2024676

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Trying (As the Mental "Pineal Gland") Author(s): Brain O'Shaughnessy Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 13, On Trying and Intending (Jul. 19, 1973), pp. 365-386 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024676 . Accessed: 19/09/2013 21:17
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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME LXX, NO. 13, JULY I9, I973
performthat action? The oddity of saying "He tried to walk across the road," of a normal able-bodied man in a settingof rural peace, may merelybe the oddity of saying "The presidentis sober this morning" (to use John Searle's1 example). While it mightbe absurd to say this to certainpeople, it would be natural to say it to a man insistingthat the presidentwas blind drunk at his breakfast;and presumably,therefore, it can be true even though absurd to speak about in normal circumstances. Analogously,though we speak of tryingonly when success is in doubt, that doubt could dwell in someone other than agent or speaker;so it seemsthat we misunderstand thislinguisticrule if we suppose it unconditionallyto forbid mention of trying when one is in no doubt. It follows that sentencesattributing tryingto an agent mustbe perfectly intelligible, and capable of truthor falsity, in humdrumcircumstances of this kind. Indeed, froma distance such sentenceslook likely to be true. For we are concernedwith situations in which success is not in doubt; and after all, when successis not in doubt, it nonethelesstrulyobtains; and wherever there is succeeding,must there not also be trying? This leads me to suppose that tryingis an essential constituentof intentional actionas such. There is a perfectly genuine sense, suppressedby philosophersof common-sensical orientation, in which no event,includingintended act-events, can be foretoldas an absolute certainty. That sense is this: the world is known to have harbored freakhappenings; this
1"Assertions and Aberrations," in Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore, eds., BritishAnalyticalPhilosophy (New York: Humanities, 1966). I. INTRODUCTION
TRYING (AS THE MENTAL "PINEAL GLAND")
OES a man who intentionally performs an action,tryto
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is a permanentpotentialof the world,and of no situationcan it be said: "This situationbears a charmedlife, it is guaranteednot to harborsuch a freak."Thereforeit might.For one thing,we simply do not have "'tabs"on all empiricallyrelevantregions: the depths of the brain and the nervous system, the centerof the earth, the heart of the fundamentalparticles,not to mentionthe farthest recesses of outer space-are all completelyopaque and might conceivablyharbora disturbing agency.Thereforethe totallyaberrant can neverbe guaranteednot to happen. Now it is preciselythis refusal of empirical reality ideally to matchour mental representations, it is this special brand of uncertaintyhanging like a question mark over everything, that gives trying a permanentfootholdin intentionalaction. For as the time of an intended act arrives,the die being cast and the will on the move,that special uncertainty continuesto pervade the act. Even if I act with the utmostconviction, say, under the simple heading of movingmyarm,I mustsimultaneously recognizethat that arm may fail to budge; and the same holds of the intentionas I act, foruntil completing the act I can alwaysand alwaysmightchange mymind. Thereforethatpeculiar uncertainty has two sources:my own mind, and all else; and the firstallows for the possibilityof freedom, whereasthe second gives trying a footholdin all action. Because of this last, 'my will is about to move, but my body may not' retains its intelligibility in all situations, in the teethof common-sensicality. Now thismeans that a willing that is distinctfrombodily phenomena must obtain even in the most favoredepistemologicalsettings. And thiswillingand trying are one and the same phenomenon. The so-calledindifference to existence,a mark of consciousness, makes one special demand of the world: namely, that it be such that consciousness is always potentiallyat variance with the outer world. Then theremust be that in intentionalaction which is no exceptionin thisrespect.If action were simplyidentical with whatever happened to our limbs,so that the doing of people was as the meredoing of leaves fleeing beforethe wind, then,no doubt, trying would lose that foothold;but then will, and with it consciousness itself,would prove to be mythical.And yet if all action is intentional under some description,2 theremust at least exist a general
2 Which is not quite true, Pace Donald Davidson, because of the existence of senseless action such as the mere making of idle bodily movements,e.g., occasionally moving one's toes as one sits reading a book. Does nothing lie between being a corpse-likegraven image and a vehicle for reason? How else but as action is one to characterizethe making of these movements, and to what but the person is one to attribute them? One can hardly telescope them into mere spasms on
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intelligiblematchingof simultaneousintent and bodily phenomena; and the existence of this match is the other mark of the realityof the will. Thereforeaction marriesan absence of absolute (i.e., unqualifiable) certainty with a general conformity of simultaneous intentand bodily phenomena.From the first featurecomes the internal constituentof action, which is tryingor (what we mightas well call) willing. From the second featurewe derive the causal efficacy in the physicalworld of that inner event of trying, and thisis made possiblethrough the co-existence of a psycho-psycho law connecting intendingand trying and a psychophysical law connectingtrying and bodilyphenomena.Thus, an innerphenomenon with such causal efficacy is a permanent constituentof physical action. Now if intentand bodily phenomena were essentially given by each other,so that their conformity was mutual and essential, then trying would fade fromthe scene, but it would take will and consciousness with it. In what follows,we shall attemptto substantiatetheseclaims.
II. INSTRUMENTAL TRYING
action (A) The omnipresence of trying in instrumental Suppose a man setsout to starta car by pressing its starter button. it Though he may have doubts about the successof his enterprise, will be allowed that he can nonetheless"have a try."But trying entails the presumption on the agent'spart that successis at least a remotepossibility. Then let us suppose that,having tried,he succeeds. In that case he will have startedthe car as a resultof trying, and here the trying-act thatconfers causes the event,enginestarting, its name upon theact thathe succeedsin performing. If he was certainhe would startthe car,whereaswe were dubious, thenwhereashe would have describedhimselfas "starting the car,"
the part of the toes. And does one not suddenly become aware of doing them? Yet it is not as if theywere intentionallysenseless,as it were the "small talk" of bodily movement,for they are not chosen. But if Davidson's claim fails in the actions can express letter,it succeeds nonethelessin the spirit, for these trifling nothing more distinctiveor more mental in our inner life than vague unease; and anyhow they are an afterthought in the scheme of things. They relate to standard examples of action somewhat as do objects that are mere lumps of and more, e.g., stuff, say rough diamonds, to objects that are both lumps of stuff artefacts,natural kinds. (But whereas all matter might have been in the form of mere chunks,these could not be the only examples of action in the universe.) not even the interSuch senseless"raw" acts are not amenable to interpretation, and that is why they are not intentional pretation of having no interpretation, under any description. Excluding them from the class of all actions would be roughly akin to excluding gold nuggets from the class of material objects,
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we would have said thathe was "merely trying to startit." Yet there is truth or falsity on thismatter;forif the evidenceshowedit highly unlikelythat it would start,and it failed to start,then it was true thathe was merelytrying. And thisdoes not derivesimplyfromhis failure.For had it been knownto all thathe would have succeeded, he could have engagedin the activity of starting the car even though he mighthave been interrupted beforehe had completedthe task. That is, eitherhe was starting the car withouthaving yet startedit or he was merelytrying to startit withoutyet starting it; and not both. That is, we oppose startingand only trying. Now thereis an argument designed to show that,even when the agent is and knows he is starting the car, still he is trying to start the car. This argumentutilizes the possible existenceof divergent cognitiveattitudestoward the intended act. Thus, suppose a third person witnessesthe spectacle; and suppose he knows the putative car-starter to be a fantasticpathological liar and this car to be a grosslyunreliable instrument; and, to complete the picture,let us suppose him to know that the car starter has a trulyurgentreason formakinga quick getaway.The pathological liar gives vent in an absurdlycomplacentvoice-as it happens on a sound factual basis, having just had the car completelyoverhauled and tuned-to the announcementthat he is "now about to drive off."The skeptical onlooker has excellent reasons for doubting the truthof this evident boast. But, because he knowsof the urgentreason for making a quick getaway,he does, I suggest, know one thing: namely,that the pathological liar is at least going to tryand start the car. It followsthat it is true thathe is. Therefore,the car-starter is trying, even as he is more than trying, i.e., even as he is engaged in starting the car. (For he is starting it.) Thus, the presenceof skepticism in the onlookerhas the effect of blotting out a fact from his view, viz., that the activityof the pathological liar is a startingof the car; but, in doing so, it lays bare a second fact. It seems that the skeptical but rational standpoint of this onlookerhas uncovereda trying that must be present wheneveranyone performs an instrumentaltask. Such onlookers act unwittingly as separatoragencies,ratherlike magnetsthat one drawsthrougha finemixtureof iron and copper filings. They draw to themselves an item normallyconcealed fromview. Now all that remainsis to extend this account to noninstrumental simple physical actions like raising an arm, and to offera formulafor trying itself. We will begin with the latter,thoughit is the less important enterprise of the two.
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of trying (B) The definition -and with just that purTrying consistsin doing, intentionally pose, whateverone takes to be needed if, the restof the world suitrather the action. This formula, one is to perform ably cooperating, is doing what causes the event thatgives than the claim that trying propose. its name to the action,is what I would tentatively directedactiviposed by noninstrumental It meetsthe difficulties ties like walking fromA to B. For here tryingcannot consist in an act that causes an event that gives its name to the performing act; for the name of this act does not come from an act-neutral event. Whereas we name the act of startingthe car throughthe we do not name the walk-actfromA to B event of car starting, will be shown event.Yet thisdifference any such act-neutral through to walk from For what does trying to be little more than a trifle. A to B consistin? compatible,and as perfectly I will mentionthreeequally correct, yetunproved answers: (1) it consistsin walking along such terrain to walk, and as one thinkswill get one fromA to B; (2) it is trying along such terrainas one thinkswill get one fromA to B, (3) it is and of such a kind (etc.) as one thinks to make movements, trying are used will get one fromA to B. Of course,such characterizations would be natural with a' The first only in special circumstances. 2 with a person both uncertainof person uncertainof the terrain, from the terrainand verydrunk,3 with a personwho is recovering damage to his limbs and is verydrunk and uncertain of the terrain. Happily, this last is no kind of norm; but still 1, 2, and 3 apply in the normalsituation. We discover what tryingto walk from A to B consistsin, by adopting the standpointof the rational but skepticalonlookerwho knows that the would-be agent has a powerfulincentivefor walkhere happens to mislead him. ing fromA to B and whose skepticism into the situation That is, we insertmaximum rational skepticism as a separator agency (with Descartes as our inspiration)and see Then in this case we what it extricates (for that will be trying). to bring about discoverthat the would-beagent is, afterall, trying an act-neutralevent; and this holds of all physical action. Thus, all physical action involves a willing or bringing about of actbetween the actneutral bodily events; and the only difference neutral events in walking fromA to B and in startingthe car is gives its name to the act. that the latterbut not the former That act-neutral eventis put on display in the followingdescripto bring trying tion of the walker'soccupation. He is continuously
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about some kind (or other,he need not exactlyknow what) of scisof propelsors motion of legs and arms that possessesthe property to do this so as thereby to get from ling his body along; and trying forthereis no A to B. These physicaleventsare indeed act-neutral, difficulty in supposingthembroughtabout by a machine that completely takes over his body. Though this is not the heading under which a normal agent acts-for this man acts under the heading, walkingfromA to B-the separatoragencyshows nonethelessthat such a trying to make movement (etc.) is takingplace. Agreed,this makes him sound like the Frankensteinmonsterventuringforth into the world; but a few laughs are neitherhere nor there.Anyway, it looks that way only because we illicitlyinsertthe feature: acting under that heading. But of course I have yet to demonstrate thatwhenever one movesone's limbsone triesto move them. dialectic (C) The inner-outer Therefore I suggestthat tryingconsistsin doing, intentionally and withjust that purpose,whateverone takes to be needed if, the that action. one is to perform restof theworldsuitablycooperating, For one is always at the mercyof the world, which may at any let one down. Indeed, it is a moment, in the sense alreadyspecified, kind of rebuffthat consciousnessexperiencesat the hands of the world which,in castingus offfromitself,throwsus back into ourthat would selves. Because omnipotence is the self-determination of must be the internalization self-guarantee its own success,trying that in action: in the inner This duality thefailureof omnipotence. world we contributewhat we contribute,while the outer world whateverit contributes;this schismor wound, the uncontributes of trying certainty of realization,is the reason for the omnipresence in all physical action. As T. S. Eliot said s: "between the motion and the act, falls the shadow." The presenceof thisshadow,and the are merelyconcealed by the general reliomnipresenceof trying, unintelligiabilityof theworld.That is,by theabsence of essentially ble phenomena, such as the discoveryof a mathematicalformula an endlessnumberof great melodies; thatgeneratesby substitution or of absolutelyunintelligiblephenomena,such as the sudden but of the AtlanticOcean; or relatively persisting apparent mythicality unintelligiblephenomena, such as the mutation today of a man into an ape. (Such thingsjust do not happen.) Now, that trying is omnipresentbeneath this physical reliability is revealed by the
3 "The Hollow Men," in, e.g., Collected Poems and Plays (New York: Harcourt. 1952).
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separatoragencyas, so to speak,he scrapesoffthe barnacles.Indeed, of the it is only through the general reliabilityor intelligibility depends itself Consciousness world that willing can be a reality. upon thatreliability. Schopenhauersays4: "I cannot really imagine this will without this body." If this wonderfulremarkis right,and I am convinced it is, the internalphenomenathatoccur when one engagesin physical action must depend upon the supposed reality of the body. More, we shall later see that those inner phenomena depend in upon the actual existenceof the body. Theregeneral constitutively Cartesian fore,ours is not a Cartesian position,howeverinsightful relation are in general,even thoughwe accountsof the mind-body insist that tryingis an inner event that is omnipresentin all physicalaction. And so thereseems to occur a kind of dialectic in our account of the will: one that swingsfrominner to outer, and back again to inner, and back again to outer: that is, fromCartesianism to logical behaviorism,and back again to the omniand on the rebound back presence of the inner event of trying, again to a discoveryof the essential mutual interdependenceof trying and of the body upon one another. I suggestthat this is a rather than a hopelessly swinging true dialectical synthesizing, of philosophicalargument. the futility pendulum thatdemonstrates Part III of this paper is dedicated to establishingthe interiorwing of what is at once a of thisdialectic,and part iv to the construction of all in the opposite exteriordirectionand a synthesis corrective thatprecedesit.
III. SIMPLE PHYSICAL ACTION
(A) Abnormalexamplesofsimplephysicalaction Let us now consider the mere moving of a limb. There exist actions that consistin that and no more, e.g., crossingone's legs. actions that consistin that and somethingelse, e.g., Alternatively, giving a wave. Then considerthe case of a man who believes but is not quite certainthathis arm is paralyzed;suppose him asked at a signal to tryand raise his arm. At the given signal he tries,and to his surprisethe arm moves; but a momentlater he triesagain and thinkshe has succeeded,only to discoveron looking down that he has failed. Now let us note that,until he looked, it seemed to him that the identical eventshad happened on both occasions.Three questions an event on both occasions? (2) arise out of this. (1) Was trying
4
The World as Will and Idea, bk. 2, ?18.
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Was it an action on both occasions?(3) If it was an event,was it the same kind of event on each occasion? Consider these in turn. an event? Certainly,it was true or false that he (1) Was trying triedwhen he saw the signal. Since it was true,therehad to be that in the world,located at that time,whichmade his utterance'I tried' had true; and it was uniquely located at that time.Also, his trying of messagephenomena down his nervesor like the traveling effects, such as an attack of anxietyon his part or rage on the part of a doctor.And it had causes,whethertheybe the desire to impressor the decision or intentionto tryat the time of the signal. Thus, we of the world, have here that which is a real individual constituent located at a point in space and time,with both causes unrepeatably it as an event. And thisestablishes and effects. an action on those occasions?If it is an action, it (2) Was trying of being an action that one cannot possessesthe peculiar property But so what? It is an internalaction, and internal tryto perform. action is an entirelyspecial domain of the will, raising problems all its own (which I hope to elucidate in a later paper). Afterall, 'he tried to remember her name' unquestionablyreportsan action, yet probablyit is not possible for him to "tryto tryto remember seem to coalesce into being her name," forall genuine attemptings tryingsto remember her name. Therefore there exist internal actions that we cannot try to perform.So why not tryingitself? that trying Now the followingfeatures are reasons forclassifying to raise the arm as an action. It was an event, whose occurrence came as no surpriseto the subject,that he knew of in no way, that happened because he chose that it should, that he intendedshould happen, whose origin lay in his reasoned desires,and that came the use of no device.Thus, it displaysalmost into existencethrough all the salient featuresof uncontentiousexamples of action. And one additional considerationexistsin favorof judging it to be an say in action. Namely, when techniques are employed in trying, an action to tryingto start a car, tryingconsistsin performing which one stands in a certain relation, viz., that of taking it to be such that, all going well, one therebyperformsthe attempted action. I conclude that the event of tryingthat happened as the subject saw the signal was an action, albeit a unique example of the species; but to placate those whose minds shy at that descripreferto it merelyas a "chosen event." tion, I will sometimes that occurredon each occasion the same (3) Was the trying-act in kind? On both occasions the man tried to raise his arm, and on each occasion it was an event and action. But was it the same
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Now the best possible descriptionof that kind of event-action? chosen event was: 'tryingto raise his arm'. Indeed, that is all the occurrence:it is the ultimatepsyagent can say of that mysterious Then on each occasion that descriptionhas chological description. application, and the agent knows so independentlyof knowing whetherhis arm moved. Thus, he knowshe tried to raise his arm each time, irrespectiveof knowing the truth concerningbodily phenomena,and on each occasion the best possible or ultimatefirstis the same. I cannot see how person descriptionof that trying-act octo avoid the conclusion that the same kind of trying-act-event chosen curredon both occasions.In sum: on eitheroccasion a freely event occurred,trying to raise the arm, and it was the same kind of event both on the occasion of success and on the occasion of failure. The same act-event occurred,both when the arm rose and when it did not. Therefore,tryingand arm rising must be two events mustrate as a psychological events.But now trying and two distinct whose occurevent; forit is an eventwhose originis psychological, rence is known of in no way, an event that he can know to have thatis not arm risingoccurred, happened withoutknowingwhether given as located at any specificpoint in the body (in immediately contrast with toothacheor arm-rising), and so on. Therefore,when event,freely thisman succeeded in raisinghis arm,a psychological chosen and intended,occurredside by side with another event, a event, the event distinctevent, a merelyphysical and act-neutral of arm rising. (B) Normal examples of simple physicalaction Now let us call once more onto the stage our music-hallteam of two: the fantasticand pathological liar, who happens for once to be right,together with his mirroropposite, the skeptical thirdperson onlooker,who happens for once to be wrong. And let us see whetherwe can generalize this account to all cases of simple physical action. The situation,easy enough to anticipate,is that the liar-agenthas a recuperatingarm which has made a sudden dramaticrecovery; meanwhilethe skeptichas had the bad luck to and fatuous doctor, be talking to an ignorant,impressive-looking, workingin the ward in which the patient is situated,who assures him it is very unlikely the patient will manage to move his arm until weekshave elapsed; but the liar has had the good fortuneto be talking to an eminent specialist who assures him his arm has recovered,and that he will be able to move it the moment the
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bandages are removed. Finally, the bandages at last having been removed,we suppose the patient to have a powerfulincentiveto move his arm at a given signal. This is the scene thatconfronts the who viewsit wryly. skeptic, At last the signal is given,and the lying patientextravagantly announces that he will now raise his arm for all to see. The skeptic,in a perfectly rational frameof mind, dryly comments, havingset eyesupon the mostdesirableincentive, "Well, I am sure that he will at least have a try."And this is something that he knows,for he knows the psychologicalcontext; and thereforeit is somethingthat is true; and so this person who knows he has a normalarm triesto raise it when he raisesit. Therefore, when anyone who is aware that he can raise his arm, proceeds then intentionally to raise that arm, he also tries to do what he actually did and knew he could and would do. Thus, in normallyraisingan arm, two distincteventssimultaneeously happen: one active and psychological,a tryingevent; the other a merelyphysical event of a kind that might instead have been caused by no more than a shove, an arm-rising event. Then how do theseeventsrelate to each other?Let me briefly returnto the man whose arm rose when he was asked to tryand raise it. Why did his arm rise?Of course,it rose because the muscle had healed; but that merely gives the causally necessary state conditionsfor the act-event of arm risingto occur. The event explanation is that he tried to raise his arm. Provided tryingis an event that explains arm rising,that is how thingsmust stand. The event,his trying to raise his arm,explains the distinct simultaneousact-neutral physical event,arm rising.These two distinctevents are linked by an explanatoryconnection.Given a body in a normal state in a world that at that momentpermitsarm rising-and, because of hysterical phenomena,we add, given a mind in a moderately healthystateto raise the arm is a sufficient trying condition for the occurrence of the act-neutral bodilyeventof arm rising.Indeed, a law-likegeneralization exists,going fromleft to right,linking tryingto raise the arm and arm rising.And let us not suppose,because of the odd qualificationof 'given a mind in a moderatelyhealthystate', that these standard conditionsfor the application of the law are outr. and exceptional; on the contrary, that preciselycharacterizes their absence. Therefore,trying both explains and is a sufficient condition of arm rising,in normal physicopsychological circumstances. Thereforethe event,trying to raise the arm, normallycauses the event,arm rising.And this also is veryfar fromexceptional,and happens in all cases in which one intentionally raises an arm. A
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in the hierarchy event,doubtlessone thatis low-grade psychological of the mental,causes a simple bodily event that mightinsteadhave resultedimmediatelyfroma mere shove. Therefore,the logically of an intentionalact of arm rising are: a requirements necessary and arm rising. causally linked pair of events,trying We require the occurrenceof two events,one mental and the other physical; and the existenceof a causal relation between the occur require that this causal interaction two. No doubt we further What these withinthe body and also meet additional specifications. are need not be our concern,but clearly the event of arm rising exemplificaas a further mustderivefromthe inner eventof trying to raise trying tion of the law: "In a personin a healthystate (etc.), conditionof arm rising."This law-likegenthe arm is a sufficient eral truthcould obtain only if therewere properor standardcausal only if therewere impaths leading to arm rising and, therefore, proper or illicit or (so to say) accidental paths. In sum, when a to raise the arm causes the man intentionally raises his arm, trying act-neutralevent of arm rising. That is, an inner active chosen event causes or brings about an outer or merelybodily event. I harmlessand thinkwe can take this to be the sense of the perfectly that,when a man raiseshis arm by intent, obvious truth, intuitively then he bringsabout the movementof his arm. We can now say how he bringsthis about: it is by trying.
IV. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF TRYING
is constituted So much forone side of the dialectic.The antithesis of three importanttruths;and while they are antitheticaltruths, all that precedes them; and this is already evident theysynthesize aspects in themannerin which theyamelioratethe more disturbing of the thesis. itself.The ultimate psychological word on trying A preliminary act to raise the arm. Therefore this trying of this is: description or possibly real or remembered to a essence inner event relates in risingof individual imaginedarm object and to an intended merely thatobject. So far thisis nothingspecial, for the same kind of relaholds ifI represented, tion,in which externalentitiesare internally features image an existentmaterialobject. But those threefurther of trying liftit clear of the ruck of otherinternalphenomena.This softensthe blow of discoveringin physical action a psychological event that is distinctfrom the act-neutralphysical event; for resistanceto the suppositionof such an item mightwell stem from Those three a confuseddiscernment of its highlyunusual character. are as follows. features we can only tryto do what we conceive First,
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relates inSecond, while trying of as at least a remotepossibility. ternallyto the putative act, a correlativeinternal relation holds More, while trying betweenboth actual and putativeact and trying. a correlativegeneral inrelates internallyto putative arm-object, Third, law-like ternalrelation holds between the body and trying. and trying link intendingat the time with trying, generalizations and psychophysievent; that is, psycho-psycho with the act-neutral cal laws obtain in thisprimevalregion of the mind. Consider these claims in turn. is: the possible (A) The putativegoal of trying a to hit the sun," If I point gun at the sun, saying"I am trying this as phantasyor as a joke; and that is beyou would interpret cause we both know thatI know it is impossibleto hit the sun. But a madman mighttryto shoot the sun, since madmen can think it a possibility, exactlyas a youngchild mighttryto grasp the moon. act need not be possible,it must althoughthe attempted Therefore, be located by the agent outside the realm of pure phantasy and within the bounds of possibility(as we say). For the putativegoal of trying is: the possible. The peculiar implicationsof this fact are most apparent in cases of paralysis.A man with a paralyzed arm can tryto raise it, and but there is a limit to how even if he fails can continue trying, In the end, the capacity even to try much he can keep on trying. just fadesaway. Odd as thatmay seem,thisis simplybecause it will sink into most heads that,for the momentat least, the act is impossible. And yet it need not sink into the head of an idiot, who this Immediately, trying. mightindeed keep on and on dementedly look to be a sheer myth."Keep on and on what?", makes trying one wishesto protest;for the idea of an internalevent so hemmed seems ridiculous. Now I think this is in by cognitiverestrictions because we take tryingto be either like imaging or an internal and therefore we construeit either as an internalreprestraining, an autonomous undirectedact. No matter.This sentingor else as the unique status section is, afterall, dedicated to demonstrating of the act. and act-object of trying (B) The essentialmutual interdependence The second peculiarity of trying residesin the fact that the (act itselfinternallydepends upon trying. that is the) object of trying withmentalimaging, forthe imaged object exists This is in contrast Therefore imaging is a sheer inindependentlyof consciousness.
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or introjection(as psychoanalysis would say). But the ternalization in sectionv, actuwe shall see object of trying and, as necessitates, ally involves, itself. If I may anticipate the conclusions of that discussion,trying putativelyrelates to what involves an intimately and peculiarlyrelated bodily movementand itself!Thus, it is almost like a sketch for a picture that includes itself! Therefore, neithertrying nor the act itselfis prior to the other.Trying is not an introjection of what is external, and neitheris its putativeobject would say) of an externalizationor projection (as psychoanalysis trying. Now a further considerationshows the relation between trying and its act-objectto be even more intimateand egalitarian.Schopenhauer (op. cit.) describedthe body as "objectifiedwill", and I propose to interpretthis in the followingway. We single out a human body as one object of a certainkind, and the kind is: body of a human being; and this mammal is such that that object could not be what it is if it did not harbor the somewherepotential for being employedin action. An organismthat contained no potential foraction,howsoeverdeeply buried and inaccessible, could not be a human being (or a camel or a mosquito,forthatmatter).This does not guarantee that any part must have the function/functions it has, but ensures that it is part of what is as such a vehicle of the will. 'I cannot reallyimaginethiswill withoutthisbody' can be 'I cannot really imagine supplementedby the equally interesting this body withoutthis will'. In sum: trying is neitherpost nor prior to action,and is a trying to do what involvesitself.Neitherit, nor the attemptedact, relates to the other as introjectionor projection; and even the physical eventone aims at causing is change in what is itselfof such a kind as necessarily to harbor the somewherepotential for being the immediate vehicle of trying.This absolute egalitarianismof trying and act, this essential interdependencebetween what is internal and what is a closelybound union of internaland external,takes us far from Cartesianism.It is the externalizingand synthesizing corrective to the antithesisto logical behaviorism. law) (C) Tryingas mental "pineal gland" (or: the psychophysical The inner event, trying, though merelyinternal and therefore lacking absolute guaranteeof its object in the outer world,has no other existence than as a putative cause of a bodily event. Were an act like the imaging the act of trying independently specifiable, of a bodily event,then whereasthat act would putatively relate to
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itemsin the outer world and also putativelybe a cause of arm risact of a certainkind. as a distinctive ing,it would retainits identity We would then merelyredescribethe act as "tryingto raise the property would be a simple contingent arm," and its causal efficacy akin to that of the thoughtof a steak to cause wateringof the mouth.Now that would indeed usherin some versionof Cartesianmust be verystrongly ism; and its falsity emphasized.For although trying to raise an arm is not: whatevercauses arm rising;it is and normality, is essentially:an x which in the state of psychophysical world permitting, is sufficient to cause arm rising.This is an essenBecause 'tryingto raise an tialist psychologicalanalysis of trying. arm' is the ultimate psychologicaldescriptionof what causes arm risingwhen one raises one's arm, we do not redescribeany mental to raise the arm." To repeat: were the causal power eventas "trying of tryingan external property,like the power of fear to cause Thereupon the whole edificeof pallor, willing would be mythical. itself, must inevitablycolanimal action, and with it consciousness in being essentiallya cause of a physical lapse. Therefore trying, servesa crucial bridge phenomenonand a linchpinof consciousness, functionbetweenmind and body, not unlike that allotted by Descartesto the pineal gland. It is the keypoint at which the essential of mind and body can be openly seen to mutual interdependence that It is like a psychicpromontory be part of the schemeof things. all but juts into the physicalworld. with two othercloselyrelated In thisrespectit is to be contrasted the mind: intentionand desire.For in their primordialdenizensof laws like: in a body in a normal case thereexist no psychophysical is a sufficient causal condinecessarily trying state,worldpermitting, tionofarmrising. After all, without fearof thechargeof abnormality, one can always rescindan intentionor be too anxious to attempt to fulfilla desire when optimal conditionsfor fulfillment present of a law in the case themselves. This alone obstructs the possibility of desire and intention.But the only impedimentsto the efficacy or bodily harm or severemenof trying are extrabodily constraints tal pathologythat doubtlesshas some sort of physicalbasis. For it would be a serious mistaketo treat hystericalincapacityto move a healthylimb as on a par with common or garden manifestations are of commonor garden anxiety.The latter,but not the former, part of the normal scene. Because trying is mental,therecan be no absolute guarantee of its object: that is, of its success.But because it is in essence nor-
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mially a cause of its physicalobjective, its causal power cannot be a thoughtto cause goose an external propertylike the power of-pimples. Thus, tryingto perform a physical act falls between sheer physical movementand ordinarymental activity.The first with its internal character,and the second would is inconsistent make of the potential for physical action a merelycontingentendowment of animal consciousness(for its causal status makes it to move a limb is unique in the mind). But we know that trying an internal event and that the potential for physical action is as primitivea featureof animal consciousnessas perception(even as life itself).Are we seriouslyto envisage a conscious-type organism that nowhere in the depths of its bodily structurehas ever harbored the most incipient of potentials for causing bodily change? to move a limb is a unique mental event simplyin In fact,trying a cause of physicalchange; for all other examples being standardly of causal power on the part of the mental, like the power of an erotic thoughtto change the pulse rate, are either merelytypical or haphazard powers. But even more importantis the fact that trying is in essence normallya cause of bodily change. For in this to move a limb we findthe materialfor demonstrating that trying is the mental "pineal gland." which of animal consciousness, constituent Thus, it is a primitive cannot exist withoutbodily phenomena.For how yetconstitutively of willed could trying be real, and be no more than the event-cause without the guaranteed physical possibilityof physicalmovement, some willed movement? Desire and imagination, while being free to range over the unreal, are tied nonethelessin various ways to the world; but the For to move a limb and the body is tighter. bond between trying it is one thingto say: I cannot embarkupon what I take to be an act of movingthe arm withoutsupposing thereto be an occurrent arm movement.It is quite another thing to say: I cannot embark upon what I take to be an act of moving the arm without there actually existingthe organicallybased possibilityof willed bodily relation to movement.The shiftfrom a purely thought-mediated one that is both that and causal, accountsfor this dramaticalteration. For how could a causal law have any realityif realitycould of that law? Could it hang in the midprovideno exemplifications air of thought? At the veryleast,the soul mustas such be searching for its body! That the dualistic account that we have given of physicalaction
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has not severedthe mind fromthe body, is evidentwhen we review the features of trying just considered.Thus, a primitive elementof animal consciousness, the trying to performa physicalaction, has as object that which involves both that act of tryingand change in what necessarilyharbors a potential for being the immediate vehicle of such trying acts; it is neitherpost nor prior to that object. Further,because it is essentially normallythe cause of bodily phenomena, its realitydepends constitutively upon the reality of such bodily phenomenal effects. It seems to me that we have here succeeded in closing the circle, in binding mind and body indissolubly togetherwhile recognizingtheir genuine diversity. It is a truesynthesis. (D) Omnipotenceand the psycho-psycho law Beforeleaving sectioniv, I will briefly discuss the psycho-psycho law connectingintendingwith trying. That law postulates an entailment between occurrentknowledge that the instant of that realization is the time of intended action, and trying. The main problem that requires discussionis: what are the consequencesof supposing the nonexistenceof this entailment?I believe them to amount to a formof omnipotence.By that I have in mind the pernicious idea that true self-determination must be answerable to nothing(as if people were like that Steinbergfigurethat was engaged in drawingitself!). Certain entailments fail to go through.Thus, if I intend to performact x at t', and now is t', it is not entailed that at t' I tryto perform x; for it is not entailed that I know I now intend to performx. Again, if at instantt" I know I now intend to perform y, it is not entailed that at t" I tryto perform y; for "now" can be an "uncouth now", say a whole week, whereas t" is an instant.Then what is the position if "now" is an instant?Does an entailment hold? Or does some thirdpossibility lie between a last-instant flagging of resolutionand the entailment? Does that precious ingredient of the universe,self-determination, lurk in so slighta crevice? I thinknot, for if I tried to perform an intentionalaction then I must have intended to try. Does not intentional action express intention? Immediately,this seems to deflatethe law to nothing.And the truthis that the law is both of great importance, and also nothing to writehome about. It is importantbecause it disprovesomnipotenceand intelligibly links presentaction with past cogitation,and
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trivial because of its circularity. Concerningthe latter: in formulating that law and speaking of "occurrentknowledge," we redescribed a psychologicalevent whose ultimate psychologicaldescription was 'at t' it seemedto me thatthatwas an instantat which I intendedto do x', as 'at t' I realized thatI intendedat that instant to do x'. Thereforeit is only under redescriptions that an event-law holds; and, in addition, the logical bond between intentional-actevent and intention-state is a truism.Nevertheless, it is of great importance. For this is how action takesplace and how it preserves its crucial link with the past. For the act emergestranslucently out of an intention,and characteristically that same intentionwas at an earlier momentformedthroughdeciding,and it persisteduntil the act. And there can be no mystery about how the intention leads into the action. For if at t' there occurstherealizationthatthat instantis an instantat which one intends to act, then inevitably that instantis one in which the will is beginningto move. Necessarily,theirtime is one and the same. (Think how people begin to wheel around as they rememberthey have forgotten something.) Yet it is natural to thinkthat something more needs to be interposed between intendingand trying if the act is to be one's own: something one mightterm"an act of will." But that createsa gap that could never be closed. It is a false account of self-determination. Certainly, as the setting foraction comes into view, intentions require supplementation by subsidiaryintentions cast in the ostensive mode, e.g., as I round the cornerthe intentionto get an apple is supplementedby the intention to get that apple in the bowl beforeme. But that is all that is needed if the will is to move. And yet it is natural for action thus determinedto seem automatic.For it seems to locate the orginatingforceoutside the self and within the intention.Thus, we findourselvesin the ridiculous position of playingoffa person and his intentionsone against the other! But thatwould make of that person: a nothing!Here, too, we stand in need of a dialectical synthesis: of the self as self-determining, and as determined by reason; and of the self as self-determining in the present, and of self-determining the presentin the past. Being people, we are vehiclesof reason and of our past reasonings. Now I suggest that thatseemingautomatismamountsto no more than this: that in the instantin which actual time and intendedact-time are seen to coincide,thereis nothingleftfor one to do but act. Small wonder,for their time is one; and the great erroris to postulate a necessarytemporal gap, as if to allow space for some
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unmotivated mentalmid-airleap. But it is a parodyof thisposition to suppose thatin thatinstantof realizationone has lost the power of choice, for that is preciselywhat one is exercising.We are running our head up against nothing but-commitment! Therefore we are seriouslymisled if we take that supposed automatism if only in the slightest to signify, degree,that the act was takenout of our hands-for example, if we make of the mind an alien force thatprecipitated us into action. If the mind gave a shove,that was us freely precipitating ourselvesinto action. It was self-determination. And, therefore, in deciding to act (and so forming an intention) and thereafter abiding by that intention,oneself determines (throughmental agreementbut throughno further willing) what in a knowledge-context entailsmovement of the will. All one needs to do to ensure action, provided the world suitablycooperates,is knowinglyto abide by one's intention until the chosen instant. Action inevitablyensues.5 The process of formingsupplementaryintentionscan readily come to an end. All that is then required, if the will is to move, is the occurrentknowledge that a certain instant is the time of intended action. And so the transitionfrom intention to will is entirely pellucid. Indeed, what else but intentioncould get the will on the move?A self-determination that is modeled on the miracle? That is, intervention as an outsider in the interior mental mefrom chanics of one's own actions,breakingoneself free therefore one's own desiresand values? (From nature itself!)But this would be to conceiveof self-determining as akin to the whimsof a Deity responsibleto nothing.Shakespeare,in depicting the sicknessof omnipotence,was presumablythinkingof this problem when he had Caesar say (concerningintended action): "The cause is in my will: I will not come/That is enough to satisfy the senate."6 For this fantastically supposes the explanation of intended action to lie in the motion of the will, understood as an explanatoryultimate. But thatwould banish intelligibility fromall action.
5 In this I find myselfin disagreement with none other than Franz Kafka, among whose aphorisms occurs the following daunting thought: "It is conceivable that Alexander the Great, in spite of the martial successes of his early days, in spite of the excellent army that he had trained,in spite of the power he felt within him to change the world, might have remained standing on the bank of the Hellespont and never crossed it, and not out of fear, not out of indecision, not out of infirmity of will, but because of the mere weight of his own body." ["Reflections on Sin," in The Great Wall of China and Other Pieces (London, Martin Secker,1933), aphorism no. 36]. 6 Julius Caesar, Act II, Scene II.
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law, linking intendingand Thus, we have here a psycho-psycho man at an instantin time if a form: It takes the following trying. realizes that that instantis an instantat which he intends to perto do x at he begins trying formaction x, then logicallynecessarily that verymomentof realization.This unconditionallaw joins the with bodily phenomena, a psychoconditional law uniting trying physicallaw, and togethertheydisplay,with absolute clarity,the fromsome earlier mentaleventof deciding to the bodily transition phenomena that are its natural outcome. The existence of such precise and simple laws shows that we are dealing with a rockbottomprimevalregion of the mind.
V. THE ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL ACTION
raises his arm, the followinghappens. When a man intentionally His arm rises; he triesto raise his arm; and the latterevent causes, along acceptable bodily paths, the physical event of arm rising. and sufficient conditionsof an inThese are the logicallynecessary tentionalaction of raising the arm. Then what analysis are we to give of that action? How does the act relate to these related phenomena? What is the act of raising an arm? Four possible answerscome to mind. (1) The action is identical with the mere risingof the arm: that is, with a risingof the arm (2) It is nothingbut the causing thatis suitablycaused by a trying. to It is identicalwith the trying the (3) arm trying-act. of risingby succeeded that the arm raise to trying with a is, raise thatarm: that in causing arm rising.(4) The act of raising the arm is a complex out of a causallylinked pair of events,the trying event,constituted and the arm rising,which are (as we saw in section Iv) "made for one another."Consider theseanswersin turn. (1) Is the act of raising the arm identical with a rising of that to raise it? This has the arm that was suitablycaused by a trying disagreeableconsequencethat the act of raisingthe arm must have been caused by one's tryingto performthat act and that this causation must be mediated by unknown bodily phenomena. But we know that the most immediatecause of tryingto performthe action, say, a desire or a becoming aware of a physical situation, was the most immediatecause of the act itself.In any event that disagreeable consequence clearly shows alternative 1 to be false, however,the position is and we can safelyset 1 aside. Thereafter, less clear. (2) This is the doctrine that the act of raising the arm is the of a bodily movementof arm rising. But causing, by a trying,
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it must be whateverone affirms what is "a causing"? Presumably, caused arm rising.Thus, that trying to be the case,when one affirms it can hardly be some third distinctevent, a distinctivecausingevent, sandwiched between any two causally linked events. This would be to suppose it just another link in a causal chain-one For if everyevent has to multiplyitselfto infinityl that threatens Therefore a cause, so has the cause-event;and so on indefinitely. it cannot be a distinctiveevent. And it cannot be either of the causally linked events.Indeed, it simplyis not an event at all. But do we not allot times to causings?But do we not, in the Think of the same derivative sense,allot places to spatial relations? statement, given perhaps in the stage directionsat the beginning of a play: "Over in the cornerof the room, a sofa stands next to as: "At midnight, a flash a piano." Is not this the same in structure caused an explosion"?But these sentencesmerelystate of lightning the location of related items,and so we read the latter as saying and an explosion, the former causing the that "a flashof lightning latter,both happened at midnight."This does not require that we understand the causing as somethingwhich, though not an event,yethas a position in time that is uniquely its own. If it has a position in time, that position is uniquely that of the effect. Thereforeit mightbe said that thesis2 should be taken to say that arm rising.And so thereis a reading of thesis the act is the effect, us to thesis1. 2 that simplyreturns or to say that the Thus, we take 2 either to say what I asserts, or that it is a causing that is not act is a distinctive causing-event, an event.The first two possibilities have been rejected,which leaves us with the claim that the act is not an event. But that is entirely such as the unacceptable. Afterall, we know it has event-effects, and such as deevent-causes, breaking of an electriclight globe, ciding or coming to believe that now is the time for the intended act; and we know it has an unrepeatable position in space-time, of raising and was constituted throughthe on-goingof an activity an arm. What more do we need if we are to demonstrate that it was an event?Thereforewe also reject thesis2. Now all that is communicated by the sentence"He intentionally raised his rightarm," is that two eventsthat were suitablycausally event,happened together. and an arm-rising linked, a trying-event Thus, it communicatesthat they were simultaneous. (I do not raised by the supposition propose to discuss here the difficulties at t' to move an arm mightcause arm movementat a that trying
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later t". Let me merelynote that one mighthave the power to try at t' to move one's arm at t", but that the normal power is to try at t' to move one's arm at t'.) Now if that is all that is communicated by the sentence,and if the act is an event,and if it cannot be the effect-event, then we are absolutelyforcedback upon theses 3 and 4. That is, (3) that the act is a trying that succeeds,or (4) thatit is a complex eventconstituted out of a successful trying and an armrising, suitablycausallylinked. I will begin by discussing 3, not because I am certainit is wrong, but because I see difficulties in that position. Thesis 3 states that an intentional act of raising one's arm is, an. inner act of trying that succeeds. Now this drives physical action under cover, for it in entirety retreats into the realm of the mind; and it also expels it fromthe class of thoseeventswhich can immediately cause effects beyond the body through(say) collision. More, it implies that the act of raising the arm causes arm rising,and so it followsthat all the evident physical effects of the act must be mediated by arm rising.The act becomes literallyinvisible,and proves to be a pure and veryspecial kind of mental act. All of theseI take to be counter considerations to 3. One further counter considerationis this. While in an everyday sense I know why this trying caused this arm rising,there is another sense in which I am ignorant as to why it did; for there is much between brain and arm for scientists to investigatethat should elucidate why any particular act of trying caused a particulararm rising.Therefore,if my act of arm raising knockeda vase offa pedestal,it should be possible forscientists to investigate the question,"Why did his act of raisinghis arm knock over the vase?", in part, throughsearchingfor the causal link betweenbrain and arm.And I should be able to say: thereis a stretch in the causal chain linkingmy act and the movementof the vase, that is totallyopaque to me. This looks implausible,seeing that I saw my elbow hit the vase! Taken in conjunctionwith the above with the supposed invisibility difficulties, and purely mental character of physical action, I believe it is enough to reject thesis 3. Thereforewe are forced back upon thesis 4, the doctrine that the act of raisingan arm is a complex event constituted out of two causally linked simultaneous events that were "made for each other."Now no especial difficulty need arise in postulatingsuch an item as a complex event; and anyhow examples abound. A short burst froma motorbikeis constitutedout of an array of discrete sounds linked in a certainrelation; if a sudden blast of wind tears
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all the leaves offa tree at one go, then this denuding of the tree, an eventof a certainkind with a phenomenalcause, is constituted out of manydistincteventsof leaf removal; and so on. So much for the concept of complex event. Now if the act of raisingan arm is constituted out of two event-parts, an act of trying and an arm-rising event,thereexist unique binding forcesbetween theseeventsthat should make of theirunion something more than a mereconventionally concoctedparcel of events.The simultaneity, the uniquely law-likepsychophysical causal link, the fact that the ultimate psychologicaldescriptionof trying is 'tryingto raise the arm', the fact that the arm is part of an object that necessarily is a possible vehicle for the will, and so on. In short,all that we saw, in section iv, that led us to say of these two eventsthat theywere "made for each other." This analysis of physical action permitsit to have immediate psychologicalcauses and immediate physical effects. On the one hand, variouslya desire or decision or intentionor awarenessthat this is the intended time; on the other hand, a toppling vase. It also does justice to our intuitionthat in physicalaction,even more than in emotion,body and mind are united. It has the superficial confirmation that it implies that one directlyperceives physical action withoutmediation by the body, yet cannot necessarily tell, merelyby looking,that what one has seen is physicalaction. Now it is undeniably natural to suppose that physical actions exhibit these traits.That they have immediate psychologicalcauses and immediatephysical unite mind and body as nowhereelse, are effects, directlywitnessableand yet not immediatelyperceptuallyindentifiableas action; and further, that theyare both viewed fromthe inside (foronly the personwho triesknowsin no way that he tries and acts), and fromthe outside (in being directlyperceived),and are yet the one event appearing to different vantage points. Now this last finalobservationis hardlya proof of thesis4, but it emphasizesits plausibility.For ifthe action is an event; and if two distinct and arm rising,are entailed by the occur. events, trying rence of the action; and ifit can be neitherof these two events; then, if only by elimination,we seem forced to accept thesis 4, which statesthat it is a unique union of both. BedfordCollege,London
BRIAN O SHAUGHNESSY

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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

TRYING (AS THE MENTAL "PINEAL GLAND")

OES a man who intentionally performs an action,tryto

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