Ho, Ho, Hoax: The Case against Santa Claus

1. The Question Refined

Is it wrong for parents and other adults to lie to children b telling the! Santa Claus exists" The fre#uenc with which it is raised b itself shows this is an i!portant #uestion. $lthough !ost parents in the %nited States continue to tell children about St. &ic', no Christ!as passes without public #uestions about doing so. Indeed, the intuiti(e case against telling children about Santa is strong. ) ing is generall wrong. 1 Telling children there is a Santa Claus is l ing. Therefore, telling children there is a Santa Claus is wrong. The #uestion would ha(e an eas answer if l ing is alwa s wrong. $lthough I!!anuel *ant fa!ousl e!braced this extre!e position +1,-./, few other philosophers ha(e been able to sto!ach it. Children, in fact, are a!ong the pri!e candidates to be (icti!s of per!issible l ing. $ oung child !a be lied to about the exact extent of her se(ere illness0 she !a be lied to about the se(erit of her parents1 financial troubles0 and for !an other reasons. If l ing to children about Santa Claus is wrong it is not because l ing is alwa s wrong. There !ust be so!e further argu!ent that telling children about Santa falls in the categor of the i!per!issible rather than the per!issible lie. The #uestion, to be clear, is not what parents and other adults should do vis a vis the child1s prospecti(e belief in Santa Claus. Should parents specificall discourage belief" Should the atte!pt to persuade the child one wa or another" I do not propose to exa!ine all of the (arious alternati(es and deter!ine which is !orall best. 2ur
1

In section 3.4, I explain what I !ean b this.

#uestion is onl whether leading4 children to belie(e in Santa is !orall appropriate. $nd to do so one need onl deter!ine whether there is so!e alternati(e that is superior to deceit. $ccordingl , alternati(es to telling children about Santa will be i!portant insofar as, in general, one can onl reasonabl deter!ine whether a certain course of action is 5ustified when co!pared with other a(ailable courses of action. In considering whether it is per!issible to tell children about Santa Claus, I will be weighing the ad(antages and disad(antages of that choice as co!pared with the ad(antages and disad(antages of the alternati(es. $lternati(es are also i!portant since, if it is wrong to tell children about Santa it is natural to as' what children should be told, in light of the fact that !ost oung children in the %nited States do belie(e in hi!. 6hat, for exa!ple, are non7belie(ing children to sa to their belie(ing peers" If the !oral conse#uences of not telling one1s children are pernicious enough as the relate to other children, then of course one1s children should be told. Since there is e(identl a great deal of (ariet in the circu!stances in which parents and children find the!sel(es, differences a!ong which are often !orall significant, it is not to be expected that telling children about Santa Claus would be always !orall wrong or always per!issible. 2ur #uestion is whether telling children about Santa Claus in the t pical $!erican circu!stances is !orall per!issible. The #uestion !a be further refined b considering who it is telling the child about Santa Claus. 8 !ain concern will be with parents. The reason for this is that parents are the ones who t picall tell children about Santa Claus in the first instance. It !ust be noted that b focusing on parents the !oral bar is altered so!ewhat. 2n the one hand, parents are felt to ha(e a special obligation to pro(ide for their children1s
8ost parents do not in so !an words tell their children Santa is real, but the do and sa !an other things9e.g., gi(ing gifts :fro! Santa;9that are intended to lead the child to belief.
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welfare. This !ight suggest a particularl strong presu!ption against l ing to the!. 2n the other hand, parents appear to ha(e special authorit to deter!ine their children1s beha(ior and belief s ste!. This !ight suggest a wea'er presu!ption against l ing to their children. Still, the do!ain of a parent1s authorit is restricted b the ai! of raising children who are, a!ong other things, intelligent, wise, and disposed to do the right thing. The #uestion is whether suggesting belief in Santa Claus is a wa to pro!ote (irtue, wisdo!, and happiness in children.

4. <eception and 8a'e =elie(e

Isn1t it a bit harsh, if not outright #uestion begging, to characteri>e the Santa Claus stor as a :hoax; or lie" The word :lie; has at least a negati(e !oral connotation. =ut it is neither false nor #uestion7begging to call it a lie. It is worth explaining first wh it is not #uestion7begging. It would be #uestion7begging to describe the Santa stor as a lie if it were an anal tic truth that l ing is wrong.3 Then to sa that the Santa Claus stor is a lie would anal ticall i!pl that it is wrong. $nd I would be i!plicitl clai!ing that telling children there is a Santa is wrong in describing doing so as l ing. =ut e(en though l ing is generall wrong, it is not a conceptual truth that l ing is wrong. To see this, note that the concept of a white lie is perfectl intelligible. In fact, since l ing is not alwa s wrong, there are such things as white lies. This is in contrast to the concept of !urder. ?art of the concept of a !urderous act is that it is wrong. It would be incoherent to suppose so!ething was a per!issible !urder. +$lthough ob(iousl it not incoherent to suppose so!ething is a per!issible killing. 8urder is morally objectionable 'illing./ Indeed, since l ing is not anal ticall wrong, our #uestion !a be understood as as'ing whether the Santa Claus stor is a white lie.
3

That is, roughl , the !eaning of :is a lie; would include :is wrong.;

=ut is telling children about Santa a lie" Tales fro! fiction, ad!ittedl , are not lies. $dults +t picall / do not lie in telling children about Red Riding Hood or Huc'leberr @inn. =ut the descriptions of Santa Claus are not fiction, in the sense that t pical descriptions of Red Riding Hood are. The difference between a fictional stor and a lie is in the intention of the spea'er. $ fictional stor in(ol(es pretending that so!ething is the case: i!agining that Red Riding Hood is wal'ing through the forest, or !a'ing belie(e that Huc'leberr @inn is riding down the 8ississippi. If the intention is successfull recogni>ed, the audience does not belie(e that Red Riding Hood is wal'ing through so!e forest. The audience !erel i!agines this. The intention of a person who lies is not to get the hearer1s i!agination to wor', but to get her beliefs to wor'. The assertion of ? is a lie when the person who asserts ? intends for her audience to belie(e what is being said, e(en though the spea'er does not belie(e ? herself. The parent who tells the child about Red Riding Hood does not belie(e Red Riding Hood is wal'ing through the forest. =ut the parent does not lie since she has no intention that the child will co!e to belie(e this either. The parent who tells a child about Santa Claus also does not belie(e in Santa Claus. =ut in the case of Santa, unli'e the case of Red Riding Hood, the parent does intend that the child will belie(e there is a 5oll , fat, bearded !an who will be co!ing with presents. Since the parent does not belie(e what she sa s et intends for the child to belie(e, the parent lies. There are so!e adults who purport to belie(e +:in a sense;/ that there is a Santa Claus +Clar' 1,,A/. This attitude, !ost ro!anticall expressed in the fa!ous editorial b @rancis Church,B calls into #uestion whether telling children about Santa Claus constitutes l ing in all cases. Those adults who belie(e there is a Santa Claus would
B

?opularl 'nown b its !ost fa!ous line: :Ces, Dirginia, there is a Santa Claus.;

see! not to lie to their children when telling the! about his existence and acti(ities. =ut the (ast !a5orit of the adults who belie(e in Santa Claus certainl do not thin' of hi! as ha(ing the t pical properties often associated with hi! b children. These adults do not thin' of hi! as being fat, 5oll , bearded, and so forth. The thin' of hi! as so!e !ore ethereal being, perhaps the :spirit of generosit .; ?arents who belie(e Santa is the :spirit of generosit ; and still lead their children to belie(e Santa has such properties as being fat, 5oll , etc., do lie about these things, e(en if the do not lie to their children in affir!ing Santa1s existence. Returning to the t pical parent who denies the existence of Santa Claus, the difference between her intentions in describing Santa and creatures of fiction is borne out b the beliefs of children. $lthough oung children generall ha(e a difficult ti!e distinguishing real things fro! !a'e belie(e, research suggests that their attitudes toward Santa Claus are significantl different fro! their attitudes toward stor boo' entities +6oole and Sharon 4EEB/. Coung children disco(er the truth about the unrealit of Super!an !ore #uic'l than the do the truth about Santa Claus. This suggests that children pic' up on the difference between adults1 attitudes toward Santa Claus and other stor boo' entities. Children apparentl notice that their parents do not lea(e coo'ies and !il' out for Red Riding Hood or the Teenage 8utant &in5a Turtles. $t a (er oung ageFcertainl before the are oneFchildren are capable of

belie(ing but not pretending. ?retending is a sophisticated cogniti(e attitude onl (er rarel found a!ong e(en intelligent ani!als. To that child, Santa Claus and Red Riding Hood !ust ha(e the sa!e doxastic status. =ecause of this, I will not consider the #uestion whether it is per!issible to tell such credulous children about Santa Claus. I restrict ! self to those children who can distinguish realit and !a'e belie(e, which A

includes !ost children in an case. Children are certainl capable of discerning real and !a'e7belie(e beings b fi(e or six ears of age.

3. The 8oral Status of ) ing to Children

In this section, I first consider and re5ect an argu!ent that l ing to children is alwa s per!issible. Then I outline the theoretical fra!ewor' I will use in deter!ining the per!issibilit of l ing to children about Santa Claus.

3.1 $utono!
So!e things that are generall wrong to do to adults are not generall wrong to do to children. It would be generall wrong to re#uire of an adult9a guest to one1s ho!e, sa 9that she eat her broccoli. It would not in general be wrong for a parent to re#uire her oung children to eat their broccoli. It would be generall wrong to re#uire an adult to go to school, while it would not in general be wrong to re#uire the sa!e of a oung child. The co!!on thread a!ong these actions is that it is thought to be !ore t picall appropriate to act paternalisticall toward children than toward adults. That is, it is thought to be !ore t picall !orall 5ustified to act in a wa that is thought to be good for the child or adult, whether the child or adult consents or not. ?aternalis! is indeed a li'el 5ustification for the Santa Claus lie. It !ight be argued that it is appropriate to tell the child about Santa because it is good for the child to belie(e. 2ne !ight infer that e(en if l ing to adults is generall wrong, l ing to children !a not be. $nd it does see! it would be !ore clearl wrong to perpetrate the Santa Claus lie on adults than children. G(en if the decei(ers had their (icti!s1 best interests in !ind, it would be difficult to 5ustif such a lie. =ut what are the differences between adults and

children that 5ustif the different !oral re#uire!ents of our relationship toward the !e!bers of each group" 2ne popular suggestion is that adults +generall / ha(e while children +generall / lac' autono! .A $utono! has e(en been fingered as the feature that !a'es l ing to people !orall proble!atic. :$utono! ; is a ter! of art that has co!e to be used in a large (ariet of different wa s. Der broadl spea'ing, autono! is the capacit in (irtue of which so!eone is a !oral agent. $!ong the #ualities that see! to be re#uired to engage in !oral +or i!!oral/ action are the capacit to propose ends to oneself !ore or less independentl , the capacit to choose rationall a!ong a(ailable options, and the capacit to act and choose freel . It see!s clear that those who ha(e these capacities to a lesser degree9ani!als, the insane, and, significantl , children9are understood not to re#uire of others the sa!e !oral treat!ent as those who ha(e these capacities to a greater degree. $nd it see!s that it is generall !ore per!issible to act paternalisticall toward those who ha(e lesser degrees of autono! than those who ha(e greater degrees. G(en if the degree of autono! !a'es a difference to the degree of !oral consideration deser(ed, it would be a !ista'e to suppose the lac' of autono! is a !oral blan' chec'. Robert &oggle argues that children generall lac' the capacities that are supposedl necessar for full !e!bership in the :!oral co!!unit ,; the co!!unit of indi(iduals acting in according with !oral principles +4EE4/. Still, he insists that children are not entirel be ond the scope of !oralit . The are :special agents; who are :pro(isional and probationar ; !e!bers and applicants for full !e!bership in the !oral co!!unit . So far fro! being an excuse for otherwise
A

8 co!!ents here are influenced b =eaucha!p and Childress +1,.,: H./.

i!!oral beha(ior, according to &oggle, the difference between the !oral status of adults and children i!plies a dut on the part of careta'ers to help children ac#uire those deliberati(e and other characteristics that are necessar for belonging to the !oral co!!unit . In a si!ilar (ein, Ta!ar Shapiro has argued that it is prima facie !ore appropriate to beha(e paternalisticall toward children because the lac' the capacities associated with autono! +1,,./. Since the cannot deter!ine on their own a principle to go(ern their actions, children do not warrant the sa!e deference as adults. =ut, again, rather than a blan' chec' for paternalistic beha(ior of an sort, Shapiro e!phasi>es that the !oral purpose of our beha(ior toward children should be to create beings who ha(e the rational capacities in(ol(ed in !oral agenc . =ecause children will in the natural course of things ac#uire autono! , the #uestion of what paternalis! allows for the! is so!ewhat easier than the sa!e #uestion concerning the insane or infir!. The (er point of paternalistic action is to do things that are in the interests of the ob5ect of the action. In the case of children, their interests in(ol(e present food and children, a satisf ing and co!fortable life, and lo(e. =ut their interests certainl also include the future possession of such capacities as rational deliberation on alternati(es, the abilit to propose an end to oneself, and free choice, a!ong !an others. Thus part of the purpose of paternalistic interference of children is to !a'e the! into beings who are not fit sub5ects of paternalistic interference. =ut, the !ention of food and shelter !a'es clear, autono! is not li'el to be the onl purpose of treating children paternalisticall . $lthough a good parent ought to ai! to raise children who are capable of the sophisticated capacities in(ol(ed in !oral agenc , the also want to raise children who eat, ha(e children, and 5ust plain en5o the!sel(es. Therefore, deter!ining whether l ing to children about Santa Claus is .

!orall appropriate re#uires !ore than 5ust ascertaining whether the child is autono!ous. $nd it re#uires !ore than 5ust ascertaining whether l ing to the child is conduci(e to her future autono! . It re#uires a consideration of all the factors that are rele(ant to appropriate interaction with a child. The !oral fra!ewor's I describe for deter!ining the !oral status of l ing to children about Santa Claus ha(e the benefit of being congenial to the idea that autono! has so!e !oral (alue. It should not co!e as a surprise that the #uestion of the per!issibilit of l ing to children about Santa Claus cannot be settled on the basis of the single #uestion whether children are autono!ous. 6hether the Santa Claus ritual is per!issible surel depends to so!e extent on the conse#uences for those in(ol(ed. I turn accordingl to two ethical theories that ta'e such considerations into account. 3.4 ?ri!a @acie <uties and $ct Conse#uentialis! In this sub7section, I clarif what I !ean in sa ing that l ing is generall wrong. $ccording to conse#uentialists, the rightness or wrongness of an action is deter!ined entirel b its conse#uences. $ccording to non7conse#uentialists, the rightness or wrongness of an action is not deter!ined entirel b its conse#uences. ) ing is a 'ind of action of which all lies are instances. $n act conse#uentialist holds that rightness and wrongness appl in the first instance to particular, concrete actions. This or that lie is right or wrong. =ut there is a sense in which l ingFa 'ind of action77in general is wrong. To capture this sense, act conse#uentialists often follow I. S. 8ill in describing the wrongness of l ing in general as a :rule of thu!b.; $ rule of thu!b is a prescription or proscription that applies in !ost but not all circu!stances. 2ne (iew about the wrongness of l ing is that it is wrong as a rule of thu!b.

Conse#uentialists hold that whether an action is !orall appropriate is deter!ined b the (alue of the conse#uences of the action. To deter!ine whether l ing is wrong in a certain circu!stance, the conse#uentialist weighs the positi(e and negati(e (alue of the conse#uences of the action. 2n conse#uentialis!, the wa to deter!ine whether l ing to children about Santa Claus is per!issible is to co!pare the o(erall (alue of the conse#uences of the Santa stor as opposed to that of plausible alternati(es. Conse#uentialists also differ significantl a!ong the!sel(es on what 'inds of states are (aluable. So!e include onl pleasure as intrinsicall good and onl pain as intrinsicall bad. 2thers include beaut and 'nowledge as intrinsicall (aluable features. @or the !ost part, the choice of intrinsicall (aluable states will not !atter for the consideration of our #uestion. @or exa!ple, the (alue of 'nowledge on the (iew that it is intrinsicall (aluable is li'el to be si!ilar to that on which it is onl instru!entall so, since it see!s clear that in the t pical situation 'nowledge is li'el to be conduci(e to other (aluable states. I will note those contexts where the choice of intrinsicall (aluable properties !a'es a difference. $nother wa to understand the general wrongness of l ing is with the concept of a prima facie dut . 2ne has a prima facie dut to do J when, other things being e#ual, one has a dut to do J. So!ething is a prima facie dut , in other words, when it tends to !a'e our action a dut . $ccording to 6. <. Ross, the originator of this conception, each person has a prima facie dut not to lie.H The prima facie dut not to lie !ust be weighed against all the other prima facie duties that characteri>e an specific action. The prima facie dut of beneficence re#uires that we do things that pro!ote the o(erall
The Right and the Good, 41. Ross belie(es the dut not to lie falls under the !ore general categor of the dut not to brea' pro!ises. This is because, as Ross sees it, entering a con(ersation in(ol(es an i!plicit pro!ise not to lie.
H

1E

welfare. The prima facie dut of non7!aleficence re#uires that we a(oid har!ing others. The !oral presu!ption against l ing can be9and so!eti!es is9outweighed b the !oral significance of these other prima facie duties. $ccording to this conception, l ing is generall wrong insofar as there is a negati(e weight associated with each lie, albeit a weight that can be tru!ped b other !oral considerations. This is one difference between the conse#uentialist and non7conse#uentialist conceptions of the wrongness of l ing. @or the +t pical/ conse#uentialist, l ing as such has no negati(e !oral (alue, e(en if !an lies are all things considered !orall wrong. @or the non7conse#uentialist in #uestion, e(en if a certain lie is !orall acceptable or obligator , there is still so!e negati(e !oral weight attached to the act si!pl in (irtue of being a lie. The 'inds of considerations that are rele(ant to deter!ining whether a particular lie is per!issible fro! a Rossian or conse#uentialist perspecti(e are largel the sa!e. @ro! the conse#uentialist perspecti(e, a lie is wrong when it leads to distrust, suffering, or disappoint!ent. @ro! the Rossian perspecti(e, a lie is wrong when the presu!ption against it is not outweighed b the prima facie duties of beneficence and non7!aleficence. $ lie !a be per!issible fro! the Rossian perspecti(e because it tends to pro!ote the o(erall welfare or pre(ents so!e har!. So the factors I consider with regard to the Santa Claus stor are congenial to either a Rossian or a conse#uentialist wa of thin'ing about the wrongness of l ing. =efore in(estigating these factors, one !ore theoretical issue !ust be addressed. $lthough I ha(e referenced research on the conse#uences of Santa beliefs abo(e, and continue to do so below, such studies are rather li!ited. There is no research, for exa!ple, on such crucial #uestions as how Santa7belie(ing children co!pare with non7 11

Santa7belie(ing children +of (arious sorts/ with respect to a nu!ber of interesting characteristics: trust0 deceitfulness0 critical reasoning. &or is there an e!pirical research on the a!ount of happiness experienced b belie(ing children as co!pared with the a!ount of happiness experienced b children who do not belie(e but pretend Santa exists. This would see! to be a significant handicap to our argu!ent, since it is !ainl concerned with the li'el conse#uences of belief in Santa Claus. 6hat is to be done in circu!stances where the li'el conse#uences of so!e course of action ha(e not been the sub5ect of scientific research" This is a #uestion not onl about what course of action if an a theorist ought to reco!!end, but also about what action if an an agent ought to choose. It cannot be plausibl !aintained that there is so!ething illegiti!ate about acting on the basis of the best a(ailable e(idence, e(en if that e(idence does not include scientificall respectable data. )et us stipulate, charitabl , that scientificall respectable research has been a(ailable since the 1.th centur . Is it to be clai!ed that no action before that ti!e was !orall acceptable, since no action was based on infor!ation arising fro! scientificall respectable research" Is it to be clai!ed that e(en since then all actions not based on such infor!ation ha(e been !orall suspect" The rightness of an action has so!ething to do with the #ualit of one1s e(idence concerning the circu!stances and the conse#uences. =ut the e(idential bar is set far too high if it is re#uired that !orall per!issible action or illu!inating !oral ad(ice be based onl on scientific research. It cannot be de!anded that the parent do nothing. G(en in the absence of scientific research, the parent !ust either encourage or not encourage her child to belie(e. 6here there are e!pirical factors that ha(e not been ade#uatel scientificall tested, the agent !ust base her decision on the best infor!ation a(ailable. This 14

infor!ation will in(ol(e ordinar obser(ation, the co!!on sense principles of hu!an ps cholog , and plausible inferences fro! these. This is of course a fallible !ethod since our beliefs about these principles are corrigible and the inferences are underdeter!ined b the e(idence. =ut there is no plausible alternati(e to acting and reco!!ending !oral action in light of the best infor!ation a(ailable in the absence of rigorous e!pirical research. 2ne !ust si!pl adopt a health !odest about one1s conclusions, in the 'nowledge that the inferences fro! obser(ed patterns !a not hold in the cases to be discussed. $nd e(identl those who ad(ocate the per!issibilit of telling children about Santa are no better off than those who ad(ocate its i!per!issibilit , since the for!er group is as lac'ing in s ste!atic scientific research concerning the effects of their reco!!endation as the latter is about its reco!!endation.

B. The 2ptions
$s I !entioned, whether the Santa Claus tale is per!issible depends on the (alue of the plausible alternati(es. There are a nu!ber of +co!patible/ alternati(es open to a parent who decides not to encourage belief in Santa: <isbelief: The parent tells the child Santa Claus is not real &eutralit : The parent does not infor! the child one wa or the other and ?retense: The parent in(ites the child to pretend there is a Santa Claus. $n parent who adopts a non7traditional stance toward Santa Claus !ust grapple with the ine(itable prospect that her children will interact with others who belie(e Santa is real. In the face of such a li'el scenario, the parent !a choose <isbelief. In choosing <isbelief, there are further #uestions to consider. It !ust be

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deter!ined 5ust how !uch further infor!ation to di(ulge. 2ne !a , for exa!ple, tell a child that other parents encourage their children to belie(e and that these children en5o the ritual. 2ne !a thereb discourage children fro! spoiling the fun for other children. = &eutralit I !ean a polic whereb , pending a child1s in#uiries, the parent neither affir!s nor denies the existence of Santa Claus. This is a ha>ardous option because of the li'elihood that the child will be exposed to belief a!ong other children. It is aw'ward to co!bine &eutralit with the i!portant infor!ation that other children belie(e. The child will ine(itabl want to 'now whether the other children belie(e accuratel or not. &eutralit is li'el to lea(e the child at a loss in the face of other children1s belief. The option I consider in !ost detail is ?retense. The thought is that the parent in(ites the child to pretend that there is a Santa Claus. @or children who ha(e a clear grasp of the distinction, one !a co!pare Santa to other exa!ples of fictional beings in the child1s experience. The pretend Santa !a be held to include whate(er characteristics of the traditional Santa one feels to be attracti(e. $s the child is in(ited to pretend there is a Santa Claus, she !a also be told that !an other fa!ilies encourage their children to belie(e Santa is real. It see!s one can !ini!i>e the li'elihood of the child1s spoiling the fun for others b encouraging the child to respect the differing beliefs of other fa!ilies and therefore not challenge their beliefs. I !aintan that in(iting to pretend there is a Santa Claus is !orall superior to encouraging to belie(e.

A. Short7Ter! ?leasure and ?ain

)et1s begin our in(estigation of the costs and benefits of the Santa Claus lie b considering the short7ter! pain and pleasure in(ol(ed in the experience for the rele(ant parties. The short7ter! includes the ti!e during which children belie(e until 5ust after

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the cease belie(ing. <ecepti(e though it !a be, the parties to the Santa Claus tale do en5o it. ?arents en5o their roles in the Santa Claus ritual and 'nowing that their children are going through such a pleasant experience +$nderson and ?rentice 1,,B/. =ut the benefit of their en5o !ent !ust be balanced against the disappoint!ent the also report when their children disco(er the truth. $nd, !ore i!portantl , whate(er she gets out of it, it see!s clear that no good parent would endorse Santa Claus if she was con(inced the experience was not in the interests of the child. The child cannot be a !ere instru!ent for her parents1 happiness. =oth scientific research +$nderson and ?rentice 1,,B/ and co!!on sense show that children also en5o the Santa Claus experience. This ad(antage !ust also be weighed against their suffering upon disco(ering the truth. 2nl a s!all nu!ber of children report being disappointed on disco(ering the truth +$nderson and ?rentice 1,,B/. =ut this fact cuts both wa s. It supports the per!issibilit of the stor because it suggests the stor does not threaten suffering for the child. =ut it also under!ines the case for its per!issibilit , since it at least suggests that children are not (er attached to the stor in the first place. The extent to which the pleasure of children and adults 5ustifies the Santa Claus lie depends on the a!ount of pleasure a(ailable fro! non7deceitful alternati(es. The alternati(e that !ost closel replicates telling children there is a Santa Claus in(ol(es in(iting children to pretend there is one. $lthough pretending so!ething is real is funda!entall different fro! belie(ing it is, as I ha(e argued, !an of the e!otions e(o'ed b an ob5ect belie(ed to be real are also e(o'ed b ob5ects supposed to be fictional. Children and adults deri(e great pleasure fro! creatures of their i!aginations, as witnessed b the large crowds at !o(ie theaters. Children who are old enough to 1A

'now she is fictional still deri(e great en5o !ent fro! the pretense that Cinderella is a real person with real hopes. $nd, it is eas to replicate the gift7gi(ing aspect of the Santa experience, which is surel a significant factor in the child1s en5o !ent. 6e 'now that pretending can bring about pleasure. Is it li'el to bring about happiness for children and parents in the case of Santa Claus" $nd is it li'el that whate(er happiness is brought about will e#ual the en5o !ent associated with belie(ing in hi!" In the absence of e!pirical research, it !a see! that the reasonable choice between pretense and deceit is the safe choice. It is 'nown that encouraging children to belie(e there is a Santa Claus leads to a significant a!ount of satisfaction for children and parents. It is not 'nown whether encouraging children to pretend there is a Santa Claus leads to significant satisfaction for children and parents. Therefore, other things being e#ual, the right thing to do is to continue with the deceitful tradition.=ut it see!s that it is 'nown that pretending there is a Santa Claus leads to significant satisfaction for children and parents. Since far fewer fa!ilies ha(e atte!pted the experi!ent of pretending, there is !uch less actual experience of the conse#uences, although there is so!e testi!onial e(idence. &onetheless, there is a!ple experience of the pleasures of pretending. $nd there is a!ple reason to belie(e that these pleasures are li'el to be associated with Santa Claus. Still, I concede that there is no si!ilarl co!pelling argu!ent for the conclusion that pretending is li'el to lead to the sa!e or a larger a!ount of pleasure for children and parents. In the short ter!, as concerns onl pain and pleasure, it would see! that telling children there is a Santa Claus is !orall superior to the strongest alternati(e, in(iting children to pretend there is one.
This does not follow fro! the Rossian perspecti(e. G(en if it leads to !ore happiness than the best co!peting alternati(e, and thus satisfies the prima facie dut of beneficence, l ing about Santa Claus !a et be wrong. This is because there is still the presu!ption against l ing.
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1H

&onetheless, it is clear that the per!issibilit of the Santa Claus lie cannot be accounted for solel in ter!s of the en5o !ent children and parents experience while children belie(e. It is fairl eas to get children en5o !ent0 cand , cartoons, and hide7 and7see' please the! easil enough. The a!ount of pleasure a child gets fro! belie(ing in Santa Claus could li'el be replicated b using the ti!e presentl de(oted to Santa to pla ing innocent ga!es the child en5o s. 2ne reason the 5ustification of the lie cannot be a !atter of the short ter! pleasure is that the purpose of parenting is not onl or e(en pri!aril to !axi!i>e children1s happiness and !ini!i>e their suffering. $ !a5or purpose of proper parenting is to foster the child1s !oral and cogniti(e de(elop!ent. 8uch !ore i!portant than whether Santa belief is conduci(e to happiness in the short ter! is the #uestion whether it is conduci(e to a child1s !oral and cogniti(e de(elop!ent.

H. 8agic and I!agination

2ne supposed cogniti(e benefit can be dis!issed #uic'l . It is often clai!ed that the Santa Claus stor is beneficial for children because it enhances their i!agination and their abilit to engage in fantas +for exa!ple, =reen 4EEB/. There is no doubt so!e benefit in i!pro(ing a child1s capacit to i!agine, but it is #uestionable whether parents encourage it through the Santa Claus experience. $s I ha(e argued, there is a funda!ental distinction between belie(ing so!ething is the case and i!agining it is. 6hen parents tell their children about Santa Claus the encourage belief, not i!agination. The features children suppose to characteri>e Santa Claus are not i!agined to be true of hi!, the are belie(ed to be. Children do go on to fill in further characteristics of Santa Claus not contained in the original stor , but this is no !ore an

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exercise of their i!agination than their efforts at filling in characteristics of China that are un'nown to the!. G(identl , insofar as increased i!agination is supposed to be what is gained through the Santa Claus experience, this can be !uch !ore effecti(el pursued b ha(ing the child pretend that Santa is real, rather than belie(e he is. ?erhaps belief in Santa Claus is beneficial in that it fosters a :sense of !agic; and :!agical . . . thought; +=reen 4EEB/. $ !agical occurrence, in the sense in #uestion, would see! to be one which (iolates the laws of ordinar realit . Santa Claus is a being #uite unli'e an other the child encounters in her life. Santa !a see! to the child all7 powerful, all7'nowing, and enor!ousl bene(olent. @l ing around the planet on Christ!as night deli(ering gifts to each and e(er child easil #ualifies as (iolating the laws of ordinar realit . To see whether belief in !agical happenings is as such beneficial, one !ust separate it fro! the belief in a bene(olent being responsible for these happenings. G(identl , Santa1s !agical acti(ities are carried out in the ser(ice of an end that is percei(ed to be worthwhile. It is doubtful whether the belief in a !agical occurrence is beneficial when se(ered fro! the connection with so!e bene(olent purpose. 6h should it be beneficial for a child to belie(e that there are things that wor' in unheard of wa s" That belie(ing in !agic as such has no benefit for the child !a be seen b i!agining the child is told about so!e (alue7neutral re!ar'able entit . 2ne !ight tell a child for exa!ple of the co!pletel non7bene(olent photons, two of which can be in exactl the sa!e place at the sa!e ti!e. 2r one !ight tell a child about the re!ar'able but (alue7neutral fact that whether two e(ents are si!ultaneous depends on one1s fra!e of reference. These tales are !agical fro! the child1s perspecti(e, since the (iolate what

1.

the child ta'es to be the laws that go(ern realit . Cet belief in the unusual character of protons or ti!e is not li'el to be held to ha(e cogniti(e benefits for children. G(en if belief in !agical beings or occurrences is not as such beneficial, it !a be that so!e !agical beliefs are. Still setting aside the bene(olence of the central !agical entit , it !a be that belief in li(ing beings that do not age and reindeer who fl is beneficial. =ut it is clear that if Santa Claus and the reindeer were not supposed to ha(e so!e i!pact on the li(es of hu!an beingsFand especiall on the child hi!selfFthe belief would not be held to ha(e an beneficial i!pact. 6hat could be the cogniti(e benefit of belie(ing that reindeer fl " 2ne !ight co!plain that I ha(e been focusing on the wrong aspect of !agical belief. $n occurrence is !agical when it does not fit ordinar experience. ?erhaps it is precisel this lac' of fit with ordinar experience that !a'es belief in Santa cogniti(el worthwhile. This is of a piece with the suggestion that belief in Santa is beneficial because it is belief in the absence of e(idence. I turn next to these suggestions.

-. Gpiste!ic Character
2ne of the pri!ar goals of proper parenting is to so!ehow induce children to be episte!icall (irtuous adults. So!e people9the !orall (irtuous ones9are !ore li'el to perfor! !orall appropriate actions than others. Si!ilarl , so!e people9call the! episte!icall (irtuous9are !ore li'el to for! episte!icall 5ustified beliefs than others. <oes encouraging belief in Santa assist in the raising of episte!icall (irtuous

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children" In the sa!e wa as there is doubt about 5ust what dispositions count as (irtues, so there is disagree!ent about what tendencies count as episte!ic (irtues. @ortunatel , these disputes can be a(oided because I belie(e the tendencies I discuss are uni(ersall accepted to either encourage or under!ine episte!ic (irtue. 2ne purported episte!ic ad(antage of belief in Santa in(ol(es the thought that it is belief in the absence of e(idence, a conception of the belief cha!pioned e(en b scientists. $nthropologist Cind <ell Clar' writes that :)i'e belief in Kod, belief in Santa Claus a!ounts to an act of faith re#uiring a suspension of disbelief on the part of the belie(ing sub5ect; +1,,A: A3/. G(en if belief in the absence of e(idence were cogniti(el beneficial, which is doubtful, the child1s attitude toward Santa Claus does not count an wa . The child has a!ple testi!onial e(idence for the existence of Santa Claus fro! her parents, neighbors, teachers, weather!en, and practicall e(er one else. If an thing is 5ustified, surel it is a belief that has such uni(ersal support fro! the adult world. The si!ilarit between the child1s belief in Santa and adult religious belief has been widel ac'nowledged. Children often thin' of Santa as ha(ing !an of the sa!e characteristics as Kod, to the extent that upon disco(ering the truth about Santa, so!e children #uestion the existence of Kod as well. Clar' e!phasi>es this aspect and connects it with the supposed lac' of e(idence for belief in Santa. She sa s :@aith, not reasoned s'epticis!, is the rele(ant !ental experience; in a child1s belief in Santa +ibid.: A-/. =elief in Santa Claus, li'e all religious belief, re#uires a :capacit to cogniti(el suspend disbelief; +ibid.: 1E4/. The rese!blance between the child1s attitude toward Santa and religious belief is onl an ad(antage of belief if encouraging this sort of religious belief is beneficial. =ut 4E

again the rese!blance between the episte!ic character of faith and the child1s attitude toward Santa is li!ited. If religious con(iction is essentiall belief in the absence of e(idence, then the child1s attitude toward Santa is not religious con(iction. $gain, the child has a!ple testi!onial and other e(idence for the existence of Santa. +Recall the coo'ies and glasses of !il' Santa apparentl consu!es during the night./ @rancis Church, the author of :Ces, Dirginia,; e!phasi>es these religious aspects of Santa belief. ?art of the benefit of belief in Santa is supposed to in(ol(e the fact that he is :unseen and unseeable.; In this he does rese!ble the t pical supernatural entit , who is not held to be obser(able in e(er da life. Santa differs fro! the t pical supernatural entit in being apparentl flesh and blood li'e other ordinar things. The fact that people do not see Santa see!s a !atter of cos!ic accident, rather than an ine(itable conse#uence of his nature. The reason Kod is not t picall seen, on the other hand, see!s to follow fro! the fact that he is not concei(ed to ha(e ordinar ph sical properties. The final (erdict on the cogniti(e !erit of belief in Santa Claus !ust include both the ti!e during which children belie(e and the ti!e when the disco(er the truth. If belief in things unseen is episte!icall beneficial, belief in Santa would be to that extent worthwhile. =ut the tendenc of belief in Santa to encourage belief in things unseen in general is counteracted b children1s disco(er that this particular unseen thing is unreal. $ plausible inference for the child to draw fro! the entire experience is a certain s'epticis! about clai!s of the existence of unseen things: once bitten, twice sh . $nd insofar as encouraging belief in Santa encourages belief in the absence of and contrar to perceptual e(idence, the supposed ad(antage !ust be weighed against the tendenc of

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the child who disco(ers the truth to infer that belie(ing in things in the absence of e(idence is a ha>ardous affair.

.. Santa Claus and 8oral Character

$!ong the pri!ar goals of proper parenting is to induce a child to beco!e a (irtuous adult. 2ur #uestion in this section is whether the Santa Claus ritual increases the li'elihood that the child will be (irtuous. 6hat (irtuous tendencies is the Santa experience supposed to induce in the child" 6hat !orall significant lessons is the child !eant to learn" )et !e begin b setting aside an aspect of the tradition that li'el once had a significant !oral i!pact but which is #uite rare toda . $lthough Santa is still supposed to obser(e whether children are naught or nice, this acti(it is rarel e!phasi>ed. $nd, i!portantl , it is extre!el rare for parents to follow through on the traditional threat that Santa will not gi(e presents to naught children. Hardl an $!erican child in the last twent ears has

found a lu!p of coal in his stoc'ing fro! Santa Claus. This is, interestingl , one of the few aspects of the tradition that has earned the conde!nation of childhood ps chologists. Since it pla s so little role in the conte!porar tradition, I will not consider the practice further. 2ne thing children are supposed to learn through the Santa experience is the i!portance of generosit . Santa Claus is single7!indedl co!!itted to fulfilling the child1s wishes0 Santa Claus is ad!ired0 therefore, the child herself will beco!e !ore concerned with i!pro(ing the welfare of others. )et1s grant for the !o!ent that children do gain an increased tendenc to generosit through the ritual. How !uch this 5ustifies the Santa lie depends on the

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extent to which one is li'el to achie(e the sa!e increase through non7deceitful !eans. 2ne non7deceitful thing that !ight be done to encourage the child to be generous is to tell the child about the i!portance of generosit . 2ne !ight encourage the child to gi(e things to others. 2ne !ight reward the child for doing generous things. In the right circu!stances, such encourage!ent is 'nown to lead to greater degrees of the tendenc encouraged. Indeed, such a direct !ethod pro!ises a !uch higher li'elihood of success than the roundabout !ethod of encouraging the child to adopt Santa as a role !odel. 8oreo(er, efforts to find a connection between belief in Santa Claus and generosit ha(e pro(ed fruitless. 6h should one expect a child to beco!e !ore generous as a result of the Santa Claus experience" &othing in the experience encourages the child to gi(e. The child1s pri!ar role in the ritual is as recipient. Indeed, a child who !ight otherwise feel inclined to do a generous deed for other children is apt to thin' that Santa will ta'e care of their needs. The tradition does include the coo'ies and !il' for Santa. =ut this is a rather li!ited generosit , appl ing as it does onl to so!eone who has done (er nice things for the child. &othing in the beha(ior points to the i!portance of being generous to people in general. The fact that Santa Claus is a not7#uite7natural being would see! to further under!ine an tendenc to encourage the child to be !ore generous. $ child who sees generous acts perfor!ed b another child !ight well infer that such actions are possible for her as well. $ child who sees an adult perfor! generous acts !ight well infer that such actions are possible for her as well. $ child sees other children as (er !uch li'e herself. $ child sees adults as still (er !uch li'e herself. The beha(ior of fellow children and adults is li'el to be seen as a plausible !odel for a child1s own actions. The beha(ior of a supernatural entit such as Santa is !uch !ore li'el to be seen as 43

be ond the child1s reach. Indeed, Santa perfor!s his generous deeds in wa sFfl ing to e(er corner of the earth in one nightFthat are entirel be ond the child1s reach. The association of such generosit with these co!pletel fantastical perfor!ances !ight well ha(e the pernicious effect of !a'ing a uni(ersal generosit see! co!pletel unrealistic, e(en before the child disco(ers the truth about Santa Claus. $nother (irtue the child !ight be thought to ac#uire is discretion. 2nce the child disco(ers there is no Santa Claus, she is t picall encouraged to go along with the deception. The child !ust then exhibit so!e concern for the welfare of others b not telling belie(ing children the truth, and e(en b decei(ing those children. $gain how !uch this counts toward the per!issibilit of the Santa Claus lie depends on the extent to which this supposed benefit can be replicated without decei(ing the child in the first place. $n parent who decides not to encourage belief in Santa faces the #uestion of how the child ought to discuss the issue with children who belie(e. If it is possible to teach for!erl belie(ing children the i!portance of discretion concerning Santa belief, then it is si!ilarl possible to teach children who ne(er belie(e the i!portance of discretion concerning belie(ers. Children who are not told there is a Santa can easil be told that other children are told and that it is i!portant not to ruin their fun b den ing his existence. )et1s sa that while the are under Santa1s spell children do !a'e significant progress toward beco!ing !ore generous. 6hat happens when the find out that there is no Santa Claus" How does that i!pact their progress" It certainl cannot help. If belie(ing that there is an ad!irable generous being is supposed to encourage the child to be generous herself, disco(ering9abruptl and without an explanation9that there is no such being after all, !ust under!ine the child1s !oti(ation to be generous. 4B

,. The Case against Santa

So far I ha(e #uestioned a nu!ber of reasons often offered in support of the per!issibilit of l ing to children about Santa Claus. It !a see! that I ha(e onl undercut the case for l ing to children, rather than arguing against it. 6hat reason is there to thin' telling children there is a Santa is wrong" In fact I ha(e done !ore than 5ust respond to pro7Santa argu!ents. In responding to those argu!ents, I ha(e shown that insofar as it is plausible to suppose that the Santa deceit is beneficial, the benefit can in al!ost e(er case be achie(ed to the sa!e or greater degree through non7deceitful alternati(es. If l ing is prima facie wrong, then in showing that a non7deceitful alternati(e is 5ust as beneficent as the deceitful alternati(e, I ha(e ipso facto shown that the non7 deceitful alternati(e is superior. The one di!ension where I conceded deceit had the ad(antage was with respect to pleasure, where it see!ed unreasonable to belie(e that pretending Santa is real would lead to the sa!e degree of pleasure for parents and children as belie(ing. The !ain proble! with l ing to children about Santa Claus is that it encourages children to lie. The encourage!ent happens because children ine(itabl disco(er that there is no Santa Claus. $nd although apparentl so!e children at first belie(e that parents are si!ilarl under the !isi!pression that there is a Santa Claus, e(entuall children disco(er that the ha(e been decei(ed. $s latel noted, when the disco(er the truth children are encouraged not to di(ulge the truth to other children and also to lie to the!. $lso when children disco(er that the ha(e been lied to, the reasonabl infer that such l ing is held to be per!issible b their parents and other adults whose opinion the hold in high regard.

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It !ight be co!plained that encouraging post7belief children to lie to other children is no part of decei(ing children about Santa Claus. The parent could tell the child who disco(ers the truth to be honest with other children, or to exercise her own 5udg!ent, or an nu!ber of other things. =ut it1s eas to see wh it would be aw'ward for the decei(ing parent to reco!!end an course of action other than l ing. The parent herself, after all, has 5ust concluded so!e ears of l ing to the child about the (er sa!e issue in the (er sa!e situation. 6hat 5ustification could such a parent gi(e for reco!!ending the child ta'e so!e different course of action fro! the parent1s own" It would be scandalousl h pocritical for the parent to discourage the child fro! l ing about Santa while continuing to do so herself. The !ere disco(er b the child that she has been decei(ed b her parents and the rest of the adult world b itself encourages a child to lie. The first step in(ol(es the child1s disco(er that the parent has lied. It cannot be seriousl !aintained that children do not disco(er that deceit has ta'en place. Children of se(en or eight understand what is in(ol(ed in l ing. $nd e(entuall children understand that although their parents told the! otherwise, the parents do not belie(e there is a Santa Claus. Children therefore beco!e aware of two facts, both of which tend to encourage the child to lie. @irst, their parents +and !an other adults/ lie. 6hether children i!itate Santa Claus is #uestionable, but the undoubtedl i!itate their parents. Since the obser(e and are aware of their parents l ing, the are !ore li'el to lie the!sel(es. Second, their parents +and !an other adults/ belie(e that it is !orall appropriate to lie. Children notice that their parents feel no !oral #ual! about ha(ing decei(ed the children about Santa Claus. It is e(ident to the child that the parent belie(es so decei(ing the child was !orall appropriate. 4H

It !ight be ob5ected that the child1s increased tendenc to lie extends onl to the existence of Santa Claus hi!self. The child !ight be thought to infer onl that her parents belie(e l ing about Santa Claus is per!issible, and therefore co!e to belie(e herself that l ing about Santa Claus is per!issible. $nd si!ilarl the child beco!es aware of the fact that her parents lie about Santa Claus, and therefore co!es to ha(e a greater tendenc to lie about Santa Claus. It would be #uestion7begging to clai! that an increased tendenc on the part of the child to lie about Santa Claus is what !a'es l ing about Santa Claus wrong. This would be to argue that l ing about Santa Claus is wrong because it has tendenc to !a'e children lie about Santa Claus. 2ur #uestion then is whether l ing to children about Santa pro!otes l ing b children in other areas. &otice first that in the usual practice no effort is !ade to ensure that the child draws onl the narrower inference about l ing about Santa Claus rather than the !ore general one about l ing. Second, notice that the deceit about Santa Claus is part of a larger pattern: the Gaster =unn and the Tooth @air , being the two !ain other culprits. Together with these other incidents, the child is li'el to draw the inference that l ing is thought to be per!issible in !an cases be ond the Santa Claus situation. @inall , the costs of l ing about Santa Claus !ust be co!pared to the costs of the alternati(es. Garlier I conceded that the safe option with respect to producing pleasure is to lie about Santa Claus, since that is the option with the successful trac' record. Here I would argue that the safe option is to not lie about Santa Claus. &ot l ing to the child about so!ething has no tendenc to encourage t he child to lie in areas be ond the !ere Santa Claus case. In(iting the child to pretend there is a Santa Claus in(ol(es no ele!ent of deceit whatsoe(er. It therefore has no danger of leading the child to lie !ore 4-

fre#uentl in other areas. Since l ing in general is wrong, it would be wrong to ta'e the chance of increasing the tendenc of a child to lie when another option is a(ailable without this tendenc and with !an of the sa!e ad(antages.

4.

References:
$nderson, Carl and ?rentice, &or!an. :Gncounter with Realit : Children1s Reactions on <isco(ering the Santa Claus 8 th,; in Child Psychiatry and Human evelopment (ol. 4A+4/ 1,,B: H-7.B. =reen, ) nda. :6hat If Santa <ied" Childhood 8 ths and <e(elop!ent,; Psychiatric !ulletin +4EEB/ 4.: BAA7BAH. *ant, I!!anuel. :2n a Supposed Right to )ie fro! $ltruistic 8oti(es,; in "ying b Sissela =o' 1,-. &ew Cor' Rando! House. Sharon, Tan a and 6oole , Iac#ueline. :<o 8onsters <rea!" Coung Children1s %nderstanding of the @antas LRealit <istinction,; !ritish #ournal of evelopmental Psychology 44 +4EEB/: 4,3731E. )ewis, 8., Stanger, C., M Sulli(an, 8. 6. +1,.,/. <eception in three7 ear7olds. evelopmental Psychology, $%+3/, B3,7BB3.

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