This article was downloaded by: [University of London] On: 5 October 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription

number 789234659] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Diplomacy & Statecraft

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634951

Richard J. Shuster, German Disarmament After World War I: The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection 1920-1931
Carolyn J. Kitching a a University of Teesside, Online Publication Date: 01 September 2008

To cite this Article Kitching, Carolyn J.(2008)'Richard J. Shuster, German Disarmament After World War I: The Diplomacy of

International Arms Inspection 1920-1931',Diplomacy & Statecraft,19:3,613 615

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09592290802260549 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290802260549

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Diplomacy and Statecraft, 19: 613615, 2008 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN 0959-2296 print/1557-301X online DOI: 10.1080/09592290802260549

1557-301X and Statecraft 0959-2296 FDPS Diplomacy Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3, July 2008: pp. 15

BOOK REVIEW

Richard J. Shuster, German Disarmament After World War I: The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection 19201931 (London: Routledge, 2006), ISBN: 978-0-415-35808-8, pp. 272, 75.00.
Book Review

Downloaded By: [University of London] At: 20:38 5 October 2009

Carolyn J. Kitching University of Teesside Although studies of international history after the First World War are well-documented and continue to appear, the impact of some aspects of the restrictions imposed upon Germany at Versailles are less well analysed. This volume, which is based upon a good range of primary source material, though relatively little recent secondary literature, supplies a muchneeded study of what the phrase German disarmament actually meant. The study commences with a slightly truncated overview of the rationale for the decision to disarm Germany. That disarmament did not stem solely from the occurrence of this catastrophic event, i.e., the war, but from a theory which became popular because of this event, which was that arms races cause wars, and therefore the abolition of arms should lead to the end of war itself. A little more explanation of this theory in the introduction would have helped make a connection with two issues which are discussed later in the book. The first of these is raised in Chapter 4 when Shuster notes the British view that the destruction of armaments essentially disarmed Germany. The second issue is raised in Chapter 6 when Shuster discusses the difficulty of achieving the moral disarmament of Germany. It arises because of the argument, effectively the other side of the disarmament debate, that it is international tensions which cause states to arm. Germany quite clearly did not subscribe to the somewhat idealistic arms cause wars side of the debate, but rather to the view favoured by supporters of realpolitik that arms are, in fact, a diplomatic and political weapon.1 It may also have been useful at this point to stress that the disarmament of Germany was intended to be the first step towards general disarmament (as set out in Article V of the League of Nations Covenant), which again the idealists may have expected would have led to greater acceptance of disarmament on the part of Germany.

614

Book Review

In examining the rationale of imposing disarmament on Germany, Shuster looks in detail at the differing points of view of the main supporters of the League, Britain and France. Frances overriding concern with her future security had to be measured against the possibility of a Bolshevik threat to a weakened Germany, a point which Britain stressed. Even at this stage, as Shuster points out, France was very dependent on British support, and was forced to compromise over her own preference, which was to see Germany unable ever to threaten her again. In Chapter 3, Shuster provides a thorough and detailed explanation of the role and nature of the bodies which were set up to oversee German disarmament: the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IAMCC) and the Conference of Ambassadors. He then looks in detail at the mechanism by which German disarmament began to be implemented, including the difficulties of reaching a definition of war material, and points out the first signs of two factors which were to dog the whole disarmament process, as far as Germany was concerned. These were the obstructive approach of the Germans themselves and the widening split between the French and British approach to German disarmament. The study then examines in detail the numerous aspects of German disarmament which the IAMCC had to tackle; a list which those studies concerned with the implementation of the disarmament clauses of both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations tend to group together merely as German disarmament. These include such issues as the elimination of war production, the demilitarisation of German industry, the reduction in effectives and in the police, and the removal or de-commissioning of German fortifications. All of these points are covered in impressive detail and depth and provide much-needed insight into why the disarmament of Germany proved to be so difficult. Shuster gives detailed examples of ways in which the German government, and indeed civilians, attempted to resist the task of the IAMCC, in failing to provide inventories of materials, for instance, and in concealing weapons either within Germany itself, or through export to neutral countries. Having looked at the mechanics of the organisation, Shuster then goes on to look at the struggle for an Allied policy. He stresses from the outset that there was no mechanism by which the Allies could enforce the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant. There were no specific ways in which they could impose penalties for violations and these violations were, of necessity, dealt with on an ad hoc basis. When the Allies could not agree on the penalties for violations, Germany was always able to capitalise on the split between them: hence the turmoil caused by the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, an action of which Britain wholeheartedly disapproved,

Downloaded By: [University of London] At: 20:38 5 October 2009

Book Review

615

Downloaded By: [University of London] At: 20:38 5 October 2009

and which Germany was able to prolong simply because British disapproval meant that they refused to back up Frances policy. One slight criticism of Shusters account of one of the major improvements in international tensions is that he implies that the question of disarmament played a much bigger part in the Locarno Treaties of 1925 than was actually the case. There is no doubt that some diplomatic measures were necessary to placate French fears, following the failure of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, and that Austen Chamberlains decision to include Stresemann in a security guarantee was essential. However, whilst disarmament may have featured in talks at Locarno there was no mention of it in the Locarno Treaties themselves.2 There was a passing reference to it as a goal that might be achieved as a consequence of the improvement in international relations, and this undoubtedly was the case, but in effect Germanys eventual admission into the League of Nations in 1926 effectively ended the Allies ability to impose any penalties at all, as Germany had officially joined the European club. From then on the role of the IAMCC became increasingly irrelevant, much to the consternation of the French. The IAMCC withdrew on 31 January 1927 and all final attempts at control were ended in March 1931. This is an extremely informative, well-written and thoroughly researched volume which fills a rather large gap in the historiography of the period. NOTES
1. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the disarmament debate see, for example, Carolyn J Kitching, Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 19191934 (London, 1999) and Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London, 1989). 2. See Carolyn J Kitching, Locarno and the Irrelevance of Disarmament, in G Johnson (ed.) Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy 19201929 (London, 2004).