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Asian Management

March 2006

The Case of the

Chaebol Cult

A True Parent-Centred Society

Asian Management

March 2006

Is organisational isomorphism sufficient to explain managerial behaviour in the Korean Chaebols?

Asian Management

March 2006

Introduction
Chaebols were at the heart of the industrial transformation in South Korea and were widely praised as the engine of the Korean success story, which threatened estern economies and ri!alled e!en the mighty "apanese machine# $owe!er, after the Asian Crisis of 1%%&, the chaebols failed dramatically, dragging much of their national economy down with them# '(rganisational isomorphism), used by institutionalists to describe the homogenisation of organisations which face the same e*ternal en!ironmental conditions, is a model fre+uently referred to when discussing chaebol beha!iour# ,he monolithic, -aibatsu.es+ue Korean chaebols are !ery ali/e, reacting to their en!ironment in much the same manner# 0re.1%%& this was a successful tactic, but after the Asian Crisis it was a fundamental wea/ness, in part due to their inability to change# 1ndeed, at first they appeared to be adopting estern managerial styles and were percei!ed to be ma/ing a reco!ery, but it was later re!ealed that they had slid bac/ into their old ways# (rganisational isomorphism has been criticised for not clearly e*plaining reasons for this phenomenon, implying an underlying, unaccounted.for comple*ity# Many of the theorists who ha!e tried to capture chaebols in a single analytical framewor/ seem not to ha!e gone further to try and unco!er the firms) seemingly illogical beha!iour, such as their institutionalised rules and di!ersification strategies# ,his essay will consider the arguments e*plaining the actions of these Korean giants, using the academic perspecti!es# 1t will be obser!ed that theories are insufficient to understand the chaebols) beha!iour and so an e*amination will follow of Korean managerial decision.ma/ing in relation to socio.cultural factors# ,he first section considers the literature, with Amsden 21%%&3, Ahn 220013, Chen 220043 and 5ee 220043 discussing the conte*t, structure and managerial beha!iours of chaebols# 6imaggio and 0owell 21%783 consider e*planations in!ol!ing coerci!e, mimetic and normati!e isomorphism, with bac/ing from institutionalists Meyer and 9owan 21%%13# :hosal 21%773 and Song and Cho 21%%73 gi!e chaebol.specific e*amples

Asian Management

March 2006

demonstrating the legitimacy of isomorphism, while (h and 0ar/ 220013 offer alternati!e theories in relation to chaebols, including transaction.cost economics# ;rom the cultural perspecti!e, $assan 21%%03 and 9itchie 21%%13 e*amine the beha!iour of the Korean. based cult, ,he <nitarian Church, or the =Moonies>, which re!eal some stri/ing similarities to chaebols that thus far seem to ha!e gone unnoticed by academia# ,he ne*t section begins to e*plore the arguments in depth, with a discussion of managerial beha!iour specifics in Korean chaebols in relation to current academic theories# Although they differ, they agree unanimously on the importance of e*ternal factors on business functions# ,he third part of this essay will draw comparisons between chaebols and the Moonies, obser!ing their common cultural characteristics, including family structure and religious influences, to further e*plain managerial beha!iours# 1t will be concluded that, to understand managerial beha!iour in Korean chaebols, one must augment academic theories with social factors, particularly as illustrated in the Moonie cult#

Literature Review
,he uni+ueness of chaebols calls for a close e*amination in order to understand their internal wor/ings# Amsden 21%%&3 and Ahn 220013 discuss chaebols in relation to their conte*t, describing them as highly state.protected, family.owned creations of a go!ernment committed to e*pansion# Chen 220043 compares these go!ernment.guided firms to "apanese -aibatsu, analysing their structure and focusing on their recruitment practices, moti!ation, and di!ersified business strategies# ,he peculiarity of their decision.ma/ing is pointed out, such as copying one another and only superficially adopting estern structures after 1%%&, though the reasons for which are gi!en only limited attention# 5ee 220043 considers managerial beha!iour from the wor/ers) perspecti!e, reporting that their poor treatment, percei!ed corruption of top management and inefficient business processes are still !ery much in e*istence#

Asian Management

March 2006

ith regards to academic theories, institutionalists 6iMaggio and 0owell 21%783 discuss three types of isomorphism? coercive, such as go!ernment.enforced rules@ mimetic, where companies copy others which ha!e successfully coped with the same en!ironment@ and normative, including professionalism, which considers cultural issues# ,he authors argue that organisational isomorphism, in contrast to competiti!e isomorphism, occurs to pro!e legitimacy, rather than to increase efficiency# Meyer and 9owan 21%%13 agree, claiming that many organisations incorporate institutionalised =ceremonies>, enforced formal rules, which can and do inhibit efficiency# Specifically loo/ing at chaebols, Song and Cho 21%%73 and :hosal 21%773 fer!ently argue for the case of organisational isomorphism in e*plaining managerial beha!iour# :hosal obser!es homogenous methods of en!ironmental scanning, no matter the industry, while Song and Cho study chaebol managers) reasons for unrelated di!ersification strategies with regards to isomorphism# Aoth studies conclude that institutionalism, particularly organisational isomorphism, sufficiently e*plains managerial beha!iour# <nli/e the abo!e authors, (h and 0ar/ 220023 ta/e a balanced multi.perspecti!e approach, e!aluating !arious strategies and structures in addition to isomorphism, including neo.classical economics, agency theory and, most significantly, transaction. cost economic theory# ,hey posit that transaction.cost economics adds to institutionalist arguments in its predictions of firms) mo!ements as determined by personal relations and a!ailability of technology# ,he authors also state that mimetic isomorphism is limited when technological uncertainties are high, which directly contradicts 6iMaggio and 0owell)s 21%783 argument# ,he problem remains of why certain managerial beha!iour in chaebols is uni+ue to Korea# 1nstitutionalism pro!ides a general answer that culture and society ha!e a significant role to play# ;ollowing the abo!e theories is an e*amination of cultural elements and another organisation specific to Korea# $assan 21%%03 and 9itchie 21%%13 dissect religious cults, focusing on the Korean.founded <nitarian Church 2also /nown as the =Moonies>, after its leader, Sun Myung Moon3# ,here are remar/able similarities between the Moonies and chaebols in their agents) beha!iours, from family.ownership and control to indoctrination, institutionalised rituals and deception# <sing the cult as an

Asian Management

March 2006

analytical tool to gain insight on chaebols) mo!ements will re!eal additional cultural factors# ,hese include a tendency to form large family groups run by an authoritarian father figure, combined with an ecology of religions, including Confucianism, Christianity, Auddhism, and ,aoism#

All models are wrong

As a part of the industrialisation of South Korea, the go!ernment in the 1%&0s offered credit to those firms which e*panded and di!ersified into the industry of the go!ernment)s choosing, particularly hea!y and chemical industries2# Amsden 21%%&3 mar/s this e!ent as the birth of the chaebols? massi!e, fast.growing conglomerates, di!ersifying into any industry which resulted in ma*imum funds from the go!ernment# Modelled on the "apanese -aibatsu, Chen 220043 obser!es that both are family owned and 2in!ariably3 controlled, meaning that they ha!e a centralised, paternalistic leadership style# ,here is also a high degree of formalisation, e!idence of corruption at the top and an organisational tendency for di!ersifying# 2fig#13#

1
2

6eming, # www#anecdote#com#auCarchi!esC 2006C01CallDmodelsDare#html Ahn EA Search for 9obust Fast Asian 6e!elopment Models After the ;inancial Crisis? Mutual 5earning ;rom Fast Asian F*periencesE, 2001, pg426

Asian Management

March 2006

Managerial behaviour
Family-based firm Paternalistic leadership Formalisation

Examples
Centralisation, hierarchical structure# Aenefits based on personal relationsCconnections and seniority 9ules inhibiting efficiency, li/e recruitment process, =socialisation> and maintenance of group harmony Maltreatment of wor/ers, altering of accounts and buying shares of affiliates ;ollowing each other into unrelated industries, e!en after withdrawal of go!ernment assistance

Corruption and cronyism of top management Diversification strategies

;ig#1 Categories of obser!ed chaebol mo!ements and specific e*amples

Chen 220043 focuses on specific beha!iours, such as the recruitment process, in!ol!ing the e!aluation of candidates based on relations of blood 2hyul-yun3, region 2jiyun3 and school 2hiahk-yun38# ,hey are also Gudged on how they maintain group harmony# 1t is also noted that, although Koreans wor/ !ery hard, they are +uite e*trinsically moti!ated, wanting pay and promotions o!er a sense of achie!ement# ,his is reflecti!e of the management)s poor treatment of the wor/ers, as 5ee 220043 obser!ed, ma/ing them wor/ !ery long hours and e!aluating them on their personal connections and seniority, rather than their performance# At a higher le!el, managers ha!e created fraudulent accounts and subsidiaries ha!e bought each other)s shares in order to boost the appearance of their firm)s performance in the eyes of the go!ernment# ,hese beha!iours were noted e!en after the 1%%& crisis, when chaebols were supposed to ha!e reformed to more estern methods# 1ndeed, 5ee)s study of 2004 shows the wor/ers) awareness of their continuing maltreatment and the corruption and cronyism of top management# ,his lac/ of change is obser!ed by Chen 220043, who notices that,
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Chen 220043 Asian Management Systems. Second Edition, pp170.171

&

Asian Management

March 2006

e!en after the go!ernment deregulated the financial sector and encouraged firms to specialise, li/e suicidal lemmings =leaping en masse off cliffs>4 they all continued to di!ersify, e!en to their demise# ,he lemming metaphor is an apt description of organisational isomorphism, which has been defined as, =a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of en!ironmental conditions>B# As already noted, 1nstitutionalists 6iMaggio and 0owell 21%783 recognise three types of institutional isomorphism? coerci!e, mimetic, and normati!e# Coerci!e isomorphism deri!es from go!ernment inter!ention, such as chaebols di!ersifying in order to recei!e financial support# ,his is supported by Song and Cho)s 21%%73 study of institutional moti!es for chaebols di!ersifying# ,hey conclude that coerci!e isomorphism is the /ey dri!er, as managers di!ersify for monetary gain# Chen)s 220043 comments on e*trinsically moti!ated employees, adds weight to this argument# ;irms employ mimetic isomorphism to cut costs and to pro!e their legitimacy, particularly in times of technological uncertainty# ;or e*ample, :hosal 21%773 attributes mimetic isomorphism to the homogeneity of en!ironmental scanning methods by Korean firms@ Samsung created a successful model, which was rapidly adopted by the other large chaebols# 1t is also interesting to note at this Guncture that mimetic isomorphism e*plains to an e*tent why chaebols only superficially adopted western managerial methods post. 1%%&# Korean firms faced different en!ironmental conditions to those in the est, so they had a greater tendency to imitate each other, rather than foreign organisations# ,his may also ha!e been affected by cultural factors that included other Korean firms as a part of a wider 'family)# Hormati!e isomorphism, such as professionalism leads to the recruitment of wor/ers from the same bac/ground and world !iews# Kanter 21%&&3 describes this homogenising isomorphic beha!iour as a =homose*ual reproduction of management>6# ,his resembles Chen)s 220043 description of the recruitment process at chaebols# Chen 220043 also notes how new recruits are also gi!en in.house training that includes
4 B

http?CCen#wi/ipedia#orgCwi/iC5emming $awley 21%673, +uoted in 6iMaggio and 0owell 21%783 ',he iron cage re!isited? institutional isomorphism and collecti!e rationality in organi-ational fieldsE, pg14% 6 Kanter 21%&&3 in 6iMaggio and 0owell 21%783 ',he iron cage re!isited? institutional isomorphism and collecti!e rationality in organi-ational fieldsE, pg1B8

Asian Management

March 2006

=socialisation>&, to further align their psychological tendencies with that of the chaebol, and which encourages a suspicion of outsiders# 1n support of this, Meyer and 9owan 21%%13 argue that these beha!iours are e*amples of corporate =ceremonies>, which are reflections of =widespread understandings of social reality>7# A more detailed discussion of socio.cultural influences will be discussed in the ne*t section of this essay# 1n contrast to the institutionalists, (h and 0ar/ 220023 ta/e a multi.theoretical approach in considering reasons behind managerial beha!iour in chaebols 2fig#23#

Theories

State regulation

Inter-firm relationships
5ow trust arm)s length relations 5ow trust means arm)s length relations

Technological uncertainties
,echnology and firm dependent on mar/et changes 6ecentralised decision. ma/ing, diffused claimants reduce uncertainties ,ype of technology is important to organisational form =;lying geese> to import technology# Mimetic isomorphism copes with uncertainties

!eo-classicists Minimal

gency theory

Minimal

Transactioncost economics Institutional theory

Hecessary to offset mar/et failures ;inancial help in particular necessary to catch up with ad!anced firms# Fncourages di!ersification

5ow trust means close, personal relations 5ow trust and power focus means centralised subsidiary networ/s

;ig#2 ;our theories on three organisational !ariables# ,a/en from (h and 0ar/ 220023 'Shooting at a Mo!ing ,arget? ;our ,heoretical 0roblems in e*plaining the 6ynamics of the Chaebol)

,he authors e*plain that, while institutionalist theorists argue for state inter!ention, neo.classical economists belie!e it should be minimal, blaming state regulation for the failure of Korean firms# 1ndeed, ta* brea/s from the go!ernment encouraged chaebols to di!ersify and e*pand, but Chen)s 220043 obser!ation of the firms)
& 7

:hosal 'Fn!ironmental Scanning in Korean ;irms? (rganisational 1somorphism in action#), 1%77, pg 72 Meyer I 9owan, '1nstitutionalised organisations? ;ormal structures, myth and ceremony,) in 0owell, I 6iMaggio, 0# 2edt#3, 21%%13# The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis, pg44

Asian Management

March 2006

high debt to e+uity ratio suggests that the chaebol)s financial dependency on the state e!entually contributed to their downfall%# All four theories agree that chaebols run on a basis of distrust, which supports Chen)s 220043 obser!ations of the recruitment of homogeneous wor/ers, reflecting a suspicion of outsiders# Heo.classical and agency theories recommend arm)s length relations, particularly in the case of agency theory, where a big issue facing the principle. agent relationship is information asymmetry# ,ransaction.cost economists, howe!er, belie!e in building close relations and institutionalists encourage the controlling of firms with which to do business# 1t seems that both of the latter theories e*plain some managerial decisions, including recruitment and promotions based on personal relations and doing deals with affiliates only, including buying each other)s shares# ;inally, the four theories offer differing suggestions for tac/ling issues of technological uncertainties# ,ransaction.cost economics argues that the type of technology a!ailable affects the form of the company and institutionalists gi!e mimetic isomorphism as a method for dealing with uncertainty# (h and 0ar/ argue that transaction.cost economic theory is more the sound from their obser!ations of the semiconductor industry# ;or e*ample, buying technologies from "apan, it appears that chaebols do not di!ersify until after they ha!e the technologies, implying that the type and a!ailability of the imported technology dictates the chaebols) di!ersification strategies# Samsung, $yundai and 5: followed each other into the semiconductor industry 2suggesting mimetic isomorphism3, but 5: failed, selling its share to $yundai# According to (h and 0ar/, this suggests that mimetic isomorphism is limited if technological uncertainty is high, which directly contradicts the organisational isomorphism argument# $owe!er, the other theories do not pro!ide any alternati!e e*planations# 6eming is +uoted as stating =All models are wrong, but some are useful>10 and in this case it can be seen from (h and 0ar/)s study that all of the theories were =wrong>, but transaction.cost economics and organisational isomorphism are useful in e*plaining chaebol managerial beha!iour#
%

,he go!ernment was lending money with interest rates lower than the le!el of inflation, meaning that they were in effect losing money# 10 www#anecdote#com#auCarchi!esC 2006C01CallDmodelsDare#html

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Asian Management

March 2006

We shall build a True Parent-centred societ

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,his essay has co!ered !arious academic theories, each of which has pro!ided either a case study or analytical framewor/ to illustrate its point, yet none so far ha!e been sufficient for the tas/ at hand# (ne of the problems is that businesses occur globally and, as many of the theorists appear to be of apply rationalist estern origin or education, it may be too easy to estern beliefs to eastern Korean firms# Chaebols) mo!ements ha!e

been closely analysed but these ha!e generally been concluded as illogical, without offering sufficient e*planation# 1nstitutionalism, howe!er, poses that firms are affected by e*ternal forces, particularly that of society# ,hus an analysis follows, using a framewor/ suitable for understanding Korean culture# ,he framewor/ ta/es the form of an e*amination of the <nitarian Church, a cult also /nown as the =Moonies># ;ounded after the Korean ar in 1%B4, $assan 21%%03 states that Sun Myung Moon claimed "esus had told him that he must finish what "esus had begun and unify the world under one religion# Korea has numerous old and new religions, many of the recent ones combining Confucianism, Auddhism, ,aoism and Christianity12 J the Moonies are no e*ception# A splinter group of Christianity, the cult features concepts such as monotheism, the Messiah, "esus and Satan# ;amilies in Korea are traditionally !ery large and run by the head male in a paternalistic fashion18# ,he Christian god.li/e masculine figure wor/s within this framewor/, as do Confucian principles of maintaining in.group harmony within a hierarchy# 1n addition, a hierarchy 2of mental states3 is a mar/ of Auddhism, as is harmony, also a /ey element of ,aoism14# 1ndeed, Moon)s focus is on e*pansion and emphatically encourages in.group harmony, while ruling as a Messiah o!er his followers, referring to himself and his wife as =,rue 0arents># Chaebols are also influenced by these same cultural mindsets, including the growth.orientated family.centred business, where the dominant family male at the top of
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Moon, S# 'Causa seminar speech), http?CCwww#unification#netC1%7BC7B072%#html, 2%th August, 1%7B http?CCwww#pbs#orgChidden/oreaCculture#htm and http?CCwww#bayfor#eduCKchartsD/empC/orean#htm 18 http?CCwww#pbs#orgChidden/oreaCculture#htm 14 <tterbac/, 9# 'Korean Culture), http?CCwww#mnsu#eduCemuseumCculturalColdworldCasiaC/oreanculture#html

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Asian Management

March 2006

a hierarchy, has almost unlimited power and to whom his subordinates are loyal# 5ee 220013 briefly mentions a culturally.related problem he had in attaining information from chaebol wor/ers# ,hey were !ery loyal to their company and to criticise superiors would be a sign of disrespect and a disruption of group harmony# Chen 220043 obser!es that while in "apanese companies there is a sense of mutual obligation between une+ual partners, in Korea the obligation lies only with the employees to ser!e their superior# ,o enforce these cultural rules, $assan 21%%03 discusses the indoctrination procedures of the Moonie cult, where a recruit undergoes a /ind of brainwashing# ,heir mental state is changed to one that encourages utter, unthin/ing de!otion to Moon and the cause of the Moonies# ,his is similar to Chen)s 220043 recruitment e!aluations and in. house training, and particularly :hosal)s 21%773 term =socialisation># Although candidates for chaebols are chosen on their prior inclination for maintaining in.group harmony within a hierarchy, they are further indoctrinated to not thin/ for themsel!es and li!e only for their company# A distrust of outsiders appears to be an additional Korean trait, another reason for building and maintaining large groups# 1ndeed chaebols were created and first pressed to di!ersify into hea!y and chemical industries by the go!ernment, in part, to protect themsel!es from Horth Korea1B# 1n addition, managers hire only people who thin/ li/e those on the inside, and di!ersify and e*pand, according to institution theory, to increase power and reduce uncertainty16# $assan 21%%03 and 9itchie 21%%13 discuss how the Moonies train people to be afraid of the outside world, claiming that Satan will get them# ,his encourages further loyalty to the cult and prompts fer!ent action for its e*pansionist cause# ,his in part e*plains the reason for continuing chaebol di!ersification after the go!ernment withdrew its support# Managers were indoctrinated to promote e*pansion through di!ersification and when they were no longer protected by the state, they responded to this increased uncertainty by di!ersifying further, as e*pansion is culturally associated with safety# ;inally, this distrust of outsiders and an almost desperate need to feel safe and secure means deceit and corruption is common practice for both Moonies and chaebols#
1B

Ahn 220013, pg420 and 0an, F#, 'South Korea)s role in a dangerous neighbourhood), http?CCwww#nytimes#comCcfrCinternationalCslot8D021106#html# 16 1nterestingly, 9itchie 21%%13 reports the Moonies, li/e chaebols, ha!e di!ersified into unrelated industries, including hotels, pharmaceuticals and military e+uipment#

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Asian Management

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$assan 21%%03 states that Moonies e*aggerate their membership numbers and gain recruits and money from the general public using a false, innocuous.sounding name1&# ,hey belie!e that the end Gustifies the means and if the outside world is e!il then lying is a necessity in order for them to sur!i!e# ,his is also true of chaebols, including the altering of accounts and bribery to appease the go!ernment, or superficially adopting western managerial methods, while continuing as normal underneath# 1t seems that the particular cultural mi* found in South Korea ma/es organisations particularly susceptible to cult.li/e beha!iour and so the Moonies analysis can be utilised with academic theories to more fully understand chaebols# ,he maintenance of a large family.based group, for e*ample, and reasons for formalisation, corruption and di!ersification as obser!ed in transaction cost.economics and institutionalism can be e*plained in relation to Korean culture, using the lens of the Moonies cult#

!onclusion
;amily.based chaebols display a number of peculiar managerial traits, including a paternalistic leadership style, di!ersification before and after the deregulation of the financial sector, formalisation resulting in efficiency inhibition, and corruption of top management# Academic theorists, including institutionalists, neo.classical economists, agency theorists and transaction.cost economists ha!e attempted to e*plain obser!ed beha!iours, but with limited success# 6eming states that Lall models are wrong, but some models are usefulL17 and it is true that institutionalism and transaction.cost economics wor/ together to pro!ide a useful analysis for understanding chaebols# $owe!er, they fail in terms of sufficiently e*plaining why and how specifically Korean managers beha!e the way they do# 1nstitutionalism states that culture and religion are influential factors in the running of the wor/place and so a study of a uni+uely Korean organisation, which is more closely lin/ed to its culture could help re!eal some answers# ,he Moonies are a
1&

F*amples from 9itchie 21%%13 include the Collegiate Associate of 9esearch 0rinciples 2CA903, Kensington :arden Arts Society, the Hew orld Singers, the 1nternational Conference of the <nity of Sciences, and the American ;reedom Coalition, pg8& 17 www#anecdote#com#auCarchi!esC 2006C01CallDmodelsDare#html

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Asian Management

March 2006

religious cult, which shares a surprising number of characteristics with chaebols# <sing the Moonies as a framewor/ facilitates further understanding of the Korean firms in terms of culture and religion# 1n conclusion, academic theory, let alone the institutionalist concept of organisational isomorphism, is insufficient by itself to e*plain managerial beha!iour in Korean chaebols# 1t is better to combine this with analyses of culture particularly that of the cult, as this gi!es a more rounded e*planation for the seemingly illogical decisions made by chaebol leaders#

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Asian Management

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"ibliogra#h
rticles Ahn# EA Search for 9obust Fast Asian 6e!elopment Models After the ;inancial Crisis? Mutual 5earning ;rom Fast Asian F*periencesE, ournal o! American Economics, 2001, pp41%.448 Amsden, A# 'South Korea? Fnterprising :roups and Fntrpreneurial :o!ernments), 1%%&, pp887.86& 6iMaggio I 0owell, ',he iron cage re!isited? institutional isomorphism and collecti!e rationality in organi-ational fieldsE# American Sociological "eview, Mol# 47, 1%78, pp14&.160 :hosal, S# 'Fn!ironmental Scanning in Korean ;irms? (rganisational 1somorphism in action#) ournal o! International #usiness Studies# Spring, 1%77, pp6%.76 5ee, "# 'Criti+ue and 1nsight into Korean Chaebol), Journal of American Academy of
Business, Cambridge, Mar2004, Vol. 4 Issue 1/2, pp476-480

Song, " I Cho, 6# '6i!ersification Strategies and the ;ormation of Korean Aig Ausiness :roups 2Chaebols3? 9esource.based and 1nstitutional 0erspecti!es on the Causes of 6i!ersification), 1%%7, pp1.1% 5ee, "# 'Criti+ue and 1nsight into the Korean Chaebol), ournal o! American Academy o! #usiness, March 2004, pp4&6.470 (h and 0ar/, 'Shooting at a Mo!ing ,arget? ;our ,heoretical 0roblems in e*plaining the 6ynamics of the Chaebol), Asia $aci!ic #usiness "eview, 2001, chapter 8, pp44.6% "oo#s Chen, M# 220043# Asian Management Systems. Second Edition. 5ondon? ,homson 5earning# $assan, S# 21%%03# %om&atting %ult Mind %ontrol# 9ochester? 0ar/ Street 0ress# Meyer I 9owan, A# '1nstitutionalised organisations? ;ormal structures, myth and ceremony,) in 0owell, I 6iMaggio, 0# 2edt#3, 21%%13# The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis. 'ondon( )niversity o! %hicago $ress 'td. 9itchie, "# 21%%13# The Secret *orld o! %ults# 5ondon? Angus I 9obertson#

1B

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$ebsites 6eming, # www#anecdote#com#auCarchi!esC 2006C01CallDmodelsDare#html NMiewed 2&th ;ebruary, 2006O Moon, S#, 'Causa seminar speech), http?CCwww#unification#netC1%7BC7B072%#html, 2%th August, 1%7B NMiewed 1%th ;ebruary 2006O 0an, F#, 'South Korea)s role in a dangerous neighbourhood), http?CCwww#nytimes#comCcfrCinternationalCslot8D021106#html, 11th ;ebruary, 2006 NMiewed 1%th ;ebruary 2006O <tterbac/, 9# 'Korean Culture), http?CCwww#mnsu#eduCemuseumCculturalColdworldCasiaC/oreanculture#html NMiewed 2Bth ;ebruary 2006O *e&sites without identi!ia&le authors http?CCwww#bayfor#eduCKchartsD/empC/orean#htm NMiewed 1%th ;ebruary 2006O http?CCwww#pbs#orgChidden/oreaCculture#htm NMiewed 80th "anuary 2006O http?CCen#wi/ipedia#orgCwi/iC5emming NMiewed 24th ;ebruary, 2006O

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