PHLA10 Tutorial notes Daniel Walsh Pascal: God exists infinite gain Infinite loss God does not

exist finite loss Finite gain

Believe God exists Do not believe God exists

The utility of believing that god exists is infinite. Thus, we have a prudential reason to believe. James: James rejects Pascals approach. James doesnt think one can believe something that one is disinclined to believe. Rather, he wants to show that under certain conditions it is acceptable both morally (contra Clifford) and epistemically to believe what one is inclined to believe even where the evidence is far from decisive. He does not, on my reading, advocate belief where the evidence runs strongly against the claim. Sum: Where the option is a genuine option, i.e., where it is live, forced and momentous, one is within ones rights to believe what one is inclined to believe with respect to a question where the evidence is indecisive. Some moral questions are of this kind; as is the question of Gods existence. Live: Does the question have some hold on me? (This condition is relative to the person) Forced: Either one believes it or one does not. Theres no middle ground. The agnostic does not believe. Momentous: The claim has serious implications for ones life. Clifford:

Jamess view is responsive to Cliffords. Clifford argues that it is morally wrong for one to believe any claim without sufficient evidence. He offers a consequentialist argument. Jamess response: There are two related epistemological aims: seek the truth and avoid error. Clifford has chosen the latter at the expense of the former. James compares Clifford to a general who isnt willing to risk any casualties to attain the victory. Surely great epistemological gains are forfeited in adhering to this approach.
The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision,just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.

A question: How much of what we believe is based on sufficient evidence? Most of our beliefs, Id venture, are based upon trust in other people. The Problem of Evil Bills argument: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. God is all knowing. God is all good. God is all powerful. Therefore, if God (as such) existed, there would be no evil. But there is evil. Therefore, God (as such) does not exist.

Some pushback: Is this argument valid? It makes some unstated assumptions. (4) does not obviously follow from (1), (2) and (3) without these assumptions. What are they? Perhaps: (a) A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can, and (b) There are no limits to what an all-powerful being can do. These are Mackies additional premises. Lets apply these 1. God is all knowing. 2. God is all good. 3. A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can. 4. Therefore God eliminates evil as far as God can. 5. God is all powerful. 6. There are no limits to what an all-powerful being can do. 7. God can eliminate all evil. 8. Therefore, if God (as such) existed, there would be no evil. 9. But there is evil. 10.Therefore, God (as such) does not exist. Now we clearly have a valid argument. Second What is meant here by evil? This assumes a hedonistic conception of evil. This involves a pleasure-pain calculus. Lets translate (d) in this light:

o An all good thing eliminates what we humans dont like as far as it can. But why suppose this is true? Does a good thing really eliminate evil as far as it can? Could a good thing have a good reason not to eliminate some evil? The answer is at least not obvious.

A side note on evil and the big picture defense: The theistic view has been that evil is an absence of being. o Evil is the absence is something without which something cannot realize its potential qua member of its kind. E.g., The absence of a virtue such as courage or temperance. Thus, an act is evil in that it lacks that virtue. E.g., The absence of eyes. This condition is evil in that it prevents one from seeing etc. But everything that exists, insofar as it exists is good. The evils of the worldthe things that ought to be but are absentare somehow constitutive of the goodness of the world. We have no access to the big picture. Some more pushback: Are there really no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do? An omnipotent being can only do what is logically possible. Perhaps its not possible to create a world with persons without some evil (theistically understood). And perhaps a world with persons is better or the best possible world. The answer is not obvious. A version of the free-will defense (This may be Leibnizs): 1. God can create a world with moral goodness only if He creates creatures capable of making morally bad choices. 2. A world with moral goodness is better than one without it. 3. Perhaps then, the best possible world will be one in which creatures are capable of making morally bad choices.

 Mackie: o God could have created a world in which his creatures could but do not make morally bad choices. The theist: o God is impassible. o Gods creation of the world is not determined by the free choices of creatures.