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S.NO 1.

AUTHOR

YEAR

TITLE

AREA/ COUNTRY

OBJECTIVE The role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of mana ers and directors.

FINDINGS CHAPTER-2 The choice of value ma!imi"ation as the corporate scorecard must be complemented by a corporate vision, strate y and tactics that unite participants in the or ani"ation in its stru le for dominance in its competitive arena. corporate overnance emer es from this overview% lar e shareholder intervention needs to be re ulated to uarantee better small investor protection

Michael C. 2001 Jensen

Val e Ma!i"i#a$i%n& U.S.A S$a'eh%l(e) The%)*& an( $he C%)+%)a$e O,-ec$i .e F nc$i%n

Ma)c% Bech$

2002

C%)+%)a$e G%.e)nanc e an( C%n$)%l

#olumbia

&.

Me/ "i S $%

200&

#apital Structure and )alaysia 'nvestment (ehavior of )alaysian *irms in the 1++0s% a study of corporate overnance before the crisis

$eview the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main le al and re ulatory institutions in different countries, and e!amine the comparative corporate overnance literature This is an empirical study analy"in the corporate finance and overnance structure in )alaysia before and after the financial crisis of 1++,, utili"in the a ency cost approach.

/. L cian A. Be,ch '

200/

0ha$ Ma$$e)s U.S.A in C%)+%)a$e G%.e)na nce1

These results imply that the concentration of ris-s on the ban-in sector and social policy advocatin the dispersion of corporate ownership wea-ened the corporate overnance mechanism, thereby e!acerbatin the distress of )alaysia.s corporate sector durin the financial crisis. The objective that firms with we find that the provisions in hi her levels of the entrenchment our entrenchment inde! fully inde! were associated with lar e drive the correlation, ne ative abnormal returns durin identified by prior wor-, that the 1++00200& period the '$$# provisions in the a re ate have with reduced

CHAPTER-2

In(ian Re.ie2 %3 li$e)a$ )e.


AREA/ S.NO AUTHOR 1. YEAR TITLE C%)+%)a$e G%.e)nance E"e)/in/ Ec%n%"ies; Re.ie2 %3 6)inci+al< 6)inci+al 6e)s+ec$i.e in A $he COUNTRY 'ndia OBJECTIVE 2rincipal3principal conflicts between controllin shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, e!tensive family ownership and control, business roup structures, and wea- le al protection of minority shareholders. FINDINGS $esultin inte ration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build.

Michael N. 2001 4&5 Y% n/ & Mi'e 7 0. 6en/ & Da.i( Ahls$)%"8& Ga))* D. B) $%n9& Yi Jian/:

CHAPTER-2

2.

=a)in S. 'hanna

2001

(an-ruptcy and the 'ndia $esolution of *inancial 4istress

The use of private and court0 supervised mechanisms for resolvin default and reor ani"in companies in financial distress.

This study emphasis that corporate overnance issues relatin to distressed restructurin s and the ma nitude of the costs and the efficiency of ban-ruptcy reor ani"ations are amon the topics covered.

&.

Ch)is$%+he) Cli33%)(

6. 2001

5alue #reation or 'ndia 4estruction 6ed e *unds as Shareholder Activists

7hen hed e funds accumulate more than 89 of a firm, they must file a re ulatory disclosure with the S:# that indicates whether their investment intentions are active or passive

/.

0e)ne) 'ish%)e

200+

A ;ew )odel of 'ndia 'nte rity% An Actionable 2athway to Trust, 2roductivity and 5alue.

This study emphasis that 7e conclude that the returns to the hed e fund are lar er for their active bloc-s than their passive bloc-s, indicatin that activist shareholders may use hi her returns to miti ate the cost of their monitorin effort. 'n this new model, we distin uish 'n this study we analysis that all four phenomena 0 inte rity, 7e assert that inte rity <the morality, ethics, and le ality 0 as condition of bein whole and e!istin within two separate realm complete= is a necessary condition for wor-ability, and that the resultant level of wor-ability

CHAPTER-2

8.

Hen)* Han-a

200+

A ency 2roblems, 'ndia >e al Strate ies, and :nforcement

This article is the second chapter This study emphasis that 7e of the second edition of ?The conclude that re ulatory Anatomy@ strate ies reAuire more e!tensive enforcement mechanisms 0 in the form of courts and procedural rules 0 to secure compliance than do overnance strate ies. The rapid rise in #:C pay over the past &0 years has spar-ed an intense debate about the nature of the pay0settin process. )any view the hi h 'n this study researcher su ests that both mana erial power and competitive mar-et forces are important determinants of #:C pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence.

B.

Di)' S%n/hai

2010

#:C #ompensation

'ndia