NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 469 SCRA 6 CORONA, J.: F!

"t#$ Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on !arch ", #$$% and, on the #&th day thereafter or on !arch #%, #$$%, filed a motion for reconsideration. 'n (uly #, #$$%, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on (uly )), #$$%. *ive days later, on (uly )+, #$$%, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on ,ugust ", #$$%. 'n ,ugust -, #$$%, the court a .uo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on (uly "#, #$$%. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated /eptember ", #$$%. 0ia a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 1&, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the C,. 2n the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the #&3day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on (uly )), #$$% since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. 4hen they filed their notice of appeal on (uly )+, #$$%, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. 'n /eptember #1, #$$$, the C, dismissed the petition. 2t ruled that the #&3day period to appeal should have been rec5oned from !arch ", #$$% or the day they received the *ebruary #), #$$% order dismissing their complaint. ,ccording to the appellate court, the order was the 6final order7 appealable under the Rules. %##&e#$

2. 4hether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the #&3day reglementary period to appeal the *ebruary #), #$$% order dismissing the complaint or the (uly #, #$$% order dismissing the !otion for Reconsideration 22. 4hether or not petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time. 'e()$ 2. The (uly #, #$$% order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. 2n the case of 8uelnan v. 09* Philippines, 2nc., the trial court declared petitioner non3suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. :pon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. 4hen the omnibus motion was filed, #) days of the #&3day period to appeal the order had lapsed. 9e later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. 9e then filed his notice of appeal. ;ut this was li5ewise dismissed < for having been filed out of time. The court a .uo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within #& days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The /C reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of ,puyan v. 9aldeman et al. where the /C again considered the order denying petitioner s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. ;ased on the aforementioned cases, the /C sustained petitioners view that the order dated (uly #, #$$% denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules. 22. =es. To standardi>e the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of #& days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 9enceforth, this 6fresh period rule7 shall also apply to Rule

-?, Rule -), Rule -" and Rule -& but does not apply to Rule 1-@Review of (udgments and *inal 'rders or Resolutions of the Commission on Alections and the Commission on ,uditB because Rule 1- is derived from the Constitution. 2t is li5ewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. The new rule aims to regiment or ma5e the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration @whether full or partialB or any final order or resolution. This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule -#, /ection " of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be ta5en within #& days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word 6or7 signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. 2t should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. 9ence, the use of 6or7 in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within #& days from the notice of judgment or within #& days from notice of the 6final order,7 which we already determined to refer to the (uly #, #$$% order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

and not to allow petitioner to present evidence eC parte. /aid motion was granted by the RTC, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. The lower court further ruled that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiff s cause of action vis a vis the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner therefore elevated the matter to the /upreme Court via petition for certiorari under Rule -& on pure .uestions of law also averring that respondent s motive for see5ing the dismissal of their entire case is to avoid putting their ownership in controversy in the counterclaim. %##&e$ 4hether or not the dismissal of the original complaint affects that of the compulsory counterclaim. 'e()$ Do, the counterclaim herein can stand on its own. The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. 2n fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. /ection " contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present case, was petitionerEs failure to appear at the pre3 trial. This situation is also covered by /ection ", as eCtended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. 9ere, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiffEs complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, eCpress or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.

P%NGA vs. 'E%RS OF SANT%AGO GR No. 1*0 54 +&,e 0, 2006 494 SCRA 9 T%NGA, J.$ F!"t#$ The 9eirs of /antiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. ,s a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the lands to which he was harvesting the fruits. 9owever, due to failures of 9eirs of /antiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal of said case. Respondents thus filed a !otion for Reconsideration to as5 for the entire action to be dismissed

The present rule embodied in /ections ) and " of Rule #+ ordains a more e.uitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. ,t the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now une.uivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint. /ection ", Rule #+ of the Rules of Court, as amended, providesF If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of his presentation of his evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. -AR%TUA vs. .ERCA/ER G.R. No. 1 6040 +!,&!r1 2 , 2001 50 SCRA 06 PANGAN%-AN, J.: F!"t#$ !ercader boarded the bus of herein petitioner (; Line bounded from !anila to D. /amar. 9owever, while said bus was traversing the ;eily ;ridge in D. /amar, the bus fell into the river and as a result, !ercader died. The heirs of !ercader sued petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. 4ith the heirs of !ercader attaining a favorable judgment at the lower court and C, level, petitioner assails the said decisions rendered therein with the /upreme Court via Petition for Review under Rule -& on the ground of procedural flaws, specifically .uestioningF @#B the jurisdiction of the lower court over the original and amended complaints

or over the subject matter of the case as the trial court was not paid the correct amount of doc5et and other lawful feesG @)B the arbitrary disregard for petitioner s constitutional right to procedural due process and fairness as the appellate court denied their right to present evidence, to eCpect that their evidence will be duly considered and appreciated and when the court passed sub silencio on the trail court s failure to rule frontally on petitioner s plea for a bill of particularsG and @"B that both the RTC and C, failed to adhere to the rule that their decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which they are based. %##&e#$ 2. 4hether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case 22. 4hether or not petitioner s procedural rights were disregarded as to the denial of their !otion for a ;ill of Particulars 222. 4hether or not petitioner was denied of his procedural right to adduce evidence 'e()$ 2. =es. The Court, in !anchester Hevelopment Corporation v. C,, held that 6the court ac.uires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed doc5et fee ,n amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the doc5et fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.7 Ienerally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. 'nce the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot be ousted therefrom by subse.uent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The !anchester ruling, which became final in #$%+, has no retroactive application and cannot be invo5ed in the subject Complaint filed in #$%-.

22. Do. 2t must be noted that petitioners counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days within which to do so. 9e, however, filed the aforesaid motion only eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. !oreover, such motion was already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint. /ection #, Rule #) of the Rules of Court, providesF Section . !hen applied for" purpose. ## $efore responding to a pleading, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten % &' days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired. 222. Do. *irst, judges cannot be eCpected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. 2n ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are not. 2n doing so, they consider all the evidence before them. 2n other words, the mere fact that (udge Doynay based his decision on the testimonies of respondents witnesses does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those of petitioners. /econd, there is no sufficient showing that (udge 'perario was over>ealous in .uestioning the witnesses. 9is .uestions merely sought to clarify their testimonies. ATTY. A-REN%CA vs. LA2 F%R. OF A-REN%CA, TUNGOL AN/ T%-AYAN G.R. No. 169420 September 22, 2006 502 SCRA 614 YNARES3SANT%AGO, J.: F!"t#$ Respondents filed with the /ecurities and ACchange Commission @/ACB two cases against petitioner regarding an

alleged refusal of petitioner to return and transfer partnership funds. The /AC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the RTC of 8ue>on City pursuant to Republic ,ct Do. %+$$, which transferred jurisdiction over intra3corporate controversies from the /AC to the courts. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, causing petitioner to file with the Court of ,ppeals a !otion for Leave of Court to ,dmit ,ttached Petition for Review under Rule -" of the Revised Rules of Court. The C,, however, denied said motion as well as the subse.uent !otion for Reconsideration. Petitioner invo5es liberal construction of the rules in see5ing reversal of the above resolutions. 9e alleges that his appeal was not filed late but that he only resorted to the wrong mode of appealG that reali>ing his error, he immediately filed the !otion *or Leave to ,dmit Petition for ReviewG that his notice of appeal had the effect of tolling the period of perfecting his appeal under Rule -" of the Rules of CourtG that although unaware of ,.!. Do. ?-3$3?+3/C, he appealed four days after receiving the consolidated decision through a notice of appeal, thus showing his JsincerityJ in appealing the decision. %##&e$ 4hether or not the Court of ,ppeals erred in the non3 application of a liberal construction of the rules resulting in the refusal to admit petitioner s petition for review 'e()$ Do. :nder Rule #, /ection 1 of the #$$+ Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. 9ence, it is a mista5e to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if

it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. 9ence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed eCcept only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaCed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invo5ing liberality to eCplain his failure to abide by the rules. J'versightJ and JeCcusable negligenceJ have become an all too familiar and ready eCcuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with established rules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is re.uired. The application of the Rules may be relaCed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of e.uity and substantial justice. PALO.A vs. .ORA G.R. No. 15**0 September 2 , 2005 4*0 SCRA *11 C'%CO3NA4AR%O, J.: F!"t#$ Petitioner was terminated from his appointment as Ieneral !anager of the Palompon, Leyte 4ater Histrict. ;y reason thereof, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer to be restored to his former position and for preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC. :nable to obtain a favorable ruling with the RTC, petitioner filed a complaint with the Civil /ervice Commission for alleged 0iolation of Civil /ervice Law and Rules and for 2llegal Hismissal. The C/C, however, dismissed the petition for lac5 of merit, which was li5ewise affirmed by the Court of ,ppeals. %##&e#$

2. 4hether or not mandamus will lie to compel the ;oard of Hirectors of Palompon, Leyte 4ater Histrict to reinstate the Ieneral !anager thereof 22. 4hether or not the Civil /ervice Commission has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal of petitioner 'e()$ 2. Do. !andamus does not lie to compel the ;oard of Hirectors of the Palompon, Leyte 4ater Histrict to reinstate petitioner because the ;oard has the discretionary power to remove him under /ection )" of P.H. Do. #$%, as amended by P.H. Do. +1%. !oreover, /ection ", Rule 1& of the Rules of Court providesF 6Sec. (. )etition for mandamus. * !hen any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and ade+uate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act re+uired to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. !andamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. !andamus will not issue to control or review the eCercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to eCercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is re.uired to act. 2t is his judgment that is to be eCercised and not that of the court. 22. =es. ,s a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended eCcept for cause provided by law as provided in /ection )@"B, ,rticle 2K3; of

the #$%+ Constitution. ,s eCception to this, P.H. Do. #$%, a special enabling charter of Local 4ater Histricts, categorically provides that the Ieneral !anager shall serve Eat the pleasure of the board. 4ater districts are government instrumentalities and their employees belong to the civil service. Thus, the hiring and firing of employees of government3owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil /ervice Law and Civil /ervice Rules and Regulations. 2n cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 8uasi3judicial bodies li5e the C/C are better3 e.uipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil /ervice since it is within the field of their eCpertise. This is consistent with the powers and functions of the C/C, being the central personnel agency of the Iovernment, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil /ervice Law and other pertinent laws, including, in this case, P.H. Do. #$%. 5UESA/A vs. /EPART.ENT OF +UST%CE G.R. No. 150 25 A&6&#t 1, 2006 500 SCRA 454 SAN/O7AL3GUT%ERRE4, J.: F!"t#$ Respondent Teruel filed with the 'ffice of the City Prosecutor in !andaluyong City an affidavit3complaint against petitioner, Camacho, (r., and Corgado with the crime of estafa under ,rticle "#& @)B and @"B of the Revised Penal Code, which in turn was opposed by petitioner who filed a counter3affidavit thereto. Thereafter, an 2nformation for estafa was filed with the RTC upon the recommendation of ,ssistant City Prosecutor Asteban ,. Tacla, (r. after the latter s issuance of a Resolution finding probable cause. 2n the meantime, petitioner filed with the Hepartment of (ustice

a Petition for Review challenging the Resolution of the 2nvestigating Prosecutor, but was however, dismissed. Pending the criminal case at the RTC, petitioner filed with the /upreme Court a Petition for Certiorari alleging that the /ecretary of (ustice, in dismissing his Petition for Review, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 or eCcess of jurisdiction. %##&e$ 4hether or not the filing of the present petition directly with the /upreme Court constitutes an utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts 'e()$ =es. The /upreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. 2t cannot and should not be burdened with the tas5 of dealing with causes in the first instance. 2ts original jurisdiction to issue the so3called eCtraordinary writs should be eCercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons eCist therefor. 9ence, that jurisdiction should generally be eCercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of ,ppeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of ,ppeals. 4here the issuance of an eCtraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of ,ppeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ s procurement must be presented. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the eCtraordinary writs. 2t is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its eCclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over3crowding of the Court s doc5et. NGO -UN T%ONG vs. 'ON. .ARCEL%NO .. SAYO G.R. No. L345025 +&,e 0, 1900

16 PARAS, J.:

SCRA 2 *

F!"t#$ The case originated from a decision of the Court a *irst 2nstance of !anila, ;ranch K222 in a case entitled 6CalteC @Phil.B 2nc. vs. Pilares Construction Co.7 ordering among others, the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of P1+,?&).") plus interests, attorneyEs fees and costs. /aid decision became final and eCecution thereof commenced with an eCecution sale for the purpose. !eanwhile, the case was appealed up to the /upreme Court. Pending proceedings in the latter court, private respondent filed a complaint with the Court of *irst 2nstance of Ri>al, ;ranch KKK222, Caloocan City, against herein petitioner and Amilio L. Reyes for JHeclaration of Dullity of the ,uction /ale and HamagesJ and a !otion to ,nnul Certificate of /ale and to declare alleged auction sale with the Court of *irst 2nstance of !anila, ;ranch K222 as null and void. The said court rendered judgment issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction restraining defendants from pulling out or removing any such property of the plaintiff from its compound, and ordering defendants to return immediately such e.uipments and properties now in their possession which were removed or hauled by them by virtue of the sale allegedly had between them. This order of the C*2, ;ranch KKK222 is now being assailed. %##&e$ 4hether or not a Court of *irst 2nstance or a branch thereof, has jurisdiction to annul or set aside, for alleged irregularities an eCecution sale, held by virtue of a decision rendered by another Court of *irst 2nstance or a branch thereof, and subse.uently to order the return of the properties sold at public auction to the judgment debtor 'e()$ Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Do court has the power to interfere by injunction, with the

judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having e.ual power to grant the relief sought by injunction. *or the simple reason that the power to open, modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to the court in which the judgment was rendered. *or obvious reasons, the matter should have been laid to rest, but private respondent instead again filed a complaint with the Court of *irst 2nstance of Ri>al, ;ranch KKK222, raising the very same issues which were already decided by the Court of *irst 2nstance, ;ranch K222 with finality. 2t is an important fundamental principle in 'ur judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. ,ccess to the courts is guaranteed. ;ut there must be a limit thereto. 'nce a litigantEs rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come bac5 for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subse.uent suits. *or, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. ELLA vs. 'ON. +U/GE SALANGA G.R. No. L32 026 September 20, 19*0 5 SCRA 06 .A8AL%NTAL, J.: F!"t#$ , verified complaint was filed in the Court of *irst 2nstance of 2locos /ur by petitioners against respondents for specific performance, to compel the payment of the price of the land allegedly purchased by the government under a perfected sales contract with petitioners, as well as attorney s fees, eCpenses of litigation, and moral and eCemplary damages. The case was raffled and assigned to ;ranch 22 whereby the latter, through (udge Humaual, issued a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents and subse.uently proceeded with the trial thereon. Later, ACecutive (udge ,ngelino /alanga, formerly presiding (udge of ;ranch 222 filed a J!otion AC Parte to Return the Case to

0igan and To /et /ame for Trial.J Thereafter, (udge /alanga issued an order directing the JCler5 of Court of Darvacan, ;ranch ), to transfer all the records of the above entitled case to this Court for the further prosecution of this proceeding.J The plaintiffs filed an eC3parte motion see5ing to reverse and/or recall the order of (udge /alanga on the grounds that they had not been served with notice thereof and that after the hearing had been commenced in ;ranch 22, jurisdiction to hear and decide the case had been firmly lodged in said branch to the eCclusion of other branches. , motion was subse.uently filed see5ing to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued by (udge Humaual. %##&e$ 2. 4hether or not ;ranch 22 had ac.uired eCclusive jurisdiction over the case 22. 4hether or not the transfer of the case from ;ranch 22 to ;ranch 222 constituted undue interference with the processes of the former 222. 4hether or not the writ of injunction, issued by ;ranch 22, may be validly dissolved by respondent (udge of ;ranch 222 'e()$ 2. Do. The different branches of a Court of *irst 2nstance of one province do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. The (udiciary ,ct vests jurisdiction upon the court, not upon any particular branch or (udge thereof. 4hen a case is filed in one branch jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the eCclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continued by and before another branch or judge. 2t is for this reason that /ection &+ of the (udiciary ,ct eCpressly grants to the /ecretary of (ustice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the wor5 by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases do not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdictionG the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of *irst 2nstance of

the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court. 22. Do. Ienerally, the branches being coordinate and co3e.ual, one branch or the judge thereof cannot unduly interfere with the processes and proceedings of another branch or (udge constituting an undue interest. The transfer of the case to 0igan was not an unusual one under the circumstances, and did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion, or an eCcess of jurisdiction such as to call for the issuance of the eCtraordinary writ of certiorari. had authority from the Hepartment of (ustice to continue holding court at 0igan, where he was Presiding (udge of ;ranch 222 prior to his appointment to ;ranch 20. This authority granted to (udge /alanga is allowed under /ection &1 of the (udiciary ,ct, which provides as followsF S,-. ./. Special terms of court. 0 !hen so directed by 1epartment 2ead, 1istrict 3udges shall hold special terms of court at any time or in any municipality in their respective districts for the transactions of any judicial business. The order for him to remain in 0igan came about because the Candon branch still had neither personnel nor available courthouse, by reason of which (udge /alanga could not immediately assume his duties there. 222. =es. The dissolution of the writ of injunction after the filing of a bond is allowed under section 1 of Rule &%. 2t rests upon the sound discretion of the court, which, unfortunately, has been abused in this case. The damage that it could cause to the petitioner is not irreparable, being subject to compensation in money. ,nd a further consideration that cannot be ignored at this stage is that two of the original plaintiffs, co3owners of the land which was the subject of the earlier negotiations with the government, have sold their shares to a third party, as a result of which there is a distinct possibility that the said land may no longer be suited for the purpose for which it was intended. 7%LLA.OR vs. SALAS G.R. No. 101041 No9ember 1 , 1991

20 GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

SCRA 450

final judgment, has found that a trial judgeEs errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of 5nowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled against the latter. /ELA ROSA vs. ROL/AN G.R. No. 1 002 September 5, 2006 501 SCRA 4 CALLE+O, SR., J.: F!"t#$ The case originated from a claim of ownership over a parcel of land which was decided in favor of defendant. 9owever, plaintiff therein, despite the order of the court, continues to refuse to vacate the land thereby prompting defendant to file with the !TC a complaint for recovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. The !TC rendered judgment therein in favor of defendant on the ground of lac5 of jurisdiction. The court held that the issue between the parties was one of ownership and not merely possession de facto. Thus, the possession of the property by defendants was not by mere tolerance, but by virtue of a claim of ownershipG in fact, defendants never recogni>ed the plaintiffsE claim of ownership over the property. %##&e$ 4hether or not the !TC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents 'e()$ =es. The action of respondents against petitioners was one for unlawful detainer, and as such, the !TC had jurisdiction over the same. 2t is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of

F!"t#$ Carlos filed an administrative case against (udge 0illamor, charging him with having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in a case he was a party of regarding a dispute on ownership and possession of a certain parcel of land against Daval. The same was summarily dismissed by the /upreme Court. Hissatisfied, Carlos filed a civil action for damages against (udge 0illamor for 5nowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed five criminal cases against Daval and the same was raffled to the RTC presided by (udge /alas. !eanwhile, ,ttorney IuerreroEs complaint for damages was raffled to ;ranch )#, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City wherein (udge ,leonar too5 cogni>ance of the same. %##&e$ 4hether or not (udges ,leonar and /alas may ta5e cogni>ance of the actions for damages against (udge 0illamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order against Carlos and ,ttorney Iuerrero which the /upreme Court subse.uently annulled 'e()$ Do. Do Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutini>e, and much less declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of ,ppeals and the /upreme Court, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts. To allow respondent (udges ,leonar and /alas to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against the petitioner, a co3e.ual judge of a co3e.ual court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the judgment of a co3e.ual court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of a Court of *irst 2nstance @now the Regional Trial CourtB being co3e.ual, may not interfere with each otherEs cases, judgments and orders. 'nly after the ,ppellate Court, in a

the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the .uestion of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. 'nce jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. (urisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the partiesG it cannot be ac.uired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Deither is it conferred by the ac.uiescence of the court. 2t is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set up by defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss. /ection " of Republic ,ct Do. +1$#, amending /ection ""@)B of ;atas Pambansa ;lg. #)$, which was the law in effect when respondents filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that J!etropolitan Trial Courts, !unicipal Trial Courts and !unicipal Circuit Trial Courts eCercise eCclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainerG provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the .uestions of ownership in his pleadings and the .uestion of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issues of possession.J T%+A. vs. S%-ONG'ANOY G.R. No. L321450 Apr:( 15, 1960 2 SCRA 29 /%4ON, J.: F!"t#$ Tijam filed for the recovery of P#,$?% and legal interest from /ibongahanoy. Hefendants in turn, filed a counter bond with !anila /urety and *idelity Co. (udgement was rendered in favour of the plaintiffs and a writ of eCecution was issued against the defendant. Hefendants then moved for writ of eCecution against the /urety which was granted. The /urety, after the denial of its motion to .uash the writ appealed to

the Court of ,ppeals, without raising the issue on lac5 of jurisdictionG however the appellate court affirmed the appealed decision. 9ence, the /urety then filed a !otion to Hismiss on the ground of lac5 of jurisdiction against C*2 Cebu in view of the effectivity of (udiciary ,ct of #$-% a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. The ,ct placed original eCclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not eCceeding ),??? eCclusive of interest. Hue to such, the C, set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to the /upreme Court since it has eCclusive jurisdiction over Jall cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.7 %##&e$ 4hether or not the /urety is estopped from .uestioning the jurisdiction of the C*2 Cebu for the first time upon appeal 'e()$ =es. The /urety is barred by laches from invo5ing a plea after almost fifteen years before the /urety filed its motion to dismiss raising the .uestion of lac5 of jurisdiction for the first time. , party may be estopped or barred from raising a .uestion in different ways and for different reasons. Thus what is referred to is estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and uneCplained length of time, to do that which, by eCercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier 3 *urthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to .uestion the jurisdiction or power of the court 3Jundesirable practiceJ of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attac5ing it for lac5 of jurisdiction, when adverse. The contention of the /urety that the lower court should have granted its motion to .uash the writ of eCecution because the same was issued without the summary hearing is untenable. , summary hearing is not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted. 2t is, rather, a procedure by which a .uestion is

resolved with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings. 4hat is essential is that Jthe defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties. 2n the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffsE motion for eCecution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. 2n fact, the suretyEs counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his re.uest that the court a .uo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. =et he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court. CAL%.L%. vs. 'ON. RA.%RE4 G.R. No. L3 4 62 No9ember 19, 1902 110 SCRA 99 7AS5UE4, J.: F!"t#$ 2ndependent !ercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel !anuel !agali to surrender the ownerEs duplicate of TCT Do. $#"% in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Dot being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, !anuel !agali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted 2ndependent !ercantile Corporation to file an eC3parte petition to declare TCT Do. $#"% as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Heeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation, TCT Do. 1%&1%. Petitioner, upon learning that her husbandEs title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT Do. 1%&1% but the court dismissed the petition.

Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record Do. "$-$) for the cancellation of TCT Do. 1%&1% but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT Do. $#"%, against *rancisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from 2ndependent !ercantile Corporation. Private respondent *rancisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the eCistence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. *rancisco Ramos filed a !otion to Hismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said !otion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. %##&e$ 4hether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment 'e()$ Do. 2t is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record Do. "$-$) for the cancellation of TCT Do. 1%&1% as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subse.uent civil case. 2n order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to ta5e cogni>ance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. 2f there is lac5 of jurisdiction over the subject3matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not eCist in the case. The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record Do. "$-$) was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on /ection ##) of the Land Registration ,ct wherein it provides that a Court of *irst 2nstance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. ,s such, its proceedings are

not ade.uate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, .uestions involving ownership or title to real property. /ELA CRU4 vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 1 9442 /e"ember 6, 2006 510 SCRA 10 7ELASCO, +R., J.: F!"t#$ The case stemmed from a dispute when petitioner refused to adhere to several verbal and written demands by the Reyeses to vacate a certain lot which it leased from the latter. Respondent Tan Te, having bought the lot from the Reyeses, demanded from petitioner to vacate the lot to be used as the former s residence. 9owever, petitioner continues to reject such demands, prompting respondent Tan Te to file an ejectment suit against him at the !anila !eTC, which rendered judgment in respondent s favor. ,ggrieved with the decisions rendered upon appeal, petitioner now files a petition for review see5ing to nullify the decision and resolution of the Court of ,ppeals which reversed the decision of the !anila RTC and reinstated the decision of the !anila !eTC, which ordered petitioner Hela Cru> to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te. %##&e#$ 2. 4hich court, the !anila RTC or the !anila !eTC, has jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit 22. 4hether or not the present petition filed before the /upreme Court for review under Rule -& is proper. 'e()$ 2. (urisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies. (urisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. /ection "" of Chapter 222 33 on !etropolitan Trial Courts, !unicipal Trial Courts, and !unicipal Circuit Trial Courts of ;. P. Do. #)$ providesF

Section ((. 3urisdiction of 4etropolitan 5rial -ourts, 4unicipal 5rial -ourts and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial -ourts in civil cases.04etropolitan 5rial -ourts, 4unicipal 5rial -ourts, and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial -ourts shall exercise6 xxxx %7' ,xclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer6 )rovided, 5hat when, in such cases, the defendant raises the +uestion of ownership in his pleadings and the +uestion of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Thus eCclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings @accion interdictalB is lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified in /ection #, Rule +? of the #$$+ Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry @detentacionB, where one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. 2n actions for forcible entry, three @"B re.uisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to ac.uire jurisdiction. *irst, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property. /econd, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within one @#B year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building. The other 5ind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer @desahucioB, where one unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the eCpiration or termination of the right to possess. 9ere, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisiveG for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff s cause of action is the termination of the defendant s right to continue in possession. The essential re.uisites of unlawful detainer areF @#B the fact of lease by virtue of a contract eCpress or impliedG @)B the eCpiration or termination of the possessor s right to hold possessionG @"B withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after eCpiration or termination of the right to possessionG @-B letter

of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premisesG and @&B the action must be filed within one @#B year from date of last demand received by the defendant. , person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule on /ummary Procedure which allows immediate eCecution of the judgment under /ection #$, Rule +? unless the defendant perfects an appeal in the RTC and complies with the re.uirements to stay eCecutionG all of which are nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of possession. 'n the other hand, /ection #$, of Chapter 22 of ;.P. Do. #)$ on Regional Trial Courts providesF Section 8. 3urisdiction in civil cases.09egional 5rial -ourts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction6 xxxx %7' In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon 4etropolitan 5rial -ourts, 4unicipal 5rial -ourts and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial -ourts. Two @)B 5inds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC areF @#B the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession @accion publicianaB when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when the action was filed more than one @#B year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or defendantG and @)B an action for the recovery of ownership @accion reivindicatoriaB which includes the recovery of possession. These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and adjudication ta5es a longer period than the summary ejectment suit. To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the !eTC @first level courtB or the RTC @second level courtB, allegations of the complaint must be referred to. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the

complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. This general rule however admits eCceptions. 4hile the allegations in the complaint ma5e out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lac5 of jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of ,grarian Relations. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. 22. *irm is the rule that findings of fact of the C, are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are supported by evidence on record or substantial evidence. *ortunately for petitioner, the case has been relaCed therefrom as the Court gave a liberal with the petition considering that the C, s factual findings contradict those of the RTC, and there was an asseveration that the court a .uo went beyond the issues of the case. 2ndeed, these grounds were considered eCceptions to the factual issue bar rule. /econdly, the petition unnecessarily impleaded the C, in violation of /ection -, Rule -&. This breach, however, was allowed to pass by the Court in this case only because there is a need to entertain the petition due to the conflicting rulings between the lower courtsG however, a repetition may result to sanctions. STA. CLARA 'O.EO2NERS vs. GASTON G.R. No. 141961 +!,&!r1 2 , 2002 9* SCRA 96 PANGAN%-AN, J.: F!"t#$ Private respondents filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and

temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court in Degros 'ccidental at ;acolod City against petitioners alleging the followingF @#B upon private respondents purchased lots in the subdivisionG @)B at the time of purchase, there was no mention or re.uirement of membership in any homeowners association and since then, they have remained non3members of /C9,G @"B an arrangement was made wherein non3members of the association were issued Mnon3member gatepass stic5ers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards and such arrangement remained undisturbed until mid !arch, #$$%, when /C9, disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only its members in good standing were to be issued stic5ers for use in their vehiclesG @-B on three separate incidents, 0ictor !. Iaston, the son of the private respondents herein who lives with them, was re.uired by the guards on duty employed by /C9, to show his driver s license as a prere.uisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite their 5nowing him personally and the eCact location of his residenceG @&B private respondent herein 0ictor !a. Iaston was himself prevented from entering the subdivision and proceeding to his residential abodeG and @1B these acts of the petitioners were done in the presence of other subdivision owners had caused private respondents to suffer moral damage. Petitioners argued that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves an intra3corporate dispute between /C9, and its members pursuant to Republic ,ct Do. &%?, as amended by ACecutive 'rder Dos. &"&, much less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of the board of directors of /C9,, the proper forum being the 9ome 2nsurance @and IuarantyB Corporation @92ICB. %##&e#$ 2. 4hether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint 22. 4hether or not the complaint states a cause of action 'e()$ 2. =es. 2n order to determine if the 92IC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve preliminarily 33 on

the basis of the allegations in the Complaint 33 whether private respondents are members of the /C9,. 2t is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. (urisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. 'therwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. The Complaint does not allege that private respondents are members of the /C9,. 2n point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the 92IC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. The 92IC eCercises limited jurisdiction over homeowners disputes. The law confines its authority to controversies that arise from any of the following intra3 corporate relationsF @#B between and among members of the associationG @)B between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are membersG and @"B between the association and the state insofar as the controversy concerns its right to eCist as a corporate entity. 22. =es. , defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lac5 of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the factual averments in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the allegations constituting the cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment on the prayers. This test implies that the issue must be passed upon on the basis of the bare allegations in the complaint. The court does not in.uire into the truth of such allegations and declare them to be false. To do so would constitute a procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff s right to due process. , complaint states a cause of action when it contains these three essential elementsF @#B the legal right of the plaintiff, @)B the correlative obligation of the defendant, and @"B the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said legal right. 2n the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause of action. *irst, the Complaint alleged that, under the Constitution, respondents had a right of free access to and from their residential abode. /econd, under the law, petitioners have the obligation to respect this right. Third,

such right was impaired by petitioners when private respondents were refused access through the /ta. Clara /ubdivision, unless they showed their driver s license for identification. SUN %NSURANCE OFF%CE vs. 'ON. ASUNC%ON G.R. No. *99 *3 0 Febr&!r1 1 , 1909 1*0 SCRA 2*4 GANCAYCO, J.: F!"t#$ /un insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent !anuel :y Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure to file the re.uired answer within the reglementary period. !eanwhile, the Respondent !anuel Tiong also filed a case against /un 2nsurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, see5ing the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, eCemplary and li.uidated damages, attorney s fees, eCpenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P&?!. The amount of only P)#?.?? was paid for the doc5et fee. Private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is as5ed that he be awarded no less than P#?! as actual and eCemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approCimately P--,1?#,1)".+?. /aid amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional doc5et fee of P"$,+%1.??, which he paid. Later, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P)?! in damages so that his total claim is approCimately P1-,1?#,1)?.+?. *our months after, private respondent paid an additional doc5et fee of P%?,"$1.??. ,fter the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court wherein private respondent was

ordered to be reassessed for additional doc5et fee, and during the pendency of this petition, private respondent paid an additional doc5et fee of P1),#").$). ,lthough private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P#%),%)-.$? for the doc5et fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P1-,1?#,1)?.+?, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a doc5et fee of P)&+,%#?.-$. %##&e$ 4hether or not the court ac.uired jurisdiction when the correct and proper doc5et fee has not been paidN 'e()$ =es. 2t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed doc5et fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. 4here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the doc5et fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 4here the trial court ac.uires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subse.uently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. 2t shall be the responsibility of the Cler5 of Court or his duly authori>ed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. -ALLATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 12560 .!r"; 2, 1999

04 SCRA PUNO, J.:

F!"t#$ ;allatan discovered encroachments made on her land when she constructed her house which was surveyed by Angineer (ose 8uedding, the authori>ed surveyor of the ,raneta 2nstitute of ,griculture @,2,B, the owner3 developer of the subdivision project. ;allatan made a written demand on respondent to remove and dismantle their improvements on the said lot. *ailing to agree amicably, petitioner ;allatan instituted against respondents Io a civil case for recovery of possession before the RTC. The Io s filed their 6,nswer with Third3Party Complaint7 impleading as third3party defendants respondents Li Ching =ao, the ,2, and Angineer 8uedding. (udgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs but the third3 party complaint filed by third3party plaintiffs Io against third3 party defendants was dismissed. :pon appeal by Io, the Court of ,ppeals affirmed the dismissal of the third3party complaint against the ,2, but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching =ao and (ose 8uedding. Petitioners .uestion the admission by the C, of the third3party complaint by respondents Io against the ,2,, (ose 8uedding and Li Ching =ao. Petitioners claim that the third3 party complaint should not have been considered by the Court of ,ppeals for lac5 of jurisdiction due to third3party plaintiffs failure to pay the doc5et and filing fees before the trial court. %##&e$ 4hether or not the Court of ,ppeals erred on .uestion of law and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lac5 of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss the third Oparty complaint due to non3payment of any filing of doc5et fee. 'e()$ Do. The Court of ,ppeals correctly dismissed the third3 party complaint against ,2,. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to ,2, s fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Angineer 8uedding that triggered these

discrepancies. ,nd it was this survey that respondent 4inston Io relied upon in constructing his house on his father s land. 9e built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father s land. 2n short, respondents Io had no 5nowledge that they encroached petitioners lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner ;allatan informed them of their encroachment on her property. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied the payment of the re.uisite doc5et and filing fees. 2n real actions, the doc5et and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any 2f the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court ac.uires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. YUC'ENGCO vs. REPU-L%C OF T'E P'%L%PP%NES G.R. No. 1 112* +&,e 0, 2000 SCRA 60 YNARES3SANT%AGO, J.: F!"t#$ The Republic of the Philippines filed with the /andiganbayan a complaint for Rescission, Reconveyance, Restitution, ,ccounting and Hamages against *erdinand A. !arcos, 2melda !arcos and Prime 9oldings, 2nc. ,lleging ownership of the properties of the !arcoses sought to be forfeited by the Republic, petitioner =uchengco filed a motion for intervention and complaint3in3intervention on, impleading the Republic, the PCII, *erdinand A. !arcos, 2melda !arcos and P92 as defendants3in3intervention. ,fter petitioner s payment of the doc5et fee of P-??.??, the /andiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion for intervention and admitting the complaint3in3intervention, thereafter denying the Republic s motion for reconsideration thereto. Petitioner moved for leave to admit amended complaint3in3intervention to implead the said claimants. This was admitted by the

/andiganbayan in open court and as a conse.uence, amended answers3in3intervention were filed by the Republic and the P92. 'n the other hand, the Astate of Ramon Cojuangco and 2melda '. Cojuangco filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint3in3intervention on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and lac5 of jurisdiction of the /andiganbayan over the case, inasmuch as petitioner did not pay the correct doc5et fees. They argued that the amended3 complaint3in3intervention failed to state the amount of the claim or the value of the property subject of the complaint, in violation of the doctrine laid down in !anchester Hevelopment Corporation, et al. v. Court of ,ppeals and /ection + @aB of Rule #-# of the Rules of Court. *urther, they contend that as the action see5s to litigate the ownership and disposition of properties consisting of subject shares, the amount of doc5et fees must be based on the total value of the same. Petitioners opposed, maintaining that no doc5et fees are payable to the /andiganbayan, pursuant to /ection ## of Presidential Hecree Do. #1?1, as amended. %##&e$ 4hether or not petitioner is barred from asserting his alleged causes of action against respondents by reason of non3payment of the proper doc5et fees 'e()$ The ruling that the timely filing of correct doc5et fees is jurisdictional is all too familiar. 2t should be noted, however, that the pronouncements of the Court on the matter have always been influenced by the peculiar legal and e.uitable circumstances surrounding each case. 2n the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unli5e !anchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional doc5et fees as re.uired. 2n the said case, the payment of the correct fee within Ja reasonable timeJ but in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period was allowed. Two situations may arise. 'ne is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts

being claimed. 2n this event the rule is that the pleading will Jnot be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be eCpunged from the record.J 2n other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be eCpunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time3barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficientG and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly ta5e cogni>ance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and conse.uently barred the right of action. 7/A. /E .URGA vs. C'AN G.R. No. L324600 O"tober *, 1960 25 SCRA 441 ANGELES, J.: F!"t#$ Petitioner as lessor, entered into a contract of lease with respondent as lessee. ;efore the eCpiration of the ten3 year period of the lease, there had been intercourse of communications between the lessor and the lessee for the renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an agreementG hence, this action by the lessor against the lessee. , letter of demand to vacate the leased premises was sent to lessee as followsF 6Please be advised further that we reiterate our demand made to you in our registered letter dated *ebruary -, #$&$ @to vacate the leased premisesB which was received by you on the #?th instant, unless you pay the amount of /iC 9undred pesos @P1??.??B or /even 9undred pesos @P+??.??B as new rental per our letter of (anuary #$, #$&$, before the eCpiration of the #&3day period granted you for vacating the same.7

4ithout any further definite demand on the lessee to vacate the premises, petitioner filed a complaint of unlawful detainer in the municipal court of Lamboanga City against the lessee, (uanito Chan, to eject the latter from the leased premises. The facts alleged in the complaint as cause of action, consisted in reproducing and reiterating the substance of the correspondence eCchanged between lessor and lessee, as narrated above, and claiming that the possession of the lessee of the premises had become illegal by his failure and refusal to pay the increased new rental. *or relief, the plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered to vacate the premises, and JT' P,= T9A DA4 RADT/ HA!,DHAH '* P1??.?? or P+??.?? *R'! *A;R:,R= #, #$&$ !'DT9L= ,/ T9A C,/A !,= ;A.J ,ttached to the complaint, as anneCes thereto, were copies of the letters eCchanged between the lessor and the lessee. %##&e$ 4hether or not the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer, and confer jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court @now city courtB of Lamboanga City, under the provisions of Rule +? of the Rules of Court and decisions interpreting the same 'e()$ The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise to vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. 4hen after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made. 2n the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter that the obligation to vacate the leased premises would be dependent on the failure of the lessee to agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor. ,s the lessee, however, was in the physical possession of the land by virtue of a prior contract of lease, and the demand was in the alternative imposing a new rental, even without ta5ing into account the efficacy of the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the lease. 4ithout any subse.uent definite demand to vacate the premises, subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in

default which would give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer. Clause J+J of the contract of lease, meant an eCpress grant to the lessee to renew the lease at his option, contrary to the claim of the lessor3appellee that there must be a prior mutual agreement of the parties. Clause J+J provides the happening of two eventualities at the eCpiration of the lease P either the lessor may purchase the improvements constructed by the lessee on the land, or in case the lessor fails, for any cause or reason, to eCercise the option to buy, the lease shall be deemed automatically renewed. The evidence has established that the lessor had refused to buy the buildings on the land. The statement in said clause J+J that in case of renewal the duration of the lease and the new rental to be paid shall be adjusted by the parties, is of no moment in the solution of the issue, whether or not the facts alleged in the complaint constitute a cause of action of unlawful detainer. The pleadings of the parties, and the anneCes thereto, clearly show that the jugular vein of the controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of clause J+J of the contract of lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court. 2nasmuch as the controversy hinges on the interpretation of clause J+J of the contract, that is, whether or not said clause contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease, the action was not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, beyond the competence of the municipal court. 'E%RS OF 7ALER%ANO CONC'A vs. SPOUSES GREGOR%O LU.OCSO G.R. No. 150121 /e"ember 12, 200* 450 SCRA 1 PUNO, J.: F!"t#$ This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule -& of the Rules of Court on the decision and resolution of the Court of ,ppeals, annulling the resolutions and order of the Regional Trial Court of Hipolog City, ;ranch $, in a civil case wherein

petitioners filed for a complaint for Reconveyance and/or ,nnulment of Title with Hamages against respondents, see5ing to annul *ree Patent Do. @2K3%B$%& and the corresponding 'riginal Certificate of Title @'CTB Do. P3))&&1 issued in the name of JIregorio LumocsoJ covering a certain parcel of land. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds ofF @aB lac5 of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaintsG @bB failure to state causes of action for reconveyanceG @cB prescriptionG and @dB waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel. 'n the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to /ection #$@)B of ;atas Pambansa ;lg. @;.P.B #)$, as amended by R.,. Do. +1$#, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P)?,???.??. Petitioners opposed, contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under /ection #$@#B of ;.P. #)$, as amended by R.,. +1$#, fall within the eCclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of actionF for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. 9ence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the eCclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. %##&e$ 4hether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to /ection #$@)B of ;atas Pambansa ;lg. @;.P.B #)$, as amended by R.,. Do. +1$#, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P)?,???.?? 'e()$ (urisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in .uestion belong. 2t is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. The

trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance. ,n action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but see5s the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other personsE names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. 2t is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. ;eing in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on oneEs title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is /ection #$@)B of ;.P. #)$, as amended by R.,. Do. +1$#, vi>F Section 8. 3urisdiction in -ivil -ases.## 9egional 5rial -ourts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction6 %7' In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds 5wenty thousand pesos %)7&,&&&.&&' or for civil actions in 4etro 4anila, where such value exceeds :ifty thousand pesos %).&,&&&.&&' except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the 4etropolitan 5rial -ourts, 4unicipal 5rial -ourts, and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial -ourts" 2n the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Hipolog City and their assessed values are less than P)?,???.??. 9ence, the !TC clearly has jurisdiction. PetitionersE contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the eCclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to /ection #$@#B of ;.P. #)$ is erroneous. AGUST%N vs. -ACALAN G.R. No. L346000 .!r"; 10, 1905 1 5 SCRA 40

GUT%ERRE4, +R. , J.: 'e()$ F!"t#$ The precursor of this case was a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff3appellant ,gustin, as adininistrator of the 2ntestate Astate of /usana ,gustin, against defendant3appellee ;acalan, before the City Court of Cebu. ;acalan is a lessee of a one3door ground floor space in a building owned by the late /usana ,gustin. Hue to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject him was filed wherein the City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in .uestion and to pay the plaintiff unpaid bac5 rentals. *rom this decision, the defendant filed an appeal with ;ranch 2ll of the Court of *irst 2nstance of Cebu which rendered judgment reversing that of the City Court. Do appeal was ta5en by the plaintiff3appellant hence the decision lapsed into finality and became eCecutory. , writ of eCecution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real properties belonging to the estate of /usana ,gustin was issued by the Heputy /heriff to satisfy judgment in the case. PlaintiffEs counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, confessing his fault and giving the reason why he failed to perfect the appeal on time. The motion was denied. Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff3 appellant filed a complaint with ;ranch 0, Court of *irst 2nstance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Heputy /heriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above3 cited decision of ;ranch 222, Court of *irst 2nstance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the ground that the eCercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void. The court sustained the defendant. %##&e#$ 2. 4hether or not the present action for the annulment of the judgment in the ejectment case is the proper remedy after it has become final and eCecutory 22. 4hether or not the Court of *irst 2nstance may, in an appeal, award the defendant3appelleeEs counterclaim in an amount eCceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin 2. To this procedural dilemma, the solution lies in the determination of the validity of the judgment sought to be annulled, for against a void judgment, plaintiff3appellantEs recourse would be proper. There is no .uestion as to the validity of the courtEs decision with respect to the issue of physical possession of property, the defendant3appelleeEs right to the same having been upheld. 9owever, the plaintiff3 appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court which granted damages to the defendant3appellee. ;y reason thereof, he see5s the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment. Plaintiff3appellant loses sight of the fact that the money judgment was awarded the defendant3appellee in the concept of a counterclaim. , defending party may set up a claim for money or any other relief which he may have against the opposing party in a counterclaim @/ection 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of CourtB. ,nd the court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or eCemplary damages as prayed for. The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar, as a counterclaim, and not as damages for the unlawful detention of property must be upheld. 9owever, the amount thereof is another matter. 22. 2t is well3settled that a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set3off or counterclaim in eCcess of its jurisdiction @/ection &, Rule &, Revised Rules of CourtG ,go v. ;uslon, #? /CR, )?)B. , counterclaim beyond the courtEs jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or wea5en plaintiffEs claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief @/ection &, Rule &, Revised Rules of CourtB. Devertheless, the defendant3 appellee, in the case at bar, set up his claim in eCcess of the jurisdiction of the city court as a compulsory counterclaim. ,s a conse.uence, the doctrine enunciated under the case of 'ne 9eartClub, 2nc. vs. Court of ,ppeals, an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of ,ppeals for decision, without .uestioning the latterEs jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waives so much of his claim as would eCceed the jurisdiction of said ,ppellate CourtG for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of

appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of ,ppeals in eCpectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attac5ing its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable. The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court cannot be entertained in the Court of *irst 2nstance on appeal. The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant3appellee on appeal, cannot eCceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. /ince the trial court did not ac.uire jurisdiction over the defendantEs counterclaim in eCcess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, li5ewise, ac.uired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise. ,ppellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation of the eCercise of the same judicial power which has been eCecuted in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original and appellate courts are capable of participating in the eCercise of the same judicial power. .ANGAL%AG vs. CATU-%G G.R. No. 14 951 O"tober 25, 2005 4*4 SCRA 15 AUSTR%A3.ART%NE4, J.: F!"t#$ Private respondent ,polinario /er.uina, (r. filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners Dorma !angaliag and Darciso /olano for failure to eCercise eCtraordinary diligence in the selection of her employee @truc5 driverB resulting to serious injuries and permanent deformities of private respondent and his co3passengers therein. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lac5 of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the !unicipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P+#,"$).??, falls within its jurisdiction. %##&e$ 2n an action for recovery of damages, does the amount of actual damages prayed for in the complaint provide the

sole test for determining the court s jurisdiction, or is the total amount of all the damages claimed, regardless of 5ind and nature, such as moral, eCemplary, nominal damages, and attorney s fees, etc., to be computed collectively with the actual damages to determine what court O whether the !TC or the RTC O has jurisdiction over the actionN 'e()$ The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron3clad rule. 2t generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. *or this reason, litigants are re.uired to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal .uestions. The well3entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 2n the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent see5s to recover not only his medical eCpenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. 0iewed as an action for .uasi3delict, the present case falls s.uarely within the purview of ,rticle ))#$ @)B, which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of .uasi3delict causing physical injuries. Private respondent s claim for moral damages of P&??,???.?? cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a conse.uence of the claim for actual damages. 2t is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. 2t springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable 9ence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in

determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance with paragraph ) of ,dministrative Circular Do. ?$3$-. ONG YU vs. PACLEG.R. No. 1*21*2 Febr&!r1 24, 2009 500 SCRA 19* PUNO, C.J.: F!"t#$ The present action is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner spouses against (avier to compel performance of the latter s underta5ings under their Contract to /ell. , decision was rendered therein at the RTC ac5nowledging Langcaan, not a party in the case, as the rightful owner of the property in dispute. Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional Trial Court as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto since it involved the .uestion of possession and ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in personam but an action .uasi in rem. %##&e$ 4hether or not the present action is a proceeding in rem or in personam 'e()$ The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. 4hether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or .uasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. , proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the eCercise of ownership of, specific property, or see5 to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court,

some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. 'f this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. ,n action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. 2t has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligationsG such action is brought against the person. 'n the other hand, a proceeding .uasi in rem is one brought against persons see5ing to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. 2n an action .uasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. ,ctions .uasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these .uestions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action. The present action s object is to compel (avier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to eCecute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their favor. The obligations of (avier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan Property. ;eing a judgment in personam, the civil case is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Deither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, ,ngelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale. /O.AGAS vs. +ENSEN G.R. No. 15040* +!,&!r1 1*, 2005 440 SCRA 66 CALLE+O, SR., J.:

F!"t#$ Homagas filed for a forcible entry case against (ensen. /ummons and complaint were not served on respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country but it was received by respondent s brother 'scar who was then at the respondent s house. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent did not appeal. ,ugust )?, )???, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the annulment of the decision of !TC since the service of summons was ineffective, the respondent being out of the country. The RTC decided in favor of (ensen since there was no valid service of the complaint and summons. The C, affirmed the decision, ruling that the case was an ejectment case which is an action .uasi in rem. %##&e$ 4hether or not the action of petitioner in the !TC against respondent is an action in personam or .uasi in rem 'e()$ The action of the petitioner fro forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. 4hether a proceeding is in rem or in personam or in .uasi in rem is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. , proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right, or the eCercise of ownership of, specific property, or see5 to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. 'f this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. ,n action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against a person, as distinguished from a judgment against the proprietary to determine its state. ,ctions for recovery of real property are in personam.

REPU-L%C OF T'E P'%L%PP%NES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122269 September 0, 1999 15 SCRA 600 .EN/O4A, J.: F!"t#$ Lot " forms part of a parcel of land declared by the /upreme Court as belonging to the public domain, classified/>onified land available for fishpond development. The lot was leased to !r. Porfirio !orado by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the /ecretary of ,griculture, for a period of )& years or up to Hecember "#, )?#", under *ishpond Lease ,greement. 'n (uly 1, #$%%, however, Lenaida ;ustria filed a complaint against Porfirio !orado in the Regional Trial Court of ,laminos, Pangasinan for ownership and possession over the lot in .uestion. 9erein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.Hue, however, to Porfirio !orado s and his counsel s failure to appear at the pre3trial and subse.uent court hearings, the trial court subse.uently declared Porfirio !orado Mas in default. Respondent (udge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiff as the eCclusive and absolute owner of the land in .uestion. Petitioner then filed with the C, a petition for the annulment of the trial court s decision. Petitioner alleged that since the land formed part of the public domain, the ;*,R has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.H. Do. +?-. The C, rendered a decision dismissing the petition. %##&e#$ 2. 4hether or not petitioner has personality to bring the action 22. 4hether or not the decision of the RTC is void for want of jurisdiction or for lac5 of due process of law which would warrant the annulment of the judgment 'e()$ 2. =es. , party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings has a sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the

judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings even though it was not a party in such proceedings. , person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. 4hat is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. The /tate clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court s disposition of inalienable public land. The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development. 2n controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. Private respondents have not discharged this burden. 22. =es. The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a 6fully developed fishpond7 does not mean that it has lost its character as one declared 6suitable for fishpond purposes7 under the decree. ;y applying for a fishpond permit with ;*,R, 2sidro ;autista admitted the character of the land as one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the ;*,R. Conse.uently, private respondents, as his successors3in3interests, are estopped from claiming otherwise. 2t is settled under the Public Land Law that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor3in3interest, openly, continuously, and eCclusively for "? years is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time. 9owever, only public lands classified as agricultural are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not alienable and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership. /ince the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the ;*,R, in accordance with P.H. Do +?-, Q-, the trial court s decision is null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to ma5e a disposition of inalienable public land. TA.ANO vs. ORT%4 G.R. No. 12660

+&,e 29, 1990 291 SCRA 504 -ELLOS%LLO, J.: F!"t#$ The case involves a dispute as to the validity of the marriage of /enator Tamano and Astrellita whom the former married in civil rites prior to his death. Tamano s former marriage with Lorayda in civil rites supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death. ,s a conse.uence, private respondent Lorayda joined by her son, ,dib, filed a Complaint for Heclaration of Dullify of !arriage of Tamano and Astrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Astrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of 8ue>on City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. /he alleged that Jonly a party to the marriageJ could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse. Petitioner li5ewise contended that since Tamano and Lorayda were both !uslims and married in !uslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the shariEa courts pursuant to ,rt. #&& of the Code of !uslim Personal Laws. %##&e$ 4hether or not it is the /hariEa court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action 'e()$ :nder The (udiciary Reorgani>ation ,ct of #$%?, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be no .uestion by now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. 2n the complaint for declaration of nullity of

marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Astrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Dever was it mentioned that Astrellita and Tamano were married under !uslim laws or PH Do. #?%". 2nterestingly, Astrellita never stated in her !otion to Hismiss that she and Tamano were married under !uslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under !uslim laws was first mentioned only in her !otion for Reconsideration. Devertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the !otion for Reconsideration that Astrellita and Tamano were li5ewise married in !uslim rites. This is because a courtEs jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. (urisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffEs causes of action. ,rticle #" of PH Do. #?%" does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and !uslim rites. Conse.uently, the shariEa courts are not vested with original and eCclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and !uslim laws. Conse.uently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under /ec. #$, par. @1B of ;P ;lg. #)$ which provides P Sec. 8. 3urisdiction in -ivil -ases. 0 9egional 5rial -ourts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction6 . . . %/' In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or +uasi#judicial functions . . . LA TON/E<A /%ST%LLERS vs. PONFERRA/A G.R. No. 109656 No9ember 21, 1996 264 SCRA 540 FRANC%SCO, J.:

F!"t#$ Hue to a breach of a contract to sell a parcel of land between private respondents @the buyer thereofB and defendants, the former filed before the RTC of ;acolod City an action for specific performance with damages. , notice of lis pendens was annotated on the defendants title although the same was cancelled upon private respondents filing of a bond. Pending trial at the lower court, petitioner bought the said lot from defendants and as a result, private respondents amended their complaint and impleaded petitioner as an additional defendant alleging that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith. /ubse.uently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on two groundsF no cause of action and improper venue. 9owever, the lower court denied the motion. Three months later, petitioner filed before the /upreme Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 1& assailing the denial of the motion. %##&e#$ 4hether or not the dismissal of the motion is warranted 'e()$ =es. *irst, an order denying a motion to dismiss is only interlocutory which is neither appealable until final judgment, nor could it generally be assailed on certiorari. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer pursuant to /ec. -, Rule #1, and interpose as defenses, the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the whole case by appeal in due time. /econd, the eCtraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if the denial of the motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 2n the case at bar, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in deferring action on the motion. /ection " of Rule #1 #? sanctions deferment of hearing on the motion Juntil the trial if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable.J Clearly respondent judge had doubts on the allegation of petitionerEs good faith. This is a .uestion of fact which necessitates presentation of evidence and is certainly far from indubitable. 2t is within the discretion of the court to defer action if the ground alleged does not

appear to be indubitable and that deferment is only deemed a provisional denial of the motion to dismiss. *inally, petitioner s argument that venue should be lodged in ;ago City where the lot is situated is untenable. The complaint is one for Jspecific performance with damagesJ involving real property, and as such, is held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper court where the party resides. Dot being an action involving title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of ;acolod City. Private respondents do not claim ownership of the lot but in fact recogni>ed title of defendants by annotating a notice of lis pendens. CA-UT%'AN vs. LAN/CENTER CONSTRUCT%ON G.R. No. 146594 +&,e 10, 2002 0 SCRA 5 PANGAN%-AN, J.: F!"t#$ Respondent Landcenter Construction R Hevelopment Corporation, represented by 4ilfredo ;.!aghuyop entered into an ,greement with Petitioner Rebecca Cabutihan for the financing, facilitation and arrangements of the recovery of a certain property. Conse.uently, this resulted into petitioner s filing of a complaint with the RTC against respondent for a breach of the contract. The RTC ruledF @#B that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary objective was to recover real property as may be shown in the prayer which was to compel respondent to eCecute the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a portion of the property corresponding to "1.& percent of its total area or, in the alternative, to hold respondent liable for the value of the said portion, based on the prevailing mar5et priceG @)B since the suit would affect the title to the property, it should have been instituted in the trial court where the property was situatedG @"B the action was filed only by petitioner with no allegation that she had been authori>ed by *orro, Radan and ,nave to represent their respective shares in the compensationG and

@-B since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the appropriate doc5et or filing fees e.uivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she failed to discharge. %##&e#$ 4hether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Complaint on the grounds ofF 2. 2mproper venueG 22. Don3joinder of necessary parties, and 222. Don3payment of proper doc5et fees 'e()$ 2. =es. /ections # and ), Rule - of the Rules of Court provide an answer to the issue of venue. ,ctions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein @real actionsB, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. 'n the other hand, all other actions, @personal actionsB shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. /ince the action is in personam, not in rem, the venue was properly laid. The fact that Jshe ultimately sought the conveyance of real propertyJ not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is an anticipated conse.uence and beyond the cause for which the action was instituted. Petitioner see5s payment of her services in accordance with the underta5ing the parties signed. ;reach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. 2f petitioner had filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the ground of lac5 of cause of action. 22. =es. Deither a misjoinder nor a non3joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courtEs own initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action. ,lthough the

Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole "1.& percent claim without impleading the companions of petitioner as party3litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case as far as her )? percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other #1.& percent. This fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can be had. ,t best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. The non3inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such party. 222. =es. The trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case and to trifle with the law. True, /ection &, Rule #-# of the Rules of Court re.uires that the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. ;ut the Court has already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation. ;esides, as the Court had earlier held, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the doc5et fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. GOC'AN vs. GOC'AN G.R. No. 146009 /e"ember 1 2001 *2 SCRA 56 YNARES3SANT%AGO, J.: F!"t#$ Respondents were stoc5holders of the *eliC Iochan and /ons Realty Corporation and the !actan Realty Hevelopment Corporation. Respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late ,mbassador Asteban Iochan, for and in

consideration of the sum of P)??,???,???.??. Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents who issued to petitioners the necessary Receipts, as well as a Release, 4aiver and 8uitclaim, wherein they undertoo5 that they would not initiate any suit, action or complaint against petitioners for whatever reason or purpose. 2n turn, the individual petitioners eCecuted a promissory note, underta5ing not to divulge the actual consideration they paid for the shares of stoc5, through Crispo Iochan, (r. in his own handwriting and had the same signed by *eliC Iochan, 222, Louise Iochan and Asteban Iochan, (r. 9owever, unbe5nown to petitioners, Crispo Iochan, (r. inserted in the promissory note a phrase that says, 6/aid amount is in partial consideration of the sale.7 Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, ;ranch ##claiming that they are entitled to the conveyance of the subject properties, in addition to the amount of P)??,???,???.??, which they ac5nowledge to have received from petitioners as well as damages. Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses which the trial court denied on the ground that the said motion lies in the discretion of the court under /ection 1 of Rule #1 of the #$$+ Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of ,ppeals which rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the ground that respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lac5 or in eCcess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to hear the affirmative defenses. %##&e#$ 2. 4hether or not the correct doc5et fees have been paid 22. 4hether or not petitioners are guilty of forum3 shopping when they filed two petitions for certiorari with the Court of ,ppeals and if so, that the Court of ,ppeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari 'e()$ 2. The rule is well3settled that the court ac.uires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the

prescribed doc5et fees. 2t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed doc5et fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. 2t is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of doc5et fees therefor. The dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for specific performance and damages. The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the eCecution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. :nder these circumstances, the case herein was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property. , real action is one where the plaintiff see5s the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section )@aB of Rule - @now /ection #, Rule - of the #$$+ Rules of Civil ProcedureB a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. 2t has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. 2n such a case, the action must be filed in the proper court where the property is located. 2n the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Conse.uently, the basis for determining the correct doc5et fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant. Rule #-#, /ection +, of the Rules of Court, as amended by ,.!. Do. ??3 )3?#3/C, providesF Section ;. -ler<s of 9egional 5rial -ourts. # x x x %b' xxx In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the

claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. 22. Petitioners are not guilty of forum3shopping. The deplorable practice of forum3shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort to two different fora to increase his or her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one. :ltimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum3shopping eCists or not is the veCation caused the courts and the parties3litigant by a person who as5s different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. 2n sum, two different orders were .uestioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were soughtG thus, forum shopping cannot be said to eCist in the case at bar.

TA-LE OF CONTENTS #. =eypes vs. -ourt of >ppeals ===================....==..=====... ). )inga vs. 2eirs of 2eirs of Santiago======..========...========== ". $aritua vs. 4ercader===============================. -. >brenica vs. >brenica ==============================.. &. )aloma vs. 4ora ================================.. 1. ?uesada vs. 1epartment of 3ustice =========================.. +. =g $ung 5iong vs. 3udge Sayo===========================.. %. ,lla vs. Salonga ================================= $. @illamor vs. Salas================================.. #?. 1ela 9osa vs. 9oldan ==============================. ##. 5ijam vs. Sibonghanoy============================== #). -alimlim vs. 9amireA==============================.. #". 1ela -ruA vs. -ourt of >ppeals==========================... #-. Sta. -lara 2omeowners vs. Baston=========================. #&. Sun Insurance Cffice vs. >suncion=========================.. #1. $allatan vs. -ourt of >ppeals===========================. #+. Duchengco vs. 9epublic of the )hilippines ======================. #%. @da. 1e 4urga vs. -han ============================= #$. 2eirs of @aleriano -oncha vs. Spouses Eumocso ===================.. )?. >gustin vs. $acalan===============================. )#. 4angaliag vs. -atubig============================== )). Du vs. )acleb================================== )". 1omagas vs. 3ensen===============================. )-. 9epublic of the )hilippines vs. -ourt of >ppeals ==================== )&. 5amano vs. CrtiA================================. )1. Ea 5oFdena 1istillers vs. )onferrada========================. )+. -abutihan vs. Eandcenter -onstruction =======================.. )%. Bochan vs. Bochan===============================.