608 / UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL DISRUPTION

measures. Distribution ofNyaccines) for instance, would viruses against which there is little or no resistance in
be difficult if airlines, trains, and trucks were not_ human populations can easily be done in theory; it may
^running. already have been done in practice. There were at one
In many parts of the world, public-health conditions time rumors of the development by the American CBW
are developing that have a high potential for disaster. establishment of a pneumonic rabies, one that, instead of
The rats that live on stored grain in India have renewed being transmitted by bite, is transmitted in the same way
the specter of a major outbreak of (bubonic plague/ as the common cold: from person to person via exhaled
Nitrate pollution of water is creating conditions in which droplets. This is certainly possible, since under special
dangerous soil organisms are brought into contact with conditions (such as those that sometimes occur in caves
human beings for the first time. The organism that has full of rabid rats) rabies appears to have been transmitted
recently caused cases of a fatal meningitis has been through the air. Such a disease would be a disastrously
identified as a soil-dwelling amoeba.228 It may be just the effective weapon if it were transmitted by infected
first of many such agents to appear seemingly from individuals before symptoms appear, since once they do
,fr nowhere. appear, rabies is (with one notable recent exception) 100
Trrigarinri project8 in the tropics and subtropics aroundpercent fatal. Other possibilities for lethal agents are/lO'
V the world are spreading the Conditions that promote the many—for example^nthrax) which even in its "naturalvCI
/.garasitic diseas^fchistosomiastTTbilharzia]^ which, to- state can be transmitted by contaminated aerosols.
/ gether witHJlnalaris!^ is one of the two most prevalent plague, tularemia, Q-fever, and encephalitis, to name a _
serious diseases on Earth.229 The broadcast use of jew231—disseminated in their natural forms or in the
chemotheragy_and antibiotics has created a serious, form of special "hot" strains that are drug-resistant or
medical problem through the inTrnffyfrinn r>f resistance^ superlethal. Besides direct assaults on human beingj,.
JTL bacteria and other parasitesjModification of the overt or covert attacks on aSarion's food supplt mjgbLbe-
^climate would~also inevitablyjnjuencejdisease patterns^ rnade byintroducing plant diseases. The more crowded i
for example, the length of time viruses remain infectious population is, and me smaller its per-capita food sup-
is in part a function of humidity. A trend toward drying plies, the better a target it would be fos-a biolo;ges!
would encourage some, whereas others would thrive in warfare attack. ATTVocfe. °f\. J off
increased moisture. , Tt is smpfwi^ in addition, that Why would nations develop such weapons? For tfce
feather changes can trigger epidemics.23^ same reason they develop others. They hope to immur.;ii
As if the threat of a natural pandemic were not or otherwise protect their own populations and fc;
gruesome enough, there is always the threat of biological avoid a biological backlash. These weapons have ;
warfare or of an accidental escape of lethal agents from a special appeal for small and poor powers, which see
biological warfare laboratory or, conceivably, from a themselves threatened by larger, richer ones and which
laboratory engaged in genetic engineering experiments ~~x lack the funds or the expertise to develop nuclear
r
(seejnaterial on recombinant DNA research in Chapter") / weapons.252
J4]J Although most laypeople have long been afraid of J Chemical-biological weapons may never be used, but
thermonuclear war, they are just beginning to grasp the that does not rule out the possibility of an accident. Virus
colossal hazard posed by chemical and biological warfare laboratories, especially, are notoriously unsafe. By 196",
(CBW). Any country with one or two well-trained some 2700 laboratory workers had become accidentally
microbiologists and even a modest budget can build its infected with viruses transmitted by insects, and 107 had
own biological doomsday weapons. Constructing lethal died.233 Their deaths were caused by just one group
228 231
J. H. Callicott, Amcbic meningo encephalitis. F. M. LaForce et al, Epidemiologic study of a fatal case of inhalaLi; -
229
K. S. Warren, Precarious odyssey of an unconquered parasite; N. anthrax; J. Lederberg, Swift biological advance can be bent to gescc-.^.
232
Ansari, Epidemiology and control of schistosomiasis. M. Meselson, Behind the Nixon policy for chemical and biolofjiaj
230
K. E. F. Watt, Ecology and resource management, McGraw-Hill, warfare.
2
New York, 1968, p. 162 ff. "Hanson, et al., Arbovirus infections.
 DIRECT ASSAULTS ON WELL-BEING / 1609

of viruses. Fatal accidents occur in laboratories where
work is done on other kinds of viruses, as well as other
microorganisms. The inability of government CBW
agencies to avoid accidents was made clear by the Skull
Valley, Utah, CBW disaster of 1968, in which many
thousands of sheep were poisoned when a chemical agent
"escaped,"254 and by the possible escape of Venezuelan
Equine Encephalitis from the Dugway, Utah, proving
ground in 1967. Congressman Richard D. McCarthy of
New York announced in 1969 that CBW agents were
being transported around the country in small containers
on commezaal airliners!
In J969,^President Nixon announced the unilateral
renunciation by the United States of the use of biological
warfare, even in retaliation.235 He directed that the stocks
of biological agents be destroyed and that further work
onjiefenses _agajnst_ biologica^weapons be transferred
from the Department of Defensgjp the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare._Destruction of U.S._
biological warfare materials was systematically carried^
out in 1970 and 1971,^feougjC5(l9753it was discovered
that the (Central intelligence Agency\had not destroyed
some toxins in its possession.
234
P. M. Boffey, 6000 sheep stricken near CBW center.
J!5
M. Meselson, Chemical and biologicalv 'ific American,
Mav 1970.
Some level of research might bejgntinuing clandes-
tinely in the United jtates ^although the possibility
seems remote), and_it would be a simple matter for a
future administration quickly to reestablish biological
warfare-xapability. Indeed, with the rapidly increasing
ability of biologists to manipulate the genetics of micro-
organisms, dtegossibilities for creating deadly agents
jieem endless^* FurthermoreTthere^ is littksign that the
U.S. action has led to the end of work on biological
weapons elsewhere. Biological warfare laboratories are
potential sources of a man-made "solution" to the
population explosion^It is essential that some way be
found to block all further work on biological weapons—
the risk for humanity is simply too great.
It should be clear now that humanity is creating an
enormous array of hazards that directly threaten the
health and welfare of all people. Unfortunately many of
these hazards are poorly understood, and many un-
doubtedly remain unrecognized at present. The next
chapter shows that the level ofTindirect threats to human/
welfare Is just as high and the level of understanding
just as low.
;3
*P. Berg ct al., Potential biohazards of recombining DNA molecules.

Recommended for Further Reading

Cairns, John. 1975. The cancer problem. Scientific American, November. A superb
semi-popular review of environmental carcinogenesis.
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). Annual. Environmental quality. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Extensive data and discussion on recent measured
levels of air and water pollution across the United States, as well as special topics in
energy, land use, transportation, radiation, and environmental legislation and
regulation.
Huddle, N.; M. Reich; and N. Stiskin. 1975. Island of dreams: Environmental crisis in Japan.
Autumn Press, New York. Well-documented and illustrated survey of the serious
environmental problems of one of the world's most intensely industrial nations.
 HE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT
some research institutes need to be investigating and
reporting on much more detailed questions. For exam-
ple, is medical research being done with adequate
attention to the needs of all segments of the population
and to birth control as well as death control? Are the
benefits and risks of the breeder reactor being studied in
proper depth? What are the possible dangerous con-
sequences of further investigating the properties of a
given virus or biocidal compound?
These questions have been settled largely by the
scientific community in the past, with results that can
most charitably be described as mixed.26 For a long time
the thrust in research was that whatever could be tried
should be tried. Physicists exploded the first atomic
bomb after Germany had been defeated and Japan's
defeat was a certainty, although some of them apparently
thought at the time there was a nonzero chance that the
explosion would destroy all life on Earth.21 It is difficult to
find parallels, outside nuclear weaponry, displaying quite
this degree of willingness to risk total environmental
disaster, but traces of it arguably are present in proposals
to "wait and see" what the consequences of assaulting the
ozone layer with fluorocarbons or SST fleets will be. .
On the bright side, microbiologists Paul Bers; and
Stanley Cohen of Stanford and Herbert Boyer of the
University of California in mid-1974 called_oji_ their
"""""""""•>^™—————•—_«••-—-—^*S53
to bring to a halt research orfcecombinanj
B^BBMBW*""
^studies involving transfers of genetic material
from one species to another.28 They recognized that
hybrid microorganisms could cause extraordinarily vir-
ulent infectious disease and that die experimental work
(could conceivably lead to the spread ot
antibioticsior to the escape of bacterial strains carrying.
oncogenic (cancer-inducing) viruses. A distinguished
molecular biologist L Robert Sinsheimerjhas written:
> ~6See, for example, the contrasting views of F. J. Dyson, The hidden
cost of saying "no!"; and P. R. Ehrlich, The benefits of saying "yes."
->7N. P. Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer. There is no doubt, in light
of present knowledge of nuclear reactions, that the chance of igniting the
atmosphere with a nuclear bomb and thereby extinguishing all life on
Earth is truly zero. A completely persuasive case on the point is made by
H. A. Bethe, Ultimate catastrophe? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, June
1976, pp. 36-37. Bethe's further contention, however, that the scientists
on the nuclear bomb project were completely sure of this in 1945, is not
persuasive.
28
P. Berg, et al., Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA molecules.
Could an Escherichia coli strain [a variety of a ubiqui-
tous bacterial resident on the human digestive tract]
carrying all or part of an oncogenic virus become
resistant in the human intestine? Could it thereby
become a possible source of maUgmancv? j^p^ld such a_
strain spread rhrnuphnnf a human population? What
would be the consequence if even an insulin-secreting,
strain became an intestinal resident? Not to mention
the more malign or just plain stupid scenarios such as
those which depict the insertion of the gene for
botulinus toxin into Escherichia coli>M
In early 1975 an international scientific meeting es-
tablished a set of safety principles under which such
research could be continued. The scientists at the meet-
ing concluded that the more dangerous experiments
should be deferred until special "crippled" strains of
organisms could be developed— that is, strains with a
very low probability of surviving outside the laboratory
(experience has shown that there is no such thing as an^
"escape-proof' microbiological laboratory^. Some of the
scientists, however, argued against social control of the
experiments, claiming an absolute right to free inquiry.
Since that meeting, various attempts have been made to
draft rules that would permit doing this dangerous
research, and there has been continuing controversy.30
In these cases, scientists themselves have assessed the
risks and then "voted" for all of humanity. With regard
to the atomic bomb, the possible savings in American
(and Japanese) lives by shortening World War II may-
have come into the calculus, and perhaps also the thought
that sooner or later someone else would blow up an
A-bomb without knowing for sure that it would not
destroy the planet. But would the people of the planet (to
say nothing of the other living organisms) have voted yes
to taking, say, a one-in-a-million chance on oblivion in
order to speed victory for the United States in World
War II? (That the chances of killing all life on the planet
turned out to be zero is beside the point— the scientists
involved were not sure of that at the time.)
''Troubled dawn for genetic engineering. The article also contains 2
good, brief, layperson's introduction to the technology of DNA
manipulation.
30
Sinsheimer, Troubled dawn; Nicholas Wade, Recombinant DNA:
NIH Group Stirs storm by drafting laxer rules; Bernard Dixon, Recom-
binant DNA: Rules without enforcement? ,

Similarly, in the case of recombinant DNA, although
scientists seem to be acting much more responsibly, we
must still ask whether they are the appropriate ones to
make the decision. J4o laboratory safeguards can guaran^
tee that an accidental escape will never occur. Are the
possible benefits to medicine and agriculture of this _
research worth any risk of releasing a serious plague or
cancer-inducing organism? We do not know the answer,
but we think the franchise on the decision should be
extended to include at least representatives of those who
will be taking the risks and (perhaps) receiving the
benefits.
f The Science Court J
One danger in allowing scientists to decide an issue for
society is that often the specialists in a field disagree^
violently on the proper course of action for society to,
take, even though they may have no serious disagreement
on the known salient facts. For example, qualified
scientists have been assembled on both sides of issues
such as whether to develop the .SST, ban the use of
pesticides and aerosols, or develop nuclear power, to
name a few. As Stephen Schneider and Lynne Mesirow
observed regarding the SST battle:
An interesting point here is that most of the bitter
scientific antagonists in the SST debate were probably
in far greater agreement on what was known and
unknown scientifically, and on the odds that state-of-
the-art estimates would be correct, than they were over
whether the evidence justified opposition to the planes.
That is, the interpretation of the weight of the
evidence that guided their opposition or support was
based not only on the scientists' technical knowledge
of the issues, but also on their personal philosophies —
on whether or not they wanted the SSTs and on
whether they thought the benefits of the project were
worth the risks of ignoring the worst possibilities. This
is not to suggest that most testimony was deliberately
misleading, but rather that scientists, like most people,
shade to some extent their perception of the merits of
conflicting evidence with the shadow of their personal
philosophy . . . . The issues facing future generations
arc too critical to permit the technical components to
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 819
be obscured in attacks on the personal philosophies of
experts. . . .31
As they pointed out, some mechanism is needed so the
public and decision-makers can separate the technical
opinions of scientists from their political opinions.
One suggestion for opening up the process of ethical
decision-making in science has been put forward by
physicist Arthur Kantrowitz.32 He proposed that in
science policy disputes (such as those over SSTs and
ozone, DDT and ecosystems, the risks and benefits of
recombinant DNA research) the technical aspects of the
cases be, in essence, tried in a scientific court. The first
step would be to separate the scientific from the moral
and political questions. What might be done with genetic
engineering technology is a disputable scientific ques-
tion, in principle soluble by experiment; what should be
done is a political-moral question not in principle
amenable to experimental solution.
Once the separation had been accomplished, then
advocates of the different scientific points of view would
"try" them before scientific judges. Thus, scientists
convinced that DDT posed a serious threat to ecosystems
could present their case, and the scientific advocates of
the ecosystemic safety of DDT could present theirs. Each
side could cross-examine the other. The judges would be
selected for their neutrality on the issue, but would have
the benefit of scientific training to help them evaluate the
opposing views. The final step would be publication
(within the limits of national security) of the opinions of
the scientific judges.
It is easy for anyone familiar with scientific disputes to
attack these proposals. In some cases the separation of
scientific from moral and political questions is difficult.
Is the question "Are blacks genetically less intelligent
than whites?" scientific or moral? We would claim that
the very posing of the question is a political act about
which a moral judgment can be made—but in theory it is
a question amenable to experimental investigation.
A thornier problem would be selection of judges. In
many cases today, disputes concern the negative direct or
indirect effects of technology on humanity or on the
T/Kgenesis strategy, pp. 188-189.
'ScCj for example. Controlling technology democratically.