When you look at the thank yous, what youre gonna see is Alaina, Meridith, Uday, Chandler, Gabriel,

Joseph, miniature & chill bro, Joel, Andy, Geoffery, Als (both den and bert), Ian, Christina, Zaki, kane, Nikolai, Luke, James, Ted, DKP, & Humza.

-- Flynn & Nick

The Border Kritik

Mexico Oil 1NC

The affirmatives geopolitical imaginary is characterized by a wholly enclosed land space of bounded nation-states. This only serves the interests of status quo power hierarchies through the construction of an inside to be secured against a dangerous outside, excepted from the law Such an order can only be maintained thought he constant policing of the inside and warfare externally. Vaughn-Williams 9 [Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 132-36]
The concept of the border of the state has enabled a dominant conception of juridical political order that is central to the modern geopolitical imaginary: a view of that order as being divided between domestic and international realms and, notwithstanding aberrations from time to time, largely settled and stable. In this way the
concept of the border of the state helps to domesticate the contingency of the juridical political order by acting as a familiar reference point on the basis of which the repetition of diverse practices cumulates to create a sense of normality and permanence. Yet, as Agnew, Tuathail and

other critical geopolitics scholars have pointed out, the role of the concept of the border of the state in maintaining this semblance of stability and immutability contributes to a form of knowledge privileged by the modern geopolitical imaginary that is inherently linked to questions of power and authority. In other words, the work that the concept of the border of the state does in upholding the juridicalpolitical order is not a natural nor neutral practice, but one that serves to benefit those whose interests are bound up in maintaining the status quo. Consequently, accounts of global politics that rely upon an unreflective usage of the concept of the border of the state are
complicit in practices of forgetting the contingency of the juridicalpolitical order and therefore also the reification of it. By contrast, thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border reveals the contingency and performative self (re)production of juridicalpolitical order. Agamben's account of the logic and operation of sovereign power demonstrates that this order, born of the exception, is

predicated upon the performative act of suspending the law to produce a zone of indistinction in which bare life can be produced. Seen in this light, sovereign power does not pre-exist bare life and neither does bare life pre-exist sovereign power. Instead, sovereign power and bare life must be thought of as co-constitutive of each other. Sovereign power comes to exist only through the constant (re)production of bare life in zones of indistinction that are amenable to its sway: The essence of political power in the West [] is the power to suspend (not apply) law and thus to produce a sphere of beings (p.133) without quantities, homines sacri, whom every being, insofar as he or she is alive, may be.4 On this basis, it is through the production of homo sacer that the politically qualified life of the polis, necessary for juridicalpolitical order, is ultimately defined and sustained. As Andrew Norris puts it: politics must again and again enact its internal distinction from bare life [] it must repeatedly define itself through the negation of bare life a negation that can always take the form of death.5 In other words, the politically qualified life of the polis and the form of juridicalpolitical order this subjectivity enables are contingent upon a sovereign
decision about the status of some human life as not worthy of being lived as such. As Judith Butler has explored in her discussion o f Agamben against the backdrop of indefinite detention in Guantnamo,

this decision relies upon nothing other than the deeming of certain forms of life to be ineligible for certain basic, if not universal, human rights: the decision to detain, to continue to detain someone indefinitely, is a unilateral judgement made by government officials who simply deem that a given individual, or indeed a group, poses a danger to the state.6 Moreover, as
politicians, thereby constituting an extension of sovereign power by stealth.7

Butler highlights, it is a decision that is increasingly taken by government officials (such as those who sanctioned and shot Jean Charles de Menezes) rather than by democratically elected

Often, the decision leading to the production of bare life is underwritten by so-called national security imperatives defined by a state of emergency: in this way the invocation of the discourse of exceptionalism attempts to legitimise the suspension of national and international law. Therefore, echoing Derrida's discussion of authority in Chapter 3, the legitimacy of sovereign power is legitimised by nothing other than its own legitimisation. One way of characterising how the generalised biopolitical border reconceptualises the (re)production of the juridicalpolitical order is in terms of performance. Whereas the modern geopolitical imaginary supported by the concept of the border of the state implies a static, immutable juridical political structure that is somehow given, Agamben's thesis reveals this as a performed fiction. The sovereign decision that creates bare life is not necessarily a singular act but a reiterative performance: one that leads to the perpetuation of bare life detained indefinitely in camps or left to die in

cargo containers at sea. (p.134) Moreover, as Agamben's analysis implies, this border performance is also a body performance. Bodies do not simply encounter pre-existing borders as if they were timeless territorial artifacts. Rather, borders are continually (re)inscribed through mobile bodies that can be risk assessed, categorised, and then treated as either trusted citizen travellers or bare life. In this way border/body performances depend upon movement and are played out at sites across everyday life. A perspective that identifies the performative character of the juridical political order reconfigures the way in which the relation between borders and subjectivity might be analysed. According to the modern geopolitical imaginary, the proper political subject is the citizen: bordered and autonomous before the law in the same way as the sovereign state of which it is a subject. Such a
formulation attempts to domesticate the radical contingencies of subjects' socio-ontological status and fix their identities to territory in order to secure the presence of sovereign political

Thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border prompts an alternative line of analysis that redirects emphasis away from the modern bordered citizen. For Agamben, the real sovereign subject is not the citizen but rather homo sacer: the mute carrier of sovereignty defined not by contract or rights but by exposure to the sovereign decision on whether it is deemed life worthy of living.8 The insistence on the significance of the marginal figure of homo sacer highlights the need for further analysis of the
community.

multifarious methods, contexts and locations in which bare life is produced in global politics. One example, which has already received some attention in the academic literature inspired by Agamben, is a critical engagement with the politics of humanitarianism.9 Conventional accounts of the relationship between human rights and sovereign power suggest that the former has a capacity to act as a check on the worst excesses of the latter. Agamben, however, shows a more insidious dimension to this relationship which, ultimately, challenges the basis for an optimistic reading of the potential of international human rights. According to an Agambenian perspective, human rights and sovereign power are not diametrically opposed because ultimately they both rely upon the same referent object: bare life. The subjects produced by the ideology of humanitarian intervention closely resemble the subjects of sovereign power: mute; undifferentiated; and depoliticised. In the same way that sovereign (p.135) power produces the bare life it needs to sustain itself, humanitarianism renders people into needy victims, lives to be saved taken outside of the workings of normal juridicalpolitical order, in such a way that justifies flouting norms of territorial integrity and intervening in the affairs of another sovereign state. In other words, the concept of humanity cannot be relied upon to check sovereign power: rather, as Anne Caldwell puts it, humanity instead a ppears as the ground and object of sovereignty; it has become a political group, represented by a new political power.10 Therefor e, despite the stated aims of humanitarian organisations and ventures, there is a danger that they can end up in solidarity with the very powers they ostensibly seek to overcome or at least mitigate: the discourse of human rights fails to call into question the

has provocatively argued, concentration camps and refugee camps can be seen as two sides of the same sociological matrix: perhaps the ultimate image of the treatment of the local population as homo sacer is that of the American war plane flying above Afghanistan one is never sure what it will drop, bombs or food parcels.11 Thinking in terms of the generalised biopolitical border also has potentially challenging implications for the way in which analyses of global security relations might be framed. To a large extent the concept of the border of the state offers a stable and comfortingly coherent means of mapping who, where and what the enemy is: it enables the juxtaposition of an immutable realm of warfare and barbarism outside the state on the one hand and the impression of safety, stability and possibility of progress inside the state on the other.12 Such a picture permits a double designation of the enemy so that it is taken to be both (a) outside the state but (b) itself another state which, in turn, leads to the possibility of a resolution of conflict through classical forms of warfare between sovereign states. The concept of the generalised biopolitical border, however, scrambles this conventional logic and the assumed alignment between inside/amity and outside/enmity. Rather than essentialising the enemy as the other outside the state, an Agambenian approach is more attentive to the ways in which different threats are produced as foreign or exteriorised, as, for example, Dan Bulley has shown in the case of the London bombings on 7 July 2005.13 Furthermore, Agamben argues that under biopolitical conditions in which security becomes the normal technique of government, classical (p.136) interstate warfare is eclipsed. Rather, as security becomes the basic principle of state activity politics is reduced to policing, and lines of amity and enmity are fundamentally blurred. Conflict is no longer between states but potentially between the terroristic state and its citizens who are all virtually homines sacri.14
distinction between politically qualified life and bare life upon which the conception of rights rests. Thus, as Slavoj iek

And, the construction of the US-Mexico border stabilizes American identity around the racist projection of lawlessness and barbarity onto the Mexican other in need of domination.
Klahn 8, professor at the University of California Chicano/Latino Research Center, 2008 [Norma, The Border: Imagined, Invented or
from the Geopolitics of Literature to Nothingness, Working Paper No.5 Chicano/Latino Research Center, clrc.soe.ucsc.edu/sites/clrcweb/files/sites/default/files/.../05_Klahn.pdf]

The diverse, complex and contradictory ways in which Mexico, its culture, and its peoples have been imagined, portrayed, glorified or vilified by the people of the U.S. have a long history. They began with the conflicts between the two colonizing powers, Spain and England. And they continued as the young United States expanded into territories occupied by the Indians and possessed first by Spain and later Mexico. In the process, a cultural and physical space known as the Border emerged in the nineteenth century. Ultimately, it resulted in both a physical and a psychological distancing during and

because of the U.S. nineteenth-century expansion and its conquest of what is now the U.S. Southwest. For political, cultural and psychological purposes this movement of displacement rendered the region's former owners, the Mexican as 'other,'that is, the construction of a different identity seen as dissonant to monolithic Western discourses of power.1 The dynamics of "othering" finally becomes self-serving for it affirms an on going process of, in this case, Anglo identity. Constituted as cultural contestants, the Mexican became everything the Anglo was not. In their studies of Anglo attitudes towards Mexicans Carey McWilliams and Arnoldo de Leon2 present the U.S. expansionist project as an acquisition of territory justified by the mission Anglos assumed as civilizers of the hinterlands with a need to control all that was barbaric-sexuality, vice, nature, and people of color. The initial constructions were racist: that 1see Edward Said, Orienta/ism (New York: Vintage
Random House, 1978)Tzetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row,1982); ; Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York: Routledge, 1993). 2 Carey McWilliams,

essential characteristics of personality, intelligence and morals were attributed to physical appearances. Mexicans were perceived in light of their differences from Anglos. Americans carried to the Southwest values constructed by the founding fathers, of English descent, male, white and Protestant-self-reliance, a puritanical morality, the erasure of the past, and a work ethic. They saw Mexicans as racially impure, descended of the Spaniards, who were contaminated by Moorish blood , and the "blood thirsty" Aztecs. " 'They are of mongrel blood, the Aztec
North from Mexico (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,1949). Arnoldo de Leon, They called them greasers is, to be dependent, resigned, complacent, not committed to improvement or progress, but rather to fun and frolic.

predominating,' asserted Gilbert D. Kingsbury, writing about the Mexicans of Brownsville in the early 1860s".3 Positioned in relation to their differences to Anglos, Mexicans appeared

For these expansionists "to have accepted other than 'white supremacy and civilization" , says de Leon, "was to submit to Mexican domination and to admit that Americans were willing to become like Mexicans. The prospect of being dominated by such untamed, uncivil, and disorderly creatures made a contest for racial hegemony almost inevitable." 4 Descriptions of Mexicans through the nineteenth century, some inoffensive, most virulent, are all grounded on the trope of difference, a rhetorical construct founded on paradigms of dissimilarity. The border was the line established both to delineate and inscribe that difference. Where the line is de-limited, the 'other' begins. The boundary was sacred, not to be transgressed. Yet, paradoxically, bridges and crossing passages were created as legitimate spaces where separation is established, precisely because the frontier, as de Certeau says, is created by contacts where "the points of differentiation between two bodies are also their common points.''5 In the case of the United States-Mexico border, the "contact zone" has become a "combat zone" where crossings and/or transgressions are the rule, rather than the 3 de Leon, 15. 4 de Leon, 13. 5 Michel de Certeau, "Spatial Stories" The Practice of Everyday Life exception.6 Constructions, concrete and imaginary, are established distancing the 'other' at least symbolically, and in this case, south of that de-limitation. The inhabitants of the United States continue to wrestle with that "alien territory." "South of the Borderism" is what I have called borrowing from Edward Said, the way that the United States and its peoples have come to terms with Mexico as they continuously invent an 'other' image, and defend and define their own. In their writings, and in contrast with the way Anglos constructed or invented themselves (stereotypically as morally superior, hard working, thrifty),
the Mexican could in the best of cases be mysterious, romantic, fun-loving, laid back, colorfully primitive or alternatively conniving, highly sexualized, disorderly, lazy,violent, and uncivilized. 7 Hollywood appropriated all of the images, from 'the greaser' and the violent bandits, to the Latin lover and the Mexican spitfire. 8

As soon as a boundary is established, the other side becomes desirable, the threshold to cross into the unknown, the yet unexplored landscape where 'the self' is discovered and the 'other' is invented. The trope of difference becomes the figure most utilized by travellers and novelists writing about their adventures "south of the border" This trope, established from the initial moment of encounter and still prevalent today, opposes U.S. 'civilization' to Mexican 'barbarism'. It seems, however, an encounter of images where language, as a code of communication, is never or seldom mentioned, stressing and acknowledging that writers cannot (or choose not to) cross one of the main borders: the spoken code . Anthropologically we could say that such literature remains etic, and not emic, that is, the perspective is established as outside and above the culture. Paradoxically, and because of that positioning, the attraction to a regenerative vitality conceived as present within 'Barbarism' continues to seduce the traveller to the point of demarcation, both physically and psychologically, where the 'other' is found. The adventure can be positive or negative. Many times it becomes a place appropriated as material to feed the imagination back home, perceived as devoid of adventure. For Paul Theroux, the crossing resembled a descent into hell. Looking south, across the river, I realize that I was looking toward another continent, another country, another world, ...T he frontier was actual: people did things differently there ... No people, but cars and trucks were evidence of them. Beyond that, past the Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo, was a black slope-the featureless, night-haunted republics of Latin America .... Laredo required the viciousness of its sister city to keep its own churches full. Laredo had

the airport and the churches; Nuevo Laredo, the brothels and basket factories. Each nationality had seemed to gravitate to its own level of competence. The frontier was more than an example of cozy hypocrisy; it demonstrated all one needed to know about the morality of the Americas, the relationship between the puritanical efficiency north of the border and the bumbling and passionate disorder-the anarchy of sex and hunger-south of it. 1 0 He doesn't stop there;Theroux's racism is rampant: Mexicans are naturally corrupt, lawless, unhygienic, a brutal and beaten people who "cruelly beat their animals." Laredo becomes a microcosm of all the United States; Nuevo Laredo not just of Mexico, but of Latin America. Mary Pratt sees Theroux's writing as exemplifying "a discourse of negation, domination, devaluation and fear that remain in the late 20th century, a powerful ideological constituent of the West's consciousness of the people and places it strives to hold in subjugation:11 In both writings, Greene's and Theroux's, a distancing occurs, either by idealization or denigration.

This construction of civilization around state borders is a colonial artifact. It undergirds the justification for the affirmatives intervention into Mexico to stabilize, develop and extract resources from the barbaric other. Slater, Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University, in 4 [David, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial Rethinking North South Relations]
The interweavings of geopolitical history. For example, the

power, knowledge and subordinating representations of the other have a long identity and authority of Western modernity took shape on the terrain of colonial and imperial power, and the production of knowledge that characterized the development of Western scientific disciplines went together with the establishment of modern imperialism. In a similar vein, the history of comparative literature, cultural analysis, and anthropology can be seen as affiliated with
imperial power, and as contributing to its methods for ensuring Western ascendancy over non-Western peoples. Together with this intertwining of power and knowledge one can locate varying forms of subordinating representation which are equally geopolitical and cultural. The assumption of Western supremacy goes together with a silencing of the non-Western other. There

is incorporation, inclusion, coercion but only infrequently an acknowledgement that the ideas of colonized people should be known. This silencing of the non-Western other is customarily combined with representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order. The posited superiorities of Western progress, modernization, democracy, development and civilization are deployed to justify a project of enduring invasiveness. The non-Western society is shorn of the legitimate symbols of independent identity and authority, and its representation tends to be frozen around the negative attributes of lack, backwardness, inertia and violence. It becomes a space ready to be penetrated, worked over, restructured and transformed. This is a process that is seen as being beneficial to the re-ordered society, so that resistance, especially in its militant form, is envisaged as being deviant and irrational. So while power and knowledge are combined together, they cannot be adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial encounters and the geopolitical history of West/non-West relations. One of the recurrent
themes of this study has been the intersection between intervention and representation. Geopolitical interventions as examined in the nineteenth, twentieth and now twenty-first centuries entail different forms of representation. Nevertheless, it can be argued that they all presuppose a combination of desire, will, capacity and justification. The

desire to intervene, to possess, to take hold of another society, even if only temporarily, flows from that deeply rooted sense of superiority and mission. The nineteenthcentury notions of Manifest Destiny or benevolent assimilation were predicated on a belief in the ostensible superiority of the Western and more specifically American way of life. It was not just that the United States had a ruling vision of itself that was associated with a destiny that needed to be fulfilled; it was a vision that was also embedded in a hierarchical perspective on peoples, races and cultures, whereby the white/black binary division was seen as a crucial marker of value and significance. As was suggested in chapter 2, in the history of US expansion, race went together with notions of destiny and mission, as exemplified in the USMexico War, the colonization of the Philippines and the creation of semi-protectorates such as Cuba at the beginning of the twentieth century. In that era, the desire to intervene was also linked to protecting the Americas from the insecurity of political disorder, and the tenets of civilization were closely associated with the stipulated need to

preserve socio-economic order and stability throughout the American hemisphere. The desire to intervene can also be traced through the histories of modernization theory and neo-liberalism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, modernization ideas were formulated with a view to diffuse Western capital, technology, and social and political values to societies that were judged to be traditional and in need of modern transformation. However, as I suggested in chapter 3, the desire to project modernization was also tied to a fear of the perceived vulnerability of Third World societies to the contagion of communism. Therefore, intervention had a double motive, and while the perceived threat from communism came to a close in 1989, the desire to modernize and reorder the other has continued into the post-Cold War period. Whereas, as was argued in chapter 4, the neoliberal doctrine of development can be distinguished from modernization theory in its greater prioritization of the private sector and of the commodification of social and economic life, it shares with modernization a privileging of a certain view of the Western experience in matters not only economic, but also governmental, social and more indirectly psychological. Its desire to intervene was initially anchored in a perception of an economic malaise, of a debt crisis in the Third World that called for the cure of structural adjustment, deregulation and privatization. The money doctors of the international financial institutions have written a series of prescriptions that amount to much more than a case of economic intervention, and their will and capacity, as well as underlying desire, have been systematically extended to cover a broad social, economic and political terrain, stretching from structural adjustment through good governance to social capital. Desire, as I am using it here, denotes a feeling of unsatisfied longing, a feeling that
satisfaction would be derived from obtaining or possessing a given object. Intervention is an action that would facilitate such a satisfaction, but such an action requires both the will and the capacity to realize the desire. If desire is longing for a certain possession or attainment, will represents a kind of concentration of desire. The will to intervene is a focusing of the desire and is reflected in individual, collective and governmental action. Moreover, as with desire, the will to intervene, as reflected, for example, in governmental action, can be envisaged as a condensation of multiple determinants for instance, cultural, economic, military, political. In both desire and will there is multiplicity, but with

will its focusing requires a greater degree of discursive order. Governments, or more broadly states, as well as international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, provide focal points for the will to intervene; and equally, as we have seen in the case of the United States, such a will has been allied to a multiple capacity to intervene. The state provides the will and also coordinates the capacity to intervene; and the desire, will and capacity all have a history
and a geopolitics (see chapters 2, 3 and 7 above). Desire, will and capacity, to be effective as an ensemble of meaning and practice, need a language of legitimization. The

will to intervene as a crystallization of desire can only be deployed with effect when the capacities military, economic, political to intervene are in place. Will and capacity together provide a force, but their power is secured as hegemonic power through the deployment of a discourse of justification. A will that focuses desire, and allies itself to capacity, seeks a hegemonic role through the power of inducing consent while retaining the ability to coerce. In the context of the imperiality of US geopolitics, the will to power has utilized a connected array of ideas and concepts to ground its projection. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 invoked an international police power, thus underlining the ability when necessary to intervene coercively, but it also incorporated notions of civilization and order that the societies of the Latin South were encouraged to embrace. The Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s and the Alliance for Progress of 1961 were also concerned with promoting order, but in a context of partnership, cooperation and progress. These were codifications of a will to power that varied according to the geopolitical conjuncture, including the responses to American power from the societies of Latin America. Developing Latin American nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s provided a key backdrop to
Washingtons framing of a good neighbour policy, and the Cuban Revolution provided a crucial context for Kennedys announcement of the Alliance for Progress, as well as for the unsuccessful US-sponsored invasion of Cuba a month later at the Bay of Pigs. The plurality of responses to the colossus of the North reminds us of what can be seen as absent from the suggested combination of desire, will, capacity and legitimization. These are notions that have been used to emphasize a certain projection of power, but such a projection can be interpreted as implicitly denoting an array of passive recipients. From

the vantage point of the periphery, and especially the Latin South, there would only seem to be an active, ubiquitous outside which as an analytical perspective can occlude the complexities and heterogeneities of the inside. In this context of the interface between a mutating external power and the dynamic specificities of
internal social, economic and political processes it is possible to highlight a number of different tendencies.

Next, bounding nation-states through the enclosure of borders is the control of territory through violence. This production of the space of the state obfuscates always on-going non-state violence and legitimates wars and genocides in the name of state-making. Neocleous 3 [Mark Neocleous is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Brunel University, Off the Map:
On Violence and Cartography, European Journal of Social Theory 2003 6: 409]
Thus in the modern state system the overlapping frontier is as anathema as the idea of multiple sovereign bodies within a territory. The edict of Pope Alexander VI in 1492 which gave impetus to the idea of a spatially divided earth by drawing lines delineating certain parts of the globe and specifying which part belonged to which European power was extended and formalized in the 17th century with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), strengthened in the 18th century with the emphasis on territorial (national) unity in the French and American revolutions, and consolidated in the 2 0th century with an international state system a system which became so entrenched that the territorial state became the political form to be adopted by all nations. The modernization of politics was thus as much a process of territorialization as it was a process of seculariz- ation and rationalization. The form of sovereign power that developed in Europe from the 16th century onward conceived space as bounded. Sovereignty, like state, implies space, and control of a territory becomes the foundation of sover- eignty (Lefebvre, 1974: 280; Foucault, 1980: 689; 1991: 87). This division of territorial sovereignty between states is most explicit at the point where the fields of power interface: there must be no overlap and no uncertainty about the borders of the territory. As Michael Hardt and Toni Negri (2000: 167) put it, modern which neither overlapping margin nor multiple sovereignty is permitted. (It is precisely because of this exclusive territoriality that Embassies exist. Having created mutually exclusive territories, states found that there was little space left for the conduct of diplomacy. The outcome was little islands of alien sovereignty within the states territory: the Embassy [see Mattingly, 1955].) At the same time, it

sovereignty resides precisely on the limit. This requires a new kind of political geography in

requires the permanent policing of territorial boundaries. States become and remain sovereign not just in the sense that they are all- powerful within their territories, but also because they police the borders of a particular space and claim to represent the citizens within those borders. The consequence of this mutually constitutive relation between territory and state power is that the earths surface has been inscribed in a particular way according to the territorial ambitions of the modern state and space has come to assume absolute priority in the statist political imaginary. Without this essential conjunction of space and politics, sovereignty would lose its meaning. As such, we might say that the modern political imaginary is a territorial imaginary. That this is so is illustrated by the policy of containment in which a political counter to the Soviet Union was thought to be necessary for territorial reasons, and the broader 20th-century terminological distinction between East and West as friend and foe, with Cuba somehow belonging to the East and Japan co-opted for the West (BuckMorss, 2000: 225). But there is more to territory than just space. The notion of territory is derived from a complex of terms:
frighten. And

from terra (of earth, and thus a domain) and territo-rium, referring to a place from which people are warned off, but is also has links with terre-re, meaning to

the notion of region derives from the Latin regere (to rule) with its connotations of military power. Territory is land occupied and maintained through terror; a region is space ruled through force. The secret of territoriality is thus violence: the force necessary for the production of space and the terror crucial to the creation of boundaries. It is not just that sovereignty implies space, then, but that it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed a space established and constituted by violence (Lefebvre, 1974: 280). As macrosociologists have pointed out time and again, it is the use of physical force in controlling a territory that is the key to the state, for without it any claim to the territory would mean nothing. Put more simply: borders are drawn with blood (General Mladic, cited in Campbell, 1998: 45). A founding violence, and continuous creation by violent means, are the hallmarks of the state. Part of the construction of the states territory took the form of defining the legitimate use of violence this is the key to Webers famous definition of the state as involving a monopoly over the means of violence. To do this, the distinc- tion between the legitimate use of force by the state and illegitimate use of force by non-state actors had to be made coherent and acceptable to the members of states. During its early history, the state exercised violence alongside and often in conjunction with a
range of non-state or semi-state organizations. (These terms are misleading because state itself had not been fully developed, but for the sake of th e argument we will leave that issue aside.) Piracy and banditry, for example, were once entirely legitimate practices within the state system, bringing, as they did, revenue to both the sovereign and private investors and weakening enemies by attacking their ships. Piracy on the seas was conducted with the full cooperation and support of cities and states, while banditry, as a form of terrestrial piracy, was conducted with the continual aid of lords. International agreements now have it that piracy, as an act of violence divorced from the authority of any state, is a crime. To reach this state of affairs required a campaign against piracy which relied on a change in the states attitude from one in which non -state violence was an exploitable resource to one in which it was a practice to be elim- inated. The catalyst appears to have been a clash of British interests in the 18th century, when the British East India Company began demanding British Royal Navy protection against British pirates who were operating in collusion with British colonists to plunder British commerce in the East. When the Navy was sent to patrol the Eastern waters, the pirates moved to the Bahamas. Suppressing it in American waters in turn pushed the pirates back to Madagascar. Since other states and companies connected with other states found themselves in the same situation, a broader and lasting solution to the problem was sought, and an agree- ment was reached among the European powers that each state was responsible for controlling piracy in its own waters. But this required that states distance themselves from piratical acts. No clear norm could develop, much less be universalized, until the state system produced a clear definition of what constituted piracy. And this was impossible so long as states continued to regard individual violence as an exploitable resource. Simply put, piracy could not be expunged until it was defined, and it could not be defined until it was distinguished from state-sponsored or -sanctioned individual

violence. (Thomson, 1994: 11718) Distinguishing it from state-sponsored or state-sanctioned violence required that states be defined as the sole legitimate organization in the exercise of violence, a process that only occurred towards the end of the 18th century. By challenging the states claim to a monopoly of the means of violence within a particular territory, piracy and banditry threatened the state system as a whole. Crucially, the delegitimization of piracy relied on pirates being defined as stateless persons persons, that is, for whose actions no state could be held responsible. Similarly, the word bandit derives from the Italian bandire, meaning to exile or banish, and thus contains the notion of frontier or border within its very meaning. A bandit is by definition one who exists on the physical borders of the state as well as at the edge of law. In struggling against banditry, states were thus involved in a struggle over the frontiers of territory as well as the exercise of violence. Bandits contributed to the demarcation of territorial states and were partly responsible for the consolidation of state power [through] the border effect. Boundaries took on concrete form in space through the interactions between border guards and bandits who seized upon the jurisdictional ambiguity of these liminal zones as cover for their depredations. (Gallant, 1999: 40) It is because the bandit throws down a challenge to law, state violence and the territorial imaginary that the state sees in the bandit not just a criminal but a political opponent and, conversely, why many bandits become primitive rebels (Hobsbawm, 1969; 1971). The bandit, like the pirate, was slowly but surely banned from the kind of political order emerging under the state. The ban is symptomatic of the connection between sovereignty and territory being drawn here. The ban designates exclusion from a territory, but also refers to the command and insignia of the sovereign power. The

banned are not merely set outside the law but rather are abandoned by it, an abandonment that has the full force of state violence to implement it (physical exclusion) and which identifies a territory within which the ban holds: one who has been banned is outside the juridical order of this or that particular state

(Agamben, 1998: 29, 109; Nancy, 1993: 44). In a contemporaneous development, mercenarism was also gradually eradicated. It is often claimed that the absolutist states of the 16th and 17th centuries pioneered the professional army. But such armies were far from being the kind of national conscription force which are now the norm. Rather, they were a mixed mass constructed from the foreign and professional soldiers then available to any state. The condottieri hired by the 15th-century Italian city-states were essentially contractors a condotta was a contract to make war for a particular sovereign. The German Unternehmer conveys the same commercial tone, while etymologically soldier means one who serves in an army for pay not one who serves his country. The extent of mercenarism and its significance to the state is illustrated by the fact that in the 18th century, all the major European armies relied heavily on foreign mercenaries for troops, as Janice Thomson (1994: 10, 88) has shown: Half the Prussian army was comprised of mercenaries. Foreigners constituted onethird of the French army. Britain used 18,000 mercenaries in the American war for Independence and 33,000 mercenaries in its 1793 war with France . . . The last instance in which a state raised an army of foreigners was in 1854, when Britain hired 16,500 German, Italian, and Swiss mercenaries for the Crimean war. For several reasons, however, states gradually stopped hiring their soldiers and sailors from anywhere, and began substituting them with standing armies based on conscription. Following the example of the French Revolution and Napoleon, in which huge effective armies were raised from within France, the practice of mercenarism gradually died out through the 19th century. One factor was sheer cost: states began to realize that fighting forces could be constructed more cheaply from its own citizens. But a further factor was reliability: states realized that an armed force whose relation to the state was purely contractual often dragged its feet and was always ready to rebel; its own citizens, however, were more reliable. To form mass national armies states therefore had to lay claim to a monopoly on the acts of military violence carried out by its own citizens. The US Neutrality Act of 1794, for example, prevented citizens of the United States from enlisting in the service of a foreign state, and prohibited all persons in the US from setting on foot military expeditions against states with which the US was at peace. Such practices of neutrality soon became the standard for other states. In other words, to prevent the enlistment of those individuals increasingly seen as being the states own citizens, states prevented their citizens from either joining the armies of foreign states or of forming their own armies.1 On the one side, then, states began to develop an international code on mercenarism. Only at this point does mercenarism become mercenarism just as contraband usually becomes contraband when rulers decide to monopolize the distribution of the commodity in question (Tilly, 1992: 54), so mercenarism only becomes mercenarism when states decide to use and monopolize the exercise of violence by its own citizens. This was crucial to the states claim to a monopoly over the means of legitimate violence within its own borders. (It is also one reason, though by no means the only reason, why states felt threatened by the International Brigade in Spain in the 1930s.) On the other side, however, to legitimize this monopoly, each state had to foster a national consciousness among its citizens, in order that they would more easily imagine that allegiance to the state of which one is a member is stronger than any allegiance formed through contract. Perry Anderson (1975: 30) suggests that the most obvious reason for the mercenary phenomenon was the natural refusal of the noble class to arm its own peasantry; the nobility understood that it was impossible to train its subjects in the art of war and to simultaneously keep them obedient. But by the late 18th century, the semi-disciplined peasantry had been more or less converted into a working class jointly disciplined through a combination of the new rules of wage-labour and the rationalization of the legal process. Ideologically, the newly emergent citizens were expected to imagine themselves as part of a community held together by and through the state. It is this imagination which has meant that many people are now more repulsed by the mercenary, and especially the citizen who fights against his own state, than by the genuinely foreign enemy. This nationalization of the masses was both material and ideological. It was a component of both the politically centralizing tendencies of the bourgeois class and the ideological tendency to imagine political formations in national rather than international terms. This can be understood as the ideological generation of one national class interest (in Marxist terms) or national identity (in sociological parlance). Either way, what is at stake is the generation of a subjectivity rooted in a political imaginary centred on the state and its national institutions. It is partly for this reason that writers on nationalism stress the importance of the late 18th century for the forming of the nation state. The imagined community of the nation that emerges at this time was a product of the imagined community embodied in the states territory. Little is heard these days of the bandit, pirate and mercenary, but thinking about them allows a greater sense of the historic importance over the struggle to delegitimize their practices. This struggle was central to the struggle over the means of violence and thus to the consolidation of the notion of territory. They were the unwitting instruments of history, as Carlo Levi comments on the bandit (1947: 137), in that their existence acted as a major catalyst in the shaping of the state, a process in which they themselves were (almost) swept from history. One

effect of this ideological isolation of non-state violence from other modal- ities of violence has been to endow state violence with a special sanctity. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the state system has seen nonmodern global political discourse, intervention generally implies a violation of state sovereignty. Inter-

intervention in a states domestic affairs as the corollary of the ideological commitment to the protection of state sovereig nty. As Cynthia Weber has shown, in

vention discourse begins by positing a sovereign state with boundaries that might be violated and then regards transgressions of these boundaries as a problem (1995: 4, 27).2 In violating sovereignty, intervention violates the norms of the international state system and the sanctity of the state. As a consequence, intervention comes to function as an alibi for the actions carried out in the name of the sovereign state, to such an extent that states use their claim to territorial sover- eignty to legitimize genocidal practices against peoples under its rule. The United Nations (UN) has generated for itself a humanitarian air, refusing a seat on the General Assembly to such states, but in accepting the states claim to sovereign territorial control the UN has effectively condoned the sacrifice of human beings to the demands of the territorial state and thus accepted genocide as regular tool of sovereign power (Kuper, 1981: 16185). Conversely, while state violence has been endowed with a special sanctity, non- state violence is either ignored entirely or is invested with a unique danger. Identifying 120 wars in 1987, Bernard Nietschmann

found that only 3 per cent involved conflict between two sovereign territorial states; the vast bulk of the wars were struggles between states and insurgent groups or nations. Yet these struggles receive very little media or academic attention. One reason for this is that the statist imaginary is so deeply entrenched in our political and intellectual culture that the predominant tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate or invisible. They are hidden from view because the struggles are against peoples, movements, formations and countries that are often not even on the map. In this war, as Nietschmann (1987) puts it, only one-half of the geography is shown and only one side of the fighting has a name. This last point is only half the story, however, since the other side of the fighting, when it is mentioned, often does go under a generic name intended to capture the unique danger of non-state violence: terrorism. Terrorism retains part of the original double meaning of territory, in that it refers not only to violence, but to space too. Things are usually labelled terrorist when the acts of violence in question are not sanctioned by the state. Where they have been sanctioned by a state, then they always take place outside of that particular states territories (and usually result in the state in question being labelled a rogue state). What this means, in effect, is that terrorism is in fact generated by the international state system; it is the other generated by the system of states. As William Connolly notes (1991: 207), terrorism allows the state and the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international sphere while veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents. Thus while terrorism appears to threaten the state, any such threat is ultimately superficial, since the production of terrorism by the state in fact protects the identity of particular states and the state system as a whole. The statist political imaginary uses terrorism to effect a political rationalization of violence under the firm control of the state. The declaration of a- ism by the US state and its allies in 2001 proves nothing other than the states own misunderstanding of the world it has created. (And note that such a declar- ation was immediately expanded to include designated states which it could then properly confront.) The standard
Left-liberal critique of the category terrorism is to point to the lack of any internationally agreed definition of the term (th e UN, NATO and the EU have all struggled to come up with an acceptable definition); or to point to the contradiction involved in the once-denigrated terrorist being feted as world statesman (Mandela), or to the once-celebrated freedom fighter being castigated as terrorist (Bin Laden); or, finally, to object to the hypocrisy of western liberal democracies training and funding armed rebellions in some parts of the globe while objecting to armed rebellions elsewhere. While pertinent, these points miss the central point, which is that terrorism

is defined according to the raison detat of hegemonic powers. States define terrorism according to their own interests, and the predominant interests are necessarily those of the hegemonic forces. In other words the terrorist, like the mercenary and pirate, is treated as part of a particular (rogue) states violence. Alternately, they are simply off the map.

The alternative is to begin from the epistemology of the subaltern. It is impossible to think through the modernity from any other perspective that that of colonial difference. The kritiks border thinking is a way of starting from the knowledge of those in the exteriority of the modern world order. No alternative can come from within the categories of modernity. Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]
classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years. In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern. The question of whether there is an exteriority to the modern/colonial world system Is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. It was originally proposed and carefully elaborated by Dussel in his

The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse. This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other from the ethical and epistemological perspective of a liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the systems institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This challenge might only be quasi-intelligible at first (Dussel 1996: 25), given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system (contra Habermas notion of a

the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc. ... There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination. ... From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as affirmation of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation (Dussel 1996: 31, 36, 54). 6 This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference. Both Mignolo and Dusselsee here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism in short, these continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of ,say, liberalism, Marxism, poststructuralism), not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference .....Critiques of modernity, in short, are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality. Dussels notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables the negation of the negation to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European. Integral to this effort is the rescuing of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses, of the alterity that is constitutive of modernity itself. This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other, for which Dussel coins the term, transmodernity, defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity (1996: 14, Ch. 7), a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself (2000: 473), in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization (1993: 76). In short, trans-modernity cannot be brought about from within modernity, but requires of the action and the incorporative solidarity of the subalternized groups, the objects of modernitys constitutive violence embedded in, among otherfeatures, the developmentalist fallacy. Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation. Mignolos notions of border thinking, border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes (Mignolo 2001: 9). There are, to be sure, no original thi nking traditions to which one can go back. Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals, however, the alternative is a kind of border thinking that engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge (2001: 11). Resituating Anzaldas metaphor of the border into the domain of coloniality, Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of `thinking otherwise, from the interior exteriority of the border. That is, to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology (p. 11). This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation. It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique. Instead, what he claims is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations (p. 11). Finally, while Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking. The result is a pluritopic hermeneutics (a term he seemingly adaptsfrom Pannikars diatopic hermeneutics), a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective. This is the double critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality, from the exterior ofthe modern/colonial world system. Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both displacement and departure (2000: 308), double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real. To sum up, Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). The `West and the rest in Huntingtons phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity, where `mundializacin creates new local histories remaking and readapting Western global designs .and transforming local(European) historiesfrom where such designs emerged.
communication free of domination). There are degrees of exteriority; in the last instance,

networks whose articulation will require epistemological principles I called in this book `border thinking and `border gnosis, as a rearticulation of the colonial difference:`diversality as a universal project, which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we are all equals (2000: 310, 311). There is no question, writes Mignolo (2000: 59), that Quijano, Dussel and I are reacting not only to the force of a historical imaginary but also to the actuality ofthis imaginary today. The corollary isthe need to build narrativesfrom the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towardsthe search for a different logic (22). This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking. While there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329).
`Interdependence may be the word that summarizes the break away from the idea of totality and brings about the idea of These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which colonial

Unlike globalization, mundializacin brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of cultures of transience that go against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.
global designs are necessarily transformed, thus transforming also the local histories that created them.

Cuba Terror 1NC

Taking Cuba of the terror list only consolidates a world order founded on the colonization of space instantiated in the world map of bounded nation-states, reproducing colonial knowledge through the language of the 1AC. This shortcircuits the border thinking that allows a break from the colonial structure of modernity. Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221]
The modern foundation of knowledge is territorial and imperial. By modern we mean the socio-historical organization and classification of the world founded on a macro-narrative and on a specific concept and principles of knowledge. The point of reference of modernity is the European Renaissance founded, as an idea and interpretation of a historical present, on two complementary moves: the colonization of time and the invention of the Middle Ages, and the colonization of space and the invention of America that became integrated into a Christian tripartite geo-political order: Asia, Africa and Europe. It was from and in Europe that the classification of the world emerged and not in and from Asia, Africa or America borders were created therein but of different kinds. The Middle Ages were integrated into the history of Europe, while the histories in Asia, Africa and America were denied as history. The world map drawn by Gerardus Mercator and Johannes Ortelius worked together with theology to create a zero point of observation and of knowledge: a perspective that denied all other perspectives (Castro-Gmez, 2002). Epistemological frontiers were set in place in that double move: frontiers that expelled to the outside the epistemic colonial differences (Arabic, Aymara, Hindi, Bengali, etc.). Epistemic frontiers were re-articulated in the eighteenth century with the displacement of theology and the theo-politics of knowledge by secular ego-logy and the ego-politics of knowledge. Epistemic frontiers were traced also by the creation of the imperial difference (with the Ottoman, the Chinese and the Russian empires) and the colonial difference (with Indians and Blacks in America). Both epistemic differences, colonial and imperial, were based on a racial classification of the population of the planet, a classificatory order in which those who made the classification put themselves at the top of Humanity. The
Renaissance idea of Man was conceptualized based on the paradigmatic examples of Western Christianity, Europe, and white and male subjectivity (Kant, 1798; Las Casas, 1552). Thus, from the Renaissance all the way down, the rhetoric of modernity could not have been sustained without its darker and constitutive side: the logic of coloniality. Border thinking or theorizing emerged

from and as a response to the violence (frontiers) of imperial/territorial epistemology and the rhetoric of modernity (and globalization) of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the Other and, therefore, continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as eradication of the difference. Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority; that is, of the outside created from the inside; and as such, it is always a decolonial project. Recent immigration to the imperial sites of Europe and the USA crossing the imperial and colonial differences contributes to maintaining the conditions for border thinking that emerged from the very inception of modern imperial expansion. In this regard, critical border thinking
displaces and subsumes Max Horkheimers critical theory which was and still is grounded in the experience of European internal history (Horkheimer, 1937). Critical border thinking instead is grounded in the experiences of the colonies and subaltern empires. Consequently, it provides the epistemology that was denied by imperial expansion. Critical border thinking also denies the epistemic privilege of the humanities and the social sciences the privilege of an observer that makes the rest of the

world an object of observation (from Orientalism to Area Studies). It also moves away from the post-colonial toward the
de-colonial, shifting to the geo and body-politics of knowledge. Why do we need border thinking? Where is it taking us? To the decolonial shift as a fracture of the epistemology of the zero point. Border thinking brings to the foreground

different kinds of theoretical actors and principles of knowledge that displace European modernity (which articulated the very concept of theory in the social sciences and the humanities) and empower those

who have been epistemically disempowered by the theo- and ego-politics of knowledge. The

decolonial epistemic shift is no longer grounded in Greek and Latin categories of thought that informed modern epistemology (since the Renaissance) in the six European imperial languages (Italian, Spanish and Portuguese for the Renaissance; French, English and German for the Enlightenment), but in the epistemic borders between European imperial categories and

languages and categories that modern epistemology ruled out as epistemically nonsustainable (e.g. Mandarin, Japanese, Russian, Hindi, Urdu, Aymara, Nahuatl, Wolof, Arabic, etc.). The epistemology of the zero point is managerial and it is today common to business, natural sciences, professional schools, and the social sciences. Border thinking is the epistemology of the future, without which another world will be impossible. Epistemology is woven into language and, above all, into alphabetically written languages. And languages are not something human beings have but they are part of what human beings are. As such, languages are embedded in the body and in the memories (geo-historically located) of each person. A person formed in Aymara, Hindi or Russian who has to learn the rules and principles of knowledge mainly inscribed in the
three imperial languages of the second modernity (French, English and German), would of necessity have to deal with a gap; while a person formed in German or English who learns the rules and principles of knowledge inscribed in German or English is not subject to such a gap. But there is more, since the situation is not one that can be accounted for in terms of the universal history of human beings and society. Knowledge and subjectivities have been and continue to be shaped by the colonial

and imperial differences that structured the modern/colonial world. Consider, on the one hand,

knowledge in the modern and imperial European languages and on the other hand Russian, Arabic and Mandarin. The difference here is imperial. However, they are not just different. In the modern/ colonial unconscious, they belong to

different epistemic ranks. Modern science, philosophy, and the social sciences are not grounded in Russian, Chinese and

Arabic languages. That of course does not mean that there is no thinking going on or knowledge produced in Russian, Chinese and Arabic. It means, on the contrary, that in the global distribution of intellectual and scientific labor, knowledge produced in English, French or German does not need to take into account knowledge in Russian, Chinese and Arabic. Furthermore, increasingly since the sixteenth century, knowledge in Russian, Chinese and Arabic cannot avoid intellectual production in English, French and German. Strictly speaking, societies in which Russian, Chinese and Arabic are spoken were not colonized in the way the Americas and South Asia were. Thus, any languages beyond the six imperial European ones, and their grounding in Greek and Latin, have been disqualified as languages with world-wide epistemic import. And of course, this impinges on subject formation: people who are not trusted in their thinking, are doubted in their rationality and wounded in their dignity. Border thinking then emerges from the colonial and

the imperial wound. If we consider, instead, Hindi or Aymara, the epistemic difference with modern European languages and

epistemology will be colonial. In both cases, the coloniality of knowledge and of being goes hand in hand with modernitys rhetoric of salvation. The rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality are mutually constituted and are the two sides of the same coin. Today

the shaping of subjectivity, the coloniality of being/knowledge is often described within the so-called globalization of culture, a phrase, which in the rhetoric of modernity reproduces the logic of coloniality of knowledge and of being.

And borders produce the ordering of the world that justifies securitization and the war-on-terror. The aff only guarantees reproducing the violence they criticize. Agathangelou & Ling, York University and the New School University, in 4
[Anna M. & L.h.m., Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11, International Studies Quarterly, 48] We extend these insights to notions of power, borders, security, and wealth. They do not reflect objective, compartmentalized categories, as in realist/liberal international relations theory. Nor do they function solely as ideological ramparts to a capitalist economic structure, as in reductionist Marxian analysis. Neither are they some cultural artifact with different meanings for different parties, as suggested by postmodernism. Rather, postcolonial-feminism casts the concepts of power, borders, security, and wealth as the product of a particular set of social relations, inflected by race, gender, class, and culture. Its purpose: to enable neocolonial interest and privilege in world politics. Elites and their lieutenants appeal to the collective good to mask such maneuvers. Meanwhile, they exploit the same for labor, resources, and ideological support. Herein lies the systems inherent contradiction and potential for instability. For this reason, violence and desire become, increasingly, its identifying characteristics. Violence assures elite control along the three axes of power: class-racegender. Desire motivates it. Heres how: 1. Discourse normalizes violence to sustain structural hierarchies of desire.6 This power narrative must resonate culturally to elicit attention but its logic draws from an ideologically rationalized economic infrastructure. As this paper demonstrates, both superpower state (U.S./Bush) and 9/11 terrorists (Al Qaeda/bin Laden) rely on neoliberalism, if not as discourse then

structure, to fuel their respective campaigns of imperial politics. Globalized militarization serves as one recent example.7 Both Bush and bin Laden transnationalize their respective militaries, not only to gather more allies by crossing borders but also to propagate an internationalist rhetoric that distracts attention from each camps exploitation of the masses economically, politically, religiously, and physically; 2. Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics. Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but their significance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonization proceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past to rationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the West. George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed against America but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizational discipline against all terror. (The Bush administrations semantic shift from terrorism to terror offers one small indication of this change
from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaders transgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an international coalition against terrorism for Bush; global jihad, for bin Laden; and, 3.

National desires for security based on neoliberal globalization transnationalizes violence and insecurity. By neoliberal globalization, we refer to the developmental maxims of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, U.S. Treasury, Citigroup, as well as the central banks of the worlds richest economies. These maxims come in familiar sound bites: for example, free trade benefits everyone, economies need direct foreign investment to develop, liberalization and privatization deliver a level playing field, governments should not intervene in the economy, and markets know best. Most Arabs/Muslims agree with Osama bin Ladens allegations of Western cultural annihilation due to neoliberal globalizations legacy in the Middle East (Waldman,
neoliberal, corporate strategies to design his terrorism campaign. Each camp blurs national security with neoliberal wealth such that one comes to mean the other, regardless of the outcome. Together,

2001). But neither GeorgeW. Bush nor other globalizers could recognize this grievance due to their vested interest in existing infrastructures of power and wealth. At the same time, bin Laden funds his quest for pure Islam with riches made from his familys business contracts with theWest, economic enterprises in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as the international opium trade (Robinson, 2002). Indeed, he utilizes

these constructions of privilege legitimate a particular mix of violence and desire. The Bush administration assumes universal acceptance of the nonviolability of American sovereignty despite U.S. hegemony in world politics.8 Bin Laden and Al Qaeda glorify themselves as Islamic freedom fighters or martyrs despite their appropriation of the Great Satans neoliberal methods. Both use discursive power to normalize radicalizations of identity, such as mutual accusations of evil, to serve these ends. Especially affected are those mental borders that govern the identities of daily life: that is, masculinity and femininity, insider and outsider, leader and follower, Self and Other. George W. Bush and the U.S. government invoke violence to protect that American object of desire-a democratic, capitalist way of life-from

the likes of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. The latter, in turn, are portrayed as oppressing their own society, generally, and women, specifically. Osama bin Laden seeks the same logic of violence and desire against George W. Bush and the U.S. government: that is, America and the West have raped and pillaged the Islamic world for that industrial object of desire: oil. In the process, they have lost their souls.

Also, you should be skeptical of their engagement with Cuba expanding American geopolitical influence in the region only serves to further the goals of US regional domination and the securitization of borders. Nicol, 2011 [Heather Nicol, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, Trent
University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, U.S. Hegemony in the 21st century: Cuba's Place in the regionalizing geopolitics of North America and Caribbean Countries Journal of Borderlands Studies, 23:1, 31-52, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2008.9695687] The process of U.S. hegemony in North American economies is not unique or unrelated to the larger workings of international order and world economy. The changing tenor of Canadian, U.S., and Mexican geopolitical rhetoric, couched in free trade and securitization , is related to the bigger project of condoning and supporting U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It is also closely related to the larger project of globalization in which the U.S. has been a driving force during the 20th and 21st centuries (Agnew 2005). Over the past decade, the U.S. has focused closely on defining regional parameters for U.S. hegemonic influence or extraterritorial control within North America, meaning that the shape of geo-economic and geopolitical regionalization in North America and its neighbors (the Caribbean and Central America for example) is directly related to U.S. responses to globalization issues. Indeed, there is a large literature suggesting that hegemony is central to U.S. imperialist claims to intervention at global, hemispheric, and continental levels (Slater
2004; Agnew 2003, 2005). While originally the desire for such hegemony was couched in Cold War terms regarding the right of the U.S. to intervene in Western Hemisphere affairs in general, and the need for its neighbors to support the benevolent superpower in its bid for hemispheric security as communism was contained, today such grand strategies are less obviously stated.

Rather than the nakedly aggressive military and economic agendas that characterized Cold War or later Reaganomics rhetoric, U.S. hegemony is now promoted as a civilizing mission in support of democracy, human rights, and continental (as well as global) free trade. In this sense it is not unlike
the EU mission in Eastern Europe and beyond, although the EU and U.S. differ in terms of the methods they employ. In both North America and the Caribbean, Cuba has figured prominently as a marker for changing bilateral and

multilateral relations with the U.S., as well as for new geopolitical discourses concerning the changing role of the U.S. in New World and global orders. For example, there has been policy convergence in the sense that increasingly hegemonic and U.S.-based attitudes towards Cuba are currently being adopted by Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Friendly relations have been disrupted if diplomatic ties are not. But there has also been policy divergence in others, as holding out against Helms-Burton and other U.S.
prescriptions for regime change in Cuba have also become normative for Americas neighboring countries. The underlying coherence, or consistent rationale for this apparent contradiction is given by the fact that in all cases the resulting convergence and

divergence in policies and diplomatic relations, or compliance and resistance to U.S. insistence of economic embargo and political shunning, are consciously framed to in reference to a U.S. geopolitical rhetoric. Cuba as a field of contest, or a contested arena for U.S. intervention, and therefore contested legitimacy of U.S. hegemonic claims. Thus the

real theme is the contours of resistance or support to U.S. policy in North America and the success or failure in the universalization of U.S. Cuban policy (Agnew 2005; Slater 2004; Nicol 2002b) rather than actual events in Cuba. Even as the U.S. position on Cuba (made concrete in the Helms Burton Act) continues to reinforce the strong and impermeable physical and political border the U.S. shares with Cuba, this border is not a hold-over from the Cold War . It is a dynamic and ongoing construction , embargo, political, and societal shunning on several fronts requiring policies which construct new kinds of walls
with neighboring countries as well as with Cuba itself. In this sense, NAFTA is critical to this process, although as Agnew (2003) suggests, more generally, the

criterion for this ideological borderline are structural and historical, going back to the very nature of the state system itself. This means that in even terms of its relationship to Cuba, the apparent continuity in Cuban-American relations since the turn of the 20st century to the Post Cold War period is actually quite deceptive. Significant shifts have taken place, particularly with respect to how Cuba policy has become a political marker for compliance with U.S. strategic and economic interests among North American states, and how Cuba has itself
adapted to the neoliberalization of U.S. foreign policy in terms of its own regional relationship within the Caribbean. Both of these are significant outcomes. In the case of subordinating Cuba, however, the U.S. has tackled a complex problem in that conformity to

geopolitical rhetoric is now required at a continental level. This complex relationshipU.S. hegemony and North American complicity or resistance has served to define the edges or borders of American hegemony in North America during the 21st century. Bearing this in mind, if
we look at foreign policies as important functional foundations for the construction of boundaries for a 21st century U.S. political space, then it is impossible to support the idea that economic integration can proceed without

significant structural change in the foreign policies of North America countries at all levels of engagement. The situation in North America suggests that clear convergences have occurred in the area of foreign policy, and that these shifts are situated in geopolitical events that have postdated the imposition of the NAFTA. Indeed,
Canada, Mexico, the U.S., Caribbean countries, and Cuba have been engaged in a complex and often reactive foreign policy-making process for a number of years. While U.S.-Cuba relations remain conspicuous in much Western Hemisphere discussion and foreign policy-making analysis, Canadians, Mexicans, and Caribbean nations

outside of Cuba have understood the relationship to Cuba in very different ways than their American neighbors. This has meant that Canada-Cuba relations have become part of a broader discussion about Canada-U.S.-Cuba relations, or even Western Hemisphere relations towards Cuba and the Caribbean, which continue to challenge the hegemonic perspectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. The virulent rhetoric concerning Cuba which defines much of the U.S. political position is not about Cuba per se, but about the logics of the leadership role which the U.S. has defined for itself in the Western Hemisphere, since World War II, particularly in North America and the countries immediately touching its geographical borders.

And, we must break from the idea of separate islands, but use an Archipelagic perspective of islands to expose imperialism viewing islands as isolated is the link Stratford 13 [Elaine, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Center for Environmental Studies at the
University of Adelaide, Associate Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies and Head of School at UTasmania, The Idea of the Archipelago: Contemplating Island Relations, Island Studies Journal 8(1)] Nominally a group of islands, more properly a sea studded with islands, and originally the chief sea that more commonly is known as the Aegean, the archipelago is a geographical form that invites significant productive thinking about island relations. I have been pondering why such labours to rethink island
relations anew might matter, doing so most concertedly by working alongside colleagues Elizabeth McMahon, Godfrey Baldacchino, Steve Royle, and Carol Farbotko. Together, we have put the case that creative, innovative, and timely research on islands and island futures is urgently needed. In the face of challenging changes at various scales of impact, we suggest that island peoples and

places are not served well by prevalent ideas of them as remote and dependent on oftdistant mainlands. Indeed, these tropes hamper more complete and nuanced understandings of the island condition and island prospects. Alternatively, we surmise, the idea of the archipelago suggests relations built on connection, assemblage, mobility, and multiplicity. For centuries, island worlds have been positioned as geographical entities mostly isolated and unmappableother spaces that need to be occupied, conquered, and colonized. Yet, archipelagos were connected by nautical trade routes long before European interventions.
Indeed, for Elizabeth DeLoughrey (2007), geography is an appropriate starting point to explore land/sea relationships that favoured complex patterns of migration and settlement, and that exemplify the idea that islands are the open subjects of

transoceanic imaginaries. So, too, is geography an appropriate starting point to explore mainland/island and island/island
relations, and the archipelago may be a useful material and theoretical tool in such labours. As Elizabeth McMahon has suggested to me in conversation, thinking with the archipelago may reveal multiple emancipatory narratives that

enunciate exceptions to colonizing grammars of empire that rendered islands remote, isolated and backward. Thinking with the archipelago thus may also enable island scholars and others to radically recentre positive, mobile, nomadic geopolitical and cultural orderings between and among island(er)s. This special set of papers focuses upon just such matters. Its genesis might also be read archipelagically for, in 2010, I found myself in conversation with colleague Dr Joseph Palis (North Carolina State

University) on the island of Bornholm, Denmark, at a conference of the International Small Island Studies Association. There, Joseph and I talked about our mutual interest in positioning island geographies more visibly at annual meetings of the Association of American Geographers. Thus it was that at, on the archipelagic shores of Seattle at the AAG in 2011, with Arnd Holdschlag from the University of Hamburg, we brought together several presenters to focus on the theme Reframing islandness I: critical and discursive cartographies in island worlds. This inaugural day-long session engaged thirteen scholars, notably doctoral candidates and early career researchers, who are working on diverse geographies of the Galpagos Islands, the Solomons, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, New Zealand, and on island languages, island mobilities, island censuses, statistics, and place names, tropes of tropicality, and the cartographic impulse to map island places. Delighted at the response, we determined to organize a second session at the AAG Conference on the island of Manhattan in February 2012, entitled Reframing islandness II: thinking with the archipelago. The day's sessions attracted 24 speakers and a significant audience, attesting, we think, to the growing interest in island studies. It included two panel discussions: one on islands, arts and the geographical imagination; and another on Island enclaves, Baldacchinos (2010a) monograph on offshoring strategies, creative governance, and subnational island jurisdictions. Let me now turn to the papers from the conference that comprise this special issue. In considering island movements as a means to think archipelagically, Jonathan Pugh starts from the premise that islands are deeply implicated in the contemplation of human nature and our place in the world. He then builds a compelling argument to show that

inattention to the archipelago is problematic because we live (increasingly) in a world of island-island movements and not static forms both obvious and less apparent, among them, wind turbine
arrays, industrial oil and military constellations. Graciously (but not uncritically) building on Stratford et al. (2011), and setting the scene for the papers that follow in ways that will set agenda for new scholarship, Pugh asks what does it mean to think with

the archipelago? His twin argument is that this labour will denaturalize how we think of space and place, and that it enables a focus on metamorphosis: the adaptation and transformation of material, cultural and political practices through island movements. Building in new ways on
work on the spatial turn (Pugh, 2009) and Caribbean islands (most recently, Pugh, 2012), he then applies his own critical reflections to post-colonial island movements, asking how do Caribbean people struggle with and against the

language that they have inherited, and is this language up to the task of effectively naming and renaming the New World that they inhabit? For Pugh, the archipelago provides a framework of transfiguration rather than repetition, and gives us another reason why we should not only think about, but with, islands. In a study demonstrating the ongoing value of the archive and of

meticulous historical analysis of geographical dynamics, Anyaa Anim-Addo is concerned with the Caribbean and island-to-island movements and mappings that implicate the operations of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. I have already alluded

to the importance of the idea of networks in archipelagic thinking, and for Anim-Addo a networked approach offers a useful lens through which to analyse nineteenth-century steamship services; it also provides a theoretical intersection between networked approaches to empire and island studies. Indeed, and in ways that should influence the reconceptualization or refinement of such approaches, Anim-Addo suggests that thinking archipelagically enables a sharpening of analytical focus, such that certain colonial priorities, imperatives and hierarchies that can appear flattened out through a networked approach are brought to the fore. In Anim-Addos work, such thinking has foregrounded the relationship between the maritime service and mobilities in the Caribbean (see also Anim-Addo, 2012). It has also demonstrated empirically how those charged with negotiating a transportation network within the Caribbean archipelago were forced to respond to various forms of connection and entanglement between and among islands, thus adding weight to earlier speculations advanced by Stratford et
al. (2011). Anim-Addo is able to posit that if the steamship network was a network in process part of this process was one of resolution between maritime links and archipelagic relations and invites others to develop a nuanced understanding of the significance of mobilities in colonial and postcolonial contexts.

The alternative is to begin from the epistemology of the subaltern. It is impossible to think through the modernity from any other perspective that that of colonial difference. The kritiks border thinking is a way of starting from the knowledge of those in the exteriority of the modern world order. No alternative can come from within the categories of modernity. Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]
classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years. In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern. The question of whether there is an exteriority to the modern/colonial world system Is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. It was originally proposed and carefully elaborated by Dussel in his

The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse. This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other from the ethical and epistemological perspective of a liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the systems institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This challenge might only be quasi-intelligible at first (Dussel 1996: 25), given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system (contra Habermas notion of a communication free of domination). There are degrees of exteriority; in the last instance, the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc. ... There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination. ... From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as affirmation of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation (Dussel 1996: 31, 36, 54). 6 This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference. Both Mignolo and Dusselsee here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism in short, these continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of ,say, liberalism, Marxism, poststructuralism), not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference .....Critiques of modernity, in short, are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality. Dussels notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables the negation of the negation to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European. Integral to this effort is the rescuing

of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses, of the alterity that is constitutive of modernity itself. This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other, for which Dussel coins the term, transmodernity, defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity (1996: 14, Ch. 7), a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself (2000: 473), in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization (1993: 76). In short, trans-modernity cannot be brought about from within modernity, but requires of the action and the incorporative solidarity of the subalternized groups, the objects of modernitys constitutive violence embedded in, among otherfeatures, the developmentalist fallacy. Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation. Mignolos notions of border thinking, border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes (Mignolo 2001: 9). There are, to be sure, no original thi nking traditions to which one can go back. Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals, however, the alternative is a kind of border thinking that engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge (2001: 11). Resituating Anzaldas metaphor of the border into the domain of coloniality, Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of `thinking otherwise, from the interior exteriority of the border. That is, to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology (p. 11). This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation. It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique. Instead, what he claims is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations (p. 11). Finally, while Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking. The result is a pluritopic hermeneutics (a term he seemingly adaptsfrom Pannikars diatopic hermeneutics), a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective. This is the double critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality, from the exterior ofthe modern/colonial world system. Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both displacement and departure (2000: 308), double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real. To sum up, Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). The `West and the rest in Huntingtons phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity, where `mundializacin creates new local histories remaking and readapting Western global designs .and transforming local(European) historiesfrom where such designs emerged. `Interdependence may be the word that summarizes the break away from the idea of totality and brings about the idea of networks whose articulation will require epistemological principles I called in this book `border thinking and `border gnosis, as a rearticulation of the colonial difference:`diversality as a universal project, which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we are all equals (2000: 310, 311). There is no question, writes Mignolo (2000: 59), that Quijano, Dussel and I are reacting not only to the force of a historical imaginary but also to the actuality ofthis imaginary today. The corollary isthe need to build narrativesfrom the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towardsthe search for a different logic (22). This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking. While there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329).
These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which colonial

Unlike globalization, mundializacin brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of cultures of transience that go
global designs are necessarily transformed, thus transforming also the local histories that created them.

against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.

Cuba Disposability(Tri) 1NC

{Insert cards from coloniality file} Orienting politics around the nation-state inevitably reproduces violent boundaries and borders Walker 2009 [R.B.J., Walker is a professor in the department of Political Science at the University
of Victoria and is the chief editor of the Journal of International Political Sociology, After the Globe, Before the world, pg. 77 80]
The consequence, however, can also be read in relation to all those historical struggles in which states have effectively minimized the sovereignty of the 9 people in the name of their own supremacy, whether for the long-term good 10 of the people, or for the short-term demands of some state of emergency. The danger of the modern state, we know all too well, is the potential for totalitarianism, authoritarianism, fascism, or what has often, and disturbingly, been in danger of amounting to much the same thing, the monopolistic claim to a state sovereignty sundered from, but articulated in, the name of a popular sovereignty, and

capable of effacing all claims to diversity in the name of its own collective unity. It is in this context

that we can again 17 understand much of the contemporary impetus behind claims about demo- 18 cratization, or even claims about the potentialities of a market rationality; but 19 also the sense that the claims of sovereign states to be able to provide the 20 conditions under which democratization might be possible are fundamentally 21 at odds with the administrative and disciplinary apparatus, and in the final, or 22 not so final, instance, the physical force and resort to war, they deem neces- 23 sary for the constitution of a properly democratic politics. 24 Perhaps the most important constitutive gamble of modern politics, in fact,

has been that the sovereign state would nurture rather than devour its citizens. 26 Contemporary

references to the security dilemma now tend to be dominated by analogies between the structurally driven competition among states coexisting in a system of states and Hobbes account of a world of free and 29 equal (modern, liberal) individuals in an abstract state of nature, but 30 Hobbes major contribution in this respect may well be his commentary on 31 the ways in which the sovereignty he insists must be constituted so as to pro- 32 tect free and equal individuals is not exactly guaranteed to live up to its pro- 33 mise.

States are a source of insecurity precisely because of the way they promise to provide security. The subject of security, as I have put it elsewhere, is precisely the modern subject that must be secured. States encourage claims about freedoms within their territory because to be within a territory is to be under law, under necessity and always subject to the exception that enables the rule. Again,
many are sufficiently privileged to take a gamble of trusting in the freedoms and securities promised by the modern state, but it is also a gamble that very many people have lost, and lost very badly. 41

There have been suspicions,

third ,

about the

capacity of the modern state to fulfill its promise to provide a home for modern politics, even when struggles 43 to sustain powerful institutions and practices of popular sovereignty have 44 been relatively effective. These suspicions can also be traced back a long way. They are expressed in a broad range of claims about the increasingly problematic status of conceptions of the political within the modern state, 2 given various suspicions about the plausibility of any sharp distinction 3 between the internal spaces of the modern state and the spaces of the inter- 4 national, of the modern system of states, beyond. Difficulties arise here not in 5 relation to the ambivalences and tensions between politics and something else, 6 or to the capacity of states to impose their understanding of collective neces- 7 sities on everyone and everything, but to the capacity of states to demarcate a 8 clear limit to their capacities and jurisdictions, especially in relation to the 9 claims of the system of sovereign states, and the claims of that system to 10 express rights and needs that might be attributed to humanity in general. 11 It is this third group of suspicions that has come to be of most pressing 12 concern in contemporary political life, though they implicate and complicate 13 the other two sorts of suspicion in various ways.23 They also explain much of 14 the contemporary impetus both to reimagine where and what we take politics 15 to be, as well as to wish that politics would somehow go away, or to suspect 16 that politics is indeed already in the process of coming to an end. If we are to 17 make any sense of what is at stake in contemporary calls to reimagine the 18 political imagination, it is now necessary to pay a lot more attention to what happens on the line that effects an apparently sharp distinction between two distinct spaces: the domestic spaces of the territorial state, and the foreign spaces of the modern system of states, each with their own accounts of temporal and political possibility a line that also assumes a capacity to draw further lines between the modern subject and other subjects/sovereigns and between the modern system of states and the wider world beyond. The dou- 25 bles and triples of modern political life are easily multiplied.24 26 To take this line for granted is precisely not to affirm a set of realities that simply exist in the world, and which, fortunately or tragically, resist any attempt to imagine something different. It is to affirm an ensemble of historical and abstractly formulated but massively embodied accounts of what it must mean to divide the world, to discriminate between that which is included and that which is excluded,

that which is friend and that which is enemy, that which is society and that which is anarchy, that which is normal and that which is exceptional: accounts that must be affirmed authorized, legitimized as the only condition under which worldly realities and political possibilities can properly be engaged. What counts for reality and necessity in modern political life, and

thus what works to both enable and constrain the modern political imagination, has to be understood in the first instance as an enactment of an historically specific imagination of political possibility, an imagination that knows how to draw the line: that knows both how to

discriminate and how to authorize the discriminations that are enacted by sovereign acts of discrimination. This enactment literally and figuratively centres on the practices of the modern state and its subjects; on all their potentialities and all their dangers. 44 It especially centres on the discriminations and authorizations enacted andexpressed in the practices and institutions of modern state sovereignty practices which simultaneously draw the line in territorial space and differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate practices within the space they delimit. It is in relation to the sovereign practices of the modern state that we are

supposed to understand what it means to draw the line: to distinguish between what is legal and illegal, possible and impossible, realistic and utopian, the properly political and the merely economic, civil or private internally and the also merely international, or perhaps theological, externally. The most important decisions about modern political life about which and what kinds of people get to be counted among the included, about what has to be done to secure the inclusion, about what ought to be done once these inclusions are secured and normalized, about who gets to decide when previously accepted decisions are to be redecided or suspended , about who gets to decide who gets to make, and make binding, judgements about these and all other decisions are made in relation to this line, this border that is so much more than a physical demarcation on earthly topography. It is the sense that this line has become a little problematic in some contexts and radically uncertain in others that has undermined so many convictions not only about what it now means to engage in political life, but also of what it would mean to struggle for something better, for something more democratic, for something recognizably political in an age in which suspicions about what now counts for politics have become quite intense. 22 To draw attention to contemporary suspicions about the distinction 23 between the state and the system of states, the properly political and the 24 merely international, however, is to run into extensive analytical difficulties. 25 Not least, the modern disciplines of knowledge that seek to engage with 26 modern politics and its imaginative possibilities are already carefully situated 27 on either side of the line that distinguishes the political from the international. 28 Moreover, they are themselves largely constituted through the assumption that this line must be drawn. They tend to observe both its discriminations and its authorizations as a natural condition rather than as an historical achievement, an ongoing practice, and an ongoing problem. In effect, they 32 assume what they are now increasingly asked to examine. Many contemporary attempts to reimagine the political imaginations likewise seek to do so from either side of this line and, unsurprisingly, tend to both reproduce and reauthorize the line they seek to evade, transcend or simply ignore. Although the line between the political and the international is widely judged to be increasingly problematic, and although questions about political life supposedly settled in relation to it are now asked with renewed urgency, itis a line that cannot be evaded, transcended or ignored. As a constitutive limit of modern politics in territorial space, it is also a constitutive limit of both modern political practice and the modern political imagination. As a 42 demarcation, however, it is also the site of a mutual production, and much of 43 what is interesting about it concerns the very active and diverse practices of 44 mutual production that are enabled once the demarcation has been made. 45 Many of these practices hinge on the ways in which the demarcation of an 1 outside that affirms an inside produces a powerful sense of what it must mean 2 to escape the inside: of what it means to escape from the modern achievement 3 of a spatially delimited political community always seeking to go beyond 4 what has already been achieved in time. Consequently, if modern political life is in need of reimagination, attempts to do so on terms uncritically assuming a stance on either side of the line that sets the limits of the modern political imagination will necessarily run into irresolvable difficulties.

And, we must break from the idea of separate islands, but use an Archipelagic perspective of islands to expose imperialism viewing islands as isolated is the link Stratford 13 [Elaine, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Center for Environmental Studies at the

University of Adelaide, Associate Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies and Head of School at UTasmania, The Idea of the Archipelago: Contemplating Island Relations, Island Studies Journal 8(1)] Nominally a group of islands, more properly a sea studded with islands, and originally the chief sea that more commonly is known as the Aegean, the archipelago is a geographical form that invites significant productive thinking about island relations. I have been pondering why such labours to rethink island
relations anew might matter, doing so most concertedly by working alongside colleagues Elizabeth McMahon, Godfrey Baldacchino, Steve Royle, and Carol Farbotko. Together, we have put the case that creative, innovative, and timely research on islands and island futures is urgently needed. In the face of challenging changes at various scales of impact, we suggest that island peoples and

places are not served well by prevalent ideas of them as remote and dependent on oft-

distant mainlands. Indeed, these tropes hamper more complete and nuanced understandings of the island condition and island prospects. Alternatively, we surmise, the idea of the archipelago suggests relations built on connection, assemblage, mobility, and multiplicity. For centuries, island worlds have been positioned as geographical entities mostly isolated and unmappableother spaces that need to be occupied, conquered, and colonized. Yet, archipelagos were connected by nautical trade routes long before European interventions.
Indeed, for Elizabeth DeLoughrey (2007), geography is an appropriate starting point to explore land/sea relationships that favoured complex patterns of migration and settlement, and that exemplify the idea that islands are the open subjects of

transoceanic imaginaries. So, too, is geography an appropriate starting point to explore mainland/island and island/island

relations, and the archipelago may be a useful material and theoretical tool in such labours. As Elizabeth McMahon has suggested to me in conversation, thinking with the archipelago may reveal multiple emancipatory narratives that

enunciate exceptions to colonizing grammars of empire that rendered islands remote, isolated and backward. Thinking with the archipelago thus may also enable island scholars and others to radically recentre positive, mobile, nomadic geopolitical and cultural orderings between and among island(er)s. This special set of papers focuses upon just such matters. Its genesis might also be read archipelagically for, in 2010, I found myself in conversation with colleague Dr Joseph Palis (North Carolina State

University) on the island of Bornholm, Denmark, at a conference of the International Small Island Studies Association. There, Joseph and I talked about our mutual interest in positioning island geographies more visibly at annual meetings of the Association of American Geographers. Thus it was that at, on the archipelagic shores of Seattle at the AAG in 2011, with Arnd Holdschlag from the University of Hamburg, we brought together several presenters to focus on the theme Reframing islandness I: critical and discursive cartographies in island worlds. This inaugural day-long session engaged thirteen scholars, notably doctoral candidates and early career researchers, who are working on diverse geographies of the Galpagos Islands, the Solomons, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, New Zealand, and on island languages, island mobilities, island censuses, statistics, and place names, tropes of tropicality, and the cartographic impulse to map island places. Delighted at the response, we determined to organize a second session at the AAG Conference on the island of Manhattan in February 2012, entitled Reframing islandness II: thinking with the archipelago. The day's sessions attracted 24 speakers and a significant audience, attesting, we think, to the growing interest in island studies. It included two panel discussions: one on islands, arts and the geographical imagination; and another on Island enclaves, Baldacchinos (2010a) monograph on offshoring strategies, creative governance, and subnational island jurisdictions. Let me now turn to the papers from the conference that comprise this special issue. In considering island movements as a means to think archipelagically, Jonathan Pugh starts from the premise that islands are deeply implicated in the contemplation of human nature and our place in the world. He then builds a compelling argument to show that

inattention to the archipelago is problematic because we live (increasingly) in a world of island-island movements and not static forms both obvious and less apparent, among them, wind turbine

arrays, industrial oil and military constellations. Graciously (but not uncritically) building on Stratford et al. (2011), and setting the scene for the papers that follow in ways that will set agenda for new scholarship, Pugh asks what does it mean to think with

the archipelago? His twin argument is that this labour will denaturalize how we think of space and place, and that it enables a focus on metamorphosis: the adaptation and transformation of material, cultural and political practices through island movements. Building in new ways on
work on the spatial turn (Pugh, 2009) and Caribbean islands (most recently, Pugh, 2012), he then applies his own critical reflections to post-colonial island movements, asking how do Caribbean people struggle with and against the

language that they have inherited, and is this language up to the task of effectively naming and renaming the New World that they inhabit? For Pugh, the archipelago provides a framework of transfiguration rather than repetition, and gives us another reason why we should not only think about, but with, islands. In a study demonstrating the ongoing value of the archive and of
meticulous historical analysis of geographical dynamics, Anyaa Anim-Addo is concerned with the Caribbean and island-to-island movements and mappings that implicate the operations of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. I have already alluded

to the importance of the idea of networks in archipelagic thinking, and for Anim-Addo a networked approach offers a useful lens through which to analyse nineteenth-century steamship services; it also provides a theoretical intersection between networked approaches to empire and island studies. Indeed, and in ways that should influence the reconceptualization or refinement of such approaches, Anim-Addo suggests that thinking archipelagically enables a sharpening of analytical focus, such that certain colonial priorities, imperatives and hierarchies that can appear flattened out through a networked approach are brought to the fore. In Anim-Addos work, such thinking has foregrounded the relationship between the maritime service and mobilities in the Caribbean (see also Anim-Addo, 2012). It has also demonstrated empirically how those charged with negotiating a transportation network within the Caribbean archipelago were forced to respond to various forms of connection and entanglement between and among islands, thus adding weight to earlier speculations advanced by Stratford et
al. (2011). Anim-Addo is able to posit that if the steamship network was a network in process part of this process was one of

resolution between maritime links and archipelagic relations and invites others to develop a nuanced understanding of the significance of mobilities in colonial and postcolonial contexts.

The alternative is to begin from the epistemology of the subaltern. It is impossible to think through the modernity from any other perspective that that of colonial difference. The kritiks border thinking is a way of starting from the knowledge of those in the exteriority of the modern world order. No alternative can come from within the categories of modernity. Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]
classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years. In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern. The question of whether there is an exteriority to the modern/colonial world system Is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. It was originally proposed and carefully elaborated by Dussel in his

The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse. This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other from the ethical and epistemological perspective of a liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the systems institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This challenge might only be quasi-intelligible at first (Dussel 1996: 25), given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system (contra Habermas notion of a communication free of domination). There are degrees of exteriority; in the last instance, the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc. ... There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination. ... From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as affirmation of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation (Dussel 1996: 31, 36, 54). 6 This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference. Both Mignolo and Dusselsee here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism in short, these continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of ,say, liberalism, Marxism, poststructuralism), not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference .....Critiques of modernity, in short, are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality. Dussels notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables the negation of the negation to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European. Integral to this effort is the rescuing of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses, of the alterity that is constitutive of modernity itself. This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other, for which Dussel coins the term, transmodernity, defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity (1996: 14, Ch. 7), a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself (2000: 473), in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization (1993: 76). In short, trans-modernity cannot be brought about from within modernity, but requires of the action and the incorporative solidarity of the subalternized groups, the objects of modernitys constitutive violence embedded in, among otherfeatures, the developmentalist fallacy. Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation. Mignolos notions of border thinking,

border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes (Mignolo 2001: 9). There are, to be sure, no original thi nking traditions to which one can go back. Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals, however, the alternative is a kind of border thinking that engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge (2001: 11). Resituating Anzaldas metaphor of the border into the domain of coloniality, Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of `thinking otherwise, from the interior exteriority of the border. That is, to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology (p. 11). This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation. It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique. Instead, what he claims is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations (p. 11). Finally, while Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking. The result is a pluritopic hermeneutics (a term he seemingly adaptsfrom Pannikars diatopic hermeneutics), a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective. This is the double critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality, from the exterior ofthe modern/colonial world system. Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both displacement and departure (2000: 308), double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real. To sum up, Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). The `West and the rest in Huntingtons phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity, where `mundializacin creates new local histories remaking and readapting Western global designs .and transforming local(European) historiesfrom where such designs emerged. `Interdependence may be the word that summarizes the break away from the idea of totality and brings about the idea of networks whose articulation will require epistemological principles I called in this book `border thinking and `border gnosis, as a rearticulation of the colonial difference:`diversality as a universal project, which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we are all equals (2000: 310, 311). There is no question, writes Mignolo (2000: 59), that Quijano, Dussel and I are reacting not only to the force of a historical imaginary but also to the actuality ofthis imaginary today. The corollary isthe need to build narrativesfrom the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towardsthe search for a different logic (22). This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking. While there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329).
These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which coloni al

Unlike globalization, mundializacin brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of cultures of transience that go against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.
global designs are necessarily transformed, thus transforming also the local histories that created them.

Cuba Policy(Tri) 1NC

First development is just a replacement for the white mans burden because it reinforces the colinal relationship through the state and neoliberlaims. Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in 11[Ramon, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and

Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(1)] So far, the history of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal worldsystem has privileged the culture, knowledge, and epistemology produced by the West (Spivak 1988 ; Mignolo 2000). No culture in the world remained untouched by European modernity. There is no absolute outside to this system. The monologism and monotopic global design of the West relates to other cultures and peoples from a position of superiority and is deaf toward the cosmologies and epistemologies of the nonWestern world. The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the socalled savages and barbarians in the 16th century, followed by the imposition of "the white mans burden" and "civilizing mission" in the 18th and 19th century, the imposition of the "developmentalist project" in the 20th century and, more recently, the imperial project of military interventions under the rhetoric of "democracy" and "human rights" in the 21st century, have all been imposed by militarism and violence under the rhetoric of modernity of saving the other from its own barbarianisms. Two responses to the Eurocentric colonial imposition are Third World nationalisms and fundamentalisms. Nationalism provides Eurocentric solutions to an Eurocentric global problem. It reproduces an internal coloniality of power within each nationstate and reifies the nationstate as the privileged location of social change (Grosfoguel 1996). Struggles above and below the nationstate are not considered in nationalist political strategies. Moreover, nationalist responses to global capitalism reinforce the nationstate as the political institutional form per excellence of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal worldsystem. In this sense, nationalism is complicit with Eurocentric thinking and political structures. On the other hand, Third World fundamentalisms of different kinds respond with the rhetoric of an essentialist "pure outside space" or "absolute exteriority" to modernity. They are "anti modern modern" forces that reproduce the binary oppositions of Eurocentric thinking. If Eurocentric thinking claims "democracy" to be a western natural attribute, Third World
fundamentalisms accept this Eurocentric premise and claim that democracy has nothing to do with the non West. Thus, it is an inherent European attribute imposed by the West. Both deny the fact that many of the elements that we consider to be part of modernity, such as democracy, were formed in a global relation between the West and the nonWest. Europeans took a lot of its utopian thinking from the non Western historical systems they encounter in the colonies and appropriated them as part of Eurocentred modernity. Third World fundamentalisms respond to the imposition of Eurocentred modernity as a global/imperial design with an antimodern modernity that is as Eurocentric, hierarchical, authoritarian and antidemocratic as the former. One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter Mignolo, following Chicano(a) thinkers such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987) and Jose David Saldivar (1997), calls "critical border thinking" (Mignolo 2000). Critical

border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefine the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, economic relations
beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not an anti modern fundamentalism. It is the decolonial transmodern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity.

And, you should be skeptical of their engagement with Cuba expanding American geopolitical influence in the region only serves to further the goals of US hegemony and the securitization of borders.
Nicol, 2011 [Heather Nicol, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, U.S. Hegemony in the 21st century: Cuba's Place in the

regionalizing geopolitics of North America and Caribbean Countries Journal of Borderlands Studies, 23:1, 31-52, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2008.9695687] The process of U.S. hegemony in North American economies is not unique or unrelated to the larger workings of international order and world economy. The changing tenor of Canadian, U.S., and Mexican geopolitical rhetoric, couched in free trade and securitization , is related to the bigger project of condoning and supporting U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It is also closely related to the larger project of globalization in which the U.S. has been a driving force during the 20th and 21st centuries (Agnew 2005). Over the past decade, the U.S. has focused closely on defining regional parameters for U.S. hegemonic influence or extraterritorial control within North America, meaning that the shape of geo-economic and geopolitical regionalization in North America and its neighbors (the Caribbean and Central America for example) is directly related to U.S. responses to globalization issues. Indeed, there is a large literature suggesting that hegemony is central to U.S. imperialist claims to intervention at global, hemispheric, and continental levels (Slater
2004; Agnew 2003, 2005). While originally the desire for such hegemony was couched in Cold War terms regarding the right of the U.S. to intervene in Western Hemisphere affairs in general, and the need for its neighbors to support the benevolent superpower in its bid for hemispheric security as communism was contained, today such grand strategies are less obviously stated.

Rather than the nakedly aggressive military and economic agendas that characterized Cold War or later Reaganomics rhetoric, U.S. hegemony is now promoted as a civilizing mission in support of democracy, human rights, and continental (as well as global) free trade. In this sense it is not unlike
the EU mission in Eastern Europe and beyond, although the EU and U.S. differ in terms of the methods they employ. In both North America and the Caribbean, Cuba has figured prominently as a marker for changing bilateral and

multilateral relations with the U.S., as well as for new geopolitical discourses concerning the changing role of the U.S. in New World and global orders. For example, there has been policy convergence in the sense that increasingly hegemonic and U.S.-based attitudes towards Cuba are currently being adopted by Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Friendly relations have been disrupted if diplomatic ties are not. But there has also been policy divergence in others, as holding out against Helms-Burton and other U.S.
prescriptions for regime change in Cuba have also become normative for Americas neighboring countries. The underlying coherence, or consistent rationale for this apparent contradiction is given by the fact that in all cases the resulting convergence and

divergence in policies and diplomatic relations, or compliance and resistance to U.S. insistence of economic embargo and political shunning, are consciously framed to in reference to a U.S. geopolitical rhetoric. Cuba as a field of contest, or a contested arena for U.S. intervention, and therefore contested legitimacy of U.S. hegemonic claims. Thus the

real theme is the contours of resistance or support to U.S. policy in North America and the success or failure in the universalization of U.S. Cuban policy (Agnew 2005; Slater 2004; Nicol 2002b) rather than actual events in Cuba. Even as the U.S. position on Cuba (made concrete in the Helms Burton Act) continues to reinforce the strong and impermeable physical and political border the U.S. shares with Cuba, this border is not a hold-over from the Cold War . It is a dynamic and ongoing construction , embargo, political, and societal shunning on several fronts requiring policies which construct new kinds of walls
with neighboring countries as well as with Cuba itself. In this sense, NAFTA is critical to this process, although as Agnew (2003) suggests, more generally, the

criterion for this ideological borderline are structural and historical, going back to the very nature of the state system itself. This means that in even terms of its relationship to Cuba, the apparent continuity in Cuban-American relations since the turn of the 20st century to the Post Cold War period is actually quite deceptive. Significant shifts have taken place, particularly with respect to how Cuba policy has become a political marker for compliance with U.S. strategic and economic interests among North American states, and how Cuba has itself
adapted to the neoliberalization of U.S. foreign policy in terms of its own regional relationship within the Caribbean. Both of these are significant outcomes. In the case of subordinating Cuba, however, the U.S. has tackled a complex problem in that conformity to

geopolitical rhetoric is now required at a continental level. This complex relationshipU.S. hegemony and North American complicity or resistance has served to define the edges or

borders of American hegemony in North America during the 21st century. Bearing this in mind, if we look at foreign policies as important functional foundations for the construction of boundaries for a 21st century U.S. political space, then it is impossible to support the idea that economic integration can proceed without significant structural change in the foreign policies of North America countries at all levels of engagement. The situation in North America suggests that clear convergences have occurred in the area of foreign policy, and that these shifts are situated in geopolitical events that have postdated the imposition of the NAFTA. Indeed,
Canada, Mexico, the U.S., Caribbean countries, and Cuba have been engaged in a complex and often reactive foreign policy-making process for a number of years. While U.S.-Cuba relations remain conspicuous in much Western Hemisphere discussion and foreign policy-making analysis, Canadians, Mexicans, and Caribbean nations

outside of Cuba have understood the relationship to Cuba in very different ways than their American neighbors. This has meant that Canada-Cuba relations have become part of a broader discussion about Canada-U.S.-Cuba relations, or even Western Hemisphere relations towards Cuba and the Caribbean, which continue to challenge the hegemonic perspectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. The virulent rhetoric concerning Cuba which defines much of the U.S. political position is not about Cuba per se, but about the logics of the leadership role which the U.S. has defined for itself in the Western Hemisphere, since World War II, particularly in North America and the countries immediately touching its geographical borders.

Next, International law legitimizes colonial cartographies and historical borders which perpetuate the logic of colonial domination Mahmud 2010 [Tayyab, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle
University School of Law, COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES AND POSTCOLONIAL BORDERS: THE UNENDING WAR IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN, pg.1] Many of todays pervasive and intractable security and nation-building dilemmas issue from the dissonance between the prescribed model of territorially bounded nation-states and the imprisonment of postcolonial polities in territorial straitjackets bequeathed by colonial cartographies. With a focus on the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the epicenter of the prolonged war in the region, this article explores the enduring ramifications of the mutually constitutive role of colonialism and modern law. The global reach of colonial rule reordered subjects and reconfigured space. Fixed territorial demarcations of colonial possessions played a pivotal role in this process. Nineteenth century constructs of international law, geography, geopolitics, and the frontier, fashioned in the age of empire, were interwoven in the enabling frame that made the drawing of colonial borders like the
Durand Line possible. Imperatives of colonial rule and compulsions of imperial rivalries positioned these demarcations that often cut across age-old cultural and historical social units. Postcolonial states inherited these demarcations and, with them, a

host of endemic political and security afflictions. Modern international law, which in its incipient stage lent license to colonial rule, today legitimates colonial cartographies, thereby accentuating postcolonial dilemmas of nation-building and territorial integrity. By freeze-framing inherited colonial borders, international law forces disparate people to circumscribe their political aspirations within predetermined territorial bounds, precluding political and territorial arrangements in tune with their aspirations. To silence the questions that rise from colonial territorial demarcations, international law raises the specter of disorder. It seeks to preserve order, even an unjust and dysfunctional one. In the process, international law betrays a deeper affliction that plagues it - its refusal to squarely face its complicity in colonial domination accentuates its inability to resolve todays international disputes procreated by colonial cartographies.

The process of state driven neoliberal practice uses inclusionary ontological enframing to reducing human existence to particular modalities of potential contribution to the marketthis idea constitutes ontological violence and the reduction of the infinite possibility of being- ontologically positioned to serve the interests of profit-making Joronen 2013, (Mikko, Department of Geography and Geology, Geography Section, University of Turku, Finland,

Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism, 3/21/13, 7/28/13|Ashwin) As I have suggested,52 ontological monopolisations constitute vio- lence through two reciprocally

conditioning mechanisms. First, through the oblivion of the mechanism of appropriation (Ereignis), which works by intrinsically concealing the openness of being and its reservoir of ungrounded possibilities; and second, through the violence intrinsic in par- ticular historical modes of revealing, for instance, the ontological ordering of entities in neoliberal enframing. The first mechanism of violence appar-

ently refers to the fundamental (im)possibility for the different forms of life to emerge. It is a question concerning particular appropriations of being, which take place by monopolising their own mode of revealing, thus refusing their intrinsic condition of possibility, the abyssal richness of open being. The sec- ond mechanism of violence, in turn, is related to the designated positions, such as the neoliberal

enframing, which violently enframe human existence and the revealing of the real to particular modalities of ontology. At the level of the first mechanism, neoliberal fabrication of particular mode of existence takes

advantage of what I have discussed, by following Heidegger, the ontological ambiguity of being, its happening as a concealing- revealing.53 Accordingly, while disclosing a peculiar mode of existence, Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 366 Mikko Joronen the appropriation of being always conceals the open possibility for the other modes of revealing to come about. Such concealment is an intrin- sic necessity for all revealing to take place: all modes of revealing conceal their originary source, the inexhaustible plenitude of open being. Neoliberal governmentality, however, follows the logic of violent mono-politics and complete grounding of the

revealing of things to the point of abandoning the possibility for ontological change. It remains solely withdrawn to the optimised arrangement of ontic realities: it concentrates on the calculative

ordering of things (beings), and as a result, hides the ontological ques- tion concerning its own mode of revealing (being). Neoliberalisation thus covers not only the ontological mechanism of concealing-revealing, but its own ontological finitude. By monopolising its own modality of revealing, neoliberal enframing veils its own finitude, its nature as a finite Event of appropriation (das Ereignis), thus passing the originary openness of being into oblivion. The latter mechanism of ontological violence, in turn, refers to the inner logic of neoliberal enframing. Neoliberalisation operates, first, by reducing political capabilities of individuals to the

internalised rule of the maximum economy, but also by moulding all things into reserves of profits. First of all, neoliberalisation violently enframes human existence into bare reserves of human capital, which are increasingly used by states in their tactics to succeed in global competition. The neoliberal state, governing its popu- lation by the means of encouraging economically calculating subjectivity, is not established out of the violent act of territorial inclusion and order, but above all, out of the violent fact of reducing human existence into usable capital. Second, as a drive to reveal things as profitable reserves, neoliberalisation violently divests natural entities from their abrupt

happen- ing and phenomenological richness of revealing. Altogether, such reductions constitute the post-political situation of neoliberal governmentality: they cre- ate a world of technical solutions and politics-free zones abrogating the

politics of ontological revealing. The depoliticising conduct of the neoliberal state is an ultimate political act, which paradoxically establishes an anti- political abrogation of all political acts through the concealment of the politics of ontological possibility. Such ontological mono-politics thus inter- twines with the first mechanism of ontological violence: by fabricating the real, including human existence, for the use of economic calculations and profits, neoliberal governmentality monopolises a particular mode of reveal- ing, and thus, fades the ontological openness of being and its finite Event (Ereignis) to the background. What remains excluded in the process of
neoliberal enframing, what remains outside of its framework, is evidently no-thing ontic, but the ontological openness of being. As the critical explorations of neoliberalism in recent geographical literature have emphasised, mainly by leaning on Marx, Harvey and a set of interpretations of Foucault, neoliberalism should Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013

be conceptualised as an open and unpredictable process of enclosure, as a complex set of logics of inclusion and exclusion operating through a variety of spatial territories and networks.54 Instead of a fixed set of doctrines and practices, neoliberalisation is conceptualised as a contingent process that works by enclosing a variety of subjects, practices, technolo- gies and materialities through different, even conflicting, rationalities and spatialities. Nevertheless, even as delegate contributions as these seem to fall short on scrutinising the ontological characteristics
Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality 367

involved in the pro- cess of neoliberalisation, not to mention the evident absence of Heideggers work, which also Foucault, though with cryptic and non-explicated man- ner, admitted as being a central influence on his own thinking.55 Although neoliberalism is conceptualised as a flexible and contingent process emerg- ing through the unlimited number of unpredictable enclosures, from the Heideggerian

perspective, neoliberalism

is not so much a dialectical pro- cess of inclusion and exclusion,56 but a process of ontological mono-politics enframing the real as such in terms of available, usable, orderable, and make- able reserve. Instead of exclusion, neoliberal enframing works through total inclusion, where every-thing is revealed as having the potential to become utilised. Things escaping the measures
of neoliberal enframing are revealed, not as excluded, but as not-yet-enframed-and-utilised reserves. Neoliberal enframing is hence a process of ontological inclusion an ontological drive towards the complete economic usability of things, where this drive in itself

is never under suspect.

The alternative is to begin from the epistemology of the subaltern. It is impossible to think through the modernity from any other perspective that that of colonial difference. The kritiks border thinking is a way of starting from the knowledge of those in the exteriority of the modern world order. No alternative can come from within the categories of modernity. Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]
classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years. In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern. The question of whether there is an exteriority to the modern/colonial world system Is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. It was originally proposed and carefully elaborated by Dussel in his

The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse. This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other from the ethical and epistemological perspective of a liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the systems institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This challenge might only be quasi-intelligible at first (Dussel 1996: 25), given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system (contra Habermas notion of a communication free of domination). There are degrees of exteriority; in the last instance, the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc. ... There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination. ... From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as affirmation of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation (Dussel 1996: 31, 36, 54). 6 This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference. Both Mignolo and Dusselsee here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism in short, these continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of ,say, liberalism, Marxism, poststructuralism), not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference .....Critiques of modernity, in short, are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality. Dussels notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables the negation of the negation to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European. Integral to this effort is the rescuing of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses, of the alterity that is constitutive of modernity itself. This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other, for which Dussel coins the term, transmodernity, defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity (1996: 14, Ch. 7), a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself (2000: 473), in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization (1993: 76). In short, trans-modernity cannot be brought

about from within modernity, but requires of the action and the incorporative solidarity of the subalternized groups, the objects of modernitys constitutive violence embedded in, among otherfeatures, the developmentalist fallacy. Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation. Mignolos notions of border thinking, border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes (Mignolo 2001: 9). There are, to be sure, no original thi nking traditions to which one can go back. Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals, however, the alternative is a kind of border thinking that engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge (2001: 11). Resituating Anzaldas metaphor of the border into the domain of coloniality, Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of `thinking otherwise, from the interior exteriority of the border. That is, to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology (p. 11). This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation. It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique. Instead, what he claims is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations (p. 11). Finally, while Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking. The result is a pluritopic hermeneutics (a term he seemingly adaptsfrom Pannikars diatopic hermeneutics), a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective. This is the double critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality, from the exterior ofthe modern/colonial world system. Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both displacement and departure (2000: 308), double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real. To sum up, Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). The `West and the rest in Huntingtons phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity, where `mundializacin creates new local histories remaking and readapting Western global designs .and transforming local(European) historiesfrom where such designs emerged. `Interdependence may be the word that summarizes the break away from the idea of totality and brings about the idea of networks whose articulation will require epistemological principles I called in this book `border thinking and `border gnosis, as a rearticulation of the colonial difference:`diversality as a universal project, which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we are all equals (2000: 310, 311). There is no question, writes Mignolo (2000: 59), that Quijano, Dussel and I are reacting not only to the force of a historical imaginary but also to the actuality ofthis imaginary today. The corollary isthe need to build narrativesfrom the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towardsthe search for a different logic (22). This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking. While there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329).
These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which colonial

Unlike globalization, mundializacin brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of cultures of transience that go against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.
global designs are necessarily transformed, thus transforming also the local histories that created them.

Labor(Survivors) 1NC
First, the emergence of the nation-state in Latin America was merely a switch from formal to informal colonization in order to extract wealth and resoruces from the global south. The affirmatives call on the state to moderate anticapitalism merely reinforces the foundation of neoliberal globalization. Anderson, School of Geography and Centre for International Borders Research Queens University Belfast In 5 [james, Borders, fixes and empires: Territoriality in the new imperialism, Centre for International Borders Research]
The historical switch from formal empires to informal ones operating through independent states was made possible by capitalisms transformation in how surplus could be extracted from foreign labour. In pre-capitalist societies it necessitated direct political control. As Justin Rosenberg (1994) has shown, Europes empires overseas initially combined slave labour with territorial possession: the Spanish operated mines in Spanish territories, Dutch plantations were in Dutch colonies, British in British, and so forth. The transformation to present-day foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic globalization across independent territories was long and complicated, but it depends on the partial separation of politics and economics which arises from within the capitalist mode of production and is unique to it (Wood 1995/1981). This partial separation or contradictory unity of politics/economics arises from the way in which economic surpluses are extracted from the direct producers (Wood 1995/1981). In pre-capitalist modes of production economic surpluses were typically extracted from
the producers (e.g., slaves, serfs) by extra-economic means: the direct use of physical force and/or political and ideological, including religious, persuasion, in for example slave-owning and feudal societies or ones ruled by priestly castes. In sharp contrast, surpluses

in capitalism are generally extracted from the free labour of the producers (workers) through the economic operations of the free market, with the politics of physical enforcement apparently absent from the economics of the production process and market exchange. However, the politics/economics separation is only partial. In reality, or despite appearances, politics and physical force are still used, but indirectly rather than directly. They have not been removed or rendered unnecessary but are only displaced to the realm of the national state which acts as the enforcer of property rights and the rule of law, without which economic production and the so-called free market could not operate. There is no such thing as capitalist production or a market which is free of state support and the force needed to protect property; and more specifically to exclude workers from ownership or use of the means of production (e.g., land, machinery, raw materials) on their own behalf, an exclusion which leaves them with little option but to sell their labour to others in the market. But this politics of force is less direct or transparent (than in e.g., slavery or feudalism) because it is displaced from the immediate economic sphere of production and exchange to the political sphere of the state. This abstract formulation has a simple clarity which cuts through the complexities to highlight the importance of the separation as the capitalist pre-condition for: (a) national state sovereignty and economic globalization as opposite sides of the same coin; (b) the relatively harmonious co-existence of one global economy but many national states; and (c) the historical switch from formal to informal empire. But we need to put some flesh on the bare bones of the argument, and re-formulate the separation in terms of geo-politics and a presence/absence of democracy its presence in the political realm within state borders, and its absence both from economic production and the market, and from the transnational sphere beyond and across borders (Anderson 2001a; Anderson 2002). Democracy hinges on borders but borders themselves are generally undemocratic.

Their transnationalism results in increased nationalism and reifies borders Faist 2010 [Thomas, Professor, Transnational, Development & Migration Studies, Diaspora and
Diaspora and Transnationalism Transnationalism, pg. 14-16]
First, all cross-border concepts refer to the importance of cross-border or even deterritorialised politics, economics and culture. Yet, diaspora and transnational approaches emphasise intense connections to national or local

territories, especially in the case of migrants. For example, the lobbying that Kurdish migrant organisations do may take place at the and are thus also local or national in their focus and goals (see Lyons 2006). Second, there is also no claim

European Parliament in Brussels, but its focus is on local issues, such as Kurdish autonomy in Turkey or the right to organise in European Union member states. In this way, cross-border social phenomena have a clear territorial reference that a global or world consciousness is evolving in a linear way. The broad definition of transnational spaces, fields and formations as sets of dense and continuous social and symbolic ties encompasses all kinds of social phenomena. These definitions apply across the board, from the cross-border activities of nongovernmental organisations and social protest movements, through the migration flows that link specific sending and receiving countries, to the ongoing ties migrants retain with their countries of origin. However, in diaspora and

transnational approaches, the intensified cross-border transactions are not necessarily connected to a global consciousness, a global horizon of world society, global justice and cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006) or the growing importance of universal norms in the world polity approach (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 1997). In particular, migration is a case where there is no neat coincidence of globalisation from below (Portes 1996), no growing awareness of oneworldness, on the one hand, and universal ideas, on the other. Moreover, diaspora and transnationalism as concepts and observable phenomena are not necessarily coterminous with what is called global or transnational civil society in the form of transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Transnational advocacy networks are often portrayed as promoting universal values, such as human rights, democracy and gender equity. Similarly, transnational social movements are studied as an instance of globalisation and the
universalisation of practices and rights from below (Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter 2006). By contrast, diaspora and transnational concepts often relate to the observation that, when it comes to understandings of the political, human mobility

reinforce and recreate all kinds of beliefs and isms, including nationalism, patriarchism, sexism, sectarianism and ethno-nationalism. Third, terms such as diaspora and transnationalism or transnationalisation do not suggest a (linear) progression of the universalisation of rights, as world approaches do. For example, post-national approaches posit that migrants right to have
may

rights (Arendt 1973 [1959]) has led to the evolution of post-national membership, which in liberal democracies guards essential social and civil rights of migrants, though falls short of full political rights and citizenship (Soysal 1994). According to this view, the ultimate source of this tendency is to be found in a diffusion of Western norms of human rights into the regulations and constitutions of national states. While considerations attached to terms such as diaspora and transnationalism do not provide comprehensive theories on rights and citizenship, there are no clear-cut assumptions about the global spread of norms. Instead, the focus is usually on contentious struggles around issues such as rights in both national and transnational arenas (Faist 2010). Diaspora and transnational concepts, in contrast to global and world theory concepts, often start physical or geographical proximity for social life, there is still no clear tendency towards universalisation. Instead, the emphasis is placed on the co-presence of universalising and particularising processes. Thus, universal norms such as

from the observation that, while there is less of a requirement of

collective self-determination, democracy and human rights may enable local or national claims. For example, demands for political autonomy or multicultural rights of cultural groups often refer to global norms such as the

right to collective self-determination. In this way, the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism are closely related to glocalisation, which combines the notions of globalisation and localisation (Robertson 1995).

And, this reinforcement of the nation-state and soverignetny perpetuate the colonial relationship between the west and Latin America. No amount of internal reform can change the oppression of Mexican labor by global markets. Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in 8 [Ramon, DECOLONIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality, http://www.humandee.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=111]
We cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power over the juridicalpolitical boundaries of a state, that is, by achieving control over a single nation state (Grosfoguel 1996). The old

national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power at the level of a nationstate are not sufficient because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration (Grosfoguel 2002) or to the political/economic structures of power. One of the most powerful myths of the 20th century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a "postcolonial" world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridicalpolitical decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same "colonial power matrix". With juridical political decolonization we moved from a period of "global colonialism" to the current period of "global coloniality". Although "colonial administrations" have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, nonEuropean people are still living under crude European/Euro American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus nonEuropean remain in place and are entangled with the "international division of labour" and accumulation of capital at a worldscale (Quijano 2000 ; Grosfoguel 2002). Herein lies the relevance of the distinction between "colonialism" and "coloniality". Coloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist worldsystem. "Coloniality of power" refers to a crucial structuring process in the modern/colonial worldsystem that articulates peripheral locations in the international division of labour with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy and Third World migrants inscription in the racial/ethnic hierarchy of metropolitan global cities. Peripheral nationstates and nonEuropean people live today under the regime of "global coloniality" imposed by the United States through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Pentagon and NATO. Peripheral zones remain in a colonial situation even though are no longer under colonial administration. "Colonial" does not refer only to "classical colonialism" or "internal colonialism", nor can it be reduced to the presence of a "colonial administration". Quijano distinguishes between colonialism and coloniality.
I use the word "colonialism" to refer to "colonial situations" enforced by the presence of a colonial administration such as the period of classical colonialism, and, following Quijano (1991 ; 1993 ; 1998), I use "coloniality" to address "colonial situations" in the present period in which colonial administrations have almost been eradicated from the capitalist worldsystem. By

"colonial situations" I mean the cultural, political, sexual and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racial/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations. Five hundred years of European colonial expansion and domination formed an international division of labour between Europeans and nonEuropeans that is reproduced in the present socalled "post colonial" phase of the capitalist worldsystem (Wallerstein, 1979 ; 1995). Today the core zones of the capitalist worldeconomy overlap with predominantly white/European/Euro American societies such as western Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States, while peripheral zones overlap with previously colonized nonEuropean people. Japan is the only exception that
confirms the rule. Japan was never colonized nor dominated by Europeans and, similar to the West, played an active role in building its own colonial empire. China, although never fully colonized, was peripheralized through the use of colonial entrepots such as Hong Kong and Macao, and through direct military interventions. The

mythology of the "decolonization of the world" obscures the continuities between the colonial past and current global colonial/racial hierarchies and contributes to the invisibility of "coloniality" today. For the last fifty years, peripheral states that are today formally independent, following the dominant Eurocentric liberal discourses (Wallerstein, 1991a ; 1995), constructed ideologies of "national identity", "national development", and "national sovereignty" that produced an illusion of "independence," "development," and "progress". Yet their economic and political systems were shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist worldsystem organized around a hierarchical international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1979 ; 1984 ; 1995). The multiple and heterogeneous processes of the worldsystem, together with the predominance of Eurocentric cultures (Said, 1979 ; Wallerstein, 1991b ; 1995 ; Lander 1998 ; Quijano 1998 ; Mignolo 2000), constitute a "global coloniality" between European/EuroAmerican peoples and nonEuropean peoples. Thus, "coloniality" is entangled with, but is not reducible to, the international division of labour. The global racial/ethnic hierarchy of
Europeans and nonEuropeans is an integral part of the development of the capitalist world systems international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1983 ; Quijano, 1993 ; Mignolo, 1995). In these "postindependence" times, the "colonial" axis between Europeans/Euro Americans and nonEuropeans is

inscribed not only in relations of exploitation (between capital and labour) and relations of domination (between metropolitan and peripheral states), but in the

of the Eurocentric myth is that we live in a socalled "post"colonial era and that the world, and in particular metropolitan centres, are in no need of decolonization. In this conventional definition, coloniality is reduced to the presence of colonial administrations. However, as the work of Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (1993, 1998, 2000) has shown with his "coloniality of power" perspective, we still live in a colonial world and we need to break from the narrow ways of thinking about colonial relations, in order to
production of subjectivities and knowledge. In sum, part accomplish the unfinished and incomplete 20th century dream of decolonization. This forces us to examine new decolonial utopian alternatives beyond Eurocentric and "Third Worldist" fundamentalisms.

And, that turns the aff. Borders are only partially secured inorder to enable illegal immigration to support western markets. This massively increases exploitation that no amount of labor protection can sovle. Anderson, School of Geography and Centre for International Borders Research Queens University Belfast In 5 [James, Borders, fixes and empires: Territoriality in the new imperialism, Centre for International Borders Research]
However, while

state borders as barriers to labour movements are a major contradiction of neoliberalism - which supposedly champions the 'free movement' of factors of production (Amin 1996) - a simple dichotomy of mobile capital / immobile labour underestimates the formative role of labour in 'globalisation'; and the reality is more complex and both less and more contradictory. While in general the contradiction weakens labour politically, barriers are welcomed by nationalistic or chauvinist elements of indigenous labour; and while in some circumstances capital is deprived of needed labour, it generally gains from cheaper migrant workers, from labours more general cheapening and from its weakening as a political force. Despite the tighter controls on labour than on capital, there have recently been massive and in some respects unprecedented movements of labour across borders. The world's core economies, and in particular their less mobile forms of capital in more labour-intensive sectors (such as personal services and construction), have been relying increasingly on migrant, often transient and sometimes illegal or 'undocumented' labour from the peripheries. According to one estimate (Sum et al 002), some 13.5 million workers entered the USA in the 1990s, they accounted for over 50% of the growth of the US labour market, and around 9 million of them were undocumented. In
absolute terms (though not as a proportion of the workforce) migration rates into the US in the 1990s were said to be higher than during the classic era of US immigration a century ago. Borders are inherently contradictory - bridges and 'barriers', 'resources' and 'symbols' (O'Dowd 2003) - often filtering and complicating rather than stopping movement, in practice

weakening and cheapening labour rather than keeping it out: appearing to stop migrants, but allowing them in while denying them legal and democratic rights and cultural or national belonging. The coincidence of massive steel fences on the US-Mexican border and a massive and increasing labour force of Latinos in the US suggests that the border fortifications may be more for internal US political consumption than actually stopping the supply of cheap labour, though they undoubtedly make cross-border migration more difficult (Heyman 1999). Here Peter Andreas (2000) sees Border Games where border policing resembles a ritualised spectator sport, not a trivial game but performative and audience-directed to tame their passions. Crossborder economic integration in NAFTA and mass dependence on migrant labour in the US called forth a massively increased investment in border security in the 1990s and an escalation in policing that was about image management and symbolically reaffirming the states territorial sovereignty. There was the construction of both a borderless economy and a barricaded border.... The politics of opening the border to legal economic flows is closely connected to the politics of making it appear closed to illegal flows (Andreas 2000, x, 140). There was a

similar escalation of securitisation at the EUs external borders with Eastern Europe and North Africa (though with less ostentatious border militarisation and a correspondingly greater reliance on surveillance inside the border). There were comparable narratives of borders being under seige (harking back to an imaginary golden age of secure borders, and also showing that the politics of fe ar pre-date 9/11); and a similar growth in tensions between deterring undesirable flows while facilitating desireable ones (Andreas 2000, 115, 138, 142-3). Mathew Coleman (2005) paints a compelling picture of this as a security/economy nexus, akin to the contradictory unity of politics/economics. It results in a giant Gordian knot rather than a patterned weave in the

US-Mexico borderlands as increased security meets an increase of liberalised cross-border economics in an instance of gated globalisation. US geo-political and geo-economic practices are tangled and inconsistent as non-locally conceived policies fail on the ground.

And, the process of state driven neoliberal practice uses inclusionary ontological enframing to reducing human existence to particular modalities of potential contribution to the marketthis idea constitutes ontological violence and the reduction of the infinite possibility of being- ontologically positioned to serve the interests of profit-making Joronen 2013, (Mikko, Department of Geography and Geology, Geography Section, University of Turku, Finland,
Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism, 3/21/13, 7/28/13|Ashwin) As I have suggested,52 ontological monopolisations constitute vio- lence through two reciprocally

conditioning mechanisms. First, through the oblivion of the mechanism of appropriation (Ereignis), which works by intrinsically concealing the openness of being and its reservoir of ungrounded possibilities; and second, through the violence intrinsic in par- ticular historical modes of revealing, for instance, the ontological ordering of entities in neoliberal enframing. The first mechanism of violence apparently refers to the fundamental (im)possibility for the different forms of life to emerge. It is a question concerning particular appropriations of being, which take place by monopolising their own mode of revealing, thus refusing their intrinsic condition of possibility, the abyssal richness of open being. The sec- ond mechanism of violence, in turn, is related to the designated positions, such as the neoliberal

enframing, which violently enframe human existence and the revealing of the real to particular modalities of ontology. At the level of the first mechanism, neoliberal fabrication of particular mode of existence takes

advantage of what I have discussed, by following Heidegger, the ontological ambiguity of being, its happening as a concealing- revealing.53 Accordingly, while disclosing a peculiar mode of existence, Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 366 Mikko Joronen the appropriation of being always conceals the open possibility for the other modes of revealing to come about. Such concealment is an intrin- sic necessity for all revealing to take place: all modes of revealing conceal their originary source, the inexhaustible plenitude of open being. Neoliberal governmentality, however, follows the logic of violent mono-politics and complete grounding of the

ontological change. It remains solely withdrawn to the optimised arrangement of ontic realities: it concentrates on the calculative

revealing of things to the point of abandoning the possibility for

ordering of things (beings), and as a result, hides the ontological ques- tion concerning its own mode of revealing (being). Neoliberalisation thus covers not only the ontological mechanism of concealing-revealing, but its own ontological finitude. By monopolising its own modality of revealing, neoliberal enframing veils its own finitude, its nature as a finite Event of appropriation (das Ereignis), thus passing the originary openness of being into oblivion. The latter mechanism of ontological violence, in turn, refers to the inner logic of neoliberal enframing. Neoliberalisation operates, first, by reducing political capabilities of individuals to the

internalised rule of the maximum economy, but also by moulding all things into reserves of profits. First of all, neoliberalisation violently enframes human existence into bare reserves of human capital, which are increasingly used by states in their tactics to succeed in global competition. The neoliberal state, governing its popu- lation by the means of encouraging economically calculating subjectivity, is not established out of the violent act of territorial inclusion and order, but above all, out of the violent fact of reducing human existence into usable capital. Second, as a drive to reveal things as profitable reserves, neoliberalisation violently divests natural entities from their abrupt

happen- ing and phenomenological richness of revealing. Altogether, such reductions constitute the post-political situation of neoliberal governmentality: they cre- ate a world of technical solutions and politics-free zones abrogating the

politics of ontological revealing. The depoliticising conduct of the neoliberal state is an ultimate political act, which paradoxically establishes an anti- political abrogation of all political acts through the concealment of the politics of ontological possibility. Such ontological mono-politics thus inter- twines with the first mechanism of ontological violence: by fabricating the real, including human existence, for the use of economic calculations and profits, neoliberal governmentality monopolises a particular mode of reveal- ing, and thus, fades the ontological openness of being and its finite Event (Ereignis) to the background. What remains excluded in the process of
neoliberal enframing, what remains outside of its framework, is evidently no-thing ontic, but the ontological openness of being. As the critical explorations of neoliberalism in recent geographical literature have emphasised, mainly by leaning on Marx, Harvey and a set of interpretations of Foucault, neoliberalism should Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013

be conceptualised as an open and unpredictable process of enclosure, as a complex set of logics of inclusion and exclusion operating through a variety of spatial territories and networks.54 Instead of a fixed set of doctrines and practices, neoliberalisation is conceptualised as a contingent process that works by enclosing a variety of subjects, practices,
Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality 367

technolo- gies and materialities through different, even conflicting, rationalities and spatialities. Nevertheless, even as delegate contributions as these seem to fall short on scrutinising the ontological characteristics

involved in the pro- cess of neoliberalisation, not to mention the evident absence of Heideggers work, which also Foucault, though with cryptic and non-explicated man- ner, admitted as being a central influence on his own thinking.55 Although neoliberalism is conceptualised as a flexible and contingent process emerg- ing through the unlimited number of unpredictable enclosures, from the Heideggerian perspective, neoliberalism is not so much a dialectical pro- cess of inclusion and exclusion,56 but a process of

ontological mono-politics enframing the real as such in terms of available, usable, orderable, and make- able reserve. Instead of exclusion, neoliberal enframing works through total inclusion, where every-thing is revealed as having the potential to become utilised. Things escaping the measures is never under suspect.

of neoliberal enframing are revealed, not as excluded, but as not-yet-enframed-and-utilised reserves. Neoliberal enframing is hence a process of ontological inclusion an ontological drive towards the complete economic usability of things, where this drive in itself

The alternative is to begin from the epistemology of the subaltern. It is impossible to think through the modernity from any other perspective that that of colonial difference. The kritiks border thinking is a way of starting from the knowledge of those in the exteriority of the modern world order. No alternative can come from within the categories of modernity. Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]
classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years. In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern. The question of whether there is an exteriority to the modern/colonial world system Is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. I t was originally proposed and carefully elaborated by Dussel in his

The notion of exteriority does not entail an ontological outside; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by a hegemonic discourse. This notion of exteriority arises chiefly by thinking about the Other from the ethical and epistemological perspective of a liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse vis vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from outside or beyond the systems institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This challenge might only be quasi-intelligible at first (Dussel 1996: 25), given the difficulties in establishing meaningful interpellation that exploited peoples have with respect to a hegemonic system (contra Habermas notion of a communication free of domination). There are degrees of exteriority; in the last instance, the greater challenge comes from the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc. ... There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domination. ... From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as affirmation of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation (Dussel 1996: 31, 36, 54). 6 This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider: that it is impossible to think about transcending or overcoming modernity without approaching it from the perspective of the colonial difference. Both Mignolo and Dusselsee here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism in short, these continue to be thought about from within eurocentric categories(of ,say, liberalism, Marxism, poststructuralism), not from the border thinking enabled by the colonial difference .....Critiques of modernity, in short, are blind to the (epistemic and cultural) colonial difference that becomes the focus of modernity/coloniality. Dussels notion of transmodernity signals the possibility of a non-eurocentric and critical dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables the negation of the negation to which the subaltern others have been subjected, and one that does not see critical discourse as intrinsically European. Integral to this effort is the rescuing of non-hegemonic and silenced counter-discourses, of the alterity that is constitutive of modernity itself. This is the ethical principle of liberation of the negated Other, for which Dussel coins the term, transmodernity, defined as a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Trans- modernity is a

future-oriented project that seeks the liberation of all humanity (1996: 14, Ch. 7), a worldwide ethical liberation project in which alterity, which was part and parcel of modernity, would be able to fulfill itself (2000: 473), in which both modernity and its negated alterity (the victims) co-realize themselves in a process of mutual fertilization (1993: 76). In short, trans-modernity cannot be brought about from within modernity, but requires of the action and the incorporative solidarity of the subalternized groups, the objects of modernitys constitutive violence embedded in, among otherfeatures, the developmentalist fallacy. Rather than the rational project of a discursive ethics, transmodernity becomes the expression of an ethics of liberation. Mignolos notions of border thinking, border epistemology, and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes (Mignolo 2001: 9). There are, to be sure, no original thi nking traditions to which one can go back. Rather than reproducing Western abstract universals, however, the alternative is a kind of border thinking that engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge (2001: 11). Resituating Anzaldas metaphor of the border into the domain of coloniality, Mignolo adumbrates the possibility of `thinking otherwise, from the interior exteriority of the border. That is, to engage in border thinking is to move beyond the categories created an imposed by Western epistemology (p. 11). This is not just a question of changing the contents but the very terms of the conversation. It is not a question of replacing existing epistemologies either; these will certainly continue to exist and as such will remain viable as spaces of, and for, critique. Instead, what he claims is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations (p. 11). Finally, while Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue with the critique(s) arising from the colonial difference, which constitutes border thinking. The result is a pluritopic hermeneutics (a term he seemingly adaptsfrom Pannikars diatopic hermeneutics), a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective. This is the double critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality, from the exterior ofthe modern/colonial world system. Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both displacement and departure (2000: 308), double critique and positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real. To sum up, Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). The `West and the rest in Huntingtons phrase provides the model to overcome, as the `rest becomes the sites where border thinking emerges in its diversity, where `mundializacin creates new local histories remaking and readapting Western global designs .and transforming local(European) historiesfrom where such designs emerged. `Interdependence may be the word that summarizes the break away from the idea of totality and brings about the idea of networks whose articulation will require epistemological principles I called in this book `border thinking and `border gnosis, as a rearticulation of the colonial difference:`diversality as a universal project, which means that people and communities have the right to be different precisely because `we are all equals (2000: 310, 311). There is no question, writes Mignolo (2000: 59), that Quijano, Dussel and I are reacting not only to the force of a historical imaginary but also to the actuality ofthis imaginary today. The corollary isthe need to build narrativesfrom the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towardsthe search for a different logic (22). This project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs by and from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of borderthinking. While there is nothing outside of totality ... totality is always projected from a given local history, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329).
These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which colonial

Unlike globalization, mundializacin brings to the fore the manifold local histories that, in questioning global designs(e.g., neo-liberal globalization), aim at forms of globality that arise out of cultures of transience that go against the cultural homogeneity fostered by such designs. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted here with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders.
global designs are necessarily transformed, thus transforming also the local histories that created them.

Links

Fiat Link
The affs immediate call to action is a lightning approach across borders that acts in the future trying to pre-empt their impacts- which is the same decision making as the invasion of Iraq- without more deliberation the aff causes their impacts Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 122-23)

Brian Massumi likens this form of decisioning to a lightning strike or flash of sovereign power.132 Moreover, he argues that this approach is the temporal equivalent of a tautology: the time form of the decision that strikes like lightning is the foregone conclusion. When it arrives, it always seems to have preceded itself. Where there is a sign of it, it has always already hit.133 The lightning-strike decision is a foregone conclusion because it sidesteps or effaces the blurriness of the present in favour of a perceived need to act on the future without delay.134 Illustrating his argument Massumi
suggests that this approach characterises the Presidency of George W. Bush for whom there is no time for uncertainty: I have made judgements in the past. I have made judgements in the future.135 Citing Bush's admission that it took just twelve

minutes for him to discuss the invasion of Iraq with cabinet colleagues, Massumi points to the way the United States administration tends to skip decision-making that takes time because: Deliberation [] in the current lexicon [] is perceived as a sign less of wisdom than of weakness. [] To admit to discussing, studying, consulting, analysing is to admit to having been in a state of indecision preceding the making of the decision. It is to admit to passages of doubt and unclarity in a blurry present.136 (p.122) For Massumi, the lightning strike approach in general is one that seeks to act on the future or, in other words, one that responds to the threat of an indefinite future: what may yet come.137 Whereas traditionally, however, threats were responded to through prevention, Massumi argues that we are witnessing the birth of a new form of response in the context of the global war on terror: the politics of pre-emption.138
This change is marked by a shift in temporal registers from the indefinite future tense to the future perfect tense: the alw ays-will-havebeen-alread.139 In other words, the politics of preemption does not respond to events by simply trying to

prevent them but actually effects or induces the event: Rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future, pre-emption brings the future into the present. It makes present the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual occurrence. The event's consequences precede it, as if it had already occurred.140 Massumi illustrates his
point using the analogy of a fire. A politics of preemption does not simply predict but actually causes fires: it is like watching footage of a fire in reverse: there will have been fire, in effect, because there is now smoke.141

Speech act
Like identification rituals at checkpoints the 1AC reconstitutes the border through its presentation. Our challenge is mutually exclusive and cannot be permuted Parker 12

[Noel, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Geopolitics, 17:4, 727-733, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.706111] One of the pressing tasks confronting the CBS scholar, therefore, is to develop tools for identifying and

interrogating what and where borders are and how they function in different settings, with what consequences, and for whose benefit. In this context, CBS urges two twinned moves: a shift from the concept
of the border to the notion of bordering practice; and the adoption of the lens of performance through which bordering practices are produced and reproduced. First, as outlined by Parker and Adler-Nissen (this issue), the notion of bordering practices

refers to the activities which have the effect . . . of constituting, sustaining, or modifying borders. Such practices can be both intentional and unintentional; carried out by state actors and non-state actors including citizens, private security companies, and others engaged in the conduct of what Chris Rumford has called borderwork (Rumford, this issue); and, further, with greater and lesser degrees of success depending from whose perspective that issue is evaluated. A focus on practice entails a sociological line of enquiry, which might emphasise attention to the everyday the processes through which controls over mobility are attempted and enacted and the effects of those controls in peoples lives and in social relations more widely. Second, the
shift in focus in CBS towards bordering practices draws on the language and the imaginary of performance for an alternative paradigm for (re)thinking border politics. Borders do not simply exist as lines on maps, but are continually

performed into being through rituals such as the showing of passports, the confessionary matrix at the airport, and the removal of clothing. Reconceptualising borders as a set of performances injects movement, dynamism, and fluidity into the study of what are otherwise often taken to be static entities: The uniform and straight lines in the sand, that borders were once thought to be, are now better understood as a complex choreography of border lines in multiple lived spaces (Gielis and van Houtum, this issue). Moreover, practices of bordering and debordering are not just performed as theatrical spectacles, but are also shown to be performative of particular socio-economic and political realities and subjectpositions. Borders are intimately bound up with the identity-making activitiesof the nation-state and other forms of political community. The modern political subject is bordered in the same way as the state of which s/he is a citizen and this marker is performed through identity cards, national insurance numbers and so on. In this way, as Parker and Adler-Nissen note, there is an important and inescapable access by states bordering practices into individual bodies a connection that is intensifying in the light of new, increasingly invasive, biometric technologies.

BORDERS ARE CONSTITUTED IN PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY MEANING IGNORING REPRESENTATIONS REFLECTS ELTIE INTEREST AND MAINTAINS ASYMETRICAL POWER RELATIONS Doty 96 (Roxanne Political Science at ASU, 1996, Imperial Encounters, pages 170-171)
North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the west, real man) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It itself has been constititued as trance- the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, refers itself. Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978:280). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meaning and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought though an engagement with various discourses in which claims

to truth have been staked to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with

imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by the analysis revolve around the question of being able to get beyond the representations or speak outside the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the
infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and allpervasive discourse. Before this question can be answeredindeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answerattention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its

inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

Language
{**In Cuba Terror 1NC**} - Imperial languages are used to control the production of knowledge and perpetuate the epistemology of coloniality. Mignolo and Tlostanova 6
(Walter D. is William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Director of the Center for Global Studies and the Humanities at Duke University, and Madina V. is professor in the Department of History of Philosophy at Peoples Friendship University of Russia Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge European Journal of Social Theory Volume 9 issue 2) Epistemology is woven into language and, above all, into alphabetically written languages. And languages are not something human beings have but they are part of what human beings are. As such, languages are embedded in the body and in the memories (geo-historically located) of each person. A
person formed in Aymara, Hindi or Russian who has to learn the rules and principles of knowledge mainly inscribed in the three imperial languages of the second modernity (French, English and German), would of necessity have to deal with a gap; while a person formed in German or English who learns the rules and principles of knowledge inscribed in German or English is not subject to such a gap. But there is more, since the situation is not one that can be accounted for in terms of the universal history of human beings and society.

Knowledge and subjectivities have been and continue to be shaped by the colonial and imperial differences that structured the modern/colonial world. Consider, on the one hand, knowledge in

the modern and imperial European languages and on the other hand Russian, Arabic and Mandarin. The difference here is imperial. However, they are not just different. In the modern/ colonial unconscious, they belong to different epistemic ranks. Modern science, philosophy, and the social sciences are not grounded in Russian, Chinese and Arabic languages. That of course does not mean that there is no thinking going on or knowledge produced in Russian, Chinese and Arabic. It means, on the contrary, that in the global

distribution of intellectual and scientific labor, knowledge produced in English, French or German does not need to take into account knowledge in Russian, Chinese and Arabic.

Furthermore, increasingly since the sixteenth century, knowledge in Russian, Chinese and Arabic cannot avoid intellectual production in English, French and German. Strictly speaking, societies in which Russian, Chinese and Arabic are spoken were not colonized in the way the Americas and South Asia were. Thus, any languages beyond the six imperial European ones, and their

grounding in Greek and Latin, have been disqualified as languages with world-wide epistemic import. And of course, this impinges on subject formation: people who are not trusted in their thinking, are doubted in their rationality and wounded in their dignity. Border thinking then emerges from the colonial and the imperial wound. If we consider, instead, Hindi or Aymara, the epistemic difference with modern European languages and epistemology will be colonial. In both cases, the coloniality of knowledge and of being goes hand in hand with modernitys rhetoric of salvation. The rhetoric of

modernity and the logic of coloniality are mutually constituted and are the two sides of the same coin. Today the shaping of subjectivity, the coloniality of being/knowledge is often described within the so-called globalization political, subjective (e.g. cultural) and epistemic and, contrary to frontiers, the very concept of border implies the

of culture, a phrase, which in the rhetoric of modernity reproduces the logic of coloniality of knowledge and of being. Borders Not Only Geographic, but Epistemic Accordingly, our first thesis is the following. Borders are not only geographic but also existence of people, languages, religions and knowledge on both sides linked through relations established by the coloniality of power (e.g. structured by the imperial and colonial differences). Borders in this precise sense, are not a natural outcome of a natural or divine historical processes in human history, but were created in the very constitution of the modern/colonial world (i.e. in the imaginary of Western and Atlantic capitalist empires formed in the past five hundred years). If we limit our observations to the

geographic, epistemic and subjective types of borders in the modern/colonial world (from the European Renaissance till today), we will see that they all have been created from the perspective of European imperial/ colonial expansion: massive appropriation of land accompanied by the constitution of international law that justified the massive appropriation of land (Grovogui, 1996; Schmitt, 1952); control of knowledge (the epistemology of the zero point as representation of the real) by disqualifying non-European languages and epistemologies and control of subjectivities (by conversation, civilization, democratization) or, in todays language by the globalization of culture.

Law
The root of the creation of law that governs a nature is violence therefore law itself is violence in order to prevent violence Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International
Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322338, Accessed: 7/27/13,) In his essay Critique of Violence (1927), Walter Benjamin considers the relationship between law and violence. More specifically, Benjamin analyzes the foundations of justifications for the use of certain forms of violence and the designation of such violence as legitimate. Indeed, it is precisely the assumed distinction between what counts as legitimate and illegitimate violence that he seeks to interrogate overall. His hypothesis is that the interest of law in having a monopoly of violence over a population within a given territory is not simply to preserve legal ends but rather to preserve the very foundational structure of the juridical political order of the state itself. Thus, in an extended passage, Benjamin argues: For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of the law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of the law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence. For in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in the law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility, because the latter knows itself to be infinitely remote from conditions

in which fate might imperiously have shown itself in such a sentence. (Benjamin 2004:242 emphasis added) As this passage indicates, Benjamins analysis refers to a separation between law-making violence on the one hand (the origin of the law is violent) and

lawpreserving violence on the other (the law reaffirms itself through the exercise of violence). However, according to Benjamin these two types of violence merge in a spectral mixture in the authority of the police: police violence is both lawmaking because its characteristic function is not the promulgation of laws but the assertion of legal claims for any decree and lawpreserving because it is at the disposal of these ends(Benjamin 2004:243). The police, he argues, often intervene where there is no clear legal situation and as such their power can be thought of as formless,[a] nowhere-tangible, all pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states (Benjamin 2004:243). Nevertheless, the key point Benjamin seeks to emphasize is that these inter-related forms of violence are inextricably implicated through the problematic of law. According to Connolly, this argument has provided an important point of departure for a number of critical twentieth century thinkers who have sought to theorize the ways in which violence is bound up in the juridicalpolitical order of the modern sovereign territorial state and state-system (Connolly 2004:24). One of these engagements, which, as I will go on to suggest is instructive for any attempt to interrogate the borders, territory, law triad, is that given by Jacques Derrida.

The revolutions that create new states gives way to an authority that legitimizes law and justifies the violence of the law Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International
Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322338, Accessed: 7/27/13,)
In Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority (Derrida 1992), Derrida engages with Benjamins text in order to offer a deconstructive critique of the inter-relationships between the law and justice, authority and violence,

and authorizations of authority and mystery. At first, Derrida invokes and elucidates the Benjaminian distinction between law-making and law-preserving violence in order to claim that the law rests on nonlaw through these two types of violence. Derrida explains the former type of violence (law-making or originary violence) in terms of the attempt of the authority behind the law to establish itself by a pure performative act that does not have to answer to or before anyone (Derrida 1992:36). The latter type of violence (law-making or secondary violence) works to secure originary violence in order to conserve, maintain, and ensure the permanence and

enforceability of law (Derrida 1992:31). Since the origin of the authority behind the law cannot rest upon anything but itself it is understood by Derrida to be a violence without a ground: a state of suspense beyond the conventional opposition between legal and illegal. Derrida calls the moments when the authority of a new law tries to establish itself the epokhe`: a Greek word, meaning pause (Derrida 1992:36). These moments, supposing that they may be isolated, are said to be terrifying moments because of the sufferings, the crimes, the tortures that rarely fail to accompany them (Derrida 1992:36). On this basis, Derrida argues that, no matter how distant it may feel, the foundation of all states occurs in a situation that we can call revolutionary (Derrida 1992:36). For each revolution to be successful in the founding of a new authority behind law it is necessary for that authority to create apre`s coup what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, proper interpretive models to give sense [and] legitimacy to the violence it has produced (Derrida 1992:36). Elsewhere, Derrida claims: successful unifications or foundations only ever succeed in making one forget that there never was a natural unity or a prior foundation (Derrida 2002:115). These interpretive models and imperatives to forget are all bound-up in what Derrida calls a discourse of self-legitimation (Derrida 1992:36). The justification for the violent origins of the foundation of authority behind the juridicalpolitical order of every state can only ever be justified belatedly (Derrida 2002:115). According to Derrida, one only has to look at revolutionary situations with their accompanying discourses throughout the twentieth century in order to get a sense for the way in which the recourse to violence is always justified by alleging the founding, in progress or to come, of a new law
(Derrida 1992:35). However, while Derrida takes his lead from Benjamin, the argument presented in Force of Law is that the oppositions set up in the Critique of Violence between law-making and law-preserving violence do not hold

in the final analysis. Derrida claims that this conclusion is reached implicitly within Benjamins own text in his discussion of the police referred to earlier: it is precisely because the police are everywhere that the separation between law-making and law-preserving The very violence of the foundation or positing of the law must envelop the violence of the preservation of the law and cannot break with it. It belongs to the

structure of fundamental violence in that it calls for the repetition itself and founds what ought to be preserved, preservable, promised to heritage and to tradition, to partaking. A foundation is a promise. Consequently, there is no more pure foundation or pure position of law, and so a pure founding violence, than there is a purely preserving violence. Positing is already an iterability, a call for self-serving repetition. Preservation in turn refounds, so that it can preserve what it claims to found. Thus there can be no rigorous opposition between positing and preserving, only what I call a differential contamination between the two, with all the paradoxes this may lead to. (Derrida 1992:35 emphasis added)

Democracy
The nation-state and democracy are the product of colonial interaction of Latin America with the west. Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in 8[Ramon, DECOLONIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality, http://www.humandee.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=111]
This conceptualization has enormous implications that I can only briefly mention here : 1) The

old Eurocentric idea that societies develop at the level of the nationstate in terms of a linear evolution of modes of production from precapitalist to capitalist is overcome. We are all encompassed within a capitalist worldsystem that articulates different
forms of labour according to the racial classification of the worlds population (Quijano 2000 ; Grosfoguel 2002). 2) The old Marxist paradigm of infrastructure and superstructure is replaced by a historicalheterogeneous structure (Quijano 2000) or a "heterarchy" (Kontopoulos 1993), that is, an entangled articulation of multiple hierarchies, in which subjectivity and the social imaginary is not derivative but constitutive of the structures of the worldsystem (Grosfoguel 2002). In this conceptualization, race and racism are not superstructural or instrumental to an overarching logic of capitalist accumulation, but are constitutive of capitalist accumulation at a worldscale. The "colonial power matrix" is an organizing principle involving exploitation and domination exercised in multiple dimensions of social life, from economic, sexual, or gender relations, to political organizations, structures of knowledge, state institutions, and households (Quijano 2000). 3) The old division between culture and politicaleconomy as expressed in postcolonial studies and politicaleconomy approaches is overcome (Grosfoguel 2002). Postcolonial studies conceptualize the capitalist world system as being constituted primarily by culture, while politicaleconomy place the primary determination on economic relations. In the "coloniality of power" approach, what comes first, "culture or the economy", is a chickenegg dilemma that obscure the complexity of the capitalist worldsystem (Grosfoguel 2002). 4) Coloniality is not equivalent to colonialism. It is not derivative from, or antecedent to, modernity. Coloniality

and modernity constitute two sides of a single coin. The same way as the European industrial revolution was achieved on the shoulders of the coerced forms of labour in the periphery, the new identities, rights, laws, and institutions of modernity such as nationstates, citizenship and democracy were formed in a process of colonial interaction with, and domination/exploitation of, non Western people. 5) To call the
present worldsystem "capitalist" is misleading, to say the least. Given the hegemonic Eurocentric "common sense", the moment we use the word "capitalism" people immediately think that we are talking about the "economy". However, "capitalism"

is only one of the multiple entangled constellations of colonial power matrix of the "European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal worldsystem". It is an important one, but not the sole one. Given its entanglement with other power relations, destroying the capitalist aspects of the worldsystem would not be enough to destroy the present worldsystem. To transform this worldsystem, it is crucial to destroy the historicalstructural heterogenous totality called the "colonial power matrix" of the "worldsystem". 6) Anticapitalist decolonization and liberation cannot be reduced to only one dimension of social life. It requires a broader transformation of the sexual, gender, spiritual, epistemic, economic, political, linguistic and racial hierarchies of the modern/colonial worldsystem. The "coloniality of power" perspective challenges us to think about social change and social
transformation in a nonreductionist way.

AT We Solve Democracy
By confining democracy to the inside and economic to the outside, borders obfuscate the oppressively political nature of globalization and maintain the global capitalist hierarchy of exploitation through the ruse of democracy. Anderson, School of Geography and Centre for International Borders Research Queens University Belfast In 5 [james, Borders, fixes and empires: Territoriality in the new imperialism, Centre for International Borders Research]
The separation can therefore be reformulated perhaps more accurately as the 'presence/absence

of democracy. Democratic politics is the key differentiator rather than politics per se. As Wood (1995) makes clear, it is
not politics that is excluded from production - the politics of class characterise the workplace. More precisely, whether the workplace is inside or outside the owners own state, it is democracy that is excluded when making decisions about

what should be produced (or not), how and where to invest, who to employ, and so forth, as these decisions are almost invariably separated off to the 'non-political' (that is non-democratic) sphere of economics. Here decisions are predominantly driven by market forces and profitability and technocratic criteria, rather than by democratic choices, ethical concerns or human needs (and in practice, although sometimes successfully contested, or obfuscated, that can apply to state capitalist as much as to privately-owned production). Likewise, it is not politics that is excluded from the transnational sphere - dominated as it is by the politics of imperialism (Harvey 2003) - but rather democratic politics, as representative democracy is largely restricted within state borders. The politics/economics separation, bolstered by its contrasts of democratic presence/absence, thus hinges in territorial and spatial terms on state borders and on the borders of work- and market-places. It is a pre-condition for the national sovereignty and independence of the state in that that claim is effectively confined to the political realm, with transnational economic (and other) interdependencies excluded from consideration. The claim has some plausibility only because 'economics' is downgraded or excluded from the equation (Rosenberg 1994). This helps explain why despite globalisation, the sovereignty of the national state or national independence is generally unquestioned, and why indeed it can often be fetishised as an absolute fact when in reality it is only a claim and a partial and questionable one at that (even in purely political terms if there are external imperialistic pressures). But the claim is believable precisely because the
politics/economics separation effectively (if not always explicitly) limits it to the sphere of politics and ignores most of the economic sphere, including foreign direct investment (FDI). Simultaneously, the separation constitutes the pre-condition for

the undemocratic nature of production being the widely accepted, as economic rather than political and hence outside the realm of democracy. By extension this also covers globalisation to the (large)
extent it involves economics (and culture or not politics), reinforced by the fact that politics, over-identified with representative democracy and the state territorial framework, is seen to be excluded from the transnational sphere outside the state. The

interdependencies of globalisation may contradict national independence but can usually be accommodated as the economic or other side of the coin. Irrespective of ownership, whether domestic or foreign or for that matter even state owned, production is generally beyond the reach of national democracy. Thus the separation enables the globalisation of economic production across national state borders without implying that sacred sovereignty has been breached. The cross-border exploitation of labour is faciliated as the economic exchange between foreign employer and indigenous employee is the same as indigenous employer-employee exchanges in being free of extra-economic compulsion. The 'foreignness' of the exploiter is effectively 'depoliticised'; and foreign capital has the same state-protected rights in principle as indigenous capital though not always in

practice as we shall see. So, far from rejecting FDI as foreign interference, the sovereign states and their constituent regions and cities can fall over themselves trying to attract it. For sovereignty is political while investment in economic production is mere ly - well economic. In fact FDI embodies the double exclusion of democracy from the transnational sphere and from production, in effect escaping the democracy of its countries of origin and destination. Its downside is foreign direct disinvestment, and here branch plant closures and mass redundancies can sometimes occasion democratic protest on nationalistic or chauvinist grounds. But this is questionable if not unprincipled given that domestic disinvestments are also beyond democratic control, the main issue. Usually of course

the democratic absences are not recognised as such because of the politics/economics

separation. In territorial terms it supports the fiction (or at best half-truth) that national states have 'sovereign independence' within their borders (by sidelining the 'economics'); and simultaneously it facilitates the global expansion of capital across state borders (by sidelining 'politics'). It grants national territory a virtual monopoly of democracy and lends it the aura of absolute sovereignty by confining this to politics. At the cost of excluding democracy from production and the transnational, it enables economics to transcend territorial borders unencumbered by politics. Borders not only divide up the world into states, they are the pivot of the whole global capitalist system.

Development
{**In CUBA Teror 1NC**} The development discourse of the aff are a prime example of the borders created in our minds that propagate hegemonic politics and are the root cause of transnational neoliberal globalization Agathangelou 4-Associate Professor of Political Science and Womens Studies @ York

University [Anna, International Studies Quarterly, Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11, pg. 520, 2004, WileyOnlineLibrary, DKP] Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics. Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but their signicance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonization proceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past to rationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the West. George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed against America but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizational discipline against all terror. (The Bush administrations semantic shift from terrorism to terror offers one small indication of this change from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaders transgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an international coalition against terrorism for Bush; global jihad, for bin Laden; and, 3. National desires for security based on neoliberal globalization transnationalizes violence and insecurity. By neoliberal globalization, we refer to the developmental maxims of international nancial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, U.S. Treasury, Citigroup, as well as the central banks of the worlds richest economies. These maxims come in familiar sound bites: for example, free trade benets everyone, economies need direct foreign investment to develop, liberalization and privatization deliver a level playing eld,

governments should not intervene in the economy, and markets know best. Most Arabs/Muslims agree with Osama bin Ladens allegations of Western cultural annihilation due to neoliberal globalizations legacy in the Middle East (Waldman, 2001). But neither George W. Bush nor other globalizers could recognize this grievance due to their vested interest in existing infrastructures of power and wealth. At the same time, bin Laden funds his quest for pure Islam with riches made from his familys business contracts with the We st, economic enterprises in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as the international opium trade (Robinson, 2002). Indeed, he utilizes neoliberal, corporate strategies to design his terrorism campaign. Each camp blurs national security with

neoliberal wealth such that one comes to mean the other, regardless of the outcome.

{In Mexico OIL 1NC**}The West masks insidious imperialism as attempts at developing the non-west Slater, Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University, 2004 [David, Modernizing the other and the Three
Worlds of Development, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial pg. 223-224]

The interweavings of geopolitical power, knowledge and subordinating representations of the other have a long history. For example, the identity and authority of Western modernity took shape on the terrain of colonial and imperial power, and the production of knowledge that characterized the development of modern imperialism. In a similar vein, the history of comparative literature, cultural analysis, and anthropology can be seen as affiliated with imperial power, and as contributing to its methods for ensuring Western ascendency over non-Western peoples. Together with this intertwining of power and knowledge one can locate varying forms of subordinating representation which are equally geopolitical and cultural. The assumption of Western supremacy goes together with a silencing of the non-Western other. There is incorporation, inclusion, coercion but only infrequently an acknowledgement that the ideas of colonized people should be known. This silencing of the non-Western other is customarily combined with representations that legitimize the power to penetrate and to re-order. The posited superiorities of Western progress, modernization, democracy, development, and civilization are deployed to justify project of enduring invasiveness. The non-Western

society is shorn of the legitimate symbols of independent identity and authority, and its representation tends to be frozen around the negative attributes of lack, backwardness, inertia and violence. It becomes a space ready to be penetrated, worked over, restructured and transformed. This is a process that is seen as being beneficial to the re-ordered society, so that resistance, especially in its militant form, is envisaged as being deviant and irrational. So while power and knowledge are combined together, they cannot be adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial encounters and the geopolitical history of West/non-West relations.

Globalization
Separating the foreign and the domestic forms an inside/outside dichotomy that obscures the process of globalization Hkli 2013 [Jouni, Space and Political Agency Research Group (SPARG), School of Management,
University of Tampere, Finland, State Space Outlining a Field Theoretical Approach, Geopolitics 18:343355,]
While important theoretical inroads have been made in the state space literature it is clear that efforts to overcome the naturalisation of the territorial state as a unit of analysis extend well beyond this line of work. For example in studying international policy transfer Mark Evans has sought to capture the ways in which competition states actively produce and reshape the international force fields that condition their policy making. This makes the competition state itself a major agent of globalisation.5 Following this line of thought Peter Cerny and Mark Evans have analysed the dynamic through which actors and institutions in neoliberal competition states have come to promote new forms of complex globalisation while attempting to adapt state action to cope more effectively with what they see as global realities.6 Emphasising the longue duree history of the modern state system Saskia Sassen also points out that the analysis of

globalisation too often assumes a dichotomy between the national and the global. To avoid state-centred anal- ysis of globalisation it is necessary to step out of what she calls endogeneity trap. The study of globalisation should not focus on the characteristics of world-scale processes and institutions but, instead, seek inroads into how globalisation is constituted inside the nation-state system. Sassen accepts that the nation-state is historically the most successful institutional form but
nevertheless seeks to unravel the aspects in nation-states functions that are conducive to the yet emergent global assemblages.7 Significant conceptual inroads into the complex relationships between national and international politics have also been made in some critical strands of International Relations scholarship.8 Especially scholars inspired by the practice turn in

social theory have systematically sought to interrogate the assumptions that underlie world politics, and to show that conceptions of the world ordered as a system of nation-states can not be directly mapped onto the very practices through which this order is upheld and governed.9 Hence, the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic politics . . . is a false dichotomy . . . [that calls for] a more sophisticated reading of the interrelationship between the internal and external contexts in which policy is made. To this end it is useful to pay specific attention to human practice and thus on the interaction of ideas, beliefs and identities with the structural environment in which action takes place to produce practices.10 Moreover, it is necessary to view the topologies of world political practices as in a Mobius ribbon, a situation where one never knows whether one is inside or outside.11 In short, the critical interrogation of states functions and strategies under contemporary globalisation stresses that the national and the global are interdependent and have historically constituted each other. In this paper I wish to explore

the potential of field theory in understanding how this complex dynamic unfolds. My intention is to develop further the concept of transnational field as a tool for a nuanced understanding of the articulation between the state and the global realm.12 As a starting point, I posit that the transnational action horizon is still dominated by an inside/outside dichotomy,

portraying the nation-state as a space and sphere clearly distinct from the rest of the world.13 This distinction also acts as a key mechanism that sustains the cognitive distance between the inten- tional activities of nation-state actors and globalisation as their (unintended) consequence. The paper proceeds as follows. I first chart the conceptual starting points for this approach by discussing the idea of
state in the context of field theory. I then seek ways of overcoming the national/global dichotomy by means of the concept of field. Because this is a theory-driven study, I offer an outline of theoretical propositions and working hypotheses to lay ground for further theoretical and empirical work. I conclude by discussing the possibilities and challenges involved in applying field theory in the study of state space.

Globalization ushers in an unequal access to wealth, resulting in notions of deterritorialization. Innerconnectivity brings problems with governance and securitization to the forefront. Martin 12 [Craig, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway College, University of London,
Desperate Mobilities: Logistics, Security and the Extra-Logistical Knowledge of Appropriation , Geopolitics, 17:355376] The connection between geopolitics and mobility is significant, in that it foregrounds

asymmetries of access to mobility. Privilege and disbarment are repeated across various categories of mobility, significantly in relation to migration.18 There are those individuals for whom globalisation implies an un-tethering of spatial impediment, and those who are denied access to the networked configurations of global mobilities. A concept that continues to provide a
useful sounding board for these debates is that of deterritorialisation; although the image of globalisation as a deterritorialised space of unfettered flows has, of course, been decisively critiqued by a range of geographers.19 Popular perceptions of globalisation do still persist however, accentuating for example the dissolution of barriers to the free movement of trade.20 These processes of

deterritorialisation are claimed by advocates of economic globalisation to underscore the transformative poten- tial of new spatio-temporal configurations, (such as digital communication networks and global transport), produced by the growing interconnectivity of socio-technological networks.21 These processes of deterritorialisation are likewise claimed to lead to the disembedding
and detachment of social relations away from specific, localised contexts towards the projection of social relations onto a global level.22 Deterritorialisation may at first be defined in relation to such practices of de-linking from the confines of a territory. However, the

unequal distribution of access to these processes (including mobility) brings with it the need to stress the very notion of deterritorialisation, by implication reterritorialisation, but perhaps most significantly that of territoriality. As Deleuze and Guattari make clear, the processes of decoding, destabilisation
and destratification that are often emphasised as part of deterritorialisation are continually channelled through recoding, restabilisation and restratification.23 So, whilst the reach of the nation-state may indeed have been reconfigured, with

sovereign power located both within and beyond the containment of the geographical border, there is, as Elden has recently suggested, a significant fault line in such assertions. In particular, the
notion of deterritorialisation as a straightforward de-linking from the confines of territorial configuration neglects to recognise the reassertion of and as I argue reconfiguration of territoriality.24 As a result the question of territory and spatial

control becomes ever more fraught: Deterritorialization in its most useful sense therefore forces us to think anew on the notion of territory, and to recognize how its logic is both played out and challenged in a period of globalization.25 It is clear that the deterritorialising strategies of
globalisation cannot be separated from reterritorialisation: they are mutually dependent.26 I sug- gest that the decisive factor in this relationship is that of interconnection: on the one hand the control of interconnection for mobilising specific groups, information and trade, but simultaneously these interconnections are secured in terms of access to them. Put simply, deterritorialisation has to be produced and secured through reterritorialisation, thus necessitating a consideration of territoriality itself as a form of interconnectivity. The

notion of interconnectivity (of the global networks of mobility) presents a significant problematic in relation to the governance and securitisation of such networks. The crux of the issue: increasing interconnectivity results in the growing complexity of connections. For advocates of global trade circulation the need to protect and securitise good circulation from bad circulation cannot be over-determined so that the flows are curtailed.27 Reterritorialisation as an attempt to stabilise interconnection holds within it the potential to stymie connection. As a result the over-securitisation of flows in the form of immovable barriers to the movement of trade, for example, are simultaneously contested. Thus I suggest that
territorial- ity must be figured around the curtailment of movement for unsanctioned flows and whilst also facilitating the movement of sanctioned flows. These entwined logics of interconnection are determined by a precarious

balance between the apparent openness of mobility flows and the potential stasis of securitisation. This highlights the continued importance of territoriality, not solely as a notion of bounded territory but rather as the
production and securitisation of interconnectivity. This makes the case for attending to the shifting configurations of territoriality.28 What is at stake here, then, is the role of interconnection. This abstract conception of interconnectivity is

concretised through the operation of various mobility networks, however my emphasis lies with the spatio-temporal practices of commercial logistics. In particular I argue that commercial logistics is an
increasingly important exemplar of the strate- gic control of global mobilities, most clearly in terms of commodities, but by implication with corporeal movement. As Cowen rightly suggests, such practices of spatio-temporal calculation enforce market logics on social and political problems.29 The root of this market-driven control resides in my reading of geopower as

the means to structure, manage and con- trol the technologies and practices of interconnection in order to promote specific mobilities: those of sanctioned commodities, peoples, knowledge, etc. This conception of geopower refers to the relationship between gov- ernmentality and geography, supplementing this with the ability to control interconnection.30 Here then the inherent relationship between geopower and logistics is crucial, for I argue that logistics
represents the strategic implementation of geopower.

Human rights
Rights should not be the center point of the discussion It cordones off and submits the body to a regime of politics incapable of solving Redfield 5 [Peter, Ph.D. Anthropology at UC Berkeley, professor of Anthropology at UNC
Chapel Hill, Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis, Cultural Anthropology 20(3)] ***MSF = Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)
To further clarify the point, let me return to the ethnographic example from my introduction. In the fall of 2000, MSF brought a traveling exhibit to several sites in greater New York and Los Angeles as part of a special publicity campaign on behalf of displaced people. Entitled A Refugee Camp in the Heart of the City, it brought together two of Agambens key elementsthe camp and the cityas a small circle of tents briefly appeared in the center of Central Park. MSF volunteers and staff issued identity cards to visitors and then led them through the exhibit in small groups to experience the key features of a miniature model camp. The first section of the exhibit illustrated

basic needs: shelter in the form of simple tents adapted to different climates, water purification in the form of a giant bladder dispensing five gallons per person per day, food in the form of compact bars providing 2100 calories, and finally hygiene in the form of a latrine (the VIP version) equipped with both a public education folk painting about hand washing and an ingenious method of trapping flies. Here was a panorama of survival in all its measured essence. To one side hung a small poster about mental health and trauma and beyond lay the medical zone, featuring a model clinic, a weighing station, and vaccination center, and finally a cholera exclusion area. The tour closed with a depiction of landmines and a photographic testimonial to the plight of refugees. In this model camp the spatial order is both exact and essential. It does not represent a final solution or a politics involving fully realized subjects, however, but an endlessly temporary defense of minimal existence. In this sense, it is the precise inverse of a concentration camp, if likewise revealing a border zone between life and death. The camp arranges itself around an effective rationale of immediate concerns localized within biological necessity. There are bodies to cleanse, to shelter and protect from hunger and disease. There are children to weigh, inoculate, and categorize by the circumference of their upper arms. In the model camp, links between these different tasks are clear. Indeed, a number of volunteer guides remarked how much clearer the system appeared to them in this context than it had in the chaos of an actual emergency. Life itself is exposed beneath the language of rights invoked to defend it and the protest against conditions that produced the camp in the first place. In this setting, human zoology exceeds biography: those whose dignity and citizenship is most in question find their crucial measurements taken in calories rather than in their ability to voice individual opinions or perform acts of civic virtue. The species body, individually varied but fundamentally interchangeable, grows visible and becomes
the focus of attention.

The human rights story of of the state as a savage only when bad culture disallows good culture fails to understand that the state is a empty vessel and it is societal norms that fill it. Mutua 01 Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard
International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The first dimension of the prism depicts a savage and evokes images of barbarism. The abominations of the savage are presented as so cruel and unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity. The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever bent on the consumption of humans.7 Although savagery in human rights discourse connotes much more than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery. States become savage when they choke off and oust civil society.8 The "good" state controls its demonic proclivities by cleansing itself with, and internalizing, human rights. The "evil" state, on the other hand, expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture. The redemption or salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights norms. The state

is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d'etre of human rights law.9 But the reality is far more complex. While the metaphor may suggest otherwise, it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture overcomes or disallows the development of "good" culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state, military junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, or even cultural practices such as the one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation (FGM),10not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive instrumentality a receptacle or an empty vesselthat conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture. The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a victim as well as the essence and the idea of victimhood. A human being whose "dignity and worth" have been violated by the savage is the victim. The victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cultural foundation of the state. The entire human rights
structure is both anti- catastrophic and reconstructive. It is anti-catastrophic because it is designed to prevent more calamities through the creation of more victims. It is reconstructive because it seeks to re-engineer the state and the society

to reduce the number of victims, as it defines them,11 and prevent conditions that give rise to victims. The classic human rights documentthe human rights reportembodies these two mutually reinforcing strategies. An INGO

human rights report is usually a catalogue of horrible catastrophes visited on individuals. As a rule, each report also carries a diagnostic epilogue and recommended therapies and remedies.12 The third dimension of the prism is the savior or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards. The savior is the victim's bulwark against tyranny. The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is freedom: freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular values. In the human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world.13 In reality, however, these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately a set of culturally based norms

and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy.

The savage metaphor is built in colonial thought, it is distance from human rights that allows the creation of victims and justifies intervention while undermining resistance to the real violators. Mutua 01 Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard
International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Second, the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic. The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original. For example, Western political democracy is in effect an organic element of human rights. "Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy. It is this distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create victims. Political democracy is then viewed as a panacea. Other textual examples anchored in the treatment of cultural
phenomena, such as "traditional" practices that appear to negate the equal protection for women, also illustrate the gulf between human rights and nonliberal, non-European cultures. Third, the

language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus present significant theoretical problems. The arrogant and biased rhetoric of the human rights movement prevents the movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy. This curse of the SVS rhetoric has no bearing on the substance of the normative judgment being rendered. A particular leader, for example, could be labeled a war criminal, but such a label may carry no validity locally because of the curse of the SVS rhetoric. In other words, the SVS rhetoric may undermine the universalist warrant that it claims and thus engender resistance to the apprehension and punishment of real violators. The subtext of human rights is a grand narrative hidden in the seemingly neutral and universal language of the corpus. For example, the U.N. Charter describes its mandate to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." This is certainly a noble ideal. But what exactly does that terminology mean

here? This phraseology conceals more than it reveals. What,

for example, are fundamental human rights, and how are they determined? Do such rights have cultural, religious, ethical, moral, political, or other biases? What exactly is meant by the "dignity and worth" of the human person? Is there an essentialized human being that the corpus imagines? Is the individual found in the streets of Nairobi, the slums of Boston, the deserts of Iraq, or the rainforests of Brazil? In
addition to the Herculean task of defining the prototypical human being, the U.N. Charter puts forward another pretense that all nations "large and small" enjoy some equality. Even

as it ratified power imbalances between the Third World1 and the dominant American and European powers, the United Nations gave the latter the primary power to define and determine "world peace" and "stability."2 These fictions of neutrality and universality, like so much else in a lopsided world, undergird the human rights corpus and belie its true identity and purposes. This international rhetoric of goodwill reveals, just beneath the surface, intentions and reality that stand in great tension and contradiction with it.

Human rights reinforce racism due to the narrative of the redeemers redeeming themselves by protecting the inferior people. This view causes the movement to fail as the people who need help are alienated. Mutua 01 Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard
International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The fifth flaw concerns the role of race in the development of the human rights narrative. The SVS metaphor of human rights carries racial connotations in which the international hierarchy of race and color is reintrenched and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact necessary for the continuation of the global racial hierarchy. In the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally nonwhite and non-Western, while the saviors are white. This old truism has found new life in the metaphor of human rights. But there is also a sense in which human rights can be seen as a project for the redemption of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged globally as a peoplewho have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against non-whitesredeem themselves by "defending" and "civilizing" "lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior" peoples. The metaphor is thus laced with the pathology of self-redemption. As currently constituted and deployed, the human rights movement will ultimately fail because it is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western societies. The movement does not deeply resonate in the cultural fabrics of non-Western states, except among hypocritical elites steeped in Western ideas. In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures of all peoples. The project of reconsidering rights, with claims to their supremacy, is not new. The culture of rights in the present milieu stretches back at least to the rise of the modern state in Europe. It is that state's monopoly of violence and the instruments of coercion that gave rise to the culture of rights to coun-terbalance the abusive state. Robert Cover refers to this construction as the myth of the jurisprudence of rights that allows society to both legitimize and control the state. Human rights, however, renew the meaning and scope of rights in a radical way. Human rights bestow naturalness, transhis- toricity, and universality to rights. But this Article lodges a counterclaim against such a leap. This Article is certainly informed by the works of critical legal scholars, feminist critics
of rights discourse, and critical race theorists. Still, the approach of this Article differs from all three because it seeks to address an international phenomenon and not a municipal, distinctly American question. The critique of human rights should be based not just on American or European legal traditions but also on other cultural milieus. The indigenous, non-European traditions of Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the Americas must be central to this critique.

The

1 The term "Third World" here refers to a geographic, political, historical, developmental, and racial paradigm. It is a term that is commonly used to refer to non-European, largely non-industrial, capital-importing countries, most of which were colonial possessions of European powers. As a political force, the Third World traces its origins to the Bandung Conference of 1955 in which the first independent African and Asian states sought to launch a political movement to counter Western hegemony over global affairs. See ROBERT MORTIMER, THE THIRD WORLD COALITION IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS (1984). See also Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, in PROC. 94TH ANN. MEETINGAM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (forthcoming 2001). 2 Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 Soc, & LEGAL STUD. 337,339-40 (1996).

idea of human rightsthe quest to craft a universal bundle of attributes with which all societies must endow all human beingsis a noble one. The problem with the current bundle of attributes lies in their inadequacy, incompleteness, and wrong-headedness. There is

little doubt that there is much to celebrate in the present human rights corpus just as there is much to quarrel with. In this exercise, a sober evaluation of the current human rights corpus and its language is not an option it is required.

Human rights discourse is rooted in Euro-centric thought. Human rights was born out of the death of Europeans, but not the genocides in Africa, slavery, and the atrocities of colonialism. Mutua 01 Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard

International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although the human rights movement is located within the historical continuum of Eurocentrism as a civilizing mission, and therefore as an attack on non-European cultures, it is critical to note that it was European, and not non-European, atrocities that gave rise to it. While the movement has today constructed the savage and the victim as non-European, Adolf Hitler was the quintessential savage. The abominations and demise of his regime ignited the human rights movement. Hitler, a white European, was the personification of evil. The Nazi
regime, a white European government, was the embodiment of barbarism. The combination of Hitler's gross deviation from the evolving European constitutional law precepts and the entombment of his imperial designs by the West and the Soviet Union started the avalanche of norms known as the human rights corpus. Nuremberg, the German town where some twenty-two major Nazi war criminals were triedresulting in nineteen convictionsstands Originally, the

as the birthplace of the human rights movement, with the London Agreement its birth certificate. West did not create the human rights movement in order to save or civilize nonEuropeans, although these hu-manist impulses drove the anti-slavery abolitionist efforts of the nineteenth century. Neither the enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric consequences and genocidal dimensions, nor the classic colonization of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans by Europeans, with its bone-chilling atrocities, were sufficient to move the West to create the human rights movement. It took the genocidal extermination of Jews in Europea white peopleto start the process of the codification and universalization of human rights norms. Thus, although the Nuremberg Tribunal has been argued by some to be in a sense hypocritical, it is its promise that
is significant. For the first time, the major powers drew a line demarcating impermissible conduct by states towards their own people and created the concept of collective responsibility for human rights. But no

one should miss the irony of brutalizing colonial powers pushing for the Nuremberg trials and the adoption of the UDHR.

Human rights discourse is rooted in Western predistenation, assuming the necessity of an imperial mission to civilize the inferior, undeveloped. Mutua 01 Mutua, Makau. "Savages, victims, and saviors: the metaphor of human rights." Harvard
International Law Journal 42.1 (2001): 201-245. Makau W. Mutua is the Dean of the University at Buffalo Law School, where he is also a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The human rights corpus, only put into effect following the atrocities of the Second World War, had its theoretical underpinnings in Western colonial attitudes. It is rooted in a deep-seated sense of European and Western global predestination.48 As put by David Slater, European "belief in the necessity of an imperial mission to civilize the other and to convert other societies into inferior versions of the same" took hold in the nineteenth century.49 This impulse to possess and transform that which was different found a ready mask and benign cover in messianic faiths. For example, Denys Shrop-shire, a European
Christian missionary, described Africans as "primitive" natives in the "technically barbaric and pre-literary stage of sociological and cultural development."50 The purpose of the missionary was not "merely to civilize but to Christianize, not merely to convey the 'Gifts of Civilization.'" By the nineteenth century, the discourse of white over black superiority had

The advocates of this discourse[German philosopher Georg} Hegel most typically, but duly followed by a host of 'justifiers'declared that Africa had no history prior to direct contact with Europe. Therefore the Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly made no development of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and could not be left to themselves, but must be "led" towards civilization by other peoples: that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of Western Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France. As if by
gained popularity and acceptance in Europe:

intuition, the missionary fused religion with civilization, a process that was meant to remove the native from the damnation of prehistory and to deliver him to the gates of history. In this idiom,

human development was defined as a linear and vertical progression of the dark or backward races from the savage to the civilized, the pre-modern to the modern, from the child to the adult, and the inferior to the superior. Slater has captured this worldview in a powerful passage: [T}he geological power over other societies, legitimated and codified under the signs of manifest destiny and civilizing missions, has been a rather salient feature of earlier Western projects of constructing new world orders. These projects or domains of truth, as they emanated from Europe or the United States, attempted to impose their hegemony by defining normalcy with reference to a particular vision of their own cultures, while designating that which was different as other than truth and
in need of tutelage. The United States, whose history is simply a continuation of the Age of Europe, suffers from this worldview just like its European predecessors. American predestination, as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, is almost as old as the country itself. President Theodore Roosevelt expressed

this sense of predestination when he referred to peoples and countries south of the United States as the "weak and chaotic governments and people south of us" and declared that it was "our duty, when it becomes absolutely inevitable, to police these countries in the interest of order and civilization." The treatment of the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking Latin America as being in the backyard of the United States was instrumental in consolidating the psyche of the United States as an empire.

Nature/environment
The root cause of the environmental crisis is a crisis of modernitys division between man and nature their approach makes ecological destruction inevitable Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]
There is, actually, an ongoing effort at developing a Latin American political ecology framework that similarly purport sto develop a unique geopolitical perspective on the question of nature; the brief comments below are purposely written from this vantage point. 12 To begin with, political ecology underscores the civilizational character of the current environmental

crisis; this crisis is, bluntly put, is a crisis of modernity, to the extent that modernity has failed to enable sustainable worlds. It is also a crisis of thought, to the extent that logocentric thought has fueled the ecologically destructive practices of modernity (Leff 2000, Boff 2002). (Assome
feminists convincingly argue, the domination of women and nature are at the basis of the modern patriarchal project enacted by fallogocentric thought.) It is difficult for those not accustomed to thinking in ecological terms

to realize that todays environmental crisis is not only a generalized crisis but perhaps the central contradiction and limit to capital today. More readily accepted is the idea that modernity is structured around the split between nature and culture, even if it is rarely acknowledged that thissplit might be equally formative of modernity than the civilized/other (us/them) binary. Nature then appears at the other side of the colonial difference, with certain natures(colonial/third world natures, womens bodies, dark bodies) located in the exteriority to the Totality of the male eurocentric world. The environmental crisis thus signals the limits of modern, instrumental rationality; it reflects modernitys failure to articulate biology and history save through the capitalization of nature and labor. What ensued was a regime of capitalist nature that subalternized all other articulations of biology and history, of nature and society, particularly those that enact through their local models and practices of the naturala culturally established continuity (as opposed to a separation) between the natural, human, and supernatural worlds. These local models of the natural are at the basis of environmental struggles today. In this way, these struggle need to be seen as struggles for the defense of cultural, ecological, and economic dif erence (Leff 2000; Escobar 1999). Ethno-ecological social movements are very clear about this. Here lies another type of critical borderthinking that needsto be taken into account. In a more prospective way, the Latin American political ecology effort attemptsto construct an ethics and culture of sustainability; this entails the rethinking of production towards a new environmental rationality; and a dialogue among forms of knowledge towards the construction of novel environmental rationalities. This ecologys ethical perspective on nature, life, and the planet entails a questioning of modernity and development, indeed an irrefutable indictment ofthe developmentalistfallacy. By privileging subaltern knowledges of the natural, this political ecology articulates in unique ways the questions of diversity, difference, and interculturality with nature, of course, occupying a role as actor and agent. At stake here is a cultural politics of difference that goes beyond the deconstruction of anthropo-logocentrism; it aims at the cultural re-appropriation of nature through political strategies such as those of social movements. According to this group, there is an emergent Latin American environmental thought that builds on the struggles and knowledges of indigenous, peasants, ethnic and other subaltern groups to envision other ways of being with a multiplicity of living and non-living beings, human and not. Respecting the specificity of place-based cultures and peoples, it aims at thinking about the re/construction of local and regional worlds in more sustainable ways.

The AFFIRMATIVE too easily deploys representations of dangerous geographies the space of disaster is taken up as the space of nature, which, when taken to its logical limit, is the epicenter of modern violence Perera 2010 (Suvendrini Perera, Department of Communication & Cultural Studies, Curtin University, Perth, Australia,
Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 page 37-38)

The intellectual constellation of natural terror, non-political or unavoidable suffering and the raced category of the sublime inaugurated by the Lisbon earthquake/tsunami meshes with the mapping of colonial geographies as dangerous and inimical. Gregory Bankoff describes how in the production of disasters: tropicality, development and vulnerability form part of the same essentialising and generalising cultural discourse: one that denigrates large regions of the world as dangerous diseaseridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone; one that depicts the inhabitants of these regions as inferior untutored, incapable, victims; and that . . . reposes in Western medicine, investment and preventive systems the expertise required to remedy these ills (2002, 29). Yet, Bankoff argues, the disproportionate incidence of disasters in the non-Western world is not simply a question of geography. It is also a matter of demographic difference, exacerbated in
more recent centuries by the unequal terms of international trade, that renders the inhabitants of less developed countries more likely to die from hazard . . . No single term has yet emerged that defines the areas where disasters are more commonplace: the media often sensationalises a certain region as a belt of pain or a rim of fire or a typhoon alley, while scientific literature makes reference to zones of seismic or volcanic activity . . . or to meteorological conditions such as the El Nino . . . Whatever the term, however, there is an implicit understanding that the place in question is somewhere else . . . and denotes a land and climate that have been endowed with dangerous and life-threatening qualities. (24) This

somewhere else belt of pain, typhoon alley is discursively and representationally rendered as somewhere else by the very enframing technologies of theatre, screen and spectacle discussed above. Technologies of enframing, and of rendering trauma and disaster into a theatre of the sublime, symbolically mark the line between the us and them that Bankoff underscores. As the responses to Hurricane Katrina in the United States demonstrated, these references to a somewhere else map racialized geographies on to spatial demarcations of East and West. Dangerous geographies are geographies of otherness and difference. The enframing technologies that produced geographies of danger simultaneously generate and sustain the illusion between a wild, undomesticated and disease-ridden nature, the locus of bare life, out there, in contradistinction to a civilized, scientifically superior and
flood). The

sanitary space that is the privileged home of the West. The sea itself figures among the most dangerous of these othered geographies because of elemental imaginaries of the ocean as a wild and ungovernable space distinct from land, one that is associated in Christian symbology with sin and error (as in the biblical

bare life located in dangerous geographies, lacking the ability to sublimate their environment, are condemned to an eternal victimhood from which only superior powers of reason, and all the scientific, medical and material power that entails, can attempt to rescue them. At work here, then, are all the familiar violently unequal power relations of colonial power that, on the one hand enable, sustain and reproduce the
possibility for strategic providential interventions, rescue missions, and acts of benevolence, while on the other demarcating disposable lives situated within necropolitical domains; marked with the unredeemable imprimatur of bare life. These

lives can be either killed with impunity or be abandoned to innumerable forms of letting die. The bare life that inhabit dangerous geographies, represented as incapable of mastering or overcoming their own environment (nature), consequently lack both selfsovereignty and subjecthood. This is the conceptual product of Hegelian
dialectics in which, as Mbembe explains in Necropolitics, questions of becoming subject, sovereignty and death all interlink: In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assum ed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks, the animal that constitutes the human subjects natural being is defeated. (2003, 14) In

geographies of danger the Third World, the global South, the arc of instability nature is precisely that which can be neither negated nor transformed (sublimated) through work and struggle. The inhabitant of the global South, marked by this failure, is she or he who consequently cannot overcome their animal status in order to become human/subject and be cast into the incessant movement of history (Mbembe 2003, 14). Their deaths, as in the world of non-human animals, cannot be essentially voluntary; rather, they die the animal death of the creature caught in unmasterable relations of nature.

The politics of separation and spatial exclusion in the name of safety and protection from hazards causes ecological wellbeing to become a second thought. The interconnected nature of the world means we must deconstruct the image of borders as a tool for demarcation Dalby 2012 (Simon, CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate ChangeBalsillie School of

International Affairs,Waterloo, Ontario, ENVIRONMENTAL GEOPOLITICS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, pg 10-11) The invocation of strategies of spatial exclusion as key to security, or keeping the bad guys out, or at least threats at a distance, works in other counter-productive ways in contemporary consumer culture. Privatized commodities are frequently seen as the way of protecting ourselves from numerous threats. In Andrew Szaszs (2007) terms, purchasing all manner of things allows us the illusion that we can shop our way to safety. In the process spatial strategies of what he terms inverted quarantine and suburbanization as distancing oneself from numerous dangers, have changed concerns from protecting the environment to protecting individuals from particular hazards. But the general concern with ecological wellbeing is abandoned in the process. The point about ecological thinking is precisely that such strategies of spatial separation are at best temporary measures that in the long run damage environments. At the larger scale this separation or drawbridge strategy, invoking national security in the face of global disruptions (Ripsman and Paul 2010), is also revealed to be counter productive in terms of nation states in the long run. The Anthropocene emphasizes how interconnected humanity is, and that now the collective fate of our planet requires that the illusion of separation be abandoned. The geopolitical cartography of separate and rival Westphalian boxes is completely inappropriate as a series of assumptions if sensible geopolitical decisions are to be taken in the next couple of decades. It is however a plausible strategy if the operant geopolitical specification of the world is one of competing separate spaces,
and if the object of what is portrayed in sports metaphors as winning such a competition in terms of being most powerful, f irst, or at least primus inter pares.

Securing the environment otherizes states that cannot cope with unsustainable development causing violence leading to their impacts- also elevating environmental destruction destroys personal agency towards the problem killing any chance of solvency Grger 96 ( Nina, PhD in policy sci @ oslo U head of IR Norweigan Institute of International
affairs, environmental security? vol 33 pg 111-12)
Although the authors of the literature reviewed agree that there are linkages between the environment and security, several have questioned the analogy between the logic of the mili- tary and that of the environmental security concept. Some warn against a 'securitization'

of environmental problems because this represents a militarization of our thinking about the relationship between humanity and the environment. The traditional logic of security involves threats issued among states with specific wills captured by nationalism or ideology. These are often directed against and conceptualized in terms of 'The Other' (Waever, 1993, pp. 1314). Securitization of the environment invites a state-centred thinking about security, with the ability to withdraw from or respond to environmental problems depending heavily on the character of the state in question. Politically unstable and/or economically poor or dependent states may have to choose between cheap and quick industrialization and environmental pro- tection. The two strategies may be mutually exclusive but equally important to satisfy the international

community. Others have argued, on the contrary, that by including a non-military threat like the environment, the concept of environmental security represents a demilitarization of security thinking. The concept of environmental security acknowledges the need for a political leader- ship to ensure the security of its citizens above and beyond their military security. A wider concept of security may also increase the range of legitimate policy choices available (Ullman, 1983, p. 133). However, by securitizing environmental

issues and making them part of high politics, the range of policy choices available is not increased but reduced. Securitization of the environ- ment describes a way of handling environmental issues where threats to the environment are seen as urgent and immediate, requiring a quick response at top political level (Buzan et al., 1995).' Indeed, for politicians to devote themselves to

a given issue, it helps a great deal if this issue falls within the realm of high politics. This is the most important political contri- bution of the

concept of environmental security - not its potential demilitarization of security thinking. Yet in the long run, desecuritization,

or politicization, may be preferable to securitization. Politicization is 'a recognition of social-political responsibilities

for changes in the quality of environmental conditions' which makes environmental issues part of the usual day-to-day political business (Buzan et al., 1995, p. 15). When environmental concerns become part of 'low politics' and lose their sense of political importance and urgency, they attract less public interest. Elections in Europe and in the USA in the 1990s show that the environment no longer triggers the same active public involvement as in the 1980s. Popular mobilization against environmental degradation seems to be at its peak in the case of potentially dangerous man-made environmental degradation, such as the French nuclear tests in French Polynesia. In the longer

run, however, a positive mobilization basis of human aspirations, rather than fear, may be necessary if individual action is to be sustained (Deudney, 1990, p. 469). In any case, the degree of popular mobilization is likely to depend heavily on perceptions of its efficacy.

Attempts by the nation state to control nature backfire and allows nature to be exploited Adams 3(William, Professor of Conservation and Development at the University of Cambridge, UK, Nature and the colonial
mind pg 17 of Decolonizing Nature Strategies for Conservation in a Post-colonial Era pg 24-25)
The classification

of nature was a critical element in the rationalizing gaze of colonialism: the othering of nature in science, art and society is the ideological practice that enables us to plunder it (Katz and Kirby, 1991, p265). In her book Imperial Eyes, Mary Pratt (1992) discusses the significance for imperial consciousness of the work of the Swedish taxonomist Linnaeus during the 18th century. The Linnaean system of classifying organisms not only drew upon biological collections from colonial explorers; it also epitomized the continental, transnational aspirations of European science (Pratt, 1992, p25). Arguably,
northern European taxonomic science (of which Linnaeus was the most famous practitioner) the naming and classifying of unknown organisms created

a new kind of Eurocentred planetary consciousness (Pratt, 1992, p39). More critically, taxonomy both represented and brought into being a new understanding of the world, one that had profound implications for human relations with nature, and with each other. Natural history asserted an urban, lettered, male authority over the whole of the planet; it elaborated a rationalizing, extractive, dissociative understanding which overlaid functional, experiential relations among people, plants and animal (Pratt, 1992, p38). The scientific definition of species locked them into colonial patterns of global exploitation. New knowledge was a catalyst to intellectual enquiry and speculation in the colonial metropole; but it also stimulated imperial ambition. For Joseph Banks, for
example, new wonders bespoke not only new knowledge, but also, perhaps primarily, new economic and spiritual opportunities (Miller, 1996, p3). Colonial scientific discourses about nature drew on pre-existing views of nature in the colonial periphery (Pratt, 1992; Grove, 1995), taking

possession, institutionalizing and re-exporting them to the colonized world (Loomba, 1998). Colonialism promoted the naming and classification of both people and places, as well as nature, in each case with the aim of control. Landscapes were renamed, and these names were entrenched through mapping and the formal education system. Linda Tuhiwai Smith comments that renaming the landscape was probably as powerful ideologically as changing the land (Smith, 1999, p51). Colonial states occupied human landscapes whose nature, names and boundaries were to them indistinct; but they conceptualized them as specific entities, with ethnicities constructed in their imagination on the model of a bargain-basement nation state (Bayart, 1993, p51). To achieve these specificentities, the colonial state used science and bureaucratic power, including forced settlement (and resettlement), control of migratory movements, artificial fixing of ethnic identity through birth certificates and identity cards, and the restriction of indigenous people to demarcated reservations. As Bayart comments: the precipitation of ethnic identities becomes incomprehensible if it is divorced from colonial rule (Bayart, 1993, p51).
created a standard grid whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored (1998, p2). This social

James Scott argues, in Seeing Like a State, that legibility and simplification were central to the work of bureaucracy in the modern state. In land tenure, language, legal discourse, urban design, population census and many other areas, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible and local social practice and

simplification was accompanied by similar views of nature. Simplification allowed a high degree of schematic knowledge, control and manipulation (p11). Scott describes the rise of scientific forestry in Prussia and Saxony during the 18th place under the wing of colonial administrations, and increasingly it served colonial purposes. Ecologists classified nature and charted its boundaries, providing categories for its effective exploitation. In this, colonial attitudes to nature strongly reflect the progressive idea of conservation as controlled or wise use, which

century. This was developed and exported under colonial rule (for example, to India), and persisted in government forest policy in many countries through the 20th century (see, for example, Fairhead and Leach, 1998). The 20th century saw a steady expansion in scientific exploration of the living world. This took

developed in the US at the end of the 19th century under President Theodore Roosevelt and the administrator Gifford Pinchot (Hays, 1959). The pattern of

scientific knowledge of nature being accumulated at the metropole so that its value could be assessed and amassed continued into the second half of the 20th century. Robin (1997) comments that the International Biological Programme was the last great imperial exercise in ecology, with information from the periphery being sent to the metropolitan centre to be converted into science (p72). Science and conservationism developed hand -in-hand. Colonial

conservation allowed resources to be appropriated, both for the use of private capital and as a source of revenue for the state itself. As Grove comments: colonial states increasingly found conservation to their taste and
economic advantage, particularly in ensuring sustainable timber and water supplies and in using the structure of forest protection to control their unruly and marginal subjects (1995, p15).

Relations
The affirmative completes the scalar transformation of the state from welfare provider into regional guardian. Moisio & Paasi 13 [Sami & Asssi, Regional Development and Regional Policy- Department of Geography, University of
Oulu, Finland, Regional Geography, Geopolitics, 18:2, 255-266, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.738729]

The transformation of the state is impregnated with conflicts, negotiations and compromises between political groupings and is characterised by selfserving actions and trade-offs.13 In such a
view, the decline of certain governmental interventions concerned with organising, dividing and classifying state space interventions which are usually associated with the welfare state for example indicates that a certain qualitatively recalibrated state power is being activated through political contest and trade-offs between political groupings. State

spatiality, from this perspective, is understood as the product of socio-economic struggles and transformations.14 The emergence of ideas about a hollowing out of the state and its retreat (and filling in) prompted new studies which took the spatiality of the state as the primary concern.15 In particular, a scalar reading of the changing nature of statehood has become a widely used approach for state spatiality over the past decade or so. Scholars have suggested that the continuous re-composition of the (welfare) state via new forms of economic scrutiny and control should not be written off as erosion of the territorial state but rather as a temporally and spatially specific re-organisation of the state (apparatus) which manifests itself as a re-scaling of the state and state power.16 Scholars drawing mainly from historical materialism have inquired into the restructuration of the Keynesian welfare state, which first began to occur in the 1970s and continues today.17 The spatial transformation of the state is conceptualised as a gradual erosion of the Keynesian political practices which were geared around the national as the focal political scale. Spatial Keynesianism, which dominated the postSecond World War era, was epitomised by a distinct geopolitical calculation that was intertwined with the emergence of the national welfare societies in Europe. One of the key messages of the state re-scaling literature has been that, since the 1970s, the founding regulative practices of spatial Keynesianism have been gradually replaced by a Schumpeterian competition state spatiality, which is ultimately based on internationalisation of policy regimes and the associated transfer of certain functions and responsibilities of the national-state to other scales of governance ranging from supranational to local/regional.18 The importance of this view lies in its capacity to illuminate that the territorial formations of the state are not static or pre-given but rather are historically (re-)construed and characterised by both relative stability and periods of rapid change. In such a view, the spread of neoliberalism as the hegemonic ideology across global and national spaces has brought into existence new privatising regulatory arrangements, spatial projects as well as forms of governance conceived around major city-regions. This, in turn, has
strengthened the role of national champions in state strategies and projects, which are increasingly predicated upon the politics of economic competitiveness rather than social equalisation.

Competitiveness
Competitiveness rhetoric is the newest manifestation of border violence cities become organized around regional wealth accumulation which creates new forms of spatial division Moisio & Paasi 13 [Sami & Asssi, Regional Development and Regional Policy- Department of Geography, University of
Oulu, Finland, Regional Geography, Geopolitics, 18:2, 255-266, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.738729]
It is often argued that the

basic distinction that characterises modernity is that the state can be conceptualised as a constellation of guardian practices (geopolitics, place) whereas cities can be considered as constellations of commercial practices (geo-economy, space of flows, capital accumulation).20 Even though this distinction occupies a central role in contemporary globalising discourses on economic growth (it has policy relevance, so to speak), it may well be that scholars should now re-think the analytical value of this distinction. The penetration of market practices and rationalities deep into the societal processes that constitute the state may potentially destabilise the relationship between the guardian and commercial practices. The recent policy practices and discourses which
aimed at re-working the state/city relationship at least across most of the OECD world arguably demonstrate a peculiar fusing of geopolitics (guardian practices) and geo-economy (commercial practices). Accordingly

, as the state increasingly works as an accumulation

machine, the issue of competitiveness is being re-located to the core of state security and national interest. This fusing of the geopolitical and geo-economic further increases the significance of globally oriented city-regions with respect to governmental interventions and, indeed, may potentially disembody some city-regions from the statist space-economy. The power of this new regionalist discourse, according to which knowledgeintensive capitalism requires (and makes) particular types of city-regions as key economic units in the global economy, is that it fundamentally challenges the policy makers to re-imagine state spaces and deconstruct, rethink and transform outdated spatial formations.21 This discourse is often constituted and legitimated by employing somewhat fuzzy spatial terms such as learning regions, clusters, regional/national innovation systems, or industrial districts which have occupied a significant role in the new regionalist lexicon. Arguably, the mobility of this lexicon has had a tremendous constitutive role for policy discourses in different geographical contexts, which, e.g., regional planners and policy makers then effectively
ago suggested that the new geopolitical order will be based around such units.22 But

circulate. The new regionalist discourse on city-regions, of course, resonates with the arguments of some of the most prominent urbanists, who already decades

rather than replacing the state, as Andrew Jonas hints in his article, the increasing strategic importance of city-regionalism, and the associated city-projects and regional policies which emanate from both above and below, may be understood as an expression of the contingent geopolitics of capitalism. As Jonas reminds the
reader, there is a great diversity in the national forms of city-regionalism, and these forms should be carefully studied contextually in order to discern their impact on city/state relations.

One of the central constituents of the neoliberal global geo-economy is that the power of the state to coordinate and generate economic growth has not only diminished but also has led to a particular denationalisation of the state and the increasing significance of international policy networks and regimes. This has been coupled with the rise of the discourse of state/national/regional competitiveness, which since the 1990s has characterised public policy making across the globe. In a way, paralleling military rivalry, competitiveness has become an instrument in the geopoliticalvocabulary of the state. In her article,
Gillian Bristow studies the discourse of regional competitiveness and inquires into how it, together with the discourse of resilience, has operated in the recent regional policy making in the UK. She treats these discourses as instrumental constituents of neoliberal governance of the state. Bristow also discusses the possibility of shaking the foundations of the discourse of competitiveness through what she calls a critical regionalist perspective.

As part of the

ongoing attempts to foster the states international competitiveness, the spatiality of the state is constantly remade through stateorchestrated arrangements which tie different types of cities with broader state strategies. It is therefore crucial to continue investigating the

projects and strategies that arise from cities, and how these position and construct cities with regard to different socio-spatial processes (such as innovation policies); i.e., how city-regional processes are impregnated with unique scalar practices and performances. The article by Anni Kangas analyses discussions

prompted by the recent decision to expand the borders of the Russian capital Moscow. The article particularly focuses on the way in which the idea of Moscow as a potential global city functions within the discussions concerned with transforming Moscow so as to connect Russia to t he global networks of investments, people and success. Kangas approaches the geopolitics of the global city as a circulating form of neoliberal governmentality. On the basis of her analysis of the Russian discussion, she outlines the ways in which neoliberalism becomes particularised in the context of Big Moscow as it gains backing from authoritarian forms of politics or historically rooted forms of cultural understanding.

Economic engagement
Their concern for Latin American relations is disingenuous the affirmative uses political stability as a tool to mask economic interests in the region that further American intervention and imperialism. Slater, 2004 [David Slater, Emeritus Professor of Political Geography, & Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of London, Geopolitics and the Postcolonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, Blackwell Publishing Ltd]
Roosevelts good neighbour approach to Latin America which, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, found
echoes in the Alliance for Progress of 1961 and President Clintons view of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 gave priority to mutually beneficial relations between the northern and southern parts of the

Americas in a context of free trade and political cooperation. Not only were the economic ties that bind being drawn closer between the north and south of the Americas, as reflected in trade and investment patterns, but also these ties were another part of the US mission to export its way of life (OBrien 1996: 251). The good neighbour policy was a significant attempt to provide a sense of political, economic, moral and cultural leadership for the Americas. It aimed at outlining the guidance and direction that was deemed necessary for Inter-American relations in turbulent times. It highlighted the importance of persuasion, of mutual understanding, responsibilities and respect, of a joint project of progress and friendship across the Americas, through which all the peoples of the American Family of Nations would benefit and prosper. It underscored the key role of free trade , a point which
Roosevelt repeated in a speech to the Inter- American Conference in Buenos Aires in 1936. Free trade and commerce were also intimately linked to a Wilsonian stress on democracy. Further, in the Good Neighbour address as well as in other speeches given in the 1930s,

Roosevelt returned to the importance of the spiritual solidarity and spiritual unity of the Americas, which he saw as an integral part of faith in God, and faith and spirit were invoked as being crucial to the Western Hemisphere and the Western World. Statements on trade and commerce, democracy, religion and a spirit of mutual obligation, respect and understanding formed the key components of the Rooseveltian perspective. His vision was also associated with a new style, the US President being presented as a friendly uncle figure offering a new deal for the Latin American nations. In general, Roosevelts intervention was an attempt to build a hegemonic discourse for the Americas, a way of bringing together the family of American nations into a US-led project which expressed a multi-dimensional power. It was an attempt to nurture Latin American consent for the leadership role of the United States , and at the same time it was also a response to the development of Latin American nationalism and antiimperialist sentiment. In practice, however, although gunboat diplomacy faded from view, and concrete steps were taken to
end the era of protectorates (as exemplified in the Cuban case with the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934), dictatorships in countries such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were still supported (Black 1988). As a consequence and by the end of the 1930s, with US support for the strengthening of the armed forces in

Latin America, Latin American opinion became much more critical of the good neighbour notion, so that at the end of the 1930s a populist Peruvian leader, Haya de la Torre, could refer to the Roosevelt Administration as the good neighbor of tyrants (Rosenberg 1982: 227).

Economic engagement is a form of imperial exploitation. The United States polices its own boundaries while it breaks down the borders of others both internally and externally so as to open up new spaces for unfettered expansion. These spaces hide a brutal form of subordination and exploitation. Slater 4 [David, David Slater is a British geographer with a BA and PhD and currently Professor of Social and Political
Geography at Loughborough University. Geopolitics and the Post-colonial Page 31-32] A little over a decade ago, Edward Said (1989: 214), in a commentary on a particular current within anthropology, wrote that in so many of the discussions of identity and difference, there is a striking absence of any critical analysis of American imperial intervention. For

Said, the imperial contest is a cultural fact of enormous political as well as interpretative

significance, since it is this specific historical encounter that acts as a defining horizon for concepts of identity, otherness and difference. More generally, and until recently, the absence of accounts of American One way of approaching this question is to refer to Hardt and Negris recent and influential text on Empire. Hardt and Negri (2000: xivxv) define Empire in relation to a notion of open, expanding frontiers, where power is distributed in networks. Originating with the founders of the United States, the imperial idea has

survived and matured throughout the history of the United States constitution and has emerged now on a global scale in its fully realized form (ibid.). For Hardt and Negri, Empire has no limits, no territorial boundaries limit its reign, and as a concept, Empire presents itself not as conquest but as an order that suspends history, that is outside history or at the end of history. They go on to argue that the fundamental principle of Empire is that its power has no actual and localizable centre and is distributed through networks, which does not mean that the US government and territory are no different from any other the US does occupy a privileged position, but as the powers and boundaries of nation-states decline, . . . differences between national territories become increasingly relative (Hardt & Negri 2000: 384). An immediate difficulty with Hardt and Negris interpretation is their idea that the

new system of Empire has its roots in the US constitution, which they see as being imperial rather than imperialist, as open and inclusive, so that the policies of Theodore Roosevelt, with his international police power of 1904, represent an old-style European imperialism,
whereas Woodrow Wilson and his League of Nations foreshadows todays regime, in which the sovereignty of the nation dissolves in a borderless world of Empire. It can be countered, as I shall indicate below, that these two tendencies are not as distinct as Hardt and Negri suppose, and that both form key components of US imperialism. It can be argued that US imperialism has

always followed a double movement of erecting and policing boundaries, and of breaking down the borders of others both internally and externally so as to open up new spaces for unfettered expansion. I want to pursue their argument a little further on this question, since the theme is central to this chapter
and has implications for subsequent chapters. In Hardt and Negris chapter on US sovereignty and network power, it is suggested that the US constitution is expressive of a democratically expansive tendency which is not exclusive. When it expands, this new sovereignty does not destroy the other powers it faces but opens itself to them. Perhaps, it is argued, the essential feature of this new imperial sovereignty is that its space is always open (Hardt & Negri 2000: 167; emphasis in original). But equally it is suggested

that the utopia of open spaces hides a brutal form of subordination of the Amerindian population. The Native Americans were the negative foundation of the US constitution since their exclusion and elimination were essential for its functioning and the facilitation of openness and colonizing expansion (2000: 170). Native Americans could be excluded because the republic did not need their labour, but with African Americans inclusion was necessary since black labour was an essential support to the new United States. African American
slaves could be neither completely included nor entirely excluded, and this was reflected in the constitution itself, wherein the slave population counted in the determination of the number of representatives for each state in the House of Representatives, but at a ratio whereby one slave equalled three-fifths of a free person. For Hardt and Negri, black slavery was both an exception to and a foundation of the constitution, and such a contradiction posed a crisis for the new notion of US sovereignty because it blocked the free circulation and equality that animated its foundation.

NGOs
NGO HUMANITARIANISM is an too easily slips into prescripted regimes of control. Be skeptical of the affirmatives claims Redfield 5 [Peter, Ph.D. Anthropology at UC Berkeley, professor of Anthropology at UNC
Chapel Hill, Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis, Cultural Anthropology 20(3)] ***MSF = Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) Such extreme actions, however, are rare. Within more common conditions of rupture, MSF usually practices a noisier variety of
humanitarian diplomacy of the Red Cross variety, intermingled with threats, denunciations, and protests. At the same time, it

operates as a technical agency, alongside other NGOs, to administer a substitute for medical government amid what it identifies as political failure. Yet this action rests squarely on a central, categorical paradox: the more successful MSF is at protecting existence in the name of a politics of rights and dignity, the more this temporary response threatens to become a norm. Related lines of tension run through much of the movement. Even as MSF seeks to maintain an anti-institutional ethos, it achieves the institutional recognition of the Nobel Prize, a recognition that promises both to increase its influence and impede its reinvention. Even as the organization seeks new forms of engagement that might emphasize structural inequities (such as the Access campaign to lower pharmaceutical costs for poor countries), it remains attached to the language of urgency: for example, Millions Die from Lack of Medicines (crisis number four on the poster described earlier). The groups anti-utopian utopianism requires both situational and categorical criteria of evaluation at different levels of engagement: Team reports for each local context filter through an organizational structure with global ambition. Universal techniques and expert guidelines mix with a legacy of continual improvisation. An established oppositional ethos takes shape within a definitional claim to humanitarian ethics. Therefore, in the face of continuing disaster, MSF responds with a defense of life that both recognizes and refuses politics. It forcefully claims an independent right to speak out and act without regard to considerations other than conscience, yet it never quite abandons neutrality in its insistence that final responsibility for alleviating suffering lies elsewhere. At the same time it maintains a critical frame of action that has undeniable political as well as social, economic, and technical effects on both local and systemic scales. Such is the dilemma of doctors yes, borders no. When analyzed at a general level, the work of NGOs such as MSF and other humanitarian groups certainly contributes to the greater contemporary world order, forming part of an established apparatus for crisis response. Thus, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000:36) can identify international NGOs as pacific weapons of what they call Empire. More concretely, Maria Pandolfi (2002:1, 5, and see 2000; see also Appadurai 1996:4549) includes them in an expanding military-humanitarian field she terms migrant sovereignties, self-legitimized through a culture of emergency exemplified by the massive intervention in Kosovo. At the very least, surely Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (2002) are correct in observing that humanitarian organizations performing statelike functions contribute to a transnational variant of governmentality, one that complicates our conceptions of national and international space. Nonetheless, MSF seeks to define itself in contrast to emerging conventions, while also participating in a
larger moral economy of evaluating politics through human life and suffering. It generally opposes humanitarian operations by military forces or any standing right of intervention (a principle memorably championed by one of its original founders-turned-politician, Bernard Kouchner, and implicit in the groups initial formulation). And it will occasionally withdraw from situations in which it believes external political manipulation outstrips its ability to influence conditions of suffering. Yet its actions, however agonizingly debated and qualified from within, often blur together with those of other aid actors when seen from the perspective of their intended beneficiaries as a continuing stream of white all-terrain vehicles. 25 General accounts of NGO governmentality, therefore, risk

slipping an older political vocabulary too quickly over contemporary forms. Although the doctors

who say yes to humanitarian action may find themselves replicating colonial patterns and inadvertently contributing to successor global orders, their own expansion is ever conflicted and oppositional. MSF may contribute to a migrant mode of

sovereignty, administered through Toyota Land Cruisers, satellite phones, and laptop computers, but we should not forget that this sovereignty is not only mobile but it is also at the same time attenuated. MSF may have achieved a measure of direct power over survival and a measure of indirect influence in bringing recognition to crisis situations. It may also reserve, like Schmitts sovereign, a measure of final decision over life and death by determining what constitutes a legitimate exception, although this is reactive and largely in a

medical vein. However, its actual ability to governto care for a populationis limited both by external factors and by internal will. Moreover, MSF is, as are most contemporary NGOs, an association composed of private citizens and, therefore, operates

obliquely with regard to classic legal categories of administration and sovereignty. As such it

holds no particular mandate to act (unlike the legally sanctioned ICRC), nor does it seek to rule. As the director of one MSF section observed to me: Four people sitting in Sudan surrounded by people with guns arent running things. This facile political analysis is nonetheless revealing when positioned alongside descriptions of global empire, for it reminds us that power can extend into

settings where a monopoly of authority is rarely apparent. 26 MSF acts on particular bodies and contributes to a larger political regime of humanitarian values. However, between these two levels, its actual command over events is ever precarious and unsure. What MSF has achieved
now passionately, now reluctantlyis a temporary and restricted form of modestly productive power that is uncertainly revealed in states of crisis. This is what I mean by a minimalist biopolitics: the temporary administration of

survival within wider circumstances that do not favor it. In foregrounding such aproject, and pursuing it within the attenuated sovereignty of an independent, butself-limiting organization, MSF protests inadequate government and provides a temporary alternative.
Whether such a minimalist biopolitics can achieve the deeper humanitarian goal of reestablishing human dignity, however, remains less clear, other than publicly demonstrating an attachment to that ideal at the moment of its abnegation. As Paul Rabinow (1999:109110) notes with regard to French concerns over their HIV blood scandal and genomic research, the bios that understands itself

as a civilizing force has difficulty imagining a zoe that it could not civilize or one whose alteration might change the very conditions of dignity. In classic humanist reason, dignity is already defined and inherent to the human person. And yet the direct pursuit of such dignity, in the form of a humanitarian ideal undertaken by a medically oriented and historically French movement, may reveal the limits of life in precisely these terms.

International law
International law is premised on state borders; borders create a wall that international law cannot surpass, and nations have full sovereignty within their borders
Orakhelashvili 2008 [Alexander Orakhelashvili, PhD, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GEOPOLITICS: ONE OBJECT, CONFLICTING LEGITIMACIES? pg.32-34] Contemporary international law is premised on inviolability of state boundaries. Geopolitics focuses on frontiers in terms of their utility in ensuring stable settlement of relevant conflicts or controversies, with the durability of frontiers. In this sense frontiers can be motivated by economic, security or ethnic factors each of which can contribute to or undermine their stability and durability. Obviously every territorial conquest is motivated by advantages following from the resources and location of the territory. This factor cannot by itself justify territorial aspirations. But the underlying

question of geopolitics seems to go deeper and address the fundamental needs of defence, security and economic existence. Before they divided states, boundaries served as dividing zones between primitive tribes. The primary purpose of having boundary zones in that context was twofold: to be an extreme limit of the area within which the relevant tribe could obtain necessary fold supply and use resources; and if located at the appropriate side, to prevent other tribal groups from intruding.97 Thus, ever since the time immemorial, two principal functions of boundary related to economic survival and security of the relevant entities. In other words, boundaries are necessary premises for existence and survival. Under some views, natural frontiers are determined above all by the access to the sea, and by the language factor.98 As Spykman observes, The boundary is thus not only a line of demarcation

between legal systems but also a point of contact of territorial power structures. Natural frontiers,

such as deserts, swamps, forests, mountains, have historically contributed to the defence of states but nature alone cannot create impassable barriers. The advance of technology and communication means enables penetrating through natural obstacles; frontier fortifications can be no hindrance to aerial bombardment. Thus frontier has lost a good deal of its significance. Still, Even if ground must be sacrificed and advanced positions surrendered, the frontier still performs its strategic function if it retards the first onslaught and provides a barrier zone behind which the nation can mobilise the full strength of its economic and military resources. Proponents of German Geopolitik had their own understanding of frontiers as temporary. Desirable frontiers favoured the nation that expands and challenges the neighbour nation that wants to obtain strategic frontier. In other words, good frontier favours the nation attacking the existing international order. Haushofer argued that only declining nations seek stable borders. At the same time, the concept of dynamic frontier was borrowed by Haushofer from the British geopolitical thinking.100 Given that geopolitical aspirations to revise frontiers often motivate wars, crises and frictions, it may have been right to observe that The best political frontier is that which has ceased to matter.101 Few cases can demonstrate this better than that of the Afghan-Pakistani border in the area of the Waziristan province. This case demonstrates the importance of boundaries as signifying the limit on territorial

sovereignty in the context of conflict in Afghanistan, where much of the Taliban support comes from the neighbouring Pakistani area of Waziristan where Taliban runs its own mini-state. Yet, the existence of an international border that divides Waziristan from Afghanistan has for a long while prevented the US and NATO intervention beyond the border line,

and thus curbs their capacity in fighting Taliban. The invasion of Waziristan in September 2008 by the United States forces have been criticised as infringement of the sovereignty of Pakistan,102 and the latters military has professed in having put up armed resistance to the US forces.103 Secure land boundaries have often been aspired and obtained in practice, but the legality of boundary depends not on the security factor as such, but on the agreement that reflects these security needs. A comprehensive analysis of post-First World War and post-Second World war boundary negotiations and agreements that have caused the multiple re-arrangements of European state boundaries, has demonstrated that the predominant attitude has always been to obtain secure boundaries through concluding treaties rather than through unilateral determination of security claims. Secure boundaries have also been obtained in the context of the aggressors responsibility.

International law legitimizes colonial cartographies and historical borders which perpetuate the logic of colonial domination Mahmud 2010 [Tayyab, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle
University School of Law, COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES AND POSTCOLONIAL BORDERS: THE UNENDING WAR IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN, pg.1] Many of todays pervasive and intractable security and nation-building dilemmas issue from the dissonance between the prescribed model of territorially bounded nation-states and the imprisonment of postcolonial polities in territorial straitjackets bequeathed by colonial cartographies. With a focus on the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the epicenter of the prolonged war in the region, this article explores the enduring ramifications of the mutually constitutive role of

colonialism and modern law. The global reach of colonial rule reordered subjects and reconfigured space. Fixed territorial demarcations of colonial possessions played a pivotal role in this process. Nineteenth century constructs of international law, geography, geopolitics, and the frontier, fashioned in the age of empire, were interwoven in the enabling frame that made the drawing of colonial borders like the
Durand Line possible. Imperatives of colonial rule and compulsions of imperial rivalries positioned these demarcations that often cut across age-old cultural and historical social units. Postcolonial states inherited these demarcations and, with them, a

host of endemic political and security afflictions. Modern international law, which in its incipient stage lent license to colonial rule, today legitimates colonial cartographies, thereby accentuating postcolonial dilemmas of nation-building and territorial integrity. By freeze-framing inherited colonial borders, international law forces disparate people to circumscribe their political aspirations within predetermined territorial bounds, precluding political and territorial arrangements in tune with their aspirations. To silence the questions that rise from colonial territorial demarcations, international law raises the specter of disorder. It seeks to preserve order, even an unjust and dysfunctional one. In the process, international law betrays a deeper affliction that plagues it - its refusal to squarely face its complicity in colonial domination accentuates its inability to resolve todays international disputes procreated by colonial cartographies.

International law draws the borders, and thus, the identities of the population of states. This collectivized categorization creates stigmatization and alienation of the "Other". Kesby 2006 [Kesby, Alison, University of Cambridge, "The Shifting and Multiple Border and
International Law"]
This section focuses on the manner in which borders may establish and shape identity and draws on Balibars insight of the need to overturn th e false simplicity of the notion.39 To

draw a border is to establish an identity, and to establish an identity, is to draw a border.40 The very act of defining simplifies that which is being defined, whilst also showing that borders and identities may be social constructs, not givens. Here identity in terms of the collective identity of a people of a territory, and of those who negotiate the border in seeking to enter that territory, will be examined. Considering first collective identity, the border is the place at which the sovereign power assigns individuals to particular territories and stakes out its ownership of its nationals.41 The
into both the territorial space and the political institutions, and power structures of the state. Here

border becomes the means by which individuals are categorized, the most fundamental category being that of the citizen and the inscription of the individual

Balibar adopts a generalized concept of territory encompassing the territorial space delimited by the border, but also the institutions governing and shaping the life of those within the space. He writes: To territorialize means to assign identities for collective subjects within structures of power, therefore to categorialize [sic] and individualize human beings (and the figure of the citizen with its statutory conditions of birth and place, its different sub-categories, spheres of activity, processes of formation, is exactly a way of categorizing individuals).42 As explained by Balibar, this appropriation of the nation by the state is internalized by the people such that the external border becomes the inner border43 shaping communal identity. Balibar asserts that there is a tendency for collective identities to crystallize around the functions of imaginary protection [borders] fill, a
fetishism of their lines and their role in separating pure identities.44 The external border creates internal unity and re lativizes differences between individuals and social groups within the territory by subordinating these differences to the overarching distinction between ourselves and foreigners. In this way, the external frontier is seen as a projection and protection of an internal collective personality.45 Balibar suggests that in democratic states, the significance of the border is intensified as not only do the people belong to the state, but also the state to the people. A reciprocal pattern of the appropriation of the state by the people and the people by the state occurs.46 In

some cases, the unity of the people may be instituted by the notion of a fictive ethnicity. That is, a states populations are represented . . . as if they formed a
means by which this fictive ethnicity may be produced. When

natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions .47 Race is one of the

the people as the subject of political representation becomes blurred with the people as ethnos, distinctions are drawn between native and foreign populations, with the latter being racially or culturally stigmatized .48 On Balibars analysis, by producing the fictive ethnicity around which nationalism is organized, racism maintains a necessary relation with nationalism.49 Borders may therefore become the point at which world views . . . and thus also views of man [are] at stake.50 The process of territorializationof assigning identities for collective subjects is always haunted . .

. by the possibility that outsiders or nomadic subjects . . . resist territorialization, remain located outside the normative political space.51 Balibar here is speaking of nomadic subjects in the broad sense of

outsiders, who are present within the territory, and yet as non-citizens, do not belong to the people. They threaten the populations self -understanding as a unified people52 and the exclusive manner in which the state belongs to the citizens and the citizens to the state described above. One response to this threat may be the closure of the geographical border to the nomad. Whatever may be the reality of the life experience of the Roma today, there remains a powerful stereotype of the Roma as nomadic people. Roma have been recognized by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as a non territorial European minority.53 Certain Romani groups have also voiced claims to non-territorial nationhood as is evidenced by the Declaration of a Nation at the July 2000 conference of the International Romani Union.54 It is perhaps this stereotype of the nomadic Roma, which informed the Governments policy at Prague Airport, or at least was present in the background to the policy.

International laws authority ends at the borders of the nation-state. The reinforcement of international law upholds the modern nation-state and allows for the creation of the artificial citizen Mahmud 2010 (Tayyab, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle

University School of Law, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1) Forged on the anvil of modern European history and enshrined in modern international law, modern statehood and sovereignty are deemed the preserve of differentiated "nations" existing within exclusive and defined territories. While "the struggle to produce citizens out of recalcitrant people accounts for much of what passes for history in modern times,"298 the prototype of the "nation-state" combines a singular national identity with state sovereignty, understood as the territorial organization of unshared political authority. "The territoriality of the nation-state" seeks to "impose supreme epistemic control in creating the citizensubject out of the individual." 299 "Inventing boundaries" 00 and "imagining communities" 30 1 work together "to naturalize the fiction of citizenship."302 Modern international law underscores this schema. It extends recognition only to the national form, with acceptance attached to the ability to hold territory in tune with "Western patterns of political organization." 303 As a result, the "nation-state" is the dominant model of organized sovereignty today. This spatially bounded construct, one that frames both the geography of actualizing self-determination and the order of the resulting political unit, put in circulation a "territorialist epistemology."304 Postcolonial formations had to subscribe to this Eurocentric grammar of state-formation to secure eligibility in the interstate legal order.305 This statist frame precludes imaginative flowerings of selfdetermination in tune with the interests and aspirations of diverse communities both within and beyond received colonial boundaries.

International law is hypocritically used as a justification to enforce borders whih expand violence, nationalism, and discrimination of the other Walker 2009 [R.B.J., Walker is a professor in the department of Political Science at the University
of Victoria and is the chief editor of the Journal of International Political Sociology, After the Globe, Before the world, pg. 60 62]
6

I want to address so as to insist that modern political life is formally organized 7 in relation to the claims and capacities of the sovereign state and the system 8 of sovereign states: to both, though ambivalently, in ways that produce both 9 fundamental conflicts, in principle and in practice, and multiple negotiations, 10 reconciliations and accommodations of conflicting principles and practices. It 11 is not organized in relation to either the sovereign state or the system of 12 sovereign states. Or perhaps it is better to say that it is not
Of all the possible ways of beginning a discussion of contemporary political 5 possibilities and necessities, I have so far shaped my framing of the problem

organized in rela- 13 tion to either one or the other, except when modern political life is in some 14 kind of crisis, when it is subject to exceptional conditions.

Or perhaps it is 15 even better to say that it is not organized in relation to either one or the other, 16 even when exceptional conditions prevail, given that exceptional conditions in 17 this case only affirm the rule that modern political life is formally organized 18 in relation to the claims of both the sovereign state and the system of sover- 19 eign states. Slight variations in formulation open up immense conceptual 20 arenas in this respect: arenas that are usually understood in relation to the 21 most extreme conditions of war and the most abstract questions about when 22 and where modern political life begins and ends, and thus to the

way the 23 boundaries, borders and limits of political life are supposed to work. There
or friend and enemy. Nevertheless, rhetorical advantage is an 29 uneasy criterion of analytical coherence. 30 There

24 are doubtless many rhetorical advantages to be gained from posing simple 25 existential choices between the sovereign state and the system of states, as 26 there are in posing similar choices between individual and society, liberty and 27 equality, liberty and security, knowledge and power, democracy and author- 28 itarianism,

is also some degree of empirical plausibility in the familiar claim that 31 the modern system of states has only a weak and largely prescriptive expression in international law and enforcement capacity, and may thus be treated 1 as a minor factor in situations shaped by state power, especially when the 2 most powerful states really start throwing their weight around. Even so, 3 modern political life cannot be understood through the discursive isolation of 4 the state from the system of states, no matter how important or powerful any 5 particular state might be, how weak the claims of international law may be, or 6 how useful it might be to examine the modern system of states as an analy- 7 tically discrete structural formation. Any attempt to do so wilfully effaces the 8 contradictory character of modern politics and encourages silence about the 9 most difficult sites, moments and practices of antagonism that must be nego- 10 tiated, through resort to violence if necessary, and which must be engaged in 11 any attempt to understand conflicts of principle and claims to sovereign 12 authority. Weakness does not automatically translate into irrelevance. Greater 13 power does not always imply greater authority. Self-assertion is no guarantee 14 of political autonomy. Boundaries, borders and limits do not necessarily have 15 minor significance. It may well be the case that statist parochialism remains a 16 powerful political commitment, but it can never be an excusable scholarly 17 strategy.1 18 Similarly, as modern political subjects, we are subject to the claims of 19 necessity and possibility made by both the modern state and the modern 20 system of states; by both the national and the international, as we are now 21 able to say having learnt, through many ecstasies and many agonies, to con- 22 flate concepts of statist sovereignty with concepts of statist nationality. 23 Sometimes these claims are reasonably consistent. Lines are then drawn 24 loosely. Upbeat accounts
of an enlightened internationalism prevail, precisely 25 on the assumption that we are enabled to be both national and international 26 both different and yet similar, both citizen in particular and human in gen- 27 eral within the modern sovereign state that is enabled by the modern system 28 of states. This is the stance advanced in the official rhetorics of states every- 29 where. Sometimes

these claims are radically incompatible, in ways that have 30 produced enduring and still active sites of controversy and conflict. Lines are 31 then drawn sharply. Difficult decisions are taken. Exceptions are declared. 32 Violence is deemed legitimate and the hard men take over. Nevertheless, while 33 we may sometimes believe that the aspirations expressed as citizens of parti- 34 cular states are not so different from the aspirations expressed by the citizens 35 of most or even all other states aspirations we might thus consider to be not 36 only international, but even a universal expression of a common humanity 37 sometimes our commitments as citizens of particular states override our 38 commitments to anyone or anything else. 39 In times of war, especially, the claims of any particular state are liable to 40 trump any other claim, to justify the priority of the obligations of citizenship 41 over any obligations to some broader humanity, indeed to legitimize practices 42 of inhumanity (even if under the rubric of just war), to trample over claims 43 about freedom with claims about security, to privilege friend over enemy, and 44 to celebrate ones own modern self both over all others and over all other 45 forms of subjectivity. Limits are acknowledged, even celebrated. Violence 1 erupts, and is deemed legitimate, necessary, the only possible option available 2 for the defence of that modern self that nevertheless claims to be part of a 3 broader humanity in whose name violence may become even more inhumane. 4 Hypocrisies sprout like weeds in spring. 5 In times of peace, also, the claims of any particular state to a right of self- 6 determination express the degree to which modern political life is predicated 7 on the possibility of freedoms for particular communities, particular peoples, 8 particular territorialized spaces, not on claims made on behalf of a politically 9 undifferentiated humanity. National chauvinism rules, in peace quite as much 10 as in war, although in peace claims about the compatibility of chauvinism 11 with some sort of humanity can find plausible rhetorical ground . Limits are 12 assumed, but scarcely acknowledged. Hypocrisies are cultivated, and bred 13 into alluring displays of virtue. Scholarly parochialism is thereby vindicated. 14 The political theorists can then endlessly cultivate their discourses of solip- 15 sism, and discuss principles of justice,

rights or freedoms as if the singular 16 state expresses a singular universe of politics and noone needs to think about 17 the systemic conditions under which a political theory can begin with claims 18 about political life in a singular state, especially a singular state that has a 19 hegemonic place in the structuring of a system of states. 20 Nevertheless, in practice as well as in principle, no state
can survive without 21 the system of states that enables any particular state to exist, to be recognized 22 as existing, to claim sovereignty, to nurture nations, to foster parochial scho- 23 larly traditions, to privilege its own cultures, laws, interests and security over 24 almost any other claim. As modern political subjects, we are always subject to 25 the claims of both the modern sovereign state and the modern system of 26 states, to obligations understood in terms of a particular understanding of 27 citizenship and a particular understanding of humanity, but also as always 28 potentially subject to demands that one of these sources of obligation be pri- 29 vileged over the other. Despite

endless assertions to the contrary, modern 30 political life is not orchestrated through a grand choice between claims to a 31 generalized humanity and particularized citizenships, but through a double 32 claim to both humanity and citizenship: a double claim that can hold sway 33 only up until certain limits are broached and a privileging of one over the 34 other becomes unavoidable: until responsibility is taken for drawing a line of 35 radical discrimination.

State
{**In Cuba Disposabilty 1NC**}Orienting politics around the nation-state inevitably reproduces violent boundaries and borders Walker 2009 [R.B.J., Walker is a professor in the department of Political Science at the University
of Victoria and is the chief editor of the Journal of International Political Sociology, After the Globe, Before the world, pg. 77 80]
The consequence, however, can also be read in relation to all those historical struggles in which states have effectively minimized the sovereignty of the 9 people in the name of their own supremacy, whether for the long-term good 10 of the people, or for the short-term demands of some state of emergency. The danger of the modern state, we know all too well, is the potential for totalitarianism, authoritarianism, fascism, or what has often, and disturbingly, been in danger of amounting to much th e same thing, the monopolistic claim to a state sovereignty sundered from, but articulated in, the name of a popular sovereignty, and

capable of effacing all claims to diversity in the name of its own collective unity. It is in this context

that we can again 17 understand much of the contemporary impetus behind claims about demo- 18 cratization, or even claims about the potentialities of a market rationality; but 19 also the sense that the claims of sovereign states to be able to provide the 20 conditions under which democratization might be possible are fundamentally 21 at odds with the administrative and disciplinary apparatus, and in the final, or 22 not so final, instance, the physical force and resort to war, they deem neces- 23 sary for the constitution of a properly democratic politics. 24 Perhaps the most important constitutive gamble of modern politics, in fact,

has been that the sovereign state would nurture rather than devour its citizens. 26 Contemporary

references to the security dilemma now tend to be dominated by analogies between the structurally driven competition among states coexisting in a system of states and Hobbes account of a world of free and 29 equal (modern, liberal) individuals in an abstract state of nature, but 30 Hobbes major contribution in this respect may well be his commentary on 31 the ways in which the sovereignty he insists must be constituted so as to pro- 32 tect free and equal individuals is not exactly guaranteed to live up to its pro- 33 mise.

States are a source of insecurity precisely because of the way they promise to provide security. The subject of security, as I have put it elsewhere, is precisely the modern subject that must be secured. States encourage claims about freedoms within their territory because to be within a territory is to be under law, under necessity and always subject to the exception that enables the rule. Again,
many are sufficiently privileged to take a gamble of trusting in the freedoms and securities promised by the modern state, but it is also a gamble that very many people have lost, and lost very badly. 41

There have been suspicions,

third ,

about the

capacity of the modern state to fulfill its promise to provide a home for modern politics, even when struggles 43 to sustain powerful institutions and practices of popular sovereignty have 44 been relatively effective. These suspicions can also be traced back a long way. They are expressed in a broad range of claims about the increasingly problematic status of conceptions of the political within the modern state, 2 given various suspicions about the plausibility of any sharp distinction 3 between the internal spaces of the modern state and the spaces of the inter- 4 national, of the modern system of states, beyond. Difficulties arise here not in 5 relation to the ambivalences and tensions between politics and something else, 6 or to the capacity of states to impose their understanding of collective neces- 7 sities on everyone and everything, but to the capacity of states to demarcate a 8 clear limit to their capacities and jurisdictions, especially in relation to the 9 claims of the system of sovereign states, and the claims of that system to 10 express rights and needs that might be attributed to humanity in general. 11 It is this third group of suspicions that has come to be of most pressing 12 concern in contemporary political life, though they implicate and complicate 13 the other two sorts of suspicion in various ways.23 They also explain much of 14 the contemporary impetus both to reimagine where and what we take politics 15 to be, as well as to wish that politics would somehow go away, or to suspect 16 that politics is indeed already in the process of coming to an end. If we are to 17 make any sense of what is at stake in contemporary calls to reimagine the 18 political imagination, it is now necessary to pay a lot more attention to what happens on the line that effects an apparently sharp distinction between two distinct spaces: the domestic spaces of the territorial state, and the foreign spaces of the modern system of states, each with their own accounts of temporal and political possibility a line that also assumes a capacity to draw further lines between the modern subject and other subjects/sovereigns and between the modern system of states and the wider world beyond. The dou- 25 bles and triples of modern political life are easily multiplied.24 26 To take this line for granted is precisely not to affirm a set of realities that simply exist in the world, and which, fortunately or tragically, resist any attempt to imagine something different. It is to affirm an ensemble of historical and abstractly formulated but massively embodied accounts of what it must mean to divide the world, to discriminate between that which is included and that which is excluded,
that which is friend and that which is enemy, that which is society and that which is anarchy, that which is normal and that which is exceptional: accounts that must be affirmed authorized, legitimized as the only condition under which worldly realities and political possibilities can properly be engaged. What counts for reality and necessity in modern political life, and

thus what works to both enable and constrain the modern political imagination, has to be

understood in the first instance as an enactment of an historically specific imagination of political possibility, an imagination that knows how to draw the line: that knows both how to

discriminate and how to authorize the discriminations that are enacted by sovereign acts of discrimination. This enactment literally and figuratively centres on the practices of the modern state and its subjects; on all their potentialities and all their dangers. 44 It especially centres on the discriminations and authorizations enacted andexpressed in the practices and institutions of modern state sovereignty practices which simultaneously draw the line in territorial space and differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate practices within the space they delimit. It is in relation to the sovereign practices of the modern state that we are

supposed to understand what it means to draw the line: to distinguish between what is legal and illegal, possible and impossible, realistic and utopian, the properly political and the merely economic, civil or private internally and the also merely international, or perhaps theological, externally. The most important decisions about modern political life about which and what kinds of people get to be counted among the included, about what has to be done to secure the inclusion, about what ought to be done once these inclusions are secured and normalized, about who gets to decide when previously accepted decisions are to be redecided or suspended , about who gets to decide who gets to make, and make binding, judgements about these and all other decisions are made in relation to this line, this border that is so much more than a physical demarcation on earthly topography. It is the sense that this line has become a little problematic in some contexts and radically uncertain in others that has undermined so many convictions not only about what it now means to engage in political life, but also of what it would mean to struggle for something better, for something more democratic, for something recognizably political in an age in which suspicions about what now counts for politics have become quite intense. 22 To draw attention to contemporary suspicions about the distinction 23 between the state and the system of states, the properly political and the 24 merely international, however, is to run into extensive analytical difficulties. 25 Not least, the modern disciplines of knowledge that seek to engage with 26 modern politics and its imaginative possibilities are already carefully situated 27 on either side of the line that distinguishes the political from the international. 28 Moreover, they are themselves largely constituted through the assumption that this line must be drawn. They tend to observe both its discriminations and its authorizations as a natural condition rather than as an historical achievement, an ongoing practice, and an ongoing problem. In effect, they 32 assume what they are now increasingly asked to examine. Many contemporary attempts to reimagine the political imaginations likewise seek to do so from either side of this line and, unsurprisingly, tend to both reproduce and reauthorize the line they seek to evade, transcend or simply ignore. Although the line between the political and the international is widely judged to be increasingly problematic, and although questions about political life supposedly settled in relation to it are now asked with renewed urgency, itis a line that cannot be evaded, transcended or ignored. As a constitutive limit of modern politics in territorial space, it is also a constitutive limit of both modern political practice and the modern political imagination. As a 42 demarcation, however, it is also the site of a mutual production, and much of 43 what is interesting about it concerns the very active and diverse practices of 44 mutual production that are enabled once the demarcation has been made. 45 Many of these practices hinge on the ways in which the demarcation of an 1 outside that affirms an inside produces a powerful sense of what it must mean 2 to escape the inside: of what it means to escape from the modern achievement 3 of a spatially delimited political community always seeking to go beyond 4 what has already been achieved in time. Consequently, if modern political life is in need of reimagination, attempts to do so on terms uncritically assuming a stance on either side of the line that sets the limits of the modern political imagination will necessarily run into irresolvable difficulties.

The state necessitates the creation of borders in order to remain sovereign this shuts down political challenges to state violence Moisio & Paasi 13 [Sami & Asssi, Regional Development and Regional Policy- Department of Geography, University of
Oulu, Finland, Regional Geography, Geopolitics, 18:2, 255-266, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.738729]

Geopolitics as a practice has for a long time been associated with territorialisation of political space: building and performing states as definitive bounded territories, constructing domestic order through different governmental techniques, and constituting the international as the inter-state. State, territory and sociospatial relations are thus reciprocally constituted. Such techniques imply a demarcation between inside and outside, a divide that was a long-taken-for-granted, widely accepted element in IR studies and political geography. Respectively, geopolitics was the key spatial idea used to depict the military and economic rivalry embedded in the imagined statecentric world order. If a bounded state was seen as a shield safeguarding national economies, geopolitics was the vehicle used to manage nations relations in the wider world. So influential has the geopolitical constitution of the state and the resultant statism been since the nineteenth century, that, as John Agnew notes, in the modern political realm, lived space has been almost invariably associated with the idea of state-territoriality, and in this view politics is about modes of government within and patterns of conflict and cooperation between the territories or tightly

bounded spaces of modern states.4 Another related idea once taken for granted but challenged today is the notion that states are separated by boundaries, and that inside these power containers states have spread their impact, control and bureaucracy to every corner of the territory and civil society. However, sovereignty is not necessarily neatly contained territorially and indeed it never has been. Agnew maintains that political space cannot be reduced to state space for two reasons: first, states are always and everywhere challenged by forms of politics that do not conform to the boundaries of the state in question, and, second, state boundaries are permeable.5 Also Peter Taylor has earlier argued that territory/territoriality may mean different things in a state in the realms of economy, politics and culture.6 Agnews conceptualisations

highlight how, particularly since the late 1980s, state-obsession and inwards-looking state-centric thinking have been challenged in political geography and IR studies. State space is increasingly understood as a multi-scalar, networked and

relational social process rather than a static territorial frame. Also, the conception of geopolitics itself has changed significantly. Today it refers to a complex assemblage of phenomena and agency, such as geopolitical discourses as representations of space and power, or the geopolicymaking of political actors, scientists, consultants, and the media, for instance.7 Scholars of critical geopolitics in particular have deconstructed the discourses of scientific geopolitics and geopolitical imaginations mainly from a post-structuralist perspective. As many of the articles in this theme section point out, the questioning of state-centricity inescapably leads to a reconceptualisation of both the (geo-)political and the state. Previous research has demonstrated that the concept of the political cannot be limited to the state. Rather, the state can be conceptualised and analysed as a set of structural effects which are the result of societal processes, technologies and institutions.8 The state is thus not a distinct domain that is separable from an entity called
society. In a word, the state is a dynamic process and assemblage of practices and discourses that is spread both inside and outside of state territory. The state is not only constituted but also put into action by competing societal forces

and processes within and beyond the states jurisdictions. Respectively, state territories and borders can both be seen as the results of power struggles related to economy, culture and politics. As Bob Jessop has suggested, state power results from a continuing interaction between the structurally inscribed strategic selectivities of the state as an institutional ensemble and the changing balance of forces operating within, and at a distance from, the state, and perhaps, also trying to transform it.9 This draws from Nicos Poulantzas, who regarded the state as a social relation and
saw that state power is an institutionally mediated condensation of the transforming balance of forces that are not class-neutral

Political geographers interested in state theory have often drawn from (strategic) relational theory.11 Various weak and strong forms of globalisation (economy, culture, and consciousness) have forced scholars to re-think the changing balance of forces operating within, across and at a distance from the state, and, indeed, the whole issue of statehood as well. Respectively, the spread of globalising political and policy practices has made the spatialities of the state a tremendously topical issue since the 1990s. Yet there is no reason to take for granted the prevailing ideas about globalisation replacing the territorially imagined world with one of networks and flows. The neoliberal idea of the rise of a borderless world, so popular in the 1990s, declared the death of the nation-state prematurely. Globalisation is, as Saskia Sassen suggests, partly endogenous to the national rather than the external, and respectively the global can be conceptualised as partly inhabiting the national and the local. Although state borders still have a role to play, new borderings cut across such borders and become evident both globally and within national territories.12
Many of the articles in the special section scrutinise this phenomenon in different spatial contexts.

The idea of the border is not a historic concept rather, boundaries are a result of European influence in the global sphere. They are completely artificial constructions that are not necessarily effective. This is exemplified by borders such as the Somali-Ethiopia border, where millions of Somalis live in Ethiopia despite a boundary Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political geography,

the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking, Ethics and Global Politics, pg 7-8, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf) To many commentators on borders, however, they are explicitly deemed as arbitrary,

contingent, or even perverse. Most importantly, international borders are not just any old boundaries. To begin with, worldwide, it is hard to find a single international boundary that has not

been inspired by the example and practices of an originally European statehood. Much of this was the direct result of the imposition and subsequent breakup of European empires outside of Europe into
state-like units, even if, as in Latin America, there was rather more local inventiveness than there was at a later date in Asia and Africa.

But it has also been more broadly the result of the spread of a model of territorial statehood, a state-centered political economy, and the association of democracy with territorial citizenship from Europe into the rest of the world. At one and the same time, both a political ideal and set of socio-political practices , the imagination of territorial statehood rests on imitation and diffusion of established political models that define what is and what is not possible in the world
particular time and in any particular place. at any

European (and, later, American) cultural hegemony has thus

written the script for the growth and consolidation of a global nation-state system. The model of statehood has had as its central geographical moment the imposition of sharp borders between one state unit (imagined as a nation-state, however implausible that usually may be) and its neighbors. Previously in world history, a wide range of types of polity co-existed without any one*empire, city-state, nomadic network, dynastic state, or religious polity*serving as the singular model of best political practice. It is only with the rise of Europe to global predominance that an idealized European territorial state became the global archetype. Part of the political tragedy of the contemporary Middle East and Africa, for example, lies in the attempted
reconciliation of the EuroAmerican style territorial state of sharp borders with ethnic and religious identities distributed geographically in ways that do not lend themselves to it.36

Lurking behind bordering everywhere is the effect of that

nationalism which has come along with the territorial nation-state: that being perpetually in question, national identity has to be constantly re-invented through the mobilization of national populations (or significant segments thereof). Borders, because they are at the edge of the national-state territory, provide the essential focus for this collective uncertainty.37 Even as defined strictly, therefore, but also by

remaining in perpetual question, state borders provide the center of attention for more generalized elite, and sometimes popular, anxiety about what still remains to be achieved by the state for the nation.38 The everyday nationalism in which borders are implicated as central moments, then, is not a project that simply takes place at the border or simply between adjacent states.39 Indeed, it is only secondarily territorial in that its origins often lie in distant centers and in scattered Diasporas where elites and activists engage in the task of defining and defending what they understand as the nationstates borders, the better to imagine the shape or geo-body of their nation. Consider, for example, the histories of Irish nationalism and Zionism with their origins in scattered Diasporas. State borders are not,

therefore, simply just another example of, albeit more clearly marked, boundaries. They are qualitatively different in their capacity to both redefine other boundaries and to override more locally-based distinctions.40 They also have a specific historical and geographical origin. If social boundaries are universal and transcendental, if varying in their incidence and precise significance, state borders, in the sense of definitive borderlines, certainly are not. They have not been around for time immemorial.41 Attempts to claim that bordering is historic in the sense of unequivocal and definite delimitation, or to take bordering as a given of state formation are, therefore, empirically problematic. What is evident has been the need to give borders a deep-seated historical genealogy even when this is a fictive exercise.42 There is, then, nothing at all natural*physically or socially*to borders. They are literally impositions on the world. This
is not to say that borders are somehow simply metaphorical or textual, without materiality; lines on a map rather than a set of objects and practices in space.43 It is more that borders are never transcendental objects that systematically secure

spaces in which identities and interests can go unquestioned. We may today also be living in a time when

they will begin to lose their grip because they no longer match the emerging spatial ontology of a world increasingly transnational and globalized.44 In the first place, as impositions, borders frequently transgress rather than celebrate or enable

cultural and political difference. For example, the US-Mexican border cuts through historic migration fields and flows of everyday life,45 perhaps around 40 million people have US-Mexico crossborder family relations;46 the Israel-Gaza border is a prison perimeter premised on collective punishment of a

population for electing rocket-firing adherents to Hamas; and most borders in the Middle East and Africa make no national or cultural sense whatsoever (e.g. the Somalia-Ethiopia border with more than 4 million Somalis within Ethiopia or the Israel-Palestine border that is constantly in precisely what gives it such symbolic power in the minds eye of the nationalists who favor/challenge it.

mutation as Israeli settlers encroach on what had been widely agreed was Palestinian territory). But in every one of these cases, borders play a crucial role in focusing the aspirations of the groups on either side. The perpetual instability of the border is

State/neoliberalism
State spaces and borders bring about the violent conceptualization of neoliberal policies Moisio & Paasi 13 [Sami & Asssi, Regional Development and Regional Policy- Department of Geography, University of
Oulu, Finland, Regional Geography, Geopolitics, 18:2, 255-266, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.738729] Many of the articles in this special section inquire into the new spatial/geopolitical formulations of the state which can be understood as bringing together transnational policy processes and place-bound political dynamics. The transnationalisation of state

spaces, which is often understood as being associated with the spread of neoliberal political rationality, has challenged scholars to rethink the often taken-for-granted distinctions between the domestic and international or the geopolitical and the geoeconomic. Consider, for instance, the ongoing competitiveness indexing and country benchmarking which are prepared by international, specialised organisations and companies. They can be seen as practices of global governance which seek to govern the behaviour of states in the wider geopolitical and geo-economic landscape through a particular neoliberal rationality of government.23 The
currently mushrooming research which brings together policy transfer, the formation of global governmentality and transnational policy processes and state spatial transformation has been particularly interested in the recent processes of market-oriented regulatory restructuring in different geographical contexts and across policy fields.24 The neoliberalisation of the state can be

considered as referring to the ongoing efforts to re-create the state as a socio-economicpolitical institution with an enterprise form. In his article, Mikko Joronen delves through a set of philosophical texts by authors such as Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger, and conceptualises the emergence of a sort of violent neoliberal geo-polity in which virtually all resources, whether these are human or natural, are increasingly set under the calculative techniques of the market as if the resources were inescapably exploitable objects. The increasingly complex geopolitical agency involved in the operation of transnational power within states merits scholarly reflection. The theme of transnationalisation is explicitly taken up in Jouni Hklis paper which develops a Bourdieu-inspired field
conceptual perspective to study the actually existing transnational policy processes within which state spatial transformat ion occurs. Hklis methodological paper offers conceptual tools for those who are interested in going beyond the dichotomies of the transnational/local/national in an empirical investigation of changing state spaces. The recent governmental

interventions which are predicated on neoliberal rationality associated with a particular type of political-economic knowledge may also be read as new modalities for producing the political. The neoliberal, or what Sami Moisio and Anssi Paasi suggest is better defined as the PorterianFloridian political rationality, does not entail the replacement of the territorial state by the relational economic spaces but rather a qualitative re-composition of the two. The authors problematise the distinction between the geopolitical and geo-economic social against the development trajectories of the Finnish state space. Moisio and Paasis investigation of the changing state spaces in Finland
highlights the process of unravelling the inherited spatial formations of the state and how they have been conditioned by place-specific political dynamics, and that the Finnish context also displays a peculiar immunity to neoliberal pressures. The Finnish case is also scrutinised by Toni Ahlqvist, who examines how the future of the state is increasingly imagined as a sort of corporation-polity, and how this geoeconomic vision is predicated upon a will to generate new entrepreneurial state-

citizens denoting an attempt to bring into existence new useful subjectivities for the operation of the state.

Neoliberal governmentality forcibly creates conditions for the monoontological politics transnationally-the space of domination is no longer confined to the sovereign state-but extends to the locus of power created by neoliberal rationalism Joronen 2013, [Mikko, Department of Geography and Geology, Geography Section, University of Turku, Finland,

Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism, 3/21/13, 7/28/13] Heideggers notion of massive and gigantic spread of enframing as a par- ticular ontological assembling of things apparently extends the discussion of neoliberalisation from the production of subjectivity to the question con- cerning the revealing of the real as such. Which role the state then has in proportion to the implementation of the logic of revealing intrinsic to the neoliberal governmentality? Foucaults

notion of governmentality evidently brings together two aspects of government: the government of everyday conducts of individuals and the government of the conducts of entire pop- ulations. Rather than a set of single doctrines and rules, governmentality

denotes an entire ethos of government. Neoliberal form of governmentality, thus, does not indicate a government where some dominant force, such as the state, has a direct control over the individual conducts, but those con- ditions out of which certain practices become more rational to choose than others. Neoliberalisation favours rational choice and costbenefit calculations not by forcing individuals to act in certain ways, but by creating conditions that encourage, reinforce and necessitate particular conducts as rational behaviour.39 Neoliberal governmentality has hence created an entirely new form of power, which is not based on the states sovereign power to control its population and territory, but on a use of more positive ways of regulating and rationalising individual conducts. Downloaded by [University of
Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality 363 Accordingly, the process of

neoliberalisation has not lead to the degra- dation of state power, but has taken place particularly through the reforms of state government. Although in a world of global flows the state has become inextricably tied to the changes that cannot be replied through the tradi- tional forms of state sovereignty, it is precisely the state that has become a locus between the neoliberal subjectification and the networks created by the global movements of capital. As Foucault claims,40 inasmuch as the neoliberal homo economicus refers to a mode of government that needs to be maintained through the institutions, administrative practices and the internalisation of market rationalities, also the (global) space of neoliberal markets, free of monopolies and interventions of the state, can only exist through the active government and legal support of the state. Neither glob- alisation of neoliberal markets nor the government of the everyday life of individuals erodes the state or turns it into what Thrift calls the phan- tom state a state based on
communicative power of electronic networks and few selected glocalities, such as the world cities, driven by the money power.41 Neoliberalisation is rather in need of the state, not so much of the sovereign power of the state, but of the state institutions and practices de- politicising the population through the survival strategies, which encourage conducts where people are treated as reserves of human capital essential for the survival of the state in the turmoil of global competition. The rationality of neoliberal governmentality consists of a new human anthropology and the support of the space of the competition, which both need to be maintained and kept viable at all levels of society through different techniques, practices, identities, and forms of visibility. The neoliberalisation of the state thus

consists of a change in the way states increasingly justify their existence: through the protection of the space of the markets, by valuing the non-human entities as reserves of profits (either as a natural resource or by framing the ecological through economical), and through the process of subjectification grounded on the human anthro- pology of homo economicus. Neoliberalisation of the state, then, denotes an increasing use of the strategies of government constituted through the particular mode of power: the strategic programming of individual conducts on a basis of economic rationality. This however, as Foucault

warns us in Security, Territory, Population,42 does not mean that the sovereign and dis- ciplinary modes of power are now somehow eliminated from the world. We should not think that the disciplinary society has replaced the society of sovereignty, or that the disciplinary society is now being entirely elimi- nated by the rise of the society of governmental management, but instead to explore the complex ways of their demonic combination.43 The violence intrinsic to the neoliberal state, to its ways of economis- ing nature and the everyday life of individuals, is fundamentally based on the ontological enframing of human and non-human life through the actualisation of different (demonic) combinations of practices, materialities, Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 364 Mikko Joronen rationalities, power relations, and spatial formations. As Giorgio Agamben has argued, by being self-consciously Heideggerian, Foucaults understand- ing of the historical regimes of power is grounded on a more original relation between the constituted (or actualised) forms of power and the constituting power of potentiality. While the constituting power works as a condition of possibility for the constituted modes of power to emerge, all histori- cal actualisations of power intrinsically depend on the suspension of the potentialities of constituting power, on their concealment.44 In this sense, constituting power has a similar ontological structure with Aristotles notion of potentiality: it maintains itself without ever fully passing into actuality, without being exhausted into actualisations.4

The neoliberal agenda crowds our any non-market solutions and imposes the will of globalization on populations Finley-Brook 2012 [Finley-Brook, Mary, Department of Geography and the Environment,
University of Richmond, VA, USA, "Geoeconomic Assumptions, Insecurity, and Free Trade in Central America"]
Applying geoeconomic arguments to free trade, Matthew Sparke describes the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a marke- tised mode of governance.20 While NAFTA impacts borderland territoriality and influences

political intervention and governance, geoeconomics analysis clarifies economic imperatives, ideas, and ideologies. Sparke suggests state actions supporting a broader neoliberal project are not solely about pol- icy changes and institutional reforms.21 In this case, geoeconomic

ideologies involve the optimistic view that free market democracy provides a quick and easy path to social well-being and economic justice. Sparke believes this ideology creates false and unrealistic hopes. The dominance of neoliberal agendas also serves to discourage other options and weakens the likeli- hood of moving toward solutions that have a better track record of creating equitable and sustainable development.22 Although states often promote free trade,

implementation of CAFTA appeared to weaken some Central American institutions. Economic liberalisation deemphasises the importance of the state as a provider of services or as a safety net in times of hardship. A further political consequence is the opening of domestic affairs to foreign control. While external intervention is not new in Central America, the difference under CAFTA is that foreign rights become permanent and have stronger legal backing. Enforcement mech- anisms that challenge state sovereignty have expanded, as demonstrated through processes in individual countries.

Neoliberalization forms an us-them dichotomy at the basis of the distinction between borders Moisi 2013 [Moisi, Sami, Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland, " From
Geopolitical to Geoeconomic? The Changing Political Rationalities of State Space"]
The geopolitical social is rooted in the emergence of national societies in the nineteenth century and acquisition of territory (and natural resources) with the goal of accumulating wealth. The geopolitical social is related to the forging of the

national territory, society and economy, and thus resonates with nation-state building, nationalism and statist practices that were asso- ciated with certain governmental techniques such as the extension of social security to all citizens. Geopolitics was never only about the states external relations but rather, as Cowen and Smith suggest, involved a more encompassing geopolitical social which both crosses and shapes the distinction represented by national state borders. The geoeconomic social, in turn, refers to the processes by which states seek to accumulate wealth through market control rather than through acqui- sition and control of territory.3 In short, national territoriality is no longer neatly aligned with national economic interest. The geoeconomic social is thus also related to the
privatisation of the state itself: The state becomes an entrepreneur in its own right, a player in the m arket first and foremost rather than a regulator of the markets excesses.4 Accordingly, market calcula- tion supplants the geopolitical logic

of state territoriality, and market power increasingly governs the social in the states welfare policies. Cowen and Smiths conceptualisation is very incisive in its elementary argument. It resonates with some recent attempts to grasp whether such state transformation should be conceptualised as a movement from social government to advanced liberalism,5 from Keynesian-national welfare state regimes to Schumpeterian post-national competition state regime,6 or from geopolitics to biopolitics of security.7 In particular, it forces us to pay atten- tion to how the potential transition from the geopolitical to
the geoeconomic takes on diverging forms and evokes different responses depending on the context. Respectively, we argue that the historical trajectories in the making of the political order in different geographical contexts (this is often decep- tively dubbed the domestic) requires sensitive scholarly attention. In order to further explicate Cowen and Smiths message, we suggest that scholars should pay attention to the political rationalities and governmental tech- niques which are mobilised in various contexts to regulate both state space and the conduct of populations. We must therefore also focus on the insti- tutions and forms of

knowledge embedded in concrete efforts to shape the spatiality of the state.

Borders are artificial products of the expanding neoliberal order Spark 6, Matthew B. Sparke-Department of Geography, University of Washington, A neoliberal
nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of citizenship on the border Political Geography Volume 25, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 151180
By securitized nationalism I am referring to the culturalpolitical forces that lead to the imagining, surveilling and policing of the nation state in especially exclusionary but economically discerning ways. The increasingly market-mediated methods of

such securitization often involve commercial risk management and dataveillance strategies, but with securitized nationalism they are combined with long-standing nationalistic traditions of imagining the homeland, encoding bodies, and in Campbell's (1998) terms writing security through identity-based exclusions of people deemed to be untrustworthy aliens. By
free market transnationalism, by contrast, I am referring to distinctively incorporative economic imperatives that involve increasing transnational capitalist interdependencies and the associated entrenchment of transnational capitalist mobility rights through various forms of free market re-regulation. Such a regime of free market transnationalism may well be considered by

many readers to be a rough synonym for neoliberalism. But here I am proposing a more conjunctural approach

to theorising neoliberalism as a contextually contingent articulation of free market governmental practices with varied and often quite illiberal forms of social and political rule (see also Sparke, 2004a and Sparke, in press). This context contingent definition of neoliberalism should not be taken to imply that it is a form of rule that is all-inclusive or simply continuous with the long history and heterogeneity of capitalism itself. The neo does mark something discrete and new historically, including, not least revival of classical nineteenth century free market liberalism, it is also clearly a new kind of capitalist liberalization that is distinct insofar as it has been imagined and implemented after and in opposition to the state-regulated national economies of the twentieth century. It is because such imagination and implementation have been worked out in different ways in different places that neoliberalism needs to be examined conjuncturally. The Neoliberal Nexus referred to in the title of this paper is therefore

of all, the transnationalism of today's liberalized market regimes. While neoliberalism certainly represents a

meant to indicate this conjunctural approach as well as underlining how the Nexus program itself can be understood as an example of neoliberalization. A conjunctural approach, it needs underlining,

does not foreclose the possibility of making more general claims about neoliberalism and its reterritorialization of social and political life. Thus while explaining the emergence and significance of the Nexus program as a context contingent response to the contradictory imperatives of national securitization and economic facilitation, the article still makes a claim that the program exemplifies broader changes to citizenship most notably, new transnational mobility rights for some and new exclusions for others under a combination of macroscale neoliberal governance and microscale neoliberal governmentality. In order to clarify this argument, I begin by explaining what I mean by neoliberal governance and governmentality and why border management can be

viewed as a useful window on to the neoliberal remaking of citizenship. Subsequently, I will chart the contradictory story of the development of the NEXUS program and consider the ways in which it exemplifies both the inclusions and exclusions of neoliberal citizenship.

State/security
Borders are merely state constructs to serve security interests Wilson and Donnan 98 [Thomas M., The Queen*s University of Belfast, Hastings, The
Queen*s University of Belfast, Border identities: Nation and state at international frontiers, pg. 911.] It may also be worth recalling, then, just what these state borders are supposed to be and what they are supposed to do . States establish borders to secure territories which are valuable to them because of their human or natural resources, or because these places have strategic or symbolic importance to the state. These borders are signs of the eminent domain of that state, and are markers of the secure relations it has with its neighbours, or are reminders of the hostility that exists between states. Borders are the political membranes through which people, goods, wealth and information must pass in order to be deemed acceptable or unacceptable by the state. Thus borders are agents of a state's security and sovereignty, and a physical record of a state's past and present relations with its
neighbours. In our view, borders have three elements: the legal borderline which simultaneously separates and joins states; the physical structures of the state which exist to demarcate and protect the borderline, composed of people and institutions which often penetrate deeply into the territory of the state; and frontiers, territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and away from borders, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and meanings associated with their membership in nations and states (cf. Martinez 1994: 5; Prescott 1987; Herzog 1990: 16). Historically frontier areas have been associated with a variety of political forms, such as city-states, kingdoms and empires. These

frontiers, which are territorial in nature, are political and social features of the borders of all modern nation-states, and should be distinguished from the metaphorical

frontiers of identity which have become so useful in describing aspects of post-modern society. Territory is only one of the necessary conditions of the nationstate. Since the birth of the modern age states have either attempted to forge a homogeneous nation from the disparate cultural and regional groupings within its domain, or ethnic groups have sought political autonomy in order to establish themselves as independent actors on the world stage. These processes of nation-building and state-building are twin tracks in the creation of the nation-state, on the model of the original French, American and British versions. But all nation-states sit uneasily on the between nation and state. As one consequence, a state's borders never function precisely according to the modeL outlined above: if the 'principal fiction of the nation-state is ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then borders always give the lie to this construct' (Horsman and Marshall 1995: 45). We suggest that the relationships of power and identity at borders and between the borders and their respective states are problematic precisely because the state cannot always control the political structures which it establishes at its extremities (and which one day may topple the

Local forces of politics and culture, possibly influenced by international forces from other states, give borders specific political configurations which may make their relations with their governments extremely problematic. States, on the other hand,
state or empire which has given rise to them, as Ibn Khaldun, Wittfogel and Lattimore, among others, have shown). may seek to leave only a nominal presence at borders, and may wish their borderlines to be relatively porous, as with the internal borders of the members of the European Union. Both processes are evident in the contributions which follow. political structures, each somewhat dependent

Borders and their states are separate but related on the other for their power and strength. In this regard we follow the Weberian definition of the state as an institution which holds the legitimate use of force in a territory. Borders are always domains of contested power, in which local, national and international groups negotiate relations of subordination and control. Although an international border is a structure of the state, this does
to the provinces. States

not mean that states can guarantee their borders' security from foreign influence. In many cases the central state is unable to control its border regions, as Serbia and Russia have recently discovered in Bosnia and Chechnya. Other states must devolve power to their border areas or run the risk of destabilising the state itself. This is the dilemma before the United Kingdom regarding Northern Ireland and Scotland, a situation averted in Spain by the devolution of power

need to control their borders because they are their first lines of defence, institutions of social coercion, and symbols of a variety of state powers. But the people of a border's frontiers are often members of political institutions and informal networks which compete with the state. Many of the activities in which they engage may not seem, at first glance, to be political, or a threat to the state.

However, many of them, such as smuggling, are certainly illegal, and may concern the state very much. Our point here is that many states with strong structures of control at their borders are also faced with cultural frontiers which are just as strong, and which may one day pose a threat to the state's power at its borders or at its core. For example, the British state is one of the most centralised in Europe, and it has attempted to create strong structures of social and political control at its land border with Ireland, but a long history of shared culture and power in Ireland has created fluid frontier relations of smuggling and ethnonationalist struggle which compete with the state. Events in Ireland are far removed from the everyday experiences of London, except when Irish republicans use the bomb to remind the English of their existence, and they may never destroy the United Kingdom, but it seems likely that they will result in a reconfiguration of the British state and its relationship with its borders in Ireland.

Specifically the United States concept of stable borders allows to apply its power extraterritorially in the defense of the homeland, furthering imperialism. Zielonka 12 Jan Zielonka (2012) Empires and the Modern International System, Geopolitics, 17:3, 502-525, DOI:

10.1080/14650045.2011.595440 Jan Zielonka is a Senior Policy Fellown working on ECFR's Reinvention of Europe project. He is also a Professor of European Politics at the University of Oxford and a Ralf Dahrendorf Fellow at St Antonys College. His main research interests are in the field of the media, democracy, political institutions and the history of political ideas. He has also published numerous works on the European Unions foreign policies.

The nature of an empires borders has an equally important impact on imperial policy as does its governance. The statist paradigm usually assumes that borders are a given, making it easy to differentiate between insiders and outsiders, and between internal and external types of policy. However, even in cases where borders are relatively hard and fixed, this reasoning may not apply. The US is a telling example of this. Though its borders are definite, the extraterritorial application of US laws or the pre-emptive use of force in the name of home land defence blurs the distinction between the inside and outside.61 The use of foreign threats in justifying certain domestic policies, especially in the field of human and civil rights is another illustration of how the notion of US borders is blurred.62 The borders of the EU, Russia and China are much fuzzier than are Americas.63 This makes them interesting objects of empire-centred analysis and, by extension, awkward objects of state-centred analysis. For instance, the fuzzy borders of Russia, China and the EU make them preoccupied if not obsessed with their immediate neighbourhood, while the USs stable borders allow a truly global perspective on international affairs. For instance, most of Chinas military investment is made in preparation for a possible international clash over Taiwan, and China is constantly undermining its global economic or diplomatic ties in defence of its partisan policy vis--vis Taiwan. China also
entertains militant rhetoric each time foreign officials meet exiled Tibetan or Uighur leaders such as the Dalai Lama or Rebiya Kadeer, regardless of the economic and political costs of such rhetoric.64 The fuzzy borders of Russia, China and the EU confuse their respective notion of interests because it is not entirely clear which territory and peoples belong to the core of empire.For instance, three twentieth-century Chinese leaders, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, all drew the map of China differently. During his career, each one changed his mind over whether one or other territory was part of China.65 Blurring borders even further, China tends to distinguish between the internal and external periphery, such as inner and outer Mongolia, indicating differentiated zones of special interest across and within its formal borders.66 The

US does not experience similar problems in defining its interests. Interdependence prompted by the fuzzy borders of Russia, China and the EU allow peripheries to have a considerable influence on the empires centre. Because US borders are not as fuzzy, there is more asymmetry and hierarchy in relations between the empires periphery and centre. In fact, one can argue that for America, the entire world represents a kind of imperial periphery.

Risk assessment
Risked based decision making allows for biopolitical control Martin 12-Phd In Geography @ University of Oulu (LAUREN L. MARTIN, , 25 Apr 2012,
Catch and Remove: Detention, Deterrence, and Discipline in US Noncitizen Family Detention Practice, Geopolitics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.554463, Accessed: 7/28/13) For Michael Dillon, infusing national security decision making with risk based evaluation represents a fundamental shift in political ontology, and therefore in security professionals concept of the human.20 Where liberal law and disciplinary regimes revolved around various notions of an individual, whole human (defined by labour, language, or signification), Dillon argues that risk-based power/knowledge regimes model the biopolitical governance as a transactional space. In this transactional space, neither the biological species being nor the moral individual is the primary object of security professionals intervention. Instead, risk modelling defines this transactional space in terms of networks, associations, and patterns between homeland security has become, Dillon argues, a science of contingency, through which security professionals deploy ever more sophisticated algorithms at a shifting terrain of possibilities. As security agencies link nationality, religion, language, and dress to risk profiles, people become threatening in and through their connections to suspicious places, people, and things. Weaving risk analysis into immigration and
map, therefore, a terrain of continually shifting possibilities.21 Seeking to calculate and control risk, border enforcement, these risk-based modelling practices produce a political ontology of connection, circulation and contingency, and a subject that is more a risk-pooled cohort than a whole moral individual or liberal subject.1

digitised pieces of information. Represented by credit card transactions, travel patterns, and criminal records, life in this transactional space unfolds through the circulation of goods, the connections between people and things, and the spontaneous emergence of disruptions. More a digital aggregate than an individual, a person exists only insofar as s/he is related to the circulation of goods and services. The connections and associations produced by this circulatory existence

Technology
Advancements in surveillance technology create threats based on historically conceived Others Shapiro 97 (Prof of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographers, pages 85-86) And ultimately, the military mentality behind the construction of the city colonized other dimensions of social and cultural life: "The defensive imagination, applied to securing the impregnability of the fortress, was translated into a mental habit of accounting and enclosing which eventually pervaded the approach to every human endeavor."35 The fabled enemy at the gates, who was far more figurable for those in the Renaissance than to contemporaries, is still motivating today's militarized cartography. Now topographical calculations produce the programming and direction finding for intercontinental missiles, rather than for designing cities as fortresses. The speed with which and directions from which destruction can be delivered have outmoded visible defenses. Indeed, time and the technology of remote vision have almost wholly displaced geographic extension in military significance. And, accordingly, defenses have been dematerialized: radar and other visioning technologies replace walls and other material defenses.36 Accompanying the dematerialization of defenses has been a change in the structure of decision making. With the displacement of traditional geographical inhibitions and the "dwindling of the last commodity: duration,"37 logistically oriented decision-making procedures, which depend on electronic information systems, displace political processes such as those described by Thucydides.38 Certainly logistical systems are not randomly deployed. They function as an adjunct to alreadydetermined, often historically conceived, threats. For the contemporary United States, for example, there is a rough (although lately unstable) cartography of danger. The geopolitical world at any given moment is divided into friends and potential foes, and violence is expected more from some quarters than from others.

Transnationalism (Labor Aff Links)

Transnationalism is shaped by nationalistic forces that is inevitably forced with the backboned of bordering disciplne that shapes all its actions that causes exclusionary alienation Spark 6, Matthew B. Sparke-Department of Geography, University of Washington, A neoliberal
nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of citizenship on the border Political Geography Volume 25, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 151180
Taking my cue from Foucault's own work on the so-called biopolitical production of self-governing citizen-subjects in modern prisons, clinics, classrooms and so on, my suggestion in what follows is that we can usefully examine the context contingent

transnationalization of civil citizenship including how it is shaped by countervailing nationalistic forces by focusing on the particular spaces of border management technologies. The jargon of biopolitics is useful in this respect because it points to what the recoding of citizenship through border discipline can tell us about the assumptions, attitudes, and abilities associated with the more general neoliberal refashioning of civil citizenship. Biopolitics for Foucault included both discourses about the self-governing subject and the actual production of self-

governed life within particular modern spaces. Some of the governmentality literature that supposedly follows in his footsteps has not always addressed both these aspects of biopolitics. Nikolas Rose's depiction of advanced liberalism, for example, offers such an abstract discursive account of the self-government of the entrepreneurial subject that the nitty-gritty activities of biopolitical production under neoliberalism disappear from view. Partly this is because he associates neoliberalism more with ideology than government practices, and partly this appears to be because he wants to avoid an epochal account of historical transition from an age of liberalism to an age of neoliberalism. However, his disembodied account is also ironically indicative of a structuralism that he disavows. Thus, as Larner cautions, without analyses of the messy actualities of particular neoliberal projects, those working within this analytic run the risk of precisely the problem they wish to avoid that of producing generalized accounts of historical epochs (Larner, 2000: 14). Here, therefore, I want to explore the messy actualities of the development of the NEXUS lane as a way of examining in a more grounded way the convolutions, contradictions and countervailing forces surrounding the neoliberalization of citizenship in contemporary North America. In

underlining the reterritorialization of the resulting civil citizenship and by therefore highlighting how the new normal as Bhandar (2004) calls it of this neoliberalized citizenship is distinctively transnational in scope, I also want to point towards the parallel transnationalization of the new abnormal too. As a result, I complement and conclude this study by exploring how NAFTA region neoliberalization also entails new forms of exceptionalism: new exclusionary exceptions from citizenship that are based upon older raciological imaginations of nation, but which work through new techniques of expedited and transnationalized alienation that expel so-called aliens as quickly as
business travelers can now buy fast passage across the NAFTA region's internal borders.

Transnational movements prohibit the movement of migrant bodies across borders. Rather than increasing the fluidity of identity across borders, transnationalism exacerbates the difference between exclusion and inclusion. Silvey et al. 2007 [Silvey, Rachel, PhD University of Washington, Olson, Elizabeth, University of
Edinburgh, School of Geosciences, and Truleove, Yaffa, PhD Student, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Denver, "Transnationalism and (Im)mobility: The Politics of Border Crossings"] In contrast to most migration research, critical political geography views the state, and the nation-states changing role in relation to transnational migration and globalization, through a very dif-ferent set of lenses ( Tuathail, 1996). This scholarship, inspired by variations of Foucauldian,
Derridean, and feminist theories, has sought tomove beyond the cult of the state (Perreault,2003). Whereas much classical w ork emphasizes states manifestations of centralized, sovereign power (Jessop, 1990), the growing body of criti-cal work

highlights governmentality and the dis-persion of power (Mountz, 2004). For migration research, this analytical shift encourages greater attention not only to discursive productions of migrants bodies, national borders, and citizen-subjects, but also to the everyday mediations of exclusion/inclusion by actors involved in these circuits of migration and governance. Rather

than imagining a world in which states stayed out of the way of international capital ows, much recent work has demonstrated the ways in which states continue to gure prominently, in many respects increasingly so, in determining the geographies of global migrat ion. Both

the rolling back of many states social service provisions and the rolling out of especially those state practices and regula-tions that promote corporate investment (Peck and Tickell, 2002) have come together to produce and inhibit particular kinds of migration. States pro-mote the transnational mobility of some groups of people while prohibiting or intensively regulating the border crossings of others.The practices of states with respect to both capital and labor have been far from postnational.Both sending and receiving states have tended overall to support the transnational citizenshipof the globe-trotting managerial elite of major corpo-rations (Mitchell, 2004; Yeoh and
Willis, 2004). Many sending and receiving states have aggres-sively also promoted the transnational migration of female domestic workers and nannies (HuangandYeoh,1996)and male low-wage contract labor-ers (Margold, 1995). The advantages of multiple citizenships are not extended to these low-wageworkers, and their marginalization within destina-tion labor markets persists as a result in part of their temporary workers status. At the same time, many states are increasingly prohibiting and regu-lating

mobility across national borders, particularly in high-income destination countries and with ris-ing intensity in the post-9/11 globalsecuritizationcontext (Nevins, 2002). Thus, as Massey (1994:149) has written: Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate ows and movement, others dont;some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are effectively imprisioned by it. Whereas early work on transnationalism focused on the technologies and economic processes
that made national nancial markets global (Yeung,1998), transnational migration research has taken these dynamics as a backdrop for examining migrant communities (Yeoh and Willis, 2004).In addition, transnational migration research has focused on migrants and migrant social formations as productive of, rather than simply resulting from, the political constituencies that affect states(Hyndman, 2001). This

research has asked how migrants cross, reafrm, and rework the bor-ders marking state territorial sovereignty. Marston(2003: 634) suggests that understanding the new state forms that are emerging under contemporary globalization requires not just an analysis of the state, but also an analysis of the ways in which, for instance, new identities are being constituted and regulated through and against these new state forms

Dont believe the hype transnationalism is easily intergrated back into state cooridnates. 3 reasons Smith and Guarnizo 98, Michael Peter Smith is a professor at the University of California. Luis Eduardo Guarnizo is a professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins. The Locations of Transnationalism, Transnationalism from Below, Comparative Urban and Community Research Volume 6
Does this mean, as some (e.g., Appadurai 1996: Part III) have claimed, that transnationalism from above and from below are ushering in a new period of weakened

nationalism, a postnational global cultural economy? There are several reasons to doubt this claim. First, historically, states and nations seeking statehood have often kept the transnational connections of their overseas diasporas alive, as in the classical examples of the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian social formations (Tllyan 1996). Second, and relatedly, contributors to this volume underline the continuing significance of nationalist projects and identities and their articulation with competing identities and projects, such as feminism, environmentalism and globalism in the formation of transnational grassroots movements (M.P. Smith
1994). These issues are thoughtfully explored in Sarah Mahlers analysis of alternative modes of political mobilization of deterritorialized migrants as well as in Andr Drainvilles discussion of the implications of enduring national and local political identities in the new transnational political coalitions that have sprung up to resist the hegemonic ideology and austerity policies imposed from above by the global neo-liberal regime. Third, in the present period of mass migration many nationstates that have experienced substantial outmigration are entering into a process of actively promoting transnational reincorporation of migrants into their state-centered projects. Why is this so? As suggested above, global economic restructuring and the repositioning of states, especially less industrialized ones, in the world economy, have investment. Political

increased the economic dependency of these countries on foreign elites and managerial strata in these societies have found that as emigration to advanced capitalist countries has increased, the monetary transfers provided by transmigrant investors have made crucial contributions to their national economies (Lessinger

1992), and family remittances have promoted social stability (Mahler 1996; M.P. Smith 1994). Thus, their growing dependence on transmigrants stable remittances has prompted sending states to try to incorporate their nationals abroad into both their national market and their national polity by a variety of measures including: naming honorary ambassadors from among transmigrant entrepr eneurs in the hope that they will promote national interests vis--vis receiving countries; subsidizing transnational migrant home-town and home-state associations (Goldring, R. Smith, and Mahler, this volume); creating formal channels for communicat ing with these constituencies across national borders (Glick Schiller and Fouron, this volume; Guarnizo 1996); passing dual citizenship laws; and even,

in the bizarre case of the state apparatus in El Salvador, providing free legal assistance to political refugees so that they may obtain asylum in the United States on the grounds that they have been persecuted by the state that is now paying their legal expenses (Mahler, this volume).

Transnationalism backfires Retrenches nationalism. Smith and Guarnizo 98, Michael Peter Smith is a professor at the University of California. Luis Eduardo Guarnizo is a professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins. The Locations of Transnationalism, Transnationalism from Below, Comparative Urban and Community Research Volume 6
Paradoxically,

the expansion of transnational practices from above and from below has resulted in outbursts of entrenched, essentialist nationalism in both sending and receiving countries. In receiving nation-states, movements aimed at recuperating and reifying a mythical national identity are expanding as a way to eliminate the penetration of alien others. States of origin, on the other hand, are reessentializing their national identity and extending it to their nationals abroad as a way to maintain their loyalty and flow
of resources back home. By granting them dual citizenship, these states are encouraging transmigrants instrumental accomod ation to receiving societies, while simultaneously inhibiting their cultural assimilation and thereby promoting the preservation of their own national culture.

Transnationalism allows for notions of colonialism, division of sexed labor , environmental degradation, capitalism, and national security states

Briggs et al. 8 (Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, J. T. Way, chair of the Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies department, Assistant Professor, History, Assistant Professor of Latin American History at Georgia State University , 2008, Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis, American Quarterly, Volume 60, Number 3, September 2008, pp. 625-648, Accessed: 7/31/13) As American studies scholars know well, none of the imputed attributes of the nationthe people, the language, the literature, the history, the culture, the environmentis the pure object that nationalisms take them to be. The notion of the transnational enables us to center certain kinds of historical events as the emphatically non-national but indisputably important processes that they are, including colonialism; the travels of the Enlightenment, [End Page 627] science, liberalism, socialism, major religions, such as Christianity and Islam; an international (sexed) division of labor; the production of migrants, slaves, coolies, and other strangers and unfree peoples as racialized minorities; resource extraction and environmental degradation, as well as the more contemporary productions of non-governmental organizations; human rights discourses; free trade agreements; refugee and migrant crises; and the production of national security states in a global war on terror. As much as it belongs to the worlds of free trade agreements and export processing zones, transnationalism belongs to genealogies of anti-imperial and decolonizing thought, ranging from anticolonial Marxism to subaltern studies to Third World feminism and feminisms of color. Transnationalism has been a diverse, contested,

cross-disciplinary intellectual movement that in some of its manifestations has been bound together by a particular insight: in place of a long and deeply embedded modernist tradition of taking the nation as the framework within which one can study things (literatures, histories, and so forth), the nation itself has to be a questionnot untrue and therefore trivial, but an

ideology that changes over time, and whose precise elaboration at any point has profound effects on wars, economies, cultures, the movements of people, and relations of domination.

Transnational movements such as the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras spurs transterrioriatial degradation leading to inequalities for workers, division of labor, and weakened society
Bandy 4-(JOE BANDY, graduate student in sociology at the University of California , 2004, Paradoxes of Transnational Civil Societies under Neoliberalism: The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, Social Problems, Vol. 51, No. 3 (August 2004), pp. 410-431, Accessed:7/31/13)

In its opposition to labor and environmental injustices, the CJMs member organizations have mobilized an estimated 20,000 wo rkers (Cota 2002), and its staff has participated in twenty-seven transnational corporate campaigns. Yet, the CJMs primary functions

have been to mobilize workers into an international movement for labor rights, and to articulate

diverse movement interests into a common framework of grievance and action. In this capacity, the CJM has had qualified successes brokering alliances between workers and activists of different nations, alliances that have provided modest but often substantive gains for workers such as environmental health protections. The CJM thus has had the potential to build a broadbased North American labor movement. However, the CJM suffers from persistent internal conflicts over resources, strategy,

and identity. It also is subject to intensive and continual opposition by government and corporate organizations bent on defending the profitability of foreign investments and trade liberalization. These latter factors thus have limited the CJMs coherence and power. In analyzing the CJM, this research began with two questions. How is transnational civil society constructed, and what are the possibilities and problems of doing so in the era of neoliberalism? Further, what lessons does the CJM teach us regarding the ability of North American labor movements to organize cross-border movements that offer some counterhegemonic force against an increasingly neoliberal world-system? In other words, how does transnational civil society succeed or fail? In what
follows, the answers to these questions will support two arguments about the CJM and transnational civil society more generally. First,

the CJM faces both great problems and possibilities for reforming neoliberal capital, thus demonstrating the highly paradoxical character of transnational civil societies. This paradox exists because transnational civil society, like its national predecessors, is both enabled and constrained by liberal capitalist expansion. On the one hand, economic and cultural globalizations have provided the conditions for cross-border alliances among workers movements. But on the other, the inequities of economic liberalization have resulted in divisions among workers within and between nations, creating fissures over identity politics, strategic initiatives, and organizational forms that fragment and weaken transnational civil society.

Even if transnationalism could be expanded it would be so entrenched in the neoliberal political economy that it would just create further conflicts
Bandy 4-(JOE BANDY, graduate student in sociology at the University of California , 2004, Paradoxes of Transnational Civil Societies under Neoliberalism: The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, Social Problems, Vol. 51, No. 3 (August 2004), pp. 410-431, Accessed:7/31/13) In sum, the CJM confirms that transnational civil societies in a globalizing world, not unlike their national predecessors, represent many paradoxes. They are both enabled and constrained by a globalizing neoliberal economy. The expansion of a liberal political economy and globalizing social forces allow workers and citizens to share ideas and build transnational publics. Yet, the power and reach of corporate actors and their state allies disrupt democratic development. Socio-economic deprivation enables labor movements of different nations to coalesce around common grievances, strategies, and targets. But deprivation also excites conflicts that limit civil societies strengths and transformative possibilities. Further, transnational civil societies show great capacities to align grievances and broker common movement cultures of opposition. However, cultural and organizational hierarchies, and external provocateurs, may excite lingering resentments and divisive animosities among workers of different identities. Thus, if the CJM is a generalizable example, transnational civil society faces tremendous difficulties in building a counter-hegemonic opposition to neoliberal globalization.

AT Borders are Pre-Capitalist

____ While borders may pre-date capitalist modes of production, those early divisions merely serve as a foundation from which new states are built around a capitalist logic. The plurality of states serves competition. Anderson, School of Geography and Centre for International Borders Research Queens University Belfast In 5 [james, Borders, fixes and empires: Territoriality in the new imperialism, Centre for International Borders Research]
Territorial means are still used by states today (and by firms as well), but they no longer follow the logic of territory for its own sake as defined by Arrighi, but rather the logic of capitalist rulers who see territory as a means and a by-product of capital accumulation. The latter rulers/strategies now prevail - including over present-day borders whose locations may sometimes be pre-capitalist, but the borders themselves, their differential permeabilities, and the states they contain have all been transformed by capitalism. Some states and some borders may be in the same place for centuries, but they are not the same states or the same borders. However, the capitalist logic clearly does not determine the size and number of national states - there is nothing in capitalism which says there should be 190 national sovereign entities, or twice, or half, that number. But the outcomes have hardly been completely random or accidental either. Arrighi (1994) for example sees causal pattern in the succession of hegemonic regimes; and
Tilly (1992) rather different patterns in European state-formation. A fuller historical account of the new imperialism (beyond our scope) would have to include how state-formation and nationalism created national states by transforming

and re-territorialising traditional empires and kingdoms - and here the configuration of precapitalist starting points is certainly important. Furthermore, while capitalism does not determine the number of states, it does set general parameters, and these are best seen as necessary but not sufficient for understanding the present system. The many states outcome, rather than a single world state, is consistent with the competition between many capitals dispersed across space, the inherently limited spatial scope of many of their production and distribution processes, and the continued centrality of the home territory as a market even for large multi-national corporations. It is consistent with particular capitals relying on support from territorially-based states in their competition with other capitals; and for the social control and reproduction of labour, including control of labour flows through border controls and nationalist ideologies (see below). On the other hand, the fact that capitalist investment and production straddle borders relatively easily means that the parameters are permissive rather than deterministic - allowing states of all shapes and sizes to flourish and allowing capital to work in and through them, large and small, though larger and more hegemonic entities can bring decided economic advantages (something reflected in EU enlargement, below). But perhaps the key outcome of these permissive parameters, and also the clearest sign that the territorial logic of state strategy has lost out to the capitalist logic, has been the historic switch from formal to informal empire - what genuinely put the new into the new imperialism.

AT Perm/Labor Movement Link Nation State focus

Organizing at the level of the state leaves the global capital processin place leaving in place the global division of labor Grosfoguel, Associate Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Ethnic Studies Department, in 8[Ramon, DECOLONIZING POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality, http://www.humandee.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=111] Dependency ideas must be understood as part of the "longue dure" of concepts of modernity in Latin America. Autonomous national development has been a central ideological theme of the modern worldsystem since the late eighteenth century. Dependentistas reproduced the illusion that rational organization and development can be achieved from the control of the nationstate. This contradicted the position that development and underdevelopment are the result of structural relations within the capitalist worldsystem. Although dependentistas defined capitalism as a global system beyond the nationstate, they still believed it was possible to delink or break with the world system at the nation state level (Frank, 1970 : 11, 104, 150 ; Frank, 1969 : Chapter 25). This implied that a socialist revolutionary process at the national level could insulate the country from the global system. However, as we know today, it is impossible to transform a system that operates on a worldscale by privileging the control/administration of the nationstate (Wallerstein, 1992b). No "rational" control of the nationstate would alter the location of a country in the international division of labour. "Rational" planning and control of the nationstate contributes to the developmentalist illusion of eliminating the inequalities of the capitalist worldsystem from a nationstate level.

Disaster relief
Representations of disasters create an spectator/victim dichotomy that results in the traumatized victims being subjugated to biopolitical control for their own protection Perera 2010 (Suvendrini Perera, Department of Communication & Cultural Studies, Curtin University, Perth, Australia,
Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 page 32-33) In effect what Corbin brings into focus in the spectacle of the shipwreck is one of the constituent aspects of Western modernity: the turning of the world into picture and representation. Even in the context of the most ungovernable of

disasters (such as the storm or the tsunami) nature is rendered into a picture that at once domesticates nature by enframing it and, simultaneously, guarantees, through this process of enframing, the position of the spectator who watches the drama unfold from the safety of the shore or, as discussed below, as the magisterial viewer of a wall of screens (Natali 2006, 1001).
The Heideggerian concept of enframing is a term that not only signifies the construction of a type of framework through whic h something is transmuted into an object of knowledge and thereby made intelligible, but . . . a term which underscores the process by which something is summoned, ordered, objectified and made calculable in advance (Perera and Pugliese 1998, 84, quoting Heidegger 2007, 21 ). 32 S. In

an eloquent essay written shortly after the 2004 tsunami, Asma Abbas makes a critical point that is often lost in moments of emergency and crisis where the pressures to feel, respond and act can be overwhelming: How a disaster is ascertained, named, defined and assessed involves historically sanctioned processes of representation and translation . . . The question of
suffering how to experience it, accost it, and respond to it has repeatedly proven that the concepts and categories of dominant philosophical, religious, political, economic, hence ethical, discourses are not passive mediators between our intellect and the world, but actively construct the way we sense it in the first place . . . Asking the question of how we sense and attend, and how our senses, access, and attention are themselves sculpted, may disarm us by forcing us to acknowledge our complicity in making, defining, and producing suffering, damage, and disasters in the way we do. (Abbas 2005) Processes of conceptualization, representation

and translation are central to the question of suffering: how to experience it, accost it, and respond to it. How are suffering, damage and disaster produced and made visible across different sites, and how are they made to count, to matter? Trauma in its various significations the banal, the aesthetic, the philosophical, the medicalized, the political, the pathologized is an essential form of currency in the torturous dialogues that make, define and delineate the contours of disaster, damage and suffering. These are constitutively geopoliticized, as they are racialized and gendered, processes of exchange. In Sivagnanam Jeysankars poem above, trauma is the talk of the town between the aid organizations, volunteers and media agencies whether from Colombo or the global North that flood the shattered east coast city of Batticaloa, like a second tsunami, and its inhabitants, the subjects of trauma, shunted endlessly between the camps they lived in last month or last year as refugees of the war and the new camps for tsunami survivors (Jeysankar
2005). Trauma is a medium that enables dialogue and exchange; it is eminently transactable, mobile and adaptable in its circulation between the refugee camp and the disaster victims camp; it ramifies, with uneven meanings and effects, across and between subjects, scenes, sites, practices and relations. What are the geopolitics of the tsunami as a globalized trauma-event? Or,

more precisely, how does the biopolitics of trauma, as a set of institutionalized practices for managing and ordering the life and health of populations, play out across the necropolitical terrain of global inequality and in relation to those it locates as bare life? Trauma is a discourse of multiple significations and I do not mean to deny in posing this question that the naming and identification of trauma is of unquestionable importance for many who have suffered its effects, including those affected by the tsunami. What I pursue here are certain philosophical, historical, geopolitical coordinates that locate trauma, disaster and the tortuous dialogues across the various geographies and geoimaginaries in which the tsunami is located elemental imaginaries of land and sea; geographies of distance and proximity, danger and

disaster, aid and capital; of exception and bare life, terror and the sublime. The final section of the essay turns to how these torturous dialogues of trauma and geography, disaster and geopolitics, play out in Australian responses to its surrounding region. The discussion is grounded in responses to the tsunami in and around the town of Batticaloa in eastern Sri Lanka, a place that I have returned to at different stages of my life since childhood, and where I spent some weeks a short while after the tsunami. I begin, then, with some stories of this place, Batticaloa. ;

Disaster assistance mimics the process of war - from rhetorical conception to policy implementation Perera 2010 (Suvendrini Perera, Department of Communication & Cultural Studies, Curtin University, Perth, Australia,
of NGO culture.

Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 page 33-34) My hosts that day did not engage in NGO-bashing, a common-enough activity in Lanka, and one with deep roots in nativist, chauvinist and fundamentalist discourses. Reluctance to tap into these destructive rhetorics restrains many critics But a young Lankan-American volunteer, Nimmi Gowrinathan, puts into words in her blog the questions that

Walking through rows of tents what is striking is not the living conditions which seem to lie on the border of some human rights violation.
many hesitated to pose in the first months after the tsunami:

Rather, it is the similarity between these camps and those that existed last February, and the February before . . . Large sums of money flow freely into post-tsunami Sri Lanka. These same funds which are the life blood of relief, reconstruction,

and rehabilitation efforts are accessed to sustain arms build ups, military development, and continued violence. The Sri Lankan government may have been war weary in early 2002 when it conceded to a bilateral ceasefire,
but it was also bankrupt . . . It had neither the funds to continue the armed combat, nor to reconstruct damaged areas and serve their constituencies . . . [Today] inflated state bank accounts with minimal regulations have permanently altered the incentive structure for the government to engage in and remain committed to a peaceful solution. (Gowrinathan 2005) The resumption of the war in 2007, renewed aggression on all sides, a new campaign of bombs in Batticaloa and elsewhere: what is the relationship between the resurgent war and the millions of humanitarian dollars that flowed in with the second tsunami? The effects of humanitarian aid and NGO

intervention cannot be isolated from the processes of war. At a deeper level, in more complex ways, the one reinforces the other. As Patricia Lawrence suggested a couple of years before the tsunami, in
Batticaloa the language of order employed alike by the military apparatus, in the peace process and in some discourses of international non-governmental organizations all collude in the production of killable bodies (Lawrence 2003, 3). I read Lawrences

comment as a reference to the underlying structure of the camp as a space where the right to save and the right to kill may be exercised alternately or in tandem, as operations of sovereign power over forms of bare life. Refugees who are first identified as oppressed and/or traumatized increasingly constitute contemporary forms of bare life (Agamben 1998; Malkki 1995). In recent years the naming of bodies as oppressed and/or traumatized has authorized and accompanied paired practices of violence and benevolence, as in the war on terror in Afghanistan (Perera 2002; Grewal 2003). Here I consider how the discursive formation of disaster, sometimes in conjunction with that of trauma, contributes to the production of bare life, and explore how the right to save and the right to kill are interrelated modalities through which sovereign power operates over bare life (Zizek 2002).

Cuba
Do not be fooled by their claims of progressivism, the affirmatives policies towards Cuba serve as the velvet glove for the iron first of United States intervention the restructuring of internal Cuban affairs has historically justified the expansion of American geopolitical influence in the region. Slater, 2004 [David Slater, Emeritus Professor of Political Geography, & Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of London, Geopolitics and the Postcolonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, Blackwell Publishing Ltd]
In the Cuban case, the United States developed a strategy that provided an important backdrop for the future of geopolitical interventions in Central America and the Caribbean. The strategy rested on five interrelated objectives. The first of these, which was basic to the others, consisted in the establishment of informal protectorates which provided a political space for internal selfgovernment. When it was deemed necessary, as in cases of internal revolts and acute political instability, military occupation by United States forces became an option, but never the assumption of formal sovereignty. In Cuba, for example, in the early part of the twentieth century, the United States intervened militarily in 19069, 1912 and 191722 to restore order and protect American interests, while controlling revolutionary activity (Williams 1980: 13841). Second, through trade, treaties or financial arrangements , a series of strong economic ties was woven between the United States and the dependent country. These ties were also and importantly put into place through land purchases by North Americans, so that by 1905 13,000 US citizens had bought land in Cuba worth US$50 million, much of the land being used for sugar production, and by 1913 US investments in Cuba would total about $220 million 18 per cent of US investments in the whole of Latin America (Thomas 2001: 365). Third, by means of investment and a variety of projects of improvement the diffusion of progress new forms of economic and social involvement were put into place, including improvements in health care, the reform of public education and a modernizing
programme of public works. This included in the Cuban example the transfer of over 1,000 Cuban teachers to Harvard for training in US teaching methods, together with the establishment by Protestant evangelists of almost 90 schools between 1898 and 1901. Fourth, there

was a reterritorialization of administrative power, including the introduction of an American version of local selfgovernment, and the central problem here, as one commentator noted for the Cuban case, lay in the attempt to engraft the Anglo-Saxon principle of local self-government on an Iberian system to which it was wholly foreign (quoted in Healy 1963: 184). Finally, through the disbandment or re-organization of particular national institutions, such as those that had been developed
by the Cuban independence movement the Liberation Army, the provisional government and the Cuban Revolutionary Party, originally founded by Jose Mart and the initiation of processes of cultural penetration and subordination, attempts were made to

Americanize the subject peoples.

This attempted Americanization of subordinated peoples went

together

with a protracted series of interventions, especially evident in Central America and the Caribbean. Between 1898 and 1934 the United States launched more than 30 military interventions in Latin America, and the vast majority of these interventions took place in the Caribbean basin. Most US interventions displayed a consistent pattern. Military forces would arrive and depose indigenous rulers, often with a minimum of force, install a hand-picked provisional government, supervise national elections, and then depart, mission accomplished (Smith 2000: 512). Apart from the three cases of the Philippines (a colony), Puerto Rico
(an unincorporated territory) and Cuba (a semi-protectorate until 1934), which were specific in the sense of being acquired in the wake of the Spanish-American War, and which exhibited different mechanisms of US geopolitical power, interventions in countries to

the south of the United States clearly related to Roosevelts invocation of an international police power, popularly known as the wielding of a big stick. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, as it became known, provided an instructive example of the close association between governing visions and the geopolitics of intervention. Roosevelts invocation of an international police power was linked to his negative view of the weak and chaotic people south of us, who would, if need be, have to be policed in the interests of order

and civilization (quoted in Niess 1990: 76). The Roosevelt Corollary was itself linked to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which

provided the initial codification of emerging US power and the first phase of containment, limited to the Americas (Slater 1999b). But there were other governing visions which emerged in the period before the Second World War which were also highly significant.

{**In Cuba Terror and Policy 1NC**}You should be skeptical of their engagement with Cuba expanding American geopolitical influence in the region only serves to further the goals of US hegemony and the securitization of borders. Nicol, 2011 [Heather Nicol, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, Trent
University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, U.S. Hegemony in the 21st century: Cuba's Place in the regionalizing geopolitics of North America and Caribbean Countries Journal of Borderlands Studies, 23:1, 31-52, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2008.9695687] The process of U.S. hegemony in North American economies is not unique or unrelated to the larger workings of international order and world economy. The changing tenor of Canadian, U.S., and Mexican geopolitical rhetoric, couched in free trade and securitization , is related to the bigger project of condoning and supporting U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It is also closely related to the larger project of globalization in which the U.S. has been a driving force during the 20th and 21st centuries (Agnew 2005). Over the past decade, the U.S. has focused closely on defining regional parameters for U.S. hegemonic influence or extraterritorial control within North America, meaning that the shape of geo-economic and geopolitical regionalization in North America and its neighbors (the Caribbean and Central America for example) is directly related to U.S. responses to globalization issues. Indeed, there is a large literature suggesting that hegemony is central to U.S. imperialist claims to intervention at global, hemispheric, and continental levels (Slater 2004;
Agnew 2003, 2005). While originally the desire for such hegemony was couched in Cold War terms regarding the right of the U.S. to intervene in Western Hemisphere affairs in general, and the need for its neighbors to support the benevolent superpower in its bid for hemispheric security as communism was contained, today such grand strategies are less obviously stated.

Rather than the nakedly aggressive military and economic agendas that characterized Cold War or later Reaganomics rhetoric, U.S. hegemony is now promoted as a civilizing mission in support of democracy, human rights, and continental (as well as global) free trade. In this sense it is not unlike the
EU mission in Eastern Europe and beyond, although the EU and U.S. differ in terms of the methods they employ. In both North America and the Caribbean, Cuba has figured prominently as a marker for changing bilateral and

multilateral relations with the U.S., as well as for new geopolitical discourses concerning the changing role of the U.S. in New World and global orders. For example, there has been policy convergence in the sense that increasingly hegemonic and U.S.-based attitudes towards Cuba are currently being adopted by Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Friendly relations have been disrupted if diplomatic ties are not. But there has also been policy divergence in others, as holding out against Helms-Burton and other U.S.
prescriptions for regime change in Cuba have also become normative for Americas neighboring countries. The underlying cohere nce, or consistent rationale for this apparent contradiction is given by the fact that in all cases the resulting convergence and

divergence in policies and diplomatic relations, or compliance and resistance to U.S. insistence of economic embargo and political shunning, are consciously framed to in reference to a U.S. geopolitical rhetoric. Cuba as a field of contest, or a contested arena for U.S. intervention, and therefore contested legitimacy of U.S. hegemonic claims. Thus the

real theme is the contours of resistance or support to U.S. policy in North America and the success or failure in the universalization of U.S. Cuban policy (Agnew 2005; Slater 2004; Nicol 2002b) rather than actual events in Cuba. Even as the U.S. position on Cuba (made concrete in the Helms Burton Act) continues to reinforce the strong and impermeable physical and political border the U.S. shares with Cuba, this border is not a holdover from the Cold War . It is a dynamic and ongoing construction , embargo, political, and societal shunning on several fronts requiring policies which construct new kinds of walls
with neighboring countries as well as with Cuba itself. In this sense, NAFTA is critical to this process, although as Agnew

(2003) suggests, more generally, the

criterion for this ideological borderline are structural and historical, going back to the very nature of the state system itself. This means that in even terms of its relationship to Cuba, the apparent continuity in Cuban-American relations since the turn of the 20st century to the Post Cold War period is actually quite deceptive. Significant shifts have taken place, particularly with respect to how Cuba policy has become a political marker for compliance with U.S. strategic and economic interests among North American states, and how Cuba has itself adapted to the
neoliberalization of U.S. foreign policy in terms of its own regional relationship within the Caribbean. Both of these are significant outcomes. In the case of subordinating Cuba, however, the U.S. has tackled a complex problem in that conformity to

geopolitical rhetoric is now required at a continental level. This complex relationshipU.S. hegemony and North American complicity or resistance has served to define the edges or borders of American hegemony in North America during the 21st century. Bearing this in mind, if we
look at foreign policies as important functional foundations for the construction of boundaries for a 21st century U.S. political space, then

it is impossible to support the idea that economic integration can proceed without significant structural change in the foreign policies of North America countries at all levels of engagement. The situation in North America suggests that clear convergences have occurred in the area of foreign policy, and that these shifts are situated in geopolitical events that have postdated the imposition of the NAFTA. Indeed,
Canada, Mexico, the U.S., Caribbean countries, and Cuba have been engaged in a complex and often reactive foreign policy-making process for a number of years. While U.S.-Cuba relations remain conspicuous in much Western Hemisphere discussion and foreign policy-making analysis, Canadians, Mexicans, and Caribbean nations

outside of Cuba have understood the relationship to Cuba in very different ways than their American neighbors. This has meant that Canada-Cuba relations have become part of a broader discussion about Canada-U.S.-Cuba relations, or even Western Hemisphere relations towards Cuba and the Caribbean, which continue to challenge the hegemonic perspectives of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. The virulent rhetoric concerning Cuba which defines much of the U.S. political position is not about Cuba per se, but about the logics of the leadership role which the U.S. has defined for itself in the Western Hemisphere, since World War II, particularly in North America and the countries immediately touching its geographical borders.

The plan is not distinct from historic efforts to contain and control the space of cuba conditions and recognition are two sides of the same imperial coin STENIMETZ 05 (George Steinmetz, Professor of Sociology at University of Michigan,

December 2005, Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective, Sociological Theory, Sociological Theory, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 339-367, Accessed:7/30/13 ) To clarify the difference between colonialism and imperialism, we can follow Carl Schmitt in distinguishing between the acquisition of territory and the authoritative political ordering of space. The latter refers to the creation of what Schmitt called a Nomos or global division of spheres of influence (Grofiraiume", large spaces") within which states extend the tentacles of their power beyond their political boundaries. As Schmitt noted with respect to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that the United States would prohibit any other foreign power from intervening in the Western Hemisphere, "every true empire around the world has claimed such a sphere of spatial sovereignty beyond its borders." In the 19th century,

the United States was making a bid only to become a regional hegemon, not yet a global one. The 1939 Declaration of Panama then "forbade warring states from undertaking hostile acts within a specified security zone"-waters adjacent to the American continent-and thus effectively "extended Grof3raumth inking over the free sea." The containment doctrine after World War II

subsequently "established the boundaries of...[the] informal [U.S.] empire" (Harvey 2003:40). American empire, especially since 1945, has been oriented toward a total "domination of sea and air" in the interest of the free movement of capital, commodities, and people and the stabilization of conditions within the Nomos, and not toward claims to new territory (Schmitt [1950] 2003a:281-83, 355; also Chase 2002:1-9). The existence of a dense web of U.S. military installations in more than 140 countries around the globe does not gainsay this argument because these bases are usually located within the sovereign territory of other states or carve out a small space of exception within an

unpopulated foreign geobody (e.g., Guantainamo Bay in Cuba, which is itself a remnant of America's colonial acquisitions
from the Spanish-American war).36

Some of the nonmilitary control mechanisms

used by the United States include setting conditions for loans or investments, denying trade with the United States, granting or withholding diplomatic recognition, freezing foreign assets, training foreign police and military forces, running media campaigns, and denying recognition to the new barbarians, the nonindividualistic "Asiatic societies" and "tribal cultures of Africa" (Habermas), the morally burdened, disorderly, nonliberal, and nondecent peoples (Rawls), while tolerantly offering them the chance to regain their inherent status as equals.37

Cuba Aid
US policy towards Cuba such as humanitarian aid is rooted in American geopolitical ideologies which serve post-colonial US hegemonic interests Nicol 2008 [Heather N., Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, Trent University,
U.S. Hegemony in the 21st century: Cuba's Place in the regionalizing geopolitics of North America and Caribbean Countries, Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol 23 Issue 1, 2008]
The end of the Cold War reinforced the strength of the anti-Castro lobby in the U.S. With the Soviet Union removed as a major security threat, the Cuban American lobby group could focus U.S. attention more easily on what had before been little more than a sideshow in the larger geopolitical considerations of U.S. foreign policy (Randall 2002, 80). Anti-Castro lobby groups attempted to organize a variety of political, economic, and social interventions on the island, and more recently succeeded in raising support for economic isolation or embargo of the island in the shape of the Helms Burton Act of 1996. The Helms Burton Act tied private property rights to the achievement of democratic rights, linking the agenda of Cuban Americans (return of property after the Cuban Revolution) to the achievement of democratic rights for Cubans remaining on the island. American policy makers confess to using this as a means to squeeze the noose on Castro by setting up barriers to the flow of American dollars to the island (Nicol 1998, 2002). By each of these me ans what had previously been a Cold War based geopolitical tension between the U.S. and Cuba, has

become transformed into a new, economic based U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. Indeed, [i]nstead of

moving toward normalization...under Democratic president Clinton and a Republican-dominated Congress, [the U.S. government has] hardened its stance on Cuba, toughening existing legislation that dealt with the bilateral relationship and introducing new law designed not only to contain the involvement of other nationals (Randall 2002, 79). This reassertion of a hard-line in the Post Cold War era was supported on many levels, including political debate that highlighted Americans vision of Cuba as a dreary communist outpost, or an island of victims looming larger than life by virtue of its potential nuclear threat, its socialist politics, and its lack of fundamental human rights (Nicol 1998, 2002). To the U.S., Castros Cuba lacked legitimacy, and as such, was portrayed in terms that were highly pejo rative and not necessarily accurate (Nicol 2002b). Indeed, Daniel Fisk (2002), who as one of Jesse Helmss staff worked on the draf ting language of the Helms Burton Act, suggests that there is the added element of changing political constituency and struggle within U.S. politics that is significant to geopolitical rhetoric emanating from Washington on the issue of Cuba. American foreign policy towards

Cuba, its geopolitical position and discourse, are also intimately tied to the more general landscape of partisan politics and American ideological discourses. Fisk asserts that the Cuban

Democracy Act, passed in 1992, and the subsequent Helms-Burton Act of 1996 marked the ascendancy of the pro-embargo coalition in Congress in the 1990s. It motivated established political actors to focus on what was for them a new issue: Cuba. In additio n, the duality upon which both acts were premisedsupport for the Cuban people and pressure on the Clinton governmentcontained a contradiction which could be influenced by U.S. relations with other communist societies (Fisk 2002, 97). In effect, the latter provided codification of emerging U.S. power through strategies of containment and isolation (Slater 2004, 44-45). The Helms Burton Act itself met with opposition in the U.S., and the Act might well have met an untimely death if the Bush administration had followed the example of the Clinton Government in continuously exempting provisions which most directly influenced those who engaged in business or owned property in Cubathe specific group who most strongly opposed the Act because of economic opportunities lost in what was rapidly becoming one of the newest and most significant tourism destinations in the Caribbean during the 1990s. But U.S. policy towards Cuba has not changed in this respect since the Bush administration took office. This means that, overall, the story of U.S. foreign policy

towards Cuba remains one of a history of the attempted Americanization of a subordinated peoples, a part of a larger centuries-long historical process which reflects what Slater suggests was a protracted series of interventions, especially evident in Central America and the Caribbean (Slater 2004). True, in the late 1990s a new U.S. geopolitical rhetoric towards Cuba emerged which employed a less aggressive language than previouslystressing democratic transition and assuring Cubans of their right to chose a new post-Castro
leadership in the days since Castros illness and temporary relinquishment of power (Department of State 2004; Friedman 200 5). As if to give substance to the claim of an apparent new dialogue of increasing openness towards Cuba, in a 2003 statement from the State Department, the new rhetoric of democracy was evoked. The State Department asserted that U.S. policy toward Cuba is intended to encourage a rapid, peaceful transition to a democratic government characterized by open markets and respect for human rights. The policy seeks to encourage change in Cuba so that it joins the democratic hemisphere, becoming a good neighbor to other nations in the region. It suggested that President Bushs so-called new Initiative for a New Cuba (outlined in a May 20, 2002 speech) unveiled a project which will reward even incremental moves by Cuba toward greater political and economic openness with improved relations with the U.S. and removal of some of the punitive elements of the policy. It also proposes a number of humanitarian measures (U.S. State Department 2003). Yet in commenting upon the apparent new democracy agenda in U.S.-Cuba foreign relations, Friedman (2005) suggests that nothing has really changed. Indeed promotion of democracy may indeed represent a

seamless continuation of a policy which has sought to maintain U.S. and capitalist hegemony in the world. As such, the concept of building civil society and democratic participation, as used to authorize U.S. actions towards Cuba are linked, and are reflective of larger geopolitical forces oriented towards free markets and globalization (Friedman 2005). Indeed,
while it is common for U.S. policy-makers to suggest that Cuba will become democratic, it is equally clear that the cause for democracy within Cuba itself requires American championship. Such discourses are reminiscent of U.S. geopolitical

discourse towards international arena like Iraq and Afghanistan, but are now seldom heard in context of

political territories and targets within the Western Hemisphere in the 21st century. What this means in terms of the bigger picture is that current U.S. treatment of Cuba remains consistent with its position as a hegemon. It reflects a

post-colonial, post-Cold War global domination project disguised in the language of marketoriented processes and democratic/human rights projects consistent with a late 20th century U.S. globalization agendas (Agnew 2003, 2005; Slater 2004). Yet the roots of this project go back to 19th century notions of
the frontier, manifest destiny and self-determination in a conflicted, yet highly successful, blend of ideology and praxis. Indeed, according to Fisk (2002), the issue of U.S. geopolitical perspectives and foreign policies towards Cuba

cannot be understood unless in context of the ideological politics of a more globalized U.S. foreign policy agenda.

Cuba islands/Achipelago
The 1AC ignores the interconnectedness of islands this relational framing necessitates a dynamic where the mainland dominates the island Stratford et al. 11 [Elaine, Ph.D. Philosophy, Professor, Geography and International Studies at UTasmania; Godfrey

Baldacchino, Ph.D. Sociology/Anthropology, Professor, Island Studies Program, U of Prince Edward Island; Elizabeth McMahon, Ph.D. Literature, Associate Professor, School of English, Media, and Performing Arts at U of New South Wales; Carol Farbotko, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, U of Wollongong; Andrew Harwood, Research Fellow, School of Geography and Environmental Studies at UTasmania, Envisioning the Archipelago, Island Studies Journal 6(2)] The second topological relation of the island discernible within island studies is that it is typically held in opposition

to a continent, a relation which is usually materialized as a particular mainland. In a sense, islands and continents are each others other (GibsonGraham, 1998; Said, 1978). On the surface, this relationship is characterized by a difference in size: islands are small, continents are very large. However, attempting to distinguish islands from continents/mainlands in terms of absolute size of land area or population, for example, works against a relational understanding. Indeed it seems most islands invariably embrace other islands within their spatial ambits: smaller islands off their coasts; larger islands (mainlands?) to which they belong; and internal islands (of interest, conflict or other assemblages, for instance) that may exist should their boundedness be fractured (Baldacchino, 2002; Stratford, 2006). Rather, the scalar relationship between island and continent points towards relative differences and representations whereby islands are seen as necessarily smaller than continents. Indeed, islandsand their constituent residents and dynamicsare routinely perceived and expected to be vulnerable, fragile, dependent and problematic on the basis of a categorical difference that is assumed to exist between continents/mainlands and islands, and which privileges the larger land mass 2 . The binary between continent and island is structured by hierarchies of value, as much as size: presence/absence, sufficiency/insufficiency, positivity/negativity, completeness/lack (Gibson-Graham, 1998: 2). Such a mix of categorical and relative
evaluations positions islands as both microcosms of continents/mainlands as well as quintessentially different or particularized others.

Homogenizing islands saps island identities and enables domination by great powers Stratford et al. 11 [Elaine, Ph.D. Philosophy, Professor, Geography and International Studies at UTasmania; Godfrey

Baldacchino, Ph.D. Sociology/Anthropology, Professor, Island Studies Program, U of Prince Edward Island; Elizabeth McMahon, Ph.D. Literature, Associate Professor, School of English, Media, and Performing Arts at U of New South Wales; Carol Farbotko, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, U of Wollongong; Andrew Harwood, Research Fellow, School of Geography and Environmental Studies at UTasmania, Envisioning the Archipelago, Island Studies Journal 6(2)] A third topological relation is much less commonly deployed than the previous two; it foregrounds interactions

between and among islands themselves. A complex and manifold lineage of real and imaginary places may be mobilized in any given instantiation of island. Yet, for various reasonshistorical, geographical, political and economicmultiplicities of islands have gravitated towards some putative unity. Alternatively, an archipelagic feature of islands is exemplified in Bentez-Rojos (1996: 1) idea of the repeating island: [blockquote] In recent decades we have begun to see a clearer outline to the profile of a group of American nations whose colonial experiences and languages have been different, but which share certain undeniable features. I mean the countries usually called Caribbean or of the Caribbean basin. This designation might serve a foreign purposethe great powers need to recodify the worlds territory better to know, to dominate itas well as a local one, selfreferential, directed toward fixing the furtive image of collective Being(emphasis added). [end blockquote] Moreover, this Being is: [blockquote] a discontinuous conjunction (of what?): unstable condensations, turbulences, whirlpools, clumps of bubbles, frayed seaweed, sunken galleons, crashing breakers, flying fish, seagull squawks, downpours, nighttime phosphorescences, eddies and pools, uncertain voyages of

signification; in short, a field of observation quite in tune with the objectives of Chaos Chaos looks toward everything that repeats, reproduces, grows, decays, unfolds, flows, spins, vibrates, seethes Chaos provides a space in which the pure sciences connect with the social sciences, and both of them connect with art and the cultural tradition (BentezRojo, 1996: 2-3; parentheses in original). [end blockquote] For Bentez-Rojo, analysis of repeating, decaying, unfolding, changing islands proceeds under the influence of this attitude (ibid.: 3). Such a clear outline (ibid.: 1) remains largely under-utilized to date, and is worth further and more penetrating attention. At

first glance, it is a liberating rubric of repetition that avoids categorization, one effect of which simplifies and stereotypes in order to numb and subjugate (Said, 1978). Yet there is something about the privileging of repetition that is

troubling: repetition can mean duplication, or cloning; and yet no two islands are ever alike.

Cuba Guantanamo turn

The affs conception of borders justifies the continued existence of Guantanamo Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg32-33)

The case of the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists by the United States on Cuban territory, and the legal arguments deployed for and against their release, are fascinating for thinking about the contemporary

relationship between state borders, territory and law. One dimension of this relationship in the context of Guantnamo is obviously the way in which the United States government has relied upon, and attempts to maintain, the principle that

limits in law and territory are coterminous (in other words, the idea that a state cannot be held legally responsible for actions that take place on another state's territory). Such a view, reinforced by military capability, has allowed for the treatment of detainees in Cuba in ways that would otherwise be considered unlawful within the traditional territorial borders of the United States. Indeed, it is because of the seemingly (p.32) anomalous nature of the naval base, with its own complicated colonial history, that detainees held indefinitely there do not have the same recourse to domestic and international law that either Cuban or American citizens enjoy. Another interesting dimension of the Guantnamo case, however, is precisely the way
in which the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has sought to erode the grounds of the United States' position by mobilising international legal opinion that the relationship between law and territory makes no difference to states' obligations under human rights treaties and humanitarian law. The notion that a state is obliged to uphold international standards of human

wellbeing only in relation to those within its own territory is challenged by the United Nations ruling. Rather,
the argument put forward by the United Nations is that if states exert control over subjects beyond their territorial borders then, irrespective of the location of those subjects, a given state is still responsible for them under international law. The situation

of detainees in Guantnamo Bay is therefore interesting because it indicates that the limits of territory are not necessarily coextensive with limits in law in contemporary political life. Indeed,
the case points to a disaggregation between juridical space on the one hand and the space of the sovereign territorially delimited state on the other. Such a disjuncture, which may also apply to the United Kingdom and European Union cases as offshore bordering

becomes an integral part of homeland security, challenges dominant assumptions about the nature and location of authority in global politics as reflected in the norm of territorial integrity enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

Guantanamo Bay base takes out solvency It is the primary vehicle consolidating and establishing the boundary between Cuba and the US Goldman 8 [Dara, Director of the Center for Caribbean and Latin American Studies at U IllinoisUrbana, professor of Caribbean and LA Studies, Spanish, and Latina/Latino Studies at U IllinoisUrbana, Theres (Always) Something about Cuba: Security and States of Exception in a Fundamentally Unsafe World, South Atlantic Quarterly 107:2] Military historians Felipa Surez Ramos and Pilar Quesada also articulate a similar argument in A escasos metros del enemigo(Mere Meters from the Enemy).15Their study is one of the few analyses to focus on the extraordinary proximity of the United States and Cuba, separated as they are by only a few meters rather than ninety miles. As in Miranda Bravos book, Surez Ramos and Quesada highlight the inappropriateness (and untenability) of this relationship and underscore its negative impact on Cubans. In this case, not only do the authors decry the political and sociological implications of the base, but they also pay tribute to two Cuban soldiers who lost their lives on the Guantnamo border.16In fact, the book is primarily dedicated to the first two members of the Brigada de la Frontera (Border Brigade), who were
killed by gunshots that emanated from the base in the 1960s: A Ramn y Luis, cuyas jvenes vidas fueron vilmente cesadas desde ese pedazo de tierra nuestra usurpado por los yanquis (To Ramon and Luis, whose young lives were vilely ended from within this piece of our land that has been usurped by the Yankees).17 Throughout its history, therefore, the base has always been afforded

a special status, whether condemned as an illegitimate encroachment on Cuban sovereignty, touted as a necessary measure of protection by the United States, or cited as a potential threat to international relations by both countries. Along with the legitimacy of the base itself, potential threats have also been invoked in order to justify particular practices routinely realized in

Guantnamo. The small strip of land that separates the base from the province of Guantnamo is filled with surveillance devices and other equipment generally reserved for zones marked by open military conflict. Indeed, the status of the base as an essential guardian against extreme conditions of potential peril has engendered dangerous conditions and caused the death of at least one U.S. soldier in addition to the two aforementioned Cuban border guards on the front lines between the base and the province (notably in the absence of any active warfare). The depictions of the region in U.S. and Cuban popular culture reveal how it figures their respective national imaginaries. More important, these perceptions do not fully conform to the characterization of the base as a necessary condition of extraordinary conditions or policies. Of course, the base is inexorably linked to the extremist rhetoric that alternately justifies and denounces its existence. At the same time, by calling attention to everyday conditions
engendered on and around the naval base, these examples underscore the contradictory intersections of the supposed purpose of the base and its impact.

Mexico
Single-Issue border focuses shatter economic cooperation- securitization and localized resistance to national policies have a debilitating effect on interdependency Trinkunas 12
[Harold, Naval Postgraduate School, Maiah Jaskoski- Naval Postgraduate School, Borders and Borderlands in the Americas- PASCC Report Number 2012 009]

Popular perceptions of borders and borderlands tend to be dominated by single issues that obscure the complexity of the border. This single-issue focus on economics, security, or migration drives policymaking, even when the focus may be unhelpful. For example, the U.S.Mexico border is defined within the U.S. as a problem of illegal migration, often overlooking the fact that allowing flows across the border is necessary to enable the economic dynamism of legal commerce between the countries. The key problem at the Ecuador-Colombia

border is insurgents crossing to rest, regroup, resupply, and train in northern Ecuador, yet the logical solution that emerged out of a narrow focus on these security challenges has not worked: the Ecuadorean Army does all it can to avoid contact with the insurgents.21 Similarly, in the tri-border region of South America, international actors insist on focusing on terrorism, even as the main challenge for authorities at the border is smuggling, piracy, and counterfeiting. Single-focus policy solutions, particularly those that

involve prioritizing security over other dimensions of borders, may not prove workable and may provoke negative externalities. In the economic realm, a security focus can lead to neglect of potential economic-based measures to facilitate legal markets and interfere with illegal ones.

{**In the Mexico Oil 1NC**} The construction of the US-Mexico border stabilizes American identity around the racist projection of lawlessness and barbarity onto the Mexican other in need of domination.
Klahn 8, professor at the University of California Chicano/Latino Research Center, 2008 [Norma, The Border: Imagined, Invented or
from the Geopolitics of Literature to Nothingness, Working Paper No.5 Chicano/Latino Research Center, clrc.soe.ucsc.edu/sites/clrcweb/files/sites/default/files/.../05_Klahn.pdf] The diverse, complex and contradictory ways in which Mexico, its culture, and its peoples imagined, portrayed, glorified or vilified

have been by the people of the U.S. have a long history. They began with the conflicts between the two colonizing powers, Spain and England. And they continued as the young United States expanded into territories occupied by the Indians and possessed first by Spain and later Mexico. In the process, a cultural and physical space known as the Border emerged in the nineteenth century. Ultimately, it resulted in both a physical and a psychological distancing during and because of the U.S. nineteenth-century expansion and its conquest of what is now the U.S. Southwest. For political, cultural and psychological purposes this movement of displacement rendered the region's former owners, the Mexican as 'other,'that is, the construction of a different identity seen as dissonant to monolithic Western discourses of power.1 The dynamics of "othering" finally becomes self-serving for it affirms an on going process of, in this case, Anglo identity. Constituted as cultural contestants, the Mexican became everything the Anglo was not. In their studies of Anglo attitudes towards Mexicans Carey McWilliams and Arnoldo de Leon2 present the U.S. expansionist project as an acquisition of territory justified by the mission Anglos assumed as civilizers of the hinterlands with a need to control all that was barbaric-sexuality, vice, nature, and people of color. The initial constructions were racist: that 1see Edward Said, Orienta/ism (New York:

Vintage Random House, 1978)Tzetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row,1982); ; Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York: Routledge, 1993). 2 Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,1949). Arnoldo de Leon, They called them greasers is, essential characteristics of personality,

intelligence and morals were attributed to physical appearances. Mexicans were perceived in light of their differences from Anglos. Americans carried to the Southwest values constructed by the founding

fathers, of English descent, male, white and Protestant-self-reliance, a puritanical morality, the erasure of the past, and a work ethic. They saw Mexicans as racially impure, descended of the Spaniards, who were contaminated by Moorish blood, and

the "blood thirsty" Aztecs. " 'They are of mongrel blood, the Aztec predominating,' asserted Gilbert D. Kingsbury, writing about the Mexicans of Brownsville in the early 1860s".3 Positioned in relation to their differences to Anglos, Mexicans appeared to be dependent, resigned, complacent, not committed to improvement or progress, but rather to fun and frolic. For these

expansionists "to have accepted other than 'white supremacy and civilization" , says de Leon, "was to submit to Mexican domination and to admit that Americans were willing to become like Mexicans. The prospect of being dominated by such untamed, uncivil, and disorderly creatures made a contest for racial hegemony almost inevitable." 4 Descriptions of Mexicans through the nineteenth century, some inoffensive, most virulent, are all grounded on the trope of difference, a rhetorical construct founded on paradigms of dissimilarity. The border was the line established both to delineate and inscribe that difference. Where the line is de-limited, the 'other' begins. The boundary was sacred, not to be transgressed. Yet, paradoxically, bridges and crossing passages were created as legitimate spaces where separation is established, precisely because the frontier, as de Certeau says, is created by contacts where "the points of differentiation between two bodies are also their common points.''5 In the case of the United States-Mexico border, the "contact zone" has become a "combat zone" where crossings and/or transgressions are the rule, rather than the 3 de Leon, 15. 4 de Leon, 13. 5 Michel de Certeau, "Spatial Stories" The Practice of Everyday Life exception.6 Constructions, concrete and imaginary, are established distancing the 'other' at least symbolically, and in this case, south of that de-limitation. The inhabitants of the United States continue to wrestle with that "alien territory." "South of the Borderism" is what I have called borrowing from Edward Said, the way that the United States and its peoples have come to terms with Mexico as they continuously invent an 'other' image, and defend and define their own. In their
writings, and in contrast with the way Anglos constructed or invented themselves (stereotypically as morally superior, hard working, thrifty), the Mexican could in the best of cases be mysterious, romantic, fun-loving, laid back, colorfully primitive or alternatively conniving, highly sexualized, disorderly, lazy,violent, and uncivilized. 7 Hollywood appropriated all of the images, from 'the greaser' and the violent bandits, to the Latin lover and the Mexican spitfire. 8 As soon as a boundary is established, the other side

becomes desirable, the threshold to cross into the unknown, the yet unexplored landscape where 'the self' is discovered and the 'other' is invented. The trope of difference becomes the figure most utilized by travellers and novelists writing about their adventures "south of the border" This trope, established from the initial moment of encounter and still prevalent today, opposes U.S. 'civilization' to Mexican 'barbarism'. It seems, however, an encounter of images where language, as a code of communication, is never or seldom mentioned, stressing and acknowledging that writers cannot (or choose not to) cross one of the main borders: the spoken code. Anthropologically we could say that such literature remains etic, and not emic, that is, the perspective is established as outside and above the culture. Paradoxically, and because of that positioning, the attraction to a regenerative vitality conceived as present within 'Barbarism' continues to seduce the traveller to the point of demarcation, both physically and psychologically, where the 'other' is found. The adventure can be positive or negative. Many times it becomes a place appropriated as material to feed the imagination back home, perceived as devoid of adventure For Paul Theroux, the crossing resembled a descent into hell. Looking south, across the river, I realize that I was looking toward another continent, another country, another world, ...T he frontier was actual: people did things differently there ... No people, but cars and trucks were evidence of them Beyond that, past the Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo, was a black slope-the featureless, night-haunted republics of Latin America .... Laredo required the viciousness of its sister city to keep its own churches full. Laredo had the airport and the churches; Nuevo Laredo, the brothels and basket factories. Each nationality had seemed to gravitate to its own level of competence. The frontier was more than an example of cozy hypocrisy; it demonstrated all one needed to know about the morality of the Americas, the relationship between the puritanical efficiency north of the border and the bumbling and passionate disorder-the anarchy of sex and hunger-south of it. 1 0 He doesn't stop there Theroux's racism is rampant: Mexicans are naturally corrupt, lawless, unhygienic, a brutal and beaten people who "cruelly beat their animals." Laredo becomes a microcosm of all the United States; Nuevo Laredo not just of Mexico, but of Latin America. Mary Pratt sees Theroux's writing exemplify a discourse of negation, domination, devaluation and fear that remain in the late 20th century, a powerful ideological constituent of the West's
. . ; as ing "

consciousness of the people and places it strives to hold in subjugation:

Theroux's, a distancing occurs, either by idealization or denigration.

11 In

both writings, Greene's and

Mexico immigration
The process of policing immigration along the US-Mexico border reinforces otherization and alienation of migrants. Coleman 2007[Coleman, M. (2007), Department of Geography, The Ohio State University,
Columbus, OH, USA, "Immigration Geopolitics Beyond the MexicoUS Border". Antipode, 39: 54 76. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00506.x]
Borders and border policing are important and ongoing components of immigration enforcement in the US. And, as noted at the outset of the paper, the present clampdown at the borderas with Operations Hold-the-Line and Gatekeeper, initiated in the mid-1990stranslates into large numbers of fatalities there as undocumented migrants are forced to navigate treacherous landscapes adjacent to increasingly fortified urban corridors. This said, the argument I have tried to make in this paper is that there is more going on than borders and border policing when it comes to understanding how the US is dealing with immigration enforcement. I will conclude with three thoughts about how geographers might think differently about the location and substance of US immigration enforcement efforts of relevance to the MexicoUS border. First, immigration enforcement can be rethought in terms broader than the straightforward deployment of troops and immigration agents directly at the external frontiers of the state. Part of what I have tried to conceptualize above is a shift in the where of immigration policing: that US immigration policing, particularly after 9/11, and through the lens of counterterrorism, has shifted gears insofar as interior enforcement has taken on a renewed importance since that date. Indeed, the emerging complementarity between immigration policing efforts at the border and new spaces of immigration geopolitics in the interior, via local and state actors who previously enjoyed little or no power to enforce immigration law, is what I take as the most significant aspect of post-9/11 immigration lawmaking. For this reason, geographers might differentiate between border policing (ie directly at the territorial margins of the state) and a spatially looser configuration of boundary policing practices. By boundary policing I mean practices of internal

organization and external bounding constitutive of state territoriality (Agnew 1997), but undertaken by a multiplicity of federal and local actors and not geographically limited to the territorial margins of the state. In other words, boundary policing might refer to border policing and practices of immigrant regulation which take place away from state borders, even if they are in the end concerned to regulate the flow of bodies across the lattera sort of border enforcement from afar. Moreover, using the Operation Predator example discussed above, immigration-related conceptualized as a far-reaching mode of extended border control in which undocumented migrants and others are harbored subject to the whim of the government and may be deported whenever the government so desires a shifting, even retroactive, regime of deportation sanctions dependent on political context rather than strictly on the transgression of immigration law (Kanstroom 2000a:1907). Second, to take up immigration enforcement as suchie in

boundary policing need not have immigration enforcement strictly speaking as its goal, even if the deportation of aliens is achieved through the latter. Indeed, boundary policing, at least in terms of the discussion above, can be

terms of localized relations of social control, which while disproportionately impacting undocumented laborers does not entail an increase in workplace investigationsalso means that geographers give renewed attention to the what of immigration enforcement. Immigration law has typically (and with good reason) been side-stepped by geographers in favor of a more grounded focus on immigration enforcement practices themselves, which at least in the MexicoUS case study raise a number of immediate and pressing social justice questions. But

the expansion of interior immigration enforcement in the US over the 1990s and after 9/11, as I have tried to demonstrate, has to do with the criminalization of immigration law; or, with how lawmakers have merged and then sequestered criminal law and immigration law to an exceptional space of immigration enforcement practices paradoxically beyond judicial reproach. In this sense, practices of immigration enforcement are rooted squarely in the geopolitics of immigration law, which we
might define as the strategic bracketingor placing asideof the reach of constitutional law. This strategic bracketing ensures the expedited removal of undocumented migrants and others under criminal law charges, now increasingly at the hands of local authorities and under the generally unproblematized guise of counterterrorism. While geographers have dealt broadly with the

intersection of law, power and space, this specific nexus between law and immigration enforcementand indeed, the geopolitical role played by immigration lawmakingrequires more research. Lastly, to focus on the legal basis of immigration policing brings us to the problem of the uneven spatiality of immigration enforcement. To examine the geopolitics of immigration law is at once to examine how statecraft is about increasingly irregular and uncertain localized conditions of possibility rather than about coherent, macro-scale strategies of state governance (see generally, Dahlman and
Tuathail 2005; Graham 2004; Warren 2002). In addition to rethinking immigration enforcement away from the border and in terms of immigration law and the exceptional practices it authorizes, I think it important to underline how immigration enforcement is being multiplied and activated unevenly across sites which, although typically thought marginal or at least tangential to geopolitical practice, are increasingly otherwise. As noted above, the post-9/11 devolution of immigration law enforcement to local proxy forces has occasioned a patchwork municipal geography of interior immigration enforcement, as certain localities sign immigration enforcement memorandums

with the Department of Homeland Security while others do not. But the situation is arguably more complex than simply the production of an uneven geography of participating and non-participating localities. In other words, the problem is not simply one of regional differentiation. At stake is a larger question about the myriad, conflicting scales of immigration policing in the US, a problem rarely if at all noted in the academic literature. In the case of municipal non-compliance related to immigration, federal immigration law is obstructed on the ground via municipal ordinances whichin a sort of mirroring of the exceptionality of federal immigration lawdeclare cities as exceptional sites exempt from federal immigration laws. While immigration law works increasingly, then, via an exception to the domestic rule of law, municipal immigration-related ordinances themselves work via an exception to immigration law. And of course this is challenged by the post-9/11 extension of federal immigration proxies into select urban centers, which brings the exceptionality of federal immigration law to bear directly on urban spaces, albeit by non-federal agents. The result is a convoluted hierarchy of

interpenetrating scales of exception or exemption in relation to the law, in which the final territorial jurisdiction of immigration enforcement remains fundamentally unsettled.

Mexico border security

The only justification for the plan is fear. Even though the most vulnerable site for entry into a nation would be airports, we are still fixated on the idea of crossing through walls, swimming, and walking. Most who perform border crossings are NOT security threats Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political geography, the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking, Ethics and Global Politics, pg 11, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf)
In addition, as is clear from the American media rhetoric about broken borders, the fanatical CNN news anchor Lou Dobbs use s this phrase regularly to refer specifically to the US-Mexico border, and my second point, the map image of the borders of the state still exercises a major influence on the territorial imagination of whose security is at stake and who most threatens it.Many of us still live in a

world where political borders are the most important signs on a world map. Even though airports, for example, may well be major sites for the arrival of contested migrants and possible terrorists, the most popular idea is that of the former running, swimming, or otherwise penetrating land and sea borders. This powerful image of the border as a guardian of personal security
akin to a security perimeter or fence around ones home underwrites much of the hardening of border controls around the US and the European Union in recent years.62 Yet, of course, this is totally misleading; not only in the fact that most

undocumented aliens/those without papers/ clandestini are not security threats (at least not in the
sense frequently considered as involved in terrorist plots) and once they arrive fulfill a variety of economic functions that would otherwise go unfulfilled, but that the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks around the world have

involved legal visitors from friendly countries or local citizens. The notion of trespass or unregulated violation appears to provide the primary ethical basis to the imaginative emphasis on the physical border per se asthe face of the nation to the world, so to speak. Rarely is it
immigrants tout court who are openly in question, it is those without legal recognition. Of course, it is their very illegality that is attractive to employers and consumers because of the lack of qualification for public services and the ever-present threat of deportation as a disciplinary measure. No one talks much about how difficult it usually is to be a legal immigrant. Yet, the discourse frequently

is more ambiguous in simultaneously always seeming to worry about the cultural threat that foreign immigrants of whatever legal status pose to the national identity because blood and family ties often count so much (either officially or unofficially) in most definitions of who really belongs within the national territory.63 Even in countries which officially claim more open definitions of citizenship than is typically the norm, such as France and the US, nativist movements have little doubt about who is more and who is less deserving of recognition as French or American. Debates about who does and who does not belong draw attention to both the fluid and the contested character of national identities.64

The US-Mexican border is an area of violence on both sides. The interior enforcement of the border creates a new form of violence where immigrants exclude themselves from society out of fear of deportation. Shapiro 12
(Michael J. Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, Mnoa, A continuing violent cartography From Guadalupe Hidalgo to contemporary border crossings in The New Violent Cartography Chapter 15)

The various U.S. policy initiatives aimed at controlling the traffic across the MexicoU.S. border are accompanied by several unofficial actions that render the area a renewed blood meridian. Heres one report that features the deadly consequences of the increasing vigilantism in the border area: PAUSING

INTERMITTENTLY under the merciless sun, Cesareo Dominguez desperately scanned the desert near the Arizona border for twentyone consecutive days. In a well-known migrant corridor, just south of Pima County, his search came to a tragic end when he discovered what he hoped he wouldnt, the lifeless body of his daughter, Lucresia. She had made a desperate attempt to cross from Mexico without papers, in order to reunite with her husband now living in the United States. On the other side of the same stretch of desert, right-wing vigilante squads calling themselves the Minutemen have begun patrols along the U.S.-Mexico border. Sporting fatigues, a small arsenal, and paramilitary bravado, their migrant hunting expeditions are designed to open a new front of the war on terrorism by portraying

the porous border as a threat to national security and American culture. (Akers, 2005: 1) The

Minutemen project is merely a harder version of the policing/surveillance practices all along the U.S.Mexican border, which reach northward into large metropolises such as Los Angeles as well as much farther north. In the case of Los Angeles, as Lawrence Herzog puts it, the Los AngelesMexico inter-face is part of a set of U.S. border relations that constitutes a transfrontier Metropolis. (Coleman, 2007: 608). Increasingly, the controls over the moving Mexican bodies crossing the border are spreading from the border territory inward, both within the U.S. and in Mexico, an expanding interior enforcement (2007: 619). As a result, the spatial practices of the U.S.s immigration control policy process has made Mexicos border as deep as it is wide (2007: 627). And now there are other governmental players involved small town governments that have in recent years, posted the most aggressive challenge to national immigration policy, primarily through municipal ordinances that preempt federal policy (Gilbert, 2009), and the state of Arizona, which is challenging federal policy with draconian surveillance procedures. Temporal rhythms, which operate outside of territorial enforcement, weigh as heavily as spatial controls on the fates of Mexican immigrants, rhythms that belong as much to economic as to political forces. For example, along with policy time, a
changing set of laws, and extra-juridical enforcement mechanisms designed to inhibit illegal immigration, is capital time and labor union time. Capital time, which is a function of money flows tends to escape the juridical frame of political territoriality (Alliez, 1996: 6). Not surprisingly, therefore, entrepreneurs who find illegal immigrants useful, employ capture and control rather than prevention and inhibition policies. As I point out elsewhere, for illegal immigrants, the political threats of punishment and

deportation that operate within the political domain effectively support the coercive controls operating within the economic sector (Shapiro, 2010). They create the conditions of possibility for turning immigrants into vulnerable, suborned bodies. Thus although a political temporality manifests itself as an increasing securitizing that seeks to inhibit the flow of immigrant bodies, a globalizing economic temporality, which includes urban development policies [that] favor state deregulation and privatization of services, encourages immigration and thereby places the increasing number of foreign born residents under political threat while at the same time pushing them into a condition of economic or social marginalization (Gilbert, 2005: 31). Among the kinds of vulnerable lives in various global venues of late are deportable lives (Talavera et al., 2006). In particular undocumented people living in the vicinity of the U.S.-Mexico border, who live with the reality of imminent deportation, are often too fearful to make use of health services or contest harassment from neighbors, lest they invite police scrutiny (Ibid.: 172). The anxiety with which they must live constitutes a softer version of the violence in the blood meridian. However, much of the violence in the border area is enacted by the landscape itself.
While two contending forces are operating to both encourage the flow of bodies and to inhibit it the enticement of entrepreneurs willing to hire undocumented cheap labor and the policing forces seeking to inhibit it the casualty rate is growing dramatically. The

landscapes of the desert southwest are so perilous that thousands die of dehydration while making the trek. As a result, the landscapes play an increasingly key role in the biopower of U.S. border enforcement policy (Doty, 2006: 6). The death-producing practices of deterrence, ranging from Operation Hold
the Line in Texas to Gatekeeper in San Diego to Safeguard in Tucson and Nogales constitute a micropolitics of the body based on its need for water (Doty, 2006: 17). Although the deterrence practices are not the kind of direct killing practiced by marauders from the nineteenth century to the present, their body count exceeds those produced by the armed gangs, who have robbed and murdered for profit. Nevertheless, while deterrence policies claim bodies indirectly, the more direct killing by marauders continues. On the

Mexican side of the border, a twenty first century equivalent of the Glanton gang, armed narco traffickers who have expanded their operations to include demanding money from Mexicans headed for the border, add a level of violence that recalls the version treated in McCarthys novel. In 2010, one of the most
powerful narco trafficking gangs, the Zetas, murdered seventy-two laborers, apparently because they either refused or could not pay a fee for a safe crossing.

The US- Mexico border is a one sided, racist system based on a collaboration of securitization and globalization- globalization necessitates securitization while creating and reinforcing social inequalities Pallitto and Heyman 2008 [ Robert, Professor of Political Science, Josiah, Professor of
Anthropology, Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility: Surveillance, Security and Identity, Surveillance & Society, 5(3): 315-333]

Long ago, Karl Marx showed how misguided it is to assume that in modernity, state power is the only source of harm to individuals and groups. In fact, the state often creates spaces in which private power can operate to produce

inequality and injustice. With that observation in mind, then, we cannot look exclusively at state-imposed mobility controls in our effort to understand mobility regimes. Private force also affects mobility, and even more important, state force and private force cannot always be separated. Sometimes they interpenetrate to produce cumulative effects, and sometimes they exhibit tension with each other. Amoore (2006) and Sparke (2006) conceptualize this problem as a tension between securitization and neoliberalist globalization, which operate both to enable and to restrict movement. While the nationalistic imperative of border security urges restriction, globalization demands unrestricted movement of economic actors. Nowhere is this more

vividly demonstrated than in Sparkes (2006) observation that the very same jet aircraft used to transport extraordinary rendition captives to overseas torture sites was also used for elite business travel. That example shows that the two logics (securitization and

globalization) are not always in conflict, but sometimes work to accommodate one another. Together they stratify social relations, producing groupings based on mobility mobility classes, if you will whose members
are readily identifiable by their movement capability just as Marxs social groups were defined by their relationship to the production process. In short, then, sorting by surveillance, in the sense used by Gandy (1993) and Adey (2004), has the effect

of distributing benefits and burdens, opportunities and risks, along discernible lines that both create and reinforce social inequalities. As Salter (2006) and others rightly point out, the political technologies of

biometric surveillance cause surveillance to fall more and more on bodies, but that is not the end of the inquiry. Those technologies impact upon subjects unequally, and how well individuals can negotiate the surveillance of their bodies often depends on class status. If they

can declare themselves blameless and be acquitted, they may pass, but the ability to do so is often influenced by race and class, as in the case of highway checkpoints discussed above. It may be impossible for some individuals to escape the discretionary processing that occurs at checkpoints, and agents perception of race and class becomes an externally imposed limitation on movement -- illegitimate in legal terms, but nonetheless real. Mitchell (2005) argues that U.S. courts have aided this sorting process, facilitating the free movement of economic elites by a certain kind of pro-privacy legal ruling, keeping those who would impede commerce (such as panhandlers) at a distance. The spaces created by these decisions, which Mitchell describes as buffer zones and bubbles, allow some individuals to move without impediment, as the state will enforce protective boundaries around them. Crucially, there are two types of state actions at work here. States erect public barriers at borders and elsewhere through which people must pass (and be slowed or stopped). But states also clear away private barriers in certain cases, so that movement is even freer than it would have been if the state had not intervened. Moreover, ordinary people can police the movement of suspicious others. Amoore (2006) notes that hand-held communication devices allow reporting of suspicious persons directly to federal authorities. With this development, border control diffuses through the social field, and restriction of movement occurs at innumerable nodal points at borders and elsewhere. This diffusion and internalization of discipline recalls Foucaults (1978) depiction of
power-knowledge regimes. However, changes wrought by globalization require some rethinking of his work. Fraser (2003) notes that Foucaults power framework relied on nation-state power practices and regulation of subjects, which Fraser terms the fordist mode of social regulation (2003:160). The denationalization and transnationalization we have seen in the era of postfordist globalization, by contrast, calls for a new analysis (2003:165). Networks, for example, are able to combine rule-governed organization with flexibility, openendedness, decenteredness and spatial dispersion (2003:169). A more updated analysis of power practices would

consider how network configurations regulate behavior, distribute privilege, and shape subjectivity.

In an attempt to resolve the security/economy contradiction of the US-Mexico border, the United States has expanded the border by localization inwardly and preemption outwardly. Coleman 7 [Mathew, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, A Geopolitics of Engagement:
Neoliberalism, the War on Terrorism, and the Reconfiguration of US Immigration Enforcement, Geopolitics, 12:607634, 2007] The tension between trade and security at the Mexico-US border is a longstanding one. However, as I have tried to argue

above, the Mexico-US border as a security/economy nexus as constituted by countervailing trade and security policies has since September 2001 become much more widely acknowledged in Washington DC. Indeed, my claim in this paper is that the contemporary Trojan horse

recoding of borderland neoliberalism has drawn new attention to the border as a contradictory site because of the way it highlights the risks posed by crossborder flows in terms of both danger and prosperity. On the one hand, and certainly not a novel

theme, border porosity is seen as a geopolitical threat; on the other hand, however, there is a growing awareness by law- and policy-makers that a reactionary geopolitics of containment at US borders is likely to threaten Americas trade linkages. The result is that while the security/economy
nexus is not new, its surfacing after September 2001 has become the basis for a major (emerging) rearrangement of US homeland security geopolitics, specifically regarding immigration enforcement at the Mexico-US border. This transformation, following the provocative analysis of neoliberal geopolitics set forth by Roberts et al., concerns a geopolitics of (immigration) engagement in spaces at some remove from the border and once previously at arms length from the federal power to police immigration.111 We might

characterise this as a lateral re-siting of US immigration enforcement away from the border itself: on the one hand, its localisation in US cities, which amounts to a newly intensified surveillance of everyday immigrant life at the urban scale; and on the other hand, its regionalisation south of the Mexico-US border, which as we saw amounts to a preinfringement, extra-jurisdictional immigration enforcement regime.112Importantly, both the localisation
and regionalisation of US immigration enforcement have their roots in the 1990s, and like the security/economy nexus itself, are not practices that we can neatly attribute to a post-September 2001 period. Nonetheless, my contention is that their

extension today as neoliberal rollout tactics, designed in effect to protect the rollback of the borderland economy engineered in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis is an attempt to deflate the tension between trade and security directly at the border. Whether or not these rollout policies succeed is not my interest. Rather, I want to draw attention to the generalisation of border life throughout a number of previously non-border spaces, or in other words how the border and border policing are being reproduced in sites far away from the border proper. This remarkable redeployment of US state power to control immigration means more than a simple
retention of US state sovereignty in its territorial guise. Instead, somewhat paradoxically, it signals an increasingly deterritorialised field of state security tactics. By deterritorialised, I here follow recent theorists of geopolitics in the American key who posit that, in the contemporary interregnum (in which state territorial power has been supplemented with an abundance of other modalities of power), state borders function geopolitically as fixed frontiers and as thresholds or points of passage. 113 In other words, US geopolitical practice works as much by transgressing and displacing state borders as it does by building them. Otherwise said, US

statecraft no longer accords if it ever did to an abstract geopolitics of verticality and encompassment verticality meaning from a single point above, and encompassment meaning over a carefully bordered and territorially contiguous bloc of space.114 Indeed, if what I have described above holds, the twin processes of localisation/devolution and regionalisation/preemptionin US immigration geopolitics constitute what we might call a proxy geography of immigration enforcement. Rather than a tidy sovereign territoriality of power, this proxy

geography outsourced, that is, to local and regional abettors whose jurisdiction over immigration could be contested defines a composite or recombinant national security topography, an unbound domestic and international field of immigration policing tactics stretching from the urban scale to the continental scale.115 Lahav and Guiraudon, in their excellent studies of

EU immigration policing, point to a similar process by which state geographies of immigration enforcement in Europe have been reinvented as an extended playing field of local, transnational, and private actors outside the central state apparatus to forestall migration.116 At the same time, we are obliged to highlight the ongoing importance of border policing per se. US lawmakers
fixation on the border, as well as the increasing number of border deaths in the new millennium, demand this. So, constitutive of an emerging neoliberal geopolitics of immigration enforcement, I contend, is a nascent tripartite overseas

enforcement-border militarisation-interior enforcement assemblage. The upshot is what a US immigration official has recently celebrated as a seamless web of enforcement from the interior of the United States to the nation's borders and out to the farthest reaches of source and transit countries that will impact the flow of illegal immigrants to the United States.117 In this sense, the Mexico-US border is becoming as deep as it is wide.

Discourse based on the dichotomy of chaos and order along the border allow the region to be controlled and securitize migrants as a threat to be eliminated. Ackleson 05 Ackleson, Jason. "Constructing security on the USMexico border." Political Geography 24.2 (2005): 165-184. Jason
Ackelson has a Ph.D. from London School of Economics and Political Science, Co-Director, and a co-director at NMSU Border Security Research Group and Frontier Interdisciplinary Experiences Program and a Policy Analyst at the Office of Policy and Strategy, Research and Evaluation Division, and US Citizenship and Immigration Services

Reyes and the INS won popular and political support for the work, including vast increases in operational budgets to bolster security resources, including the hiring of more agents and direct military assistance. From 1993 to 2000, for example, the Border Patrol more than doubled from 4000 to 9000 agents while the overall INS

budget increased from $1.5 billion to over $5 billion in this period (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). What were some of the discursive elements used as speech acts to define the security problem and justify this solution? As one example, in discussions, Border Patrol

officials often emphasized the disorder and chaos caused by undocumented workers entering the U.S.Mexico borderlands: There is a very serious havoc that can be reeked by unchecked illegal

immigration (Mosier, 1996). The Border Patrol was clear about the rhetorical and material implications of the policy: Operation Hold the Line was very simpledvery symbolic of what we were trying to do and the name stuck (Mosier, 1993). The Border Patrols spokesman, representative of numerous Border Patrol agents and indeed many El Pasoens, also promotes the perceived success of the recent initiatives in similar terms: I think people are very happy.[we] are cleaning up of a lot of problemsdthat was a positive effect of having the Operation (Mosier, 1996). Another Border Patrol chief responded similarly: Chaos reigned on the border. Not today (Veal, 2001). The

discourse created a dichotomy of chaos versus order; the border needed to be controlled by reconfiguring difference and separation, in effect, securitizing the frontier. As Reyes (1993: 1B) put it, There was a disorder here when people were running around here which is scary to people. Reyes was not the only elite to articulate the problem of order in these terms. In dramatic rhetoric, Alan
Bersin, then U.S. Attorney Generals Special Representative for border issuesdformer President Clintons Border Czardalso

expressed this central component of the discursive strategy, complete with nationalist zeal:
[O]ur duty and responsibility is to manage the border satisfactorily, to manage it away from the epic of lawlessness that has characterized that border for the 150 years that the American Southwest has been a part of the United States, as contrasted with the northern half of Mexico (Bersin, 1997: 16). In addition to all of this, several key events that occurred away from the U.S.

Mexico border in 1993 also acted to foment anti-immigrant sentiment, further pushing societal/state security concerns and a national political project of border control. The first bombing of the World Trade Center in that year was linked to, among others, individuals who had received amnesty or had overstayed their visas; so too was the killing of two CIA employees. There was also considerable outcry that year about several hundred unauthorized Chinese who attempted to reach the U.S. on the Golden Venture boat. These events, and the discourse that accompanied them in the popular press and in the political realm, had repercussions which fueled some of border security strategies discussed above (Francis, 1993: 20; Kwong, 1997; Purcell & Nevins, in this issue). Public discourse and political symbolism, combined with these material developments, have thus served to help reconstruct Americas southern border through the securitization of migrants as a threat. Moreover, by invoking elements of national myth, by drawing firm symbolic, material, and rhetorical boundaries between us and the alien other, and by relegating and presenting the problems of disorder and poverty to the border, securitization policies had an effect on American identity and the idea of separation and ultimately helped define the problem as one impacting societal security. As one resident put it, We have to confront the fact that this isnt one big community anymore. And pretty soon, there will be a wall to remind us about that (Vela, 1993: 3). While the overall border security of the 1990s has been quite visible, it remains unclear if undocumented migration has been actually reduced through the new measures.
The U.S. Congress investigative arm, the U.S. General Accounting Office (1997), issued a study warning INS claims that policy had reduced undocumented migration were inconclusive. By analysis of apprehension data, it indeed is unclear if overall flows of migrants diminished because of the security build-up. Nevins (2002), for example, has identified the failings of such a law enforcement scheme in his analysis of Operation Gatekeeper, pointing in part to migrant adaptability, strong U.S.Mexico ties, and the free trade/security paradox. Taking the discussion back to the realm of discourse and security, it becomes clear

that elite speech acts worked to help construct migrants as a security threat in part to justify and expand border control operations. Supporting this view, Edelman (1985) and Bigo (2001) have demonstrated the way in which federal agencies both receive and help define a threat or problem (such as migration) and then construct particular solutions. This occurs despite the fact that such threats are often complex and ambiguous. Are migrants, for example, really threats or actually vital boons to the economy?

Militarization and other securitizing policies on North American borders exclude particular bodies. Bhandar, 8

(Davina, Trent University, Canadian Studies, Faculty Member, Resistance, Detainment, Asylum: The Onto-Political Limits of Border Crossing in North America in War, Citizenship, Territory, Chapter 13) The increased militarization of borders within North America has given rise to a fortress mentality and the implementation of new border controls. This militarization, which has typically secured the southern American border shared with Mexico, is ideologically being reproduced along
American border, militarized on both the southern and northern borders, and a

its northern border shared with Canada. The contemporary politics of border controls and formation in North America is shifting between a strongly protected

Fortress North America approach that establishes a perimeter surrounding the continent (Andreas 2006, 14). Both approaches will greatly affect the claims to sovereign control over border management and immigration for Canada and Mexico. The ideological nature of security and border control is evident by the nature of so-called illegal migrants becoming legitimate, by virtue of the fact that the economy in the United States, and increasingly in Canada, is heavily dependent on illegal work. As Sharma (2006) has argued, this is a management strategy that compels migrant subjects to remain on the outside of society. The public media discourse regarding the controls and maintaining the border has led to significant concerns regarding sovereignty; however, these practices were put into effect far before the crisis that arose in response to the War on Terror. In this sense, the national imaginary shared between Canada and the United States of its great undefended border is starkly contrasted to the other North American border between the United States and Mexico. Here the border has been constituted through a racialized and colonial project of administration. The study of borders in a North American context has overwhelming been focused on the cultures and formation of the Spanish borderlands between Mexico and the United States of America. The study of border cultures, the political economy of
borders, security, and transmigration have been overlain with postcolonial critiques, the development of the discourse of Chicana/Chicano and mestizo cultures. The

border communities and the transborder crossings have been understood through a racial and ontological lens that has been grounded in an absolute difference between the Mexican body and that of the American (writ throughout as the middle-class, white body). The
creation and manifestation of Otherness inscribed in the border cultures explore the production of racial difference that easily collapses national identity with the racialized body. In very particular and in stark contrast, the study of the northern North American border, the 49th parallel, has been racialized as the white border crossing. Border

crossings in North America have supported a variety of nationalist myths and ideologies that contribute to a formation of a racist thinking or racial discourse. In the context of the Mexican American border, the racialized 414 economy of migrant workers, transgressive acts of border crossing, and the highlighting of the erotic zone of the border have been the topics of much debate and analysis.5 And yet, the northern North American border, which

resituates the whiteness of the national identities of both Canada and the United States, has remained unremarkable. The border crossing between Canada and the United States has historically been produced through an unspoken racial economy that further cements a normative assumption of the construction of citizenship in both Canada and the United States. Due to increasing pressures to create a securitized border, the American government, post September 11, 2001, has in a way exposed this mythic northern border. In the case of Canadians moving across to the United States, the presumption in this great unprotected border has been that the Canadian citizen/national is presumed the white national subject.6 This particular racial economy is highlighted in the Canadian response to increasing border harmonization with the United States in the postSeptember 11 era.7 The contemporary North American security agenda has come to challenge modern nation-state territorialization of borders. Indeed, histories such as Bruno Ramirezs Crossing the 49th Parallel (2001) relay a somewhat incomplete historical picture of the movements over the border in the early twentieth century. This reading of Canadian mass migrations across the borders compares the experience of migrants from Anglo-Canadian groups and French Canadian groups, and mentions other European groups such as Polish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants moving from Canada to the United States. Even though the racial grammar at the time would have distinguished between these various races, and indeed the

U.S. immigration control from the late nineteenth century was very concerned with the class of European immigration entering from Canada, this historical viewpoint acts to situate the whiteness of this border crossing. This history does not include the movement of Asians, indigenous peoples, or black people who also constituted important border-crossing subjects. Indeed, such an inclusion would necessarily trouble the nationalizing framework that this history unwittingly produces. To include these Other raced bodies would mean to question the discourse of national identity production, even as this identity was not based exclusively on the juridical-legal formation of citizenship. The border is constituted differentially depending on the racialized, classed, and gendered bodies that pass through its mechanisms. The use of border control technologies such as passports works in consort with the ideological formation of
national identity. Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill argues, The impetus for the requirement that t ravelers to Canada carry passports appears to have come initially from a wish to use such documents as a means of exclusion (Kaprielian -Churchill 1994, 293). The introduction of the passport in Canada for this purpose illustrates 415 the degree to which border control technologies effectively produce and extend beyond the territorial boundaries of a nation-state. With the introduction of the passport, travelers to Canada (with the exception of those from the British Isles or the United States of America) were required to provide passport documents at the point of departure to Canadian consular officials (Kaprielian-Churchill 1994). The

border undergoes new management policies in times of perceived national crisis, or in particularly risky events. The

the Anti-Asiatic riots in 1907 exists as a historical remainder of how border practices are constituted and aim to constitute national identity. During the time of the 1907 riots, both nations were engaged in raging debates regarding the inadmissibility of Asiatics, specifically targeting
value of examining the current context of border management and security in relation to legitimizing and managing populations as border crossers. John Torpey points out how

Chinese, Japanese, and Indian migrants. In this context it is also important to note that both Canada and the United States of America set out to establish immigration policies that curtailed or managed the in-migration from these populations. New technologies of management such as in the form of identification documents, in the Canadian instance the issuance of Head Tax certificates, act in multiple ways, by both curtailing immigration from China and also

the introduction of the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States was central to the imposition of documents restricting the movement of particular bodies (Torpey 2000, 96). My rationale for examining the practices of border controls and viewing the processes through which migrant bodies move across the border is to understand the connection or unearth the racialized border practices existent in North America. This example needs to be juxtaposed to contemporary discussions of security and border debates that produce the racialized border through a somewhat distinct racial language. Contemporary debates of security, immigration, and border control in Canada are produced through the ideological lens of multiculturalism.
In the following sections, I try to examine the relationship between the governments instance on racial profiling through th e language of official multiculturalism as being central to contemporary Canadian national identity.

Mexico trade/nafta
Economic integration is an extension of imperialism NAFTA proves
(John Saxe-Fernndez, professor in the School of Political and Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico , 1996, NAFTA: The Intersection of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Capital, Social Justice, Social Justice, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (63-64), The World Today (Spring-Summer 1996), pp.63-78, Accessed: 7/29/13) From a historical perspective, this "integration process" should be seen as a fresh manifestation of the Monroe Doctrine; there is a direct link between NAFTA and the expansionist tradition of the United States. U.S. Vice President AI Gore vividly expressed this connection, urbi et orbi, when he compared NAFTA to the territorial acquisitions of Louisiana and Alaska made by the United States in the last century.3 In this century, NAFTA is not the first example of expansion and the Western Hemisphere is not the first theater for it, as we can see by studying the "Grand Area" worked out
between Franklin Roosevelt's government and the business community before and after World War II,4 or by examining other experiences linked to adaptations of Monroe-style integration, such as those deployed by German capitalism before World War II. It is worth recalling that each interventionist phase served to stave off the successive crises as they arose. Alan Milward (1986:19) has illustrated with abundant documentation that the interna? tional aspects of a controlled economy ? exchange controls and bilateral trade

treaties could easily be incorporated into an expansionist foreign policy. Fascism, the form of

capitalism that prevailed in Germany during this period, indeed set out to overcome the country's internal crisis by dividing up the world and laying claim to a "new Lebensraum" in which Germany would establish "large economic areas" under the jurisdiction of the motor economy of the "zone."5

Economic integration enhances the spectral nature of borders As the affirmative opens up space through trade, it simultaneously restricts by controlling flow and direction Palafox 2k Palafox, Jose. "Opening up borderland studies: A review of US-Mexico border militarization discourse." Social Justice

27.3 (81 (2000): 56-72. Jose Palafox, (josefox@uclink4.berkeley.edu) is a graduate student in the Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Palafox, born in Tijuana, B.C., Mexico, and raised in San Diego, California, has long been involved with border and immigrant rights groups. This is part of the author's doctoral dissertation tentatively titled: "The Open Veins of Undocumented Workers: Enforcing Global Apartheid Through U.S.-Mexico Border Boundary Policing, 1992-2000. In their devastating critique of the costly and deadly "war on drugs," Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, Peter Andreas and his coauthors show that the "war" on illicit drugs and drug-related crime actually exacerbates addiction, abuse, and "crimes" related to this underground economy. As Andreas and his colleagues point out, much of what we fear and condemn as drug-related crime is in fact the product of our drug policies, not the substances themselves (Bertram et al., 1996: 34). Similarly, Andreas successfully shows how "freetrade" market liberalization policies and increased economic integration with Mexico have fueled legal and "illegal" economic flows between both countries (see also Massey and Espinosa, 1997: 991-992). Indeed, while much of the discourse among policymakers focuses on how "free trade" facilitates legal trade and commerce, Andreas tells us that: an unintended side effect of liberal economic reforms in Latin America (deregulation, privatization, and the opening up of national markets) has been to encourage the export of illegal drugs and migrant labor. This can partly be explained by simple economic logic: opening the economy through market liberalization reduces the ability of the state to withstand external market pressures -- and the high market demand for illegal drugs and migrant labor in the U.S. is certainly no exception (1995: 6; see also 1998a: 206-207; 1996: 55). Before the passage of NAFTA, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno claimed that once passed, NAFTA would help "protect our borders" and that, a failure to pass it would make "effective immigration control...impossible." This assertion is contradicted by documents Andreas obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. According to pre-NAFTA Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) studies, the increased entrance of Mexican trucks could "prove to be a definite boon to both the legitimate food industry and drug smugglers who conceal their illegal shipments in trucks transporting fruits and vegetables from Mexico to U.S. markets" (Andreas, 2000: 75). Andreas' work (1994: 46) has suggested that the practice and

ideology of market liberalization (e.g., NAFTA) might superficially appear to be a "retreat of the state" and a form of boundary erosion, but in reality increased militarization and crossborder economic flows on the U.S.-Mexico border suggest something else. thus, it can be argued that a new function of borders in a global economy might actually be to simultaneously "open" and "close" border(s) between countries. on the U.S.- Mexico border, Andreas argues, recent
enforcement "has less to do with actual deterrence [of unauthorized migrants] and more to do with managing the border's image and coping with the deepening contradictions of economic integration" (1999a: 14, emphasis added). Andreas (1998b: 353) even argues that

border policing is a spectator sport, though the objective is to pacify rather than to inflame the passions of the spectators. His insightful examination into how recent border militarization has gone about "recrafting"

an image of control on the border encounters problems, though, by limiting investigation of border militarization to the perceptions of the spectators (Congress, the media, local residents in the border areas, and the broad public). This position does not consider the effects of

border militarization on the human rights of undocumented immigrants and fails to see the agency of immigrants. Analogies

that reduce the process of undocumented immigration (in the context of a militarized U.S.Mexico border) to "an endless game of cat-and-mouse" or "hunted vs. hunter" (Ibid.; see also Kossoudji, 1992: 159-180) problematically construct and view undocumented immigration only from the perspective of "the hunters" (see Hagan, 1998: 357-361). For human rights groups like the Arizona Border Rights

Coalition, documenting and challenging the abuses visited on undocumented immigrants by Border Patrol agents also includes monitoring the recent vigilantism by local ranchers toward would-be migrants near the Nogales and Douglas border area. Ironically, Andreas' line of argument, that U.S. border enforcement policy is flawed and not serious about thwarting unauthorized migration, is also used by antiimmigrant groups, such as the Nogales, Arizona-based "Neighborhood Ranch Watch," in their efforts to apprehend, detain, and turn "illegal" immigrants -- sometimes at gunpoint -- over to local law enforcement (see Palafox, 2000: 28-30). This discussion leads us to the work of Michael Huspek, who examines border enforcement strategies such as Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, California.

The collapse of economic barriers is followed by an influx of permanent securitization. Newman 2006, [David, Newman, Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion
University, Beer Sheba, Israel, "Progress in Human Geography 30: The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our borderless world", pp. 143161]
The USA-Canada boundary, traditionally seen as a soft boundary, has now become much more difficult to cross, while the new restrictions have made it much more difficult for illegal migrants to cross the USA-Mexico boundary (Andreas and Snyder, 2000; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Brunet-Jailly, 2004c; Nicol, 2005). The self-appointed minutemen vigilante activity which com- menced operations in 2005 demonstrates how the closing of borders has become as much a bottom-up process as it has a top- down process initiated by government, with the former feeding into the latter as part of a renewed sense of national self-defence and patriotic exclusiveness in the post-9/11 period (Ackleson, 2004; Olmedo and Sowden, 2005). Thus, contemporary studies are, once again,

focusing on the implications of the border-closing process. This includes not only the mechanics of the

process, but also the human and ethical implications of cutting off thousands of people from places of employment to the detriment of both the Mexican employees and the American employers on the other side of the border who have benefited from this source of cheap, unregistered, labour. The changing functional characteristics of the USA-Mexico boundary is a

good example of the clash between the securitization and the economic discourse in relation to borders (Andreas, 2000; Nevins, 2002; Coleman, 2004; Laitinen, 2003; Purcell and Nevins, 2004). Economic interests of the past two decades have brought about an opening of borders, with the EU and NAFTA being the two major examples of this. In contrast, the securitiza- tion discourse has brought about the closing of borders because of the perceived and constructed fears of new threats from the outside. When the two discourses clash with each other (such as in the USA-Mexico example), it is generally the securitization discourse which predominates, bringing about a reclosing of borders. Nowhere is this more apparent at the local level than in Israel/ Palestine where the recent construction of the Separation Fence/Wall in the name of security, along with the physical withdrawal (disengagement) from the Gaza Strip, has prevented Palestinians from crossing into Israel to find employment as menial labourers, serving the basic subsistence needs of the Palestinian
population.

The increased unrestricted trade at the US-Mexico border has reinforced the boundary between the two states by restricting the flow of immigrants. Cottam and Marenin 2005[Cottam, Martha and Marenin, Otwan, Washington State
University, "The Management of Border Security in NAFTA Imagery, Nationalism, and the War on Drugs"] NAFTA is the Western Hemispheres version of globalization. It envisions a free trade area that requires the relatively unrestricted movement of people, goods and services across the internal borders, ultimately leading to increased political, social, and cultural interdependence among the three member states. While the proponents of NAFTA emphasize positive economic
outcomes for the three partners, the dependence of those outcomes on open borders inevitably brings with it the prospect of greater opportunities for transnational criminal activities. The

easy movements of legal capital, services, goods and workers require less border control. Yet, at the same time, to prevent illegal flows of capital, goods, and workers, the border needs to be more fortified. And as internal economic integration strengthens, greater emphasis on controlling the common external NAFTA borders will become a significant policy issue as well. Border control is caught in a vice - control must be exercised to prevent illegal trans-1212 border acts but legal

commercial and people traffic cannot be brought to a halt. The examination of the responses of the NAFTA

partners to this reality at their national borders is the topic of this paper. We argue that an appropriate and effective balance between opening and fortifying the borders, enabling and preventing traffic simultaneously, will only be achieved through coordinated and cooperative security and law enforcement policies by governments and agencies on both sides of the C-US and M-US borders. Specifically, we ask whether law enforcement cooperation at the internal borders of NAFTA will follow similar paths at the Canada-US and Mexico-US borders and will lead to the development of a common external NAFTA border control policy. We argue that the answer is no or not likely to both questions. Canada-United States (C-US) and Mexico-United States (MUS) border relations have long yet very different histories The C-US border is often proclaimed, by both sides, as the longest, peaceful, undefended border in the world. In contrast, the M-US border region has experienced a contentious and often violent history; it has been, in Schmidts (1997: 300) succinct summation, an ecosystem for violence as a consequence of being removed form direct governmental supervision and a lack of law enforcement by the centers of power. The creation of NAFTA incorporated two bi-lateral borders which have faced and will face distinctly different problems for police cooperation, and created a political, organizational and perceptual overlay on former bilateral relations which have had a profoundly different character (Zagaris, 1995-96, 1996). The conventional explanation for the disparate histories of the borders stresses the differences in objective, functional needs and conditions - the extent of trafficking in controlled goods, massive undocumented immigration and people smuggling, security threats to the partners (but mainly the USA) - which are so fundamental that contrasting patterns of crossborder relations at the strategic or policy level and among security and police agencies are a natural outcome.

The balance of open and closed borders within NAFTA, under this view, reflects the conflicting interests in economic trade and protection against trans-border threats. At the C-US border, economic interests have outbalanced threats, at least until post 9-11, leading to fairly open borders and cooperative relations, while at the M-US border economic interests (which are large) have been counterbalanced by the greater levels of all trans-border threats, leading to a more fortified border and less cooperation (e.g., Andreas, 2000; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003). This conventional explanation is insufficient for it leaves out the power of imagery and the force of nationalism, the way the three partners see each other through perceptual and affective lenses which shape definitions of and responses to problems. The dissimilar approach by the US to trans-border

threats at the internal NAFTA borders has not been a result of rational responses to divergent functional conditions (threats to the integrity of the borders); rather, the assessment by the US of both needs and policy goals have been and will continue to be filtered through imagery and stereotypes of self and others which have hardened into conventional understandings. The capacity to protect the border and the cooperate in security arrangements has been judged by different standards. From the US perspective, Mexico, perceived as the colonial child, cannot be trusted and dealt with in the same manner as Canada, the ally and cousin of the family (Gibbins, 1997; Schmidt, 1997).1 The influence of imagery also complicates the cooperation among law enforcement agencies required to properly balance freedom of legal movement with control of illegal 122122 activities. The impact of nationalistic sentiments and associated images and stereotypes of each other, and underlying assessments of the nature, character, credibility, capability and will of self and other, profoundly affect the possibilities of linkages and cooperation. Images develop independently of border threats but once formed will constrain and distort the capacity to create cooperative and cordial relations among the agencies joined in the mutual tasks of controlling a border. Over time, differences in police cooperation at the two internal (to NAFTA) borders may lessen but, given the contrasting histories of the borders, and the perceptual imagery, competing nationalistic sentiments, policy differences and distinct functional problems associated with those histories, such differences will not disappear soon. The coalescence of imagery and threats at the Canada-US border will continue to lead to cooperative and cordial relations; at the Mexico-US border imagery and threats combine to frustrate efforts to cooperate, leading instead to tensions, recriminations and failure. Yet as Papademetriou noted in Congressional hearings, NAFTA can only succeed as one economic system if the internal borders are treated similarly and partners are equally trusted to defend the external borders (U.S. Congress, 1999). This will only happen if imagery changes, and that will be a long process. Border

policing, everywhere, presents unique and complicated challenges to law enforcement agencies, for normal concerns about order maintenance and crime control are overlaid, distorted and constrained by claims of sovereignty, the flux of foreign policy priorities, the dynamics of threats and needs, and mutual perceptions of each others' intentions, capabilities, and credibility. Responding to problems of transnational crime, disorder and security threats raises issues lacking in purely domestic law enforcement (e.g.,
Anderson, 1996; Davis, 1997; Hills, 2003; Marx, 1997; Snow, 1997). Although this paper mentions a variety of law 122 enforcement issues at both borders, the focus is on cooperation in the war on drugs. Drug trafficking is not the only border control issue, yet it allows us to examine more precisely the intersections of policy preferences, imagery and functional threats as these affect the capacity for police cooperation. We present our argument in three sections: a description of threats to the internal borders; mutual imagery; and patterns of police cooperation at both borders.

The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement turned Mexico into yet another casualty of American expansionism. This can be compared to the fascist economic policies of Nazi Germany in WW2 Saxe-Fernndez, Professor and Senior Researcher at the Faculty of Political Sciences - National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1996 [John, NAFTA: The Intersection of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Capital, Social Justice, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (63-64),
The World Today (Spring-Summer 1996), pp. 63-78]

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) "is reminiscent of an earlier era, when mother countries such as England offered preferential trade terms, or Commonwealth preferences, to their former colonies in order to ensure their continued economic, financial, and political dependence.... The motives of the [U.S.] government with regard to Mexico certainly remind us of those of the British Empire." This was written by Robert Kuttner in Business Week in mid-1991. At that time the intersection of U.S. "geoeconomics and geopolitics," as it would affect North America and the rest of the Western Hemisphere was already apparent. The idea was to "integrate" a Third World country of Latin America, a country that at the time of this writing is still officially known as the United States of Mexico into the larger economy of North America.1 Few Mexican citizens were aware that not only some of the constitutional principles established more than 150 years

ago, but also crucial elements of the exercise of "jurisdiction" normally associated with the concept of the nation-state were at stake in the "negotiations" preceding the eventual implementation of NAFTA. More specifically, I refer to the "total" transformation of the "economic geography" (which covers not only trade, but also finance, industry, infrastructure, and agriculture) of North America, to the detriment of the "public interest" of Mexico and that of the other countries involved. The consequences will be especially costly and damaging for the formal wage-earning sector, whether blue- or white-collar. This sweeping transformation has been orchestrated mainly to cater to "U.S. private interests"2 and it entails a "geopolitics" that also serves large corporate interests. Both the geopolitics and the geoeconomics have been codified through the commercial, financial, geopolitical, and jurisdictional instruments developed by the most powerful of the three nations concerned during the process that culminated in the signing of NAFTA. From a historical perspective, this "integration process" should be seen as a fresh manifestation of the Monroe Doctrine; there is a direct link between NAFTA and the expansionist tradition of the United States. U.S. Vice President AI Gore vividly expressed this connection, urbi et orbi, when he compared NAFTA to the territorial acquisitions of Louisiana and Alaska made by the United States in the last century.3 In this century, NAFTA is not the first example of expansion and the Western Hemisphere is not
the first theater for it, as we can see by studying the "Grand Area" worked out between Franklin Roosevelt's government and the business community before and after World War II,4 or by examining other experiences linked to adaptations of Monroe-style integration, such as those deployed by German capitalism before World War II. It is worth recalling that each interventionist phase served to stave off the successive crises as they arose. Alan Milward (1986:19) has illustrated with abundant documentation that

the international aspects of a controlled economy exchange controls and bilateral trade treaties could easily be incorporated into an expansionist foreign policy. Fascism, the form of capitalism that prevailed in Germany during this period, indeed set out to overcome the country's internal crisis by dividing up the world and laying claim to a "new Lebensraum" in which Germany would establish "large economic areas" under the
jurisdiction of the motor economy of the "zone."5

NAFTA turned Mexico into a base to increase American hegemony in the region. This turned Latin America into the U.S.s new order that does nothing but further the spread of globalization and imperialist policies Saxe-Fernndez, Professor and Senior Researcher at the Faculty of Political Sciences - National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1996 [John, NAFTA: The Intersection of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Capital, Social Justice, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (63-64),
The World Today (Spring-Summer 1996), pp. 63-78] The crux of the matter is, therefore, that

the economic and geopolitical designs codified in NAFTA make Mexico a launch pad for a greater U.S. presence in the hemisphere . Mexico also becomes the pivot at the center of a global model. Henry Kissinger has argued that because of European and Japanese hesitance to submit to U.S. hegemony, the "new order" may be achieved in Latin America first. Kissinger expects that NAFTA and its hemispheric extension through the Initiative for the Americas (both endorsed by Clinton) will form the backbone of a New International Order. In this perspective, this highly asymmetric model is, therefore, to be globalized. It is an unbalanced, ill-conceived, and poorly negotiated structure that responds to the short-run interests of U.S. business to the exclusion of other "national public interests." It has
much in common with the Treaty of Versailles, as shown by serious examinations of the various phases and economic "orders" set up since the Great War.9 From a global perspective, NAFTA has disturbing features. Not only does it codify

and formalize the interests of transnational capital, and the abysmal imbalances between Mexico and the United States, but it is also riddled with the structural and global contradictions that have flourished so strongly in the aftermath of the Cold War. Insecurity, instability, fragmentation, and political and economic polarizations will necessarily become more acute, at the national and international levels ? especially if the Clinton administration uses NAFTA as a battering ram with which to impose a globalization model centered on "U.S. private interests" and internationalizes the contradictions implicit in this intersection of the geoeconomics and the geopolitics of U.S. capital.10 The Democratic administration has continued to design a "political and economic geography" for North America in accordance with immediate interests and with no checks on the belligerent, slothful tendencies of the

monopolies, by devising a "Grand Area." The geopolitical boundaries of this area, which were drawn by the Republicans, hark back

to old habits of hemispheric depredation and were merely renewed in the wake of the 1980s' debt crisis. This crisis made tributary economies of anything south of the border and it now culminates in NAFTA. Clinton's maneuvering to get NAFTA approved by Congress led to a split down the middle of the Democratic Party, when 156 of 258 Democratic representatives voted against the agreement. Following the passage of NAFTA, Democratic Representative Mary Kaptur accused Clinton of having become "Wall Street's candidate." At that decisive conjuncture, Clinton had backed down on an issue critical to Democratic representatives and senators who were loyal to unions, environmental groups, African American urban organizations, and vast sectors of the middle classes threatened by unemployment and falling incomes. Still, when it comes time for Clinton to make even more important decisions, the bankers and Kissingers, who so applauded him on NAFTA, are unlikely to stand by him in the electoral process of 1996. The schism within the Democratic Party is the result of the social structure and dynamics of the United States and its crises; hence, this division will not be breached quite as the White House would wish. The outright abandonment of the "grass roots" has created a climate of class antago? nism not seen since the social upheavals of the 1930s.

NAFTA represents the latest attempt by the US to tear down the border and spread neoliberalism Fernandez and Massey 7-( Patricia Fernndez-Kelly & Douglas S. Massey, professor of
sociology at Princeton, Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University , Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 610, NAFTA andBeyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007),pp. 98-118, Accessed: 7/28/13) Borders are neither natural nor fixed phenomena; they come and go in response to political and economic transformations. Most national boundaries were established less than two centuries ago. In 1985, the worlds total number of sovereign states was roughly 180; but over the next decade, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, that number grew to 202. Africa is filled with borders imposed as
part of colonial domination or redrawn after wars of independence, which often run through populations with shared traditions and history. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents the latest attempt to tear down

barriers to capital mobility, even as territorial demarcations were tightened for workers. Whether tangible or not, the drawing of borders always exposes hierarchies of power and authority. In this article we analyze the enforcement of boundaries under NAFTA. We argue that neoliberal economic policies were applied throughout Latin America to solve financial problems precipitated by the external debt crisis of the 1980s. During the 1970s, North American banks were awash in petrodollars. Desperate to find profitable investments, they made what were perceived to be secure loans to Latin American governments to finance development projects under import substitution industrialization (ISI). Ultimately, however, many countries were unable to repay these loans, and U.S. banks and federal many countries were unable to repay these loans, and U.S. banks and federal officials turned to NAFTA as a means of transforming risk into opportunity.

NAFTA sought to break down the border and facilitate neoliberal ideas of trade and capital to flow while oppressing the Mexican people Fernandez and Massey 7-(Patricia Fernndez-Kelly & Douglas S. Massey, professor of
sociology at Princeton, Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University , Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 610, NAFTA andBeyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007),pp. 98-118, Accessed: 7/28/13) Thus, the purpose of NAFTA was not merely to facilitate trade and open markets, but to expand opportunities for capital investment. The treaty paid little attention to worker mobility, in striking contrast to the European Union, which made labor central to the broader process of market integration. The
consolidation of European markets was effected by multilateral policies designed to harmonize social policies, equalize economic infrastructures, and guarantee worker rights and mobility within the trade zone. In contrast, NAFTA omitted these pro

visions, and its U.S. backers instead insisted on the unilateral right to prevent Mexican workers from migrating through restrictive border policies. The result of this contradiction was a lopsided

process of development in North America, in which rising

capital mobility and growing U.S. investment south of the border coincided with repressive efforts to limit the cross-border movement of Mexicans, although the number of workers seeking opportunities in the United States had increased as a result of NAFTA. The privatization of Mexico's collective farms under neoliberalism and the elimination of agricultural subsidies under NAFTA also increased the number of displaced peasants seeking economic opportunities elsewhere. The combination of continued pressures for emigration and increasingly restrictive border policies had a profound effect on patterns and processes of Mexico-U.S. migration. Although migrants continued to arrive at the border and cross into the United States, they did not return to Mexico in the same numbers as before. Instead, unauthorized migrants reduced cyclical movements to spare themselves the greater costs and risks of reentry after 1986. The reduction in return migration led, in turn, to unprecedented accretions to the Mexican population living north of the border. We conclude by offering concrete recommendations to rationalize U.S. immigration policy in the context of the economic
integration that is occurring under NAFTA.

Terrorism
Increasing border security in the name of the war on terror opens the floodgate of rapid militarization despite the fact that no weapon has ever been found to cross it. Ackleson 05 Ackleson, Jason. "Constructing security on the USMexico border." Political Geography 24.2 (2005): 165-184. Jason
Ackelson has a Ph.D. from London School of Economics and Political Science, Co-Director, and a co-director at NMSU Border Security Research Group and Frontier Interdisciplinary Experiences Program and a Policy Analyst at the Office of Policy and Strategy, Research and Evaluation Division, and US Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Fighting terrorism along the border has become both a national-security objective and a justification to continue and expand 1990s-style border security policies that primarily targeted migrants and drugs. Increasingly, as Bigo (2002) has pointed out, the lines of internal and external security continue to blur. Now military deployment internally (formally an external security concern) appears to be an open option. The tie was made, for instance, in October 2001 by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He argued that it might be desirable to give federal troops more of a role in domestic policing to prevent more terrorist acts: In certain cases we can do more than anyone else in the country because of the special capabilities that we have (Wolfowitz, 2001). Those roles could be varied, such as helping local law

enforcement in the event of a terrorist attack to patrolling the nations borders to nab undocumented migrants (Swarns, 2004b: A14). A new willingness to engage the military is evident among some law enforcement officials in the borderlands.8 Moreover, parallel internal security efforts are
being undertakendin states such as Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Colorado, and Virginia dto empower police to be immigration agents (Swarns, 2004a, 2004b: A14). As Joe Greene, assistant commissioner of investigations for the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service put it, this is a big deal, its revolutionary.theres a role in homeland security for an appropriate mix of the INS with the support of local and state law enforcement officials (Branom, 2002). In August 2004, the Department of Homeland security gave Customs and Border Protection officers expanded powers of expedited removal, e.g., deporting undocumented workers within 100

miles of the international border without a hearing (Koring, 2004: A2; Swarns, 2004a). While this has been a fairly common practice for Mexican citizens at ports-of-entry, the new powers extend to other nationalities and deeper into the United States. These two developments underscore the contention here about the gradual merging of societal and state security in the U.S. vis-a` -vis the border and defined threats. Furthermore, we can see a blending of the construction of threat in transnational undocumented migrant flows and the border as conduit for terrorism. While this
blending occurred occasionally in the 1990sdparticularly in the wake of the events of 1993dtoday it is of course much more pronounced (Nevins, 2002). The newly established Department of Homeland Security, for example, has

placed border security high on its agenda, and in its discourse has now linked migration and terrorism. In Ridges action plan which outlines border strategy, the border is described as a a conduit for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migrants, contraband, and other unlawful commodities.The new threats and opportunities of the 21st century demand a new approach to border management (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2002). As the plan goes on: America requires a border management system that keeps pace with expanding trade while protecting the United States and its territories from the threats of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, illegal drugs, and other contraband. Bushs guest worker program, as it is currently constructed, can in fact be seen to fit into a national security rationale of electronically documenting all foreign nationals to try and screen out threats. Along with additional material resources, Ridge has indicated he is willing to deploy the military as well as more technology as solutions to create, in his words, a seamless border. What and how this could be achieved remains to be seen; it appears it will take the form of the Smart Borders program: technological solutions designed to quickly screen out terrorists and WMDs while at the same time facilitating the movement of legitimate goods and people (Ackleson, 2003). However, as Ridge (2004a) has himself conceded, we cant guarantee a foolproof system. On an alternative discursive level, the use of the U.S. military on the border has some borderland residents worried they will become casualties in the new war on terrorism. Approximately 1600
military personal were deployed following the attacks, including assets to assist in air patrols and intelligence-gathering operations (Tedford, 2002). This has brought renewed concern among some border residents of

militarization, the kind that tragically ended the life of an American citizen in 1997 (Smith, 1998).

Some groups, particularly

ethnic minorities, remain concerned about civil liberties violations. Ultimately, the open question of what happens to the border should another terrorist attack occur remains a daunting prospect. Despite lingering questions, in the final analysis, the U.S. is constructing the border as a security threat and in the process projecting an image that its measures are working. As one Department of Homeland Security official put it, Heightened security at our land border crossings has provided a strong defense against terrorists seeking entry into the U.S. through our ports-of-entry (Fasano, 2002). Returning to the tension identified earlier in the paper, the Department of Homeland Security has at the same time recently indicated no chemical materials, explosives, or terrorists have yet to be seized at the U.S.Mexico border since 9/11 (Gilot, 2003).9

Crossing the border is an ontological experience. War on Terror discourse turns friendly borders into leaky borders, and the securitization of borders categorize individuals as inadmissible, detainee, or deportable. Bhandar, 8 (Davina, Trent University, Canadian Studies, Faculty Member, Resistance,
Detainment, Asylum: The Onto-Political Limits of Border Crossing in North America in War, Citizenship, Territory, Chapter 13) Inadmissible, deportable, undesirable, terrorist, no-fly list: all of these categories exist on a continuum that marks the border crosser. Crossing borders, even the borders that are understood to be friendly, often reveals the production of differentiated racial ontologies of immigrant/migrant communities situated within nation-states. The experience of border crossing is an ontological one whereby both the technologies used in border security and the mode of securitization are understood to have a profound effect on the immigrant and migrant communities within nation-states. In North America, as well as other securitized regions, the coupling of racial profiling strategies and the renewed politics of nationalizing identity as a response to the War on Terror has revealed the extent of the racial ontological formation of border crossing. With the manifestation of the War on Terror, scholarship has focused on questions regarding the limitations of civil liberties, the limits to human rights, and changes in legal and extrajudicial processes. While it is important to note the particular shifts and changes that have been brought about through national security policies, domestic policing, and border control agendas, it is also necessary to question the relation of the present to the past. In the context of border control in North America, and specifically the border shared between Canada and the United States, the public image of this friendly border has radically altered through the War on Terror discourse. What was once regarded as a friendly border has become a leaky border and a suspect border. Canadian media have reported on the resistance of Canadians to the compulsory use of passports or national identity cards to travel to the United States (Globe and Mail 2006). This national representation of the border is somewhat disturbing to me, and I think it reveals the historical vestige of this border crossing. For many migrants and nonwhite immigrants, the experience of crossing this border is not necessarily so friendly. In the first half of the twentieth century in both Canada and the United States, Asian and South Asian migrants faced insidious forms of
passports (Torpey 2000). In this context,

surveillance and 404 management through rigid forms of border controls including the introduction of identification certificates predating the instantiation of

it is important to examine how contemporary regressive border control mechanisms, such as racial profiling, have indeed shaped and informed the development of the shared border between Canada and the United States. In turn, these processes have shaped a racial ontological condition in both Canada and the United States. Formal and informal practices of border controls regulate the mobility of citizens, nationals, and noncitizens in distinct ways. In the case of crossing borders, identity and the condition of being human comprise a highly categorized experience. Various technologies of border crossing, such as picture identification, retina eye scans, human thermal recognition, and the constitution of detailed personal data, determine the state of being human in numerous public contexts. Border technologies permit the state to substantiate the ontological status of a person who is subjected to modes of categorization, such as inadmissible, deportable, detainee, or terrorist suspect. Through the acts of
detainment, deportation, and imprisonment, the condition of being human is rearticulated, as the act of crossing borders is taking on greater significance in the intensive securitization of borders. By viewing border crossings as a racial ontological practice, I am not only investigating how borders act as a technology of self, identification, and subjection, but also showing how the border is present in the day-to-day lives of border crossers. Is it possible that by examining border crossings as a racialized ontological practice, the extension of the border into the day-to-day lives of border crossers is made evident? By viewing the crossing of borders as a racial ontological practice, in which ways has national identity been rearticulated through the management of borders? In the present context of the securitization and militarization of North American borders, what significance do racial profiling and racial targeting play, and how does this affect the

ideological and policy manifestation of multiculturalism and cultural plurality? I examine the racial ontology of border crossing to highlight the multiple ways in which the human condition is reorganized by border control mechanism1 and by nation-state processes in this present period of militarized imperialism otherwise known as the War on Terror. The border separating the United States of America from Canada is popularly imagined as the worlds greatest undefended border or as a friendly border dividing two great neighbors (Drache 2004; Laxer). Until recently, crossing this border was paid little attention in the public political and cultural sensibilities in either the Canadian or American perspectives. The border, which is the conduit of something in the realm of $1.3 billion of two-way daily trading (Andreas 2006, 10), hassomewhat remarkablybeen understood in the public discourse as something 405 unremarkable and uneventful.2 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington and the ensuing proclamation of an endless War on Terror which has come to define American and Canadian foreign policy, this border has been produced somewhat differently in the public imagination. Rather than a friendly border, Canada has come under suspicion from the United States rega rding its domestic immigration and refugee policies. Canadas national character as a multicultural, tolerant, and plural nation is questioned. This suspicion has resulted in a newly emer gent sense of risk regarding Canadas shared border with the United States of America. The

internalization of fear produces an experience or ontology of race in a very particular way in the subject who is surveyed. This does not simply help produce the Islamic fundamentalist, the inadmissible, or the deportee, but, rather, security and surveillance borrowed from the border and deployed in the subject produce ontological effects. The effects may range from the feeling of not belonging or of being external to the nation-project, to being forcibly made external, policed, and detained. Such effects can be demonstrated in the case of Maher Arar, in his self-restricted movement, stateproduced immobility, and general paralysis of identity (discussed below). Securitization is also dependent on a circulation of fear that externally manifests itself as new border regulations and forms of detainment and control. Fear of this kind is ontologized in the form of border guards and border detainees.
But this border and detention are forms of ontology that have also been exported to the internal limits of citizenship and the immigrants, police, and newcomers who practice that limit on a day-to-day basis. This

is the onto-connection to the war on terror.

Transportation Security
The system of transportation necessitated by trade and globalization creates a violent networked border Walters 6 [William, Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Carleton University, Ph.D. from York, Border/Control,
European Journal of Social Theory 9(2)]
The case of road haulage is particularly interesting in this regard. If

it is the case that cross-border trucking had recently emerged as a key pathway for clandestine migrants and refugees seeking to enter the UK from continental Europe, then carrier sanctions have sought to turn the truck and its entire routeway into a dispersed, mobile border. The nature of air travel largely precludes the possibility of clandestine migration. At the airport its largely a matter
of training airline staff in the techniques of document inspection the verification of identity. But with trucking its much more a question of detecting hidden bodies. To this end, the UK immigration service now provides companies and their staff with detailed instructions on what we might call the securitization of the truck and its milieu (UK Immigration Service, 2004). The

very surface of the truck is to be made impermeable to unauthorized entry. The outer fabric on the vehicle is to be suitably resistant to cutting open. All external storage compartments are to be secured with seals and padlocks.
Drivers and their supervisors are to be trained in the responsibilities and procedures of regularly inspecting their own vehicles, especially when stopping en route at petrol stations and restaurants. Similarly, scanners

and CO2 detectors are to be used to mechanically see and smell every recess within the vehicle. Can we say that with road haulage we have moved beyond even the situation where
the UK relocates its borders to the desks of its overseas embassies and consulates, where visas are issued, or the check-in areas of airports in distant countries? Once applied to road haulage, the

entire road transportation system becomes a kind of networked border. The border transforms into a mobile, noncontiguous zone materializing at the very surface of the truck and every place it stops. If the 1980s saw Europes routeways identified and re-imagined as one of its foremost Trans-European Networks, an instrument to positively integrate Europe along new spatial and social axes (Barry, 1996), then carrier sanctions and the many little practices this policy insinuates into the everyday conduct of transportation and commerce aspire to project a regime of surveillance into the very capillaries of these same networks. The project becomes one of TransEuropean networks of control. It would be misleading to consider remote control as a recent invention. Zolberg dates the emergence of remote control to 1924 (1999: 756) when, in response to the perception of uncontrolled immigration from Europe and human chaos at its great ports, the US federal government put in place a system requiring all foreign nationals coming from overseas to produce an entry visa prior to boarding a US-bound vessel. Similarly, it would be mistaken to see remote control as though it were the expression of some kind of
social or technological logic; as though the border were simply one more setting where the inexorable tendency of the control society works itself out. Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) point to an interplay

of quite specific political logics that underpin the spread of remote control today. These include a desire on the part of Western governments to intercept refugees before they have an opportunity to activate human rights claims within the territory. But they also include a concern to decongest border crossings in the interests of further liberalizing and accelerating circuits of transnational tourism, trade and production.

Identity Politics Link

Using ID politics for social movements recreates sovereign power since the borders of the state created those identities- destabilizing the system comes first Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 141)
Following Agamben's claim referred to earlier, that it is by

starting from this uncertain terrain and from this opaque zone of indistinction that today we must once again find the path of another politics, of another body, of another world, Edkins and Pin-Fat argue that strategies for contesting sovereign power cannot consist of a call for a reinstatement of classical politics, a reinstatement of the distinction between zo and bios.44 In other words, it will not do for any such contestation to find its basis in the very logic it is trying to overcome. Edkins emphasises that identity politics, associated with social movements, for instance, would reappropriate rather than displace that flawed logic.45 This is because, as she explains, identity-based claims ultimately work within the same horizon as sovereign power: such a claim is a demand for inclusion in or recognition by the state, (p.141) not a claim that contests or disrupts the notions of inclusion and exclusion upon which sovereign power depends.46 Rather, what is required is a displacement of the logic that might tie resistance back to sovereign politics: If a
logic of sovereign power is identified that relies for its very operation on the production and organisation of bare life as a form of life that is hospitable to its operation, then it is in a sense obvious that a challenge to sovereignty might be framed in

terms of a refusal or destabilisation of that very form of life itself.47

Different identities are constructed from separate cultural, ethnic, social, and economic boundaries. Newman 2006, [David, Newman, Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion
University, Beer Sheba, Israel, "Progress in Human Geography 30: The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our borderless world", pp. 143161] Another major focus of border studies during the past decade is the relationship between borders and identity formation (Leimgruber, 1991; Falah and Newman, 1995; Paasi, 1995; 1996; 1999a; Berdahl, 1997;

Ackleson, 1999; Wilson and Donnan, 1998; Donnan and Wilson, 1999; Knippenberg and Markusse, 1999; Klemencic, 2000; Albert et al., 2001; Brown, 2001; Agnew, 2002; Kaplan and Hakli, 2002; Meinhof, 2002; Migdal, 2002). The opening of bor- ders does

not, automatically, result in the hybridization of ethnic and national identity. Separate identities are dependent on the existence of group categorization, be they religious, cultural, economic, social or ethnic. Ethnicity remains a key determinant of group affiliation, inclusion and exclusion, while the removal, or opening, of the borders does not necessarily or automatically trans- form a member of a national State into a European, or global, citizen.
Even if we have become more mobile and find it easier to cross the boundaries that previously hindered our movement, most of us retain strong ethnic or national affiliations and loyalties, be they territorial-focused or group affiliations (Sigurdson, 2000). The global access to cyberspace and the unhindered spatial dissemination of information and knowledge has, paradoxically, engendered a national identity among diaspora populations which have previously been remote and - dislocated from their places (or parents places) of origin, but who are now possessed with more information, and greater ease of access, to the ancestral (sic) homelands, and identify with the causes and struggles of the ethnic or national groups in faraway places. Language remains the one great boundary which, for so many of us, remains difficult to cross, in the absence of a single, global, borderless form of communication. Scale has also figured

prominently in much of the recent border literature. There has been a geographical refocusing of the border away from the level of the State, down to internal regions, municipalities and neigh- bourhoods (Lunden and Zalamans, 2001). We live in a world of scale hierarchies, where different borders affects our daily life prac- tices at one and the same time (Blatter, 2001). Many towns and cities, which are normally perceived as constituting single functional entities, are divided along the national and State borders, the degree of transboundary coordination and integration contingent upon the nature of political and power relations between the two sides (Bucken- Knapp, 2001; Buursink, 2001; Matthiesen and Burkner, 2001). At the

most micro of scales, anthropologists remind us of the personal, often invisible to the eye, borders,

which determine our daily life practices to a much greater extent than do national boundaries across which the majority of the global population do not even cross once in their lifetime (Alvarez, 1995).

Alternatives

General
Place and boundaries have a connection to our view of everyday life. Assessing its influence allows us to question capitalism, modernity, and Eurocentric thought. Escobar 2001 (Arturo, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization Political Geography 20) The question of place has been newly raised in recent years from a variety of perspectives placelessness has become the essential feature of the modern condition, and a very acute and painful one in many cases, such as those of exiles and refugees. Whether celebrated or decried, the sense of atopia
(Dirlik, 2000); or debates

from its relation to the basic understanding of being and knowing to its fate under globalization and the extent to which it continues to be an aid or a hindrance for thinking about culture and the economy. This questioning, of course, is not coincidental; for some,

seems to have settled in. This seems to be as true of discussions in philosophy, where place has been ignored by most thinkers (Casey 1993, 1997); theories of globalization, that have effected a significant discursive erasure of place

in anthropology, which have seen a radical questioning of place and place making. Yet the fact remains that place continues to be important in the lives of many people, perhaps most, if we understand by place the experience of a particular location with some measure of groundedness (however, unstable), sense of boundaries (however, permeable), and connection to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed, traversed by power, and never fixed. There is an implacement that counts for more than we want to acknowledge, which makes one ponder if the idea of
getting back into place to use Caseys expression or a defense of place as project in Dirliks case are not so irrelevant after all2. To be sure, the critique of place in anthropology, geography, communications, and cultural studies of recent times has been both productive and important, and continues to be so. New spatial concepts and metaphors of mobility

deterritorialization, displacement, diaspora, migration, traveling, border-crossings, nomadology, etc. have made us aware of the fact that the principal dynamics of culture and economy have been significantly altered by unprecedented global processes. Yet there has been a certain asymmetry in these debates. As Arif Dirlik argues (Dirlik 1998, 2000), this asymmetry is most evident
in discourses of globalization, where the global is often equated with space, capital, history and agency, and the local with place, labor, and tradition. Place has dropped out of sight in the globalization craze of recent years, and this

erasure of place has profound consequences for our understanding of culture, knowledge, nature, and economy. It is perhaps time to reverse some of this asymmetry by focusing anew and from the perspective
and alterity, since both place and space are crucial in this regard, as they are in the creation of forms of domination. It does

afforded by the critiques of place themselves on the continued vitality of place and place-making for culture, nature, and economy. Restoring some measure of symmetry, as we shall see, does not entail an erasure of space as a domain of resistance

mean, however, a questioning of the privilege accorded to space in analyses of the dynamics of culture, power, and economy. This is, indeed, an increasingly felt need of those working at the intersection of

environment, culture and development, despite the fact that the development experience has meant for most people a sundering of local life from place of greater depth than ever before. Not only are scholars and activists in environmental studies confronted with social movements that commonly maintain a strong reference to place and territory, but faced with the growing realization that any alternative course of action must take into account place-based models of nature, culture, and politics. While it is evident that local economies and culture are not outside the scope of capital and modernity, it also needs to be newly acknowledged that the former are not produced exclusively by the latter; this place specificity, as we shall see, enables a different reading of culture and

economy, capitalism and modernity. The inquiry into place is of equal importance for renewing the critique of eurocentrism in the conceptualizaton of world regions, area studies, and cultural diversity. The marginalization of place in European social theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been particularly deleterious to those social formations for which placebased modes of consciousness and practices have continued to be important. This includes many contemporary societies, perhaps with the exception of those most exposed to the de-localizing, disembedding and universalizing influence of modern economy, culture and thought. The reassertion of place thus appears as an important arena for rethinking and reworking eurocentric forms of analysis.

The alt is a criticism the flawed notion that borders are marked by territorial boundariesonly way to put limits on power Jerrems 11-(Ari Jerrems, Universidad Autnoma de Madrid graduate, ph.d contender , 2011,
BOOK REVIEW of Border Politics: The Limits of SovereignPower by Nick Vaughan-Williams, Borderlands VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1, 2011, Accessed: 7/27/13) Critical approaches tend to avoid treating borders as a stable reality. tienne Balibar indicates that to define or identify in general is nothing more than the creation of a border (2005, p. 77). Therefore, we may regard the border not as the territorial separation between two political identities but rather the point where one entity differs from another. The process of continually defining and identifying borders points to an ever changing and unstable reality. Borders should be studied not by their appearance but rather by an appearing or bordering process (Deleuze 2008, p. 22). It is during
this appearing process that a phenomenon acquires retrospectively the sense of being there (Foucault 2009, p. 79). Michel F oucault maintains that bodies, couples, races, species or borders are never completely closed off. Rather it is through their constant redefining that they are given sense (2009, p. 83). Hence

borders should not be taken as an assumption that can be simply described as absent or present. Any analysis should concentrate on how continual practices bring them into existence. As such, bordering is not restricted to the territorial separation understood as the limit of the Nation-State. A common critical argument is that borders have not disappeared, rather they are being found at sites that Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams state are increasingly ephemeral and/or impalpable: electronic, non-visible, and located in zones that defy straightforwardly territorial logic (2009, p. 583). In Border Politics Vaughan-Williams attempts to defy territorial logic in his reworking of the border concept, claiming that borders are no longer at the territorial border by focusing on the bordering process. Nevertheless, his efforts achieve mixed results as they appear to narrow analysis exclusively to state power whilst excluding other possible border sites. This essay will discuss the limitations of VaughanWilliams work and propose alternative ways of understanding the bordering process.

Analyzing the way states re-inscribe borders is fundamental to broader understandings of their political structures Parker and Addler-Nissen 12, Department of Political Science at the University of
Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012 [Noel and Rebecca, Picking and Choosing the Sovereign Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660582] Whether to have some kind of border or not cannot be the choice, as borders for states are precondition for the possibility of choice. Why that should be so thorny for them has been recently articulated with a Derridian insight by Nick Vaughan-Williams.23 States are perpetually embroiled in biopoli- tics by their efforts to control human persons through their domination of territory. Under the heading of

Alternative border imaginaries, this leads Vaughan-Williams to evince a concept of the generalized biopolitical border, primarily in the light of Agambens account of the fundamental biopolitical nature of state sovereignty. But this is pursued with a take on all discriminations, derived from Derridas early work24 that of Agamben included. In Derridas deconstructivist understanding, no discrimination of any kind can be nal. If states are involved in combining government of territory together with government of persons, then they cannot rest content with any established determination of their borders as nal. States cannot live without borders, but cannot

afford to abandon the business of determining and re-determining borders. So, rather than looking at any supposed state decision to have bor- ders, we should be looking for variations in articulations of the borders that states make. An analytically powerful point of departure would be the dif- ferent materials, physical as well as symbolic, that need to be drawn upon in any determination of borders. In a word, we should study the ways in which states inscribe their borders. We make the categorisation of planes that follows for analytical purposes. This is a limited set of more-or-less independent elds, which need to be examined separately to get a purchase on the different ways that states can pick their borders. These planes, we contend, provide a grid through which we can understand bordering prac- tices by states. In short, a states choices concern which planes to inscribe their borders upon, and how to formulate inscriptions that will be read as intended by the various addressees inside and outside.

Socially constructed categories appear to have a definite inside and outside. Recognizing the lack of intrinsic meaning to the categories and emphasizing the spatiality of the boundary-making process disrupt their fixity. Jones 10
(Reese, Associate Professor and Chair of Graduate Studies Department of Geography University of Hawaii at Manoa, March 31, 2010 The spatiality of boundaries Progress in Human Geography) The boundary-making process that creates group identity categories serves as a useful example that demonstrates the commonality of our approaches, and also the utility of incorporating the categories are containers metaphor and emphasizing the inchoateness of boundaries. The durability and persistence of group identity categories like ethnicity, race, and nation is confounding for constructivist or poststructural critiques. These categories are widely understood in scholarly work as modern social constructions, imagined communities, or perspectives-ontheworld not things-in-the-world (Anderson, 1991; Brubaker, 2002; Brubaker et al., 2004). Nevertheless, in practice, they continue to operate as if they are real things and they shape many peoples everyday lives and experiences. Even in academic work, these categories are used in ways that reproduce and institutionalize them. As Brubaker (2002) suggests, even while recognizing the historical contingency of a category like
Bangladeshi (Jones, 2008), when we use the category the Bangladeshis it operates as if it refers to a homogenous group with common practices and objectives. This is problematic because group connotations obscure who is narrating and

practicing the category and for what aims. This is not to say that identity categories are invented out of thin air; they are not. They are based on a multitude of historical events, narratives, and practices. Difference exists in the world. What is unfixed is the precise ways in which the current sets of categories are organized, as Abbott (1995) would say, how the locations of difference were linked together through boundaries. The categories we use to understand the world are not intrinsic or essential; they are all the result of boundary-making narratives and practices that reify, naturalize, and fetishize the category as a thing-in-the- world. By recognizing the metaphor of categories are containers, we can gain further
insight into why identity categories operate based on notions of inclusion and exclusion and why they are effectively territorialized. In the metaphor, the category has a definite inside, outside, and boundary that is homogenous within

and sharply differentiated from other categories around it. Just as an object could go inside one container or another, individuals are either in the category or not. The metaphor takes the fixity and certainty of a container and imposes it onto a fluid and uncertain experience. In this sense, categorization is useful because it organizes information so it can be understood, but it simultaneously erases the differences within the category and solidifies the arbitrary position of the boundary. Territoriality fixes the inchoate boundaries of the category on the ground by creating the container that was already imagined cognitively. Similarly, as Thongchai Winichakul (1994) has demonstrated, a map of a territory with borders creates the cognitive container that becomes the idea of a nation of people. My insistence that categories do not have an intrinsic meaning and that their boundaries are always inchoate is an attempt to disrupt the apparent fixity of the categories ordering the world. This leaves open the question of where to locate the boundaries of boundary studies. While I see some utility in thinking

about the bounding process more generally because of the spatiality of the metaphor, Schaffter et al. (2009) would prefer to focus only on when this process has a spatial referent. This seems unnecessarily arbitrary, particularly when these categories rely on the spatial metaphor of the container and their meanings are almost always spatialized in practice. To be clear, I am not suggesting that geographers should not consider how categories are inscribed into the landscape through borders and barriers; my own empirical research is in this area specifically (Jones, 2009b; 2009c). On the contrary, I am suggesting that we should not limit boundary studies only to

these acts of on-the-ground bordering. Therefore, I again argue that boundaries and bounding processes should not be interpreted too narrowly, particularly as categorization and boundaries have been receiving increased attention by scholars across the social sciences (Wimmer, 2008). Indeed, the most troubling aspect of many recent engagements in other disciplines with boundarymaking practices is that they completely overlook the long history of boundary studies in geography. As Lamont and Molnr (2002: 167) pointedly put it, In recent years, the concept of boundaries has been at the center of influential research agendas in anthropology, history, political science, social psychology, and sociology. Where is geography? While Schaffter et al. (2009: 260, my emphasis) counsel against making boundary studies into a field of scholarship that takes an interest in anything called a boundary, I argue that geographers should be emphasizing the spatiality of the boundary-making process and demonstrating that we have something

meaningful to say about the various boundaries that metaphorically and physically shape the ways in which we understand the world around us.

Border Thinking
Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221]
One of the common views about modernity and globalization (e.g. a later stage of modernity) is to conceive of the former in contradistinction with alternative modernities and the latter in contradistinction with the local. Local histories/ alternative modernities are dependent and surrogate components of the triumphal march of global history/modernity. The assumed reality in both cases is that globalization moves to the periphery and it is in the peripheries where alternative modernities take place as well. Our three theses are an exercise in border thinking (or thinking
from the borders) and they contest both the held view of the global/local and of modernity/alternative modernities. Regarding the first,

the distinction global/local is based on a territorial, not a border epistemology that assumes the global emanating from Western Europe and the USA to the rest of the world, where the local dwells. In that regard, globalization is seen as a set of processes that engender responses and reactions by those who defend the authentic cultures or political sovereignty threatened by global forces. Our theses assume, on the contrary, that local histories are everywhere, in the USA and the European Union, as well as in Tanzania, Bolivia, China or MERCOSUR. But the question is that not every local history is in a position to devise and enact global designs; the majority of local histories in the planet have had to deal, in the past five hundred years, with an increasing spread of imperial global designs of all kinds: religious, political, economic, linguistic and epistemic, and cultural. The coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being, i.e. the spread of global designs from local histories where they emerged to local histories to which they are alien, create the conditions for border thinking (instead of authenticity), for the de-colonial epistemic shift aiming at the decolonization of
knowledge and of being. And it is in the precise sense of the imperial/colonial conflicts between global designs that spread forms of knowledges and subjectivities from the local histories, where they emerge to local histories to which they are

alien, that the de-colonial epistemic shift is geo- and body-politically oriented in confrontation with the theo- and ego-politics that sustained and continues to sustain, the global imperial designs. Hence, our second conclusion, our response to the emergence of the idea of alternative modernities
that is grounded in the territorial epistemology of modernity. In other words, the very idea of alternative modernities only makes sense from an epistemological Euro-centered perspective that looks at the world as if the epistemic gaze was independent of any geo-historical and body-graphic locations. That is, precisely, the epistemology of the zero point that, historically, has the name of theology and egology. From the perspective of border thinking and the de-colonial shift, the idea of alternative modernities is, as just said, already embedded in the Euro-centered idea of modernity. There is no modernity, in other words, beyond the macro-

narratives, invented since the Renaissance by means of which Europe was invented as geohistorically occupying the center of space and the present in time. From a border epistemology, the idea
of alternative modernities is unsound and what is needed instead are alternatives TO modernity, i.e. alternatives to the naturalized idea that the past five hundred years of European history are the point of arrival (or the end of history) of the human race and, as Anthony Giddens has it, it will be modernity all the way down. If that is the case, then, it will be coloniality all the way down because from a border epistemology perspective, coloniality is constitutive (and not derivative) of modernity. Border thinking is indeed a way to move toward the de-colonial shift; and the de-colonial shift, in the last analysis, consists in delinking (desprenderse is the word employed by Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano) of theo- and ego-logical epistemic tyranny of the modern world and its epistemic and cultural (e.g. formation of subjectivities) consequences: the coloniality of knowledge and of being. But to delink is not to abandon, to ignore. No one could abandon or ignore the deposit and sedimentation of imperial languages and categories of thought. Border thinking

proposes how to deal with that imperial sedimentation while at the same time breaking free of the spell and the enchantment of imperial modernity. The de-colonial epistemic shift, grounded in border thinking, aims at processes of de-colonizing of knowledge and being. De-colonizing being and knowledge is a way toward the idea that another world is possible (and not alternative modernities). That world, as the Zapatistas had it, will be a world in which many worlds will co-exist (and not a world in which globalization or the imposition of global designs and authenticity or fundamentalist responses to imperial global designs will reproduce an unending war against the enemies of imperial abstract universals). A world in which

many worlds will co-exist cannot be imagined and predicated on the basis of the good abstract universal valid for all but, instead, on pluri-versality as a universal project. Critical border thinking and the de-colonial shift are one road politics of knowledge.

toward that possible future. Ours was an effort at theorizing in the borders and contributing to changing the geo- and body-

Rethink state space

Rethinking the state as the center of geopolitics opens up space for new perspectives on border violence Moisio & Paasi 13
[Sami & Asssi, Regional Development and Regional Policy- Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland, Regional Geography, Geopolitics, 18:2, 255-266, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.738729] Relational thinking has long roots in the social sciences, where it has given rise to a fundamental dilemma:

whether to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily of substances or processes, static things or in terms of dynamic, unfolding relations.25 The key issue in the early geographical debates of the 1990s was whether the regional and territorial worlds should best be seen as bounded or open. Initially, the territorial and relational views were sharply contrasted so that the former was labelled as regressive whereas the latter was regarded as progressive.26 The problem in much of the early debates was that such divides were largely artificial when the dichotomy was universalised as an ontological given. Such dilemma has had long roots in political geography and has more recently manifested itself in the efforts to abandon container-based views of state and territory, and the attempts to overcome the ideas of borders as passive, static lines between states while still acknowledging the continuing allure of modernist ideas of territory.27 The study of the geopolitics of changing state spaces may not only draw on such debates but also may contribute to the understanding of the complexities of contemporary political spaces and, more specifically, whether these are best conceptualised as territorial or relational, or perhaps as a combination of the two. It is easy to agree with Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey when they propose that it is beneficial to understand states as complex networks of relations among a shifting mixture of institutions and social groups, and to see states as products of their own processes of institutional development, historical change and important external influences.28 Yet we would suggest that rather than universalising certain given categories or ontologies, the challenge is to perpetually rethink contextually the multiple combinations of relational and territorial aspects of governing practices and discourses on state space as part of the wider geopolitics. This may help to progress beyond the conceptual dichotomy of territorial/relational, and help to develop research methods and even invent novel research materials. Inquiring into the mundane geographies of stateness is one of the possible ways by which the relational-territorial divide might be contextually rethought. In other words, paying attention to the links between the state and civil society, crucially mediated by citizenship, national socialisation and other mediated forms of governance, may be worthwhile. The lack of such mundane perspectives was obvious in the early works of critical geopolitics, which often operated at the level of the states international relations and leaned on research materials that characterised such relations at the level of the states foreign policy elites. An increasing number of

scholars have become interested in the relations of state (space) to the daily lives of citizens and non-citizens in conditions which are to an increasing degree post-national or de-nationalised. The challenge, then, is to map the geopolitics of mundane

state spaces. The geopolitics of mundane state spaces may draw from series of interdisciplinary literature. Michael Mann, for instance, famously charted the infrastructural power of the state, which refers to the ability of the state to penetrate the daily lives of citizens in civil society and implement political decisions.29 Painter has taken this idea further. He speaks of a prosaic state which refers to the mundane, unsystematic, indeterminate and unintended ways that the state enters into everyday life practices .30 By

challenging the often accepted notion that the state is a separate, self-contained political realm, he argues that an emphasis on prosaics of stateness can reveal the extent and limits of the statization of social life. He proposes that this approach highlights the openness, porosity, heterogeneity, fallibility, unevenness and creativity of state practices. The prosaics of stateness are highly important in the dynamic world in which the association of the political and geo takes place across diverging spatial scales, from the bodies of ordinary people to national and international contexts. Yet we should simultaneously also critically reflect on how the state perpetually regionalises or territorialises the lives of its citizens in state spaces, for instance through spatial socialisation, language or social policies. Second, one may argue that state spatial transformation is inescapably connected with certain policy transfers/policy mobilities. The recent geographical work on policy transfer has been particularly interested in the extension of specific hegemonic regimes of truth which define policy norms and which seem to point to an internationalisation of policy regimes31 and associated state spaces. Bringing the
literature on policy mobility/transfer and the geopolitics of state spaces into a closer dialogue may well be one of the possibilities for moving beyond the relationalterritorial divide. The interconnections between these two themes can be

examined, for instance, in the context of supranational policy practices which cross the domesticinternational divide and which ultimately reconstruct state spaces through mixing policies which are both territorial and relational in nature. To illustrate, the construction of the EU as a geopolitical actor
has involved spatial planning discourses and practices which are predicated upon a distinct scalar rhetoric which espouses the effort to constitute a singular EU territory through the use of different network-based ideas which re-group national places into the new European territorial frame.32 But we know relatively little about how the territorial/relational geopolitical practices of the EU are being negotiated, adopted and perhaps resisted in different contexts. This would require systematic study of geopolicy communities and the knowledge that circulates within and between these communities in the European setting. Finally, the geopolitical study of

changing state spaces requires rigorous empirical research based on creatively selected research materials. Instead of associating geopolitics research solely with foreign and security policy authorities and communities conceived in the traditional sense, researchers should start pondering alternatives. To illustrate, although the current state spatial transformation seems to be predicated upon a particular business management knowledge and the associated authority, scholarly analysis of this type of knowledge, its operation in political practices as well as its fundamental geopolitical underpinnings is virtually absent in geopolitical literature. Bringing this form of knowledge and its association with policy mobility under (geopolitical) investigation would potentially open up new perspectives into the debate concerned with relational/territorial spaces. In this context, interpretive and ethnographic approaches would enable a focus on individual actors and communities as agents driving policy transfer processes. More generally, new research materials should increase our understanding of the geographical situatedness of policy mobility, its impact on the everyday spaces of the state and the new subjectivities which are co-constitutive of state spatial transformation.

Movements
The integration of social movements and critical analysis of geopolitics offer different modalities of rupturing colonialism and spatial ordering the alternative is necessary for Latin American liberation. Slater, 2004 [David Slater, Emeritus Professor of Political Geography, & Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of London, Geopolitics and the Postcolonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, Blackwell Publishing Ltd]
Customarily, the

analysis of the relations between politics and the political is worked out within the conceptual confines of an implicitly Western territorial state. There is an assumption of a pre-given territorial integrity and impermeability. 9 But in the situation of peripheral polities, the historical realities of external power and its effects within those polities are much more difficult to ignore. What this contrast points to is the lack of equality in the full recognition of the territorial integrity of nationstates. For the societies of Latin America, Africa and Asia, the principles governing the constitution of their mode of political being were deeply structured by external penetration, by the invasiveness of foreign powers. The framing of time and the ordering of space followed an externally imposed logic, the effects of which still resonate in the postcolonial period. The struggles to recover an autochthonous narrative of time, to counter a colonialist rule of memory, and to rediscover an indigenous amalgam of meanings for the territory of the nation have formed a primary part of post-Independence politics. In what were referred to as wars of national liberation, the struggle to breathe new life into the timespace nexus of independence lay at the core of the anti-imperialist movement. This then is one modality of the geopolitical, of a transformative rupture, where anti-colonial movements were the disrupting and destabilizing currents able to challenge and eventually bring to an end the colonial appropriation of national space. But within the bounded territories of nation-states there is another modality of the geopolitical. Across a broad array of societies of the South, movements have emerged which challenge the established territorial orderings of the state. In some instances, such social movements have been rooted in ethnic identities, as has been the case in the post-1994 Zapatista uprising in the Chiapas region of Mexico, while in other cases as in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, the geopolitical has been partly associated with ethnic-regional mobilizations but also with broader coalitions to restructure and decentralize centralized state power. Here the challenge to the territorial ordering of the central state has assumed a close connection with the notion of extending the territoriality of democratic politics through a decentralization of the state (Slater 2002). In this example, the geopolitical as I have defined it could be also thought of as a counter-geopolitics, where an alternative indigenous memory of territory is deployed as part of the ideological struggle against a centralized and monocultural state. This is clearly to be seen in the case of the Zapatista uprising in Mexico, discussed in chapter 8. There are many
themes that could be taken up for further consideration. However, at this stage, I want to simply indicate how both geopolitics and its counter, the geopolitical, are best approached as inhabiting a variety of spheres, both international and national, both inside and outside.

The geo- in politics and the political needs to be set free from any pre-given anchorage in any spatial level. At the same time, as Bonura (1998) has suggested, critical geopolitical analysis can be made more effective if questions of cultural representation are connected to the power of spatial politics. In my
own approach I want to include some suggestions on what it might mean to think critically, in a geopolitical context. There is already an excellent literature in the area of critical geopolitics,10 and in my own case, and as already noted in the preface, I shall develop a perspective that revolves around rethinking the geopolitics of NorthSouth relations in historical perspective, and with specific

regard to the relations between the United States and the societies of the South, especially, although not exclusively, the societies of Latin America. But how might we think the critical in critical geographical analysis or
more generally the critical in critical thought itself?

Encountering the other (Levinas)

Cartography hides and displaces bloodshed and violence and creates a historical amnesia with which the state masks violence. Only by encountering the Other outside of our dominant spatial construction can we disrupt violent cartographies and unmask historical violence. Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, p. 175-179)
The ethical sensibility offered in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas provides an important contribution to the ethics-as-nonviolent encounter thematized in my analysis. Levinas regarded war, the ultimate form of violence, as the

suspension of morality; "it renders morality derisory," he said. Moreover, Levinas's thought fits the more general anti-

Clausewitzian/antirationalist approach to war thematized in prior chapters, for Levinas regarded a strategically oriented politics"the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means," which is "enjoined as the very essence of reason"as "opposed to morality."8 In

order to oppose war and promote peace, Levinas enacted a linguistic war on the governing assumptions of Western philosophy. He argued that philosophy from Plato through Heidegger constructed persons and peoples within totalizing conceptions of humanity. The ethical regard, he insisted, is one that resists
encompassing the Other as part of the same, that resists recognizing the Other solely within the already spoken codes of a universalizing vision of humankind. However problematic Levinas's notion of infinite respect for an alterity that always evades complete comprehension may be (an issue I discuss later), it

nevertheless makes possible a concern with the violence of representation, with discursive control over narratives of space and identity, which is central to my analysis. Edward Said emphasized the ethicopolitical significance of systems of discursive control, locating the violence of imperialism in the control over stories: "The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them."9 Indeed, contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance of a spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level. Despite an increasing instability in the geopolitical map of states, the more general discourses of "international affairs" and "international relations" continue to dominate both ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence are most often constructed within a statecentric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and on cross-boundary antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical cartography.10 To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we must challenge the geopolitical map. Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific imagination, it is nevertheless the case that "the cartographer's categories," as J. B. Harley has put it, "are the basis of the morality of the map."11 "Morality" here emerges most
significantly from the boundary and naming practices that construct the map. The nominations and territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a "topographical amnesia."12 Effacements of older maps in contemporary

namings and configurations amount to a nonrecognition of older, often violently displaced practices of identity and space. Among the consequences of this neglected dimension of cartography, which include a morality-delegating spatial unconscious and a historical amnesia with respect to alternatives, has been a radical circumspection of the kinds of persons and groups recognized as worthy subjects of moral solicitude. State citizenship has tended to remain the primary basis for the identities recognized in discourses such as the "ethics of international affairs."13 The dominance and persistence of this discursive genre, an "ethics" predicated on absolute state sovereignty, is evident in a recent analysis that has attempted to be
both critical of the ethical limitations of the sovereignty system and aware that "conflict has increasingly moved away from interstate territorial disputes."14 Despite these acknowledged sensitivities, the analysis proceeds within a discourse that

reinstalls the dominance of geopolitical thinking, for it remains within its cartography and conceptual legacy. Arguing for a humanitarianism that avoids interstate partisanship, the writers go on to reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, which grants recognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of "intervention" as a reaffirmation of a sovereignty discourse, they refer to the "Persian

Gulf War" on the one hand and "insurgencies" on the other. As I noted in chapter i, Bernard Nietschmann has shown that the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and unmapping the geostrategic cartography of "international relations," Nietschmann refers to the "Third World War," which is "hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map"a war in which "only one side of the fighting has a name." beyond the confines of the state sovereignty orientation, it is therefore necessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditional moral thinking and thereby grant recognition outside of modernity's dominant political identities. This must necessarily also take us outside the primary approach that contemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory. As applied at any level of human interaction, the familiar neo-Kantian ethical injunction is to seek transcendent values. Applied

Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann proceeds to map 120 armed struggles as part of the "war." In his mapping, only 4 of the struggles involve confrontations between states, while 77 involve states against nations.15 In order to think

to the interstate or sovereignty model of global space more specifically, this approach seeks to achieve a set of universal moral imperatives based on shared values and regulative norms. A brief account of an encounter between alternative spatial imaginaries helps to situate the alternative ethical frame to be elaborated later. It is provided by the reflections of the writer Carlos Fuentes after an unanticipated encounter with a Mexican peasant. Lost while driving with friends in the state of Morelos, Mexico, Fuentes stopped in

a village and asked an old peasant the name of the village. "Well, that depends," answered the peasant. "We call it the Village Santa Maria in times of peace. We call it Zapata in times of war." Fuentes's meditation on this response reveals the historical depth of forms of otherness that exist relatively unrecognized within modernity. He notes that the peasant has existed within a narrative trace that tends to be uncoded in the contemporary institutionalized discourses on space: That old campesino knew what most people in the West have ignored since the seventeenth century: that there is more than one time in the world, that there is another time existing alongside, above, underneath the linear time calendars of the West. This man who could live in the time of Zapata or the time of
moment. Provoked

Santa Maria, depending, was a living heir to a complex culture of many strata in creative tension.18 Fuentes's reaction constitutes an ethical

by an Other, he engages in an ethnographic self-reflection rather than reasserting modernity's dominant temporal and spatial imaginaries; he recognizes an Other who cannot be absorbed into the same. His reaction cannot therefore be contained solely within what constitutes the ethical life of his community. By encountering an alterity that is at once inside and wholly outside of the particular narrative within which his social and cultural self-construction has been elaborated, he is able to step back from the story of modernity that is continually recycled within the West's reigning discourses on time and space: "What we call 'modernity' is more often than not this process whereby the rising industrial and mercantile classes of Europe gave unto themselves the role of universal protagonists of history."19 Face to face with an otherness that these "protagonists," those who have managed to perform the dominant structures of meaning, have suppressed, Fuentes is able to recover the historical trace of that otherness and, on reflection, to recognize that the encounter must yield more than mere affirmation for his practices of self. Most significantly, the encounter produces a disruption of the totalizing conceptions that have governed contemporary societiesfor example, the illusion that they are unproblematically consolidated and that they have quelled recalcitrant subjectivities. Therefore, in order to elaborate the ethical possibilities toward which Fuentes's story points, we can consider an approach that assails such totalizations with the aim of providing an ethics of encounter.

We must reject the homogenization of identity by which the state justifies violence through the domestication of alterity. An encounter with the Other is a recognition of their difference and exteriority Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, p. 179-180)
Fuentes's experience and the conclusions he draws from it are elaborately prescripted in the face-to-face encounter and the experience of the Other as a historical trace are crucial dimensions of an ethical responsibility. To confront Levinas is to be faced with an ethical tradition quite different from those traditionally applied to issues of global encounter. In Levinas's ethical thinking and writing, morality is not an experience of value, as it is for both

the ethical writings of Levinas, for whom

the Kantian tradition and Alasdair Maclntyre's post-Kantian concern with an anthropology of ethics, but a

recognition of and vulnerability to alterity. This conception of vulnerability to alterity is not a moral psychology, as is the case with, for example, Adam Smith's notion of interpersonal sympathy.20 It is a fundamentally ethical condition attached to human subjectivity; it is an acceptance of the Other's absolute exteriority, a recognition that "the other is in no way another myself, participating with me in a common existence."21 According to Levinas, we are responsible to alterity as absolute alterity, as a difference that cannot be subsumed into the same, into a totalizing conceptual system that comprehends self and Other. For relations with Others to be ethical they must therefore be nontotalizing. Rejecting
ontologies that homogenize humanity, so that self-recognition is sufficient to constitute the significance of Others, Levinas locates the ethical regard as a recognition of Others as enigmatically and irreducibly other, as prior to any ontological aim of locating oneself at home in the world: "The relations with the other ... [do] not arise within a totality nor does it establish a totality, integrating me and the other.22

Ontologies of integration are egoistically aimed at domesticating alterity to a frame of understanding that allows for the violent appropriation of the space of the Other: My being in the

world or my 'place in the sun,' my being at home, have not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing?23 To be regarded ethically, the Other must remain a stranger "who disturbs the being at home with

oneself."24 The ethical for Levinas is, in sum, "a non-violent relationship to the other as infinitely other."25 If we recall the

problematic presented in chapter 5, it should be evident that within a Levinasian ethical perspective, one would, for example, accept Ward Just's perpetually enigmatic Vietnam rather than endorse Norman Schwarzkopf's domesticated version.

Assumption of Bare Life Solves Biopower

Vote negative to assume a politics that renders the biopolitical machine inoperativethe cessation of line-drawing under the sovereign body and assuming the situation of bare life reframes the ethical-political thought and inscribes a politics more open to potentialities Vaughan-Williams 2009, (Nick, Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online, Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign
life at all ties into a broader argument Edkins and Pin-Fat seek to establish: that sovereign power is not a relation of power in the Foucauldian sense, as discussed in Chapter 3, but rather one of violence.40 Relations of

Power, 3/12/09, 6/28/13|Ashwin) This leads Edkins to deny that sovereign power constitutes the only possible form of political life and, indeed, that it constitutes a political life at all.39 The suggestion that the biopolitical sovereign order does not constitute a political

violence do not produce subjectivities in the same way as power relations. Instead, the former is a type of relation that involves the technologised administration of sovereign biopolitics: in other words a form of slavery or servitude.41 With the emergence of a global zone of indistinction in which we can no longer distinguish between our biological life as living beings and our political existence, the possibilities for resistance arguably have been curtailed.42 Thus, according to Edkins and Pin-Fat, any attempt at contesting

sovereign biopolitics must, however paradoxical it may seem, seek to reinstall power relations with their accompanying freedoms and potentialities.43 On this basis, the challenge for practical politics is to envisage how such a reinstallation might take place. Following Agamben's claim referred to earlier, that it is by starting from this uncertain terrain and from this opaque zone of indistinction that today we must once again find the path of another politics, of another body, of another world, Edkins and Pin-Fat argue that strategies for contesting sovereign power cannot consist of a call for a reinstatement of classical politics, a reinstatement of the distinction between zo and bios.44 In other words, it will not do for any such contestation to find its basis in the very logic it is trying to overcome. Edkins emphasises that identity politics, associated with social movements, for instance, would reappropriate rather than displace that flawed logic.45 This is because, as she explains, identity-based claims ultimately work within the same horizon as sovereign
power: such a claim is a demand for inclusion in or recognition by the state, (p.141) not a claim that contests or disru pts the notions of inclusion and exclusion upon which sovereign power depends.46 Rather, what is required is a displacement of the

logic that might tie resistance back to sovereign politics:

If a logic of sovereign power is identified that relies for its very operation on the production and organisation of bare life as a form of life that is hospitable to its operation, then it is in a sense obvious that a challenge to sovereignty might be framed in terms of a refusal or destabilisation of that very form of life itself.47

One way of challenging sovereign power would be to remove the grounds upon which it is able to produce bare life in the first place thereby rendering the biopolitical machine inoperative on its own terms. This implies the need for a life that is inseparable from its form: one where the classical binary between zo and bios does not hold and cannot be blurred in a zone of indistinction. Crucially,

as far as the potential for a politics of resistance is concerned, Agamben's notion of whatever being lacks the features permitting sovereign capture: what the state cannot tolerate in any way [] is that the singularities form a community, without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging.48 Somewhat ironically, then, as Edkins has pointed out, the

form of being produced by sovereign power, that is, bare life, turns out to be that form of being sovereign power finds intolerable.49 Put differently, the form of life sovereign power produces for its own survival is also potentially the source of its undoing. The type of politics that

might follow from Agamben's formulation a whatever politics as Edkins puts it is one that capitalises on this potential weakness in sovereign power. In practical terms, Edkins and Pin-Fat argue that such a politics consists of two interrelated

moves: the refusal to draw abstract lines of the sort sovereign power itself relies upon; and/or what they call the assumption of bare life.50 These moves, and their implications for how thinking in terms of a generalised biopolitical border might prompt a reframing of ethical political practice/thought, warrant closer attention. To produce a zone of indistinction between zo and bios that is hospitable to the cultivation of bare life, the logic of sovereign power must assume a distinction between the two to begin with. This (p.142) involves drawing abstract lines or borders between different forms of life in order to distinguish the politically qualified life of the polis from life that is deemed not to be worthy as such. What counts as politically qualified life is not a static given but a historically contingent outcome. Different groups have been
excluded from politics throughout history (for example slaves, women, and Jews) although the fear arising from Agamben's work is that we are now all potentially excluded as homines sacri. To counter this, Edkins and PinFat suggest that one form of resistance

would be to reject or to prevent the inscription of borders between zo and bios, inside and outside, human and inhuman: It is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all (and, indeed, nothing else will do) that
sovereign power (as a form of violence) can be contested and a properly political power relation can be reinstated.51 Importantly, Edkins and Pin-Fat emphasise that they are not arguing for a renegotiation of where these lines are

drawn: to renegotiate in this fashion would be to remain inside the relation of violence. Rather, they argue that to move outside this relation of violence and reinstall a properly political power relation must involve the cessation of line-drawing in toto: [] we need not146 only to
contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also to resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.52 The second and interrelated strategy of resistance put forward by Edkins and Pin-Fat involves what

they call an acceptance of bare life and it is this line of thought that perhaps reflects Agamben's notion of inoperativity most closely. Such an acceptance occurs when the subject both acknowledges and also demands recognition of its status as nothing but bare life. In this way properly political power relations are reinstalled as the subject transforms bare life into what Agamben calls form-of-life.53 The transformation occurs as the subject literally lays bare the violent excesses upon which sovereign power rests by assuming them. To illustrate this
point, Edkins and PinFat draw on the provocative example of the phenomenon of lip sewing among refugees. Among others they cite the case of Abbas Amini, an Iranian national seeking asylum in Britain, who, in 2003, protested against the government's immigration policies by sewing shut his eyes, ears and mouth: (p.143) Amini's political act of resistance, using his own body, can be read as an act where, with all hope lost, the only site left for resistance is in complete embrace of bare life as a form-of-life that has its own bios.54 This example offers a useful illustration of what Agamben means by an act of transgression that un-works

the biopolitical system from within. By assuming bare life Amini takes away the grounds upon which sovereign power would otherwise operate. His actions adopt the logic of the system in order to jam it. Another example of an attempt to render the sovereign biopolitical machine inoperative is

Agamben's own refusal to travel to the United States.55 Since March 2004, Agamben has protested against what he considers to be the biopolitical tattooing of the US Department of Homeland Security by publically resigning from his position as Visiting Professor at New York University and banning himself from air travel to the United States.56 In an article published in Le Monde in 2004, Agamben claims that: History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves applied later to the rest of the citizenry.57 Citing the capture and filing of finger print and retina data as reflecting a new normal biopolitical relationship between the citizen and the state, he argues: By applying these techniques and these devices invented for the dangerous classes to a citizen, or rather to a human being as such, states, which should constitute the precise space of political life, have made the person the ideal suspect, to the146 point that it's humanity itself that has become the dangerous class.58 Agamben's decision to ban himself from travel to the United States, thereby effectively rendering himself immobile, jams the generalised biopolitical border because, as we have seen in previous chapters, it relies precisely on circulation of people, goods and services. Indeed, this example highlights that, for border security to work

effectively, subjects need to be constantly on the move: without movement biopolitical bordering practices cannot operate. The profanatory potential of this insight has yet to be mobilised as far as resistance
against some of the most insidious practices legitimised by the War on Terror is concerned.

Interrogating border politics to think through the violence of the border opens up new forms of ethical-political praxis Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 166-70)
This is no easy task because many of the theories, categories and (p.166) concepts

we might use to critique the modern geopolitical imaginary are themselves part of that very horizon of thought. Seeking to
contribute to nascent moves away from a geopolitical towards a biopolitical paradigm of analysis, however, this book has argued that

critical resources for developing alternative border imaginaries can be found in the work of Giorgio Agamben. Agamben's diagnosis of the operation of sovereign power offers an array of spatio-ontological devices, such as the ban, the camp and a logic of the field, with which it is possible to articulate how borders are intimately linked to the bodies of those in transit, as mobile as the subjects they seek to control, and not merely confined to the outer edges of sovereign territory but more and more generalised throughout a global biopolitical terrain. dynamics whereas, responding to interdisciplinary calls for alternative border imaginaries from writers such as Balibar, Walker and Weizman, the concept of the generalised biopolitical border offers both a means of identifying and of engaging critically with them Thinking in terms of the biopolitical generalised border highlights and confronts the contingency of the juridicalpolitical order. This order, born of the exception, is predicated

These features of bordering practices in contemporary political life are not otherwise locatable on the radar of conventional border studies reliant upon and reproductive of the modern geopolitical imaginary. This way of thinking is blind to these

upon the performative act of suspending law to create a zone of indistinction in which sovereign power produces a form of life amenable to its sway: bare life. The proper subject of sovereign power is recast: not the modern bordered sovereign citizen but the mute carrier of sovereignty defined not by rights but by exposure to the decision on whether it is human life deemed worthy of living as such.6 Once this reconfigured view of the relation between sovereignty and subjectivity is adopted, then alternative possibilities for thinking about ethical political praxis are opened up. New ways of conceptualising resistance emerge based around the notion of inoperativity and the attempt to jam the sovereign biopolitical machine by turning its own logic against it. Agamben's diagnosis of the activity of sovereign power calls for analyses of the changing methods and locations of the
production of bare life which, as we have seen, are not only confined to traditional border crossings but detention camps, railway stations and spaces of exception throughout everyday life. Furthermore, the production of (p.167) bare life is a bordering practice that can involve citizens as well as government officials and this has particular significance in the context of the War on Terror.7 Writing in 1938, Walter Benjamin claimed that: In times of terror, when everyone is something of a conspirator, everybody will be in the position of having to play detective.8 Reflecting Benjamin's insight of seventy years ago, in 2007 the New York Metropolitan Transport Agency (MTA) ran a poster and radio advertisement campaign called The Eyes of New York. Under the banner If you see something, say something, good citizens were enjoined to be on the lookout for suspicious activity. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the London Metropolitan Police (the Met) has led a series of similar campaigns in the United Kingdom. The most recent, from January 2006 to March 2007, led with the banner: If you suspect it, report it. Six posters call for vigilance, targeting: f inancial activity (Terrorists need funding. Have any cheque or credit card transactions made you suspicious?); the use of vehicles (Terrorists need transport. Has a vehicle sale or a rental made you suspicious?); the Thames (Terrorists could use the river. If you live or work on the river, has anything made you suspicious?); domestic storage (Terrorists need storage. Are you suspicious of anyone using garages, lockup s or storage space?); and apartment blocks (Terrorists need places to live. Are you suspicious of your tenants or neighbours?) (See figure 3.) What the campaign does not tell us is what it is about getting a refund, owning a white van, being near a river, using a garage or living in a block of flats that is particular to terrorist activity. Rather, the suspicion, as with the MTA example, is generalised and objectless. While the stated aim of both campaigns in New York and London is to achieve greater security, it is not at all clear that this sort o f approach is successful in accomplishing its expressed goals. On the contrary, it can lead to many more problems, including the very dynamics it presumably seeks to overcome. For example, Judith Butler has high-lighted how the imperative for good citizens to be on (p.169) In this way, she claims, a certain form of indefinite containment permeates public culture outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace.11 Furthermore, the racialisation of suspicion translates into acts of violence in these otherwise normal everyday settings as demonstrated by the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in Stockwell Station. Irrespective of the numbers of people who actually call anti-terror hotline numbers, the campaigns of the MTA and London Met illustrate how a politics of affect is employed in the ongoing War on Terror. Indeed, following Benjamin, it is through the attempt to cultivate citizen -detectives that the central dynamics of the war on terror are (re)produced: dynamics that are not localised in the conflict zones of Afghanistan and Iraq but identifiable throughout everyday life in Europe and the West more generally. The cultivation of citizen-detectives corresponds with attempts to produce others, usually of non-white appearance, as depoliticised subjects whose normal recourse to conventional provisions in politics and law are suspended in favour of national security objectives. Of course, it might be rightly pointed out that many of these dynamics are not new: Benjamin's writings point to the historical legacies within which current practices must be located. Developments in technology, however, as well as in news media coverage enable innovations in the ways in which sovereign power attempts to secure itself both temporally and spatially. Agamben's reference to the figure of homo sacer in Roman law reveals the ancient roots of biopolitical bordering practices but it is necessary to detect how borders get (re)produced differently from one historical and geographical context to another. On the one hand, the added value of the concept of the biopolitical generalised border is that it offers

an alternative account of the limits of sovereign power to one reliant upon the modern geopolitical imaginary. On the other hand, as we have seen, this concept should not be considered as a straightforward

replacement for the concept of the border of the state. Rather, what we are dealing with here are different framings of global politics, each with particular ethical political implications, as discussed in Chapter 5. Applying the thought of Derrida, the task for

the future of border studies, as I see it, is not to attempt to develop new ways of thinking that try to escape, go beyond or move outside the inside/outside problematic. On the contrary, such attempts are always already destined to failure as they (p.170) only ever serve to reproduce an inside/outside logic. Instead, a Derridean-inspired approach is one that urges the incessant identification and perpetual deconstruction of the multiple practices of inside/outside in order to interrogate what is enabled by, and who benefits from, diverse border politics.

The alternative is to accept bare life- this radical action of acceptance is ironically the opposite of what the sovereign wants and assuming this bare life grinds the logic of the system to a halt Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 143)
The second and interrelated strategy of resistance put forward by Edkins and Pin-Fat involves what they call an

acceptance of bare life and it is this line of thought that perhaps reflects Agamben's notion of inoperativity most closely. Such an acceptance occurs when the subject both acknowledges and also

demands recognition of its status as nothing but bare life. In this way properly political power relations are reinstalled as the subject transforms bare life into what Agamben calls form-of-life.53 The transformation occurs as the subject literally lays bare the violent excesses upon which sovereign power rests by assuming them. To illustrate this point, Edkins and PinFat draw on the provocative example of the phenomenon of lip sewing among refugees. Among others they cite the case of Abbas Amini, an Iranian national seeking asylum in Britain, who, in 2003, protested against the government's immigration policies by sewing shut his eyes, ears and mouth: (p.143) Amini's political act of resistance, using his own body, can be read as an act where, with all hope lost, the only site left for resistance is in complete embrace of bare life as a form-of-life that has its own bios.54 This example offers a useful illustration of what Agamben means by an act of transgression that un-works the biopolitical system from within. By assuming bare life Amini takes away the grounds upon which sovereign power would otherwise operate. His actions adopt the logic of the system in order to jam it. Another example of an attempt to render the sovereign biopolitical machine inoperative is Agamben's own refusal to travel to the
United States.55 Since March 2004, Agamben has protested against what he considers to be the biopolitical tattooing of the US Department of Homeland Security by publically resigning from his position as Visiting Professor at New York University and banning himself from air travel to the United States.56 In an article published in Le Monde in 2004, Agamben claims that: History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves applied later to the rest of the citizenry.57 Citing the capture and filing of finger print and retina data as reflecting a new normal biopolitical relationship between the citizen and the state, he argues: By apply ing these techniques and these devices invented for the dangerous classes to a citizen, or rather to a human being as such, states, which should constitute the precise space of political life, have made the person the ideal suspect, to thepoint that it's humanity itself that has become the dangerous class.58

The alternative is to render ourselves immobile in the face of the biopolitical border- borders and border security cannot operate without the continuous flow of goods and people Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 143-44)
This example offers a useful illustration of what Agamben

means by an act of transgression that un-works the biopolitical system from within. By assuming bare life Amini takes away the grounds upon which sovereign power would otherwise operate. His actions adopt the logic of the system in order to jam it. Another example of an attempt to render the sovereign biopolitical machine inoperative is Agamben's own refusal to travel to the United States.55 Since March 2004, Agamben has protested against what he considers to be the biopolitical tattooing of the US Department of Homeland Security by publically resigning from his position as Visiting Professor at New York University and banning himself from air travel to the United States.56
In an article published in Le Monde in 2004, Agamben claims that: History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves applied later to the rest of the citizenry.57 Citing the capture and filing of finger print and retina

data as reflecting a new normal biopolitical relationship between the citizen and the state, he
argues: By applying these techniques and these devices invented for the dangerous classes to a citizen, or rather to a human being as such, states, which should constitute the precise space of political life, have made the person the ideal suspect, to thepoint

that it's humanity itself that has become the dangerous class.58 Agamben's decision to ban himself from travel to the United States, thereby effectively rendering himself immobile, jams the generalised biopolitical border because, as we have seen in previous chapters, it relies precisely on circulation of people, goods and services. Indeed, this example highlights that, for border security to work effectively, subjects need to be constantly on the move: without movement biopolitical bordering practices cannot operate. The profanatory potential of this insight has yet to be mobilised as far as resistance
against some of the most insidious practices legitimised by the War on Terror is concerned.

Bridges
Envisioning the border as a bridge breaks the one-dimensional discourse concerning state boundaries. We must disrupt the current epistemology surrounding the border to create the possibility of a new understanding Alvarez 2012 (Robert, University of California, San Diego, The Journal of Latin American and

Caribbean Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 1) The metaphor of borders and bridges provides a refreshing cartography/architecture for border studies. Bridging and connection have been prominent in border studies yet the focus has been one-dimensional in terms of studies of immigration, transborder communities, and commodity chains. Rather than maintaining the horizontal line that dissects and crosses the nation state(s), the notion of borders and bridges provides a specific verticality and a new dimension. It is not solely the
crossings that are important, but the connections, the nodes, and the intervening process involved in the possible focus of study. Connections are not necessarily harmonious (see Grimson and Vila 2002.), and bridges span turbulence and the

underbelly, including the figure of the subaltern. Bridges connect contrasting venues and control crossings in various ways. What I am suggesting is a different analytic to disrupt (not replace) the entrenched epistemology of the border. We are in need of a new architecture that builds on the studies and epistemology of the past, but one that helps break the cartography created to produce new perceptions of analysis and understanding . The actuality and the metaphor of borders and bridges helps query both the current restricted notion of the border and the study of specific processes that include entrance and closure, connectivity and contrasts, construction, and depth and range in border thinking and empirical study. Rather than be restricted to the horizontal line in the sand, work in this area should be attentive to the broader spans of borderlands, spaces, and places. The primary interest of the present work in terms of borders and bridges is with the ethnographicnot solely as a method to study local human behavior but also as a conceptual parameter to address broad and complex spans of activity. The ethnographic is often synonymous with the local, the qualitative, and the construction of everyday life. But the ethnographic lens also provides insight, and queries broader institutional and structural influences that condition human behavior and societal process. Take, for example, Lugos (2008) study of maquildoras. Lugo begins by illustrating the deep place and connection of Juarez-El Paso with Mexicos colonial past while illustrating the constructed border and its generative control through inspections in the entire Juarez-El Paso range. Utilizing a border narrative, Lugo exposes the racial, gendered, and class connections among Mex- icanos and Mexicanas of Juarez; these people live along the border, labor in its industry, and maneuver in the stronghold of the state and economy. The maquilas are structural entities constructed by economic, commercial processes; but they have dramatically conditioned social forms, local relations, and communities, as well as the role of the nation
state and society on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border. In the end, peoples lives have changed dramatically not only along the border but also in the broader range and depth of the borderlands and mobile frontiers of the nation state.

Aspect Seeing
Border knowledge cannot be produced from an objective vantage point. Aspect-seeing uncovers previously hidden aspects of the border which is the only way to generate a positive form of border knowledge Bauder 2011 (Harald, Academic Director, Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS)
Associate Professor, Graduate Program in Immigration & Settlement Studies, Dept. of Geography, Toward a Critical Geography of the Border: Engaging the Dialectic of Practice and Meaning, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 101, Iss. 5, 5/23/13) A discussion of the terms aspect and aspect-seeing can provide valuable insights for investigating the polysemic nature of borders and for exploring the formation of the border concept. Ludwig Wittgenstein used this term to investigate how an object appears to the observer (Park 1998). In a famous example, he presented the so-called rabbitduck heada picture that can be seen alternately as the head of a rabbit and the head of a duckto illustrate that a single object contains two aspects (Wittgenstein [1945/1946] 2001, 1024 [Part II, xi, a3]). In another example, Wittgenstein shows the image of a triangle that can be seen as apex, mountain, wedge, and so on; the number of aspects in this case is virtually unlimited (Aidun 1982, 111). An observer notices an aspect (Wittgenstein [1945/1946] 2001, 1024 [Part II, xi, a3]) when she or he perceives an object in a particular way; with the dawning of a new aspect, the observer recognizes a previously unrecognized
[1945/1946] 2001, 1028 [Part II, xi, a18]). Wittgensteins use of the term aspect conveys that meanings

meaning of the same object and experiences an aspect-change (Aspektwechsel; Wittgenstein are not simply a matter of passive perception but that meanings are guided by both experience and anticipation. Wittgenstein himself applied the term aspect mostly in reference to visual and sensual perception (Park 1998). I do not

claim that my use of the term in the context of the border concept is entirely faithful to Wittgensteins original intentions. Rather, I follow others who have expanded on Wittgensteins original use of the term. For example, Aidun (1982) suggested that Wittgenstein conceived of the entire field of philosophy as aspect-seeing. In the following discussions, I apply the term aspect and the idea of aspect-seeing to the concept of the border and the conception of borders in contemporary scholarship. The appeal of applying the term

aspect to the border is that it permits capturing the polysemic nature of the border within a single concept. This application resonates with Balibars observation that the border might not possess a singular essence but it

constitutes a single complex (Balibar 2002, xi) and a symptom, referring to an overdetermination of phenomena (Balibar 2004, 102). As I illustrated earlier, contemporary scholarship notices multiple aspects of the border and affirms the

change of aspects of the border concept. For example, although they do not directly refer toWittgenstein,Mark Purcell
and Joseph Nevins (2005) used the term aspect to describe the distinct practices of economic liberation and militarization of the U.S. Mexico border. Moreover, scholarship has been willing to fathom the possibility of previously

unobserved aspects of the border. Or, to use geographical terminology, as new and previously untheorized border and migration practices emerge, geographers and border scholars have drawn new types of atlases (O Tuathail 1999, 151) to grasp these new meanings of borders. What the notion of overdetermination adds in this context is that border practices and representations cannot always be sorted into neat stories about particular interests or experiences.2 The second appeal of applying the idea of
aspectseeing to the border concept is that each aspect can be theorized as situated in a particular set of experiences, contexts, and uses and as guided by anticipation. This treatment of the term aspect resonates with the existing literature

related to positionality and situatedness, which has long demonstrated that knowledge is always partial and located in a particular set of experiences (e.g., Haraway 1991; Rose 1997). Accordingly, authoritative knowledge of the border can never be produced from a hypothetical

Archimedean vantage point . Rather, scholarly discussions of the border are always located, partial, and incomplete. The idea of aspect-seeing permits linking various scholarly vantage points and imaginations to a

consolidated border concept. Furthermore, aspect-seeing related to the border is not the result of purely passive perception but involves a situated observers imagination. Following Wittgenstein ([1945/1946] 2001, 43), who realized that meanings of concepts are derived from uses and practices,3 I suggest that the noticing of border aspects is related to the particular uses of a border and border practices. In the introduction to an edited volume on borders, van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer (2005, 2, italics added) concurred, advocating

understandings of borders that focus on the complex and varied patterns of both implicit and explicit bordering and ordering practices. The preceding discussion also showed that academic scholarship has noticed multiple aspects of the border, based on various cultural, economic, social, and political uses and practices of borders. The example of the U.S.Canada border illustrates

how particular practices of cross-border migration produce various meanings of the border.4 A U.S. citizen from Seattle can travel east for 4,500 km and is not considered an international migrant; however, when she goes 200 km north to Vancouver, she crosses the U.S.Canada border and becomes an international migrant. The border in this case formally defines people as migrants. Concrete visual objects (van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer 2005, 2), such as rivers, lakes, mountain ranges, and shorelines, as well as barbedwired fences and walls, often mark the border as a physical barrier. In this context the border is imagined as a line in Cartesian space, which people need to cross to be defined as migrant. It is seen as problematic when the border disappears as a visual object, as recently illustrated when U.S.Canada border officials were unable to locate the border because it was overgrown by forest. A Canadian official of the International Boundary Commission remarked, If you cant see the boundary, then you cant secure it (Alberts 2006). This aspect of the border, as this official noticed, is that of a line that cuts across the earths surface, and securing the border means preventing people from freely crossing this line. The aspect representing the border as a line in Cartesian space is, of course, located, partial, and incomplete. The very geometry of the line dissolves as migration flows are increasingly monitored remotely at airports, or along trucking routes before migrants reach the actual border line (Andreas and Biersteker 2003;
Walters 2006; Rumford 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2008), or at workplaces and in public spaces after they have crossed this line (e.g., Coleman 2007; Vaughan- Williams 2008). [B]orders are no longer at the border, Balibar (1998, 21718) observed; rather, they are dispersed (Balibar 1999). On

both sides of the U.S. Canada border, migration controls and politics have shifted scale from the physical border toward the body (Nevins 2002; Mountz 2004). A simple line on a map represents only a narrow and partial view of the border. In the context of the
U.S.Canada border, scholars have also noticed other aspects. For example, this border can also be conceived as state instrument to exercise sovereignty by managing migration. In her analysis of Canadian immigration law, Catherine Dauvergne (2007, 2008) called migration controls the last bastion of sovereignty. Some liberal political theorists concur that the border community and identity (Walzer 1983) and defend the right to property (Carens 1987; Cole 2000).5 In the case of Canada, the state also selects immigrants in an effort toward nation building and to stimulate economic development (e.g., Green and Green 1999; Li 2003).

is an instrument to protect political and civic order (Hobbes [1651] 1969; Rawls 1971), preserve the right to national Other scholarship has imagined the same border as a mechanism of labor exploitation. For many migrants, crossing the border into Canada is associated with a devaluation of their labor due to discrimination, cultural exclusion, nonrecognition of foreign credentials and experience, visa regulations, lack of status, and other factors (Preston 2003; Bauder 2006b; Sharma 2006).

Migrants who cross borders without the states permission are criminalized and relegated to the informal economy.6 According to this aspect, the Canadian border facilitates the control, disciplining, and exploitation of labor. A final example illustrates the situated and located nature of border aspect-seeing. International border scholarship has imagined borders as markers of distinction that delineate territories of shared cultural identity and practices (e.g., Newman and Paasi 1998). Drawing on Hannah Arendt, Williams (2006, 96) suggested that borders are constitutive of a toleration of difference and diversity in human societies. Newman and Paasi (1998, 194) evoke Bourdieus (1984) notion of distinction in the context of borders that separate those who belong from those who do not. This border aspect, however, might not be noticeable in relation to a section of the U.S.Canada border that slices through the Cascadian. This region can be seen as a space where people share a common state of mind (Sparke 2005, 58) that supposedly evolved from the regions distinct ecology (Alper 2005; Artibise 2005). Conversely, in other geographical contexts, a border might have physically disappeared but still functions as a mechanism of distinction. The DutchGerman border, for example, is open to people but continues to divide two nation states with different languages, norms, and habits (Struver 2005, 217). The preceding examples illustrate that border aspects are always located, partial, and incomplete representations of the border. The impossibility of uncovering an overarching ordering

principle that unifies various aspects of the border has presented a critical moment in an ongoing dialectic of the concept of the border, motivating researchers to continuously reanalyze, retheorize, and rethink borders. In the next section, I examine the dialectical movement of the border
concept in greater detail.

Critical geography
A combination of Critical Race Theory and Critical Geography studies is key to breaking down racial norms 3 Reasons Price 2010 [Patricia L. Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International
University, At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race in Progress in Human Geography 34(2) pages 153-154] Critical geographers of race and critical race theorists share common ground on at least three topics: the all-encompassing nature of race, debate over the primacy of the black/ white binary, and the utility of narrative. The fact that both geographers and legal scholars utilize these key ideas, while
at the same time they have not engaged substantially with each other, points to the genesis of these notions in a larger, interdisciplinary, broadly critical arena of contemporary race studies. Critical geographers of race and critical race theorists

have emphasized different aspects of these topics, employed different methodological approaches, and taken diverse political stances toward them. I will emphasize that critical geographers of race and critical race theorists can glean important insights from each others disciplinary engagement with these three topics. By bringing geography and CRT into conversation around these
three themes, I will both illustrate the value of specifi c interdisciplinary exchange, and provide a road map of sorts for the following section, which discusses the case of Elin Gonzlez utilizing insights from this exchange. 1 A wholly racialized world In an important article, geographer David Delaney one of the few geographers to substantively engage with CRT utilizes the writer

Toni Morrisons phrase, a wholly racialized world (Morrison, 1992: 4; quoted in Delaney, 2002: 6), to make the point that there is no outside to racial geographies (p. 7) and to pose the provocative question What does it mean for geographers to take this claim of a wholly racialized world seriously? (p. 6). Delaneys observation echoes, in a spatial register, the contentions of critical race theorists, which tend to be of a
historical nature. Though much of the scholarship on race has focused on the extraordinary Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, Jim Crow segregation in the USA, skinhead antiimmigrant violence across Europe CRT has insisted on the ordinary

quality of race in framing and shaping the world around us (Goldberg, 2002). As with all violence, racism is everyday; as with evil, the banality of racism is most shocking. [R]acism is ordinary, not aberrational normal science, the usual way society does business, the common, everyday experience of most people of color in this country (Delgado and Stefancic, 2001).
Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake, geographers who also substantively engage with CRT proper, make a similar observation:

Racialization is part of the normal, and normalized, landscape and needs to be analyzed as such (Kobayashi and Peake, 2000: 392; see also Schein, 2006). I will suggest that, for both critical geographers of race and critical race theorists, the challenge posed by Delaney to take the wholly racialized world seriously is at once theoretical, methodological, and political. For if race is all-encompassing, how can race be got beyond? If race is normalized to the point of invisibility, how can it be rendered visible? Critical geographic approaches to these questions have encompassed notions of scale, belonging, and displacement. Critical race theory has emphasized the historical trajectory of concession, and subsequent rescinding, of rights to non-whites. Both critical geographers and critical legal scholars have centralized activism in different forms, a point that I will take up in more detail in the conclusion. Critical geographers have long worked with concepts of inclusion and exclusion to contend that what, and who, is socially valued enjoys a presence in the landscape, while that and those who are devalued are kept out of sight (Sibley, 1992; Cresswell, 1996). People and places that are racialized or otherwize stigmatized are literally and figuratively erased from the official landscape (Kobayashi and Peake, 2000; Foote, 2003). Importantly, most if not all of these processes of erasure are legally facilitated, justified, and normalized.5 Racial segregation, for instance, keeps racially devalued populations away from those in power (or, alternately, allows for
spatial concentration by choice), and has long been a topic of study for geographers of varying critical bents (Li, 1998; Allen, 2002; Wright et al., 2005). Racialized ghettos, a long-standing form of spatial isolation, concentrate and

reinforce other dimensions of marginalization (Woods, 2002; Wilson, 2007). Literal removal from normative space, through incarceration, reservations, genocide/ethnic cleansing, and in the case of refugees and migrants deportation, are other, extreme forms of racialized displacement (Sparke, 1998; Coleman, 2005; Gregory, 2006; Anderson, 2007; Gilmore, 2007; Nevins, 2008).

Criminalization, through rendering a person or group outside the law (illegal), is a related strategy of removal from normative space a normativity defined in many aspects legislatively and one that has been the focus of much recent geographic scholarship that variously centralizes race (Coleman, 2007; Herbert, 2008; Hiemstra, 2008).

Rejecting a one-dimensional conception of the border challenges existing border practices and generates new material possibility Bauder 2011 (Harald, Academic Director, Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS)
Associate Professor, Graduate Program in Immigration & Settlement Studies, Dept. of Geography, Toward a Critical Geography of the Border: Engaging the Dialectic of Practice and Meaning, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 101, Iss. 5, 5/23/13)

The border is a polysemic and overdetermined geographical concept. In this article, I show that geographers and border scholars have been able to carefully distinguish among various aspects, capturing different material practices and meanings of the border. In fact, not conflating these aspects of the border into an abstract concept is an important task for critical geographic scholarship. Almost a half-century ago, Marcuse (1964, 88) observed that concepts such as freedom and equality have been used

uncritically as abstractions in an increasingly one-dimensional mass society. Geographers must

prevent the border concept from meeting a similar fate and continue their commitment to aspect-seeing related to geographical concepts such as that of the border (Aidun 1982). Moreover, geographers can critically engage in the border concept. Lefebvre (2001) observed that the possible always contradicts the real. This necessary contradiction constitutes a moment that geographers can use as an instrument (Lefebvre 2001, 769) to engage the border dialectic. In particular, they can articulate fresh meanings of the

border that challenge existing border practices and anticipate new material possibilities. The role of critical geography is precisely to facilitate the dawning of new border aspects and draw the atlases that make these aspects noticeable. Beck and Grande (2007, 17) proposed that the bordering of Europe is an open political project. In a similar European context, Rumford (2008, 10) remarked optimistically, Borderwork is less and less something over which people have no control. These commentaries point toward the possibility of democratic meanings and practices related to borders. A democratic border, however, should not be understood as a stable end condition but rather a located, partial, and incomplete aspect in the dialectical movement of the border concept. I have furthermore argued that the possibility of a border that regulates migration in a democratic manner requires envisioning the border as decoupled from the state. The possibility of a democratic border might, in fact, necessitate to invent another kind of state
(Bourdieu, in Grass and Bourdieu 2002, 71). The preceding discussion of the border concept is relevant to scholarly geographic practice in general. Aspect-seeing and exposing the contradictions of geographical concepts is of general concern for critical geographers, not only those examining borders. Moreover, the multidimensional and situated nature of material practices and

meanings related to geographical concepts permits critical geographical scholarship to engage actively in the dialectic of these concepts. Transformation is possible through the ruthless exposure of existing material practices and the articulation of meanings that inspire possible new practices. By rejecting onedimensional , eitheror thinking (Hyndman 2003), critical geographers can pursue democratic experimentalism in a world characterized by an open political horizon (Amin and Thrift 2005, 232) and at the same time stay involved and help focus (the) transformative potential (Smith 2005, 898) of social struggle. As conventional meanings of the border
are increasingly in flux and existing border practices are perceived to be insufficient to meet the needs of people, governments, businesses, migrants, and other groups (e.g., Balibar 1998), the proposal of fresh visions of the border presents a

particular opportunity for geography to assert its relevance. Critical geographers teaching at universities and colleges can play a particularly important role in presenting fresh geographical imaginations of borders to a broader audience that engages in everyday border practices (Bauder and Engel-Di Mauro 2008).Obviously, critical academic geographers are not the only agents engaging in the

dialectical movement of the border; the state, supranational organizations, the media, citizen groups, and multinational corporations are among the other influential players (e.g., Jensen and Richardson 2007; Rumford 2007, 2008). In the web of human relations, any efforts of proactive engagement will inevitably produce unintended consequences (Arendt [1958] 1998, 183). For example, although the spring 2006 protests, which I mentioned earlier, might have been inspired by a vision of democratic inclusion, the participants also reinforced the nation-state, which is the main institution responsible for their exclusion (Bauder 2006a, 2008; Pulido 2007). Despite the prospect of such unintended consequences, critical geographers and border scholars must stay engaged in the dialectical movement of the border concept, continue to reflect on their imaginations of the border, and present visions of the border that have the potential to translate into new possible material practices.

Critical ethnography
Our Alternative is to work within the framework of critical ethnographic. This effectively disrupts dominate power structures by locating the discourses silenced by state practice
Shapiro 97 (Prof of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographers, pages 30-32) Clearly the persistence of the strategic view is owed to more than reasons of state. Identityrelated territorial commitments and the cartographic imaginaries they produce at the level of representation are tied to ontological structures of self-recognition. The nation-state and its related world of Others persists in policy discourses because of ontological impulses that are dissimulated in strategic policy talk, articulations in which spatial predicates are unproblematic. To foreground the significance of ontology in warring violence and to heed the cartographic predicates of self-Other interpretations, space must be treated explicitly as a matter of practice. Rather than naturalizing spaces of enactment by focusing on the actions by which boundaries are policed, defended, and transgressedthe familiar focus of war and security studiesthe emphasis must be on the practices, discursive and otherwise, for constructing space and identity, on the ways that the self-alterity relationships are historically framed and played out. This emphasis requires an anthropological rather than a strategic approach to war, or, more specifically, ethnographic inquiries into how war is located among contending forces at social and cultural levels rather than
their interpretive predicates), an

strategic inquiries into how war is conducted logistically. While strategic approaches to warfare tend to be explanatory in emphasis (and indeed tend to suppress

ethnographic focus is more concerned with the interpretive practices that sustain the antagonistic predicates of war. Moreover, a critical ethnography attempts to disrupt dominant interpretations by locating the silenced remainders of various discourses. Rather than naturalizing the boundaries by which states maintain their control over the representations of global issues , the focus involves both criticism and recovery. It is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous Others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence, and second at disclosing other forms of affiliation uncoded in stateoriented interpretations. A focus on ontological investments rather than the strategic aspects of warring violence turns our attention to the identity dimensions imposed on interpretations of enemy-Others. To elaborate this identity significance in terms of the Euro- and Native American encounters I have discussed, it should be noted that the erasure of indigenous peoples, in fact and in representation, has been part of the self-recognition by which state societies have territorialized and stabilized their identities. In recent years, however,
instabilities in the territorial frames on which nation- states have relied have highlighted the identity stakes attached to state spatial practices, while at the same time making them more contentious. Given the heightened identity anxieties that this instability has produced, it is a propitious time to investigate the significance of those stakes in relation to modern state warfare. An

examination of indigenous societies, which have tended to foreground the ontological investments and the identity stakes of warfare to which they give rise, provides an effective, distancing strategy, a way to make that which has been all too familiar appear strange, or at least historically contingent.

Anthropology Study of Borders

The alternative is to engage in an anthropological study of bordersonly way to understand the formations of hegemonic relationships in international relations Wilson and Donnan 98 [Thomas M., The Queen*s University of Belfast, Hastings, The
Queen*s University of Belfast, Border identities: Nation and state at international frontiers, pg. 34.] The growing interest of social scientists in the structure and function of international borders, and in the lives of border peoples and communities, has increasingly demonstrated the dialectical relationships between borders and their states - relationships in which border regions often have a critical impact on the formation of nations and states. These relationships are like many between the state and its regions, and they
remain one of the most important and least understood in the general scholarship of nations and states, which too often takes a topdown view in which all power flows from the 'centre'. Perhaps more so than colleagues in other disciplines, anthropologists are well placed to view borders from both local and national perspectives, from the distance of capital cities to the villages of border areas (or, indeed, in those metropolitan centres - such as Jerusalem and Nicosia - which are themselves divided by international borders). An

anthropology of borders is distinctive in a number of ways (Donnan and Wilson 1994). Anthropological theories and methods enable ethnographers to focus on local communities at international borders in order to examine the material and symbolic processes of culture. This focus on everyday life, and on the cultural constructions which give meaning to the boundaries between communities and between nations, is often absent in the wider perspectives of the other social sciences. The anthropology of borders is one perspective in political anthropology which reminds social scientists outside the discipline, and some within it, that nations and states, and their institutions, are composed of people who cannot or should not be reduced to the images which are constructed by the state, the media or of any other groups who wish to represent them. The anthropological study of the everyday lives of border communities is simultaneously the study of the daily life of the state, whose agents there must take an active role in the implementation of policy and the intrusion of the state's structures into its people's lives. When ethnographers study border peoples, they do so with the intention of narrating the experiences of people who often are comfortable with the notion that they are tied culturally to many other people in neighbouring states. An anthropology of borders simultaneously explores the cultural permeability of borders, the adaptability of border peoples in their attempts ideologically to construct political divides, and the rigidity of some states in their efforts to control the cultural fields which transcend their borders.

Anthropologists thus study the social and economic forces which demand that a variety of political and cultural boundaries be constructed and crossed in the everyday lives of border people. The anthropology of borders has a long but not very deep history, which began in many ways with Barth's (1969) paradigmatic ideas on ethnic boundaries, but which owes just as much to work that, although not specifically focused on culture, nation and state at international borders, nevertheless showed the value of localised studies for the understanding of how cultural landscapes are superimposed across social and political divides (see, for example, Cohen 1965 and Frankenberg 1989 [1957]). Historical and ethnological studies (as collected, for example, in Bohannan and Plog 1967) also helped to develop this interest, though it was only in the 1970s as anthropologists began to address issues of nationalism, political economy, class, migration and the political disintegration of nations and states that a distinctive body of anthropological work on international borders emerged. Following the ground-breaking research in the Italian Tyrol by Cole and Wolf (1974) on the durability of cultural frontiers long after the political borders of state and empire had shifted, anthropologists began to use their field research at international or interstate borders as a means of widening perspectives in political anthropology to encompass the formal and informal ties between local communities and the larger polities of which they are a part (in ways so clearly solicited by many of the most influential anthropologists of their time, such as Wolf (1966) and Boissevain (1975)). They have accomplished this in a variety of ways: some have looked at how international borders have influenced local culture (Douglass 1977, Heyman 1991, Kavanagh 1994) or have created the conditions which have shaped new rural and urban communities (Alvarez 1991, Price 1973 and 1974); others have examined nation- and state-building (Aronoff 1974, Kopytoff 1987, Pettigrew 1994); and yet others have focused on people who choose or are forced to move across borders (Alvarez 1994, Alvarez and Collier 1994, Hann and Hann 1992, Hansen 1994, Malkki 1992). Recent studies have concentrated on the symbols and meanings which encode border life (see, for example, Lask 1994, Lavie 1990, Shanks 1994, Stokes 1994). Regardless of theoretical orientation or locale, however, most of these studies have focused on how social relations, defined in part by the state, transcend the physical limits of the state and, in so doing, transform the structure of the state at home and its relations with its neighbours. Anthropological attention

to the ways in which local developments have an impact on national centres of power and hegemony has been influenced in part by historical analyses of localities and the

construction of national identities (see, for example, Sahlins 1989). These analyses are indicative of the need to view the anthropology of borders as historical anthropology. Borders are spatial and temporal records of relationships between local communities and between states. Ethnographic explorations of the relationship between symbolic and political or juridical boundaries are salient beyond anthropology because of what they may tell us of the history of cultural practices as well as the role of border cultures and communities in policy-making and diplomacy. For example, Driessen's study (1992) of the Spanish enclave in Morocco, at the interface of two states and two

continents, provides a history of the creation and maintenance of a variety of identities in an urban border zone, but also suggests how local forces have influenced the Spanish state. Borneman's analysis (1991, 1992a) of kin and state in Berlin before and after the dramatic changes of a few years ago problematises the divergent 'national' traditions of law and social policy in East and West Germany in terms of generational adaptations to the new, 'unified' state. These books are perhaps the best recent examples of the growing importance of a border perspective in political anthropology, in which the dialectical relations between border areas and their nations and states take precedence over local culture viewed with the state as a backdrop.

An anthropological study of borders reveals the root of state-based relationships Wilson and Donnan 98 [Thomas M., The Queen*s University of Belfast, Hastings, The
Queen*s University of Belfast, Border identities: Nation and state at international frontiers, pg. 79.]
Despite the large and growing literature on the anthropology of borders, there has been little comparative research and little in the way of anthropological theories of border regions. This parallels the situation in other social sciences, as summarised by Prescott (1987: 8): Attempts to produce a set of reliable theories about international boundaries have failed. Attempts to devise a set of procedures by which boundaries can be studied have been successful. This is due in part to a misconception about what it is that might be theorised. The theoretical importance of an anthropology of borders lies primarily in what it might reveal about the interplay

between nation and state, and about the role of the border in the past, present and future of nation and state. As such, an anthropology of borders sits squarely within the wider anthropology of nationalism (for a review of the relationship between the concepts of nation and state, in anthropology and
in other disciplines, see Grillo 1980). It is our view that the more anthropologists objectify border cultures and communities in ethnographic study, the less able they will be to trace the relationships among culture, power and the state, thereby missing a valuable opportunity to contribute to the wider social science of nationalism. Given the long tradition of anthropological analysis of the evolution of the state, in archaeology as well as in social and cultural anthropology, it is surprising how few anthropological studies of borders focus principally on the modern nation-state and nationalism. Here anthropologists' reticence to problematise 'nation' and 'state' as the terms of reference for local studies of society and culture plays a part (cf. Alonso 1994). 'Nation' and 'state' are concepts which do not readily fit classic anthropological notions about cultures, because all three concepts are seen by many people to share the same properties of integrity, unity, linearity of time and space, and discreteness. Nevertheless, anthropologists have made many important and

lasting contributions to the comparative study of culture and power among nations and states. Among the most influential have been studies of the origins of nationalism (Gellner 1983); nationalist ideologies (Verdery 1991;

Fox 1990); nation- and state-building (Wolf 1959; Lofgren 1995); states and empires (Mintz 1972; Wolf 1982); and post-colonial states (Geertz 1973). Over the last generation political anthropology has increasingly turned to the analysis of the roles of state institutions at local levels, the impact of policies on localities, and the symbolic constructions of ethnicity and nation which are often treated as aspects of 'identity'. But difficulties in problematising nation and state remain for many anthropologists. As Handler points out with reference to Quebecois identity, the nation may be perceived as bounded, continuous and homogeneous, but the current content of

national identity is continuously contested and negotiated (1988: 32; see also Handler 1994). In this view, a

'culture' is simultaneously objectified, an entity associated with a place and owned by a people, and subjectified, a context for relations which seek the realisation of the idealised goals intrinsic to the objectified culture. We recognise that the state is also simultaneously a form of objectified and subjectified culture. While the subjective and constructed notions of culture have become

for many anthropologists the principal means of understanding national identities, we must not

forget that the institutions and the agents of the state, as well as the representatives of national and international capital, see themselves as objective entities with concrete, bounded and unilinear goals. Simply put, the state is an object whose reality will be

denied if we focus exclusively on deconstructed representations of it, and nowhere is this more apparent than at borders, where the powers of the state are monumentally inscribed. Nations and

their individuated members may be in a perpetual condition of becoming, but this is only partially true of the state. The state exists. Its institutions and representatives make and enforce the laws which regiment most daily activities of its citizens and residents, in direct relations of cause and effect. Border peoples, because of their histories, and objectified and subjectified cultures, not only have to deal with the institutions of their own state, but with those institutions of the state or states across the border, entities of equal and sovereign power which overshadow all border relations. An anthropology of borders is simultaneously one of a nation's

history and of a state's frontiers. In our assessment of the theoretical and disciplinary implications of an anthropology of
international borders in the contemporary world, it may be worth recalling how such borders differ from those in stateless societies. Considering Turner's frontier thesis in relation to Africa, Kopytoff (1987) suggests that the term 'border' must include the notion of shifting margins if it is to accommodate the particularities of a situation where it is people and not land that are seen as relatively scarce.

Much like the traditional Southeast Asian state (see Carsten, this volume), social formations and their frontiers in West Africa arguably developed in response to a need to bring ever greater numbers of people within their domain. Governance of people rather than place thus characterised large parts of pre-colonial Africa. But as the government of people gave way to the government of territory, so the need for clearly bounded divisions of ownership and control correspondingly increased, and land came to be seen as something potentially valuable and of limited availability. These new borders still operated as part of 'a relation between people and space,

but where the space is finite, and the centre can control a more or less continuous boundary, such relationships change, and the border becomes a state weapon' (Tonkin 1994: 27). Territoriality thus
became one of the first conditions of the state's existence, and the sine qua non of its borders.

Nonviolent Geography
The entrenchment of violence can only be combatted by the teaching of nonviolence- the repositioning of geographical is a key step to construct a discipline for peace Megoran 11

[Nick, Studies political geography of nationalism in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan-School of Geography, Politics and Sociology- Newcastle University, Political Geography 30 178-189] On the first point, I do believe that academic scholarly analysis should aim at objectivity, if that means

seeking to speak as truthfully and cogently as humanly possible about the nature of things in a way that leaves us open to question our own presuppositions in the light of what we find.
But I do not believe we should or can stand outside of commitments. The inconsistency in Hollands own argument amply demonst rates that. He opines that violence is something that occurs in the world, and political geographers

should join Reinhold Niebuhr and President Obama in recognising that force may sometimes be necessary. It is inconsistent that supporting nonviolence can be seen as advocacy, whereas following Niehburs realism and advocating the violence of the just war is simply unbiased and a recognition of history. The second point, that nonviolence is nave because in reality violence occurs in the world, shows a
fundamental misunderstanding of nonviolence. Of course violence occurs in the world: that is the point of nonviolence!

Nonviolence argues that it is better, for whatever reason, to resist violence by breaking the cycle of retaliation that mars so much of our world. In countering critiques that his radical pacifist interpretation of
Christs teaching was unrealistic, Tolstoy retorted It is as though drunkards when advised how they could become sober, were to reply that the advice was unsuitable to their alcoholic condition (Tolstoy, 1905: 57)! Niebuhr used the example of Hitlerism (Niebuhr,1940): so let us consider that as a counter example. On February 27, 1943, Berlins remaining 1500e2000 Jewish husbands of German wives were rounded up and brought to a holding centre at Rosenstrasse 2e4. By the early hours of the next day their wives and other relatives had discovered their location and began to congregate at the gate of the detention centre to protest. Over the next fortnight the family and other supporters swelled the number to 6000. The SS and police tried unsuccessfully to disperse them (Stoltzfus, 1996; for a rejection of the interpretation of these events as a protest, see Evans, 2009: 271e272). By firing on the crowd the authorities could swiftly have cleared the women away and ended their protest. But fearing the impact on support for Germanys faltering foreignwars, the regime calculated that this was too risky a step to take, and on March 6th Goebbels ordered their release. As Heinz Ullstein, one of the arrested men, was later to put it, Scared by an incident which had no equal in the history of the Third Reich, headquarters consented to negotiate, and the prisoners were released (Sharp, 1973: 88e90): the 25 already dispatched to Auschwitz were released. Such an example is hopeful, instructive, but also tragic. It is hopeful and instructive in that it shows how, through concerted action, the regime that has become themythical touchstone against which all rational action be measured suffered tactical defeats against nonviolent actions. It is tragic in that it is exceptional. If the mass of Berlins women had decamped outside Hitlers prisons to protest the arrest of all Jewish men, Nazism could never hav e perpetrated the crimes that it did. But it is scarcely fair to berate the German people for that. Nonviolence, like violence, is

taught. Successful nonviolence is a tactic that demands training, instruction, and practice. It requires strategic and tactical understanding, theorisation, leadership, vision, organisation, materials, and hard work, over the long run and preferably in peacetime. Here, we are at a disadvantage. Most countries on earth have one or more military academies to teach people how to resolve their problems through violence. Militaries are well-financed, legitimised through myriad performances of close relationships with the state, and glamourised in popular culture. There exist in comparison pitiful resources to train people in nonviolence. In our research, our teaching, our public engagement, we as geographers could do a little to begin redressing that imbalance, to contribute towards building cultures of peace and practices of nonviolence, and in so doing reposition geography as a discipline for peace (Dalby, 2010: 285).

A reconceptualization of geography as a tool for promoting peace is a necessary step to transition away from the militant violence agenda Megoran 11

[Nick, Studies political geography of nationalism in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan-School of Geography, Politics and Sociology- Newcastle University, Political Geography 30 178-189] Our first task is to better conceptualise peace. What have different geographers meant by it at

different times? The consideration of power is crucial here: who are definitions of peace for? What do they do? This naturally will engage with much material outside the traditional disciplinary ambits of political geography, in social and economic geography. There is much scope
for a fuller historical review of this literature, and here Richmonds work in international relations theory could serve as the model for a

geography PhD or monograph. A

more difficult question to answer is to what extent a generic concept of positive peace is possible or necessary to frame a research agenda that is both political and intellectual. In this paper I have elided that question by arguing that the unifying focus should be the praxis of nonviolence: but the question nonetheless demands fuller consideration than has been possible here. Likewise, in order to conceptualise peace, it will be necessary to map its multiple relationships to violence. As many of the examples cited herein demonstrate, the two conceptual fields are closely linked. I do not argue that we should not study war, militarism, and other forms of violence: rather, that peace should be identified as the goal of all such research, and that it would be the beneficiary of the same empirical rigour, intellectual sophistication and critical reflection. Secondly, our goal ought not simply be to understand peace, but to make a commitment to it. This is a commitment to researching peace: understanding the geographical conditions whereby peace in its fullest senses is lived, created, sustained, and struggled for. Part of the challenge - and this is particularly the challenge in masculinist political geographye is that this isnt
glamorous. As YiFu Tuan lamented, War, with its rich cast of heroes and villains, politicians and generals, is exciting, wherea s peace e the daily life of nameless folks - is boring (Tuan, 2002: 124). But it is also a commitment to building peace, or at least helping build cultures of understanding in which peace can be heard and can flourish. We

can do this through our critical involvement with movements we study, in teaching, and by public engagement. This will involve reflecting on the nature of our own commitments, and the possibilities for collective engagement. This argument is intended to initiate debate as to what an agenda for peace in geography might include: it does not claim to be an
exhaustive overview. Rather, it has presented selective historical snapshots and identified corners of the discipline where peace debates are e or ought to be e vibrant. Clearly, it has many lacunae: a peace agenda could profitably engage literatures

within geography on themes such as cosmopolitanism (Harvey, 2009) and care (Cloke, May, & Johnsen, 2010), as well as more obvious topics including diplomacy (Henrikson, 2005) and UN Peacekeeping (Grundy-Warr,

1994). Beyond our discipline, literatures such as that within political science on democratic/capitalist peace (Mousseau, 2009), or peace traditions within other religions such as Judaism (Greenberg, 2004) or Islam (Huda, 2010), are also clearly relevant. The question of praxis needs pushing much further than it has been here, too. For example, in the ugly competition for resources, the ungainly

push for promotion, and the macho performance in defending research findings or attacking the views of others, geography departments, conferences and journals can become spaces of pride, aggression and intimidation. What would a more peaceable practice of the geographical profession look like? It is hoped that this papers many omissions, as well as its inclusions, will be productive of further debate. In his classic 1885 intervention on what geography ought to be, Kropotkin wrote: In our time of wars, of national self-conceit, of national jealousies and hatreds ably nourished by people who pursue their own egotistic, personal or class interests, geography must be - in so far as the school may do anything to counterbalance hostile influences - a means of dissipating these prejudices and of creating other feelings more worthy of humanity (Kropotkin, 1885: 956) As a body of scholars, we have risen far more ably to the
negative task of dissipating than to the positive charge of creating: we are better at researching war than peace. For our discipline to play a serious role in addressing the problems wracking twenty-first century humanity, it is imperative that this imbalance be redressed.

Denizenry Abandon Citizenship

The alternative is denizenryabandoning political citizenship renders borders useless
Eyssens 2008 [Terry, PhD candidate in Philosophy in the School of Behavioural & Social Sciences & Humanities @ U. of Ballarat,
Democracy of the Civil Dead: The Blind Trade in Citizenship Transformations, Vol. 16, http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_16/article_03.shtml]

The denizenry: (exposure) As the most common and recognisable form of homo sacer and bare life, Agamben sees the refugee as the central figure of our political history (Means Without End 22). As such, he argues that the increase of people who are no longer representable inside the nation-state threatens its very foundations (21-22). He writes that, industrialized> countries face ... a permanently resident mass of non-citizens who do not want to be and cannot be either naturalized or repatriated. These non-citizens often have nationalities of origin, but, inasmuch as they prefer not to benefit from their own states protection, they find themselves as refugees, in a condition of de facto statelessness ... denizens (Means Without End 23). Agamben argues that, as a neologism, denizens has the merit of showing how the concept of citizen is no longer adequate for describing the socio-political reality of modern states (23) [17]. He then expands on the theme, beyond the situation in which statelessness is imposed or, in other ways involuntary, to that in which citizens effectively opt out (or desert from) constitutional political participation. He writes that these people show an evident propensity to turn into denizens, into noncitizen permanent residents (23). Criticism of Agambens work has focused on the idea that the state of exception invests all structures
of power and eradicates any experience and definition of democracy (Negri) and on the unrealistic bifurcation of the population into two halves: political beings and bare life (Ong 22). Ong argues that in this rigid binary opposition, Agamben seems to preclude the possibility of non-rights mediation or complex distinctions that can buttress claims for moral protection and legitimacy (23). However, in the figure of the denizen, we do not find this bifurcation. She is a political being inhabiting (at least some of) the

conditions of bare life. And the stance of the denizen seems to include the possibility of non-rights mediation. The denizen can also be seen as an example of how, as Negri has noted, Agambens analysis can be realist and revolutionary (The Ripe Fruit of Redemption). Still, there are limitations. The denizens conscious or unconscious acceptance of the exposure of a state of exception, and the ban, and a refusal of the enclosure of laws, rights and citizenship could not be said to inhabit a realm of political life (as Arendt would have it). This acceptance, as residing in consciousness (or
unconsciousness), does not amount to political action. However, if the figure of the denizen contains the possibility of the adoption the taking up of a political position of exposure, exception and the ban and of the refusal of enclosure in the laws, rights and citizenship inscribed into the state order, the possibility for a different experience and definition of democracy could be opened. How long

will it be before citizens more deliberately renounce citizenship of their countries of birth, to become conscious denizens, because states of exception and the suspension or denial of civil rights has rendered being a citizen of that state meaningless? Until now the act of denying citizenship of a state to certain native born residents has been exercised only by states. Agamben claims that the refugee, in breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and ... between nativity and nationality ... brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis (21). If this is so, what then would the
presence of deliberate denizens who inhabit a legal space like that of the refugee and who refuse the refuge of their own states laws and rights mean for the integrity of the state? The presence of large groups of rights rejecters within the

state would firstly reduce the efficacy of anything like a blind trade. The state would need to either

present or force through exceptional measures without pleas and appeals to the security of a contract, or would have to abandon them.

Regardless of the possible strategies of governments in response to such a situation, the denizen contains the potential to change a political situation whether they represent a ruinous rupture in
the political fabric, or whether they represent a new kind of bug that a state has to learn how to swat. This question cannot be answered until, or unless, or if, enough denizens take such a stance. If nothing else, to consciously take up a position of

exposure and the ban is to embrace the possibility of inscribing a political life as being open to all, free in such a way that (as with the medieval outlaw) the state is opened up to contestation. To invoke the denizen as a notion of political life and activity is not to call for a return to or re-creation of the classical Greek ideal of life devoted to matters of the polis
(Arendt, The Human Condition 13). Such retrospective consciousness of a lost archaic community is of an ideal community that has

never taken place along the lines of our projections (Nancy 10-11). And so, its impossible. Jean-Luc Nancy argues that such an ideal repeats the mistake of the thinking of community as essence which is effectively the closure of the political, rather than thinking of a being in common as exposure, openness and sharing (xxxviii). For Nancy, this being in common means ... no

longer having, in any form, in any empirical or ideal place ... a substantial identity and sharing this ... lack of identity (xxxviii). The denizen is a political being without a political identity. That is, without an identity associated with a (closed) community or state. The denizenry is being in common rather than
a being in essence. The invocation of the denizen is not to invoke the polis as a physical location or ideal community but as being in common of acting, speaking and sharing and, as a response to the call to be a polis (Arendt, The Human Condition 198). In a similar way, the invocation can be understood as a response to an understanding of the word democracy, of which we are legatees, and which has been addressed to us for centuries (Derrida 8-9), and under which political life is more than merely holding rights or opinions. This understanding cannot but reject the existence of a blind trade. In recognising the blind trade as a means of

keeping citizens enclosed in the reciprocal illusion of the social contract and as a veil behind which the state of exception and bare life can become more prevalent, we open the way for its rejection. This rejection is a gesture on the way to taking up a position of exposure, which can be understood as a position which opens towards a being in common or a community without community (Nancy 71) or a even a democracy to come (Derrida 8). The denizen allows us to imagine the possibility to engage in political action and activity as one might in a polis, without the enclosure of rights and identity that are inscribed in our received liberal and classical notions. In the figure of the denizen is the possibility to be a polis. The denizen opens the way for a response to the erosion of civil rights in liberal democracies that does not rely on the logic that makes that erosion possible.

Cuba - Archipelagraphy
Archipelagraphy exposes the colonial history of the Carribbean Stratford et al. 11 [Elaine, Ph.D. Philosophy, Professor, Geography and International Studies at UTasmania; Godfrey
Baldacchino, Ph.D. Sociology/Anthropology, Professor, Island Studies Program, U of Prince Edward Island; Elizabeth McMahon, Ph.D. Literature, Associate Professor, School of English, Media, and Performing Arts at U of New South Wales; Carol Farbotko, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, U of Wollongong; Andrew Harwood, Research Fellow, School of Geography and Environmental Studies at UTasmania, Envisioning the Archipelago, Island Studies Journal 6(2)] Returning to Bentez-Rojo and the possibilities that adhere to Chaos and the archipelago, it is useful to note that this is a

unique assemblage (DeLanda, 2006; Deleuze & Guattari, 1986) and a complex ecology (Botkin, 1989; Haila & Dyke, 2006), whereby bits and pieces achieve significance in relation to others (Law & Mol, 1995: 276). The significance of the assemblage is ontogenic: it is not simply a gathering, a collection, a composition of things that are believed to fit together. Assemblages act in concert: they actively map out, select, piece together, and allow for the conception and conduct of individual units as members of a group. Deleuze & Guattari (1986) use the example of constellations: assemblages of heavenly bodies that, like Orion the Hunter, take on one (or more) recognizable forms only when their wholeness arises out of a process of articulating multiple elements by establishing connections amongst them. An archipelago is similar: its framing as such and such an assemblage draws our attention to the ways in which practices, representations, experiences, and affects articulate to take a particular dynamic form (Slack & Wise, 2005: 129). Perhaps, at least as conceptual manifestations, archipelagos are fluid
cultural processes, sites of abstract and material relations of movement and rest, dependent on changing conditions of articulation or connection. DeLoughrey (2001: 23) is an early proponent of the need for such liquid narratives: in her case, in relation to island migrations that speak to the rosaries of archipelagos that are the Pacific and Caribbean: [blockquote] no island is an isolated isle and a system of archipelagraphythat is, a historiography that considers chains of islands in fluctuating relationship to their

surrounding seas, islands and continentsprovides

a more appropriate metaphor for reading island cultures. Not surprisingly, writers from the Caribbean and Pacific such as Edouard Glissant, Epeli Hauofa, and Derek Walcott have called for a cartography of archipelagoes that maps the complex ebb and flow of immigration, arrival, and of island settlement. [end blockquote] Assuredly, an archipelagic turn is salient in the Pacific: the first ocean to be settled, the last major island region to be colonized by the West, and the one that has proportionately witnessed most indigenous people survive the fatal impact (Moorehead, 1990). The Pacific was probably the site of the development of the worlds
first ocean-going vessels and navigation systems, and the original settling of and travel between the islands, from which emerged powerful collective identities, as well as shared myths and languages (Nunn, 2009).

Viewing islands within an archipelago exposes the history of colonialism that forms the basis of the US-Cuba relationship Pugh 13 [Jonathan, Ph.D. Geography from ULondon, Senior Academic Fellow at the School of
Geography, Politics, and Sociology at Newcastle University, Island Movements: Thinking with the Archipelago, Island Studies Journal 8(1)] The question then, is how can thinking with the archipelago change how we think about the world and our place in it? Firstly, I claim that Envisioning the archipelago both reflects and contributes to an increasingly prominent theme in the contemporary social sciences and humanities; namely, the spatial turn. Thinking with the archipelago denaturalizes space so that space is more than the mere backcloth for political or ethical debate. Instead, reflective of a spatial turn in thinking, it emphasizes more fluid tropes of assemblages (Tsai, 2003), mobilities, and multiplicities associated with islandisland movements. Secondly, thinking with the archipelago foregrounds what I further suggest to be a trope of metamorphosis. What I mean by this idea is that, following the St Lucian Nobel Prize winner Derek Walcott (1974a; 1974b; 1986; 1991; 1992; 1998), we can observe how island movements adapt, transfigure and transform their inheritances into original form. As some initial illustrations of this transformation, the Caribbean carnival, religion, folklore and food are not imitations of something else: through the island-chain movement they all express a transfigurative originality. We are of course not just talking here about the inventive cultures or religions of the

archipelago, but also

its politics and material forms. To highlight such concerns will require explaining how thinking with the archipelago takes us beyond reductive categories that diminish islands to states of mimicry; to instead foreground how island-island movements and middle passages are cognitive spaces of metamorphosis in their
own right. As I will explain in my analysis, this idea does not however take us down the line of Bentez-Rojos (1996) repeating island; rather, in the work of Walcott it stresses themes of creativity. Here we can further remind ourselves that the word archipelago can be broken down into the Arch (the Greek signifying original, principal) and pelago (deep, abyss, sea). I therefore conclude this paper with how, for me, thinking with the archipelago foregrounds how island movements are generative and inter-connective spaces of metamorphosis, of material practices, culture and politics.

Archipelagy breaks down dichotomies that construct islands as vulnerable this notion informs all of US/Cuba relations Pugh 13 [Jonathan, Ph.D. Geography from ULondon, Senior Academic Fellow at the School of
Geography, Politics, and Sociology at Newcastle University, Island Movements: Thinking with the Archipelago, Island Studies Journal 8(1)] Stratford et al. (2011, p. 118) say that in the field of island studies, the archipelago remains one of the least examined metageographical concepts. To then start with a definition of the archipelago, they usefully outline their conceptualization of it by positioning this against how islands have tended to be previously studied: Certain limitations arise from the persistent consideration of two common relations of islands in the humanities and social sciences: land and sea, and island and continent/mainland. What remains largely absent or silent are ways of being, knowing and doingontologies, epistemologies and methodsthat illuminate island spaces as inter-related, mutually constituted and co-constructed: as island and island (ibid.). Their point is that the study of islands has too often focused upon boundaries and dichotomies, and fixated upon borders: land and sea, island and mainland. Their response is to encourage us to emphasize instead the connections between island and island and, therefore, to consider how the notion of the archipelago unsettles static tropes of singularity, isolation, dependency and peripherality that presently dominate how islands are conceptualized in the literature. For Stratford et al. the question is, as they say, ontological. When they write that an emphasis upon archipelagos is a form of counter-mapping (Stratford et al., 2011, p. 121) they are referring to producing better maps through more effective empirical research and methodological practices, and seeking to operate on an ontological land fundamental level.

Impacts

Root cause - war

The purpose of the other is only to affirm the identity of the oppressor. The creation of state identity is only possible through antagonizing the other Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, p. 42-45)
The state is therefore the individual in macrocosm for the purpose of understanding the necessity for a coherence-inducing negation. And Hegel is explicit about the analogy: "The state is an individual, and individuality essentially implies negation."10 Hegelian (i.e., spiritualized and individualized) states need enemies for their health and solidarity. And Hegel extends this principle to groups of states. These aggregates are also like individuals, needing negation to maintain their coherence: " Even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy. " Despite his position on war as a "necessity," Hegel disparages particular hostilities and registers himself in opposition to overzealous destruction during war. Again treating states as individuals, he emphasizes the mechanism of mutual recognition through which states are sustained in their autonomy. This exchange of recognition continues during war and functions to inhibit war's duration and destructive aim. Although his language is descriptive, Hegel's commitments to state interdependence and mutual respect, parallel with his views on civic life* should

allow the reader to infer an advocacy of limiting war's aims so that "the possibility of peace be retained" and that "war not be waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life, or against persons in their private capacity."12 These inhibitions Hegel wants to apply to war, like his eager acceptance of war as a vital necessity, derive from his philosophy of identity, which he applies consistently across various levels of aggregation from individuals through states to state alliance groups. It is therefore misleading and simplistic to regard Hegel's advocacy of war as an attitude or a direct discursive performance. It is more appropriate to say that Hegel supplies an ontological justification for war. Whatever

the claims particular states make to justify warseeking to increase their protection, to settle grievances or acquire resourcesHegel's interest is in the affirmation they achieve as states by experiencing the "negation" of war through the violent confrontation with another autonomous entity. We are therefore left with an apparent paradox: the Hegelian war enemy is an object of desire. But if we conceive of "desire"
in its Hegelian sense, elaborately explicated in Alexandre Kojeve's influential lectures on Hegel, paradox yields to consistency and comprehension.

Hegelian desire is reflexive. It is not an emotional projection outward toward an object or person. It is aimed against the other in a way that allows its projection back toward the self. It is what brings a person back to herself or himself. It is animated by a resistance to being absorbed into the object.13 Through desire a person becomes a conscious and autonomous "I."14 The external object therefore serves as a force of resistance to be overcome through the action of negation. The individual negates alterity's independence and absorbs it into the I. Desire is not merely a "sentiment of self," something to be satisfied as in the case of an
alterity are aimed at self-recognition, which is a nonbiological desire.16 The

animal desire such as hunger; it is precisely resistance to a fall into animal (i.e., nonself-conscious) nature. Desire moves toward nonbeing or nonnatural dependence by revealing and creating the "I"15 and thus achieving autonomy and freedom. Rather than being enslaved by the object, one's confrontations with

Hegelian enemy, as an object of desire, is therefore an opportunity for the self-affirmation of the state body, an essential moment in the production of its coherence through a recognition of its autonomy and freedom. The Hegelian
ontological impetus toward war is exemplary. Hegel is both instructive about the significance of identity attachments and an exemplar of one committed to the kind of collective identity coherence that translates as a commitment to a strong nationalism. Therefore, rather than allowing Hegel to merely instruct as though he provides a detached philosophical stance, we can also treat his commitment as a datum and seek to discern the pervasiveness of his form of desire; we can learn as much from what he manifests as from the objects of attention in his writing. Allowing Hegel an exemplary role, we can locate his kind of attachment to war in a more general cultural production of antagonism in which enemy/Others become acceptable indeed, desirabletargets of violence for ontological rather than merely utilitarian reasons. Antagonistic

Others serve as objects to perpetuate the identity of those who locate them as oppositional. This is the case for individuals as well as for collectivities such as peoples, nations, and states. Taking instruction from the broad outlines of this Hegelian model, Edward Said notes that the construction of identity requires an oppositional Other, for the struggles between peoples have involved contention over "historical and social meaning" as much as over territorial control.17 In the case of war, the use of the oppositional Other involves a more intense and higherstakes identity confrontation. But in the case of the modern state, this dimension of the antagonism is often difficult to discern because it tends to be overcoded with strategic rationales.

Leaders use national interest as a justification for the creation good/evil dichotomies with the other
Agathangelou 04 [Anna, University of HoustonClear-Lake and Global Change Institute Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11 International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 517538] Those at the margins of world politics understand violence. They negotiate with it daily. Yet elites, whether led by Bush or bin Laden, exploit violence to afx collective identities, forge a common political project, and subsume dissent. In this way, they deny opportunities for transformation in exchange for more violence. Nine days after the September 11 attacks, George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress to outline Americas war on terror and to nger Osama bin Laden as its chief suspect. Bin Laden responded with a videotape broadcasted on October
7 by Al-Jazeera television based in Qatar. Although from opposing camps, the two speeches share remarkable similarities. Each leader targets the other as the cause of violence and destruction in the world, generally, and against their own country or people, specically. They declare that the other must be defeated or killed.

Each leader presents the national Self as innocent, victimized, virtuous, moral, and rational; the enemy Other, as demonic, murderous, and radically barbaric. Both leaders conclude that militarization must be globalized as the only moral imperative to achieving national security, couched as taking care of ones
own.

Nations seek to reconcile internal aspects of their existence that are contradictory to an ideal national identity that is generated by the creation and reinforcement of boundaries. This results in violence internal and external to the nation state. Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, p. 58-59)
In combining the Freudian and Hegelian emphases on the problem of the subject, Lacan helps us to understand what I have called Clausewitz's aggressive misrecognition. Like the Hegelian subject, the Lacanian subject seeks a coherent selfhood and uses alterity in the service of that aim. However, unlike Hegel, who posited a wholly successful narrative of the development of a continuously more selfconscious and coherent subject, Lacan emphasized the Freudian dissimulating mechanisms whereby

the subject dwells in misapprehensions, projecting meanings on objects as a result of irreconcilable incoherences within its aims. These incoherences are related to the misrecognition of aspects of otherness within the subjectfor example, the masculine subject who seeks to recognize its aspects of the feminine and at the same time to avoid that recognition and maintain an unambiguously masculine self-interpretation. This troubling disjuncture can produce aggressiveness as the subject focuses on the world rather than its own coherence problem, thus "throwing back onto the world the disorder of which it is composed."45 The turn to Lacan to investigate the ontological dimension of warfare is appropriate, therefore, because the various displacements and projections through which objects of violence are interpretively selected are at issue, and because this interpretive dynamic operates in relation to the ontological interest of the subject. This frame can be applied to collective models of subjectivity as well. Just as Hegel took his view of the necessity for negation from the level of the individual to that of the state, we can move the Lacanian model of aggressivity from individual to collectivity. The individual's symbolic participation in national enmities derives from identification with the national body. The nation's coherence producing activities and boundary policing serve to affirm the coherence sought by the individual while at the same time projecting a collective unity that constitutes a denial of social antagonisms and other fragmenting domestic forces. At a collective level, the domestic negotiation of a national identity, which is an ongoing historical and often contentious process, involves a continuous search for dangerous forms of disorder, various Others whose dangers involve threats that are not exhausted by merely strategic considerations; they
are fueled by interpretations that cannot be comfortably focused on various contentious dynamics involved in attempts to produce an ideology of national coherence.46 One should expect, therefore, that a

strong identification with unambiguous

boundaries for one's collectivitythat is, a strong demand for a coherent model of national autonomy and differencecan produce adversaries, both within and without. These become

national objects of desire; they are both necessary for self-identity and a threat insofar as they reflect a disorder too unacceptable to be recognized as part of one's own order.

Cognitive science proves that categorization via the creation of borders is the root of us-them distinctions
Jones 8 (Reese, Associate Professor and Chair of Graduate Studies Department of Geography University of Hawaii at Manoa, 13 May 2008, Categories, borders and boundaries Progress in Human Geography) In order to understand why it appears to be diffi cult to get beyond particular categories, I want to turn to some recent work in cognitive science that investigates the role categories play in human cognitive mechanisms
(Barth, 2000; Bowker and Star, 1999; Brubaker et al., 2004; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Worchel and Austin, 1986). Like nonrepresentational theories in geography (Rose, 2002; Thrift, 1996), much recent work in cognitive science has

emphasized the embodiedness of human conceptual systems. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that mind body dualism that is, the idea of a disembodied reason, itself an important tenet of many modern philosophical texts is not supported by research in cognitive science. They instead suggest that human concepts and categories are drawn from our shared, embodied experiences as beings that move through and perceive the world spatially, which create[s] our conceptual systems and modes of reason (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 4). These conceptual systems are based on categories. Lakoff and Johnson argue that every living being categorizes because of the way our brains are organized. In human brains, and the brains of all animals, there are far fewer connections between parts of the brain but rather our categories are a consequence of how we are embodied which establishes what kinds of categories we will have and what their structure will be (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 17
18). Echoing the points made by many poststructural scholars, they note too that there is no reason whatsoever to believe that there is a disembodied reason or that the world comes neatly carved up into categories or that the categories of our mind are the categories of the world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 29). This agreement between cognitive science and poststructural thought is important because

than there are neurons and synapses in each part. Thus, in order for information to move between parts of the brain it has to be grouped into manageable units, that is, it must be categorized. They further argue that we do not categorize in any way we want,

scholars approaching the question of categories from completely different perspectives end up with the same conclusions about the disconnection between conceptual categories and the world around us. For Lakoff and Johnson (1999), although our conceptual categories are often inexact, we still cannot get beyond our categories and have a purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience. Neural beings cannot do that (p. 19). The final key point that emerges from Lakoff and Johnsons work is what they call the container schema. They argue that, Downloaded from phg.sagepub.com at University of Texas Libraries on July 28, 2013 Reece Jones: Categories, borders and boundaries 179 cognitively, humans perceive categories to be containers. Consequently, we imagine categories to have a defi nite inside, boundary, and an outside, like a container (Barth, 2000: 278; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 312). Lakoff (1987: 284)
uses the image of a liquid being poured into a cup to illustrate the container schema. As the liquid is poured in, it homogeneously spreads to the edges without passing through them, creating a sharp division between what is on the inside and on the outside. Both Weber (1968), in his discussions of open and closed social relationships, and Wittgenstein (1958), in his references to the definition of a game, recognized what I see here as a major conceptual problem related to the container schema. Because we cognitively think of

categories as containers, we consequently imagine all categories to be inherently closed, with fixed, stable boundaries between them. Yet, intellectually, we know that these boundaries are almost always fluid and permeable. In order to illustrate this point, Wittgenstein (1958: 3438) uses the example of the game. He argues that we all know what a game is and what is not a game, which makes it seem to be a closed category. In our minds we can imagine a container into which we can place all things that are games. However, defining a game precisely is difficult. Is a game played on a board? Do you have to keep score? Is it played between two people? Are there teams? What about something like solitaire? The list could go on and on. The point is that although in our minds we think of the category game as a container with rigid boundaries that allow us to mentally place some things into the container and to place others on the outside, when you try to define it the categorys boundaries turn out to be quite open. Instead of a container there is, according to
Lakoff and Johnson, a cognitive system or, according to Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, a socially constructed system that simplifies, organizes and limits the diversity of the world. 3 The paradox of categories The paradox of categories, then, is that when

we are trying to think of the boundaries between categories as open and porous which,

intellectually, we know they are we tend cognitively to understand categories as closed and bounded containers. Several problems arise out of this paradox. On one hand, categories appear to be necessary in order to understand the world around us. Indeed, it seems that without categories the diversity of the world would be incomprehensible. On the other hand, these same categories, as Foucault and others have demonstrated, are the instruments through which order is established and power exercised. Categories appear to play a crucial role in how we make sense of the world while, at the same time, these categories limit and control those same experiences. Consequently, rather than suggesting, as Peet has done, that in order for geography to be respected as a discipline it needs to shed its association with categories and categorization, I would propose that geography should re-emphasize its connection with these topics through an analysis of the inchoate process of bounding that delimits the categories that shape daily life and academic work.

Borders are the root cause of us-them dichotomies that cause violence and securitization
Jones 11-(REECE JONES, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Hawaii , September 2011, Border security, 9/11 and the enclosure of Civilization, The Geographical Journal, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 177, No. 3, September 2011, pp. 213217,, Accessed: 7/28/13) Beyond removing the stigma of building border fences, the events of 11 September are significant because they
crystallised feelings of difference and allowed exclusionary narratives about civilised and barbaric behaviour to pervade the popular discourse. Borders are where these abstract notions of us and them are materialised. At the

border the idea of a nation of people is reified in the form of a line on a map. The lines on the map become the containers for these categories and are where mental categories are solidified. The border also becomes the last defence to protect the privilege and perceived homogeneity of the states population. Indeed, most of the new borders barriers are erected to fight against migrations, even if this dimension is often mixed with other concerns such as terrorism and security. In an unexpected twist, the movement that defines the concept of globalisation resulted in a pronounced trend towards the enclosure of wealthy societies around the world.

War on Terror
State borders fueled the designation of terrorists and a militarized response Shapiro 7 [Michael J. Shapiro is Professor of Political Science at the University of HawaiI, The
New Violent Cartography, Security Dialogue 2007 38: 291]
As Virilio (2002: 8) points out in an analysis he undertook during the first Gulf War, the

militarized state looks inward as well as outward, manifesting a panicked anticipation of internal war. In the case of the post-9/11 war on terror, the same preemption involved in assaults on states has been turned inward. A state of siege mentality is effacing the inside/outside boundary of the war. Achille Mbembe (2003: 30) puts it succinctly: The state of siege is itself a military institution. In contrast with the firefights deployed on distanced terrains, the weapons used internally are surveillance technologies and extra- juridical modes of detention. For example, as an instance of hysterical per- ception, an FBI fingerprinting laboratory identified a lawyer in Oregon as one
whose fingerprints were found among the detritus of the train bombings in Madrid in 2004. Furthermore, FBI agents pressed their perceptions for some time, despite a rejection of their fingerprint data by their counterparts in Madrid. The technologies

deployed in the war on terror have operated on two fronts, the distant and the home. For example, the drone, which was weaponized for use on a distant battlefield, is being employed in its spare, observational version in USMexico border areas to help prevent illegal entry of immigrants. According to a report in the New York Times, on 25 June 2004, unmanned planes known as drones, which use thermal and night-vision equipment, were used in the US southwest to catch illegal immigrants attempting to cross into the USA from Mexico. The drones form part of the domestic front in the USAs war on terror; specifically, they are part of the Department of Homeland Securitys operational control of the border in Arizona (Myers, 2004). However, while one agency involved in the war on terror is diverting its technology to help exclude Hispanic bodies, another is actively recruiting them for duty on the external war fronts. As shown in Michael Moores documentary Fahrenheit 9/11, military recruiters are most in evidence in poorer and disproportionately ethnic neighborhoods and venues for example, the parking lots of
discount department stores. Ironically, given the participation of southwestern border patrol agencies within the Homeland Security network, much of the recruiting is aimed at those Hispanics that live on the margins of the

national economy. An item about recruitment in the Denver area tells much of the story: In Denver and other cities where the
Hispanic population is growing, recruiting Latinos has become one of the Armys top priorities. From 2001 to 2005, the number of Latino enlistments in the Army rose 26 percent, and in the military as a whole, the increase was 18 percent. The increase comes at a time when the Army is struggling to recruit new soldiers and when the enlistment of African-Americans, a group particularly disillu- sioned with the war in Iraq, has dropped off sharply, to 14.5 percent from 22.3 percent over the past four years (Alvarez, 2006). Where are the recruiters searching? The story continues: Sgt. First Class Gavino Barron, dressed in a crisp Army uniform, trawls the Wal-Mart here for recruits, past stacks of pillows and towers of detergent, he is zeroing-in on one of the Armys special missions: to increase the number of Hispanic enlisted soldiers. But the militarys domestic initiatives go beyond collecting bodies. It is also

militarizing other agencies, assembling them within what I have called the tertiary spatialization of terrorism. As the author of The Pentagons New Map points out, a whole lot more than just the Defense Department is actively pursuing the war on terror (Barnett, 2004: 95). One aspect of that broadened participation is evident in a recent collaboration between three kinds of institutions: Hollywood film-making, the military, and the university, all of whom share participation in the University of Southern Californias Institute for Creative Technologies. The collaboration exemplifies the tertiary spatial- ization of terrorism inasmuch as it is located in the sector of the institutional ecologies of militarization that involve relations among military, entertain- ment, and university agencies. Leaving aside the historical development of the film industry (which, like the Internet, has borrowed much of
its tech- nology from innovations in the militarys information technologies), USCs involvement can be located in a long history of th e universitys role in national policy.

The war on terror and Al Quadas jihad are mirror strategies of transnational violence in the name of national security Agathangelou 4-Associate Professor of Political Science and Womens Studies @ York
University [Anna, International Studies Quarterly, Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11, intro, 2004, WileyOnlineLibrary, DKP] Americas war on terror and Al Qaedas jihad reect mirror strategies of imperial politics. Each camp transnationalizes violence and insecurity in the name of national or communal security. Neoliberal globalization underpins this militarization of daily life. Its desire treason, hunter vs. prey, and masculinity vs. femininity that are played out on the bodies of ordinary men and
women. We conclude with suggestions of a human security to displace the elite privilege that currently besets world politics.

industries motivate and legitimate elite arguments (whether from indels or terrorists) that society must sacrice fo r its hypermasculine leaders. Such violence and desire draw on colonial identities of Self vs. Other, patriotism vs.

The war on terror is the latest example of the expansion of sovereign power

Jones 11-(REECE JONES, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Hawaii , September 2011, Border security, 9/11 and the enclosure of Civilization, The Geographical Journal, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 177, No. 3, September 2011, pp. 213217,, Accessed: 7/28/13) In the end, the discourse of the global war on terror that gained widespread currency after the events of 11 September is clearly implicated in the immediate justifications for many of these border security projects. Nevertheless, they were under consideration for many years before 11 September and achieved other goals beyond strictly providing security against terrorism. Therefore, rather than being understood as a novel aspect of the global war on terror, these walls and security projects are better seen as only the latest example of the long-term expansion of the sovereign state through the performance of sovereignty and the attempt to bring order to the people and practices within a particular territory. The dominant narrative of globalisation is no longer the borderless world, but rather one that describes the protection of civilisation in the US, Europe and other privileged societies through the prevention of dangerous flows from other places. Indeed, the confluence of the narratives of globalisation and the globalwar on terror produced the most bounded and bordered world we have ever known.

Root cause violence

Boundaries sustain cruelty and violence as they allow for the use of terror and fear upon the states own people Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International
Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322338, Accessed: 7/27/13,) William Connolly points to the rather more Janus-faced character of borders between states when he argues that boundaries form indispensable protections against violation and violence; but the divisions they sustain also carry cruelty and violence (Connolly 1995:163). On the latter, Connolly refers to the etymology of the concept of territory as deriving from the Latin root terrere, which means to frighten or terrorize (Connolly 1995:xxii). From here Connolly suggests that territory can be thought of as precisely land occupied and bounded by violence (Connolly 1995:xxii). On this view, to territorialize is to establish boundaries around [territory] by warning other people off (Connolly 1995:xxii). This etymological connection between territory and violence is also made by Barry Hindess: While terror may sometimes pose a threat to the territorial order of state, the possibility that territory and terror derive from the same Latin root suggest that it might also be an integral part of this orders functioning (Hindess 2006:244). For Hindess, terror and territory are intrinsically linked not just because territorial impulses imply violence to those who are deemed not to belong; the threat of violence is also imminent to those who do belong through the regulation of conduct using fear (Hindess 2006:244). Indeed, as Hindess reminds us, the territorial order of states often fails to domesticate terror: when states do not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; when terror is used as an instrument of policy by a state against their own or other states populations; when there are disputes over the government of a population that are under the jurisdiction of another state (Hindess 2006). Echoing the connection between violence and territory made by Connolly and Hindess, Walker has argued that borders between states should not be read as sites of airbrushed achievement but re-appraised, and indeed re-politicized, as a site of struggle (Walker 2002:22). On his view, the historical
transition from a system of overlapping loyalties and allegiances in favor of sharp borders did not happen either peacefully or overnight: One has to ask how have we so easily forgotten the concrete struggles that have left their traces in the clean lines of political cartography and the codifications of international law (Walker 1990:159). Connolly, Hindess, and Walker thus emphasize a deep connection

between the borders, territory, law triad and violence that is not only etymological but historical, structural, and colonial. The next part of the article seeks to explore this connection further by drawing on
analyses of the violence of the foundation and reproduction of juridicalpolitical order offered by Benjamin and Derrida.

Spatial differences and borders are the root cause of all violencethey create spheres of power and domination Springer 2011 [Simon, Department of Geography, University of Otago. Violence sits in places?
Cultural practice, neoliberal rationalism, and virulent imaginative geographies Political Geography Vol. 30] Violence is one of the most profound ongoing stories influencing the (re)production of space. Similarly, individual and embodied narratives of violence woven out of a more expansive spatial logic may become acute, forming
constellations that delineate and associate place. Accordingly, it may be useful to begin to think about violent narratives , not simply as stories about violence, but rather as a spatial metaphor analogous to violent geographies and in direct reference to Masseys (2005) reconceptualization of space and place. Allen Feldman (1991: 1) looks to bodily, spatial, and violent practices as

configuring a unified language of material signification, compelling him to treat the political subject, partic- ularly the body, as the locus of manifold material practices. To Feldman
approaching violence from its site of effect and generation (agency) is to examine where it takes place, thereby embedding violence in the situated practices of agents. Violence is bound up within the production of social space (Bourdieu, 1989),

and because, by virtue of spatiality, social space and somatic place continually predicate each other, the recognition of violence having a direct bearing on those bodies implies a geography of violence. Foucault (1980: 98) has argued that individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application,

and this is precisely how power and violence depart, as individuals

are at once both the vehicles of violence and its points of application. In the end, because the body is where all violence finds its influence e be it direct and thus obvious to the entangled actors, or structural and thus temporally and spatially diffused before reaching its final destination at and upon the embodied geographies of human beings e place is the site where violence is most visible and easily discerned. Yet violence is only one facet of the multiple, variegated, and protean contours of place. So while violence bites down on our lived experiences by affixing itself to our everyday geographies and by colonizing our bodies, violence itself, much like culture, is by no means restricted to place, nor is place static. Thus, the place-based dynamics of violence that seemingly make it possible to conceive a culture of violence actually render this notion untenable precisely because of places relationality and proteanism. The embodied geographies of experience (including violence) that exist in places stretch their accounts out
through other places, linking together a matrix of narratives in forming the mutable landscapes of human existence (Tilley, 1994). This porosity of boundaries is essential to place, and it reveals how local specific- ities of culture are comprised by a complex interplay of internal constructions and external exchange. In the face of such perme- ability an enculturation of violence

is certainly conceivable. All forms of violence are not produced by the frenzied depravity of savage or pathological minds, but are instead cultural performances whose poetics derive from the sociocultural histories and relational geographies of the locale (Whitehead, 2004). Violence has
a culturally informed logic, and it thereby follows that because culture sits in places (Basso, 1996; Escobar, 2001), so too does violence.

Yet the grounds on which some insist on affixing and bounding violence so firmly to particular places in articulating a culture of violence argument are inherently unstable.1 The

shifting, kaleidoscopic nature of space-time demonstrates the sheer impossibility of such attempts. So while it is important to highlight the emplacement of all cultural practices (including violence), whereby culture is carried into places by bodies engaged in practices that are at once both encultured and enculturing (Escobar, 2001), it is only through a geographical imagination constructed on a parochial agenda, rooted in colonial modes of thought, and dislocated from the dynamic material underpinnings of place that a culture itself can be caricatured as violent. In short, while violence forms a part of any given culture, it is never the sole defining feature.

Structural violence
Borders create a mutual xenophobic otherization of those across the borderthis causes zones of structural violence that devalue lives. Bornstein 2(Avram, professor @ John Jay college anthropology PhD and masters @ Columbia, Borders
and the Utility of Violence State Effects on the Superexploitation of West Bank Palestinians vol 22)
Heyman (1998a, 1998b, 1999) has argued that militarization of the border cannot always be explained by the superexploitation of workers. He explains that border procedures are often the result of popular panic, encouraged by

opportunistic politicians who turn rhetoric into real bureaucracies of violence. The border, like other technologies of violence used by modern states, is often part of exploitative systems, but explanations that posit class struggles in simple, single-interest-group types of models are often
insufcient. At times, military violence is usefully understood as a way to maintain the increasing polarization of wealth and the hegemony of neoliberalism (Sluka, 2000: 30), but sometimes violence is expressive and nonstrategic (Mahmood, 2000). A

number of anthropologists have already described how state violence is not necessarily functional, but often expressive of historically unique meanings.9 The fact that terrorist acts are often more expressive than instrumental in nature is oddly reciprocated by the industry of counterterrorism, which despite its rhetoric of brute realism is focused on strategies that appeal philosophically but are rarely pragmatic responses to the violence they purport to address. (Mahmood, 2000: 81) While acknowledging and documenting the class effects of the border, this article has argued against simple class analysis of violence by pointing to the racial and political logic for a militarized border. But to say that violence is often racial and nonstrategic in an obvious material sense is not to say that it works outside the production and circulation of power in a class system. The criminalization of undocumented workers stigmatizes them and this is an important characteristic of class societies (see Heyman, 1998a: 1734). It serves to distance employers from the humanity of those they exploit and exclude. The processes of class exploitation are integrated with, but not necessarily causative of, nationalist or racist violence. Border maintenance is largely symbolic
action directed primarily at Israelis, but symbolic action has quite real effects (Heyman, 1998a: 161). Since that meeting with Shmuel, Ive decided that he was partly right. The border is a mechanism of exploitation, but it is also more complicated. Border enforcement on the Green Line has often been a performance of security for the Israeli public in which politicians respond to longstanding racial and political fears of anti-Semitism. The conclusion that racialized state violence and class

struggle overlap, rather than privileging surplus extraction as an explanatory logic, is particularly important in conicts like Israel-Palestine, where enemies are so intimately bound together in dailylife, yet their antagonistic motivations are so misunderstood. The persistent misapprehension of their opponents has resulted in tactics and strategies on both sides that only exacerbate the division and the danger. Most Palestinians and their sympathizers locate the conict in the
history of colonialism and European imperialism. Zionists and their sympathizers tend to locate the conict within the history of antiSemitism. The theoretical position presented here teaches that the motivations of militarization are more complicated than surplus extraction and that those motivations can have impoverishing consequences

The re-entrenching of economic and social inequality is symptomatic of the 1ACs globalization of Latin America. Latin American economies become dependent on the hegemon eliminating economic sovereignty while social exclusion and the separation from higher and lower classes creates a larger divide. Slater 4 [David, David Slater is a British geographer with a BA and PhD and currently Professor of Social and Political
Geography at Loughborough University. Geopolitics and the Post-colonial Page 70-73]

My first suggestion is that the process of globalization, fuelled as it is by turbo or fast capitalism, has been and continues to be configured not only by unevenness but also by an important series of tensions and counterpoints. Thus, while the processes of global economic integration proceed, the more trends towards social and political disintegration become accentuated. This phenomenon has been described in terms of a combined dynamic of fusion and fission (Ramonet 1997). Hence, on the one side there is a drive towards supranational economic integration, as

exemplified by NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), the European Union, Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and the projected FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas), and on the other, propelled by the energies of resurgent nationalism and discourses of ethnic identification, multi-ethnic states are destabilized from below by new political fissures. Moreover, while instantaneous electronic movements of money and messages give meaning to notions of a borderless world, in other zones fortified enclaves or gated communities are erected to separate high-income spaces from the social worlds of poverty, crime and disorder (Caldeira 1996). In a similar vein, an explosion of interconnectivity is contradicted by
a turning in, reflected for example by a tangible reduction in the coverage of foreign affairs by key Western media outlets (Moisy 1997). Hence going global can exist side by side with a tendency, certainly visible in the US, towards the re-assertion of an inner-directed gaze, a tendency also reflected in the content of US textbooks on international relations where the world beyond the US, albeit pre-September 11, was minimally present (Dalby 2003: 148) An ethos of turning inward can also be connected to a refusal

to recognize the rights of others, be they from ethnic minorities, different religions, migrant communities or poor neighbourhoods. In the US and Europe, the desire to defend borders and erect fortresses sits uneasily with support for the free movement of commodities, open economies, the abolition of economic protectionism, and deregulation. Hence, while on the one hand the opening up of space to the free flow of capital is championed, the free flow of labour is checked at the border. Within the transnational space of NAFTA, for example, the US places increasing restrictions on the inflow of Mexican labour while reasserting the centrality of open economies; in fact, for some Mexicans there is a new Berlin Wall exemplified in the refortification of the fence along the USMexican frontier (see Nevins 2002 and Smith 1998). Underlying these kinds of tensions and counterpoints, one can discern a deeplyrooted unevenness which is symptomatic of the process of globalization. Such an unevenness is
tellingly depicted by the Cuban artist and writer Mosquera (1994), who argues that while the word globalization may evoke the idea of a planet in which all points happen to be interconnected in a web-like network, in actual fact, connections occur inside a

radial and hegemonic pattern around the centres of power, while the peripheral countries tend to remain disconnected from one another, or are only connected indirectly via and under the control of the centres. For Mosquera, there is a twin structure of axial globalization and zones of silence

which forms the basis of the economic, political and cultural network that moulds the whole planet. In the highly centralized system of museums, galleries, collectors and market networks, Mosquera argues that the countries which host the art of other cultures are at the same time curating the shows, so that the world is being practically divided between curating cultures and curated cultures.1 Mosqueras couplet of axial globalization and zones of silence highlights a key dimension of the geopolitical unevenness of globality, while also foregrounding the place of the periphery in contemporary treatments of culture. A primary theme here concerns the

issue of how genuinely global is the contemporary theorization of global politics. In some instances, it is clear that a NorthSouth divide emerges when the question of global change is posed. Nakarada (1994), for example, reporting on a workshop held in Zimbabwe, where the theme was the future of world order, noted the existence of a crucial NorthSouth difference in the orientation of the discussion. The participants from the North tended to stress the phenomena of speed and the dissolution of spatial borders, with some emphasizing the positive potential of globalization. By contrast, participants from the South were far more negative in their diagnosis of globalization, referring to the South as a new object of recolonization and global apartheid. This kind of split raises the question of the
existence of a NorthSouth divide in terms of the effects of globalization and also of the presence of a NorthSouth differential in the manner that this divide is diagnosed. A contemporary example of the former differential can be seen in

the current political debate on USLatin American relations. If, for instance, we look at the impacts of NAFTA for Mexico, it can be noted that while Mexican trade with the US has skyrocketed, going from US$36 billion in 1993 to $450 billion in 2002, most of the highvolume SouthNorth exchanges have been between a handful of transnational subsidiaries in Mexico and their US-based corporate headquarters (Latin America Press no. 1, 15 Jan. 2003: 6). During these years, a substantial number of Mexicos banks have now become controlled by US, Canadian and Spanish investors, while US-based Wal-Mart has become Mexicos leading retailer. Mexican agriculture has been badly affected by imports 6 million tons of cheap US and Canadian corn, much of it genetically modified, enters Mexico each year, displacing small farmers from the internal market. Moreover, farmers have now to sell to transnationals such as Cargill which have taken over the nations privatized grain distribution infrastructure. Basic food imports

have increased by 77 per cent over the past decade to an estimated $78 billion, equivalent to the governments public debt, and critics fear Mexico is losing its food sovereignty. There is
inequality also in food subsidies, so while per capita subsidies of $21,000 per annum enable US farmers to sell produce in Mexico at prices 20 per cent below production costs, Mexican farm subsidies have continually fallen so that they are now at an average of $760 per farmer (Latin America Press ibid.). With increased poverty in the rural areas of Mexico, many farmers have joined the immigration flow to the US. Further, in accordance with a 10-year-old NAFTA schedule, the programmed suspension at the beginning of January 2003 of all tariffs on basic agricultural imports from the US has provoked Mexican peasant farmers into organizing militant protests. During a recent demonstration (December 2002) of rural workers outside the Mexican Congress, where using sledgehammers and tractors as battering rams, the campesinos broke down the gates of the building, one 80-year-old peasant farmer from Guanajuato said, Im an old man and Ive never had to work in El Norte [the US] because my land gave me what I needed to live but now this government is forcing me to go there (Latin America Press ibid.). The radical opposition expressed by Mexican peasant farmers to the subordinating effects of free trade doctrine has been shared more generally. In late October 2002, in Quito, Ecuador, for example, at a meeting of trade ministers for the FTAA (Free Trade Area for the Americas), demonstrators who were organizing protests

against the new trade deal for 2005 proclaimed We dont want to be an American colony!, linking their protests to the Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silvas description of the FTAA as a policy of annexation, not integration (Latin America Press no. 24, 2 Dec. 2002: 45). Similarly critical while broader evaluations of neo-liberal globalization were voiced in Havana in April 2000 when members of the Group of 77 came together to discuss NorthSouth issues (see Third World Resurgence, no. 117, May 2000),2 and such critiques continue to spread, as exemplified by Vindana Shivas (2003: 878) statement that globalization is a project of domination by the North over the South, by corporations over citizens, by patriarchal structures over women, by humans over other species. Overall, such representations, especially in relation to the terms of transnational integration, connect historically to Jose Marts views on American economic integration in the late nineteenth century (mentioned in chapter 2), and raise the issue of the political nature of integration, of the balance between interdependence and dependence/domination. This is not a new theme.

Bare life
Sovereignty and society is created through a force that results in bare life for non-state identities
Jerrems 11-(Ari Jerrems, Universidad Autnoma de Madrid graduate, ph.d contender , 2011, BOOK REVIEW of Border Politics: The Limits of SovereignPower by Nick Vaughan-Williams, Borderlands VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1, 2011, Accessed: 7/27/13) In regard to Agambens thought, a particularly strong line of criticism takes issue with how a society of reasonand hence its bordersis created through force alone. This line maintains that in his quest to go
beyond modernist thinking, Agamben becomes embroiled in an esoteric world of mythological beginnings. Jos Luis Pardo argues that any imagined scenario about the foundation of society, such as Therefore, the creation of a legal system through

the suspension of law in a state of exception presumes a mythical order of events where a social state is forced upon nature (1998-1999, p. 163). In his analysis Pardo identifies two types of power, Potentia or natural power and Potestas or power through rights and obligations. According to Agamben, the natural Potentia of the sovereign is what founds the Potestas and therefore any sovereign state is founded upon unjustifiable prepolitical violence (1998-1999, p. 164). The inclusion and exclusion of bare life in the polis becomes problematic as it is revealed that it is dependent on the belief in this hidden originary myth. It reduces bordering to a violent discriminatory process with no possibility for the creation of meaning by democratic means. This is largely due to the context of Carl Schmitts definition of sovereign power that Agamben relies upon. One should take into account that Schmitts definition of sovereignty explicitly sought to eliminate differences between democratic and dictatorial government (Pardo 1998-1999, p. 165). His thinking reflects a period of nostalgia for archaic sovereignty amidst a crisis of belief in civil accords after the First World War (Pardo 1998-1999, p. 166). Following such ideas based on a specific interpretation of sovereign power creates severe limitations when it comes to thinking about bordering processes of non-State identities.

Imaginative geographies reinforce orientalist exclusion that creates a state of bare life for the savages on the outside Gregory 4
(Derek, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, The lightning of possible storms Antipode Volume 36 Issue 5) On one side, imaginative geographies produce not only a series of spacings between us and them, white and black. They also produce, through a series of topological displacements, a vast grey area in which indifference is folded into indistinction. I owe this formulation to Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which is why I wanted to affirm those affiliations between Said and Foucault. For Agamben radicalizes Foucaults theses about biopoliticsthe entry of biological life into political calculationto insist that this is not a distinctively modern modality of power, and that sovereign power routinely and constitutively distinguishes between those who are to be admitted to political life and those who are to be excluded as the mute bearers of bare life. This is no simple geography of exclusion. Agamben directs our attention not merely to those who are on the margin but to those who are placed beyond the margin, in a zone of indistinction from which the protections of the law have been withdrawn. This involves the production of a space of the exception, a juridicopolitical space whose performance traces a moving line on the basis of which outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos, enter into those complex topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order possible (Agamben 1998:19). This is a caricature of a complex argument,
but think of all the ways in which a predatory Israeli state has turned Gaza and the West Bank into so many zones of indistinction: international laws suspended, Geneva Conventions violated, Security Council resolutions disregarded; houses demolished, orchards uprooted, wells expropriated; Palestinians locked down, detained without trial, summarily executed. What can this be other than the serial space of the exception? (Gregory 2004a). Or think of the different geographies that fold in and out of the

vast theatre of cruelty dispersed across US detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Air Force Base, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere: here too, laws have been suspended and captives kept in the

shadows, doubly confined within the carceral archipelago and the prisonhouse of Orientalism, and subjected to degradation and torture (Gregory 2004b). Like Foucault, Agamben (2004) is critical of the modern anthropological machine that produces our seemingly commonsensical idea of the humanthe traditional basis of the humanitiesand directs our attention to its silent production, within paradoxical spaces like these, of all those othersthe barbarians, the savages, the monsterswho (because they are excluded) are to have no claim on our sympathies but who (because they are included) can be made the object of our violence. Said had no truck with this colonial economy of meaning, and repeatedly

declared his solidarity with its victims, with what Gilroy (2003:263) calls all the other shadowy third things lodged between animal and human [that] can only be held accountable under special emergency rules and fierce martial laws. On the other side, the

black and white grids of conventional imaginative geographies can be dissolved into an altogether different grey area, in which the absolutisms of us and them are made to cross over into new constellations. In his original critique, Said emphasized the power of Orientalism as a corporate institution, political and intellectual, but he was also very well aware of its other circuits that spark across different publics to legitimate the conduct of public policy and underwrite the petty racisms that disfigure everyday life. Orientalism has been mobilized in all sorts of

ways to orchestrate the war on terror, both inside the United States and beyond its borders: military violence always requires more than the calculus of politics and political economy. These multiple trajectories do not oblige us to fall back before its sheer, knitted together strength, however, because they show that Orientalism is a network which, for this very reason, is vulnerable in its spans and its spaces. Saids own writings demonstrate that it is possible to understand other cultures without reverting to its tyrannies. His principled

objections to a clash of civilizationswhat he later dismissed as the clash of ignorance are well known (Said 2000:569590; 2001a), and these same objections confound the Manichean geographies that he exposed in his critique of Orientalism. This is surely how one ought to understand

his practice of contrapuntal reading, as a critical strategy that overturns the myth of auto-production peddled by books like Niall Fergusons Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (the subtitle says it all) by disclosing those routes by which peripheries enter into the fashioning of centers. Contrapuntal reading conveys an intrinsically mobile topology in which centers and peripheries repeatedly modulate one another and change position: All there is is peripheries, he explained, everything is an elaboration of something [and somewhere] else (Katz and Smith 2003; Said 1993:5152, 6667).

Biopower
The sovereignty of the state allows for a biopolitical reduction of the population to tools for exploitation Moisi 2013 [Moisi, Sami, Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland, " From
Geopolitical to Geoeconomic? The Changing Political Rationalities of State Space"] One significant conceptual option for examining the political making of the spatial order in certain geohistorical contexts is the governmentality approach.8 From this angle, state transformation is an historical process which is based on political rationalities, governmental technologies and knowledge, and which entails the construction of new citizen subjectivities. Such a process is not linear: it is typically characterised by ruptures, accumu- lation and/or active rejection of institutional practices and discourses that are networked both inside the state and across its borders. The governmentality approach draws on, and also further develops, the work of Michel Foucault, who associated the term governmentality with the rationalities and tech- niques of power that focus on the conduct of both populations and individuals. The population not only appears as the ultimate end of govern- ment
but it also emerges as a political subject which can be managed through various techniques in order to increase its potentials.9

Governmentality thus refers to interventions which seek to affect the capacities, skills, mentalities and behaviour of the populace.10 Population is regulated directly or indi- rectly, for instance, by stimulating birth rates or directing the flows of people into certain regions or activities.11 Governmentality thus alludes to activities which aim to shape both who and what people within a given state are or should be, and to the spatial forms of the state. It denotes the ways in which a state attempts to regulate its people and territories.12 The spatial transformation of the state thus unfolds through governmental interventions which seek to reorganise spatial relations within the state and which have the population as their target.

Sovereignty is the ultimate biopolitical control of the state

Jerems 11-(Ari Jerrems, Universidad Autnoma de Madrid graduate, ph.d contender , 2011, BOOK REVIEW of Border Politics: The Limits of SovereignPower by Nick Vaughan-Williams, Borderlands VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1, 2011, Accessed: 7/27/13)
The theoretical innovation central to Vaughan-Williams thesis is based heavily on Giorgio Agambens philosophy (Cf. Agamben 1998, 2005). Agamben builds upon Foucaults biopower thesis (Cf. Foucault 1998, 2007). He alters Foucaults concept of modern

sovereignty, as the ability to make life live or leave it to die, by arguing that this inclusion/exclusion of biological life is the original practice of sovereign power (Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 98). Agambens theoretical work argues that the originary separation in Ancient Greek thought between zo (the biological fact of living) and bios (politically qualified life) has become increasingly indistinguishable in modern society (Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 97). Sovereign power generates a confused state where zo can be taken as bios and vice versa. The individual in this confused state is exposed as bare life to be categorized by the whim of sovereign decision (VaughanWilliams 2009, p. 103). In this blurred state or state of exception, the sovereign power is necessary as a law founding decision of inclusion and exclusion to fill the legal vacuum. Agamben implies that the existence of citizenship and political institutions depends on a discriminatory law founding violence (Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 99). Bare life is the founding element which is simultaneously included and excluded in the system, creating the appearance of unity, yet relying on the excluded other to give it meaning. The idea that the implementation of law is a constant bordering decision is the key element which Vaughan-Williams discusses. However, whilst Vaughan-Williams offers a detailed and
accurate reading of Agamben, he spends far too little time interacting with critical interpretations which will be discussed later in this essay.

Nations seek to reconcile internal aspects of their existence that are contradictory to an ideal national identity through the enforcement of boundaries and policing Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, p. 58-59)

In combining the Freudian and Hegelian emphases on the problem of the subject, Lacan helps us to understand what I have called Clausewitz's aggressive misrecognition. Like the Hegelian subject, the Lacanian subject seeks a coherent selfhood and uses alterity in the service of that aim. However, unlike Hegel, who posited a wholly successful narrative of the development of a continuously more selfconscious and coherent subject, Lacan emphasized the Freudian dissimulating mechanisms whereby

the subject dwells in misapprehensions, projecting meanings on objects as a result of irreconcilable incoherences within its aims. These incoherences are related to the misrecognition of aspects of otherness within the subjectfor example, the masculine subject who seeks to recognize its aspects of the feminine and at the same time to avoid that recognition and maintain an unambiguously masculine self-interpretation. This troubling disjuncture can produce aggressiveness as the subject focuses on the world rather than its own coherence problem, thus "throwing back onto the world the disorder of which it is composed."45 The turn to Lacan to investigate the ontological dimension of warfare is appropriate, therefore, because the various displacements and projections through which objects of violence are interpretively selected are at issue, and because this interpretive dynamic operates in relation to the ontological interest of the subject. This frame can be applied to collective models of subjectivity as well. Just as Hegel took his view of the necessity for negation from the level of the individual to that of the state, we can move the Lacanian model of aggressivity from individual to collectivity. The individual's symbolic participation in national enmities derives from identification with the national body. The nation's coherence producing activities and boundary policing serve to affirm the coherence sought by the individual while at the same time projecting a collective unity that constitutes a denial of social antagonisms and other fragmenting domestic forces. At a collective level, the domestic negotiation of a national identity, which is an ongoing historical and often contentious process, involves a continuous search for dangerous forms of disorder, various Others whose dangers involve threats that are not exhausted by merely strategic considerations; they
are fueled by interpretations that cannot be comfortably focused on various contentious dynamics involved in attempts to produce an ideology of national coherence.46 One should expect, therefore, that a

strong identification with unambiguous

boundaries for one's collectivitythat is, a strong demand for a coherent model of national autonomy and differencecan produce adversaries, both within and without. These become national objects of desire; they are both necessary for self-identity and a threat insofar as they reflect a disorder too unacceptable to be recognized as part of one's own order.

Race
Race is purely a spatial construct Price 2010 [Patricia L. Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International
University, At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race in Progress in Human Geography 34(2) pages 147-148] Critical human geographers have for several decades emphasized the sociospatial dialectic at the heart of the construction, expression, and contestation of difference, a cornerstone insight that has crossed disciplinary boundaries and enriched cognate critical traditions (Soja,
age, nature, and myriad other differences have more recently come to the forefront of inquiry (Oakes and Price, 2008). Human

1980; Massey, 2005). Though classed and gendered differences have long been mainstays of critical geographic scrutiny, geographies of sexuality, (dis)ability,

geographers engaged in the study of ethnicity and race,1 though not always (or all) a particularly critical bunch, have nonetheless contributed greatly to the understanding that racialized processes are always and thoroughly spatialized ones (eg, Jackson, 1987; Kobayashi, 1990; Dwyer, 1997; Pulido, 2000; Zelinsky, 2001;
Anderson, 2002; Berry and Henderson, 2002). In addition, geographers have insisted that diverse axes of difference are mutually constructed and thus intertwined. Feminist geographers, in particular, have been at the forefront of scholarship examining the co-construction of gender, race, and class (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Kobayashi, 2003; Mahtani, 2006; McKittrick, 2006). Indeed,

theorizing about the mutually constitutive qualities of race and gender, in addition to a much older tradition of class analysis, has provided much of the zing to our discipline (Kobayashi, 2005: 32). Such is the excitement over recent developments in geographies of race that in their commentary on the topic at the turn of the new millennium Linda Peake and Richard Schein (2000) assert that questions of race and racism are undergoing a renaissance in geography, thanks in large part to theoretical developments spanning the social sciences. Catherine Nash (2003: 639) characterizes these developments as antiessentialist perspectives on race which deconstruct race as a naturalized hierarchy of biologically distinctive human groups while exploring processes of racialization which place individuals and groups within racial categories and have material effects in terms of the unequal distribution of power and wealth, though she is skeptical of Peake and Scheins claim that this reinvigorated critical
geographic research on race can or should maintain links to an older, less (or un-) critical tradition of what Wright and Ellis (2006) politely term mapping others.

Colonialism
Borders are colonialism. First by the expropriation of land, then by the imposition of international law and western culture. Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221]
Accordingly, our first thesis is the following. Borders (e.g. cultural) and

are not only geographic but also political, subjective epistemic and, contrary to frontiers, the very concept of border implies the existence of people, languages, religions and knowledge on both sides linked through relations established by the coloniality of power (e.g. structured by the imperial and colonial differences). Borders in this precise sense, are not a natural outcome of a natural or divine historical processes in human history, but were created in the very constitution of the modern/colonial world (i.e. in the imaginary of Western and Atlantic capitalist empires formed in the past five hundred years). If we limit our observations to the geographic, epistemic and subjective types of borders in the modern/colonial world (from the European Renaissance till today), we will see that they all have been created from the perspective of European imperial/ colonial expansion: massive appropriation of land accompanied by the constitution of international law that justified the massive appropriation of land (Grovogui, 1996; Schmitt, 1952); control of knowledge (the epistemology of the
zero point as representation of the real) by disqualifying non-European languages and epistemologies and control of subjectivities (by conversation, civilization, democratization) or, in todays language by the globalization of culture.

Us/Them All Exclusions

Constructing border to establish space is the root cause of the social borders across lines of race, gender, nature, and nationsroot cause of exclusion
Jones 8-(Reese, Associate Professor and Chair of Graduate Studies Department of Geography University of Hawaii at Manoa, 13 May 2008, Categories, borders and boundaries Progress in Human Geography) Categories shape the world around us. Everything inside an office or outside in a forest can be categorized and organized in some way. Humans have spent generations categorizing history into eras, dirt into soil types, plants and animals into phyla and species, and people into classes, ethnicities, nations and races. Scholars in cognitive science have
argued this is an embodied practice that allows humans and other creatures to survive in the world by sorting out the diversity present into a manageable system. Without being able to categorize items as food or not food, for example, an organism would not be able to survive (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Poststructural scholars have argued that these same categories allow power to be exercised as the world is ordered and organized in

Scholars from both fields, although approaching the question of categories from different perspectives, end up with the same conclusions about the disconnection between conceptual categories and the wider world. Categories do not simply mimetically represent the world but, instead, simultaneously create it and limit it. The result is a paradox in which categories cognitively fit neatly into containers even while intellectually the boundaries between them appear to be messy and inexact. Here I have argued that thinking of the
particular ways that are favorable to a select group of people.

boundaries of categories as inchoate

as never fully formed

allows a move away from this paradoxical

relationship and creates a space to contest categorization schemes . I have also proposed that the inchoate process of bounding that results in the categories that shape, organize and control everyday life which are already at the center of many academic pursuits across a range of disciplines should be thought of collectively as the field boundary studies. However, linking together inquiries into bounding processes and categorization schemes as a unified field of boundary studies does not imply that bounding processes occur
and practices that establish boundaries and create the perception of a particular set of categories cannot be generalized.

uniformly over space/time. Although I suggest that all categories cannot be thought of as such without first having boundaries, regardless of how ambiguous and blurred, to mark them off as distinct, the everyday narratives

The bounding process that results in the understanding of the boundary between the categories white and not-white in the United States is not the same as the bounding process that results in the boundary between the categories of mountain and hill. At the same time, none of these four categories has any meaning without the perception of a boundary between them. Consequently, the inchoate process of bounding, although particular and unique in each context, is essential to both. By
states, regions, or scales. Here I have argued that

thinking of research into categorization from across academia as a single endeavor, the currently fragmented insights into bounding processes can be consolidated in the field of boundary studies. Geography, given its attention to context, difference and particularity, is the ideal discipline in and through which we may investigate the complex bounding processes of categorization. A boundary, after all, is fundamentally a spatial phenomenon. It allows an entity or idea to be spatially differentiated and identified. Political geographers have long made this point in terms of how territoriality is employed to carve up the space of the world into places as

cognitive bounding processes should also be within the domain of geography. The container schema takes abstract undifferentiated ideas and reifies them as distinct categories by creating mental boxes with solid boundaries into which they can be placed. This insight into how categories cognitively operate as containers is crucial to understanding why particular categories are able to retain the appearance of being fixed and permanent even while it is widely accepted that they are not. These containers then frame the way the world is ordered, organized and understood. If geographers only look at this second step the territorialization of categories at different scales and sites in the world then the previous bounding processes of categorization have been overlooked and left unexplored. Rather than allowing
boundary studies to be another missed boat (Dicken, 2004), geographers should work to establish geography as the discipline that is fundamentally concerned with the inchoate bounding processes of categorization. The xenophobic and exclusionary categorization of the present era brings the importance of investigating bounding processes into sharp focus.

The narration of the global war on terror by politicians, journalists and commentators as a struggle of modernity against barbarity and right against wrong allows these framings of the world to be sedimented into the public discourse (Gregory, 2004; Gregory and Pred, 2007). It is the shifting and blurring of boundaries between the inside and outside of these categories from terrorist/civilian, modern/traditional, to here/there that organizes and limits the world around us. Although these boundaries are often problematic, it is not possible to simply get beyond categories and create a world that is unbounded and uncategorized. At the same time, this does not mean that inherited categories must be uncritically accepted. Instead, by emphasizing bounding processes rather than categories that appear fixed and finalized scholars can demonstrate that particular framings that rely on exclusive categories are not as immutable as they often appear. By recognizing the

inchoate nature of the bounding process and the flexible and open categories that are produced, we can begin to understand the paradox of categories as we interrogate the bounding of the containers that order the world.

Dehumanization/violence
Securitized borders result in extraordinary rendition and spaces of exception those outside of the US State border are rendered inhuman Sparke 2006 [Matthew B., Professor of Geography and International Studies, Adjunct Professor
of Global Health, Director of the University of Washington's Online Integrated Social Science Major, A neoliberal nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of citizenship on the border, Political Geography 25 (2006) 151-180]
The main argument made in this article about NEXUS concerns the ways in which this little known expedited border-crossing program and its development are symptomatic of the neoliberalization of citizenship in todays North American context. This is a context, as I have explained, shaped at once by the transnational entrenchment of free market rights and the increasingly oppressive impact of securitized nationalism. NEXUS lane participants the people who cross often and want to make it simple, the people who are

prepared to buy flexible citizenship because the fastlane is where you want to be would seem to represent the paradigmatic neoliberal citizen-players on the transnational level playing field of free trade, neoliberal citizens for whom transnational mobility rights are part of the more general transnational

business class privilege that continues to be expanded and entrenched globally through the new constitutionalism of free trade and related laws. As such, the kinetic elites of the NEXUS lane appear to be able to buy for themselves at least a little of the borderless world fantasylife whose most transcendently transnational subjects can rise above it all as Gulfstream citizens of the world, the world of transnational property rights and mobility rights seen best through the Enhanced Vision System of a Gulfstream jet. But then we have the

kinetic underclasses of expedited removal and extraordinary rendition whose borderless world is, by contrast, a world without a constitution, a world which may well extend transnationally via Gulfstream jets across borders, but only so as to better cast out its dehumanized and rights-deprived subjects into the spaces of exception that now increasingly seem to form a transnational gulag of incarceration and outsourced torture. The violence of extraordinary rendition may seem especially context contingent, in this regard, not a neoliberal or otherwise economically induced outcome, but a result of an exceptional American ability to combine free market fundamentalism with an inhuman disregard for foreigners deemed unfit (often because of orientalist codes) for business. Consider in this regard what happened when Edward Markey, a democratic congressman from Massachusetts, introduced legislation to ban extraordinary rendition in 2005. Republican House speaker Dennis Hastert said the legislation was going nowhere, and, when Herbert (2005: A 25), a columnist from the New York Times asked why, he was told: The speaker does not support the Markey proposal. He believes that suspected terrorists should be sent to their home countries. Then, when Herbert asked why they should not be held and prosecuted in the US, Pete Jeffries from the speakers office replied: Because U.S. taxpayers should not necessarily be on the hook for their judicial and incarceration costs. This response seems a telling illustration of the white-Americans-first exceptionalism that has led many in US government to think that creating spaces of exception to human rights laws is just fine. But it is also, I think, an extraordinarily telling indictment of the neoliberal logic through which extraordinary rendition has been thought out and justified by its perpetrators. American taxpayers, Jeffries seemed to be saying, should not have to pay for government services (whether they be torture or its prevention) when they are being consumed by those who do not pay taxes in America. Also overdetermined by economic codes, expedited removal seems to reflect a similarly
consumerist neoliberal revisioning of citizenship and security, being imagined by the 1996 legislative promoters of IIRIRA as part of the same individualized contractualism that turned welfare into workfare and recoded American citizenship more generally in the terms of the payments and debts of private commercial contracts. In other words, while both extraordinary rendition and

expedited removal both clearly need to be understood in terms of the extra-capitalistic imperatives associated with virulently nationalistic (and thus racist and masculinist) imperatives, they also appear to reflect some of the same economic hall-marks of a neoliberalism that, as Foucault once argued, turns citizens into entrepreneurs of their selves. Thus, while asylum seekers thrown into subcontracted prison space by DHS
and carceral cosmopolitans such as Maher Arar are completely deprived of agency and choice, their plight needs nonetheless to be understood in relation to the ways in which the normative citizen of North America has meanwhile been re-specified as an active agent both able and obliged to exercise autonomous choices. (Larner, 2000: 13). The implication of the argument that neoliberal ideas and imperatives overdetermine extraordinary rendition and expedited removal is not that these appallingly inhuman state

practices are an inevitable outcome of the same neoliberalism that has extended the freedom

and choice of economic elites across transnational space (far more intrinsically interconnected, it seems, are the unfree flows of undocumented Mexican workers into the US economy). But nor are the spaces of exception created by rendition and removal entirely disconnected from neoliberalism either. They are not just a
contingent outcome of the exceptional American context with its history of free market capitalism rooted in that most profitable as well as paradigmatic space of exception: the slave plantation. There is instead a more complexly interrelated

relationship between the neoliberal dynamics and the violence of expedited removal and rendition, a relationship where neoliberalism provides both the capitalistic context and some of the structuring order too. Private sector promoters of programs such as NEXUS and US-VISIT sometimes note that the

systems offer an alternative to racist border agents and a way of introducing a neutral kind of third party technical administration that keeps the agents themselves as much as the travelers accountable to the formal protocols of the law. Yet, as we have seen, expedited

removal rules like expedited crossing lanes have also been implemented through the mediation of privately procured services. Extraordinary rendition relies in its own turn on the very vehicles used to transport business elites around their borderless world. But more than this
private sector context and mediation, both practices would seem to be structured by a neoliberal double standard: a double standard that is like liberalisms own inaugural double standards with rights for whites in Europe and often utter inhumanity in the colonies (Mehta, 2000) but which is also significantly reterritorialized and reorganized by contemporary transnational business class power. The result is a

recodification of the normative citizen-subject as a transnationally mobile soft cosmopolitan with heightened human capital vis-a`-vis all the kinetic underclasses: some of the latter being merely

marooned in nationalestate spaces with weakened political and social citizenship rights; others being expedited into the world without a constitution of carceral cosmopolitanism. Examples of such reterritorialized and reorganized neoliberal double standards are by no means exceptional to America (see Hyndman, 2005; Rajaram, 2003). For example, the neoliberalization of EU citizenship has not happened without the creation of its own spaces of exception. This is what William Walters argues in his account of the partial transnationalization of EU citizenship, a transnationalization which he notes is a neoliberal project which focuses on enhancing mobility and freedom across an extended European space. Tracking this extension of mobilities and freedoms in which business has also enjoyed the major b enefits Walters also notes that from the perspective of those now named and shunned as asylum -seekers, European governance might invoke the renewal of a much older art of government that of police but now on a transnational basis (Walters, 2004: 170). EU Sc hengen policing may not yet have created the same record of abuse recorded by the critics of expedited removal and extraordinary rendition, but it does suggest that the neoliberal advance of transnational citizenship rights is repeatedly related to the redrawing of lines that shut out and imprison diverse others sometimes using biometrics to do so (Van Der Ploeg, 1999). For such transnationals who are

expedited into otherness, the invitation to cross often and make it simple seems at once barbed and barred forever.

Dehumanization/otherization
The state uses categories and different economic and social boundaries to assign worth to the population allowing for a calculated control that turns people into resources Moisi 2013 [Moisi, Sami, Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland, " From

Geopolitical to Geoeconomic? The Changing Political Rationalities of State Space"] From the perspective of governmentality, state space is not only an object of contestation but also an inseparable component of political strat- egy. On this basis, we will make an analytical, heuristic
distinction between the two modalities of the geopolitics of state space. This distinction is useful in the concrete analysis of the changing governmentalities of state space in various contexts. First, we conceptualise the efforts of state authority to

mould the population through various spatial projects and strategies as governing population through state space. This type of governing manifests itself in technologies such as nation-wide regional planning. After World War II many OECD countries implemented extensive and equalising

spatial policies aimed at creating a new loyal state citizen with the skills needed in the modern industrial economy. The state was rooted in place through exhaustive governmental technologies which increased the visibility of the state in the everyday lives of the population throughout state space. By expanding the states infrastructural power through institutions (ranging

from basic administration to the military) across state spaces, the abstraction called the states territorial sovereignty turned into a locally visible phe- nomenon. The spread of welfare infrastructures and services throughout the state space, an active bid not only to increase the level of welfare but also the populations loyalty to the state, was thus linked with the strategy of positioning and binding the population within the state space as well as establishing national political order. Second, it is helpful to distinguish governing population through state space from governing state space through population. For instance, gover- nance which is predicated on the neoliberal political rationality is based on calculation of worth: population is treated as a calculable resource. Different population segments are valued differently on the basis of abstractions such as states international competitiveness. Simultaneously, the desired, imag- ined qualities of these populations (e.g., creative class) provide a rationale for various space-making strategies within the state (e.g., innovative/creative Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:45 27 July 2013

cities, global cities, special economic zones, etc.). The endeavours to develop state space for the purposes of nurturing an innovative and creative pop- ulation (the talented) which is deemed requisite for the creation and maintenance of a globally attractive, knowledgebased-society manifest themselves not only in various concentrated institutional arrangements, such as developing new globally renowned institutions of higher education, but also in other space-making activities ranging from urban architecture to spatial structures of the state.

Capitalism/Explitation
Borders produce a world system that can be exploited for wealth though gunboat diplomacy and neoliberal regimesof trade Anderson, School of Geography and Centre for International Borders Research Queens University Belfast In 5 [James, Borders, fixes and empires: Territoriality in the

new imperialism, Centre for International Borders Research] The partial politics/economics separation was a pre-condition for this switch too. It increasingly meant that the laws of the market could be enforced by independent states for foreign-owned as for indigenous capital. Capitalisms historical development and global spread meant economic power increased relative to political power (Wood 2003), and as surplus generally came to be extracted from free labour by economic means, there was a decreasing need for the direct political control in formal territorial empires which previously had been essential (e.g., in the slave labour economies of the various European empires in the Americas Rosenberg 1994). Broadly speaking, the development of the partial separation was roughly matched by the sequence of types of labour used from slave or serf, to indentured, to free (Anderson 2001a). Geopolitically, the British Empire initiated a partial switch to informal empire in the 19th century in the formally independent national states of Latin America; since WWI the US empire has been almost entirely informal (Smith 2003); and by the 1960s informal had become the global norm with the European de-colonisations and the globalization of nationalism. This new imperialism works well when states play by the rules of liberalism (e.g., as desired/imposed by the neo-liberal Washington Consensus), but it has an Achilles heel, or rather several of them. States do not always play by these rules - in practice they break their own rules to discriminate against foreign-owned capital, or on principle they favour general state control or ownership, in a worse case scenario nationalising foreign assets into state capitalism. Investments in the more peripheral parts of the global economy rely on a multiplicity of variably unreliable states with their own divergent and conflicting interests. The partial separation of politics/economics is not much defense against a nationalising government which actively contests the separation. Stronger measures are needed, including economic sanctions and military force,
though preferably the threat of it is sufficient to force such state governments to play by the rules and enforce them fairly. In the 19th century the British sent gunboats from their naval bases to threaten Latin American states,

today the US tries to keep control by sending aircraft carriers and planes from its world-wide 'archipelago' of military bases in independent countries. The task has been getting more difficult for several reasons, paradoxically encouraging both the strengthening of borders for security and transgressing them with interventions (invasions) in the name of security. Recurrent capitalist crises over the last four decades - severest in some peripheral parts of the global economy disrupted by neo-liberalism - have fostered general instability, a global 'implosion', and (as we shall discuss) a new spatial fix of migrant labour, all bringing further pressure on borders. The world has got more unruly but also the hegemonic power of the USA has weakened, despite having the now essential large home territory of a successful hegemon, and despite too its unprecedented and unrivalled archaeopelago of bases, military superiority and spending. Partly because of now being increasingly rivalled economically (e.g., by the EU and China), there has been discernable hegemonic decline, and particularly in the effectiveness of the less costly options of persuasive power and only having to threaten rather than actually needing to invade other states. The difficulties of disciplining recalcitrant states and staying ahead of rivals are the context for the high-risk 'Bush doctrine (gamble) of pre-emptive strikes across sovereign borders (Anderson 2003). The Iraq adventure may be exceptional in its wider aim (and failure) to give US hegemony a new lease of life, and in the extent of territorial occupation by the US, but invasion and regime-change per se are an integral part of the new imperialism of informal empire (not some neo-conservative optional extra). Recalcitrant states have to be
threatened, and threats do sometimes have to carried out, though the costly mess of getting embroiled in a territorial occupation graphically demonstrates why informal rather than formal empire is still the easier, cheaper option.

Neoliberalism
{**In Cuba Policy and Labor 1NC**}The process of state driven neoliberal practice uses inclusionary ontological enframing to reducing human existence to particular modalities of potential contribution to the marketthis idea constitutes ontological violence and the reduction of the infinite possibility of being- ontologically positioned to serve the interests of profit-making Joronen 2013, (Mikko, Department of Geography and Geology, Geography Section, University of Turku, Finland,
Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism, 3/21/13, 7/28/13|Ashwin) As I have suggested,52 ontological monopolisations constitute vio- lence through two reciprocally

conditioning mechanisms. First, through the oblivion of the mechanism of appropriation (Ereignis), which works by intrinsically concealing the openness of being and its reservoir of ungrounded possibilities; and second, through the violence intrinsic in par- ticular historical modes of revealing, for instance, the ontological ordering of entities in neoliberal enframing. The first mechanism of violence appar-

ently refers to the fundamental (im)possibility for the different forms of life to emerge. It is a question concerning particular appropriations of being, which take place by monopolising their own mode of revealing, thus refusing their intrinsic condition of possibility, the abyssal richness of open being. The sec- ond mechanism of violence, in turn, is related to the designated positions, such as the neoliberal

enframing, which violently enframe human existence and the revealing of the real to particular modalities of ontology. At the level of the first mechanism, neoliberal fabrication of particular mode of existence takes

advantage of what I have discussed, by following Heidegger, the ontological ambiguity of being, its happening as a concealing- revealing.53 Accordingly, while disclosing a peculiar mode of existence, Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013 366 Mikko Joronen the appropriation of being always conceals the open possibility for the other modes of revealing to come about. Such concealment is an intrin- sic necessity for all revealing to take place: all modes of revealing conceal their originary source, the inexhaustible plenitude of open being. Neoliberal governmentality, however, follows the logic of violent mono-politics and complete grounding of the

revealing of things to the point of abandoning the possibility for ontological change. It remains solely withdrawn to the optimised arrangement of ontic realities: it concentrates on the calculative

ordering of things (beings), and as a result, hides the ontological ques- tion concerning its own mode of revealing (being). Neoliberalisation thus covers not only the ontological mechanism of concealing-revealing, but its own ontological finitude. By monopolising its own modality of revealing, neoliberal enframing veils its own finitude, its nature as a finite Event of appropriation (das Ereignis), thus passing the originary openness of being into oblivion. The latter mechanism of ontological violence, in turn, refers to the inner logic of neoliberal enframing. Neoliberalisation operates, first, by reducing political capabilities of individuals to the

internalised rule of the maximum economy, but also by moulding all things into reserves of profits. First of all, neoliberalisation violently enframes human existence into bare reserves of human capital, which are increasingly used by states in their tactics to succeed in global competition. The neoliberal state, governing its popu- lation by the means of encouraging economically calculating subjectivity, is not established out of the violent act of territorial inclusion and order, but above all, out of the violent fact of reducing human existence into usable capital. Second, as a drive to reveal things as profitable reserves, neoliberalisation violently divests natural entities from their abrupt

happen- ing and phenomenological richness of revealing. Altogether, such reductions constitute the post-political situation of neoliberal governmentality: they cre- ate a world of technical solutions and politics-free zones abrogating the

politics of ontological revealing. The depoliticising conduct of the neoliberal state is an ultimate political act, which paradoxically establishes an anti- political abrogation of all political acts through the concealment of the politics of ontological possibility. Such ontological mono-politics thus inter- twines with the first mechanism of ontological violence: by fabricating the real, including human existence, for the use of economic calculations and profits, neoliberal governmentality monopolises a particular mode of reveal- ing, and thus, fades the ontological openness of being and its finite Event (Ereignis) to the background. What remains excluded in the process of
neoliberal enframing, what remains outside of its framework, is evidently no-thing ontic, but the ontological openness of being. As the critical explorations of neoliberalism in recent geographical literature have emphasised, mainly by leaning on Marx, Harvey and a set of interpretations of Foucault, neoliberalism should Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 18:46 27 July 2013

be conceptualised as an open and unpredictable process of enclosure, as a complex set of logics of inclusion and exclusion operating through a variety of spatial territories and networks.54 Instead of a fixed set of doctrines and practices, neoliberalisation is conceptualised as a contingent process that works by enclosing a variety of subjects, practices,
Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality 367

technolo- gies and materialities through different, even conflicting, rationalities and spatialities. Nevertheless, even as delegate contributions as these seem to fall short on scrutinising the ontological characteristics

involved in the pro- cess of neoliberalisation, not to mention the evident absence of Heideggers work, which also Foucault, though with cryptic and non-explicated man- ner, admitted as being a central influence on his own thinking.55 Although neoliberalism is conceptualised as a flexible and contingent process emerg- ing through the unlimited number of unpredictable enclosures, from the Heideggerian perspective, neoliberalism is not so much a dialectical pro- cess of inclusion and exclusion,56 but a process of

ontological mono-politics enframing the real as such in terms of available, usable, orderable, and make- able reserve. Instead of exclusion, neoliberal enframing works through total inclusion, where every-thing is revealed as having the potential to become utilised. Things escaping the measures is never under suspect.

of neoliberal enframing are revealed, not as excluded, but as not-yet-enframed-and-utilised reserves. Neoliberal enframing is hence a process of ontological inclusion an ontological drive towards the complete economic usability of things, where this drive in itself

Neolib bad
Neoliberalism reproduces colinalism thnrough the exploitation of the global South Racism, Sexism and Violence result Agathangelou & Ling, York University and the New School University, in 4
[Anna M. & L.h.m., Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11, International Studies Quarterly, 48] Neoliberal economics enables globalized militarization. It exploits the states monopoly of violence to entrench economic desire by: (1) rationalizing the private consumption of products and people as a public good, (2) commodifying and (re)colonizing third-world labor, generally, and women, specifically, to transnationalize production at relatively low costs, and (3) institutionalizing racism, sexism, and neo-colonialism to deflect and distract social dissent (Agathangelou, 2002; cf. Agathangelou and Ling, 2003). Agents of globalization, such as multinational corporations, the media, and the nationalist state, seamlessly transition from freedom to consumption (Firat and Dholakia, 2000), all the while militarizing middle-class life.20 Although ostensibly anti-Western, bin Laden and his cohorts also militarize neoliberal desire industries to journey from jihad to Paradise. Neoliberalism and Post-Cold War Insecurities The end of the Cold War intensified economic insecurities even as it relaxed superpower-induced, political ones. Socialisms retreat as a material and ideological threat allowed the newly unfettered owners of corporate capital-the Wall Street- Treasury-IMF Complex (Wade and Veneroso, 1998)-and its technologicalmanagerial elite to abrogate an earlier, social contract with workers, initiated in the aftermath of World War II, for a rapidly, globalizing market system. Reagan- Thatcher
hyperliberalism (Cox, 1987) in the 1980s facilitated this global restructuring of national institutions, the military, and their international partners with largescale, governmental deregulation. High-income

inequalities and polarities now afflict the world, especially those who are neither white, male, professional, nor Western (Marchand and Runyan, 2000; World Bank, 2001;
Galbraith, 2002).21 Today, a citizens movement around the world-which the media have labeled anti-globalization-signals a new era of class, gender, and racial discontent.22 An ultimate insider like Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist at the World Bank, admits that international financial institutions, governed by the central banks of the worlds richest economies, seek only to fatten their own treasuries rather than improve peoples lives (Stiglitz, 2002). Not by coincidence did the September 11 terrorists target Americas two leading institutions of wealth and power. Such

violence inheres in neoliberal globalization. Charlotte Hooper (2001), for instance, finds a consistent application of predatory, white-male heterosexuality to global business in one of neoliberal globalizations premier media outlets: The Economist. One article (15 January 1994) paeans Myanmars rich resources as ripe for rape for Western
businessmen (quoted in Hooper, 2001: 139). Just as George Bush subliminally sexualizes terrorists as violable prey, so The Economist constructs global business as another colonial adventure for hypermasculine plunder and privilege. Woman-nature-culture,

especially from the third-world, serve as sexualized, racialized instruments of use or pleasure for these globetrotting, money-making captains of industry. Not surprisingly, women, immigrants, and minorities endure the worst jobs at the lowest pay under neoliberal globalization (Sassen, 1998). They also face the most abusive and systematic forms of collective violence: urban terrorism from the
extreme right and left, racist attacks, Islamic bombings, gang shootings, death squads, riots, vandalism, human rights abuses, vigilante lynchings, political assassinations, kidnappings, police shootings, high-tech security harassments, private justice making, civil disobedience, shantytown eradication, and soccer hooliganism (Holston and Appadurai, 1996: 200). Paradoxically, industrialized economies

have increased subsidies to immigration and other policing institutions to secure economic, political, and cultural borders even while transnationalizing them (Agathangelou, 2004a).

Elian Gonzalez Key

What youre gonna see here in this case is that the narrative of Elian is best understood in the crossroads of Critical geography and Critical race theory I cant figure out a tag for the rest of the card it needs to jive with the narrative solvency and make some sort of impact claim Price 2010[Patricia L. Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International
University, At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race in Progress in Human Geography 34(2) pages 160-162] Elins odyssey, while compelling on its own merits, lends itself well to analysis located at the crossroads of critical geographies of race and CRT, for the racialized legal and spatial politics of inside and outside were at the heart of the controversy. The cover of the 27 January 27 2000 issue of Time Magazine put it succinctly, asking Where does he belong?. Where was Elins rightful home Cuba or Miami? Who was Elins rightful family his father in Cuba or his relatives in Miami? Where was Elins rightful place in the world? Elins liminal status as a child, and as a Cuban in the United States in the post-cold war era, added to his indeterminate legal status. Because Elisabet Brotons death had left him motherless, Elin was also, symbolically, nationless (Banet-Weizer, 2003: 154). Elins fluid liminality, literally adrift in the Atlantic Ocean, added to perceptions of his lack of rootedness. As Bruce DArcus, one of the few geographers to analyze Elin Gonzlez (see also Price, 2004), notes: Lines were drawn between good and evil, as well as us and them, certainly, but also quite literally with respect to the here and the there of a geographic morality play (DArcus, 2006: 106). Thus Elins was at its crux a border case, involving literal and figurative crossings that were moral, legal, and spatial in nature. In this section, it is not my intent to provide a comprehensive discussion of the details of the case. Rather, I will illustrate how the key ideas elaborated in section III can be productively employed in a real-world example. The diversely scaled debates, the strategic deployment of narrative, and the medias role in shaping public perception of the racialized normalcy (or lack thereof) of Elin, all constituted specific aspects of this example that inhabit the intersection of critical geographies of race and CRT. In broader terms, as well, Elins case exemplified the place-mutability of whiteness, and the contemporary racialization of Latinos/as in the USA, also important crossroads topics. In short, the understandings, contestations, and ultimate resolution of the Elin Gonzlez affair brought intrinsically spatial questions of belonging and exclusion into direct and productive conversation with the legal system in ways that turned, implicitly and explicitly, on race. The narrativization of Elin Gonzlez was the most patently obvious feature of his existence in the US popular imaginary. A view to the narrative structure of any series of events helps understand how they are lent a particular order and logic, as well as suggesting a conclusion that makes more sense than other possible conclusions. The case was crafted and presented in terms so dramatic and compelling that the incident was likened to a soap opera or a circus (Bragg, 2000; del Carmen Martnez, 2003; Barry, 2007). The presence of 24-hour Elin-cams positioned by local news media outside the Gonzlez family home in Miami made Elin and his surrogate familys every move the subject of continuous discussion, dissection, and speculation. Much of

this consisted of apparent gossip: was Aunt Marisleysis having an affair with Donato Dalrymple (the fi sherman who plucked Elin from the Atlantic), or perhaps with a Cuban-American National Foundation official? Did Elins visiting Cuban grandmothers really inspect his penis to see if it had grown? Was Janet Reno, the US Attorney General at the time of the case, truly an unnatural woman (ie , a lesbian)? The media sexualization of Elin himself a very sexy kid in a soap opera (Banet-Weizer, 2003: 157) was

persistent in its obsessive, repetitive, near pornographic quality (Martnez, 2003: 31). These sexualized tidbits undergirded a family drama that deeply emplotted Elins story. As geographer Heidi Nast (2000) has pointed out, the normative Oedipal family triad (mother/father/son) is coded as white, yet it has an additional, repressed, racialized member (the bestial). Though Nasts work focuses on the sexualized and familialized race relations deriving from US slavery, the notion of a racially normative (white) family that holds a racially repressed (black) tension at its center can certainly be extended to the

Cuban (and Cuban exile) case, given that nations history of African slavery and white supremacy. I will suggest that, in part, the sexualization of the Elin drama reflects precisely this racialized tension over who (and where) was Elins proper family: the Miami Gonzlezes or
Elins father Juan in Crdenas, Cuba? On the one hand, his Miami relatives, though related to Elins father, were not his imme diate biological parents; on the other hand, his biological father Juan had divorced from Elins mother Elisabet before her depart ure from Cuba. In addition and in a rare case of water being thicker than blood the Miami Gonzlezes staunchly

identified with the Cuban exile community. Among other issues, particularly their outspoken anti-Castro stance, Cuban exiles are noted for their racially white identification. Cubanancestry
individuals were three times as likely to claim white alone as their race on the 2000 Census than were other Hispanic-ancestry individuals (Committee on Transforming our Common Destiny, 2006).6 Juan Miguel, by contrast, had remained in

revolutionary Cuba, which has become much blacker both demographically through the exodus of white Cubans, and through the revolutionary ideology which has promoted (in theory if not in practice) a racially tolerant national identity and anti-racist policies. Thus, not only was Elins return to Cuba viewed by the Gonzlezes as politically dangerous, it was tantamount to child abuse. Returning Elin to Juan Miguel was equivalent to sacrificing him to the (racialized) beast, repressed but always present, in the form of the Cuban island, Fidel Castro, and Juan Miguel.

Framework

Borders Come First

Borders and place come before and determine politics where we locate political authority is a prerequisite to political engagement Walker 9 [RBJ, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria,
Canada, After the Globe, Before the World, p 33-35]
The list of challenges to established political conventions is undoubtedly long. It offers ample potential for scholarly squabbles and public debates about sequencing and priorities. It certainly exceeds the analytical competence of established disciplinary traditions of scholarship, not least because established scholarly disciplines are already overcommitted to specific sequences and priorities. It feeds multiple disputes about the interpretation of information and the specific ontological, epistemological and axiological commitments these interpretations should stimulate. Specific claims sometimes lead to sophisticated conceptual and empirical innovation; though they also lead to disputes about the grounds on which conceptual and empirical sophistication might now be judged. Sometimes such claims generate wild speculation, righteous indignation, and desperate affirmations of entrenched theoretical traditions; though they also intensify suspicions that the grounds on which we have come to think about both tradition and radical possibility are now precisely what is being called into question. Most significantly, claims about specific trends and problems generate further claims about

the limitations of established forms of political authority, especially about the always uncertain relationship between various practices of power and the territorially located institutions and procedures through which deployments of, and responses to, power are understood to be legitimate. Whether in relation to narratives about new or intensified trends and dangers, or to contestations over basic principles that have long been taken for granted, claims that we need to be more imaginative in our ability to work together (as the political animals of the polis, as Aristotle would put it, as participants in some community as we tend to put it now) increasingly run up against the multiple ways in which our authoritative expressions of political engagement are firmly located in a particular somewhere: within and between the spatial boundaries of modern states. 7 To imagine some other way of being political, it is often assumed, is also to imagine future possibilities without the benefit of those boundaries, those lines of both discrimination and relation that have shaped our most basic assumptions about what it means to be modern political subjects capable of responding to specific challenges or to more general structural and historical transformations. This is what gives such disconcerting force to claims that we need to reimagine where and what political life might be. To articulate suspicions that political life often fails to take place where it is supposed to take place is to generate multiple questions about how to engage with whatever politics is supposed to be from those places within which it is supposed to occur. To contemplate the implications of various claims about the speed, acceleration and temporal contingency of contemporary
political practices is to generate questions about how such practices can be contained and organized within the spatial boundaries of a particular somewhere. To claim that the boundaries of the modern state and the modern system of

states are being displaced is to provoke uncertainty about where we are or what we might be as political subjects. To suspect that contemporary political life exceeds the instrumental and/or imaginative capacities of modern subjects conceiving themselves to be citizens of a particular somewhere is to raise doubts about our capacity to think about the prospects for liberty, equality, security and democracy, and thus about how we might still claim to be both members of a particular community and participants in some more broadly defined community, perhaps even one encompassing the entirety of humankind. To contemplate the possibilities of resistance or emancipation in relation to claims about the failings of the modern state, or to envisage plans for updating the United Nations so as to meet demands for fairer and more effective forms of

governance, or to make claims about the significance of social movements that are somehow new, a civil society that is somehow global, or forms of violence that require still more violence, is to come up against many well defined boundaries,

whether understood as physical borders or as other, less tangible forms of limitation: limits in space, limits in time, and limits in our capacity to imagine where and what we are in space and in time. Most disturbingly, to try to respond to claims that the problems of our age are worldwide in scope, involving complex economic, ecological and cultural processes that exceed the grasp of established political authorities, is to generate profound doubts about our capacity to engage with a world that has already been excluded as the necessary

condition under which modern political authority has been constituted in the formalized spaces of abstractly sovereign jurisdictions. Consequently, it is now scarcely possible to engage with contemporary political life without some sense that we risk speaking in terms that have lost much of their grip not only upon important empirical events but even more so upon the theoretical principles through which we are encouraged to make sense of and respond to empirical events. While many specific problems or trends attract pragmatic responses requiring little attention to conceptual coherence or to grandiose notions of spatiotemporality, once these responses impinge on established principles of political authority, responsibility, liberty, equality, security and democracy upon the principles through which we have come to understand the possibilities and limits of a politics of modern subjects enabled within and between modern sovereign states the spatiotemporal organization of what counts as a coherent and acceptable form of political life quickly become of great controversy. In the meantime, ambitious one-liners are thrown around as once merely speculative concepts are puffed up for the talk shows, the best-seller lists, the quick sound-bites and the executive summaries. Claims about globalization, postmodernity, a conflict of civilizations, a coming anarchy, a third way, a risk society, a tipping point or a new empire blind us in a momentary glare, and then fade as complexities impinge and contingencies are brought to order. The stories we are told about contemporary

transformations vary enormously. Anyone who claims to know how to offer a reasoned scholarly judgement about what they add up to is certainly tempting the fates. Nevertheless, in my judgement it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our capacity to know how to engage with political possibilities because we know where those possibilities are to be engaged is in serious trouble. Much of this trouble arises in those contexts that we call the international: that strange and very puzzling place in which we are encouraged to imagine ourselves engaged in a politics that encompasses, or might one day encompass, the entire world; as if a politics both enabled by and sustaining the ambitions of specifically modern subjects could ever encompass the entire world from which such subjects have been separated as the necessary but impossible condition under which they can celebrate their liberties, equalities and securities.

Language First
Language and knowledge production must be investigated first western approaches misrepresent hiearchal systems of domination Grosfoguel 2 (Ramn Grosfoguel, Associate Professor. Ethnic Studies Department , 2002,
Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the Modern/ColonialCapitalist World-System, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 25, No. 3, Utopian Thinking (2002), pp. 203-224, Accessed: 7/31/13) We have yet to develop a new language to account for the com- plex processes of the modern/colonial world-system without relying on the old liberal language of the three arenas. For example, the fact that world-systems theorists characterize the modern world-system as a world-economy misleads many people into thinking that world-sys- tems analysis is about analyzing the so-called economic logic of the system. This is precisely the kind of interpretation Wallerstein attempts to avoid in his critique of the three autonomous domains. However, as Wallerstein himself acknowledges, the language used in world-systems analysis is still caught in the old language of nineteenth- century social science and to dispense with this language is a huge challenge. What if capitalism is a world-economy, not in the limited sense of an economic system, but in the sense of Wallerstein's histori- cal system defined as "an integrated network of economic, political and cultural processes the sum of which hold the system together" (Wallerstein, 1991a: 230)? We need to find new concepts and a new language to account for the complex entanglement of gender, racial, sexual, and class hierarchies within global geopolitical, geocultural, and geo-economic processes of the modern/colonial world-system where the ceaseless accumulation of capital is affected by, integrated to, constitutive of, and constituted by those hierarchies. In order to find a new language for this complexity, we need to go outside our paradigms, approaches, disciplines, and fields. I propose that we examine the metatheoretical notion of heterarchies developed by Greek social theorist, sociologist, and philosopher Kyriakos Konto- poulos (1993) as well as the notion of coloniality of power developed by Anbal Quijano (1991; 1993; 1998). Hierarchical thinking is an attempt to conceptualize social struc- tures with a new language that breaks with the liberal paradigm of nineteenth-century social science (Kontopoulos, 1993). The old lan- guage of social structures is a language of closed systems, that is, of a single, overarching logic determining a single hierarchy. To define a historical system as a "nested hierarchy," as Wallers tein proposed in the Gulbenkian Commission report Open the Social Sciences (1996), undermines the world-systems approach by continuing to use a metatheoretical model that corresponds to closed systems, precisely the opposite of what the world-systems approach attempts to do. In contrast, heterarchies move us beyond closed hierarchies into a language of complexity, open systems, entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous hierarchies, structural levels, and structuring logics. The notion of logics here is redefined to refer to the heterogeneous entanglement of multiple agents' strategies. The idea is that there is neither autonomous logics nor a single logic, but multiple, heterogeneous, entangled, and complex processes within a single historical reality. The notion of entanglement is crucial here and approaches Wallerstein's notion of historical systems understood as "integrated network[s] of economic, political and cultural processes" (1991a: 230). The moment multiple hierarchical relationships are considered to be entangled, according to Kontopoulos, or integrated, according to Wallerstein, no autonomous logics or domains remain. The no- tion of a single logic runs the risk of reductionism, which is contrary to the idea of
complex systems, while the notion of multiple logics runs the risk of dualism. The solution to these ontological questions (the reductionist/autonomist dilemma) in heterarchichal thinking is to go beyond the monism/dualism

binary opposition and to talk about an emergentist materialism that implies multiple, entangled processes at different structural levels within a single historical mate- rial reality (which includes the symbolic/ideological as part of that material reality). Heterarchies keep the use of the notion of logics only for analytical purposes in order to make certain

distinctions or to abstract certain processes that once integrated or entangled in a concrete historical process acquire a different structural effect and meaning. Heterarchical thinking provides a

language for what Immanuel Wallerstein calls a new way of thinking that can break with the liberal nineteenth-century social sciences and focus on com- plex historical systems.

Epistemolgoy Comes First

Epistemology comes first theres no such thing as objective neutrality means we must investigate the production of knowledge as a prerequisite to policy outcomes Grosfoguel 2 (Ramn Grosfoguel, Associate Professor. Ethnic Studies Department , 2002,

Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the Modern/ColonialCapitalist World-System, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 25, No. 3, Utopian Thinking (2002), pp. 203-224, Accessed: 7/31/13) As scholars we must recognize that we always speak from a specific location in the gender, class, racial, and sexual hierarchies of a particular region in the modern/colonial worldsystem. Our knowl- edges, as the feminist thinker Donna Haraway contends, are always already situated (1988), but I will add, following Quijano (1993) and Mignolo (2000), that they are situated within the axis of the colonial difference produced by the coloniality of power in the modern/ colonial world-system. The Western/masculinist idea that we can produce knowledges that are unpositioned, unlocated, neutral, and universalistic, is one of the most pervasive mythologies in the mod- ern/colonial world. Universal/global designs are always already situ- ated in local histories (Mignolo, 2000). Those in power positions in the European/Euro-American vs. non-European hierarchy of the modern/colonial world often think in terms of global designs or universalistic knowledges to control and dominate colonized/ racial- ized/subordinated peoples in the capitalist world-system. The colonial difference formed by centuries of European colonial ex- pansion in the modern/colonial world-system is always constitutive of processes of knowledge production. To speak from the subaltern side of the colonial difference forces us to look at the world from angles and points of view critical of hegemonic perspectives. This requires an effort on our part. "Border thinking" or "border episte- mology" are precisely the terms used by Walter Mignolo (2000), inspired in the work of Chicana and Chicano scholars such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987), Norma Alarcon (1983), and Jos David Saldivar (1998), to refer to this in-between location of subaltern knowledges, critical of both imperial global designs (global coloniality) and anti- colonial nationalist strategies (internal coloniality).

Frameworks Bad
A framework for debate totalizes discussion and other forms of politics- turns education and locks in current border dialogue Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg157-59)
According to Derrida, a

deconstructive perspective must neither re-frame nor fantasise the absence of the frame.129 In other words, the work of deconstruction is to negotiate between two competing imperatives. On the one hand, because the activity of framing is always contingent, unstable and violent,

deconstructive analysis should not aspire to, or be satisfied with, merely switching one problematic frame (for example, the concept of the border of the state) for another (for example, the concept of the generalised biopolitical border). On the other hand, deconstructive analysis requires sensitivity to the way in which frames are used everyday through language and, while the activity of framing never works because of infinite context, it will not do simply to wish this activity away: some form of closure is necessary for anything to happen and so we need frames. This means that any form of practice/theory ultimately relies (p.158) upon line drawing: even a mode of thinking that advocates the refusal of drawing lines. Interestingly, this is reflected in the counter-response to Prozorov given by Edkins and Pin-Fat: that their reading of Agamben leads to a politics of decisioning and particular distinctions.130 In this way, despite Agamben's insistence on the necessity of adopting a logic of the field, his accounts of the activity of sovereign power and the prospects for resistance against it do not overcome a reliance on borders, distinctions and separations. It must be reiterated, however, that, for Derrida, this is not necessarily something to lament. Although borders continually break down, they are nevertheless necessary.

What this means is that the politics of framing must be marked and negotiated as such. The
implications of Derrida's account of what I have called the politics of framing can be summarised as follows. First, as we have seen in relation to the use of the concept of the border of the state, different frames in global politics do not simply

produce different representations of global politics. The activity of framing, of invoking borders, distinctions and separations to try to make sense of contemporary political life, is not divorced from global politics but fundamentally part of it. Therefore, any form of framing constitutes praxis in its own right, with important ethical and political ramifications. Second, in the absence of a metaframe or absolute standard, the use of a particular frame to try to make sense of contemporary political life must be seen as a political move. In other words, the adoption of one frame or another is always something that cannot be fully justified and is therefore open to the possibility of unending scrutiny, debate and/or contestation. On this basis, for example, my own
elaboration of the concept of the generalised biopolitical border can be read as a political act using the work of a variety of theorists to articulate an alternative imaginary to that dominated by the concept of the border of the state. Third , part of the work of

deconstruction is to expose practices of framing in order that particular frames might be interrogated and/or resisted as contingent outcomes: as borders drawn to provide comfort and security in the otherwise meaninglessness of the flux. A deconstructive ethos is to show how, no matter how established or settled a given frame appears to be, it is always produced in a limitless context of interpretation and reinterpretation which, necessarily, (p.159) denies the possibility of any sort of closure, finitude or totalisation. Fourth, as well as vigilance towards diverse practices of framing, deconstruction implies the need for a constant questioning of frames. On this basis, it is necessary continually to reflect on the frames used to try to make sense of global politics and project these reflections into our analyses. Following this ethos, it is necessary perpetually to return to, question and realise the limitations of framings in global politics which any further uptake of the concept

Questions of boundaries should come first. They produce our understanding of all other social constructions Jones 10 (Reese, Associate Professor and Chair of Graduate Studies Department of Geography

University of Hawaii at Manoa, March 31, 2010 The spatiality of boundaries Progress in Human Geography) Schaffter et al.s argument hinges on the need for boundary studies to stick to materiality. They imply that I am trying radically to despatialize or dematerialize boundary studies. My intention was the exact opposite: by emphasizing the embodied spatial experiences on which primary metaphors rely, I am arguing that everyday experiences with the world are

imbued with prior spatial understandings. Smith and Katz (1993: 69) also recognize the problematic nature of spatial metaphors
when they argue that it is precisely this apparent familiarity of space, the givenness of space, its fi xi ty and inertness, that make a spatial grammar so fertile for metaphoric appropriation. Recognizing

the spatiality of the categories are containers metaphor opens up new ways to contest the notion that categories are fi xed and bounded containers of social life. Schaffter et al. suggest, however, that intrinsically non-spatial concepts should be left to other disciplines. This is a flawed proposition for two reasons. First, by looking only at the stuff inside a category rather than the boundary-making process, they fall directly into the trap Barth (1969), Abbott (1995), and Newman (2003) warn against. They are focusing on things and are missing the process that produced those understandings. Second, their argument flies in the face of some of the most important contributions geographers have made over the last few decades by requiring scholars in other disciplines to recognize that many concepts that they treat as non-spatial givens are always imbued with spatial meanings and practices (Agnew, 1994; Lee, 2002). For example, Schaffter et al. (2009: 257) argue that Economy is a non-spatial concept. It is unclear to me how economic activities could actually be practiced non-spatially. What benefit, then, is there in maintaining the distinction that the concept itself is nonspatial? Leaving that aside, what I want to emphasize is how the concept is defined. How do we understand whether a thing or process is part of the economy? We can take a concept like monetary policy and say that it fits within the economy while another concept, for example sleep, would not go in the category economy. The ability to say it is in, out, or part of the category demonstrates how the
metaphor of categories are containers is transposed onto the category. Even when talking about a supposedly non-spatial category, it relies on a spatial schema. There is a boundary between the categories economy and noteconomy that allows us metaphorically to put things int o the container or not. To put it another way, the

categories that shape our understanding of the world rely on the spatial metaphor of boundaries, inclusion, and exclusion regardless of whether the concept itself is supposedly intrinsically spatial, spatialized, or non-spatial.

Discourse key
Focus on discourse and representations is key in the context of our criticism threat construction and the securitization of national identities legitimize violent intervention in the name of United States hegemony critical analysis is necessary. Slater, 2004 [David Slater, Emeritus Professor of Political Geography, & Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of London, Geopolitics and the Postcolonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, Blackwell Publishing Ltd]
In the light of Olneys dictum, it can be noted that an

expansion of spatial power or the establishment of a new spatial-political order needs a justification, an ensemble of ideas and concepts that can provide a moral and cultural foundation. Moreover, in the context of relations with other societies, and specifically in the Americas, remembering Jeffersons notion of the United States having a hemisphere to itself, the construction of a geopolitical identity included the positing of difference as inferiority and danger. The outside world contained threats to security and to the diffusion of mission. The of disorder and chaos to the rule of the emerging American Empire could be taken as an example of the key relation between the perception of threat and the geopolitics
perceived threat

of intervention to maintain a sense of security. It can be argued here that any discussion of threats to order and stability must be linked to discourses of identity and difference. What exactly is being
threatened? What are the discourses or regimes of truth that are immanent in the power relations that seek to preserve order? In the case of nineteenth-century US power, the spread of progress and a civilizational mission were predominantly

envisaged as being rooted in a specifically American destiny. There were the pressures of economic expansion, but the USAs representation of itself to the world, the construction of a project of leadership (backed by the capacity and willingness to deploy force) was crucial to any understanding of the geopolitics of interventionism. Threats and perceptions of disorder are predicated on governing visions which are one expression of the complex intersections of power and cultural representation. But these visions are also a reflection of a hegemonic ambition. Further, in a context that is international, where the intersubjectivity that is a pivotal part of power relations stretches across national boundaries, and therefore national cultures, and where the attempt to develop a hegemonic project comes up against nationalist opposition, one kind of countergeopolitics, the resistance to imperial persuasion, has been strikingly resilient, even if it has never been the only tendency, as will be mentioned below. What needs to be remembered, as I shall suggest below, is that in any account of the power/discourse intersection, the effectiveness of counter-discourses or counter-representations to Empire ought to be included as a significant part of the analysis.

Discourse comes first shapes and sustains power relations Herod, Tuathail, and Roberts 98 Andrew Herod is Associate Professor of Geography at the
University of Georgia, Athens. Gearoid O Tuathail is Associate Professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Susan M. Roberts is Assistant Professor of Geography and member of the Committee on Social Theory at the University of Kentucky. An Unruly World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography February 20, 1998 page 32-34
(1992) and Serres (1995a), the

These tenets (Lakoff 1987) lead to a view of the world that is very different from the purified and purifying Joshua discourse, which we might call, after Jowitt

"Genesis discourse." It is a view of the world in which "borders are no longer of fundamental importance; territorial, ideological and issue boundaries are attenuated, unclear, and confusing" (Jowitt 1992: 307). It is a view of the world in which knowledge has become an archipelago of
the coral reefs of order" (Latour 1987a: 94-5). Obviously,

islands of epistemic stability in a sea of disorder, fluctuations, noise, randomness and chaos. Whereas in the Joshua discourse order is the rule and disorder is the exception, in the Genesis discourse disorder is the rule and order the exception and, as a result, "what becomes more interesting are the transitions and bifurcations, the long fringes, edges, verges, rims, brims, auras, crenellates, confines . . . all the shores that lead from one to another, from the sea of disorder to

such a view has a number of consequences, of which two

are particularly significant. First, the favored epistemological stance is, to use Wittgenstein's (1978) feline phrase, "not empiricism yet realism." That may sound like a contradiction in terms, but it is, in fact, an argument for a limited but not total form of relativism which argues that individuals understand the same domain of experience in different and inconsistent ways and that this is a necessary condition of knowledge (Diamond 1991). Since even the most disinterested of analysts is engaged in social projects any a priori claim to epistemological privilege is impossible. Second, knowledge is no longer seen as a form of empirebuilding in which "a powerful critique is one that ties, like a bicycle wheel, every point of a periphery to one of the center through the intermediary of a

proxy. At the end holding the center is tantamount to holding the world" (Latour 1987a: 90). At best, knowledge is, in Lakoff's (1987) phrase, "radial." That is: THE RISE OF SOFT CAPITALISM central truths are true by virtue of the directness of fit between the preconceptual structure of experience and the conceptual structure in terms of which the sentence is understood. But most of the sentences we speak and hear and read and write are not capable of expressing central truths; they are sentences that contain concepts that are very general or very specific or abstract or metaphorical or metonymic or display other kinds of 'indirectness' relative to the direct structuring of experience. Not that they need to be any less true, but they aren't central examples. (Lakoff 1987: 297) Discourses

produce power relations. Within them, stories are spun which legitimate certain kinds of constructs, subject positions, and affective states over others. The myths and fables of

the Joshua discourse were particularly powerful. Specifically, four of these myths and fables did serious work in producing a particular kind of world which is now so often called "modern" that we no longer realize the cultural specificity of the description or the strength of the investments we have placed in it. The first of these myths was an old Enlightenment "chestnut" the myth of total knowledge. Somehow - though we don't have this facility yet we could get to know everything that is going on. Every movement of an ant and every rustling of a leaf could be tracked and explained. Every human culture could be laid open to inspection and documentation. Every practical skill could be analyzed down to its last detail and then transcended. This myth was supported by a second: that the world was set up in such a way as to allow this that the world was an ordered, homogeneous, quantitatively different multiplicity. The world was defined by oneness, consistency and integrity which, in turn, acted as an ideal terrain on which purified theoretical orders could operate and permeate. The third myth was of a material world which could be separated out from the world of the imagination, from the world of symbols and semiotics. There was no sense, therefore, of a world in which materials are interactively constituted, in which "objects, entities, actors, processes - all are semiotic effects" (Law and Mol 1995: 277). The fourth myth was one of individuality. This was the idea that knowledge comes from the operation of a God-like gaze which emanates from an individual focal point. Human capacities, therefore, could be framed as being the result of an innate endowment that every individual received at the point of conception. There was, in other words, no grasp of the individual as being a modulated effect (Thrift 1991), of human capacities as arising out of: emergent properties of the total developmental system constituted by virtue of an individual's situation, from the start, within a wider field of relations including most importantly, relations with other persons. In short", social relations, far from being the mere resultant of the association of discrete individuals, each independently 'wired up' for co-operative or enthusiastic behaviour, constitute the very ground from which human existence unfolds.

Aff Cards Wrong Epistemolgoy Biased

Their research is motivated solely by the interests of sustaining the US State and entrenches the narrative of Latin American inferiority be skeptical of the affs claims to objectivity Sundberg 5 [Juanita, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Looking for the

critical geographer, or why bodies and geographies matter to the emergence of critical geographies of Latin America, Geoforum 36 (2005) 1728] Over 10 years ago, Said (1989, p. 214), expressed a complaint about the total absence of any reference to American imperial intervention in studies of epistemology and di erence. Such an analysis is critical because, as Said argues, the structures of location and geographical reference found in United Statesian cultural representations are predicated upon and underwritten by structures of attitude that legitimate inequality. To reveal the inner workings and material consequences of such
discursive patterns, Said (1995, p. 34), advocates wedding, rather than separating, political context a context that is primarily imperial with representations and their production, circulation, history, and interpretation. Given that scholars operate within a world not of their own making, their research questions, however innovative, are

rooted in systems of thinking and bodies of literature that articulate certain discursive categories and modes of representation, which in turn are embedded in specic socio-political and historical conditions. For this reason, as Said notes, situating representations within political contexts and locating researchers within geographical networks is key to understanding how scholarship and scholarly discourses embody, (re)produce, and contest social relations. In light of the history of US interests and interventions in Latin American countries, this section situates geographical knowledge about Latin America within a broader geo-political context. In particular, I am interested in critically asking to
what extent knowledge produced in the US is constituted by and reects United Statesian perspectives and interests. 3.1. Lati n American studies and the (re)production of inequality Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and subsequent declarations of manifest destiny, the United States has sought to assert hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere. Although Latin Americans from diverse countries have consistently called the US an imperialist force (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Dorfman, 1975), diplomats and scholars within the US have debated the accuracy or appropriateness of (Kaplan and Pease, 1993, p. 13). Others submit to the accusation, but suggest that US policy is driven solely by economic considerations. While some US academics and policy makers continue to engage in an ongoing pattern of

this term. For many, US imperialism was an aberration, or a eeting episode in the late 19th century denial about US imperialism (Kaplan and Pease, 1993, p. 11), others seek to re-conceptualize how we research and analyze
imperial encounters on the ground (Joseph et al., 1998). Historian Mark Bergers study, Under Northern Eyesthe North American equivalent to Saids Orientalismis an explicit attempt to make the relationship between power and knowledge central to the examination of the North American study of Latin America (1995, p. 1). Although Latin American studies has been cloaked in

assertions of objectivity and [articulates] a commitment to scientic and rational discourses, Bergers painstakingly detailed analysis situates scholars within the specic socio-historical contexts that condition their views of Latin America (1995, p. 19). Arguably, the most important factor shaping the context in which scholars operate is the US governments shifting interests in individual Latin American countries. As Berger notes, the boundaries between academia and the state have been blurred in Latin American studies. Not only have academics moved back and forth between academia and the various agencies of the government, but the state also has attempted to shape the kinds of research undertaken. For instance, the

1958 Defense Education Act created funding for area studies programs, in recognition of the strategic value of cultural knowledge about Latin America and other regions of the world (Morris-Suzuki, 2000, p. 14). 10 Ultimately, scholars suggest, such policies

explicitly recognized that the development of area studies programs could contribute to the successful exercise of US world power (Morris-Suzuki, 2000, p. 14). 11 In light of these close ties, Berger (1995, p. 2), argues that ...North American historical and social science professions facilitate the creation and maintenance of the national and international organizations, institutions, inter-state relations and politico-economic structures that sustain and extend US hegemony in Latin America and around the world. Furthermore, history and social science disciplines derive their power and authority from their linkages to these organizations, institutions and political structures. In
using Bergers analysis to highlight the connections between geo-politics and the production of knowledge, my goal is not to suggest that all

United States researchers working in Latin America have the interests of the state at heart; nor do I wish to argue that place determines outlook. Rather, I want to point out that Latin American studies in the US and consequently, geographies

of Latin America are embedded in and emerge from specic contexts characterized by asymmetrical power relations. Such a genesis has implications for the kinds of interpretative categories and research questions underwriting US research in the region. One such consequence is that Latin American studies consistently positions the West or the US as the implicit referent, i.e. the yardstick by which to encode and represent Latin America (after Mohanty, 1991, p. 55). As Berger notes, between the mid-19th century and World War I, Latin American studies reected and reproduced Anglo-Saxonist assumptions about North American civilization as the highest form of civilization in history (Berger, 1995, p. 30; see also Schoultz, 1998). Scholars looked to biological di erences between North American and Latin American peoples to explain socio-political phenomena in Latin American countries. After World
War II, the majority of scholarship on Latin America was structured by modernization theory, which cast these ideas in a new light.

Notions of racial di erences were replaced with cultural conceptions of development, progress, although an idealized vision of the West remained the yardstick by which Latin American nations and people were measured. Binaries such as developed/underdeveloped emerged to replace earlier versions like advanced/ backward. The
discourses have shifted, but the underlying presumption of the superior white North American self as referent of analysis remain the same (see also Schoultz, 1998). 12 Bergers study illustrates the extent to which research on Latin America coming out of the United States presumes a white, elite, (masculine) United Statesian referent of analysis. This is also to say that United Statesian

representations of Latin America may say more about US interests and identities than about Latin American people and society. Clearly, geography, geographical location, and geo-political context matter greatly in the production of knowledge about Latin America. Although a Berger-like
self-critique is yet to be elaborated, a number of geographers have begun to analyze the epistemological assumption underlying AngloAmerican geographical research on Latin America. 3.2. Contesting Anglo-American geographies of Latin America Berman Santana (1996) provides a compelling example of how geographers from the United States enlisted biological and cultural hierarchies to describe and analyze Puerto Ricos socio-spatial characteristics. Between the 1930s and 1950s during US occupation of Puerto Rico, geographers from the US conducted research on the island and participated in such projects as the Rural Land Classication Program and Operat ion Bootstrapa development program based upon export-led industrialization. In the process, geographers produced a series of studies about the island. One outcome of this research was the theory of nonviability, which asserted that Puerto Rico was too smal l, geographically too strategic, too poor in natural and human resources, and too overpopulated and therefore was not viable as an independent state (Berman Santana, 1996, p. 459). Interestingly, the geographers recommendations coincided with and supported the US governments strategies and goals for the island. Even as Berman Santana disputes the accuracy of geographical representations, her analysis highlights their emergence in the context of asymmetrical power relations between the United States and an island colony. Such a genesis, she contends, has the e ect of attributing the underscored characteristics as internal or essential to Puerto Rican people and nature, rather than the outcome of overlapping histories of colonialism, political exclusion, and environmentally destructive extractive economies. In this case, Berman Santana (1996, p. 458), argues, development models provided an explanation

for inequality among nations without placing responsibility on colonialist exploitationthus allowing it to continue. Ultimately, the theory of nonviability, which drew upon and reproduced beliefs about the inherent
inferiority of Puerto Ricans, had the e ect of authorizing the US to shape the islands future. In a somewhat di erent approach, Lawson and Klak (1993, p. 1068), challenge geographers working in Latin America to undertake an analysis of our own practice of knowledge production to reveal the workings of an ideology of power relations that marginalizes research on the South within the academy. The authors specifically interrogate the political economy of knowledge in Anglo social science wherein concepts and categories ow unilaterally from North to South (Lawson and Klak, 1993, p. 1073; see also Ramrez, 2000). This has the e ect of positioning the South as little more than a series of case studies demonstrating North American concepts and theories. Moreover, the authors suggest, Latin

America tends to be analyzed either in isolation from the North or as a peripheral region subject to forces emanating from the core (see also Dussell, 1998; Coronil, 1996). The interconnections and interdependencies between places are made invisible by these representational practices; each region is made to stand apart, di erent and distant from one another. Finally, Lawson and Klak suggest that the prevalence of dualisms such as First World/Third World, developed/ developing in geographical analyses imply that North America continues to be used as the yardstick against which Latin American countries and people are measured. Ultimately, these modes of representation leave intact dichotomous thinking practices that are also inherently hierarchical. Although Berman Santana and Lawson and Klak traverse new terrain in pursuing an internal
critique of geographies of Latin America, the authors do not go far enough. Following Coronil (1996), I want to consider how AngloAmerican epistemological positions and representations of Latin America are implicated in practices of self-fashioning. In a recent article, Coronil (1996, p. 56), seeks to extend Edward Saids work by reorienting our attention from the problematic of Orientalism, which focuses on the deciencies of the Wests representations of the Orient, to that of Occidentalism, which refers to the conce ptions of the West animating these representations. In this sense, Coronils (1996, p. 56), project is to unearth the implicit constructions of Selfhood that underwrite representations of Others; Occidentalism, then, is not the reverse of Orientalism but its condition of possibility. For

Coronil, analyzing Occidentalism is critical to understanding how asymmetrical power relations are (re)produced in everyday practices of knowledge production. To more fully explore how epistemological positions and modes of representation in geographies of Latin America constitute practices of self-fashioning that (re)produce inequality, I now turn to an analysis of the connections between objectivity, epistemology, and subject formation. I begin with an exploration of the implicit constructions of selfhood that underwrite prevailing notions of objectivity and extend this analysis to geographies of Latin America. 3.3. Objectivity and practices of epistemological selffashioning If prevailing notions of objectivity obliterate the bodies and geographies of geographers as outlined here, then objectivity-

as-we-know-it is underwritten by very particular constructions of selfhood: as disembodied, un-located or unlimited by place, and separate or separable from the objects of research.

Indeed, as Barnes and Gregory (1997, p. 15), suggest, the geographer in European and North American human geography has been imagined as elevated above the rest of the population, occupying a position from which he could survey the world with a detachment and a clarity that was denied to those closer to the ground (whose vision was supposed to be necessarily limited by their involvement in the mundane tasks of ordinary life). What are the implications of these practices of self-fashioning? How do constructions of the objective self inform geographies of Latin America? The objective observer is, rst and foremost, an identity category built

upon acts of exclusion. While the objective observer claims the capacity for bodily transcendence, historically men of color and
all women were excluded from performing such practices based upon the perception that they were mired in bodily or private (local) concerns (Haraway, 1997). In contemporary Anglo-American social sciences, this epistemological stance is re-articulated in the spatial politics of theory production. Not only is the West situated as the fountainhead of theories with

which to interpret the rest of the world (Morris-Suzuki, 2000, p. 19), but the production of theory that is of universal value, applicable across time and space has been restricted to that emerging from Europe (Chakrabarty, 2000). 13 In the context of Latin American studies, as Lawson and Klak (1993, p. 1078), note, theory produced in Anglo settings is privileged as generalizable, whereas theory from Latin America is typically labelled and identied as specic in origin and applicability. Consequently,
geographers tend to work very little with scholarship from Latin America, despite the availability of works in translation or written in English by prominent theoreticians such as Coronil (1996), Dussel (1995, 1998), Mignolo (1995), Mignolo (1999), and Quijano (2000) (to name just a few of particular interest to geographers). 14 Without this engagement, Anglo-American frames of reference remain intact. Secondly, if the (white, elite) objective self is constituted as detached and una ected by the objects of research, then knowledge production is framed as the exclusive property or outcome of the researcher and not something that emerged from the embodied interactions between researcher and the people and objects being researched. How the research process changed the researchers ideas and identity also remains outside the purview of such perspectives. This framing of research is pervasive in geographies of Latin America, wherein predominant epistemological positions and writing conventions render research transparent and indeed unremarkable. If we do not ask how the daily practices of eldwork, the interactions and negotiations between researcher and the many individuals en countered shape knowledge, then the geographer is constituted as the ultimate authority in the production of knowledge about other people and places (Mullings, 1999; Pratt, 2000). Following from this, to claim to be above and detached from the world under investigation is also to assume a position of mastery (Bondi, 1997, p. 247). In this sense, the geographical self is constituted and performed as a monarch -ofall-I-survey, to borrow Pratts (1992, p. 201), evocative term. Indeed, the history of geography and other disciplines

is one of intimate connections between research and the exercise of imperial power (Livingstone, 1992). As Maori scholar L.T. Smith (1999, p. 2), notes, the pursuit of knowledge is deeply embedded in the multiple layers of imperial and colonial practices. L.T. Smith (1999, p. 2), argues that white or Western researchers often position themselves and their research as serving a greater good for mankind. However, indigenous peoples around the world tell counter-stories about research that point to its
absolute worthlessness to us, the indigenous world, and its absolute usefulness to those who wielded it as an instrument (L.T . Smith, 1999, p. 3).

Answers to Answers

AT: Perm
Complete Negativity is key- only through imagining political praxis can we create change Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 137-38)
Prima facie, Agamben seems to lead in somewhat pessimistic, even despairing, directions. Indeed, his diagnosis of the relationship between politics and life, analysis of the production of bare life in zones of indistinction, and prognosis that we are all virtually homines sacri imply a bleak picture of the possibility for contestation, change and, in short, politics. For this reason, Andreas Kalyvas argues that Agamben's portrayal of the unstoppable march to the camp is totalistic [], and though it is concerned with politics and its eclipse , it is itself quite un-political.15 William Connolly arrives at a similar conclusion: Agamben [] carries us through the conjunction of sovereignty, the sacred, and biopolitics to a historical impasse.16 In an interview in 2004, however, Agamben replied to his critics: I've

often been reproached for (or at least attributed with) this pessimism that I am perhaps unaware of. But I don't see it like that. There is a phrase from Marx, cited by Debord as well, that I like a lot: the desperate situation of society in which I live fills me with hope. I don't see myself as pessimistic.17 By now a growing number of scholars have identified a more positive moment in Homo Sacer. On Jenny Edkins's view, a bleak assessment of Agamben's work, such as that reached by Kalyvas and Connolly, overlooks a significant facet of Agamben's work, where he seeks to propose an alternative to, and indeed a contestation of, sovereign biopolitics.18 Central to Agamben's thinking about ethicalpolitical praxis and resistance against sovereign biopolitics is his conception of the subject (p.137) as an interval or remainder between what he refers to as practices
of subjectification and de-subjectification.19 According to Agamben, the biopolitical terrain of global politics can be understood as a kind of desubjectification machine: it's a machine that both scrambles all the classical identities and [] a machine that [] recodes these very same dissolved identities.20 For Agamben it is possible to think through the potential for resistance

by rendering the machine inoperative on its own terms.21 Agamben's thought does not lead to nihilism or passivity but calls for the radical invention of new practices: a movement on the spot, in the situation itself.22 In The Time That Remains [2005], Agamben gives the example of St Paul's negotiation

with the Jewish law that divides Jews and non-Jews. Agamben is interested in the way in which, instead of applying a universal principle to argue against this sovereign cut, Paul intervenes by taking the law on on its own terms. According to Agamben, Paul does this by dividing the division itself: by introducing a further division between the Jew according to the flesh and the Jew according to the spirit. This division of the division means that, instead of a simple separation between Jews/non-Jews, there are now Jews who are not Jews, because there are Jews who are Jews according to the flesh, not the spirit, and [non-Jews] who are [non-Jews] according to the flesh, but not according to the spirit.23 Consequently, a remainder is produced that renders the applicability and operativity of the law ineffective: a new form of subject that is neither a Jew nor a non-Jew but a non-non-Jew.24 Applying this logic to contemporary conditions,

Agamben places his hope for a kind of minority politics in this form of unworking of the system or biopolitical machine from within: One should proceed in this way, from division to division, rather than by asking oneself: What would be the universal communal principle that would allow us to be together?To the contrary. It is a matter, confronted with the divisions introduced by the law, of working with what disables them through resisting, through remaining rsister, rester, it's the same root.25 Elsewhere, Agamben links the move to render the system inoperative with notions of profanation, meaning to violate or transgress, and play.26 He illustrates the logic of profanation through play with the (p.138) example of the cat that plays with the
ball of string as if it were a mouse. The game frees the mouse from being cast as prey and at the same time the predatory activity of the cat is shifted away from the chasing and killing of the mouse: and yet, this play stages the very same behaviours that define hunting.27 With this example Agamben seeks to demonstrate the profanatory potential in play as a means of creating a

new use of something by deactivating an old one. The ultimate call is to subvert the given machine or apparatus according to its own logic: to wrest from the apparatuses from all apparatuses the possibility of use that they have captured.28

Western Thought Co-opts Border thinking ****

Western thought cant move beyond borders the perm fails and just reentrenches them Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship
Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221] Border thinking needs its own genealogy and its own history; a history and a genealogy that emerge in the very act of performing border thinking. Without it, border thinking will remain either an appendix of modern Western imperial epistemology and the variants of canonical history of Western civilization told from the imperial perspective (from the Renaissance, to Hegel, to Marx); or an object of study for the social sciences (like the savage mind for earlier anthropologists). If border thinking is to emerge and prosper in the ex-second world today, it would have to happen in the colonial and ex-colonial locales of the subaltern empires, among the people who were multi-marginalized and denied their voice by Western modernity
directly and through subaltern imperial mediation. It is the Caucasus and Central Asia (with regard to Russia), the Kurds, the Greeks and the Armenians (with regard to the Ottoman Empire), the Yugoslavian bundle of contradictions in the Balkans, etc. But these voices are never heard and will hardly be heard soon. These mutes colonized by the subaltern empires are split between the original of Western culture (now also accessible to them) and its bad subaltern empire copies, the ex-mediators of civilization, plus their own native ethnic traditions continue to play their part in the process of the already split selves being shattered into even smaller pieces. Thats why the manifestation of the multitude (in Georgia, the Ukraine or Kirgizstan) is mobilized more by a desire to assimilate to the West than to engage in imagining a possible future beyond the options offered by communism and its aftermath, and liberalism and its aftermath. Our third thesis is the following. Borders could be studied from the perspective of territorial

epistemology (e.g. Western social sciences, see Horkheimers traditional theory) but the problem of the twenty-first century will be not so much to study the life and deeds of the borders, but to think from the borders themselves. That is, dwelling in the borders means re-writing geographic frontiers, imperial/colonial subjectivities and territorial epistemologies. Paraphrasing African-American sociologist W.E.B. Dubois (1904), we can say that the problem of the twenty-first century will be next to that of the color line announced by Dubois the problem of the epistemic line (Bogues, 2003). However, the epistemic line does not replace or displace the color line. The color and epistemic lines belong to different realms of reality, since epistemology is not supposed to have color, gender or sexuality. In terms of social class, the problems are easier to deal with because it was assumed that epistemology belonged to a division of labor in which the

intellectual workers do not belong to the same class as the proletarians. However, intellectual workers, even if they are not proletarians, do have color, gender and sexuality. Thus, the borders between the color (and gender and sexuality) line and the epistemic line are precisely where the problem appears and the solutions are being played out. For there is a shift at work at the moment when the epistemic line is interrogated from the perspective of the color (gender and sexuality) line. It is at this very moment that border thinking or border epistemology emerges: it emerges in the crack and it emerges as an epistemic shift. It is a shift from theo- and ego- to geo- and body-politics of knowledge.

Perm Fails Border Thinking Specific Alt

Perm fails its impossible to reconcile bordered and anti-border thinking, and starting from a Western viewpoint dooms the perm and causes cooption Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship
Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221] While imperial epistemology is based on theological and egological principles, the shift to geo- and body- political principles is indeed a de-colonial move. Geo and body-politics are the displaced inversion of theo- and ego-politics of knowledge. It is an inversion because it is assumed that John Lockes secondary qualities cannot be bracketed in the process of knowing and understanding. And in a world order in which the imperial and colonial differences establish all hierarchies, from economy to knowledge, secondary qualities that
matter are colonial local histories (geo-politics) subordinated to imperial local histories, on the one hand, and colonial subjectivities (e.g. what Frantz Fanon described as the wretched of the earth), on the other. Colonial subjectivities are the

consequences of racialized bodies, the inferiority that imperial classification assigned to every body that does not comply with the criteria of knowledge established by white, European, Christian and secular men. Thus, displaced inversion means that it is not just a change in the content but fundamentally in the terms of the conversation: the geo- and bodypolitical perspectives de-link from the imperial and totalitarian bent of theo- and ego-logical principles. It is hardly enough to question the secularity of the social sciences from the perspective of theology, as John Milbank does. It is of the essence to move away from inversions internal to imperial epistemology and to shift the geo-graphy and the bio-graphy of reason. These positions are hard to reconcile, which is clearly seen in any juxtaposition of Western and radical non-Western theorizing of borders. From the perspective of the imperial difference, the conditions and possibilities of border thinking and de-colonization are not only different but also more difficult. If in the history of borders marked by colonial differences the opposition to the empire is clear and loud; in the history of borders marked by imperial differences, the assimilation (e.g. Peter and Catherine in Russia) and desire to become the West, or competition (the Soviet Union confronting Western capitalist empires) takes precedence over decolonization (which would be a sort of de-imperialization), as we see in case of Russia today. China offers still another example of border thinking through the imperial difference: adaptation without assimilation. Overall, the conditions for decolonization seem to be more promising in the colonies and ex-colonies; or in empires that had been
reduced to colonies (e.g. the Islamic empire, which by the nineteenth century, was already subdivided and found itself at the mercy of the new imperialism of England and France). The ex-second world, or better yet, the world marked by the imperial more

than colonial differences, lives on/in the border, and yet instead of border thinking we find there blurred,

smudged, in-between models (the Ottoman Empire, Russia/ USSR, Central and South-Eastern Europe).4 Their differences with the West are also of a blurred and unstable nature and this makes it difficult to conceptualize such locales and epistemic and existential configurations from the viewpoints of both West and radical non-West, as well as from the viewpoint of these very people who were colonized by Western thinking, infected with secondary Eurocentrism and not able to analyse their own split subjectivity (their double consciousness, the necessary condition for border thinking), because it is always easier to analyze binary polar

structures than soft and blurred difference same but not quite, different, but too similar. Geo- and body-politics of knowledge as well as border thinking implies the awareness of the double consciousness. Double consciousness, as conceptualized by the African-American sociologist W.E.B. Dubois (see note 2) lies at the very foundation of border thinking. Double consciousness is border thinking and border thinking is double consciousness. There cannot be border thinking without double consciousness. Imperial consciousness is always territorial and monotopic; border thinking is always pluritopic and engendered by the violence of the colonial and imperial differences. Internal imperial critique (be that of Bartolom de las Casas or Karl Marx) is territorial and monotopic and assumes the truth of abstract universals (peaceful Christianization by conversion, free market, international revolution of the proletarians, etc.). Double consciousness emerges from the experiences of being someone (black, inscribed in the memory and histories of the slave trade in the Atlantic economy) who was classified by the imperialnational gaze (the European imperial frame of mind, the emerging US imperial nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century).
Thus, the problem of identity and of identity politics is a direct consequence of imperial knowledges making all the inhabitants of the

New World Indians and Blacks and all of Asia the Yellow Race. If border thinking is the unavoidable condition of imperial/colonial domination, critical border thinking is the imperial/condition transformed into epistemic and political projects of de-colonization. For that reason, de-colonial thinking is always already critical, it is border thinking and it is double

consciousness border thinking and double consciousness. Hegel, Kant and Marx to name just three

European luminaries denied internal others, be they Slavic people or Turks, a place in the universal history, in the march of modernity, in the unfolding of global proletarian revolution, etc. Their dis-incorporated epistemology and their belief in universal parameters blinded them to the subjectivity of otherness and more so to internal others. It was beyond their scope to understand why a Russian feels himself to be a cockroach in Europe (Yerofeyev, 2000), while a Turk buying a coat from a French store is in fact buying a European dream (Pamuk, 2000).5

Starting points key Border Thinking Alt

STARTING POINTS MATTER the perm begins with the dominant viewpoint of the state, ensuring a new politics will never emerge Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship
Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221] Our second thesis is the following. Border thinking (or border epistemology) emerges primarily from the peoples anti-imperial epistemic responses to the colonial difference the difference that hegemonic discourse endowed to other people, classifying them as inferior and at the same time asserting its geohistorical and body-social configurations as superior and the models to be followed. These people refuse to be geographically caged, subjectively humiliated and denigrated and epistemically disregarded. For this reason, the de-colonial epistemic shift proposes to change the rule of the game and not just the content and the reason why knowledge is produced: de-colonization, instead of working toward the accumulation of knowledge and imperial management, works toward the empowerment and liberation of different layers (racial, sexual, gender, class, linguistic, epistemic, religious, etc.) from oppression, and toward the undermining of the assumption upon which imperial power is naturalized, enacted and corrupted. Second, border thinking could emerge also from the imperial difference, i.e. the same mechanism of the colonial difference but applied to people in similar socio-economic

conditions as the ones who are in a dominant position. Western (Christian and secular) discourses about Indians and Blacks (that is, Africans transported to the Americas) founded the colonial difference and the modern matrix of racism. During the same period, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western Christian and secular discourse founded the imperial difference with the Ottoman and the Russian Empires. Turks and Russian, in other words, were obviously not Indians and Blacks in the Western hegemonic geo- and bodyclassification of the world. However, it was clear to everybody in the West that Turks and Russians might not be Blacks or Indians, but they were not European either. However, second-class empires in the history of Western capitalist ones also had to deal with colonies. Empires like the Russian/Soviet (and also Japan, 18951945) and the Ottoman, before its demise, are all Janus-faced empires: one eye

is pointing toward Western capitalist and dominant empires, while the other looks toward their own colonies (Tlostanova, 2003).

Zero point epistemology configured by the theo- and ego-politics of knowledge has shaped Western imperial expansion throughout five centuries. Border thinking is configured by the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. What are the relations between geo-historical locations and epistemology, on the one hand, and between identity and epistemology, on the other? These questions have not been asked by theological and egological epistemologies.2 The array of possibilities for border thinking is indeed vast but they all have one thing in common: how do people in the world deal with Western economic, political

and epistemic expansion if they do not want to assimilate but choose to imagine a future that is their own invention and not the invention of the empires, hegemonic or subaltern?

Someone born and raised in British India does not have much in common with someone born and raised in Latin America; the languages and religions are different, the histories are incommensurable. However, they have a common history: the imperial/colonial history of Western capitalist and Christian empires Spain and England. From the imperial perspective either of the

dominant empires (England, America) or the subaltern empires (Russia, China, the Ottoman Empire of the past), border thinking is almost an impossibility (one would have to give up the epistemic privilege of Western modernity and admit that knowledge and understanding are generated beyond institutional norms and control) and, from the colonial perspective, border thinking is straightforwardly a necessity. The next question is whether border thinking could emerge from the perspective of
subaltern empires or its chances for emergence are better in the colonies and what kind of colonies at that the (ex-)colonies of a subaltern empire (e.g., Uzbekistan, Ukraine) or a hegemonic empire (e.g., India during the British rule; Iraq under US imperial moves; Bolivia and Ecuador in the history of the Spanish empire and the present of US domination in Latin America; or South Africa in its past and present)?3 Border thinking and the de-colonial shift cannot be reduced to an abstract

universal (e.g. critical theory, semiotics of culture, or nomadology for everyone on the planet) that will account for all experiences and geo-historical violence and memories. Pluriversality, and not universality, is the major claim made by border thinking and the justification for the de-colonial shift. Once again, there is no pluri-versality from the perspective of theo- and ego-politics of knowledge. Pluri-versality is only possible from border thinking, that is, from shifting the geography of reason to geo- and bodypolitics of knowledge.

The perm cant solve, it is an alternative modernity which is still rooted in Euro-centered perspective. Mignolo and Tlostanova 6
(Walter D. is William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Director of the Center for Global Studies and the Humanities at Duke University, and Madina V. is professor in the Department of History of Philosophy at Peoples Friendship University of Russia Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge European Journal of Social Theory Volume 9 issue 2) The coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being, i.e. the spread of global designs from local histories where they emerged to local histories to which they are alien, create the conditions for border thinking (instead of authenticity), for the de-colonial epistemic shift aiming at the decolonization of knowledge and of being. And it is in the precise sense of the imperial/colonial conflicts between global designs that spread forms of knowledges and
subjectivities from the local histories, where they emerge to local histories to which they are alien, that the de-colonial epistemic shift is geo- and body-politically oriented in confrontation with the theo- and ego-politics that sustained and continues to sustain, the global imperial designs. Hence, our second conclusion, our response to the emergence of the idea of alternative

modernities that is grounded in the territorial epistemology of modernity. In other words, the very idea of alternative modernities only makes sense from an epistemological Eurocentered perspective that looks at the world as if the epistemic gaze was independent of any geo-historical and body-graphic locations. That is, precisely, the epistemology of the zero point that, historically, has the name of theology and egology. From the perspective of border thinking and the de-colonial shift, the idea of alternative modernities is, as just said, already embedded in the Euro-centered idea of modernity. There is no modernity, in other words, beyond the macro-narratives, invented since the Renaissance by means of which Europe was invented as geo-historically occupying the center of space and the present in time. From a border epistemology, the idea of alternative modernities is unsound and what is needed instead are alternatives TO modernity , i.e. alternatives to the naturalized idea that the past five hundred years of European history are the point of arrival (or the end of history) of the human race and, as Anthony

Giddens has it, it will be modernity all the way down. If that is the case, then, it will be coloniality all the way down because from a border epistemology perspective, coloniality is constitutive (and not derivative) of modernity. Border thinking is indeed

a way to move toward the de-colonial shift; and the de-colonial shift, in the last analysis, consists in delinking (desprenderse is the word employed by Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano) of theo- and egological epistemic tyranny of the modern world and its epistemic and cultural (e.g. formation of subjectivities) consequences: the coloniality of knowledge and of being. But to delink is not to abandon, to ignore. No one could abandon or ignore the deposit and sedimentation of imperial languages and categories of thought. Border thinking proposes how to deal with that imperial sedimentation while at the same time breaking free of the spell and the enchantment of imperial modernity . The de-colonial epistemic shift, grounded in border thinking, aims at processes of de-colonizing of knowledge and being. De-colonizing being and knowledge is a way toward the idea that another world is possible (and not alternative modernities). That world, as the Zapatistas had it, will be a world in which many worlds will co-exist (and not a world in which globalization or the imposition of global
designs and authenticity or fundamentalist responses to imperial global designs will reproduce an unending war against the enemies of imperial abstract universals). A world in which many worlds will co-exist cannot be imagined and

predicated on the basis of the good abstract universal valid for all but, instead, on pluriversality as a universal project. Critical border thinking and the de-colonial shift are one road toward that possible future.
Ours was an effort at theorizing in the borders and contributing to changing the geo- and body-politics of knowledge.

Bringing in other movements fails conflicting ideologies destroys changeInstead a starting point of profane act of whatever being can change politics Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 139-40)
In Means Without End [2000], Agamben is clear that any move to render biopolitical apparatuses inoperative must do so on the basis of his diagnosis of the relationship between politics and life as outlined in the previous chapter: It is by starting from this

uncertain terrain and from this opaque zone of indistinction that today we must once again find the path of another politics, of another body, of another world. I would not feel up to forgoing this indistinction of public and private, of biological body and body politic, of zo and bios, for any reason whatsoever. It is here that I must find my space once again here or nowhere else. Only a politics that starts from such an awareness can interest me.29 The figure that Agamben draws upon to think through the possibility of resistance is what he calls whatever being.30 The notion of whatever being refers to being-as-such: the simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentialit.31 Whatever being has no essence that can be separated from its attributes.32 It constitutes a pure singularit in the sense that it cannot be broken down into different parts.33 The task, then, is not to mobilise resistance on the basis of universal generalised principles such as human rights. Rather, it is to explore and invent the profanatory potential that resides within remnants of forms of subjectification and desubjectification produced by sovereign power itself. Prospects for thinking and acting otherwise in global politics centre around the figure of the refugee in Agamben's work. According to Agamben, this figure, which can be understood precisely as the remnant of sovereign biopolitics, is perhaps the only imaginable (p.139) figure of the people today: a whatever being that throws conventional juridicalpolitical categories into disarray.34 Indeed, for Agamben, this unique figure acts as a site for the invention of alternative forms of political community not based on unity, sovereignty, citizenship or other conventional categories. Rather, the refugee [] should be considered for what he [sic] is, that is, nothing less than a border concept that radically calls into question the principles of the nation-state and, at the same time, helps clear the field for a no-longerdelayable [sic] renewal of categories.35Taking the refugee as a starting point for the reconstruction of political categories and philosophy demands attention to how the topology wrought by this figure, reflecting the Mbius strip outlined in the previous chapter, might stimulate alternative
conceptualisations of ethicalpolitical relationality. Agamben illustrates the direction in which this thinking could lead against the backdrop of the politics of space in Jerusalem.36 The prospect of this city as the capital of two states, without territorial divisions, could be generalized as a model of new international relations. Agamben continues: Inst ead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening boundaries, one could imagine two political communities dwelling in the same region and in exodus one into the other, divided from each other by a series of reciprocal extraterritorialities, in which the guiding concept would no longer be the ius of the citizen, but rather the refugium of the individual.37 This alternative topology, embodied by the figure of the refugee,

disaggregates political space from the homogeneous and territorially bordered sovereign nation-state to create the possibility for new political arrangements: It is only in a land where the spaces of states will have been perforated and topologically deformed, and the citizens will have learned to acknowledge the refugee that he himself is, that man's political survival today is imaginable.38

Total rejection key-inclusion of statecentric discourses is a complicity with domination and kills alt solvency Shapiro 97 (Prof of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographers, pages 15-16)
Statecentric academic, official, and media political discourses approached adequacy only in their role of legitimating the authority of nation-states. Helping to contain ethical and political conversations within the problematics that served the centralizing authorities of states and the state system, they were complicit in reproducing modernity's dominant, territorial imaginary . To recognize that the dominant geopolitical map has been imposed on the world by power rather than simply emerging as an evolutionary historical inevitablity, as the dominant consensual narratives would have it, one needs to achieve an effective conceptual distance, to think outside of the state system's mode of global comprehension, outside of the spatial predicates of its structures of power, authority, and recognition. 42 As Henri Lefebvre has noted, space, especially for those occupying it, tends to have an air of neutrality, to appear empty of normative imposition, as "the epitome of rational abstraction . . . because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape."

AT: perm Venezuela

The permutation cannot solve; economic interactions are entirely insulated from politicization and the material effects of the plan questions of territory and societal perceptions permeate economic calculations in the context of Venezuela.
Bonfili, 2010 [Christian Bonifili, Department of Political Science & International Studies, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina & Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, The United States and Venezuela: The Social Construction of Interdependent Rivalry Security Dialogue 2010 41: 669 DOI: 10.1177/0967010610388209] As already argued, the dynamics that have driven interaction in the economic/ energy dimension have stood in stark contrast to those in the political/ strategic one. Interdependence in this particular realm needs to be assessed against the backdrop of relative strength of constraints and costs involved in interaction, which have been framed by threat perceptions and rivalry. In this way, both actors calculations of gain and loss relative to aspects of sovereignty, territorial integrity , and vital security and economic interests, among other things, have informed their mutually referred and competitive strategies. Largely asymmetric levels of dependence characterize the relationship in the political/strategic sector, mainly as a result of a highly unbalanced distribution of capabilities between the two states. Material

conditions are important, yet socially constructed perceptions may have a crucial role in the way and extent to which actors ascribe certain understandings to mutual dependence on the basis of those same material conditions. Such understandings may
conceivably reveal antagonism when asymmetrical distribution of power framing mutual dependence is perceived as a threat. For instance, threat perceptions have been constructed in relation to the political and military ambitions of the Chvez regime, which in turn have paved the way for the construction of meanings that clearly classify these same ambitions as a major threat to US interests in Latin America. Specific understandings about what has been labeled Chvezs radical populism have

been central to this process. In his 2004 testimony before Congress, General James Hill (2004) of the US Southern Command warned of Chvezs radical populism, considering this a new kind of threat to US interests in the region. He emphasized that this socio-political phenomenon might have dangerous consequences because, by tapping into collective frustration, leaders like Chvez were able to reinforce their radical positions by inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment. Over time, Chvezs projection of influence would

become one of the most pressing concerns among US policymakers dealing with the region. The US approach towards this perceived menace would evolve in accordance with Chvezs increasingly radical foreign policy. The evolution of the Bush administrations approach highlights the way in which understandings were constructed around Chvezs actions within the wider context of chain reactions related to other perceived threats. In turn, the linkage of perceptions pointing to the various dimensions of the Chvez menace, the internalization of these perceptions, and the policies implemented in response paved the way for the gradual securitization of US policy toward Venezuela. Therefore, the respective processes of constructing threat perceptions have been a core aspect of the social process driving interaction in the political/ strategic sector. The policies both actors have implemented as a response to the perceived threat coming from the Other are to be understood as manifestations of such processes. To the extent that they have involved a disruption of long-established practices in the context of the two countries relationship, those responses were exceptional in character. Chvezs new national defense doctrine (see Garrido, 2005; Jcome, 2006; Presidencia de la Repblica, 2004) epitomizes the scope of recent changes, as it reveals the extent to which Venezuelan authorities have internalized threat perceptions around a potential US invasion. Equally, the new doctrine reflects a particular understanding of the nature of the would-be conflict; it draws heavily on the concept of

asymmetric warfare and encompasses several unconventional aspects (see Manwaring, 2005). For instance, Chvez has endeavored to create what would become the largest reserve in the hemisphere, which, along with the armed forces, would be charged with defending the

country against the more powerful US enemy. Crucially, a significant proportion of this reserve would consist of civilians. To this aim, the Chvez administration has established the Milicia Nacional Bolivariana (Bolivarian National Militia), which consists of the Reserva Militar (Military Reserve) and the Milicia Territorial (Territorial Militia). These are to contribute to the protection of the country in a scenario clearly identified with a guerrilla warfare-like strategy conducted by civilians rather than a professional army.

AT Alt Utopian/Alt Solvency

Questioning the border must be the starting point for political engagement Walker 9 [RBJ, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria,
Canada, After the Globe, Before the World, p 35-37] For many commentators, the solution to the multiple challenges of our age is disarmingly simple: get rid of boundaries entirely, whether as physical borders or limits of principle. We are all supposed to be

human after all; or at least we are all more or less modern; or participants in the great capitalist world economy; or just part of a complex but ultimately singular ecology. Boundaries, they say, are an anachronism. Their tidy delineations of earthly space pale into insignificance when viewed from beyond the horizons of our planetary atmosphere. Dont live in the past. Dont be parochial. Dont be chauvi nistic. Be realistic. We must learn to live without them. For others, this solution is so hopelessly naive, even dangerous,

as to warrant an equally simple claim that the boundaries of the modern state are here to stay. Be realistic, they also say. Boundaries are absolutely necessary for sustaining our statist achievements, even though these achievements may demand hard compromises between the necessities of security and the possibilities of liberty, or between peace at home and war abroad. In this view, the divisions and exclusions of the modern statist imagination still offer sufficient ground, literally, for thinking
about our collective futures. We know what we must do because we know where we can do it, and where we can articulate responsibilities and mechanisms for doing so. The interplay of these two familiar narratives has generated many

comforting clichs about the sovereign state and doctrines of political realism, on the one hand, and about globalization and the need for more normative forms of theorization, on the other. Both narratives express obvious and often stunning oversimplifications, especially in relation to what it might mean to make claims to a political reality, to a theory of history or to a sovereign authority. They are nevertheless constantly reiterated in popular rhetoric, public policy, and the scholarly literature that is the more explicit focus of my attention here. They express familiar accounts of

what it means to engage with necessities and possibilities in modern political life, of what counts as realistic, aspirational or simply naive: of how we should understand our limits as political beings in space and in time, and of how we might imagine ourselves as some other kind of political being in some other space and some other time. They frame the broad possibilities articulated in debates about the legitimacy of violence in responses to violence, about claims to rights that apply to every human being, about military interventions challenging principles of self-determination, about obligations that come with citizenship, about novel forms and technologies of governance and governmentality, about the role and limits of law. Sometimes these clichs appear to be overruled by more complex and sophisticated narratives. Claims that we are caught up in processes that are both globalizing and localizing might be mooted in this respect. So, too, might claims that while boundaries

may be dissipating in processes we classify as economic (like trade and financial flows), they are becoming increasingly elaborate in processes we classify as social (like the movements of certain kinds of people). Attempts to show
how it is possible to diaggregate or unbundle various functions and sites of state sovereignty as an institution so as to examine contradictory tendencies among different functions and sites suggest a similar tendency. Indeed, it is difficult to see how

it is possible to make any sense of political life anywhere without starting from some such observation about the contradictory dynamics observable across many boundaries. Yet such
narratives only serve to highlight some of what is at stake in resisting claims about the eternal presence or impending absence of boundaries. To start to disaggregate or unbundle practices of state sovereignty is to pose

questions about how far such disaggregation might be taken, or what happens in the process to distinctions between internal and external, or between power and authority. To point to contradictory trends between the economic and the social is to pose questions about complex practices through which the sovereign state has long mediated between of capital and social orders, as well as about the work that has to be done to affirm any clear-cut distinction between an economic and a
social or between power and authority. To postulate contradictory dynamics of both globalization and localization, or universalization and pluralization, is to engage questions about how the boundaries of modern political life work precisely to affirm a specific (territorial) spatiotemporal articulation of the relation between global and local, or universal and particular. Such questions are

undoubtedly important; indeed, they speak to much of what is at stake in claims about the need to reimagine where and what political life might be. They are nevertheless easily swamped, or kept within the boundaries of established accounts of where and what politics must be in a world of sovereign states, by clichd narratives that affirm ever-present or imminently absent boundaries. These clichs have been especially familiar in literatures canvassing the prospects for a grand
historical shift from forms of political life predicated on the existence of modern sovereign states in a system of such states to forms that

are somehow more integrated, or global, or cosmopolitan: a shift from forms of international politics shaped by a system of sovereign states to a somehow more authentically world politics, 8 or the inevitable absence of such a shift in a system of sovereign states destined to remain eternally the same. 9 In fact, clichs about the presence and absence of boundaries enable what has probably become the most pervasive array of contemporary narratives about future political possibilities: those envisaging a transition from a world of fragmentation and conflict to a world of greater integration and harmony. These narratives remain influential, across all ideological and scholarly horizons, even though the world of modern politics is organized through complex relationships between principles of fragmentation and integration, between principles of unity within diversity and diversity within unity. Despite the enormous weight of literatures

that seek to persuade us that our political futures depend on our capacity to abandon a world of particularities and pluralities in favour of a world of commonalities and universalities, just about the only prediction about our political futures that can be made with any degree of confidence is that such a journey is not an option. This is not because, as the other conventional story goes, we will always live in a world of sovereign states coexisting in a system of sovereign states. It is because it is so absurd to start thinking about future political possibilities as if modern political life has ever been understandable in relation to the presence or absence of a sovereign state abstracted either from the
system of sovereign states or from the specific conditions under which both the sovereign state and the system of sovereign states have been enabled to establish their place in the world. This place has long been profoundly problematic, in many respects. It has been problematic not least because

this place works as, among other things, a claim to be able to know what it means to be able to speak about a world in which modern political subjects can take their place as subjects, as citizens and as members of a common humanity expressed within modern subjectivities, within modern sovereign states and within the modern system of sovereign states. To express ambitions for internalization, for subjectivity, for what modern political life has envisaged
variously as freedom, liberty, autonomy and self-determination, is to assume a correlative ambition for externalization and the necessity for exclusion of the world, or worlds, left outside, or left behind.

AT: Alts utopian

Their indicts and truth claims are sheltered in the framework of sovereign power- a radical break from the status quo is only seen as utopian due to their epistemic lock in. Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 144-46)
On this basis, Prozorov dismisses the forms of resistance advocated by Edkins and Pin-Fat as quaintly paradoxical.60 In their counterresponse, however, Edkins and Pin-Fat argue that Prozorov's criticisms make sense only when viewed from the

framework of sovereign power.61 It is precisely their intention to dispense with the very principle of order as far as it is founded upon the sovereign ban and a division between forms of life.62 Furthermore, Edkins and Pin-Fat stipulate that they are not advocating the refusal of all dividing lines and installing

limits as Prozorov claims: we are specifically referring to the drawing of lines between what amounts to forms of life as politically qualified or as bare life.63 With this proviso in mind, they argue that the form of praxis emanating from their reading o f Agamben is one that insists [] on the politics of decisioning and particular distinctions and demands that specifics of time, place and circumstance be attended to in each instance.64 This exchange is interesting because it highlights an area of ambiguity in Agamben's work that is carried through to Edkins and Pin-Fat's discussion of the possibilities of a practical politics that follow on from it. On the one hand, at the heart of Edkins and Pin-Fat's argument is a normative commitment to the displacement of line drawing or practices

of bordering associated with sovereign politics: nothing less will do.65 In this way the ethical and political codes they call for resonate with the spirit of Agamben's logic of the field as

outlined in Chapter 4. On the other hand, Edkins and Pin-Fat make it clear in their response to Prozorov above, that it is not all but only certain distinctions they are refusing: only the drawing of lines upon which sovereignty depends.66 In this way there seems to be a depar (p.145) ture from a logic of the field and a return to thinking in terms of borders, distinctions and separations. Therefore, the ambiguity lies in the issue of whether Agamben's call for a logic of the field implies the need for the abandonment of all forms of borders, distinctions and separations, or just some. If it is the former case then the meta-distinction Edkins and Pin-Fat rely upon in their argument between certain types of distinctions that are to be refused and other types of distinctions that are to be embraced surely falls prey to the very logic they are ostensibly seeking to displace. If it is the latter then the question arises, how do we know which borders, distinctions and separations should be refused? We are then back to familiar questions located within the framework of sovereign politics: Who draws the line? Where? On what grounds? Furthermore, an additional problem arises when the relationship between a logic of the field and the concept of the generalised biopolitical border is considered against the backdrop of the inside/ outside problematic. Despite Agamben's commitment to a logic of the field, the generalised biopolitical border, understood as a form of dividing practice, does not escape or go beyond the inside/outside dichotomy in any straightforward sense. If one of the purposes of the production of bare life is to define the politically qualified life of the polis, then the former acts as the constitutive outside of the latter. In other words, while the border between inside/outside is shown not to be fixed at the geographical outer edge of the sovereign state as the modern geopolitical imaginary implies, Agamben's diagnosis of the activity of sovereign power as the decision to produce some life as bare life (and thus other forms of life as non-bare life) is still reliant upon and reiterative of an inside/outside way of thinking. Effectively, the substitution of the concept of the generalised biopolitical border for the concept of the border of the state means that the dividing practice upon which sovereign power relies is recast: not something pre-given, static and localised at a territorial extremity but reinscribed Agamben's call for an adoption of a logic of the field in political analysis raises these thorny questions without putting forward any easy solutions. To abandon a mode of thought that is reliant upon borders, distinctions and separations is difficult perhaps impossible to envisage as Prozorov's comments reflect. In her essay Whatever Politics, Edkins suggests that the move to acknowledge the inevitable (p.146) chaos of a

world without lines is not hopelessly utopian.67 Drawing on Jacques Derrida, she claims that, while borders attempt to produce clarity and offer stability, they are always already doomed to failure and break down on an everyday basis: Attempts are continually made, in the here and now, in philosophy and in politics, to make distinctions, but these only ever partially or temporarily succeed.68 Pursuing this line of enquiry, the following section investigates Derrida's treatment of borders further in order to elucidate

what is at stake with the identification of these problems arising from Agamben's adoption of a logic of the field: first, by examining Derrida's problematisation of the concept of the border in a general sense; second, by outlining what I call his account of the politics of framing; and, third, by applying this account to the question of the relation between the concept of the border of the state and the concept of the generalised biopolitical border as rival border imaginaries in global politics.

Its Western Eurocentric thinking is Utopian Grosfoguel 2 (Ramn Grosfoguel, Associate Professor. Ethnic Studies Department , 2002,
Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the Modern/ColonialCapitalist World-System, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 25, No. 3, Utopian Thinking (2002), pp. 203-224, Accessed: 7/31/13) The outlined discussion has important implications for Utopian thinking. So far, Utopian thinking coming from the West is in serious crisis. The West has produced an Utopian thinking that has not

transcended the abstract universals that characterize Eurocentric thinking as part of global designs. The Left crisis in the present is partly due to the inability to imagine alternative worlds. The West is at a dead end when it comes to producing new alternatives. From socialist Utopias to the market Utopias of neoliberal thinking, the West keeps producing oppressive global designs. It is from the sub- altern side of the colonial difference that new perspectives are emerging. The Zapatistas's struggle in Chiapas, Mexico as well as stuggles in other parts of the periphery, are producing new border thinking resignifying the Western Utopias from the cosmologies of non-Western subaltern groups. For example, the slogan of un mundo donde muchos mundos co-existan ("a world where many worlds co- exist"), leads to an Utopian project of what Mignolo called, following Caribbean thinker Edouard Glissant, "diversality" as a response to the Occidentalist universality (2000). Diversality, which is not equiva- lent to pluralism, implies a critique to the global designs that attempt to impose a single, monologic Utopian solution to the world at large beyond time and space. Diversality is a universal (antiuniver-salistic) project open to the diverse responses and alternative cosmologies from the subaltern side of the colonial difference. Moreover, the Zapatista
slogan oimandar obedeciendo (to rule by following), resigni- fies the notion of democracy from the cosmologies of indigenous people in Mexico. This is border thinking at its best, beyond nation- alism and colonialism, beyond

Western and non- Western fundamen- talism One crucial implication of the notion of coloniality of power is that the first decolonization was incomplete. It was limited to the juridical-political independence from the European imperial states. This led to the formation of colonial independences. As a result, the world needs a second decolonization, different and more radical than the first one. A future decolonization should address heter- archies of entangled racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, and economic relations that the first decolonization left untouched. This second decolonization would necessarily imply the demise of the existing modern/colonial capitalist world-system. If Immanuel Wallerstein's assestment is correct, that is, that we are living a bifurcation, a moment of transformational TimeSpace, towards a new historical system that could be better or worse than the capitalist world-system depending on the imagining of new alternatives and the effectivity of the agencies involved, then: We need to listen to the subaltern speak from non-Eurocentric, non-metropolitan locations. The essays in this collection represent an effort to think on
alternative worlds beyond Eurocentrism and to make a contribution to these debates.

AT: vague alts

The demand for specificity is a western way of knowing used to derail decolonial movements Mignolo & Tlostanova 2006 [Walter D. & Madina V., Duke University & Peoples Friendship
Univ, Moscow, Theorizing from the Borders Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205221] The question commonly asked is: how do you perform border thinking and how do you enact the decolonial shift? What is the method? Interestingly enough, the question is most often asked by predominantly white and North Atlantic scholars and intellectuals. It is impossible to imagine Dubois asking that question because he prompted it with his own thinking, dwelling in what he called double consciousness. The question is interesting because it acts like a boomerang and returns to the person who asked the question. Why is he or she asking that question? Where is he or she dwelling, in a single consciousness? Why was it an African-American like Dubois and not a German like
Habermas who came up with a concept such as double consciousness? Furthermore, double consciousness would not admit the thesis that promotes the inclusion of the other (Habermas, 1998). Double consciousness and the inclusion of the other confront each other across the colonial difference. The question is not being asked because modern epistemology (theologically and ego-logically based), separated the geo- and corporal location of the thinker. The hubris of the zero point by eliminating

perspectives prevents the possibility of asking: how can I inhabit at once both the zero point and that place which the zero point negates? Asking that question, feeling that modern epistemology is totalitarian (that negates all other alternatives to the zero point), is the first step to border thinking. And it is also a
dwelling that is no longer the House of the Spirit i.e. the dwelling of modern European philosophy and science.

AT: cede the political

Our epistemic focus is key to changing the parameters of political engagement not cede them Mignolo 1 [Walter, with L. Elena Delgado and Rolando J. Robero Local Histories and Global
Designs: An Interview with Walter Mignolo Discourse, 22.3, Fall 2000, pp. 733] Am I diluting the political problems and practices that the theory itself was attempting to address? I do not think so. We cannot, in my opinion, think of the border as an object of study from a territorial epistemology, not infected by the border. A dilution would be to think that a different political effectiveness could be achieved by changing the content and not the terms of the conversation. Changing the content only would, of course, allow for certain victories, say, in Proposition 127 or other similar social conflicts. This is the level of reform, which of course shall remain open. But my argument moves, simultaneously, toward a complementary end: that of transformation, of changing the terms, and not only the content, of the conversation. The political and the ethical are at this point in need of a new epistemology, epistemologies that come from the borders and from the perspectives of subaltern coloniality. And one final note: the border epistemologies I amclaiming are not intended to replace the existing ones. It wont happen like that even if we want it to. Existing macronarratives are well entrenched. What I amclaiming is the space for an epistemology that comes from the border and aims toward political and ethical transformations.

These exclusionary borders help reinforce this epistemology inherent in the us/them dichotomy that leads to the otherization of anyone that is on the outside Parker and Addler-Nissen, Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012 [Noel
and Rebecca, Picking and Choosing the Sovereign Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660582]

We can rst observe that borders help full epistemological conditions. Borders produce particular conditions for understanding reality. We who are inside the border are also expected to possess greater knowledge of insiders than of outsiders, which in turn reduces uncertainties regarding our common knowledge on the inside. The border is frequently a bulwark sustaining commonly agreed measures of reality (such as national-currency measures for ination or relative welfare). The border slices the world up into different pieces of reality that we cannot know equally well. That increases as well the plausibility of any assertion regarding the circumstances, gains or losses within our border. Hence, other things being equal, borders help promote the idea that there are fewer uncertainties in communications between insiders by comparison with communications with those on the outside. This leads to an assumption that we will be able to agree on the terms used to evaluate changes and preferences even the order of priorities, which is a pre-condition of political decisions. Put in a nutshell, the border provides conditions for greater certainty and agreement for those within it. Thompson also makes explicit an ontological claim for the border/boundary which is implicit in post-structuralisms prioritisation of differences as against commonalities: namely, that ...borders exist before entities ... that is to say, borders are ontologically prior to specic enti- ties. Borders help constitute the way we conceive the world. This can be demonstrated, inter alia, on the basis of the epistemological claims above. For those epistemological consequences of boundaries provide key onto- logical pre-conditions for the continuity of the given social particular as an integrated entity; and hence also for its identity.14 The fact of the border helps produce shared understandings of the identities of particulars, both internal and external to

the particular itself. This includes understandings of internal variations and sub-categories (constituencies, classes ... ) between insiders/members of the given social particular. The self-identities of mem- bers and sub-categories are grounded in, and thus far validated, by seeing those particulars in relation to each other.15 Likewise, the boundary sustains any determination of

the collectivity (the nation, or whatever it may be) whose interests may be the basis for decisions and actions on its behalf. This, as Rokkan noted,16 is especially signicant in democratic collectivities, where a large self-aware demos is postulated as the ground for decisions that need to accord in some way with the preference of an indeterminable category, the ordinary mass of the people. The above ontological effects of borders yield yet further consequences. For borders provide pre-conditions for determinations of the situation of insiders relative to outsiders: claims regarding presumed and/or potential different conditions (be it better or worse) for insiders than for outsiders.17 The same could be said of any impression of greater/lesser (or poten- tially greater/lesser) welfare than outsiders. Only with these kinds of claims and impressions in place, can an additional, politically important category of knowledge have meaning: assertions about potential improvements or deteriorations in conditions for the inside.18 If the existence of the

subjects who experience comparative well-being were not given, we would not nd meaning in headlines such as Danish schools worst on PISA tests.19 A fortiori threats which it may be necessary to protect against.

AT: Pragmatism
Even if its true that we must approach borders with pragmatic policy, changing our orientation towards the border is a key prerequisite Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles
Perhaps even more importantly, however, borders, including their sites at airports, serve vital economic functions. A third point, therefore, is that though

(UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political geography, the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking, Ethics and Global Politics, pg 11-13, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf)

borders are about classifying identities, they are also about sorting and sifting goods and people to enhance or maintain unequal cross-border exchanges.65 They are not simply about a security-identity nexus as both dominant stories about borders tend to allege. Cheap labor on one side facilitates cheaper products for more affluent consumers on the other. Though the idea of a global economy has become widely accepted, in fact much economic activity is still overwhelmingly within national
borders and most firms are still effectively reliant on national models of business structure and spatial organization.66 There are very few truly global companies and they are mostly Swiss (or from other small countries). More particularly,

borders still stand guard over massive differences in standards of living that, though shrinking somewhat as within nation differences have grown in recent years, are still largely defined precisely at national borders. The US-Mexico border* the tortilla curtain*is emblematic in this
regard. The extreme income gradient that it marks invites people to cross it whatever the barriers they encounter on the way. Alain Badiou makes the overall point eloquently as follows:

The fall of the Berlin wall was supposed to signal the advent of the single world of freedom and democracy. Twenty years later, it is clear that the worlds wall has simply shifted: instead of separating East and West it now divides the rich capitalist North from the poor and devastated South. New walls are being constructed all over the world: between Palestinians and Israelis, between
Mexico and the United States, between Africa and the Spanish enclaves, between the pleasures of wealth and the desires of the poor, whether they be peasants in villages or urban dwellers in favelas, banlieues, estates, hostels, squats and shantytowns.

The price of the supposedly unified world of capital is the brutal division of human existence into regions separated by police dogs, bureaucratic controls, naval patrols, barbed wire and expulsions.67 Fourthly, and finally, policing borders still has a powerful normative justification in the defense of that territorial sovereignty which serves to underpin both liberal and democratic claims to (Lockean) popular rule. Now such claims may frequently be empirically fictive, particularly in the case of imperial and large nation-states, but the logic of the argument is that, absent effective worldwide government, the highest authority available is that of existing states .68 How such states police their borders, of course, should be subject to transparent and open
regulation. But why it is popularly legitimate to engage in policing functions in the way they are carried out cannot simply be put down to mass docility in the face of an omnipotent (because it is omniscient) state apparatus. National populations do worry about their borders because their democracy (or other, familiar, politics) depends on it. The border is a continuing marker of a national (or supranational) political order even as people, in Europe at least, can now cross it for lunch.69

The problem here is that democratic theory and practice is not yet up to dealing with the complexities of a world in which territories and flows must necessarily co-exist. If one can argue, as does Arash Abizadeh, that the demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded, this still begs the question of who is foreigner and who is citizen in a world that is still practically divided by borders.70 As Sofia Na
sstrom puts the problem succinctly: it is one thing to argue that globalization has opened the door to a problem within mode rn political thought, quite another to argue that globalization

Until political community is redefined in some way as not being coextensive with nation-state, we will be stuck with much of business as usual. Currently then, given the strong arguments about what borders do and the problems that they also entail, a more productive ethic than thinking either just with or just against them would be to re-frame the discussion in terms of the impacts that borders have; what they do both for and to people. From this perspective, we can both recognize the necessary roles of borders and the barriers to improved welfare that they create. In the first
is the origin of this problem. 71

place , however, this requires re-framing thinking about borders away from the emphasis on national citizenship towards a model of what Dora Kostakopoulou calls civic registration. 72 Under this model, the
only condition for residence would be demonstrated willingness to live according to democratic rule plus some set requirements for residency and the absence of a serious criminal record.

Such a citizenship model requires a reconceptualization of territorial space as a dwelling space for residents and, thus, a move away from the nationalist narratives which cultivate the belief that territory is a form of property to be owned by a particular national group,

either because the latter has established a first occupancy claim or because it regards this territory as a formative part of its identity. 73 In a world in which wars and systematic violations of human rights push millions to seek asylum across borders every year, this rethinking is imperative.74 In the second place, and by way of example, from this viewpoint it is reasonable to prefer global redistributive justice to open borders. To put it bluntly, it is better to shift resources to people rather than permitting people to shift themselves towards resources. 75 Currently much migration from country-to-

country is the result of the desire to improve economic well-being and enhance the life-chances of offspring. Yet, people often prefer to stay put, for familial, social, and political reasons, if they can. There seems no good basis, therefore, to eulogize and institutionalize movement as inherently preferable to staying put. If adequate mechanisms were developed to stimulate development in situ, many people who currently move would not. Not only people in destination countries associate their identities with territory. Using the standard of a decent life, therefore, can lead beyond the present impasse between the two dominant views of borders towards a perspective that re-frames borders as having both negative and positive effects and that focuses on how people can both benefit from borders and avoid their most harmful effects. In political vision as in everyday practice, therefore, borders remain as ambiguously relevant as ever, even as we work to enhance their positive and limit their negative effects.

AT: borders inevitable

Geopolitical binaries are not physical; rather, they serve as psychological structuring mechanisms the alternate must problematize conventional categorization to open new spaces for classification. Slater, 2004 [David Slater, Emeritus Professor of Political Geography, & Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of London, Geopolitics and the Postcolonial: Rethinking North-South Relations, Blackwell Publishing Ltd]
Another binary division that I have already alluded to and which permeates a wide range of texts is that of the West/non-West distinction. This couplet has been deployed in a way that grounds a primary identity for the West, as the self, and a secondary identity for the non-Western other. Traditionally, the West has been constructed as a model and measure of social progress for the world as a whole. It has been and remains much more a driving idea than a fact of geography. For example, in the late 1970s, one member of the Argentinian junta asserted that the West today is a state of the soul, no longer tied to geography, while for another, the West is for us a process of development more than a geographical location (Graziano 1992: 123 and 271). From a very different political position, the Indian writer Ashis Nandy (1992: xi), in his text on the psychology of colonialism, linked notions of the West with modern colonialism and its impact in the Third World, and also noted that the modern West was as much a psychological category as a geographical or temporal entity the West is now everywhere, he wrote, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds (ibid.). What this line of argument points to is the suggestion that Third World societies have been colonized by a Western imagination that frames and represents their meaning as part of a project of rule, and examples of such a framing can be found in both modernization and neo-liberal discourses, as will be indicated in chapters 3 and 4. Geographically, the West, the First

World and the North are customarily associated with the countries of Western Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand, with Japan being classified as both First World and of the North, but clearly more of the East than of the West. What is important to note here is that these binary divisions, particularly First World/Third World and West/non-West, are charged categories

(see Bell 1994, for example). They are replete with sedimented meanings, while in contrast the NorthSouth distinction, I would argue, is less burdened with those deeply rooted associations of Occidental or First World primacy. Given the fact that all these categories can be justifiably put into question, while at the same time continuing to retain a broad usage, it can be useful to borrow a term from Derrida (1976), whereby these terms are seen as under erasure. In other words, they can be

approached as if there is a line running through them, cancelling them out in their old form , but still allowing them to be read. With such a partial erasure, we can be encouraged to continue to reproblematize their meaning , validity, applicability, etc. while keeping an open space for the possibility of new categories.

Borders represents the status quo but also as reminders of the ability to challenge authority and the possibility of a revolution Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International
Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322338, Accessed: 7/27/13,)
Derridas engagement with Benjamins Critique of Violence opens up a series of insights into the connection between the borde rs, territory, law triad on the one hand, and violence on the other. Force of Law permits a reading of borders between

states as spatial instantiations of the epokhe` or moments when the authority of a new law establishes itself. On this reading, borders between states can be said to represent traces of the violent foundations of the juridical political order they supposedly delimit: scars in the territorial landscape that act as reminders of the sufferings, the crimes, the tortures that rarely fail to accompany the founding of states as distinct entities. To do as Walker suggests and treat state borders as sites of struggle is to politicize the way we think about them: not only as merely socially

constructed phenomena but the outcome of violent encounters. Moreover, to remember the epokhe`, the anxiety-ridden moment of suspense [or] interval of spacing in which revolutions take place, is also to remember the deconstructibility of the foundations upon which juridical political orders rest (Derrida 1992:20). In short, it is to remember Walkers axiom that once upon a time things were not as they are now (Walker 1993:179). The memory of the epokhe` is potentially revolutionary: state borders may serve to uphold the status quo but, paradoxically, they are equally a reminder of the ability to challenge authority, enact change and act politically. After all, following the BenjaminDerrida line of argument, the border of the state can be considered a product of the violent attempts to establish authority in the lack thereof. Hence, there is a locus of possibility at the heart of the concept of the border of the state. To recognize this locus of possibility is to remember the possibility of politics, and therefore, the potential for alternative forms of political arrangements.

Boundaries and borders are human made and not natural Dein 10 [Alexander Diener, Assistant Professor of Geography, University of Kansas, Borderlines and Borderlands, page
4] [Gender paraphrased, though not completely inaccurate to say man-made since our argument is also that masculine domination is what produces borders] Partially in response to these inherent biases and the difficulties in defining and locating objective natural borders, professional geographers soon concluded that all borders were arbitrary, subjective, and the result of human decisions, not forces of nature. "All

political boundaries are man-made, that is, artificial; obviously, they are not phenomena of nature," Richard Hartshorne argued. "Consequently, man, not nature, determines their location; we must eliminate, therefore, any distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' political boundaries."15 As a result, most border research during the 1930s and 1940s focused on empirical descriptions of border locations, before-and-after case studies of border realignments, and new systems of border classification.16 While no standard system of classification or methodology emerged, scholars widely agreed that the natural-artificial distinction was pointless. While much of the general public continued to think of borders as either natural or artificial, geographers during the 1950s began to reject attempts to develop systems of classification or generalization as useless since each border was regarded as unique. As one scholar noted: "Geographers have spent too much time in devising classifications and generalizations about boundaries and frontiers which have led to little or no progress."17 Partially as a result,
geographers focused on descriptive, nontheoretical case studies aimed at understanding the practical impact of individual borders on international phenomena such as trade and migration.

Borders are not natural, but a result of violent approrpriation Dein 10 [Alexander Diener, Assistant Professor of Geography, University of Kansas, Borderlines and Borderlands, page
3] While the apparent oddity of the international borders along the Strait of Gibraltar may appear without precedent, anyone

who peruses a world atlas will soon notice other borders or portions of borders with seemingly odd or discontiguous shapes. Indeed, these borders are often the subject of conflicting territorial claims and international tension. The continued division of the islands of Cyprus and Ireland, the Nagorno-Karabakh region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Angola's Cabinda exclave are just a few examples. Yet people rarely reflect on the historical development or contemporary significance of international borders, regardless of their shape. For many people, the lines that divide the world's landmasses possess an air of unquestionable sanctity, as though they were based on some higher logic. This is simply not the case. Indeed, professional geographers have long discounted the notion of "natural" borders. All borders, whether they appear oddly contrived and artificial, as in some of the examples mentioned above, or appear to be based on objective criteria, such as rivers or lines of latitude, are and have always been constructions of humanjbeings. As such, any border's delineation is subjective, contrived, negotiated, and contested. While this is true of virtually any scale of place, from the personal, to the municipal, to the provincial, to the international, the modern political map of the world has been largely shaped by disputes over land and the division of resources between states (i.e., countries). Even today, more than a hundred active border disputes (not counting disputed islands) exist among the 194 independent states worldwide.

This means that of the roughly 301 contiguous international land borders, some 33 percent are sites of contestation.

AT: democracy solves

Society itself is created through force and there is no difference in the creation of dictorial or democratic states Jerrems 11 (Ari Jerrems, Universidad Autnoma de Madrid graduate, ph.d contender , 2011,
BOOK REVIEW of Border Politics: The Limits of SovereignPower by Nick Vaughan-Williams, Borderlands VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1, 2011, Accessed: 7/27/13) In regard to Agambens thought, a particularly strong line of criticism takes issue with how a society of reasonand hence its bordersis created through force alone. This line maintains that in his quest to go the suspension of law in a state of exception presumes a mythical order of events where a social state is forced upon nature (1998-1999, p. 163). In his analysis Pardo identifies two types of power, Potentia or natural power and Potestas or power through rights and obligations. According to Agamben, the natural Potentia of the sovereign is what founds the Potestas and therefore any sovereign state is founded upon unjustifiable prepolitical violence (1998-1999, p. 164). The inclusion and exclusion of bare life in the polis becomes problematic as it is revealed that it is dependent on the belief in this hidden originary myth. It reduces bordering to a violent discriminatory process with no possibility for the creation of meaning by democratic means. This is largely due to the context of Carl Schmitts definition of sovereign power that Agamben relies upon. One should take into account that Schmitts definition of sovereignty explicitly sought to eliminate differences between democratic and dictatorial government (Pardo 1998-1999, p. 165). His thinking reflects a period of nostalgia for archaic sovereignty amidst a crisis of belief in civil accords after the First World War (Pardo 1998-1999, p. 166). Following such ideas based on a specific interpretation of sovereign power creates severe limitations when it comes to thinking about bordering processes of non-State identities.

beyond modernist thinking, Agamben becomes embroiled in an esoteric world of mythological beginnings. Jos Luis Pardo argues that any imagined scenario about the foundation of society, such as Therefore, the creation of a legal system through

AT: interdependence solves war

Interdependence isnt enough to stop war and takes years to develop Skaperdas and Syropolis 1 [Stergios, Ph.D. in Economics from Johns Hopkins University, Prof. of Economics,
Director of Institute for Mathematical Behavior Sciences, UC Irvine; Constantinos, Ph.D. in Economics from Yale, Trustee Professor of International Economics, Drexel University; Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship Between Security and Trade, The American Economic Review 91(2)]//JG The expansion of trade and economic interdependence over the past 50 years, coupled with

the absence of major wars, might give the impression that humanity has now crossed a threshold which relegates insecurity and its possible effects on openness to the dustbin of history. That might eventually turn out to be true, but in the meantime, insecurity and contention among states are alive in many parts of the world. From the Spratly Islands in the South China sea that seven countries contest, to Kashmir, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, or the Congo, countries expend a significant percentage of their national incomes on arming. The resultant insecurity and arming do not just subtract from their welfare directly, but also, as we have shown, can have significant indirect effects through the trade posture that the affected countries adopt. Solving the problem of insecurity entails the development of commitment devices that would reduce or eliminate the need to arm. Such commitment devices, however, are not easy to come by, and they take a long time to develop. Europe is a good example of that. After the
experience of the two world wars, the original six members of the European Community slowly began to develop mechanisms of economic integration that were in large part institutions of conflict management as well. That coupled process of

integration and conflict resolution through bureaucratic and political struggle, instead of through the battlefield, is ongoing and far from complete after a century of tribulations. Trade and economic interdependence can help resolve conflict, but it is naive and scientifically inappropriate to think that they are sufficient by themselves to do so.

AT: dont share a geographical border

Globalization shifted division from line to dimension The topic countries ARE the new border and economic engagement is the means of constitution Rumford 6
[Chris, ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, European Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 155169] the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as representing a symbolic end to the era of space and the primacy of territorial power (Bauman, 2002: 88).

In global space borders are translated into extraterritorial frontierlands (Bauman, 2002: 90). The point about the two approaches not being mutually exclusive is borne out by Baumans appropriation of the metaphor of fluids (liquid modernity, liquid life, liquid love). Ulrich Beck, particularly in his work on the cosmopolitanization of societies (globalization from within) identifies the pluralization of borders as a key development. Borders are no longer only national but may take many different forms. In this context, Beck (2004) points to the lack of separation between domestic and international and between inside and outside as being a significant dimension of the new spatiality. These themes are echoed in the work of Balibar for whom borders have become so diffuse that whole countries can now be borderlands , for example those at the margins of the EUs project of integration: once countries had borders, now they are borders (Balibar, 1998). A key shift not addressed directly by any of these approaches concerns our changing consciousness of borders. No longer simply represented by lines on a map, or marked by political boundaries (security check-points, passport controls, transit points), borders and the regular crossing of borders, have become part of our routine experience,
particularly in Europe where borders proliferate (between an increasing number of EU member states and non-member countries, or within countries as sub-national and city regions assert their EU-sponsored autonomy and assert a new spatial existence) but where

the importance of individual borders is in many cases very much reduced. As Balibar says, Borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled . . . the quantitative relation between border and territory is being inverted (1998: 220). In other words, borders abound but they are frequently encountered as non-boundaries, and so for many people they are much easier to cross. Alongside this diminution in the importance of borders as physical barriers (or mental boundaries) is the awareness that hard borders still exist at the edges of nation-state territories, brimming with security controls and state-of-the-art surveillance technology, although they are
largely unable to prevent (and we have lost confidence in their ability to control) the movement of illegal immigrants, terrorists, traffickers in people and drugs or whosoever is deemed to represent a threat at any particular time: those beyond borders are no longer in awe of them. Moreover, debordering and rebordering accompany each other. We have become accustomed to a world where borders wax and wane, as it were, and the important borders in our lives do not remain fixed. The borderless world th esis associated with some variants of globalization theory suggests that borders are being effaced in order to facilitate greater economic mobility (the borderless internal market of the EU, for example) while at the same time security concerns and worries about open borders have led to the rebordering of nation-states who wish to better control flows of migrant workers, refugees and terrorists. This has led to a tension between accounts which emphasize the openness and/or the transcendability of borders as a feature of globalization and accounts which draw attention to massive processes of securitized rebordering (Andreas and Snyder, 2000). We can move this debate

forward by thinking in terms of the existence of networked borders. Contemporary borders are

increasingly differentiated. Security borders are far more rigid than corresponding economic, telecommunication and educational borders. Indeed, one problem with the rebordering thesis, which emphasizes the renewed need for securitized borders in a world of gl obal threats, is that it relies on a rather undifferentiated notion of borders, which are intelligible only in terms of policing and security and a defence against external threats (the mobility of the dangerous, undesirable and fear-inducing). In fact, borders are not singular and unitary and are designed to encourage various kinds of mobility, particularly for certain categories of immigrants, migrant workers and students (Rumford, 2006).

AT: globalization breaks down borders

American Borders are not opening. An increase in economic engagement is coupled with an increase in security on the border especially after 9/11. Dein 10 [Alexander Diener, Assistant Professor of Geography, University of Kansas, Borderlines and Borderlands, page
10] Reflecting the persistence of the "borderless" world claims, one obvious point of departure has been to ask whether international borders are indeed becoming more permeable, becoming more rigid, or staying the same. Or, put another way, to what extent are

borders "opening" versus "closing"? At present, the answers are ambiguous and at times contradictory. While barriers to international trade have generally declined, for example, security concerns following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have led to increased border enforcement measures in the United States and many other countries. Indeed, in a certain sense, the same border may be in the process of becoming more open to the flow of trade goods, investment, or information via the Internet but simultaneously less open to the flow of people. Indeed, David Newman noted globalization's influence on international borders "is as geographically and socially differentiated as most other social phenomenain some places, it results in the opening of borders and the associated creation of transition zone borderlands, while in others, the borderland remains a frontier in which mutual suspicions, mistrust of the other and a desire to maintain group or national exclusivity remain in place.AT realism

Realism is a nave understanding of the world Walker 9 [RBJ, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria,
Canada, After the Globe, Before the World,p 40] If contemporary political life is in difficulty in large part because of the multidimensional inadequacies of the sovereign state and system of sovereign states, as, in very broad terms, I certainly think is the case, then any more creative political imagination must resist not only the forms of diversity and fragmentation expressed by the sovereign state and system of sovereign states, but also the forms of universality and integration that already enable the forms of diversity and fragmentation that are usually said to be so problematic. Put more heretically,
and in terms of the thoroughly misleading categories that have structured theories of international relations since midtwentieth-century writers such as E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau enabled profound political and theoretical

antagonisms to be converted into sloppily dualistic choices between caricatured extremes, 11 doctrines of political realism may be a problem, but the doctrines of political idealism that have produced doctrines of political realism are even more of a problem. Put rather less heretically, all too many valiant and well meaning attempts to think otherwise about contemporary political possibilities have been lured into dualistic choices between realisms and idealisms, politics and ethics, necessities and freedoms or differences and universalities of the kind that force an impossible politics of choice between one and the other, while simultaneously mobilizing a theory of history that will take us from one to the other. Such dualisms mask much more important problems. As one might readily gather from any of the canonical theorists who are nevertheless so often and so
flagrantly cited as authoritative sources of unchallengeable caricature in claims about the international, modern politics is a politics of freedom within and under necessity, a politics that expresses ethical principles, and ethical principles that express political commitments: a politics of antagonisms between claims to differentiation and universalization that cannot simply be cut into two. Relations rule, contradictions prevail. Seductive narratives that rest on an affirmation of dualistic choices can only end in grand illusions and eventual disappointments. 12 Consequently, if it is necessary to reimagine where and what political life might

now become, it is first of all necessary to appreciate the discursive force of claims about a universalizing philosophy of history that have both affirmed the necessity of a politics of modern subjects enacted within sovereign states enabled by a system of sovereign states while insisting on a proper trajectory of escape that might finally avoid all the dangers and insecurities of life within the sovereign state and system of sovereign states.

AT: Nation State=Liberation

Rather than being a way of liberating people from colonialism, the nationstate recreates division and opression Ashcroft, Professor of English at the University of NSW, in 9 [Bill, Beyond the Nation: Post-Colonial Hope, The Journal of the European Association of Studies on Australia, Vol.1]

Yet in cultural terms the nation is perhaps an even more ambiguous phenomenon than it has been in the past, and this is particularly so in post-colonial theory. The nation-state has been critiqued in post-colonial analysis largely because

the post-independence, postcolonized nation, that wonderful utopian idea, proved to be a focus of exclusion and division rather than unity; perpetuating the class divisions of the colonial state rather than liberating national subjects. However nationalism, and its vision of a liberated nation has still been extremely important to post-colonial studies because the idea of nation has so clearly focussed the utopian ideals of anti-colonialism. There is perhaps no greater
example of this than India, where independence was preceded by decades of utopian nationalist thought, yet in Rabindranath Tagore we find also the earliest and most widely known anti-nationalist. For Tagore, there can be no good nationalism; it can only be what he calls the fierce self-idolatry of nation-worship (2002, 15)the exquisite irony being that his songs were used as Bengali, Bangladeshi and Indian This text may be archived and redistributed both in electronic form and in hard copy, provided that the author and journal are properly cited and no fee is charged national anthems. So the trajectory of colonial utopianism has been

deeply ambivalent: on the one hand offering the vision of a united national people, and on the other a perhaps even more utopian idea of the spiritual unity of all peoples. The years since

1947, when India led the way for other colonial states into post-colonial independence, has been marked by the simultaneous deferral of pre-independence nationalist utopias, and yet a vibrant and unquenchable utopianism in the various postcolonial literatures. This utopianism has taken many forms but its most significant postcolonial characteristic has been the operation of memory. Yet in the decades before and after the turn of the century utopianism has taken a significant turnone affected by globalization, with its increasing mobility and diasporic movement of peoplesthat might be cautiously given the term cosmopolitan. Again it is India that has led the way in its literature, not only because of the proliferation of South Asian diasporic writing, but also because India itself has thrown the traditional idea of the nation as imagined community into question. That national ideal of one people, so successfully championed by Nehru has never been more challenged than it has by Indias size and complexity. India shows us that the nation is not

synonymous with the state and despite the increasing mobility of peoples across borders, the proliferation of diasporas, the increasing rhetoric of international displacement, India reveals that before national borders have been crossed, the national subject is already the subject of a transnation. I want to propose the concept of transnation to extend the post-colonial critique of nation, (or more specifically the
linking of nation and state) and to argue with the entrenched idea of diaspora as simply defined by absence and loss. Such a definition of the diasporic population as fundamentally absent from the nation fails to recognise the liberating possibilities of mobility. The transnation, on the other hand, represents the utopian idea that national borders may not in the end need to be the authoritarian constructors of identity that they have become.

AT: Schmitt
Difference does not have to revolve around enmitywe can engage otherness and difference as mutually productive practices Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at Hawaii, 1997 [Michael J., Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, p. 197-199]
Thus far, I have dwelled on the performative aspect of an ethical regard. As understood by Levinas,

the ethical is the enactment of a response to the summons of alterity beyond or prior to any institutionalized normativity; for Derrida it is an attempt to minimize the violence of that prior normativity. For both, the responsibility to alterity precedes all conceptions, however persistent and irreducible they may be. At a minimum, what is required to heed this summons of the Other is a distancing from the prolepses through which Others are already inscribedfor example, the cartographies and discourses through which J. S. Mill constructed North American peoples as asocial and nonnational. The required
distance comes in part through modes of writing that are open to encounter with difference. The ethical apprehension or regard of alterity outside of institutionalized inscriptions, as practiced by Levinas and Derrida, for example, is achieved with performances intrinsic to their writing practices.

Because the obverse of the ethical regard, a violent one, consists in appropriating alterity to an already inscribed set of conceptualizations, ethical practices, realized as writing performances, require a degree of unreading, unmapping, and rewriting. This requirement of undoing was evident in Levinas's struggle to extract an ethics from a philosophical tradition in which it had
influenced commentary."

been suppressed. He had not only to struggle within the language of philosophy by redirecting many of its dominant tropes (twisting and turning that which already twists and turns) but also to confront a philosophy suffused with Greek conceptualizations with an even more venerable tradition, Jewish thought as he understands it. Inasmuch as "Jewish thought" is also available to contemporaries in a form that is mediated by the Greek philosophical tradition, however, Levinas's talmudic readings involve an unreading of a long tradition of Greek-

To the extent that Levinas has failed to heed his own ethical injunctions, it has been a result of insensitivity to the complex self-Other inter-relations repressed in the construction of the stories that have assembled such entities as "Jews" and "Jewish thought." For example, Ammiel Al-calay has shown how contemporary "Jewish discourse" represses its historic Arab influences and notes how the Hebrew language itselfand consequently much contemporary Hebrew literaturehas arisen from a dissociative impulse in which a shared Jewish-Arab cultural tradition has been erased. Recalling what he refers to as a "Levantine culture," Alcalay discloses a historical narrative of Arab-Jewish hybridity expressed in Arab and Jewish literatures prior to the establishment of the
State of Israel.92 Restoration of Levantine cultural sensibilities, according to Alcalay, would attenuate the radical othering that characterizes the identity practices of contemporary Israeli Jews and Palestinians.

Instead of narrations of Israeli and Palestinian nationalism, Arab and Jew could be Other to each other within a tradition of interactive identity creation instead of a geopolitically based antagonism. They could tell themselves a story in which they recognize a positive association based on shared traditions. Alcalay's rereading of the Arab-Israeli relationship remaps cultural difference and comports well with the general strategy of Levinas, whose enactments of the ethical have demanded a strenuous unreading, a resistance, expressed ultimately as a form of writing, to the institutionalized "said" of philosophy. Therefore, despite its blind spots, the Levinasian model should be heeded. Focusing on its fundamental resistance to essentialized and forgetful readings of identities and spaces, Derrida, in his reading of Levinas, has emphasized that an ethics cannot be explicated precisely because the institutionalized said, resident in discourse, reproduces a violence toward alterity; it can only be enacted through "the perpetual undoing of the said."93 Significantly,
Derrida prefers the imagery of writing to "saying," suggesting that it is perhaps a better mode for "escaping empirical urgencies" and that "the writer more effectively renounces violence."94 Recognizing the limits of Levinas's struggle, Derrida challenges the confinements of the already said and attempts to think what has been unthinkable. Accordingly, his deconstructive writing points toward a re-mainder, that which is excluded or unrecognized in the established system of intelligibility.

Its ethical force therefore consists in its challenge to prevailing conditions of possibility for recognition. Inasmuch as any system of

thought will always produce its remainder, any final recovery of what is remaindered is impossible. Yet an ethics, embodied in Derrida's deconstructive practice, recognizes the necessity of pursuing that remainder nevertheless.95 It accepts both the impossibility and the necessity to pursue it at the same time. Derrida's practice therefore recognizes that the responsibility to alterity amounts to a permanent excursion; it takes the form of writing practices that disrupt the totalities within which identity spaces and domains are shaped and confined.

The attempt at internal order through a well-defined sovereign makes war inevitableenemies who cannot be made stable must be eliminated Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at Hawaii, 1997 [Michael J., Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, p. 72]
To put the matter within the discourse of order, which emerged in the discussion of Anggor cosmology, sensitivity

to the ontological dimensions of warfare should lead one to expect complementarity between the

orders of the self and those discerned in the world. Those who regard any aspect of disorder within the self as intolerablethose who demand a totally coherent and unified bodymust necessarily engage in a denial of the forces of disorder within the order of the self. Insofar as this is the case, external disorder, practices in the world that do not comport with the system of order within which one resides, will be particularly threatening. When one recognizes in addition that the collectivity or nation serves as a symbolic extensionthe individual body connects to the national bodythe same structural logic linking self and other at the level of in-dividual selves also applies to the link between the domestic and foreign orders. Denial of disorder within the order for the collective body as a whole should lead to an intolerance of an external order that fails to validate, by imitation, the domestic order. Thus a nonimitative order will be interpreted as disorder and, accordingly, as a threat. Moreover, the "threat" is dissimulated because of the misrecognition involved in the very constitution of the self, a failure to recognize dimensions of incoherence and otherness within the self. Accordingly, the threat is interpreted as a danger to the survival of the order rather than an affront to the order's interpretive coherence. Having established a basis for the suspicion that the modern nation-state, like the prestate society, contains an ontological impetus to warfare and that in modernity this often takes the form of extraordinary demands for coherence within the orders of the self and the nation, the next move is to deepen that suspicion by pursuing a recent case. Accordingly, in the next chapter I pursue the ontological theme with special attention to the selection and targeting of dangerous objects during the Gulf War.

Schmitts conception of the political as coterminous with the nation-state combines with biopolitics in a way that allows the sovereign to decide on whose lives are worth saving and whose should be sacrificed. This is the logic of the camp. Burke, Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and Int. Relations at the Univ of New South Wales, Sydney, in 7 [Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, 6-9]
In The Concept of the Political Schmitt

argued, given that 'the concept of the state presupposes the political', that there was a need to understand `the nature of the political' in a 'simple and elementary' way. This should be through 'the specific political distinction . . . between friend and enemy': The distinction between

friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of union or separation, of an association of disassociation . . . the political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his

nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible.? (emphasis added) Like Hobbes before him, Schmitt conceived a figure of the enemy a threatening Other that is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.8 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and

settle the extreme case of conflict . . . to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.9 (emphasis added) It is clear that such a conception of the

political has a tendency to surround the entirety of political life with an aura of emergency and threat to one's very existence. Problems such as terrorism, flows of asylum seekers or weapons of mass destruction, are thus easily magnified into ones that must be viewed through the prisms of identity, existential antagonism and combat. While Schmitt claimed to be opposed to militarism (like many realists he advocated the avoidance of war) he stated that the political was only existent 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity'. Hence the potential for war was an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy
and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.1 In his 2004 State of the Union speech, Bush went out of his way to

defend his administration's conceptualisation of the response to terrorism as 'war' and the

use of extraordinary legal powers and unilateral military force to meet the threat: 'after the chaos

and carnage of September the 11th', he argued, 'it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.'" He also lectured Congress on the need to renew the Patriot Act, 'key provisions [of which] are set to expire next year. The terrorist threat will not expire on that schedule'.12 Yet many provisions of that Act and other administrative measures were deeply controversial, especially the Executive Order that authorised the

'indefinite detention' and trial by 'military commissions' of the 'battlefield detainees' held in camps at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As if sprung whole from Schmitt's theory, the Order stated that: it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence

generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts. . . . Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.I3

An important detail about this extraordinary measure was that it only applied to non-citizens of the United States; citizens suspected of terrorism must be prosecuted under US criminal codes. Such orders invoke what Schmitt called the 'state of exception' wherein the existing legal order is suspended and 'unlimited authority' seized by the sovereign to meet a `danger to the existence of the state'. This, he argues, is the essence of sovereignty: 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.' 14 What is especially distinctive is not only the idealistic alignment of extrajudicial powers of life and death with sovereignty, freed from the dominance of the constitution and the rule of law, but the enactment of an uncertain threshold between law and the human in which the human can disappear as a matter of executive power and whim 'in the interest of the state, public safety and order'.15 Giorgio Agamben argues that 'what is new about President
Bush's order is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being'.16 Similarly, Judith Butler suggests that we are witnessing the emergence of 'normative conceptions

of the human that produce, through an exclusionary process, a host of "unliveable lives" whose legal and political status is suspended'; lives 'viewed and judged so that they are less than human, or as having departed from the recognisable human community'.17 Agamben, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, has done most to describe and denounce the violent and impoverished conceptualisation of life implicit in such a politics. He saw in the convergence of a Schmittian theory of sovereignty and what Foucault termed `biopolitics' a diabolical system of political and administrative power that reduced human existence to 'bare life' (Homo sacer) that 'may be killed and yet not sacrificed' Homo sacer being 'an obscure figure of
archaic Roman law in which human life is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)'.18 He sees such a simultaneously exceptional and biopolitical power at work in `the

Camp', which took on its most horrific form in the Holocaust but is also in operation at the US prisons in Cuba and Abu Ghraib, and, as Suvendrini Perera19 has shown, at immigration detention centres like
Woomera and Baxter in remote South Australia, where sovereign power is unchecked and life is taken hold of outside the existing legal order (or at least within a radically unstable and arbitrary one). The camp, Agamaben argues, is 'the biopolitical

paradigm of the modern' and the state of exception is becoming normalised and universalised: it 'tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics'.20 Agamben thus issues a profound warning for anyone concerned with interrogating modern conceptions of security which, after all, posit the sovereign nation-state as the collective to be secured and abrogate to government powers to protect the 'life' of this collective. Yet life is not valued equally and its 'protection' comes with a simultaneous seizing of life by power: . . . in the age of biopolitics this power [to decide which life can be killed] becomes emancipated from the state of exception and transformed into the power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant. When life becomes the supreme political value, not only is the problem of life's nonvalue thereby posed as Schmitt suggests, but further, it is as if the ultimate ground of sovereign power were at stake in this decision. In modern biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as such.21 In a world where life and existence are defined biopolitically, and government takes on the responsibility to secure, enable, regulate and order life, Agamben argues (after Foucault) that it is as if: 'every decisive political event were double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the state order, thus offering a new more dreadful foundation for the sovereign power from which they wanted to free themselves.'22

In this light, the 'active defense of the American people' comes to sound sinister indeed, for Americans and their Others alike.

Aff Answers

Ignoring the State Bad

The alts rejection of the states makes it seem stronger than it actually is. This dooms the alt to reproduce the hierarchal structures we critique. Guattari and Rolnik, schitzoanalysts, revolutionaries, 1986 [Felix and Suely, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 120-121]
Comment: It's good that you mentioned those homosexuals who worked within the system as lawyers and succeeded in shaking it up. Here, everyone looks down on the institutional part. Guattari: That's silly. Comment: They think that dealing with the

institutional side is reformism, that it doesn't change anything. As far as they're concerned, the institutions should be ignored because only one kind of thing is worthwhile, anarchismwhich I question deeply. I think it's very naive, as you yourself say, to ignore the state on the basis that "it's useless," or "it oppresses us," and therefore to leave it aside and try to do something totally from outside, as though it might be possible for us to destroy it like that. Suely Rolnik: This malaise in relation to institutions is nothing new; on the contrary, the feeling is particularly strong in our generation which, since the 1960s, has taken institutions as one of its main targets. But it's true that the malaise has been especially pronounced in Brazil over the last

few years, and in my view this must have to do with an absolutely objective (and obvious) fact, which is the hardness of the dictatorship to which we were subjected for so long. The rigidity of that regime is embodied in all the country's institutions, in one way or another; in fact, that constituted an important factor for the permanence of the dictatorship in power over so many years. But I think that this

antiinstitutional malaise, whatever its cause, doesn't end there: the feeling that the institutions are contaminated territories, and the conclusion that nothing should be invested in them, is often the expression of a defensive role. This kind of sensation is, in my view, the flip side of the fascination with the institution that characterizes the "bureaucratic libido." These
two attitudes really satisfy the same need, which is to use the prevailing forms, the instituted, as the sole, exclusive parameter in the organization of oneself and of relations with the other, and thus avoid succumbing to the danger of collapse that might be brought about by any kind of change. Those are two styles of symbiosis with the institution: either "gluey"

adhesion and identification (those who adopt this style base their identity on the "instituted"), or else repulsion and counteridentification (those who adopt this style base their identity on negation of the "instituted," as if there were something "outside" the institutions, a supposed "alternative" space to this world). Seen in this light, both "alternativism" and "bureaucratism" restrict themselves to approaching the world from the viewpoint of its forms and representations, from a molar viewpoint; they protect themselves against accessing the molecular plane, where new sensations are being produced and composed and ultimately force the creation of new forms of reality,. They both reflect a blockage of instituting power, an impossibility of surrender to the processes of singularization, a need for conservation of the prevailing forms, a difficulty in gaining access to the molecular plane, where the new is engendered. It's more difficult, to perceive this in the case of "alternativism," because it involves the hallucination of a supposedly parallel world that emanates the illusion of unfettered autonomy and freedom of creation; and just when we think we've got away from "squareness" we risk succumbing to it again, in a more

disguised form. In this respect, I agree with you: the institutions aren't going to be changed by pretending that they don't exist. Nonetheless, it's necessary to add two reserves. In the first place, it's obvious that not every social experimentation

qualified by the name of "alternative" is marked by this defensive hallucination of a parallel world. And secondly, x it's self-evident that in order to bear the harshness of an authoritarian regime there is a tendency to make believe
that itdoesn't exist, so as not to have to enter into contact with sensations of frustration and powerlessness that go beyond the limit of tolerability (indeed, this is a general reaction before any traumatic experience). And in order to survive, people try in so far as possible to create other territories of life, which are often clandestine.

Permutation
Deconstruction cannot be confined to one method or the movement will fail Vaughn-Williams 9 ( Nick, IR MA @ university of Warwick IR PhD @ Aberystwyth, Border Politics:
The Limits of Sovereign Power pg 146-47)

Derrida is notoriously hesitant to define deconstruction because any attempt at such a definition would be ironic. In his Letter to a Japanese Friend, Derrida writes: What deconstruction is not? Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course!70 More accessible accounts of the
basic moves of deconstructive thought can be found in Positions [1981] and Limited Inc. [1988]. Derrida insists that (p.147) a

deconstructive strategy or way of reading always involves a double and simultaneous movement: Deconstruction cannot be restricted or immediately pass to a neutralization: it must, through a double gesture, double science, a double writing put into practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is on that condition alone that deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticizes and that is also a field of non-discursive forces.71

An outright rejection of borders fails. Reframing our concepts of borders in terms of effects is crucial to cultivate a politics attentive to lived experience Agnew 8
(John, Department of Geography, UCLA, Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking Ethics & Global Politics Vol. 1, No. 4, 2008) Fourthly, and finally, policing borders still has a powerful normative justification in the defense of that territorial sovereignty which serves to underpin both liberal and democratic claims to (Lockean) popular rule. Now such claims may frequently be empirically fictive, particularly in the case of imperial and large nationstates, but the logic of the argument is that, absent effective worldwide government, the highest authority available is that of existing states .68 How such states police their borders, of course, should be subject to transparent
and open regulation. But why it is popularly legitimate to engage in policing functions in the way they are carried out cannot simply be put down to mass docility in the face of an omnipotent (because it is omniscient) state apparatus. National populations do

worry about their borders because their democracy (or other, familiar, politics) depends on it. The border is a continuing marker of a national (or supranational) political order even as people, in Europe at least, can now cross it for lunch.69 The problem here is that democratic theory and practice is not yet up to dealing with the complexities of a world in which territories and flows must necessarily co-exist. If one can argue, as does Arash Abizadeh, that the demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded, this still begs the
question of who is foreigner and who is citizen in a world that is still practically divided by borders.70 As Sofia Nasstrom puts the problem succinctly: it is one thing to argue that globalization has opened the door to a problem

within modern political thought, quite another to argue that globalization is the origin of this problem.71 Until political community is redefined in some way as not being coextensive with nation-state, we will be stuck with much of business as usual. Currently then, given the strong arguments about what borders do and the problems that they also entail, a more productive ethic than thinking either just with or just against them would be to re-frame the discussion in terms of the impacts that borders have; what they do both for and to people. From this perspective, we can both recognize the necessary roles of borders and the barriers to improved welfare that they create. In the first place,

however, this requires re-framing thinking about borders away from the emphasis on national citizenship towards a model of what Dora Kostakopoulou calls civic registration.72 Under this model, the only condition for residence would be demonstrated willingness to live according to democratic rule plus some set requirements for residency and the absence of a serious criminal record. Such a citizenship model requires a reconceptualization of territorial space as a dwelling space for residents and, thus, a move away from the nationali st narratives which cultivate the belief that territory is a form of property to be owned by a particular national group, eith er because the latter has established a first occupancy claim or because it regards this territory as a formative part of its identity.73 In a world in which wars and systematic violations of human rights push millions to seek asylum across borders every year, this rethinking is imperative.74 In the second place, and by way of example, from this viewpoint it is reasonable to prefer global redistribu tive justice to open borders. To put it bluntly, it is better to shift resources to people rather than permitting people to

shift themselves towards resources.75 Currently much migration from country-to-country is the result of the desire to improve economic well-being and enhance the life-chances of offspring. Yet, people often prefer to stay put, for

familial, social, and political reasons, if they can. There seems no good basis, therefore, to eulogize and institutionalize movement as inherently preferable to staying put. If adequate

mechanisms were developed to stimulate development in situ, many people who currently move would not. Not only people in destination countries associate their identities with territory. Using the standard of a decent life, therefore, can

lead beyond the present impasse between the two dominant views of borders towards a perspective that re-frames borders as having both negative and positive effects and that focuses on how people can both benefit from borders and avoid their most harmful effects.
In political vision as in everyday practice, therefore, borders remain as ambiguously relevant as ever, even as we work to enhance their positive and limit their negative effects.

Imagining multiple genealogies of place-based practices challenges the current epistemology of dominance and subalternity. Escobar 2001
(Arturo, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization Political Geography 20)
It might seem paradoxical to assert that the identities that can been as emerging in the culturalenvironmental domain today might simultaneously be attached to place and most open to what remains unimagined and unthought in biological, cultural, and economic terms. These identities engage in more complex types of mixing and dialectics than in the most

recent past. The dynamic of place, networks, and power at play today in many ambits suggests that this is the case. Subaltern strategies of localization still need still to be seen in terms of place; places are surely connected and constructed yet those constructions entail boundaries, grounds, selective connection, interaction, and positioning, and in some cases a renewal of history-making skills. Connectivity, interactivity an positionality are the correlative characteristics of the attachment to place (Escobar, 1999b,c), and they derive greatly from the modes of operation of the networks that are becoming central to the strategies
of localization advanced by social movements (and, of course, by capital in different ways). Networks can be seen as apparatuses for the production of discourses and practices that connect nodes in a discontinuous space; networks are not necessarily

hierarchical but can in some cases be described as self-organizing, non-linear and nonhierarchical meshworks, as some theorists of complexity think of them at present (De Landa, 1997). They create flows that link sites which, operating more like fractal structures than fixed architectures, enable diverse couplings (structural, strategic, conjunctural) with other sites and networks. This is why I say that the meaning of the politics of place can be found at the intersection of the scaling effects of networks and the strategies of the emergent identities. As Rocheleau put it
eloquently, this calls for an interest in the combination of people-in-place and people-in-networks, and the portability (or not) of peoples ways of being-in-place and being-in-relation with humans and other beings (D. Rocheleau, personal communication). It has been said that the ideas and practices of modernity are appropriated and reembedded in locally-

situated practices, giving rise to a plethora of modernities through the assemblage of diverse cultural elements, and that often times this process results in counter-tendencies and counter-development, defined as the process by which multiple modernities are established (Arce & Long, 2000: 19). The challenge for this constructive proposal is to imagine multiple modernities from multiple directions, that is, from multiple genealogies of place-based (if clearly not place-bound) practices. It is at this level that the postdevelopment moment is of relevance, at least in some recent reinterpretations of the concept. For Fagan (1999), for instance, the construction of a post-development politics must start with a consideration of material struggles and the cultural politics around them, critically engage with dominant development discourse by acknowledging its problems, and imagine transformation strategies fully cognizant of how cultural production is associated with power. Reconstituted development workers, researchers, and activists might thus begin to outline a more substantial post-development strategy. More than an anti-development movement, this strategy point at the construction of post-development scenarios that incorporate a pedagogical orientation towards change. A movement towards the defense of place might well be an element in this

strategy. This defense is of course not the only source of hope and change, but an important dimension of them. The critique of the privilege of space over place, of capitalism over non-capitalism, of global cultures and natures over local ones is not so much, or not only, a critique of our understanding of the world but of the social theories on which we rely to derive such understanding. This critique

also points at the marginalization of intellectual production on globalization produced in the peripheries of the world (Slater, 1998). The critique, finally, is an attempt to bring social theory into line with the views of the world and political strategies of those who exist on the side of

place, non-capitalism and local knowledge and effort to which anthropologists and ecologists are usually committed. Dominance and subalternity, as Guha (1988) forcefully demonstrated, are complex social and epistemological phenomena. Those frameworks that elide the historical experience of the subaltern and that participate in the erasure of subaltern strategies of localization can also be said to participate in the prose of counterinsurgency. Conversely, if it is true that politically enriched forms
of difference are always under construction, there is hope that they could get to constitute new grounds for existence and significant rearticulations of subjectivity and alterity in their economic, cultural and ecological dimensions. In the last instance, anthropology, political geography and political ecology can contribute to re-state the critique of current

hegemonies as a question of the utopian imagination: Can the world be reconceived and reconstructed from the perspective of the multiplicity of place-based practices of culture, nature and economy? Which forms of the global can be imagined from multiple placebased perspectives? Which counter-structures can be set into place to make them viable and productive? What notions of

politics, democracy and the economy are needed to release the effectivity of the local in all of its multiplicity and contradictions? What role will various social actors including technologies old and new have to play in order to create the networks on which manifold forms of the local can rely in their encounter with the multiple manifestations of the global? Some of these questions will have to be

given serious consideration in our efforts to give shape to the imagination of alternatives to the current order of things.

Totalizing rejections of globalization fail the reappropriation space is necessary for any challenge to borders Escobar 2001
(Arturo, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization Political Geography 20) Let us start with a enlightening critique of capitalocentrism in recent discourses of globalization. This critique is intended to enable us to free up the space for thinking about the potential value of other local models of the economy in ways that also apply to models of nature or development. Geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson present a powerful case against the claim, shared by mainstream and left theories alike, that capitalism is the hegemonic, even the only present form of economy, and that it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. In this view, capitalism has been endowed with such dominance and hegemony in these theories, that it has become impossible to think social reality differently, let alone to imagine capitalisms suppression. All other realities (subsistence economies, biodiversity economies, Third World forms of resistance, cooperatives and minor local initiatives, the recent barter and solidarity economies in various parts of the world, etc.) are thus seen as opposite, subordinate, or complementary to capitalism, never as sources of a significant economic difference. Their critique applies to most theories of globalization and even of postdevelopment, to the extent that the
latter situate capitalism at the center of development narratives, thus tending to devalue or marginalize possibilities of noncapitalist development (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 41). By criticizing capitalocentrism, these authors seek to liberate

our ability for seeing noncapitalisms and building alternative economic imaginaries9. This reinterpretation challenges the inevitability of capitalist penetration that is assumed in much of the literature on globalization: In the globalization scriptonly capitalism has the ability to spread and

invade. Capitalism is presented as inherently spatial and as naturally stronger than the forms of noncapitalist economy (traditional economies, Third World economies, socialist economies, communal experiments) because of its presumed capacity to universalize the market for capitalist commoditiesGlobalization according to this script involves the violation and eventual death of other noncapitalist forms of economyAll forms of noncapitalism become damaged, violated, fallen, subordinated to capitalismHow can we challenge the similar representation of globalization as capable of taking the life from noncapitalist sites, particularly the Third World? (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 125, 130) From this perspective, not everything that emerges from

globalization can be said to conform to the capitalist script; in fact, globalization and development might

propitiate a variety of economic development paths; these could be theorized in terms of postdevelopment in such a way that the naturalness of capitalist identity as the template of all economic identity can be called into question (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 146). They could also be conceived of, as Mayfair Yang does in her farsighted application of Gibson-Graham to the changing and multiple Chinese economies, in terms of the hybridity of economies; what she means by this is that many of todays economic formations in China are composed of both capitalist and a whole array of non-capitalist forms. With this reinterpretation, Yang challenges us to entertain the idea that indigenous economies do not always get ploughed under with the entrance of

capitalism, but may even experience renewal and pose a challenge to the spread of capitalist principles and stimulate us to rethink and rework existing critiques of capitalism (Yang, 1999:

5). What is certain is that we no longer seem to be sure about what is there on the ground after centuries of capitalism and five decades of development. Do we even know how to look at social reality in ways that might allow us to

detect elements of difference that are not reducible to the constructs of capitalism and modernity? The role of ethnography has of course been particularly important in this respect. In the 1980s, a number of ethnographies documented active and creative resistance to capitalism and modernity in various

settings10. Resistance by itself, however, is only suggestive of what is going on in many communities, stopping short of showing how people actively continue to create and reconstruct their lifeworlds and places. Successive works characterized the local hybridized models of the economy and the natural environment maintained by peasants and indigenous communities. The attention paid, particularly in Latin American anthropology and cultural studies, to cultural hybridization is another attempt at making visible the dynamic encounter of practices originating in many cultural and temporal matrices, and the extent to which local groups, far from being passive receivers of transnational conditions, actively shape the process of constructing identities, social relations, and economic practice (see Escobar, 1995 for a review of this literature). These lines of inquiry have reached sophisticated levels in the provision of nuanced accounts of the encounter between development, modernity, and local culture in postcolonial settings (see, for instance, Gupta, 1998; Arce & Long, 2000). These bodies of literature, however, are yet to be related systematically to the project of rethinking place from the perspective of practices of cultural, ecological, and economic difference among Third World communities in contexts of globalization and postcoloniality. This link might enable researchers to foreground the political aspects of their critique, not infrequently rendered intractable by the emphasis on the heterogeneity, hybridity, localization, and differentiation of forms and practices. If the goal of

Gibson-Graham was to provide an alternative language a new class language in particular for addressing the economic meaning of local practices, and if the goal of the postdevelopment literature is similarly to make visible practices of cultural and ecological difference which could serve as the basis for alternatives, it is necessary to acknowledge that these goals are inextricably linked to conceptions of locality, place, and place-based consciousness. Place is central to issues of development, culture and the environment and is equally essential, on the other, for imagining other contexts for thinking about the construction of politics, knowledge and identity. The erasure of place is a reflection of the asymmetry that exist between the global and the local in much contemporary
literature on globalization, in which the global is associated with space, capital, history and agency while the local, conversely, is linked to place, labor, and tradition as well as with women, minorities, the poor and, one might add, local cultures11. Some feminist geographers have attempted to correct this asymmetry by arguing that place can also lead to articulations across space, for instance through networks of various kinds (Chernaik, 1996); this leaves unresolved, however, the relation between place and location, as well as the question of boundaries. More fundamental perhaps in Dirliks analysis are the consequences of

the neglect of place for current categories of social analysis such as class, gender, and race (and we should add the environment here), which make such categories susceptible of becoming instruments of hegemony. To the extent that they are significantly sundered from place in discourses of globalization and

deterritoralization, contemporary notions of culture do not manage to escape this predicament, for they tend to assume the existence of a global power structure in which the local occupies a necessarily subordinate position. Under these conditions, is it possible to launch a defense of place in which place and the local do not derive their meaning only from their juxtaposition to the global? A first step in

resisting the marginalization of place, continuing with Dirliks exposition, is provided by Lefebvres notion of place as a form of lived and grounded space and the reappropriation of which must be part of any radical political agenda against capitalism and spaceless and timeless globalization. Politics, in other words, is also located in place, not only in the supra-levels of capital and space. Place, one might
add, is the location of a multiplicity of forms of cultural politics, that is, of the cultural-becoming-political, as it has become evident with rainforest and other ecological social movements12.

No impact
Borders in Latin America may contribute to rivalry, but do not cause conflict Studies prove Trinkunas 12
[Harold, Naval Postgraduate School, Maiah Jaskoski- Naval Postgraduate School, Borders and Borderlands in the Americas- PASCC Report Number 2012 009]

Border policies are rooted in a deep history of partial, problematic state building in the region. Historically, Latin American states have engaged in rivalry rather than war. Rivalry benefits these states because it enables the development of nationalism and nationality. Rivalry promotes state coherence and acts as an attractor for weak central governments, using nationalism to retain some loyalty and some authority over populations in their borderlands.8 Though rivalry impedes interstate cooperation to resolve border issues in some key cases in the Americas (Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; Venezuela and Colombia), it does not rise to such a level that it generates the cycle of international conflict,
defense preparedness, taxation, and popular mobilization. This means that Central and South America did not experience the type of state building that led to the development of hard fiscal/military/industrial states in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries.9 This historically limited state capacity across much of the region to address border security issues unilaterally, but rivalry also limited the possibility for cooperation across borders to address security and other dimensions of borderlands. This project found no cases in the

Americas in which borders were seriously at risk of provoking international war, even in the cases that were most ideologically polarized, as was the case on the Colombian-Venezuelan and ColombianEcuadorean borders. While we still see the militarization of borders as vehicles for signaling during international disputes, we found that leaders in the contemporary Americas were constrained by domestic stakeholders and economic considerations. In fact, much of the violence identified in borderlands has occurred in precisely those spaces where international relations are smoothest, especially due to strong economic relations: in Central America, regional economic integration and cross-border flows are growing even as states struggle to maintain border security.10 The peaceful settlement of international disputes and uti posidetis (the legal concept that borders are based on those inherited from the colonial period) has become the norm across the region. In some cases, there is an increased tendency to legalize territorial claims, settling border disputes in international tribunals and through judicial arbitration. This means that states do not necessarily view their borders as matters of existential import, but at most as subjects that may be negotiated.11

Reject their generic link claims - borders produce cultural connections as much as they exclude. Parker 12

[Noel, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Geopolitics, 17:4, 727-733, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.706111] On the other hand, bordering practices and the various forms of contestation and resistance they often give rise to are

not treated simply as normatively bad phenomena. Rumford, for example, highlights the ways in which borders are also sites of cultural encounter rather than simply a mechanism of division and exclusion. Indeed, even in some of the worlds most persistently troubled border-zones, such as the India-Pakistan region, the border can be said to act as an interlinking and cooperative space (Bouzas, this issue). On this view, as Salter might say about Bouzas material, borders then knit the world together even though the colonial sutures remain living after-traces of past violence.

Methodologically, the empirical thrust of CBS research is conversant with anthropological approaches to the phenomenology of the border and indeed several of the pieces included here reflect extensive ethnographic fieldwork for example Bouzas interviews with migrants in the border villages near Kargil, Pakistan and Gieliss time spent with Dutch migrants in Kranenburg.

No link
Borderlands are utilized as "transition zones" for the acclimatization of one culture into another. Rather than a strict dividing line, borders represent regions of negotiation and a mixture of different identities. Newman 2006, [David, Newman, Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion
University, Beer Sheba, Israel, "Progress in Human Geography 30: The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our borderless world", pp. 143161]
The notion of frontiers and borderlands as used in the geographic literature has a great deal of relevance for our increasingly complex lives and social interactions. Just as the scholars of territorial borders are increasingly examining the

notion of transitional spaces which cross the boundary and take in areas and people on both sides of the formal line of divide, so too our belonging to cosmopolitan social and cultural groups is increasingly becoming hybrid, in a sort of frontier/ transition world between, and across, the more rigid lines that separated us in the past. Borderlands do exist around borders, but they vary in
their intensity and the extent to which they equally affect people on both sides of the border. The discussion concerning the nature of borders as bridges and points of interaction (as contrasted to their tradi- tional role of barriers) is of relevance in the sense that borders

can become transformed into the frontiers (in the most positive sense of the term) where people or groups who have traditionally kept themselves distant from each other, make the first attempts at contact and interaction, creating a mix- ture of cultures and hybridity of identities (ODowd and Corrigan, 1995; Newman, 2003b). Not all such frontiers necessarily occur along the territorial border dividing
States. Their sociospatial location may equally be found in the middle of the metropoli- tan centre (New York, London, etc) where cultural and ethnic residential ghettos enforce the notion of border on the one hand, but where daily mixing on the streets, in the subways, in workplaces and in apartment blocks creates the frontiers of cross-border and transboundary interaction on the other. The classic border literature distinguished between the border or boundary on the one hand, and the political frontier or the border- land on the other (House, 1980; Rumley and Minghi, 1991). The latter constituted the region or area in relative close proximity to the border within which the dynamics of change and daily life practices were affected by the very presence of the border (Martinez, 1994a; 1994b). This would vary between closed and open borders, and it would also vary on each side of the line of separation. The impact of the border as a line which both reflects, and enhances, differ- ence is the key parameter to understanding change and diversity within the borderland (Pratt and Brown, 2000). Traditional ideas of borderland and fron- tier are related to notions of transition

zone. In the EU the borderland has constituted the place for the emergence of transboundary border regions, where social, economic and cultural activities have come together across the border. This has been encouraged by the EU as a means of breaking down the tradi- tional barriers of national suspicion between the peoples on each side of the border, creat- ing the conditions for the eventual opening or removal of the border altogether. In many cases, the borderlands take on the charac- teristics of transition regions, enabling a gradual movement from one cultural norm to another, as contrasted with the rigid line understanding of the border as a distinct cut-off point. Within the transition zone, cultural, linguistic and
social hybridity can emerge, resulting in the formation of a sub-cultural buffer zone within which move- ment from one side to the other eases up considerably the person in transit from one place or group to another undergoes a process

of acclimatization and acculturation as he/she moves through the zone of transition, so that the shock of meeting the other is not as great as he/she feared. In some cases it can bring about the
formation of transnational, transboundary, spaces with the emergence of new hybrid regional identities (Dobell and Neufeld, 1994; ColdRauvkilde et al., 2004; Smith, 2004; Chen, 2005). At a recent seminar on border discourses which took place at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, we heard two border-related papers from doctoral students. One was from a sociologist writing about the impact of globalization on the creation of high-tech complexes; the other was from a dancer turned anthropologist who has worked on the DCO areas which were created as joint Israel-Palestinian security exclaves in the period after the Oslo Agreements and operated until the outbreak of the second Intifada in 1990. Seemingly very different presentations, the two papers were

surpris- ingly similar in their use conscious and unconscious of notions of border. In partic- ular, they both focused on the way that new spaces are created and the way in which groups working or operating within these spaces of transition negotiate their way through and across the new borders and lines which have been created at the very heart of these new spaces.

Alt ignores gender

The alt makes gender invisible - only the perm solves Escobar 2 [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill,
Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf] In a more recent text, and building on post-colonial and feminist theory, Vuola (2003) renews her call for taking seriously the heterogeneity and multiplicity ofthe subject of liberation (theology and philosophy), namely the poor and, one may add, the subaltern, in the MC project. In other words,she is calling for a politics of representation of the poor and the subaltern that fully acknowledges this multiplicity; in the case of women, this means addressing themes that have been absent from the discussion, such as violence against women, reproductive rights and sexuality, and giving complete visibility to the agency of women. In other words, the subject of the colonial difference is not an undifferentiated, gender-neutral subject (or differentiated only in terms of race and class); there are differences in the way subaltern groups are objects of power and subjects of agency. To acknowledge this might change, to paraphrase, not only the contents but also the terms of the conversation. That women are othe rin relation to men and certainly treated assuch by phallogocentric social and human sciencescertainly should have consequences for a perspective centered precisely on exteriority and difference. What Vuola points at is the fact that whereas the discourse of the (mostly male still) MC group is
illuminating and radical in so many ways, and as such taken seriously by feminists, it largely excludes women and womens the oretical and political concerns. There seems to be a conflict here between discourse and practice as far as

women is concerned. Finally, the feminist deconstruction of religious fundamentalism,something that is not well known in eitherfeministsocialscience orthe MC project, is also of relevance to the engendering ofthe MC project. As a broad political movement, transnational feminism(s) is developing new approaches to formulating intercultural criteria for human rights, especially women'srights, and for analyzing the truth claims on which these are based (Vuola 2002). New works on transnational feminism deal with race, gender and culture issues in ways that resonate with the concerns of the MC project (see, e.g, Shohat, ed.
1998; Bahavani, Foran and Kurian, eds. 2003). .

Cedes the political

ALT FAILS even an active refusal cedes the political Redfield 5 [Peter, Ph.D. Anthropology at UC Berkeley, professor of Anthropology at UNC
Chapel Hill, Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis, Cultural Anthropology 20(3)] ***MSF = Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) Here the context of MSFs ethic of refusal comes most sharply into focus. The groups insistence on a politics of witnessing combined with its abstention from taking a directly political role stems from an unwillingness to accept the extended state of emergency within which it generally operates. Simply to denounce situations would achieve no immediate humanitarian ends and to endorse political agendas would potentially sacrifice the present needs of a population for the hope of future conditions. But to maintain formal neutrality at all times without protest would mimic the classic limitations of the Red Cross movement that the founders of MSF originally rejected. Confronted with such a range of unsatisfying options while still being committed to humanitarian values, MSFs ideological strategy is to claim a position of refusal in the form of action taken with an outspoken, troubled conscience. The practical application of this approach varies according to the situation. In truly exceptional circumstances MSF has found itself forced out or has chosen to withdraw. For example, during the highly televised Ethiopian famine of 198485, the French section was forced to leave after accusing the regime of using both famine and relief aid to effect a forced resettlement policy. During the dark Rwandan spring a decade later, MSF publicly proclaimed its helplessness with a bitter, angry refrain: you cant stop genocide with doctors. The French section both denounced the political
complicity of its national government and issued its first call for some form of military intervention to halt the slaughter. Upset at the flagrant manipulation of aid by the perpetrators of genocide in the aftermath, MSFFrance subsequently pulled out

of the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania at the end of 1994 and then condemned the new Rwandan regime for the forcible repatriation and massacre of Hutu refugees. Although other MSF sections followed different strategic lines of action amid heated debate, they all eventually withdrew from the camps by the end of 1995, publicly protesting the continuing political situation within them. Most recently and poignantly, the organization withdrew from Afghanistan following the murder of five members of a team from MSFHolland in 2004. After more than two decades of continuous presence, the organization felt that the altered political circumstances of U.S.-led coalition efforts to administer a post-Taliban reconstruction had eliminated the humanitarian space necessary for its operations.

State key
The state is necessary for emancipatory struggles empirics prove Slater Professor of Social and Political Geography at Loughborough University, in 4 [David, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial Rethinking North South Relations,
. From a starting point that states that an ethic of responsibility, allied with a search for a more emancipatory and democratic politics, must include a responsibility to the other, then it follows that there will
be a call to resist domination, exploitation, oppression and all other similar conditions that seek to subordinate the other. This would provide a substantive criterion according to which one must mobilize opposition to, for example, ethnic and nationalist chauvinism, fascism, racism, xenophobia, dictatorship and the imperiality of power. However, while such mobilizations might

helps us go beyond the ossifying influence of political indifference, nevertheless, in prioritizing struggles against existing conditions, the question of struggles for some wider objective is left unattended. It is here that a notion of radical democracy can be introduced; not as a goal that is restricted to the national level, but as a political horizon that can connect overlapping global, supra-national, national, regional and local spheres in the sense that justice and equality and representative and direct democracy can be fought for and extended through a series of struggles, as has been occurring in Latin American societies such as Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. In these examples and elsewhere, democratic struggles for greater equality, justice, and socio-economic and political rights crucially unfold at the national level, which remains pivotal to political change, even though this level is radically
affected by those other levels or domains above it and below it

Critical Geography is racist

Critical geography cannot effectively combat race whiteness is too inscribed in the study Price 2010 [Patricia L. Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International
University, At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race in Progress in Human Geography 34(2) page 156 ]
Critical geographic studies of whiteness are not, however, without their own critics. Alastair Bonnett (1996), for instance, makes the (problematic) assertion that the tendency to focus on blackness or whiteness is a particularly American obsession that does not reflect the subtler reality of race in other places. Yet there is very little intentionally comparative critical geographic research on race, such that Bonnetts claim is difficult to substantiate empirically. What is perhaps more troubling and easier to

document is the remarkably persistent whiteness of geographys practitioners. According to some, the popularity of white studies in geography may in fact simply reflect the whiteness of geographers, and as such constitute a zone of racial solipsism, or worse, a comfort zone rather than a space of truly critical engagement with racism (let alone antiracism; Pulido, 2002; Mahtani, 2006). The prominence of white studies in geographic studies of race may in fact not simply reflect but also unwittingly act to reinforce white dominance in geography (Nash, 2003).

Borders good
Borders are key to social solidarity that solves poverty, equality, and are key to macroeconomic regulation Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political geography, the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking, Ethics and Global Politics, pg 5, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf)

A second theme in how borders serve political identity is a broadly social democratic emphasis on how social solidarity within national borders furthers goals such as diminished poverty, increased equality of opportunity, and given the absence of effective global-level institutions, macroeconomic regulation and stabilization. To Paul Hirst, for example, as sources of power are increasingly pluralistic, the state becomes even more important in providing a locus for political solidarity.28 In particular, he writes, Macroeconomic policy continues to be crucial in promoting prosperity, at the international level by ensuring stability, and at the national and regional levels by balancing co-operation and competition. Governments are not just municipalities in a global market-place

Borders are necessary as they fulfill our ethical and identity of humans as means to independence, limits of violence, and the ability for stability Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International
Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322338, Accessed: 7/27/13,) Nevertheless, when taken collectively, these complaints perhaps overstate the case and over the past 5 years or so in particular there have been some notable attempts at acknowledging and offering theoretically reflective accounts of the concept of the border of the state. Jackson, for example, has built upon the work of Hedley Bull and emphasized the normative role that state borders play in international life: the sanctity and stability of inherited boundaries is a fundamental building block of international society and a principle behind which the vast majority of sovereign states rally (Jackson 2000:333). On his view, borders between states not only delimit the spheres of national interests, security, and law but also shape rights and duties such as those relating to non-intervention (Jackson
2000:319). As such, borders are said to perform a key normative role by distinguishing between insider groups (members of international institutions such as the UN) and outsider groups (those who enjoy no legal existence as independent states) (Jackson 2000:333). A

similar line of argument is pursued by Williams who also draws on Bull to argue that borders between states perform an important ethical function in world politics (Williams 2002:739). For Williams, state borders are ubiquitous and embedded in IR because they are a necessary facet of human existence: The durability and depth of sedimentation of territorial borders as fences suggest that division, and division on a territorial basis, speaks to a deep-seated need of human identity and also in human ethics (Williams 2003:39; emphasis added). On this view, borders between states are said to act as fences between neighbours in such a way that tolerates diversity instead of stifling difference (Williams 2003:39). Without borders, Williams claims, the international juridicalpolitical system would not be able to ensure state independence, limits on violence, sanctity of agreement or the stability of possession (Williams 2002:739740). Hence, he argues, to remove, or even to re-conceptualize, territorial borders would mean the end of IR requiring a shift in the conduct of politics on the planet that is unimaginable (Williams 2003:27). However, Williams argument might be challenged on two grounds: first, that borders between states are not necessarily limits on but rather markers and even upholders of violence in political life; and,
second, in any case, as we have already seen in the case of legal arguments deployed by the UN in defence of the Human Rights of detainees in Guantanamo, planetary shifts in the conduct of politics occasioned by (or reflected in) the disaggregation of territorial limits and limits of law appear to be already well under way.

Modern borders are engines of connectivity that allow for engagement with the other
Rumford 11, Chris Rumford, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, Seeing like a border Political Geography 30 (2011) pages 61-69 Borders are no longer seen only as lines on a map but as spaces in their own right (as in the idea of borderlands) and as processes; in short, there has been a shift from borders to bordering (or rebordering, on some accounts). The argument advanced here is that the changes to borders are in fact more far-reaching than can be captured by either the idea that borders are everywhere or a security-driven rebordering thesis. I propose that to understand borders fully scholars need to see like a border. Three key dimensions of borders/bordering are generating a distinct research agenda and associated literature. First, borders can be engines of connectivity. Rather than curtailing mobility, borders can actively facilitate it; many key borders are at airports, maritime ports, and railway terminals. Borders can connect as well as divide, not just proximate entities, but globally. This means that more conventional views of
interactions across borders (e.g. Minghi, 1991) are in need of revision. It also means that border scholars must take issue with the idea, expressed by Hkli and Kaplan (2002, p. 7), that cross-border interactions are more likely to occur when the

other side is easily accessible, in contrast to when people live farther away from the border.

For van Schendel (2005) borderlanders are able to jump scales (local, national, regional, global) and therefore do not experience the national border only as an immediate limit. People can construct the scale of the border for themselves; as a local phenome non, a nationstate edge, or as a transnational staging post: the border can be reconfigured as a portal.

Construction of borders involve citizens and give people autonomy

Rumford 11, Chris Rumford, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, Seeing like a border Political Geography 30 (2011) pages 61-69 Second, bordering is not always the business of the state. Ordinary people (citizens and also non-citizens) are increasingly involved in the business of bordering, an activity I have previously termed borderwork (Rumford, 2008). Citizens, entrepreneurs, and NGOs are active in constructing, shifting,

or even erasing borders. The borders in question are not necessarily those (at the edges) of the nation-state; they can be found at a range of sites throughout society: in towns and cities, and in local neighborhoods. Examples (in the UK) include: the local currency schemes in several English towns (Stroud, Lewes, Totnes) designed to prevent the leeching of money from the local economy; securing Protected Designation of Origin status (from the EU) for local produce such as Melton Mowbray pork pies and Stilton cheese (Cooper & Rumford, in press) which creates bounded regions for branded products. What is distinctive about these activities is that they result from initiatives by entrepreneurs, citizens/ residents, and grass roots activists. They are not top-down, state-led processes of bordering. This activity

does not necessarily result in borders that enhance national security but it provides borderworkers with new political and/or economic opportunities: the uses of borders are many and various. Third, borders provide opportunities for claims-making. This has long been recognized to be the case in respect of the nation-state, where national borders are not always imposed by the center. For example Sahlins (1989, p. 9)work on the SpaineFrance border in the Pyrenees shows that local society brought the nation into the village. But borderwork also has a post-national dimension and is consistent with what Isin and Nielsen (2008) term an act of citizenship: they are part of the process by which citizens are distinguished from others: strangers, outsiders, non-status people and the rest (Nyers, 2008, p.
168). Moreover, acts of citizenship and borderwork alike are not restricted to those who are already citizens; they are means by which non-status persons can constitute themselves as being political (Nyers, 2008, p. 162). Borderwork can also be associated with a range of claims-making activity, not only claims to national belonging or citizenship, but also demands for transnationalmobility, assertions of human rights, and demonstrations of political actorhood, all of which can comprise acts of citizenship. This leads to the

possibility of viewing bordering not only in terms of securitization but also in terms of opportunities for humanitarian assistance targeted at those (refugees, migrants) who may coalesce at the borders.

Even if Borders split up the world artificially they are key to preserving our ontological connection to the world and pre-requisite for political agency
Parker and Addler-Nissen 12, Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012 [Noel
and Rebecca, Picking and Choosing the Sovereign Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660582]

We can rst observe that borders help full epistemological conditions. Borders produce particular conditions for understanding reality. We who are inside the border are also

expected to possess greater knowledge of insiders than of outsiders, which in turn reduces uncertainties regarding our common knowledge on the inside. The border is frequently a bulwark sustaining commonly agreed measures of reality (such as national-currency measures for ination or relative welfare). The border slices the world up into different pieces of reality that we cannot know equally well. That increases as well the plausibility of any assertion regarding the circumstances, gains or losses within our border. Hence, other things being equal, borders help promote the idea that there are fewer uncertainties in communications between insiders by comparison with communications with those on the outside. This leads to an assumption that we will be able to agree on the terms used to evaluate changes and preferences even the order of priorities, which is a pre-condition of political decisions. Put in a nutshell, the border provides conditions for greater certainty and agreement for those within it. Thompson also makes explicit an ontological claim for the border/boundary which is implicit in post-structuralisms prioritisation of differences as against commonalities: namely, that ...borders exist before entities ... that is to say, borders are ontologically prior to specic enti- ties. Borders help constitute the way we conceive the world. This can be demonstrated, inter alia, on the basis of the epistemological claims above. For those epistemological consequences of boundaries provide key onto- logical pre-conditions for the continuity of the given social particular as an integrated entity; and hence also for its identity.14 The fact of the border helps produce shared understandings of the identities of particulars, both internal and external to

the particular itself. This includes understandings of internal variations and sub-categories (constituencies, classes ... ) between insiders/members of the given social particular. The self-identities of mem- bers and sub-categories are grounded in, and thus far validated, by seeing those particulars in relation to each other.15 Likewise, the boundary sustains any determination of

the collectivity (the nation, or whatever it may be) whose interests may be the basis for decisions and actions on its behalf. This, as Rokkan noted,16 is especially signicant in democratic collectivities, where a large self-aware demos is postulated as the ground for decisions that need to accord in some way with the preference of an indeterminable category, the ordinary mass of the people. The above ontological effects of borders yield yet further consequences. For borders provide pre-conditions for determinations of the situation of insiders relative to outsiders: claims regarding presumed and/or potential different conditions (be it better or worse) for insiders than for outsiders.17 The same could be said of any impression of greater/lesser (or poten- tially greater/lesser) welfare than outsiders. Only with these kinds of claims and impressions in place, can an additional, politically important category of knowledge have meaning: assertions about potential improvements or deteriorations in conditions for the inside.18 If the existence of the

subjects who experience comparative well-being were not given, we would not nd meaning in headlines such as Danish schools worst on PISA tests.19 A fortiori threats which it may be necessary to protect again

Borders inevitable
The alt cant overcome bio-political or sovereign distinctions. Salter 6 Mark B, School of Poli Sci @ U of Ottawa, The Global Visa Regime and the Political
Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics; Alternatives 31 P 174-7, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3225/is_2_31/ai_n29276866/?tag=content;col1 Derrida describes how becoming suppliant before the law at the border is inevitable: The foreigner is someone whose name must be asked in order that he or she might be received. The foreigner must state and guarantee his or her identity, like a witness before a court. This is someone to whom you put a question and address a demand, the first demand, the minimal demand being, "What is your name?" or then "In telling me what your name is, in responding to this request, you are responding on your own behalf, you are responsible before the law and before your hosts, you are a subject in law." (29) And yet, as Agamben illustrates in terms of the homo sacer, the appellant is subject to the law, but not a subject in the law. This article continues to address the question of the politics of decision below. What are the asymmetric structures of choice that create the frequent and massive movement of individuals through the border, into a zone of indistinction and control, where they are subject to the law but do not enjoy rights? While the characteristics of the globalized world make movement necessary (in addition to desirable), the structure of the global mobility regime reinforces the act of crossing the frontier as an exceptional act.

Borders are not defined objects but rather an abstract idea that cannot be defined simply by a states limit to their sovereignty Jerrems 11
(Ari Jerrems, Universidad Autnoma de Madrid graduate, ph.d contender , 2011, BOOK REVIEW of Border Politics: The Limits of SovereignPower by Nick Vaughan-Williams, Borderlands VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1, 2011, Accessed: 7/27/13) Critical approaches tend to avoid treating borders as a stable reality. tienne Balibar indicates that to define or identify in general is nothing more than the creation of a border (2005, p. 77). Therefore, we may regard the border not as the territorial separation between two political identities but rather the point where one entity differs from another. The process of continually defining and identifying borders points to an ever changing and unstable reality. Borders should be studied not by their appearance but rather by an appearing or bordering process (Deleuze
2008, p. 22). It is during this appearing process that a phenomenon acquires retrospectively the sense of being there (Fouc ault 2009, p. 79). Michel Foucault maintains that bodies, couples, races, species or borders are never completely closed off. Rather it is through their constant redefining that they are given sense (2009, p. 83). Hence borders should not be taken as an assumption

that can be simply described as absent or present. Any analysis should concentrate on how continual practices bring them into existence. As such, bordering is not restricted to the territorial separation understood as the limit of the Nation-State. A common critical argument is that borders have not disappeared, rather they are being found at sites that Noel Parker and Nick VaughanWilliams state are increasingly ephemeral and/or impalpable: electronic, non-visible, and located in zones that defy straightforwardly territorial logic (2009, p. 583). In Border Politics VaughanWilliams attempts to defy territorial logic in his reworking of the border concept, claiming that borders are no longer at the territorial border by focusing on the bordering process. Nevertheless, his efforts achieve mixed results as they appear to narrow analysis exclusively to state power whilst excluding other possible border sites. This essay will discuss the limitations of Vaughan-Williams work and propose alternative ways of
understanding the bordering process.

Link turn Cuban embargo

The embargo is an act of imperialism that encloses Cuba in the borders of the America political order even as it excludes it from the global economy Slater 4 [David, Ph.D. (London School of Econ + PolSci), Emeritus Professor of Political Geography @ Loughborough University, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, published 2004, p. 180-183] As a symptomatic illustration of these kinds of interconnections, it can be suggested that international, and more specifically North/South, relations are characterized by an asymmetrical power to define and be defined who, for example, has the will and capacity to define sovereignty for both the self and the other? Looking at the example of the US in relation to societies of the Latin South, this asymmetrical power, notwithstanding its varied mutations, has been continuously present, as has been discussed in previous chapters. Such an asymmetrical power has gone together with a sharp dissonance between the imperialist impact of the US and its enunciated belief from Jefferson on in the selfdetermination of peoples. This contradiction has been the subject of varied attempts at resolution. In some instances, as with
the Reagan administrations intervention in Grenada in 1983, a clear separation was drawn between a people that purportedly needed rescuing the US invasion of Grenada was portrayed as a rescue mission and a tyrannical regime that not only did not represent the interests of its people but also constituted a threat to the neighbourhood of the Americas (Weber 1999: 79). At the same time, this

separation has been reinforced by the association of the tyrannical regime with a foreign ideology that is seen as subverting the values of Western freedom and democracy, as in the Cuban case both during the Cold War and also post-1989. In these contexts, the US has assigned to itself the right and also the responsibility to define the sovereignty of another people. For example, in the case of the US

invasion of Panama in December 1989, which was undertaken despite the refusal to accord it legitimacy at either the continental, i.e. OAS (Organization of American States), or the UN level, the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations declared that the sovereign will of the Panamanian people is what we are here defending (qtd in Weber 1995: 100). The hegemonic will to define the

sovereignty of another people is also clearly present in the Cuban case, and not only in relation to the Platt Amendment, as discussed in chapter 2, but more recently in the example of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (US GPO 1996), sometimes known as the HelmsBurton Act. This Act contains a number of statements that establish a clear demarcation between the rights of the Cuban people and the Castro government. It is written, for example, that it has been the consistent policy of US

administrations to keep faith with the people of Cuba, while sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime. The Cuban people, the Act continues, deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically improper conduct by the international community (US GPO 1996, 110 Stat, 7868). The Act set out a number of purposes which can be summarized as follows. First, the Act aimed at encouraging the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba under international supervision, and secondly, it was stipulated that international sanctions

against the Castro government should be strengthened. Third, the Act aimed to protect US nationals against confiscatory takings and the exchange of confiscated property, and fourth the Act had the purpose of providing for the continued national security of the US in the face of what were considered to be continuing threats from the Castro government. In addition,
the Act provided a policy framework for US support to the Cuban people in their need for a transition to democracy. This framework followed on from the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, that encouraged the governments of countries trading with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with the island. Overall, the Cuban problem was constructed as both a domestic

and international issue. Thus, while a specific conception of the Cuban people, with an emphasis on their right to freedom, democracy and prosperity through self-determination (US GPO 1996, 110 Stat, 789 and 805) is set against a notion of a tyrannical regime that needs to be replaced, that same tyrannical regime is constructed as a threat not only to its own people but also to the US. Its removal therefore is interpreted as being beneficial to both the Cuban people and the people of the US and its
government. Symptomatically, while regime change is the clear long-term goal, at the same time, the Act underlines the fact that US policy is to (a) recognize that the self-determination of the Cuban people is a sovereign and national right of the citizens of Cuba which must be exercised free of interference by the government of any other country and to (b) encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves with a government which reflects the self-determination of the Cuban people (US GPO 1996, 110 Stat, 805). Reminiscent of the third article of the Platt Amendment, whereby the Cuban government had agreed to the right of the US to intervene in order to preserve Cuban independence, the US government in 1996 defined Cuban sovereignty as a Cuban right

which must be exercised free of interference by the government of any other country. At the

same moment, the US was itself setting the terms for the nature of that sovereignty and stipulating its own right and responsibility (as well as that of the international community) to act against the present Cuban government. And this government was represented as being separate from its people, as implicitly being an extraneous and unhealthy growth on the body politic of the Cuban people. 5 From the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 it can be seen that the US has assumed the right to represent or act as guardian for the Cuban people to write a narrative for the defence of Cuban sovereignty which is also a defence of US interests against an ostensibly threatening and tyrannical regime. The internal and external are closely intertwined, and the moral, cultural and political leadership role assumed by the US can only be fully understood as part of the geopolitical history of USCuban relations (see, for example, Benjamin 1990 and Weldes & Saco 1996). Equally, however, as writers such as Cottam (1994) and Kenworthy (1995) have demonstrated, US hegemony has been constructed in similar ways with regards to other Latin American societies, where the combined US role of being teacher, doctor and policeman has received a continuing significance (Schoultz 1999). But also, the invocation of a commonality of interest must not be forgotten. This is illustrated, for
example, in the emphasis in the HelmsBurton Act on the posited shared USCuban interest in representative democracy, market economy and freedom and prosperity. Moreover, there is the shared importance given to self-determination, which is born out of a sense of the American nations being the product, as President Kennedy expressed it in 1961, of a common struggle, the revolt from colonial rule (see Holden & Zolov 2000: 227). From the perspective of Washington, what has been specific about contemporary Cuba, or more accurately the Castro government, is its alliance during the Cold War period with the Soviet Union and its continuing adherence post1989 to a communist political system. This specificity has been used by the US as a justification for not only classifying Cuba as a threat to the US and the Western Hemisphere, and now more recently as a rogue state, but also as a justification for its embargo on or blockade of Cuba an embargo which has been condemned by the UN, the European Union and the Inter-American Juridical Committee, which has ruled that such a measure against Cuba violates international law (Chomsky 2000: 2). The embargo and related acts of

interference 6 also contravene Article 15 of the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States, which stipulates that no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other state (see Holden & Zolov 2000: 192). The Cuban in a rather concentrated form a persistent theme in the history of USLatin American relations. For example, there are other cases of the US assigning to itself a role of framing relations with Latin American societies in which their sovereignty is transgressed. One thematic
exemplification of this problem concerns the US policy of certification in relation to the war on drugs.

case might be considered to be too specific to act as a basis for broader interpretations, and certainly in the context of USLatin American relations it has a unique geopolitical significance. However, it can also be argued that USCuban relations express

Schmitt
Erasing borders leads to unlimited and endless violence of a world police state in order to erase the ontological necessity of pluralism that makes resistance ineinvtbale. The political gesutre of the Kritik is a way to erase the other and bring about the kingdom of satan. Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, in 8 [Sergei, De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 34-6]
For Schmitt, the

immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement of sovereign transcendence, inevitably renders it anti-political by virtue of its negation of any outside to the immanent order of being (cf. Ewald 1992; Ojakangas 2004). This negation of the out- side may be
conceptualized at two levels. In terms of political ontology, immanentism necessarily disavows its own origins, which must logically be decisionist and exceptional, i.e., exterior to the plane of immanence of the internal organization of order. Every order is constituted by a founding rupture that dispenses with the previously existing order and inaugurates the new order, without itself being part of either. In the ontological sense, the outside of order, disavowed in immanentist thought, is that marginal excess

that constitutes the form of order by escaping from it, that supple- ment which simultaneously sustains and undermines the existence of order, the sovereign decision that institutes order, while remaining unsubsumed under its principles (see Schmitt 1985; Derrida 1992). The

dis- avowal of the sovereign foundation is thus the negation of the boundary that ultimately separates order from itself, and thus, in the well-known Derridean argument, prevents its closure and consolidation into a self- propelling

machine. On the ontic level, the negation of the outside takes place through the effacement of the fundamental spatio-temporal pluralism of political orders in the project of world unity, for which there are no longer friends and enemies, both of whom are legitimate equals to the self in the pluralistic domain of the international. What remains is only the selfimmanent self that is to be elevated to the universal status and the obscene excess of the foe, whose resistance to forcible incorporation into world unity serves as a justification for its annihilation. The logic of world unity is marked by a persistent attempt at the erasure of all dividing lines between individuals and political communities and, thus, the merger of the self and the other in the final reign of benign universality. There is no longer a place (literally as well as figuratively) for the exclusion of the other, simply because there is no longer any otherness in the system which operates with the all-inclu- sive category of humanity (Schmitt 1976; Kervegan 1999). For Schmitt, the horrifying consequence of world unity would be the elimination of all pluralism and, hence, the impossibility of difference, otherness, and, in concretely spatial terms, the outside. A unified world is a world, which is impossible to leave in any other manner than by discon- tinuing ones own existence. Freedom is freedom of movement, nothing else. What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer space for measuring and test- ing ones strength freely? (Schmitt 1988, 243). The problem with world unity, however, is more than the sacrifice of pluralism. The world, in which there is only a homeland, is, in Schmitts diagnosis, a dystopic world police power, to which the romantic connotations of homeland barely apply: The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be trans- formed in a world police power (Schmitt, cited in Petito 2004, 6). For Schmitt, pluralistic antagonism between states in an international society is infinitely preferable to the technological nihilism of world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes: after all, the Kingdom of Satan is also a unity (Schmitt, cited in Ojakangas 2004, 80). In a spiritual world ruled by the law of pluralism, a piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty generalizations of a false totality. For it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary abstraction . . . It would be a false pluralism, which played

world-comprehending totalities off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders

(Schmitt 1999, 206). The effacement of the outside only serves to endow a necessarily par- ticularistic unity with a universality that elevates it above its numerous equals in the pluralistic ontology of the international, and consequently opens a path for global police domination by what, by logical necessity, remains merely one political force in the world. The

borderless world, tele- ologically presupposed in much contemporary political discourse, is, in a Schmittian analysis, a world of infinite self-certitude and arrogance, unbounded violence of the subjection of particular political entities to the pseudo-universal ideal and unlimited world police power over a world that remains ontologically pluralistic and, thus, will inevitably resist its subjection.

Difference is inevitablea borderless world is an impossible attempt to deny the foundations of politics themselves Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, in 8 [Sergei, De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 38-9]

What then becomes of boundaries in an anti-immanentist turn in polit- ical ontology? Should we simply reaffirm the ontological necessity of boundaries and their irreducible presence even in the immanentist designs for the unity of the world? Indeed, the argument

that boundaries are onto- logical preconditions rather than merely ontic phenomena points to the impossibility not merely of dispensing with boundaries in practice, but also of transcending them in thought. As I have argued, it is only by a prior reification of the boundary that disavows its spectral parergonal ontology, and endows it with empirical presence that the discourse of denigration of boundaries becomes possible in the first place. A crucial distinction
must be drawn, though, between the ontological function of boundaries and the empirical positivities of bounded entities. While the existence of some or other boundaries must be viewed as an ontological necessity, it does not follow from this that

particular orders, bounded in historically specific ways, are in any way necessary. There can be no natural boundaries, just as it is impossible to legitimize the location of a boundary with reference to the limits of ethnic or political identity that it bounds, if only because this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that they delimit, i.e., to assert that a boundary is not a ground. It is precisely this ontological stance that permits the ontic discernment of the diverse potentialities at the margin, analyzed in this volumethe reaf- firmation of the

parergonal status of the boundary necessarily focuses our attention on concrete practices of (re)constituting marginal entities as pos- itive effects of delimitation. In other words, anti-immanentist discourse must not merely displace the utopian pathos of overcoming boundaries in global, self-immanent unity, but also problematize and disturb the existence of such unities within the pluralistic international order. From this perspective, a critique of the state may well be derived from the critique of globalism rather than function as its opposite. Our

critique of immanentist tendencies in politi- cal thought, which is necessarily a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must therefore not be equated with a shallow conser- vatism of the defense of the status quo or a nostalgia for the Westphalian nationstate. Just as Schmitts (1976, 2003) argument about the impossibility of the negation of the political did not entail for him the impossibility of the demise of the nation-state, we must not equate the ontological status of the borderline with the historical immutability of the modern embodiment of the boundary in the nation-state border. New forms of delimiting difference may well be invented, just as new forms of antagonism are certain to appear. Thus, boundaries are neither natural givens nor superficial social constructs, but rather markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world, its difference from itself that precludes its closure into self-immanence.

Borders are problematic because the liberal universalism pre-supposes them to be. Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, in 8 [Sergei, De-Limitation: The Denigration of

Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 26- ] In contemporary political discourse, the transcendence of boundaries functions as a teleological and axiological presupposition, rather than an empirical observation. Irrespective of the empirical indications of the problematic status of boundaries, the denigration of boundariesthat is, the claim that they are inappropriatecannot be empirically inferred, but is already present as a constitutive presupposition of the discourse. We hardly ever encounter an empirical analysis of the problematic status of sovereign statehood, made from a normatively statist perspective. The empirical problematization of boundaries is only thinkable on the basis that they are always-already ontologically and axiologically problematic. The developments cited as empirical proof of this discourse are frequently nothing other than its own political consequences. Many innovations of contemporary neo-liberal governmentality arise in response to the theo- retical discourse on globalization and are likewise effects rather than causes of the global denigration of boundaries (cf. Dean 2002a, 2002b). The discourse of denigration of boundaries is thus a form of wishful thinking that is vindicated by the gradual fulfillment of its own wishes. Instead of revisiting familiar discussions of the epochal transformations of late or post- modernity, I will focus on the basic presuppositions of this discourse and account for the hostility of contemporary political discourse toward boundaries.