the property from Velasco, and that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in open, continuous, peaceful and notorious possession of the land for more than 30 years. The RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the CA arguing that Malabanan failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law. ISSUE: Are petitioners to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree or both. HELD: They cannot avail themselves of Registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree because their evidence is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property since June 12, 1945. Neither can they invoke Sec. 14 (2). While the subject property was declared alienable and disposable, there is no competent evidence that it is no longer intended for public use, service or for the development of the national wealth. The classification as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public domain under Art. 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. REYES v. ORTIZ, 628 SCRA 1 FACTS: Spouses Perl sought the ouster of Reyes, Spouses Matienzo and Abejero who are occupants of their lot, which is part of the Tala Estate. Respondent Bautista filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession against Spouses Matienzo. While Spouses Perl filed a complaint of Ejectment case against Reyes. These two ejecment case were consolidated. The trial court issued a decision ordering Reyes to vacate the subject property. ISSUE: Whether or not a pending action for annulment of title shall suspend ejectment proceeding. HELD: No. It is a well settled rule that a pending civil action for ownership such as the annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an ejecment proceeding. In ejecment case the issue is the material possession, while in the annulment case it is the ownership. Hence, an ejecment case can be separately tried with that of the annulment case. Although there is an exception to the rule as aforementioned, petitioners failed to justify that the case falls within the said exception. 5

HEIRS OF M. PIDACAN v. ATO, 629 SCRA 457 FACTS: Spouses Pidacan are the predecessors-in-interests of the petitioners, who acquired a parcel of land and were issued a title. However, respondent ATO used portion of the property as an airport and they introduced some improvements therein. Petitioners demand for the payment of the value of the property as well as rentals but ATO refused to heed to the demand. Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC for the payment of the value of the property and rentals due thereon. The RTC decided the case in favor of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled of just compensation. HELD: Yes. When ATO used the portion of the property as airport, Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property for a length of time. A decision if it is not executed, the victory of the winning party will be useless. Petitioners prevailed over the respondents and it would be unjust and unequitable under the particular circumstances that payment of just compensation be withheld from them.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK v. DNG REALTY, 617 SCRA 125 FACTS: Respondent DNG obtained a loan from Equitable PCI Bank secured by a real estate mortgage. However, respondent failed to pay their obligation, causing the mortgage to be foreclosed and subsequently sold at public auction declaring Petitioner as the highest bidder. Petitioner filed an ExParte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession which was granted. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the respondent is the proper remedy. 2. Whether or not the consolidation of title, issuance of writ of possession and the cancellation of respondents title were ultimately and premature. HELD: 1. No. Respondents petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy, because said remedy could be availed only if a tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court cannot be charged of grave abuse because there is no proof that its decision of issuing writ of possession was issued with lack or excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 2. No. DNG failed to redeem the foreclosed property within the reglementary period for redemption, making the petitioner the absolute owner of the property. It is the right of the petitioner to ask for the consolidation of title and issuance of new title in its name as a consequence of ownership and it follows the entitlement of the possession and enjoyment of the property.

REPUBLIC v. MENDOZA, 627 SCRA 443 FACTS: Paninsingan Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by the petitioner and has been using a certain parcel of land for its school, registered in the name of the respondents. PPS alleged 6

that Mendozas relinquished it their rights over the school lot as evidence by the consolidation and subdivision. On the other hand Mendozas, contend that they did not relinquished their right, they just allowed PPS to occupy the property. Mendozas demand PPS to vacate the subject lot but they refused. Mendozas filed a complaint with the MTCC for unlawful detainer but it was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be evicted from the subject property. HELD: No. Evidence shows that Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa and even allowed the City to declare in its name for taxation purposes. The Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. The complaint of unlawful detainer should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

NAVARRO v. GO, 627 SCRA 476 FACTS: The mother of the respondent purchased a certain parcel of land from Emilia and allowed Palma, the nephew of the petitioner to stay on the said lot. The subject property was later donated to the respondent by his mother. When Palma vacated the premise, respondent constructed fences on the subject property. However, Samson heirs transferred their rights to the land and sold it to Spouses Navarro and Sindao. They destroyed the fence and the improvements, forcing respondent to file a complaint for annulment of document. The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are buyer in good faith. HELD: No. A person to be considered as buyer in good faith is that when he purchases a property of another, there should be no other person who has right or interest on such property. When petitioners live in the lot, said lot was improved such as the fence and even planted with fruit bearing trees. By such Circumstances it is believe that the land was possessed by somebody.

BRIONES v. MACABAGDAL, 626 SCRA 300 FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a lot which is adjacent to the lot which was purchased by the respondent from the Vergon. After obtaining a building permit, they constructed a house on their lot. After learning of the construction, respondents demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. But petitioners refused the heed their demand. Respondent filed an action to recover ownership and possession before the RTC. In their answer, petitioners alleged that the lot was consistently pointed to them by the vendor. The RTC decided the case in favor of the respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are builders in good faith and should be indemnified for the expenses they incurred.

HELD: Yes. There is no evidence to show that petitioners acted in bad faith, hence, they should be presumed as builders in good faith of the house constructed. Petitioners have also the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have incurred for the construction of the house. Though petitioner acted in good faith, they failed to show what authority the employees of the vendor were acting when they pointed to the lot where the house was built and it is not corroborated by any sufficient evidence.

TAN v. RAMIREZ, 626 SCRA 327 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession and/or quieting of title of one-half portion of the subject property against the respondents before the MCTC. She alleged that her great-grand mother was the owner of the subject property covered by Tax Declaration No. 2724. On the part of the respondents, their father Robert Ramirez bought the subject property from Nicomedesa and the remaining half from the Gavinos heir. The MCTC ruled that Roberto was entitled to only three-fourths, as this was Gavinos entire share. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondents are possessors in good faith. 2. Whether or not respondents acquired the property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. HELD: 1. No. Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person the property is received is the true owner thereof and could transmit ownership. Roberto is one of the respondent in the case filed by Belacho for recovery of possession, thus, it clearly shows that he is knowledgeable that Belacho is also claiming ownership of the subject property as heir of Gavino. He cannot insist that he acted in good faith because there was defect or dispute with regards to the title of the vendor. 2. No. Acquisitive prescription may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. Extraordinary requires thirty (30) years uninterrupted possession without need of just title and good faith. This two (2) kind of acquisitive prescription cannot be applied to Roberto because he only possessed the property for twenty-four (24) years from the time the property was declared for tax until to the time of the filing of the complaint.

NEY v. QUIJANO, 626 SCRA 800 FACTS: Petitioners are the registered owner of a residential lot wherein a three (3) door apartment was constructed divided among the petitioners and respondents. Respondents filed with the RTC a suit for reconveyance and partition against petitioners, contending that they are co-owners of the subject property. In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were not co-owners with the

respondents. They maintained that respondents have no cause of action against them because the possession of said respondents was just by mere tolerance. The trial court dismissed the case. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondents and petitioners are co-owners of the subject property. 2. Whether or not respondents action for reconveyance constitute quieting of title. HELD: 1. Yes. The Deed of Reconveyance executed by the petitioners clearly shows that they recognize the right of the respondents as co-owner of the one third (1/3) portion of the property. Said Deed outweight the evidences presented by the petitioners. 2.Yes. The CA did not commit error in considering respondents complaint as one for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. Respondent also seek for the reconveyance of their share which was mistakenly included in the petitioners title. An Action for reconveyance is one seeking to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. The action of reconveyance which was treated as an action to quiet title was further explained in Mendizabel v. Apo, if a person is claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. For the reason that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed before taking action to protect his right.

SARMIENTO v. LINDAYAG, 626 SCRA 292 FACTS: Burlas spouses filed a complaint for ejectment case against herein complainant but it was dismissed by herein respondent Hon. Lindayag. After how many years, Burlas Spouses filed another case of ejectment against the same defendants before the same court presided by the respondent, raising res judicata as defense. The respondent judge decided the case in favor of Burlas Spouses. The herein complainants questioned the decision, alleging that the judge committed delay in deciding the second complaint and liable for malicious delay in the administration of justice. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge is liable for malicious delay in the administration of justice. HELD: Yes. Ejectment cases are summary proceedings designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. The objective of the ejecment case is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing possession for a long time. Under Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10, it provides that ejecment complaint should be decided within thirty (30) days after the last receipt of any document submitted. Respondent judge shows his inefficiency when he decided the case for almost four (4) years.

CARBONILLA v. ABIERA, 625 SCRA 461 FACTS: Petitioner Carbonilla filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents. He alleged that he is the owner of a registered land and a residential building erected on the said land. He further alleged that respondents occupied the building by mere tolerance by the previous owner. He demanded respondents to vacate the building but they refused. In their answer, respondents denied 9

the allegations of the petitioner. They alleged that they inherited the building and occupied it as owners since 1960. The MTCC decided the case in favor of the respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not ejectment is the proper remedy for the petitioner against respondents. HELD: No. Ejecment case whether forcible entry or unlawful detainer is summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possess the property involved. In unlawful detainer, allegation that the plaintiff possesses the property by mere tolerance should be proved. Petitioner failed to prove that respondents possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He should present evidence to show overt acts indicating that he really or his predecessors-in-interest permitted respondent to occupy the subject property.

MORES v. YU-GO, 625 SCRA 290 FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the RTC against Petitioner. They alleged that they co-owned a parcel of land wherein a building was erected. Respondents allowed petitioners to stay on the building with the condition that they will stay until anyone of the respondents would need the subject property. Petitioners stay on the subject property was extended for how many times because of their plead to the respondents. Respondents finally demand petitioners to vacate the premise but they refuse to heed to the demand. In their answer, petitioners assert that they were allowed to occupy said property as their dwelling house and that they were the one who introduced the improvements. The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted in good faith. HELD: Yes. As far as the improvements on the subject property is concerned. However, they cannot be considered as builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the property. Furthermore, they were in good faith because no one from the respondents objected on the introduction of the improvements. Since respondents did not offer to pay the petitioners one-half of the value of the improvements, petitioners had the right to remove the improvements.

FERNANDEZ, SR. v. CO, 625 SCRA 370 FACTS: The subject property was sold to Spouses Martinez and Erlinda Co by the Torres Spouses and subsequently a title was issued to them. They took actual possession of the property and introduced improvements. Respondents mortgage the subject property to Solid Bank to obtain a loan. Respondents possession was disturbed by the petitioner and in order to protect their rights they filed a case of quieting of title but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. They filed a case of forcible entry before the MTC against petitioners. In their answer, petitioners alleged that the 10

subject property belonged to them and possessed it for a long time. The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondents. ISSUE: Who among the parties are entitled to the subject property. HELD: It is the respondent. In unlawful detainer and forcible entry case the only issue to be determined is who between the contending parties has the better right to the contested property independent of any claim of ownership. Evidence proved that respondents and their predecessorsin-interest have been in continuous and actual possession of the subject property and are registered owner thereof. Their predecessor-in-interest applied for a free patent over the subject property which was approved and was registered with the Registry of Deeds. As to the contention of the petitioners with regard to the failure of the respondent to state in their Certificate of Forum Shopping that an action to quiet title was previously filed prior to the ejectment case have no basis. The law provides that an ejecment case proceed independently of any claim of ownership.

REPUBLIC v. MANGOTARA, 624 SCRA 360 FACTS: Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Petition for Quieting of title against respondents. Vidal alleged that she is entitled over a certain parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Titles, while AZIMUTH filed the petition being Vidals successor-in-interest with respect to the portion of the subject property. Teofilo opposed the petition contending that there was no cause of action because there was no title being disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a third party. The RTC decided the case in favor of the petitioners. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RTC has no jurisdiction to resolve the issues of status, filiation, and heirship in action for quieting of title. 2. Whether or not case is barred by prescription. HELD: 1. No. The RTC has jurisdiction, as it acquired jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title under the circumstances such as the amount of the property involved provided under BP Blg. 129, Sec. 19 (2) as amended. In the case, the value of the subject property is more than P20, 000.00, thus, the RTC has the jurisdiction. The consequence acquiring such jurisdiction is that, it can resolved all issues in the case, including the status, filiations and heirship of Vidal in exercise of said jurisdiction. 2. No. Issue on prescription is too late to raise by the LANDTRADE because it was only on appeal to the CA that it was raised and as a rule CA cannot resolved issues that were not raised in the lower court. LANDTRADE cannot be possessor in good faith and as a consequence ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot be applied to them.

VALENZUELA v. MANO, Jr., 624 SCRA 664

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FACTS: The subject property was transferred to the petitioner by his father. Respondent on the other hand acquired the land from Feliciano and applied for a Free Patent and sold portion of it to Balingcongan. Petitioner entrusted the property to his nephew and further instructed the latter to construct a fence on the said property. Respondent prevented the construction of the fence claiming that it was his property. Petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment of Title which was decided in his favor. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the owner of the disputed property. HELD: Yes. The ocular inspection and the testimony of Feliciano, when the respondent acquired his property was fully aware that the property at the eastern part of his property belonged to the father of the petitioner. Feliciano further testified that his lot is only about 2,000 sq. m. and that own by petitioners father is enclosed by a fence. Settled is the rule that a person, whose title included by mistake or oversight the land owned by another, does not become owner of such land by virtue of the title alone.

REPUBLIC v. ROCHE, 624 SCRA 116 FACTS: Respondent Roche applied for registration of title over a certain parcel land, she alleged that she inherited it from her father. Her application was opposed by the Government through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Laguna Lake Development (LLDA). The OSG alleged that neither Roche nor her predecessor-in-interest had occupied the land for the required number of years and that the land belongs to the state which cannot be subjected to private ownership. LLDA alleged that the land forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. Te trial court granted the application for registration of Roche. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. HELD: No. Under Section 14 (1) of PD No. 1529 it provides three requisites for the application for registration to be complied with by an applicant, one of which is that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable and disposable land, by any positive act of the government. She only submitted a document which did not state the classification of the land.

AGUILAR v. ALFARO, 623 SCRA 130 FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession before the RTC; she alleged that her husband was issued a title over a certain parcel of land. Her husband allowed respondents mother to construct a house on the lot and to stay therein temporarily. Petitioner demands the respondent to vacate the property but said respondent refuses. In their answer, respondent alleged that their mother purchased the property. The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not Torrens Certificate of Title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

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HELD: Yes. Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack; it cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding, in accordance with law. Respondents allegation that their mother became true owner of the portion of the subject property even before the issuances of the OCT constitutes collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objectives is to question the validity of the judgment granting then title.

REPUBLIC v. ESPINOSA, 623 SCRA 382 FACTS: Respondent filed with the MTC an application for registration over a certain parcel of land; he claimed that he purchased it from his mother. He further claimed that he has been in open, public, continuous and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years. The Chief of the Map Projection Section of the DENR verified that the subject of his application is within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The trial court granted his application. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property has been classified as alienable and disposable land. HELD: No. Respondent failed to show evidence from the government that will prove the classification of the land as alienable and disposable. He only shows the Advance Plan noting that the subject property is alienable and disposable. The rule required by law for application for registration is that an applicant must show the existence of a positive act of the government such as presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands Investigators, legislative act or statute and a certification from the Government that the land applied for are alienable and disposable. The Advance Plan refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do with the classification of the property.

ORDUA v. FUENTEBELLA, 622 SCRA 146 FACTS: Petitioner acquired the subject property from Gabriel, Sr. in an installment basis, and took possession over it. When Gabriel, Sr, died his son continued accepting the payment from the petitioners. However, without petitioners knowledge, Gabriel, Jr. sold the property to Banta. The subject property were subsequently sold to different person and the last person who purchased it was Fuentebella. Fuentebella demand all the residence of the subject property to vacate the premise. Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of merit. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondents are purchasers in good faith. 2. Whether or not the complaint has already prescribed.

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HELD: 1. No. The respondents when they purchased the subject property from each other know that there is other person who has right or interest on the property other than Gabriel, Jr. When Gabriel, Jr. sold to Banta, he was not in possession of the property, the same when situation when it was transferred to Cids and finally to Fuentebella. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. 2.No. Petitioners right to the reconveyance of the property and the annulment of title has not prescribed. An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. It is a well settled rule that one who is in actual possession of a certain parcel of land and claimed to be the owner may wait until his possession is disturbed before taking action to protect his right. Here, petitioners have possession of the subject property as owners before respondents disturbed such possession and before they file a complaint, thus, petitioners action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.

DEANON v. MAG-ABO, 622 SCRA 180 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and ejectment case against respondent before the MeTC of Pasig. He alleged that he purchased the property and demanded respondent to vacate the premise. Respondent refused to vacate, in her answer to the complaint she alleged that she acquired the subject property from Cabrera through a Deed of Transfer and Assignment of Rights. The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a buyer in good faith. HELD: No. When Galvan transferred her right over the property on 2003 to the petitioner she already lost such rights as Cabrera acquired her rights by virtue of the Certificate of Sale and eventually transferred it to respondent on 2001, which is two years earlier than the transfer to petitioners. As a consequence, petitioner cannot be a buyer in good faith, because respondent was already in possession of the subject property at the time the right was transferred to her. As a rule a buyer of a real property that is in the possession of a person other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of the person in possession. Absence of such inquiry, the buyer cannot be considered as buyer in good faith.

DE GUZMAN v. PERONA, 622 SCRA 653 FACTS: De Guzman filed a complaint for reconveyance with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondents. He alleged that through unlawful machination, fraud, deceit and evident bad faith, respondents caused the cancellation of OCT No. 10075 in the name of Andrea De Guzman and subdivided the property into three lots. The share of respondent Spouses De Guzman was foreclosed by BD Bank for failure to pay their obligation. The RTC dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent BD Bank is a mortgagee in bad faith. 14

HELD: No. The issue raised by the petitioners is a question of fact as they did not raised it in the trial court. BD Bank conducted an inspection on the property which was subsequently taken as collateral for the loan, it defeated the contention of the petitioners that BD Bank did not exercise due diligence in inspecting and ascertaining the status of the property. BD bank presented evidence to prove that they exercise diligence before approving the mortgage such as the appraisal report of the Banks appraiser. From such circumstances it clearly shows that there is no fraud done by the bank in approving the mortgage and later foreclosing the subject property.

REPUBLIC v. HANOVER WORLDWIDE TRADING, 622 SCRA 730 FACTS: Respondent filed an application for registration of title over a certain parcel of land, alleging therein that they acquired said land through purchase as evidence by Deed of Absolute Sale. However, Republic through OSG opposed the application, contending that the property subject of the application is a public domain belonging to the state and neither respondent nor their predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945. The trial court approved respondents application. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 2. Whether or not the subject property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. HELD: 1. No. There was no discussion in the trial court to show that indeed respondents or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property for the required number of years. There is no testimonial to prove such kind of possession, the manager of the Hanovers testified only that he is the former owner and he paid taxes. Perusal of the tax declaration it only started on 1965 and the presumption is that possession of the property started only on that year. 2. Yes. Respondent failed to prove that the subject property was classified as alienable and disposable of the public domain. Although they presented a certification issued by the CENRO stating that the subject property is alienable and disposable land it is only hearsay because the one who issued it was not presented during the trial to testify regarding its contents. Moreover, CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of DENR Secretarys Certification declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands.

PARAAQUE CITY v. EBIO, 621 SCRA 555 FACTS: Respondent claimed that they are owners of a parcel of land which is an accretion of the Cutcut river, and continuously and exclusively occupied the subject property. They declared the property for taxation purposes and religiously paid the tax. However, they were surprised that several persons cut coconut trees planted on the subject property. Feared to be evicted, they

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applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners before the RTC of Paraaque but it was denied for lack of merit. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the State is an indispensable party to respondents action for prohibitory action. 2. Whether or not the character of respondents possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction. HELD: 1. No. Under Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 it provides that, accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. In relation of Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides that, owners of lands adjoin the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. By these provisions of law it is therefore clear that the accretions do not form part of the public domain but it automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have added. 2. Yes. Respondent and their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject property as early as 1930, thus they acquired such land through prescription although they have yet to register the subject property. On the other hand petitioners did not register the land giving the respondents the right to acquire the property through prescription.

PLANTERS DEV. BANK v. NG, 620 SCRA 292 FACTS: Respondents, on various occasions secured a loan from the petitioners which they mortgaged two parcels of land. However, they failed to pay their obligation causing the foreclosure of the mortgage and selling of the property to public auction. Petitioner is the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was issued to them. After the lapsed of the redemption period, petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Respondents instituted an action for annulment of certificate of sale. The RTC denied the petition of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not entitlement to the writ of possession is a matter of right. HELD: Yes. Upon the lapsed of redemption period, the purchaser shall acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim over the property. Since respondents, failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the redemption period, petitioners entitlement for the issuance of writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is just a ministerial act. The purchaser is also entitled to a writ of possession even though the redemption period did not yet lapsed provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case of foreclosure.

FERRER v. CARGANILLO, 620 SCRA 493 FACTS: Petitioner filed a case of ejecment against respondents before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); she alleged that she is the owner of the lot being tenanted by Domingo 16

Carganillo. However, without her knowledge, Carganillo subleased the property to his brother Sergio. In his answer, Domingo denied the allegation of the Petitioner and asserted that he is still in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject property. The PARAD dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not subject property was subleased by respondent Domingo to respondent Sergio Carganillo. HELD: Yes. Records show that there is indeed subleasing of the subject property. Domingo himself admitted that he subleased the property to his brother Sergio as evidenced by the investigation conducted by the MARO Legal Officer. His admission was corroborated by affidavit of Clarion who stated that Domingo subleased the property to Sergio in 1995. Under RA 1199, The Agricultural Act, Article 24 (2), it provides the prohibition of tenant and the exception wherein the share-tenant can employ sub-tent if he is suffering from illness or temporary incapacity. Such exception cannot be applied to Domingo because he is not suffering from illness or he is temporary incapacitated.

FLORES v. BAGAOISAN, 618 SCRA 323 FACTS: The subject property covered by OCT was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent in the name of the Heirs of Victor Flores. Through the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim executed by the petitioners, they agreed to sell, cede, convey, grant and transfer by way of Quitclaim the subject property to Lazo who subsequently sold to Bagaoisan. Petitioner Virginia executed an affidavit attesting that the subject was mistakenly included in the patent application of their father. Respondent filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against petitioners. He alleged that subject property was erroneously included in the title of the petitioners and they knew of such facts. In their answer petitioners alleged that they did not relinquished their ownership or possession to Lagazo and that their signature in the Affidavit were taken fraudulently. The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim valid. HELD: No. It violated the provision of Public Land Act particularly Section 118, which provides for the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through homestead patent. The Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim was executed three (3) years after the issuance of the homestead patent, thus it is void and cannot be enforced. No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five-years after the issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agricultural and Commerce and it cannot be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

CAWIS v. CERILLES, 618 SCRA 357

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FACTS: A sales patent was issued to Andrada by the DENR covering Lot No. 47 on 1957. On 1969 RA No. 6099 was enacted, it provided that parcels of land including Lot 47 within the Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision would be sold to the actual occupants without the need of a public bidding. Andrada sold the property to Peralta. It was found out in the investigation that neither Andrada nor Peralta built a house on the lot. It was Cawis who built a house on Lot 47. Petitioner filed a complaint alleging fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the issuance of the sale patent and the OCT. The trial court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the right to question the validity of the sales and the OCT issued on Lot No. 47 as covered by RA No. 6099. HELD: No. The action filed by the petitioners is clearly a reversion suit; its objective is the cancellation of the certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered by the land to the state. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated as an annulment suit. It is the Government through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) who has the right to file an action of reversion on the ground of fraud as provided by Section 101 of the Public Land Act. The land in question is a public land when it was applied for sales patent, any action questioning the validity of the sales patent on the ground of fraud should be initiated by the state.

NUEZ v. SLTEAS PHOENIX, 618 SCRA134 FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint of forcible entry against the petitioners. They alleged that they are the owner of the subject property and that without any lease agreement, petitioner with other individual occupied the subject property. Respondent thru their representatives and predecessorsin-interest had been continuously possessed the subject property. In his answer, he denied the allegations of the respondent, he contend that Maria Sylianteng leased to him the subject property. He also questions the jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court have no jurisdiction over the case. HELD: No. The MeTC have jurisdiction over the case because the following are present in the complaint filed by the respondent: a) plaintiff must allege their prior possession of the property; b) that they were deprived of such possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, c) action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the deprivation is known by the owners. The respondent had sufficiently alleged all the requisites as aforementioned in their complaint. By their representatives and thru its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of the property and in the concept of an owner. That the ocular inspection revealed that petitioners occupied of the subject property through stealth and strategy.

FUENTES v. ROCA, 618 SCRA 732

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FACTS: Tarciano owned a parcel of land he acquired from his mother and sold it Fuentes Spouses. Upon satisfying the agreement, Tarciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the Fuentes Spouses. Upon the death of Tarciano and Rosario, their children filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of their land against Fuentes before the RTC. They claimed that the sale was void since Tracianos wife did not give her consent. The RTCT dismissed the complaint ruling that the action had already prescribed. ISSUE: Whether or not the action taken by the respondent for the declaration of nullity if the sale already prescribed. HELD: No. Under Article 1410 of the NCC it provides that an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The passage of time did not take away the right of the Rocas to file an action against Fuentes Spouses. Article 170 of the Civil Code provides a period wherein the wife can question the validity of the transaction questioned within ten (10) years. Rocas filed the action in 1997 fell within ten (10) years of the January 11, 1989 sale, hence, it did not yet prescribe.

REPUBLIC v. ABRIL, 601 SCRA 83 FACTS: Respondent applied for an application for registration of title over a certain parcel of land identified as lot No. 9310, Cad. 578-D, Nabas Cadastre, alleging that he acquired said land through Deed of Sale from the anterior owners. The Republic through the OSG opposed the application claiming that requirements of Sec. 14 PD No. 1529 were not complied. Said provision provides the person who may apply for registration. The MCTC granted the application of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent comply with the requirements of Section 14 of PD No. 1529. HELD: No. All the testimonies of the witnesses presented did not show the period of possession of the property by his predecessors-in-interest. It was not properly shown how the property was transferred to the respondent by the vendor. The evidence presented by the respondent did not establish the nature of possession by him and his predecessors-in-interest. Hence, he did not satisfy the requirements provided by Sec. 14 of PD No. 1529.

CANLAS v. TUBIL, 601 SCRA 147 FACTS: Respondent Tubil filed a case of unlawful detainer against petitioners, claiming that she is the owner together with the other co-owner of a residential land. They further alleged that they allowed the petitioners to occupy the land by mere tolerance and when they need the land they asked petitioners to vacate. In their answer petitioners alleged that together with their predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, adverse, public and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than sixty (60) years. The MTC dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC have no jurisdiction over the case of unlawful detainer. 19

HELD: No. The MTC have jurisdiction over the case of unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In the instant case, the action taken by the respondent is clearly a case for unlawful detainer as shown by her allegations in the complaint. The entry of petitioners in the subject property was by mere tolerance and they were demanded to vacate but they refused to do. The complaint was filed within one year from the time the last demand to vacate was made.

FERNANDEZ v. AMAGNA, 601 SCRA 330 FACTS: Private respondent, Amagna, was a co-owner of a parcel of land which the petitioners rented a portion thereon, allegedly for over fifty years. When petitioner failed to pay their monthly rental, eviction proceeding was commenced by the respondent. The MeTC decided the case in favor of the respondent and was affirmed by the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not ejectment cannot prosper wanting a fixed period between the parties. HELD: No. Under Art. 1687 of the New Civil Code it provides that, lease agreement with no specified period, but in which rentals are paid monthly, are considered to be on a month-to-month basis. They are for definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty-day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate. When respondent did not renew the lease and demanded the petitioner to vacate, unlawful withholding of the property existed. The respondent was correct to file for ejecment as relief. As to the contention of petitioner with regards to PD 1517, he is not entitled because respondent has no intention to sell the property.

BLAS v. GALAPON, 601 SCRA 369 FACTS: The NHA conducted a Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) census to identify beneficiaries of their lot-giving program and one of the lots identified is the subject property of the case. On the said lot was a structure was erected by the petitioner which she rented out to private respondents. Petitioner applied for a change of status from absentee-structure-owner to residing-structure-to owner in order to be qualified as beneficiary but it was denied by the Office of the President (OP). She filed a case of ejecment against respondent where the lower court decided in her favor. ISSUE: Whether or not ejecment case can affect respondents right to qualify as beneficiary of the NHA program. HELD: No. The right conferred by the NHA upon the respondents cannot automatically be changed by judicial ejecment at the petitioners instance. Being qualified beneficiaries of the program, respondents have the right to purchase the structure because they were in actual possession. Their

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rights as beneficiary were recognized by the National Housing Authority, Office of the President and the Court of Appeals.

REYES v. MONTEMAYOR, 598 SCRA 61 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for Reconveyance against private respondent. They alleged that they were the owner of the subject property which they acquired from Cuevas. However, they learned that Cuevas sold it to respondent. They even alleged that the signatures of the vendors were forged in the Deed of Sale. In her answer, respondent denied the allegations of the petitioners and that the subject property was offered to her for sale. The RTC dismissed the complaint and declared Montemayor as the true owner of the land. ISSUE: Whether or not who has better right to the subject property. HELD: Preponderance of evidence is in favor of the petitioners. Cuevas testified that they only sold the subject property to petitioners and did not sell it to private respondent. Respondent even confessed to have acquired and registered the property in bad faith against the petitioners. She persisted in acquiring and registering in her name what she already knew was a questionable title. She violated the right of the petitioners for peaceful possession of the subject property. LOPEZ v. ESPINOSA, 598 SCRA 567 FACTS: Respondents filed a case of forcible entry against petitioners before the MTCC of Surigao C ity. They alleged that petitioners, by means, of stealth and strategy, took advantage of their absence and demolished their house. In their answer, petitioners denied the allegations and averred that they have a registered title to the lot where the respondents built their house. The MTCC decide the case in favor of the respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners title stands against respondents. HELD: No. In forcible entry, the basic inquiry centers on who has prior possession. Plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession and that he was deprived thereof. Although petitioners hold a title to the subject property, evidence showed that the respondents had prior possession until they were deprived by said petitioners. As to the allegations of abandonment raised by the petitioners, there is no clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property. The intention to abandon implies departure, intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. Such intentions to abandon were missing in the case.

IGLESIA EVANGELICA v. JUANE, 600 SCRA 555 FACTS: Petitioner filed a case of unlawful detainer against respondent. They alleged that they authorized respondent to occupy one of their Congregations in Tondo being a member of their 21

religious corporation. Later on the Petitioner reassigned respondent to another congregation. Respondent defied the reassignment and continued to stay and arrogate upon himself the position of Resident Pastor of Tondo Congregation, depriving the petitioner physical possession thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not unlawful detainer is present in the case. HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction over the matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Since all the jurisdictional elements were stated by the petitioners in their complaint, unlawful detainer was properly filed with the MeTC. The assailed decision of the CA, pointing that the loss of the right to possess the subject property was only incidental to respondents removal from office, is reversed and set aside.

FLORES-CRUZ v. GOLI-CRUZ, 600 SCRA 545 FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property from Lydias siblings. They further alleged that although did not occupy it, they paid realty taxes on the land. After purchase of the subject property, petitioners found out that respondents were occupying a portion of the land. Petitioners demand respondents to vacate the property but they refused. Petitioners filed a complaint of recovery of possession before the RTC which was decided in favor of them. ISSUE. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case. HELD: No. It held that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegation in the complaint and the law at the time of the action was commenced. When petitioners bought the land and demanded respondents to vacate. The right of respondents to possess has terminated. The case was also filed in 2001 when the expanded jurisdiction of the MTCs, RA7691 was approved. In the said new law, other actions involving title to or possession of real property where the value of the property outside Metro manila does not exceed P20,000.00 (P50,000.00 within Metro Manila) are now cognizable by the MTCs. The petitioners complaint of recovery of possession can no longer be heard automatically by the RTC since they failed to allege the value of the property.

MALANA v. TAPPA, 600 SCRA 180 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint of Reinvindicacion and Quieting of Title against respondents, alleging that they were the owners of a parcel of land as evidenced by TCT which they inherited from Anastacio. Respondents were allowed to occupy the subject property. When petitioners needed the subject property they informed and demanded respondents to vacate. Respondents did not heed to their demand. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

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HELD: Yes. A court has no more jurisdictions over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the filing of the action. Petitioners complaint for quieting of title was filed after they already demanded and respondent refused to vacate the subject property. Petitioners should take an action of accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana because they alleged that they were deprived of their right of possession over the subject property. Accion Reivindicatoria is an action to recover possession over the real property as an owner and accion publiciana is an action to recover possession from the unlawful withholding of possession of a property. Those allegations in the complaint of petitioners are much more on accion reivindicatoria, its jurisdiction would be identified through the value of the property. Since the value of the subject property is only P410.00, then it is the MTC and not the RTC who has jurisdiction over the case.

PROVINCE OF CAMSUR v. CA, 600 SCRA 775 FACTS: City of Naga filed a complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title against petitioners before the RTC. They alleged that for a considerable length of time, petitioners possessed and claimed ownership of Plaza Rizal which deprived them to introduced improvements on it and could not use it without securing permit from said petitioners. In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were the legal and absolute owner of the Plaza and had the sole right to maintain, manage, control, and supervise the said property. The RTC decided the case in favor of the Naga City. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Naga City has territorial jurisdiction over the subject property. 2. Whether or not Plaza Rizal forms part of the patrimonial property of the petitioners. HELD: 1. Yes. The territorial jurisdiction of the petitioners over the subject property ceased upon enactment of RA No. 305 converting Municipality of Naga to City of Naga. Such law transferred the territorial jurisdiction from Camarines Sur to Naga City. Therefore, it should be the City of Naga to administer and possessed the Plaza Rizal being the proper agent of the Government. 2. No. Petitioners cannot claim that the subject property is part of its patrimonial property. The basis for the claim of ownership by the petitioners is the tax declaration. It is a well settled rule that a tax declaration is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, when not supported by any other evidence.

GO v. GO, 600 SCRA 775 FACTS: Petitioner instituted an action against respondent for partition and accounting before the RTC; he alleged that he and respondent are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land. That without his authority respondent rented out several warehouses to different business. That he repeatedly demands for his share to the rentals but respondent refused to give any. In his answer, respondent alleged that their father entrusted to him the operations and management of business in accordance with the customs and practice by the Chinese. The trial court ordered the respondent to deposit the rentals with the court.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed an error when it nullified the order requiring respondent to deposit the monthly rentals over the subject land with the trial court during the pendency of the action for partition and accounting. HELD: Yes. The purpose of the trial court in ordering the respondent to deposit the rentals with the court is merely preservatory or provisional in nature. It will be kept by the trial court until it is finally determined who is lawfully entitled thereto. It is a provisional relief designed to protect and preserve the rights of the parties while the main action is being litigated. In fact such order may be issued even prior to the determination of co-ownership because it only meant to preserve the rights of the parties until the courts will determine who is lawfully entitled thereto. However, like other orders issued by the court it must not suffer from the vice of grave abuse of discretion.

FELICIANO v. CANOZA, 629 SCRA 550 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents for declaration of nullity of documents and title, recovery of real property and damages. They alleged that the transaction regarding the settlement and sale were done without their participation and consent as an heirs. In their answer, respondent Canoza Spouses and Feliciano alleged that they were buyers in good faith, the case was prematurely filed and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners were just a mere squatter. The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioners but it was reversed by the CA on the ground of prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription. HELD: No. The prescriptive period to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud. Petitioners complaint was filed sixteen (16) years after Feliciano was issued a Free Patent and fourteen (14) years from the time private respondent Canoza was issued a OCT. Petitioners failed to institute the present civil action questioning the validity of the Free Patent and the OCT within the allowable period of four (4) years.

CAEZO v. BAUTISTA, 629 SCRA 580 FACTS: Both petitioners and respondents owned a certain parcel of land adjacent to each other. Respondent learned that the structures built by the petitioners encroached to their lot when they started to construct their own structure. However despite several demands petitioner refused to remove the structures. Both parties filed separately an action for the issuance of writ of demolition. The trial court decided the case in favor of the Caezo and against the Bautista. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition. HELD: No. Although the case inaccurately captioned an action for a Writ of Demolition with Damages, in reality it is an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 24

434 of the Civil Code. Said provision provides that in an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. Petitioners were able to prove their ownership of the subject property. They presented sufficient evidence, documentary and testimonial, to identify the lot wherein the Bautistas structure encroached on the lot of the petitioners.

CEBU AUTOMETIC MOTORS, INC. v. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, 629 SCRA 9 FACTS: Respondent is an owner of a commercial building and entered into a contract with Petitioner for the lease of a 2,906 Sq. M. commercial space. However, petitioner violated the provisions of the lease contract; thus, respondent informed petitioner that they are terminating the lease contract and demanded them to vacate the premise and settled the unpaid balance. Respondent finally filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC against petitioners. In their answer, petitioners denied the allegation of the respondent and further alleged that they did not sublease any portion of the leased premises. The MTCC decided the case in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the demand letter sent by respondent GMC is the demand that Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court contemplates as a jurisdictional requirement before a lessor can undertake a judicial ejecment pursuant to Article 1673 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. Under Rule 70, Section 2 of the Rules of Court it provides two demands, namely: 1) the demand for payment of the amounts due the lessor, or compliance with the conditions of the lease, and 2) the demand to vacate the premises. While Article 1673 mandates the rescission of the contract of lease and the judicial ejecment of the lessee. Perusal of the demand letter sent by the respondent to the petitioner, it did not demand for the compliance of the terms of the lease but it only informs petitioner that the lease was terminated based on the violation. Based on the said termination respondent required petitioner to vacate the premises. Respondent did not comply with the provision of Rule 70, Sec. 2 as it had rescinded the contract and was already demanding that the leased premises be vacated and the unsettled balance be paid.

LA CAMPANA v. LEDESMA, 629 SCRA 28 FACTS: Petitioner filed an ejectment case against private respondent before the MeTC for failure of the latter to vacate the subject property despite the expiration of the contract and for failure to pay rentals. In his answer, private respondent alleged that he had paid the rentals and petitioners had no right to possess the subject property because it was foreclosed by the DBP. Thus it was with the DBP that he made arrangement for his continued occupation of the subject property. The MeTC decided the case in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the execution of the decision of the RTC. 25

HELD: No. As a rule, issuance of writ of a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse. The CA just acted in prudent way when it order the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the execution of the trial courts decision until a final resolution for the main case is reached. Furthermore, the CA did not commit error in giving consideration to the supersedeas bond filed with the MeTC as payment for the unpaid rentals and as sufficient bond for the issuance of the said writ of preliminary injunction.

VAGILAD v. VAGILIDAD FACTS: Spouses Vagilad filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages against Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita Vagilad before the RTC. They alleged that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B which they acquired from Loreto. On their answer, defendants, denied the allegations of the plaintiffs and claimed that they the lawful owners which they allegedly acquired also from Loreto. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners Wifredo and Lolita Vagilad but it was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed an error in not applying the provision of Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code. HELD: No. Under Article 1544 it provides that, if the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who has fists taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. The Deed of Sale executed to the petitioners is tainted with blatant irregularities making them buyers in bad faith. Said bad faith of the petitioners is corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses presented stating that there are irregularities in the execution of the Deed of Sale. Thus, petitioners cannot invoke the provision of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

FAJARDO v. FREEDOM TO BUILD, 337 SCRA 115 FACTS: Respondent is an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioners a house and lot designated as Lot No.33. The Contract to Sell contained a Restrictive Covenant. The controversy arose when petitioners, despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded second floor of their house. Respondent filed before the RTC an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. ISSUE: Whether or not the Restrictive Covenant stipulated in the Contract to Sell the same to that of easement. HELD: No. Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. While it is correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use or the location or character of the buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can be also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own 26

property, do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements. The statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not opposed the construction is unavailing to their case, the subject restrictive covenant not being intended for the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe the uses of the building, i.e., to ensure, among other things, that the structures built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision would prevent overcrowding and promote privacy among dwellers.

SECRETARY OF EDUCATION v. HEIRS OF DULAY, 480 SCRA 452 FACTS: Respondents donated a certain parcel of land to DECS, to be used as school purposes. The property was subdivided and Lot 8858-A was issued in the name of the DECS; however, it was not used for school purposes and remained idle. Later on, DECS started constructing a school on another lot which is 2 kilometers away from the land donated by respondents. Respondents sent a letter to the DECS requesting that the land donated will be returned to them since it was not use for the construction of the school. Heirs of Dulay filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of donation and cancellation of title before the RTC. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners failed to comply with the condition imposed in the deed of donation. 2. Whether or not the right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribe. HELD: 1. Yes. It is difficult to sustain that the petitioners have complied with the condition of the deed of donation. There is no other evidence that could concretely prove that the donation has been complied with by the petitioners. 2. Yes. Failure on the part of the petitioners to comply with the condition of the deed of donation became manifest in 1998 when they constructed the school in another land, thus, the fouryear prescriptive period did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more than enough to comply with the condition.

BOGO MEDELLIN v. CA, 407 SCRA 518 FACTS: The father of the private respondents owned a certain parcel of land which they inherited when their father died. However, the entire length of the land from the north to south was already traversed in the middle tracks owned by petitioner BOMEDCO. Unknown to the private respondents, BOMEDCO was able to register in its name the subject property in the Cadastral Survey. Private respondent filed a Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages with Application of Restraining Order/ Preliminary Injunction against BOMEDCO. In its answer BOMEDCO alleged that they were the owner and possessor of the subject property which they purchased from Santillan. ISSUE: Whether or not BOMEDCO acquire the subject property through Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription.

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HELD: No.The property was in the possession of the petitioner through a granted easement. Petitioner cannot now assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription started from that year. Furthermore, the expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title.

BALOLOY v. HULAR, 438 SCRA 80 FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title of real property with damages against the heirs of Baloloy. He alleged that his father is the owner of the subject property and that the father of the petitioners was able to secure a Free Patent over the subject property through fraud. In their answer, petitioners alleged that then house was built in 1962 on a portion purchased from Balbedina and not on a portion which Hular purchase. The trail court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial court. HELD: No. Under Art. 487, provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kind of actions for the recovery of possession. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. In the case, respondent filed alone the complaint, claiming the sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no evidence to show that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent.

ADLAWAN v. ADLAWAN, 479 SCRA 275 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent over the subject property and the house built thereon. Petitioner alleged that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador Adlawan and the sole heir. That he adjudicate unto himself the subject properties. That he allowed respondents to stay on the said properties. That he demanded them to vacate the said properties when he needs to use it, but respondents refused. In their answer, respondents denied the allegations and alleged that they are occupants of the subject properties since birth. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment. HELD: No. There is no merit in petitioners claim that he has the legal personality to file the case because the ejectment of respondents would be benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. When petitioner filed the case of ejectment in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Gracaiana, thus he cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property.

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RONQUILLO v. ROCO, 103 Phil. 84 FACTS: Petitioners have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage of way which traversed the land of the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years. Respondents respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said petitioners. Respondents constructed a chapel in the middle of the said right of way which causes obstruction and disturbance to the continuous rights of the petitioners over the said right of way. ISSUE: Whether or an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription. HELD: No. Under the provision of the Civil Code, old and new, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. Even Art. 1959 of the Old Civil code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excluded therefrom the exception established by Art. 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way.

BACALING v. LAGUNA, 54 SCRA 43 FACTS: Petitioner filed several times a certiorari with the RTC, CA and SC but was denied. Suffering from these legal reverses, petitioner entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. One of the condition stipulated in the said agreement is that, petitioner agreed to vacate the premises and remove the residential house therefrom.before December 31, 1966. However, petitioner failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the agreement, thus, respondent filed a motion for execution. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and should be reimburse for reasonable expenses. HELD: No. Petitioners contention with regards to his alleged good faith cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is that lessees, like petitioners, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, and much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed.

EVANGELISTA v. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., L-11139, April 23, 1958 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a case for sum of money and obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon a house. The case was decided in his favor and became the highest bidder of the house sold at public auction. When he sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused and contended that the house was leased to respondent. In its answer respondent alleged that they are the owner of the subject property because their deed of sale precede that of the petitioner. The CFI decided the case in favor of Petitioner.

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ISSUE: Whether or not a house, constructed the lessee of the land on which it is build, should be dealt with, for purpose, of attachment, as immovable property, or as personal property. HELD: The subject house in the case is considered as immovable and not personal property. The finding of the CA that even if the subject property was considered as immovable, the attachment of it was void or ineffective was not accurate. Records would show that petitioner acquired the house as a consequence of the levy of an attachment and execution of the judgment. It was even corroborated by the respondent by admitting that his house was attached.

NAVARRO v. PINEDA, L-18456, Nov. 30, 1963 FACTS: Respondent mortgaged their house and a certain parcel of land through Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage to secure a loan, however they failed to pay their obligation even they were given so many extension. Petitioner filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage and for damages. In their answer, they admit that the loan is overdue but denied that they failed and refuse to pay. The trial court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended to the complaint is valid, even if the house was made the subject of the chattel because it is erected the land of third person. HELD: Only one of the parties to the contract of mortgages who assailed its validity. Those cases cited by the appellants are not applicable to the case because third person assailed the validity of the deed of chattel mortgages. The house in question was treated as personal or movable property by the parties themselves to the contract because of its smallness and made out of light materials.

LEUNG YEE v. STRONG MACHINERIES, 37 Phil. 644 FACTS: Defendant sold rice-cleaning machinery to the Compaia Agricola Filipina which executed a chattel mortgage to secure payment of the purchase price. Said mortgage included the building wherein the machine was installed. Plaintiff secured judgment for the amount levied execution upon the building and subsequently bought it from public auction. Plaintiff instituted an action to recover possession of the building from the company but it was decided against him. ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff is a purchaser in good faith. HELD: No. He is knowledgeable that the company owned the subject property when he bought it from the sheriffs sale. The companys right of ownership over the subject property is well founded; hence, he cannot insist that he is purchaser in good faith but rather a purchaser in bad faith. He should suffer the consequences of his act as he took the risk. A person who purchases a property

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with knowledge of a defect or lack of title of his vendor cannot claim that he has purchased such property in good faith.

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & COMPANY INC., v. ISABEL IYA, 103 Phil. 972 FACTS: Private respondent Valino filed a bond subscribed by the petitioner in order to purchase on credit rice from the NARIC. They mortgaged the subject property to private respondent Iya in order to pay their debt. For failure to pay their obligation, petitioner forecloses the mortgage and sold it at public auction wherein they were the highest bidder. Petitioner learned about the existence of the mortgage in favor of Iya, instituted an action against the respondents for exclusion. In their answer, respondents denied all the allegation of the petitioner and pray for the dismissal of the action for lack of cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not which of the two mortgages should receive preference over the other. HELD: Iyas right to foreclose not only the land but also the building erected thereon subject of the two mortgages is hereby recognized over that of the petitioner. Although the insurance company registered the Chattel Mortgage with the Registry of Deeds there is no effect because the interest conveyed in the nature of a real property making the registration useless. As to the contention of the petitioner that they purchased the property from the public auction, such contention have no basis, because real properties purchase at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale by virtue of a chattel mortgage but said mortgage has been declared void with respect to real properties, acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale.

MINDANAO BUS CO. v. THE CITY ASSESSOR, L-17870, Sept. 29, 1962 FACTS: Respondent City Assessor assessed the value of the maintenance and repair equipment and claimed that Mindanao Bus Company is liable to pay realty taxes. They even further contend that said equipments are immobilized by destination, in accordance with par. 5 of Art. 415 of the New Civil Code. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals but it was only sustained. ISSUE: Whether or not the equipments of the petitioner are considered as immovable property under Art. 415 of the New Civil Code. HELD: No. Under the said provision of the Civil Code it provides for the following immovable properties: Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. In the present case the equipments in question is destined to repair or service the transportation business, which is not erected on in a building or in a piece of land, thus, it is not a real property. It is not even essential to the bus companys business because even if without their equipments their business can go on because they can have the repair or service to another shop belonging to another.

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MACHINERY v. CA, L-7057, Oct. 29, 1954 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin against private respondent Villarama for the recovery or the machineries and equipments sold and delivered to said defendant at their factory. The sheriff upon ordered by the judge to seize the subject properties went to the place and seized the material causing damages to the properties and to the premise were they were installed. Defendant factory filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized machineries which was granted. The sheriff returned the machineries without inventory and re-installing them in their former position and replacing the destroyed posts. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is correct in instituting replevin to recover the machineries. HELD: No. Replevin may be brought to recover personal property unlawfully taken or detained from the owner, provided such property is capable of identification and delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property. In the present case, the machineries were permanently attached to the land that they needed to destroy its wooden support and its concrete foundation. Furthermore, said machineries and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said land and tended to meet the needs of said factory. Thus, the machineries and equipments were immovable property and as a consequence an action of replevin cannot be applied.

CALTEX v. CENTRAL BORAD, GR NO. 50466, May 31, 1982 FACTS: CALTEX owned machines and equipments consists of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks and other kind of machines. Respondent City Assessor of Pasay contends that those gas station machineries and equipments are characterized as taxable realty. The board of tax appeals ruled as real property and was sustained by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The petitioner filed a petition praying that the machines and equipment be declared as personal property and not subject to realty tax. ISSUE: Whether or not the gas station equipment and machinery of the petitioner are subject to realty tax. HELD: Yes. Under Assessment Law, Section provides that, the realty tax is due on real property, including land, building, machinery, and other improvements. In the present case, the improvements, those erected machinery and equipment are necessary for the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless. Moreover, said equipments and machineries were attached permanently to the gas station site, wherein without destroying them it cannot be separated. Thus, they taxable realty under Assessment Law and Real Property Tax.

STANDARD COMPANY OIL OF NEW YORK v. JARAMILLO, 44 Phil 630

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FACTS: de Vera, was a lessee of a parcel of land and owner of a house built of strong materials erected on the land. She executed a chattel mortgage, purporting to convey to the petitioner by way of mortgage both the leasehold interest in said lot and building. However, herein private respondent did not accept the document ruling that the document is not a chattel mortgage because the interest of the mortgaged did not appear to be personal property. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has the jurisdiction to determine the nature of document to be registered as chattel mortgage. HELD: No. The duty of the Registry of Deeds is to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record. With regards to chattel mortgage their duties are purely ministerial character and there is no any provision of law granting them the power to determine the nature of a document to be registered constituting chattel mortgage. Furthermore, it would become necessary for the SC to pass upon the point whether the interest conveyed in the document now in question are real or personal. It is the Registry of Deeds accepts the document of the petitioner and registers it upon payment of the proper fee.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT, L-47943, May 31, 1982 FACTS: Petitioner contends that the two oil storage tanks were not permanently attached on the land where it was erected. However, respondent also contend that while the tanks rest on their foundation, the integral parts of the tank are affixed to the land while the pipelines are attached to the tank. Respondent also contends that those machineries of the petitioners are taxable realty. ISSUE: Whether or not the two oil storage tanks of the petitioners are taxable realty. HELD: Yes. Assessment La provides that the realty tax is due on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements. In the present case the two storage tanks have been installed permanently on the land where it was erected and it is use to store the quantities of oil needed by petitioner for its operation. Moreover in some of the decided case of the Supreme Court oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty.

PRESBITERO v. FERNANDEZ, L-19527, March 30, 1963 FACTS: A preliminary restraining writ was issued by the court against the respondent from implementing the order dated February 3, 1960 and March 5, 1962 it further seeks the setting aside of the sheriffs certificate of sale of the sugar quotas. Petitioner denies having received the notice of garnishment of the sugar quotas. ISSUE: Whether or not the sugar quotas are personal properties. HELD: Yes. Under EO No. 873 it defines plantation as any specific area of land under sole or undivided ownership to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar. The sugar quota 33

allocations are accessories to land which cannot be separated from a plantation although said plantation may vary. The subject sugar quotas are improvements attached to the land which cannot be separated therefrom although they are not physically united just like other servitudes and real rights over an immovable.

INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY v. RAMIREZ, 44 Phil. 933 FACTS: The two mortgages were both registered at the Registry of Deeds, however, as to priority it is the Fidelity & Surety Co. that was first registered. Appellant Ramirez contends that the first mortgage is not valid on the ground that the subject-matter is not capable of being mortgaged and that the amount due the appellant is a purchase price invoking Art. 1922 of the Civil Code to support his contention. ISSUE: Whether or not which of the two mortgages in question must be given preference. HELD: It is the mortgage registered by the Fidelity & Surety Co. The appellant have knowledge of the preferential character of the mortgage in favor of the Fidelity & Surety Co. Furthermore he cannot invoke Art. 1922 because it is not applicable to him and he is not in possession of the property but instead it is in the possession of the Surety Corporation. As to the issue on the characteristics of the one-half interest of the business, such interest is a personal property which is capable of appropriation and may be subject of mortgage. MENESES v. ALAGAD, 69 Phil. 647 (Spanish context) REPUBLIC v. ALAGAD, GR NO. 66807, Jan. 26, 1989 FACTS: Defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land located at Laguna. The Republic and the barrio folk opposed the application, alleging therein that the subject property is still part of the public domain and the applicants or their predecessors-in-interest have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely. The application was granted with regards to Lot 1. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is a foreshore land. HELD: A foreshore land is defined as that part of the land which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. However, the SC cannot decide on it because the case is not artier of facts and it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition. Further, the SC remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the subject property is a foreshore land.

MANALO v. IAC, GR NO. 64753, April 26, 1985

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FACTS: Private respondents instituted an action for the cancellation of titles of the petitioners. They alleged that they were the owner of two parcels of land and embraced by titles which were acquired through sales patent. That the petitioners with malice misrepresented that they were the owners; hence, they were also issued a titles. In their answer, petitioners that they have been in actual, peaceful, and continuous and open possession of the parcels of land as evidence by their documents. The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have the right to institute the action for annulment of title. HELD: Yes. The subject property ceased to be part of the public domain when it was classified as disposable and subsequently transferred to respondents through free patents, thus the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over them. By these circumstances gives the respondents the right to institute the case against petitioners who has also titles acquired through fraud.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. KALAHI INVESTMENS, INC., GR NO. 48066, January 31, 1989 FACTS: Kalahi presented evidence to support perfected mining rights over the 123 mineral claims: that it had located in 1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in Floridablanca mountains; made annual assessment work thereto; made declaration of location and paid annual assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed roads traversing the mountains and hills, and planted 500, 000 coffee trees. ISSUE: Whether or not the mineral claims of the herein claimant-appellant, Kalahi Investment, Inc., is registrable. HELD: No. The lands in the public domain are classified under three main categories: Mineral, Forest and Agricultural lands. It is only on agricultural lands in the public domain that title could be issued either under administrative proceedings by application in the Bureau of Lands or under compulsory proceedings under Cadastral Act or ordinary proceedings under Act 496. These lands are never private lands either.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. VILLAREAL, GR NO. 32266, Feb. 27, 1989 FACTS: Respondent applied for registration of title over a certain mangrove swamps, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. However, his application was opposed by the petitioner claiming that the subject property is forestall and cannot be subject to disposition and private appropriation. The CFI approved the application of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not mangrove swamps or manglares are forest lands or agricultural lands.

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HELD: Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 1820 which remains unamended defines mangrove swamps or manglares as part of the public forest of the Philippines. It is the legislature who determined as such, thus it cannot be contested by the higher courts but just to apply it. Being part of the forest land, they cannot be subject to alienation, unless they are first classified as alienable agricultural land. As to respondents contention with regards to the survey plan proving that the land is registrable has no basis at all, because mere existence of such plan does not convert the characteristics of the subject property as forest land into an agricultural land.

PILAPIL v. CA, GR NO. 97619, Nov. 26, 1992 FACTS: Petitioners owned a certain parcel of land covered by a tax declaration. On the other hand, private respondents owned also a certain parcel of land covered by a tax declaration. When private respondents intended to improve the road they were prevented by the respondent. Respondent alleged that the road right of way of the petitioner ends at the portion of their property where a camino vecinal exist. Private respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer of writ of preliminary mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the RTC. The trial court decided the case in favor of the private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist a camino vecinal on the property that traverse petitioners property. HELD: Yes. A camino vicinal is a municipal road which is use for public use. The Municipality of Liloan had the authority to prepare and adopt a land use map, promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider such as municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and close any municipal road. The testimonial evidence presented by Engr. Jordan, stated that this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak passess the side of the land of Pilapil. This is the proposed roads leading to the national highway. Such testimonial evidence was not rebutted by the respondent.

BINALAY v. MANALO, GR NO. 92161, March 18, 1991 FACTS: Private respondent Manalo filed a complaint before the CFI for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged that he is the owner of the two parcels of land formed due to accretion which enjoined the alleged land of the petitioners and further prayed that petitioners will vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Petitioners insist that they were the owners of the subject property. The trial court decided the case in favor of the private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not there was an accretion on the subject property. HELD: Article 457, provides three requisites: a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; b) that it be the result of the action of the water of the river; and c) that the land were accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. If indeed there was an accretion claimed by the private respondent it should be deposited on Lot 307, likewise on the lot of the 36

petitioners (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but opposite of it. In fact, it is difficult to suppose that the area of Lot 821 which is bigger size than Lot 307 that it resulted from accretion from another lot of almost equal size. The SC decided the case declaring Manalo as the owner of Lot 307 and the submerged portion of the Cagayan River is declared as property of the public dominion.

REYNOSO v. CA, GR NO. 49344, Feb. 23, 1989 FACTS: Petitioners owned a parcel of land he acquired from his predecessors-in-interest, introduced improvements therein. However the application for registration for title filed by his predecessors-ininterest was still pending because of the opposition of the private respondent. Private respondent armed with claim of transfer of rights deprived petitioners from the possession of the subject property and took over the possession. Private respondent further alleged that the land in questioned is in abandoned state. The trial court decided the case in favor of petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the Bureau of Lands over the alienation and disposition of public land precludes the court from its jurisdiction over possessory action over public lands. HELD: No. The right of the Bureau of Lands over alienation and disposition of public land doe not divest the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of actions instituted by applicants or occupants against others to protect their respective possession and occupation. Furthermore, court has possessory actions involving public land to determine the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases, and better right of possession in accion publiciana. As to the issue on abandonment, Article 555 of the Civil Code cannot be applied in favor of the respondent because petitioners made known their objections to their unlawful acts when the surreptitiously took possession of the subject property.

GUINOBATAN v. CFI, GR NO. 52295, Feb. 15, 1990 FACTS: Private respondent filed a petition for segregation, issuance of title and annotation of the sale over a certain parcel of land they purchased from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Legazpi, Inc. Petitioner opposed the petition alleging that the property is part of the registered historical landmark of Albay and that the deed of sale does not exist. The trial court decided the case in favor of the private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the subject property violates the Constitution or any provision of law. HELD: Answer is in then negative. The alleged violation of the Constitution as raised by the petitioners is that the subject property is registered in the records of the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a historical landmark of Albay. However such issue was rebutted by the private respondent, they presented information from the NHI that there were no records pertaining to the subject property. Even if it was registered the same it is doubtful it such registration will deprive the owner of the right to dispose of the property. Under Art. III of the Constitution and Art. 435 of the Civil 37

Code it states that, no person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.

REPUBLIC v. JUDGE ANGELES, GR NO. 30240, March 25, 1988 FACTS: Zobels owned the Hacienda de Calatagan covered by TCT No. 722. Upon the cessation of their sugar mill operations, they converted the pier into a fish pond. Subsequently, Zobels ordered the subdivision of the hacienda which enabled them to acquire titles to the subdivided lots which were outside the hacienda perimeter. The Honorable Court affirmed the court a quos finding that the subdivision plan was prepared not in accordance with the technical description of TCT No. 722 but in disregard of it. And that the appropriated fishpond lots are actually parts of the territorial waters and belong to the State. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents can claim ownership over the area in excess covered by his title which was part of the public domain. HELD: No. The areas in dispute were found to portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable water itself. And it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant.

MANECLANG v. IAC, GR NO. 66575, May 24, 1988 FACTS: Petitioners filed before the CFI a complaint of Quieting of Title over a certain fishpond against private respondents. The case was denied by the trial court ruling that the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek forms part of the Agno River making it public in nature and cannot be the subject of private appropriation. The CA affirmed the trial court decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject body of water belongs to the public domain. HELD: Yes. Through the ocular inspection pursuant to Resolution No. 38 it was found out that the body of water belongs to the public domain. The Municipality of Bugalon has the authority to pass such resolution dealing with its municipal waters. Considering that the a creek is a property belonging to the public dominion which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription it cannot be registered under the Torrens System.

BUYSER v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, L-22763, March 18, 1983 FACTS: Buyser is the registered owner of a parcel of land, contiguous to said land is a parcel of land which was formed by accretion from the sea. Private respondents have been occupying the 38

foreshore land by virtue of the Revocable Permit issued by the Directors of Land. Buyser filed an action against the private respondents to recover possession of the subject property. The trial court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion forms part of the public domain. HELD: Yes. The alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain, thus, not open to acquisition by private persons. Petitioner invokes Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters which have no basis because such provision of law is that the state will grant the accretion added to the land to the adjoining owners only when they are no longer needed for public use. Petitioner failed to prove that subject property is no longer needed by the government. The Revocable Permit Application by the private respondent does not mean that the subject property is no longer needed by the government but it only allowed said private respondent to occupy the subject property temporarily.

REPUBLIC v. CARANTES, GR NO. 56948, Sept. 30, 1987 FACTS: Private respondents in behalf of the heirs of Piraso filed with the CFI of Baguio and Benguet Land Registration Case No. N-287 over a certain parcel of land. The Director of Lands through the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the application alleging that, neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation the subject property. Petitioners further alleged that the subject property is a portion of the public domain belonging to the State. The trial court adjudicated the parcels of land to the private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is a public domain being part of the public forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. HELD: Yes. It is a well settled rule that forest land or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession unless reclassified by the Government to be alienable and disposable land. Records shows that the subject property cannot be utilized as an agricultural land because of its nature that it is covered with trees, bushes, and grasses and very stony. In addition to such circumstances, the subject property fails within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Therefore, the subject property forms part of the forest land which cannot be alienated and dispose by private person.

TOTTOC v. IAC, GR NO. 69969, Dec. 20, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner applied for the lease of a vast track of a pasture land and he was issued ordinary pasture permit. On the other private respondent was able to acquire a certification from the Bureau of Forestry certifying that the subject property is alienable and disposable and later on he was issued a title. Petitioner caused the relocation of his pasture land and was found out that a portion of the land subject of private respondents application was within his pasture land.

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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court committed error in concluding that the subject property is alienable relying on the certification issued by the Bureau of Forestry. HELD: Yes. Petitioners contention that the respondent court should not have relied on the certification because it is merely hearsay for failure of the person who issued to testify. The SC agreed on the contention of the petitioner but only for the reason that the evidence-in-chief or private respondent, by strict of law, be constitutive of hearsay. The issue on classification of a public land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. Therefore, the certification issued by the Bureau of Forestry is not controlling in the case.

DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT v. CA, GR NO. 81961, April 18, 1989 FACTS: Private Respondent applied for registration of title over a certain parcel of land under the Land Registration of Act (Act 496) and for an alternative he also invokes the provision of Act 141. The Director of Lands opposes the said application, alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership or have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for atleast thirty (30) years. Further, Petitioners alleged that the subject property is a portion of the public domain belonging to the State. The trial court granted the application of the private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is registrable under the provision of RA 8372 notwithstanding that it is within Central Cordillera Forest Reserves. HELD: No. It is a rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and even in long possession. RA 8372 applies only to agricultural public lands and to no other type of land and it is only an amendatory to Commonwealth Act No. 141. The only land allowed by the law for registration is those agricultural although not disposable such as agricultural lands within a reservation for fruit experiments, but not a forest reserves which the Constitution and other laws excluded from alienation.

SUNBEAM v. CA, GR NO. 70464, Jan. 29, 1989 FACTS: ISSUE: HELD:

REPUBLIC v. CA, GR NO. 62572-73, Feb. 15, 1990 FACTS: Private respondents applied for original registrations of two (2) different parcels of land, logged as LRC Case No. N-125 and LRC Case No. 126. The Director of Land opposed the said applications alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title to said parcels of land and neither can they avail the Provisions of Public Land Act. Furthermore, 40

he opposed LRC Case No. 126 because it was found out that the property is within the Northern Norte Forest Reserve. The applications were granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property in LRC Case No. 126 is a forest reserve. HELD: No. The question of whether the land involved in a land registration is a forest land or forest reserve is a matter or proof. The allegation of the petitioners that the land in question is within the forest reserve declared under PD No. 338 has not been clearly established. Under the Rules of Court, Section 1, Rule 131 provides that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations by presenting amount of evidence, for civil cases it is preponderance of evidence. Petitioners relies on the report of Forest Warden that portion of the subject property is within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve, but it did not substantiate its allegations.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA, GR NO. 50260, July 29, 1992 FACTS: Private respondent filed an application for registration of title over a certain parcel of land within Timberland, Masbate. Director of Lands opposed the said application, alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land or neither they openly and adversely possessed the land and that the land in question is part of the public domain belonging to the State. The trial court granted the application. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is a public domain belonging to the State. HELD: Yes. Petitioners presented sufficient to prove that the subject property is indeed a timberland which forms part of the public domain. Among that evidence presented is the report which states that the said area is a part of Timberland; sketch plan showing the demarcation and classification of the land as within the forest zone and many more evidence. Considering that the land in question is classified as timberland there is no need for judicial determination that indeed the area if forest land. On the government and not the court can classify public lands. Thus, an applicant for registration of a public land has the burden to prove that the land subject of his application does not form part of the public domain. Private respondent cannot insist that she has no obligation to show that the property involved is agricultural.

ZAMBALES v. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, GR NO. 49143, August 21, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner claims that it is the owner and holder of sixty (60) mineral claims and registered under the Act of US Congress (known as the Philippine Bill of 1902). That they applied for its patent for each and were granted by the Director of Mines. The subject property became the private property of the petitioner and segregated from the public domain. ISSUE: Whether or not under the provision of PD No. 1214 there was deprivation or property without due process of law and just compensation which makes it unconstitutional.

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HELD: No. Petitioner did not comply with the terms and condition stipulated in the said decree. One of the terms and condition that the petitioner did not comply is that there should be not only a valid and subsisting location of the mineral land but that there should be, thereafter, continuous compliance with all the requirements of the said law such as the payment of real estate taxes. Records show that petitioner filed only its application for patent 43 years after they located and registered the mining claims. As to the constitutionality of the decree, PD No. 1214 is constitutional because it is in accordance with Section 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution and now Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. BUYCO, 216 SCRA 78 FACTS: Private respondents through their attorney-in-fact filed an application for registration over a certain parcel of land which they acquired through inheritance from their grandparents. Petitioner filed its opposition and likewise Development Bank of the Philippines manifested that portion of the property pertaining to Edgar is covered by mortgage in its favor. The trial court granted the application. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not private respondents had established propriety right over the subject property. 2. Whether or not the subject property is part of the public domain belonging to the State. HELD: 1. No. Private respondents did not present any evidence to show that they and their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an Old Spanish grant such as the titulo real or royal grant, concession especial or special grant, informacion posesoria or possessory information and other kind of Spanish grant. 2. An applicant for registration of public lands must able to establish that the land subject of the application is: a) alienable public land; b) his possession, in the concept of an owner for a long time. In the case, private respondents did not ho any evidence to prove that the land in question is alienable and disposable. Based on the evidence the subject property was part of a pasture land. As a rule grazing land and timber land are not alienable.

MOLINA v. De BACUD, 19 SCRA 956 FACTS: Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she is the owner of a certain parcel of land she inherited from her mother. That during the lifetime of her mother was in continuous, public, quiet and adverse possession. That Molina through violence, strategy and intimidation took over possession of the subject property and cut trees found therein. Molina denied all the allegations and alleged that the subject properties were public lands which he acquired through sale application duly approved by the Director of Lands.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of Land has the jurisdiction of disposing public lands under Section 4 of the Public Land Act. HELD: No. The authority given vested to the Land Departments over disposition of public lands does not preclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the character of the land in question. Even if the Director of land s could validly dispose the subject property, still the jurisdiction must be recognized in the court. The reason of such is that once a sales application is approved, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and as a consequence the Director of Lands loses control and possession thereof.

MADARCOS v. De La Merced, GR NO. 39975, June 30, 1989 FACTS: Catain Spouses died leaving a tract of land covered by Homestead Patent No. 8193 and described in Certificate of Title G-25 issued in the name of Benigno Catain. Petitioner Madarcos sold her share of the inheritance of, Lot B, to private respondent Loreto. Subsequently, petitioners demanded the reconveyance of Lot B pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act. When the private respondent Loreto refused to reconvey, petitioners instituted an action for repurchase. Private respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the petitioners have no authority to sue because they are not the legal heirs. The trial court dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have the right to repurchase the property as legal heirs of Catain. HELD: Yes. Under the rules of intestacy in the Civil Code, the following inherit successively and exclusively: a) Legitimate children and their descendants; b) Legitimate parents and ascendants; c) Illegitimate children and their descendants; d) Surviving spouse without prejudice to rights of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the deceased; e) Collateral relatives within the fifth degree; and f) The State. These provisions of law identify the petitioners as legal heirs. Considering that there are no compulsory heirs, they now became the decedents and were given the right to the estate of Catain spouses. But only Francisca Madarcos can invoke the right to repurchase of her share because she is still alive. BecausePetitioner Telesforo cannot be considered as a legal heir and further, the homestead had already been partitioned and distributed among heirs.

REPUBLIC v. CA, GR NO. 79582, April 10, 1989 FACTS: The late Felisilda filed Free Patent over the subject property with the Bureau of Lands but he died so her wife continued the application. The application was corroborated with Certification that the applicant was in continuous occupation and cultivation since 191. The application was approved by the Bureau of Lands. However, a protest was filed contesting the free patent issued, alleging that it had been falsified for the reason that the patentee died and the land in question had been sold to other parties before the expiration of five (5) years. The trial court dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the title is imprescriptible and indefeasible after the lapse of five (5) years.

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HELD: A title issued through Free Patent is indefeasible as provided under Section 122 of the Land Registration. However, such indefeasibility does not bar the Director of Lands to investigate on how the title was acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine if there is fraud in securing the title inorder that the government may file an action of reversion. Public lands included in patents or certificate fraudulently may be recovered or reverted to the State as provided in Section 101 of the Public Land Action and it is not barred by prescription. Prescription does not run against the State.

EGAO v. CA, GR NO. 79787, June 29, 1989 FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint of Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and Ownership before the RTC. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of two (2) parcels of land. In their answer, petitioners alleged that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the parcel of land and his family have been in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous possession thereof even before the issuance of the free patent to him. The trial court decided the case against the private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are innocent purchasers for value. HELD: No. Under the Torrens System, an innocent purchaser for value includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrance for value. An individual who purchases a land cannot insist that he is a buyer in good faith for value when he did not conduct inquiries to determine the possibility of the existence of defect in his vendors title. There is no valid title that was passed to the private respondents from Marfori. Thus, private respondent are not innocent purchasers for value and have no right to question petitioners right to the land.

PADERES v. CA, 463 SCRA 504 FACTS: Manila International Construction Corporation (MICC) executed a real estate mortgage from Banco Filipino in order to secure a loan. Subsequently MICC sold the lot covered by TCT No. 61078 together with the house to the petitioners. MICC failed to pay their obligation causing the mortgage to be extrajudicially foreclosed and the Banco Filipino is the highest bidder at the public auction. No redemption of the foreclosed mortgage having been made with the reglementary period. A Writ of Possession with notice to vacate the premises were sent to the petitioners, nut instead of vacating they instituted another petitioner to the CA but it was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to redeem the foreclosed properties. HELD: No. They did not redeem the property within the one-year redemption period being the successors-in-interest of the MICC. As provided under Act No. 3135, a debtor in extrajudicial foreclosures or his successors-in-interest, has, one year from the date of registration of the Certificate of Sale with the Registry of Deeds.

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Vda. DE GULABERTO v. CA, 463 SCRA 671 FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of Generoso Gauaberto. Gualberto and wife Consuelo sold the subject property to the respondents father and they executed a deed of sale and subsequently executed an Affidavit stating that indeed they sold the subject property. Respondents filed a case of Forcible Entry against petitioners which was decided in their favor. ISSUES: 1.Whether or not a titled property can be the subject of a free patent. 2. Whether or not a registered owners right to assail the validity of his defendants title and to thereafter seek reconveyance thereof, may be lost by prescription. HELD: 1. The first issue attacks the validity of respondent Rosa Gos free patent title. This cannot be done for two (2) basic reasons: a) the validity of s torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally; and b) the issue is being raised for the first time before the SC. The action taken by the petitioners is one for conveyance, accion publiciana and quieting of title and not an action for annulment of title, thus, the issue cannot be entertain. Moreover, the issue was raised for the first time, it a rule that issues not raised in the proceedings in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 2. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is not barred by prescription, only if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. In the instant case, petitioners actual possession of the property after their fathers sale thereof to Kiang and up to the filing of the complaint did not establish such possession.

BANCO FILIPINO v. CA, 463 SCRA 64 FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for redemption and specific performance. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case alleging that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Assuming that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct, still there was no redemption effected within one year from the date of the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale. The trial court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents complaint for redemption and specific performance states a cause of action against petitioner. HELD: No. It is well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action, only the facts in the complaint must be considered. Perusal of the complaint, the allegations of private respondent established that they have no cause of action for redemption against petitioner. BUKIDNON DOCTORS v. METRO BANK, 463 SCRA 222 FACTS: Petitioner mortgaged six parcels of land to secure a loan from the respondent. However, they failed to pay their obligation, causing the mortgage to be extrajudicially foreclosed and sold it at 45

public auction making the respondent the highest bidder. Respondent asked the petitioner to vacate leased, but the petitioner refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement. Respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession and was granted. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was still entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. HELD: No. The reason for the issuance of a writ of possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in possession of the property sold without delay, since the right to possession is founded on ownership of the property. But in the case, respondent wrongfully instituted an action for writ of possession as remedy to oust the petitioner from the subject property. In a lease agreement, entered into by a mortgagor and the mortgagee after expiration of the redemption period and the title were consolidated in the name of the mortgagee, the proper remedy to evict the person form the property is to institute an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer and not a writ of possession.

PANGANIBAN v. DAYRIT, 464 SCRA 370 FACTS: In the amended complaint filed by the petitioners, they alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited. That unknown to them a certain Salcedo ascertained ownership over lot 1436 and sold it to respondent believing that it is an unregistered land. Respondent however learned that the land she purchased is a registered land. Respondent fraudulently filed a Petition for the Issuance of an owners copy of the title OCT No. 7864 which was granted. Petitioners further alleged that the issuance of the title to the respondent prejudiced their previous issued title. In her answer, respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint; she alleged that Lot 436 was sold to her by the petitioners and their father. ISSUE: Whether or not who among the parties is the rightful owner of the subject property. HELD: When the lower court conducted an ocular inspection it was found out that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Salcedo, is the one in actual possession and that Salcedo was the owner of the said land until 1978 when respondent became the possessor thereof. On the other hand, petitioner claim of ownership only in 1992 or forty-five (45) years from the time Salcedo took possession of the property. That long period of time that passed, petitioner did nothing to assert their right of ownership and possession over the subject property.

BEJOC v. CABREROS, 464 SCRA 78 FACTS: Private respondent and his husband appointed petitioners to be the administrator of their property which is the subject of the case when they went abroad. Petitioners were tasked to deliver the harvest to respondents mother. However, when respondent came back home she learned that petitioners stopped from delivering the harvest to her mother and further learned that petitioner applied for a free patent over the properties. Private respondent filed an action for reconveyance against petitioners. In their answer, petitioners alleged that they had been in possession of the

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subject properties as administrator and as absolute owners. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents action for reconveyance has prescribed. HELD: No. The action was based on implied trust and not on fraud. Implied trust is one that, without being express, is deducible from the nature of the transaction as a matter of intent or which is superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as a matter of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. The 4-year prescriptive period cannot be applied to the case because it was not based exclusively on fraud. Although reconveyance base on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, starting from the discovery of the fraud, still the action taken by the respondent fall within such prescriptive period. The title was issued on 1984 and the action for reconveyance was filed on 1990 which is six (6) years from the discovery of the fraud.

DAVID v. CORDOVA, 464 SCRA 384 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against the respondents; he alleged that he is a co-owner of the subject property before the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (FMCTC). That respondent forcibly entered the subject property who constructs a structure on the land. He tried to stop them but respondent refused. In their answer respondents, they questioned the jurisdiction of the FMCTC; allegedly the subject property is under the disposition and administration of DAR. ISSUE: Whether or not the FMCTC had jurisdiction over the Complaint for forcible entry. HELD: No. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth as provided by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In order to determined the jurisdiction of the court there are two (2) mandatory allegations that must be present: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession; and second, he must allege that he was deprived of his possession by any means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In the complaint filed by the petitioner, he clearly alleged that he is the co-owner of the subject property; therefore he is entitled to possession. That respondent forcibly entered the premises without their consent and further respondents threatened him with harm if he should interfere with their work. The action of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property and this all that is necessary.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PADERANGA, 464 SCRA 481 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land before the RTC against respondents. The subject property is co-owned by herein private respondent Dilao. Petitioner asserts that the traversed land of the Dilao, which being expropriated shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value property as provided under Section 3A, RA No. 6395. They further

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alleged that the land could still be used for agricultural purposes by the defendant subject only to its easement. ISSUE: Whether or not real property can be a subject of easement of right-of-way which constitutes power of eminent domain. HELD: Yes. Power of eminent results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. The facts of the case clearly established that the acquisition of the-right-of-way easement constitute power of eminent domain, which the owner thereof must be compensated. However, the transmission line installed by the petitioner on the subject property deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. Furthermore, the transmission lines cause damaged to the property, thus, NPC should pay just compensation to private respondents. Just compensation in expropriation proceedings is a judicial function, meaning the court has the jurisdiction.

CALACALA v. REPUBLIC, 464 SCRA 438 FACTS: Spouses Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, offered the subject property as a property bond in order to provisionally release an accused in a criminal case. However, failed to appear during the hearing, thus the property was forfeited by order of the judge. The trial court further issued a Writ of Execution for the levy of the subject property and to sell the same at public auction. Respondent was declared as the highest bidder and a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued to them. Petitioners filed a complaint of Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance. ISSUE: Whether or not trial courts dismissal of petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title proper. HELD: Yes. Quieting of title is a remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. In order that an action for Quieting of title will prosper, two (2) essential requisites must be present: 1) the plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and 2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are lacking in the case. Petitioners just rely on the respondents failure to secure a Certificate of Final Sale which cannot stand; they did not base their claim on the strength of any independent writing in their favor.

DIAZ v. VIRATA, 498 SCRA 141 FACTS: Respondent filed with the RTC a Complaint with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner. He alleged that petitioner filed a claim with a DENR, and such claim over the subject properties created a clout which may be prejudicial to their titles. Further alleged that petitioners fenced the subject properties and constructed a driveway thereon. 48

In his answer, Enrique alleged that he filed a protest with the DENR to enforce his valid and legitimate rights over the subject properties and that his predecessors-in-interest had been in actual and continuous possession. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents title over the subject properties, valid. HELD: Yes. The principle that the person holding a prior certificate of title is entitled to the land against who relies on a subsequent certificate. Said principle is applicable to Antenor because his title was issued as early as 1959 as found by the trial and appellate court. Antenor acquired the subject properties in installment basis from Crisologo and after payment of his obligation, several titles were issued to him. The fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor the person whose name appears therein. The titles became the best proof of ownership of the subject properties by Antenor and it was also found that said titles were not tainted with any defects.

TAMAYO v. DOMINGUEZ, 498 SCRA 342 FACTS: Dominguez executed a real estate mortgage to secure a loan from the Community Savings and Loan Association (CSLA). Dominguez died without settling his obligation. For failure to pay obligation, the subject property was extrajudicially foreclosed and CLSA became the highest bidder at the public auction. Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for partition against partition, alleging that CSLA violated the mortgage deed when it failed to notify Dominguez or his heirs of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale. ISSUE: Whether or not CSLA notify respondents regarding the extrajudicial and sale of the subject property. HELD: No. Records show that CSLA violated the notice requirement in the mortgage deed. Indeed, there is no evidence to show that CSLA sent notice of the foreclosure proceedings to the respondents, pursuant to Section 10 of the Real Estate Mortgage Contract. As to petitioners reliance on the alleged notice of foreclosure proceedings sent to deceased Dominguez, it have no basis, in as much as there is no showing that in the blank return card of said letter the same was properly received by Dominguez or his heirs or any authorized representatives. In extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, personal notice to the mortgagor is actually unnecessary unless stipulated. In the case, the parties voluntarily agreed on an additional stipulation embodied in Section 10 of the mortgage deed. Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, CSLA should have complied with it faithfully.

MANANSAN v. REPUBLIC, 498 SCRA 348 FACTS: Respondent through the DECS filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila for the expropriation of two (2) parcels of land with improvements thereon: one owned by ADC and the other by Manansan. Petitioners property was to be used for the construction of the Trinidad Tecson Elementary School. 49

A Writ of Possession was issued to the Respondent, thus they demolished some of the improvements and had the elementary school constructed thereon. ADC filed a motion for the appointment of three (3) commissioners to fix the just compensation and require respondents to deposit 10% thereof. Respondent opposed the motion insisting that they had already deposited the same with the PNB. Petitioner filed a motion to be restored to the possession of the subject properties but it was denied by the trial court ruling that restoration was no longer feasible. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation for a property may be base only on the trial courts exercise of mere halving a 1993 BIR Zonal Valuation. HELD: No. The trial court erred in reducing in half the assessment of the City Treasure and Cit Assessor based on the BIR Zonal Value as of 1995, and consequently fixing the fair market value of the subject property at P7,946,555.55. There is no evidence on record that the said amount is the fair market value of the property, as of 1979 when public respondent filed its complaint in the RTC. The trial court merely indulged in the speculation and surmises when it declared that the aforementioned amount is the fair market value of the property. The rule is that the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint. The complaint was filed in 1979, and the assessment report was in 1995 which is sixteen (16) years difference. Indeed, the fair market value of the property in 1979 cannot be fixed by the mere expedient of cutting in half the assessment made for that matter as of 1997. Such a process is arbitrary and a grave abuse of the trial courts discretion.

CRUZ v. CRISTOBAL, 498 SCRA 37 FACTS: Buenaventura Cristobal contracted two (2) marriage and have a children on both wife which are the herein petitioners and respondents. More than six (6) decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names. Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages before the RTC against private respondents. The trial court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court erred in applying the principle of laches resulting to gross injustice and inequity to the petitioners. HELD: Yes. The respondent court committed reversible error in upholding the claim of the private respondents that they acquired ownership of the entire subject property and that claim of the petitioners was barred by laches. The doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice and its application cannot be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of the owner. Petitioner Elisa discovered in 1994 that the title had been transferred to private respondents and that she was excluded, petitioners filed in 1995 a complaint to annul the title. There is no evidence to show that petitioners failed or neglected, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.

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BELUSO v. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, 498 SCRA 113 FACTS: Respondent filed a petition for exploration over a certain parcel of land owned by the Petitioners. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition alleging that the taking is not for public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals. The trial court denied the motion of the petitioners and declared expropriation upon payment of just compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not LGU has the power to acquire any or all of the subject properties through the power of eminent domain. HELD: No. Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to the LGUs, the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. There are several requisites that LGU must concur before exercising the power of eminent domain, one of which is that, an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative counsel authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU. As respondents expropriation in the case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGUs to exercise its power of eminent domain.

REPUBLIC v. TRI-PLUS CORP., 593 SCRA 91 FACTS: Respondent filed an application for Registration of Title over two parcels of land, alleging that it is the owner of the said land, having acquired through purchased. That it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest. Petitioner opposed the application, alleging that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. That the subject property forms part of the public domain. The MTC granted the application. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable. HELD: Yes. Respondent failed to prove that the properties sought to be titled forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. Respondent presented an Advance Plan; said plan refers only to the technical correctness of the survey of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the subject property. Respondent failed to show certification or any positive act of the government to prove that indeed the subject property is alienable and disposable. Moreoever, respondent and its predecessors-in-interest failed to prove that they had been in long possession in the concept of an owner of the subject property.

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SAAD AGRO v. REPUBLIC, 503 SCRA 522 FACTS: Petitioner acquired the subject property from Orcullo, who was able to title it through Free Patent. Republic through OSG filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by the Free Patent. Respondent alleged that the subject property is part of the public domain, being part of the timberland and that the Free Patent was erroneously issued. The trial court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to prove that the property part of the public domain. HELD: Yes. Respondents main basis in asserting that the subject property is part of the timberland or forest reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961. However, during the trial they denied admission of the map for the purposes of showing that the subject property falls within a timberland reserve after they failed to submit a certified true copy of said Map. The Map presented is just a mere photocopy and not the blue print of the original. A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence of the existence of the map. Even assuming that the LC map as admissible as evidence, still the subject property in question can hardly be said that it is within the timberland. The delineation of the subject properties was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent.

ALTIZO v. BRYC, 503 SCRA 87 FACTS: The subject property Lot 300 was subdivided into three lots, Lot 300-A, Lot 300-B, and Lot 300-C. Sea Foods Corporation (SFC) sold Lot 300-C to respondent. Respondent was issued a title and demanded petitioners to vacate the premises. Failure to heed to the demand, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners before the MTC. The court ruled in favor of the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the right to remain in Lot 300-C. HELD: Petitioners occupation of the subject properties was on the mere tolerance of the previous owner SFC. Their right to occupy have ceased when SFC sold the subject property to respondent which has been issued a title thereto, hence, entitled to its possession. Despite demand from the respondent, petitioners still continue to occupy the property making them a deforciant occupant. Moreover, petitioners contention that they can still continue to occupy the subject property because they were granted by the previous owner preferential right to buy Lot 300 under the Letter of Intent, does not lie. No right of possession, which is the only issue in an unlawful detainer case, arises from such Letter of Intent it does not actually transfer ownership.

CARILLO v. CA, 503 SCRA 66 FACTS: Petitioner Gonzales filed a complaint against Spouses Manio, praying that a deed of sale will be executed in her favor. She alleged that she bought a parcel of land from Spouses Manio in installment basis. Upon payment of the purchased price petitioner asked for the execution of the 52

final deed of sale but spouses Manio refused to execute. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Herein respondents, Dabon filed a petition for judgment and orders of the RTC, claiming that they bought also the subject property from Aristotle, son of Spouses Manio. They also opposed the motion of Gonzales for the issuance of a writ of possession. ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient basis to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2647. HELD: The subject property is owned by Aristotle and not her mother Prescilla. Gonzales filed a complaint for specific performance against Spouses Manio. It is rule that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. The only essential is that he will be able to prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by fraud or collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby and if it will be substantiated by preponderance of evidence, his allegation will be the ground for the annulment of the judgment. In the present case, even is respondents were not parties to the specific performance case but it was found that there was a fraud in the institution of the complaint, such as the exclusion of the party-in-interest it would adversely affect the respondents ownership and thus, it could be the basis for annulment of the judgment.

NPC v. SAN PEDRO, 503 SCRA 333 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other landowners, in to construct a Transmission Line Project, it was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement of right of way. Maria in her answer alleged that Petitioner had resorted to deceit, trickery and machination to induce her to grant a right of way by assuring her that it would also pay for the residential portion of the property at P600.00 per square meter. The RTC issued a writ of possession against Maria San Pedro. ISSUE: Whether or not appellate court committed error when it upheld the decision of the trial court fixing the just compensation, instead of the easement fee provided under RA 6395. HELD: No. The CA found no error in the trial courts finding of just compensation. As to the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases it is a judicial function and factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls within recognized exceptions. Just Compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property. The fact that there was no available sales data on properties within the vicinity of respondents land for 1996 and 1996 and that the BIR zonal value was P600.00 per sq. m. fdor residential and P30.00 per sq. m. for agricultural, did not proscribe the commissioners and the trial court from making their own reasonable estimates of just compensation.

LECA REALTY v. REPUBLIC, 503 SCRA 563 FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for eminent domain before the RTC taking some portions of the properties of Leca, Metrobank, CityLand. Said properties would be affected by the construction of 53

the EDSA over pass. The court a quo appointed three (3) commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation of the properties sought to be taken. The trial court decided the case adopting the commissioners report for just compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed error in affirming the amount fixed by the trial court for just compensation based on the commissioners report. HELD: No. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of a property taken from its owner by the expropriator. Necessarily, just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors. The commissioners report made use of the market-data approach in arriving at the valuation of the properties. In the said method, the value of the land is based on sales and listings of comparable property registered within the vicinity. Although the commissioners relied on newspapers advertisements of offers of sale, these offers were merely asking prices. They are subject of negotiations in which a buyer may ask for a lower price and also the owner to raise the price offer.

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