Whitebook, J. (2004). Hans Loewald: A radical conservative. Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 85:97-115.

(2004). International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 85:97-115

Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

Joel Whitebook
Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is a le to accomplish the di!!icult !eat o! remaining non"sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's !ragmented psychoanalytic world. #his author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many o! the rigid oppositions that o!ten ecome rei!ied in analytic controversies$ structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre"oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scienti!ic. #he article e%amines how &ros, understood in terms o! the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a ma'or role in Loewald's theory. #he author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions o! epistemology. #hese discussions tend to criticize the o 'ectivism o! modern science(and analysis in so !ar as it models itsel! on science(and stress countertrans!erence and the su 'ectivity o! the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. )ecause o! his concern with the autonomy and individuality o! the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising !rom an overemphasis on the su 'ectivity o! the analyst. #here seems to e a Loewald revival going on in American psychoanalysis *see Chodorow, 2001+.1 In a period that has grown suspicious o! the sectarianism o! the past, Loewald's attractiveness to analysts holding varied and even opposed theoretical positions is not di!!icult to understand. He was an eminently non" tendentious thinker, who pre"dated the rise o! pluralism y ,- years. .or e%ample, his e!!ort to do 'ustice to the truth content o! every position he took up is apparent in his remarka ly even"handed review o! the .reud/0ung letters (1977). )ut Loewald's non"dogmatic sensi ility(his 1prophetic ecumenism2, as .riedman *1991, p. 34+ put it(shouldn't e taken to mean that he su!!ered !rom theoretical timidity, o!ten the downside o! pluralism. His review o! Arlow and )renner (1966) and his criticisms o! Hartmann's theory o! neutralization *1988, pp. ,-"5+, !or e%ample, make it clear that he didn't shy away !rom taking strong positions. #hough ecumenical, he was no eclectic.

Loewald's work is characterized y a degree o! systematic rigor and a synthetic thrust generally a sent !rom contemporary psychoanalysis. Indeed, not only is the concept o! synthesis central to Loewald's theory, the activity o! synthesis is also mani!ested in his

I only received 6hodorow's (2003) article 1#he psychoanalytic vision o! Hans Loewald2

a!ter I had completed this paper and was there!ore not a le to take it into consideration. 6hodorow also seeks to demonstrate the originality and scope o! Loewald's thinking.

work. He methodically attempts to transcend the inary oppositions(the theoretical splitting(into which psychoanalytic controversies regularly get !rozen. .or e%ample, oth the relational analysts and the structural theorists try to claim him as their own. )ut Loewald's analysis should have done much to o viate the opposition etween the two positions *see .riedman, 1991, p. 347 .ogel, 1996, p. 884+. #he relational analysts right!ully maintain that Loewald was one o! the !irst .reudians to criticize the model o! the psychic apparatus as 1a closed system2, stress the role that 1interaction with 9the: environment2 plays in development and analysis *Loewald, 1960, pp. ,,4, ,,5+ and re'ect the lank"screen model o! analytic neutrality. At the same time the structural theorists correctly stress that he never stopped insisting that the goal o! development and treatment is 1su limation and true ego e%pansion2 *Loewald, 1977, p. ;5<+. In !act, he argued that this goal is achieved through the structuralizing internalization o! the o 'ect o! interaction$ 1#he development o! an ego !unction is dependent on interaction2 *1960, p. ,,8+. In other words, he elieved that interaction and structure !ormation are two sides o! the some process. I! there is a tilt in Loewald's position, it is towards autonomy and individuation, rather than relatedness and mutuality, as developmental goals. )ut even here we will see that he doesn't treat these norms uncritically. A num er o! commentators *Friedman 19917 Schafer, 19917 Teicholz, 19997 Fogel, 19967 reen!erg, 19967 "ear, 19987 #i$chell, 2000+ try to assess the e%tent o! Loewald's radicalism versus his conservatism. )ut again, his thinking de!ies an either/or opposition. His understanding o! the relation etween tradition and innovation is ased on his understanding o! the =edipus comple% *196%, pp. 3>"5--, 1979, pp. 48>"3>+. Along with seeing it as a stage o! psychose%ual development, he understands it in road anthropological terms concerning the individual's assumption o! his/her maturity and individuality through the con!lictual entry into a tradition. Loewald insists that human eings are originally 1thrown2 *1978!, p. 53+(the term is Heidegger's(into a world o! language, laws and customs not o! their own making. In so !ar as they 1strive !or their own individuality and maturity2, a 1parricidal2 con!rontation with their elders (at least 1on the plane o! psychic action2(is, there!ore, 1a developmental necessity2 *1978a, p. 43-+. #he processes can only e completed, however, i! they also come to identi!y with and internalize those same elders, !or those

internalizations create the structures that are necessary !or an autonomous psychic e%istence. Signi!icant innovation in any !ield does not only consist in the 1 reak with tradition2, that is, a parricidal challenge to one's !ore ears, as romantic modernists o!ten elieve. It also re?uires a deep internalization o! the tradition that !ormed the innovators. #his can een seen in the great iconoclastic innovators o! modernity(@icasso, Schoen erg and 0oyce. As Aoethe says in one o! .reud's !avorite ?uotes$ 1#ake what was your !ather's and make it your own2 *?uoted in .reud, 1913, p. ,->+. @sychoanalysis is itsel! an instituted tradition with its own particular modes o! initiation, socialization and transmission o! authority. *Indeed, we might say that it is its own tri e(or !ederation o! tri es. How primitive is itB #hat's a di!!erent ?uestion.+ And Loewald's own relation to the psychoanalytic tradition e%empli!ies his general theory o! tradition and innovation. .or Loewald(as opposed to many revisionists(a deep and prolonged engagement with the history o! psychoanalysis remains an essential !ormative e%perience. His immersion in 1the language o! psychoanalysis2(indeed, its Ursprache *see Citchell, 2000, p. 5,+(is his way o! identi!ying with and appropriating that tradition. )e!ore turning to psychoanalysis, Loewald studied philosophy with Cartin Heidegger, and he theorizes in a way that is more typical o! a philosopher than a psychoanalyst *see 1980, pp. viii"i%+. Heidegger elieved that the riches o! the philosophical tradition are sedimented in its voca ulary. He there!ore constructed his own iconoclastic position through an idiosyncratic e%egesis o! asic terms !rom Areek philosophy and Aerman Idealism *Citchell, 2000, pp. 5,"4+. Similarly, Loewald elieves that the asic terms o! psychoanalysis are 1essentially contested concepts2 ( allie, 19%6). #hat is, they have so much meaning condensed in them and are so centrally located in our conceptual schemes, that they constitute a virtually open"ended source !or creative argumentation and theorizing$ 1Cany .reudian concepts and terms are overdetermined and !ull o! connotations and implications that have not een spelled out y him or that are neglected2 *Loewald, 1978a, p. 53,+. 6ontrary to Scha!er *1976, 1991+, Loewald argues that psychoanalysis doesn't need a 1new language2. Instead, it needs 1a less inhi ited, less pedantic and narrow understanding and interpretation o! its current language2 *1978a, p. 534+. Loewald likes 1the old words2 *Citchell, 2000, p. 5,+, and develops his own position through the painstaking interpretation o! asic(and generally un!ashiona le(.reudian concepts. In addition to 1&ros2, e%amples include 1hyper" cathe%is2 and 1narcissistic li ido2. #his seemingly scholastic approach can o scure the iconoclastic dimension o! Loewald's thinking and create the impression that he is a dyed"in"the"wool traditionalist. )ut such a conclusion misses the point, !or it doesn't recognize that more o!ten than not he interprets those !undamental concepts in such a radical way that he trans!orms their meanings. #he .reud that emerges !rom Loewald's interpretations isn't 1the .reud o! the .reudian authorities o! 9his: day2(indeed, it isn't even 1.reud as .reud understood himsel!2 *Citchell,

2000, p. 4,+. Loewald's 1coherent de!ormations2 *6astoriadis, 198&, p. 54,+ o! .reud's asic terms in !act comprise the parricidal"iconoclastic dimension o! his work. #he center o! Loewald's pro'ect consists in the attempt to assess the meaning o! the pre"oedipal turn(and its concomitant, the widening scope o! psychoanalysis(!or classical theory *see also '( Fre)d, 19767 reen, 1986+. )y the 53<-s(and especially y the 53>-s(as a result o! the work o! Dlein, Einnicott, Spitz, Cahler and others, a heated controversy emerged concerning the relative weight that ought to e attri uted to pre"oedipal versus oedipal !actors in development and clinical practice. #o put it in a somewhat oversimpli!ied way, the revisionists emphasized the pre"oedipal and the classicists the oedipal. *#oday, the whole de ate has een rendered largely o solete y the notion o! the hierarchical structuring o! the psyche.+ Loewald argues that work with post" classical patients can reach a 1genetic depth and anti?uity2 that is, !or the most part, unusual with their classical counterparts. )ecause these patients are 1trans!i%ed2 y issues concerning 1the development o! su 'ect"o 'ect di!!erentiation !rom primary narcissism2, they can teach us something a out 1the origins o! human li!e and there y F its essence or core2 *1979, p. ;--+. #he e%ploration o! the more archaic layers o! the psyche, Loewald argues, uncovered 1a psychotic core2 where the psyche strives to undo separation and reinstitute nondi!!erentiation. 1#he more we understand a out primitive mentality2, he writes, 1the harder it ecomes to escape the idea that its implicit sense o! and ?uest !or irrational nondi!!erentiation o! su 'ect and o 'ect contains a truth o! its own2 *1979, p. ;-47 see also Areen, 1986, p. 4>+. *Loewald's appreciation o! this ?uest most likely contri utes to his deep appreciation o! the religious impulse in psychic li!e, something which is a sent in .reud and most contemporary analysts.+ Against the reigning psychoanalytic orthodo%y o! his day, Loewald consistently challenges its touchstone, namely that the =edipus comple% is the singular 1nuclear comple%2 o! all psychopathology *see 1973, 198&+. A!ter the pu lication o! 1#he waning o! the =edipus comple%2, Loewald was o!ten seen as an 1anti"oedipal2 thinker. )ut a close reading o! that te%t, as well as others that !ollowed *see e.g. 198%+, reveals that Loewald once again re!uses to accept a inary opposition. Instead, he tries to integrate the pre"oedipal and the oedipal into a hierarchical developmental structure, which gives 1new luster to the =edipus comple% in the present psychoanalytic climate2 *1979, p. 433+. #hough the drive toward separation and individuation may have its origins in in orn Anlagen and re?uires a !acilitating environment to properly un!old, it must also pass through the cruci le o! the =edipus comple%(a 1watershed o! individuation2 *Loewald, 198%, p. ;48+(in order to achieve ma%imum realization. =nly something with the intensity o! intrapsychic murder has the psychic he!t, as it were, to e!!ect the separation o! children !rom their internal incestuous o 'ects. Loewald doesn't so!ten the tragic severity o! the classical =edipus comple%(

something he is accused o!(in !avor o! a more enign vision o! 1good enough mothering2. Gor does he elieve the guilt associated with the incestuous and murderous wishes represents 1a trou lesome a!!ect that we might hope to eliminate in some !ashion2. Like .reud, he sees it as 1one o! the driving !orces in the organization o! the sel!2 *1979, p. 53;+. Instead o! pursuing various ways o! evading it(including sel!"punishment, which, !or Loewald, is a !orm o! acting out (individuals must have the capacity to tolerate the pain!ul e%perience o! this guilt in order to 1avow2, that is, acknowledge and take responsi ility !or their unconscious"instinctual lives. Coreover, the working through o! this guilt allows !or the completion o! the individuation process in so !ar as it promotes the internalization and transmutation o! the 1ghosts2 o! those 1murdered2 into 1ancestors2 *1979, pp. ,;8"3+. Eith his a!!irmative attitude toward the !unction o! guilt, as well as his assumption that the internalization o! parental authority and the !ormation o! the superego is the 1normal2 *Aray, 199&, p. 5,>+ and most desira le way o! managing intrapsychic con!lict, Loewald 'oins a long line o! psychoanalytic conservatives stretching ack to .reud himsel!. .or .reud, religious sentiment itsel!, which is the asis !or culture and morality, develops out o! the remorse that results !rom the murder o! the primal !ather. Indeed, guilt provides the 1sacred cement2 *1913, p. 54<+ that holds society together. Geither .reud nor Loewald consider the more radical possi ility that superego morality, with its sense o! guilt, represents a rather primitive instinctualized !orm o! 1premorality2 *Hicoeur, 1970, p. ;;3+ that can, in !act, e surpassed. #hat is, they never entertain a proposition to the e!!ect that 1where superego was, there shall ego e2. 2

Aray's (199&) ?uestioning o! .reud's uncritical acceptance o! the superego as the highest

!orm o! moral agency and his pursuit o! more sel!"conscious means o! managing instinctual li!e represents a lauda le attempt to e%pand the conception o! autonomy in psychoanalysis.

The pre-oedipal and the postmodern3

#hrough a comple% !eed ack mechanism, psychoanalysis is simultaneously oth a product o! its times and a promoter o! 1!ar"reaching changes in the sensi ility o! our age2. It 1does not only change our knowledge o! the human mind, it changes the human mind y that new knowledge2 *Loewald, 1979, p. ;-5+. At the turn o! the century, although it arose out o! the conditions o! Iictorian society, 1the new psychology o! psychoanalysis2 in turn did much to undermine and !undamentally trans!orm the prevailing attitudes toward the !amily, se%uality and morality. Ehile 1classical2 psychoanalysis !ocused on the supposedly well" structured neurotic pathologies that were produced y a relatively intact ourgeois household and its !orm o! socializing its young *see *or+heimer,

197%+, it did not directly address the genesis and structure o! the sel! *and the nature o! rationality+(at least in principle *see Einnicott, 19%&, p. ,8;+. Indeed, a su!!iciently well"structured sel!, which makes intrapsychic con!lict possi le, was generally taken as the sine qua non o! neurotic pathology. .urthermore, .reud rather un?uestioningly took autonomy(the central ethical norm o! the &nlightenment(as his own. His dictum 1where id was there shall ego e2 * 1933, p. 8-+ can e seen as a psychological concretization o! the &nlightenment's moral program *see 6astoriadis, 198&, pp. 4,";7 6avell, 1987, p. 553+. A!ter the Second Eorld Ear, psychoanalysis re!lected new interrelated developments in !amily li!e, childrearing and character !ormation, which resulted in the loosening o! social and psychic structures. Indeed, these changes were so thoroughgoing, that Loewald asked whether it was still possi le to speak o! 1an average accepta le environment2 *197%, p. 5>;+. #he encounter with the post" classical patients and e%ploration o! the more archaic strata o! the psyche called into ?uestion the very 1o 'ectivity o! the o 'ect and the su 'ectivity o! the su 'ect2 *p. 433+. 1= 'ectivity, rationality, and reality themselves are not what we thought them to e2 *Loewald, 1979, p. ;-,+. 1Eittingly or unwittingly2, Loewald notes, 1these deeper unconscious currents2 have re"entered the 1modern sensi ility2 and are in!luencing 1the organization o! mind, e%perience, and action F Codern li!e, partly moved y and partly moving psychoanalysis, is redrawing the outlines o! normality, o! what is archaic in mental li!e and what is advanced, mature mentality2 *pp. ;-5, ;-4+. At this point, the themes o! post".reudian pre"oedipal psychoanalysis intersect with the concerns o! postmodern discourse. Loewald !ormulates the dilemmas con!ronting psychoanalysis directly. @sychoanalysis, he writes, 1seems to stand and !all with the proposition that the emergence o! a relatively autonomous individual is the culmination o! human development2 *1979, pp. ;-5",+.& At the same time, however, he also maintains that the striving 1!or unity, sym iosis, !usion, merging, or identi!ication2 has a 1!orce and validity2 that cannot e denied. #he pro lem is that the acceptance o! the validity o! these strivings 1!its adly2 with our commitment to autonomy as a value *1979, pp. ;-5",7 see

#eicholz claims that Loewald(along with Dohut(represents a 1way station2 * 1999, p. 58+

on the road to a !ully realized postmodernism. It is implausi le to maintain that his !ailure to make the postmodern move avant la lettre simply resulted !rom the !act that he arrived on the scene too early. His philosophical training would have made him !ully aware o! the Heideggerian and Gietzschean themes that later congealed to !orm the postmodern paradigm. Loewald's resistance to this was surely a matter o! theoretical choice not ad timing.
;

In so !ar as he e%plicitly re'ects individuation and autonomy as norms !or psychoanalysis,

Dohut represents a postmodernist element in psychoanalysis. See his criticism o! Cahler *1980, pp. ;J5"4+.

also Lear, 1990, pp. ,,"8+. Loewald's solution to the dilemma is to pursue an e%panded conception o! autonomy. Autonomy, in the Dantian and .reudian conception, is achieved through repression( through the e%clusion o! unconscious"instinctual material !rom the domain o! the rational ego. Indeed, as we will see, Loewald elieved that the ego" psychologists o! his day had unintentionally 1taken over much o! the o sessive neurotic's e%perience and conception o! reality2 *19%1, p. 4-+ and elevated a rigidly and narrowly integrated conception o! the sel! into a normative position. Loewald proposes an alternative conception, in which autonomy is achieved through the integration o! that material into the ego, there y contri uting to the e%pansion o! a more di!!erentiated whole.

Loewald's revision of classical theory

As we have seen, 1&ros2 is one o! the old words that Loewald likes the most *see Scha!er, 1991, p. 8<7 Lear, 1998, pp. 5,4";+. Indeed, it is central to his entire theory. #o correct .reud's theoretical e%cesses, Loewald tries to ring the concept o! &ros down !rom its speculative heights and give it concrete empirical and clinical content. He does this primarily y interpreting it in terms o! the synthetic or integrative process within the psyche. At the eginning o! .reud's psychoanalytic career, Loewald maintains, he recognized the clinical importance o! integration. In his early treatment o! hysterics, .reud argued that ideas ecame pathological to the e%tent they were split o!! !rom 1the great comple% o! associations2 *1893, p. 55+. )ut .reud didn't completely incorporate these insights into his theoretical !ormulations. He didn't see the !unction o! the psychic apparatus as integrating unconscious"instinctual material into larger and more di!!erentiated psychic structures(a process that would create increased tension in the psyche. =n the contrary, he saw its 'o as discharging, 1getting rid o!2 *Loewald, 1971, p. 553+ stimuli as e!!iciently as possi le. *#here is only one place where the early .reud recognized a synthetic tendency in the psyche$ in his instinct theory, he argued that the telos o! psychose%ual development is the uni!ication o! the component instincts under genital supremacy.+ It wasn't until years later, when he postulated the structural theory, that .reud !ully appreciated the 1irresisti le advance towards unity in mental li!e2*1921, p. 5-J+. .reud tended to associate the synthetic !unction with ego !unctioning. Loewald, in line with his general pro'ect, locates its origins in the earliest stages o! pre"oedipal development. And this reconceptualization o! the synthetic !unction is closely connected with Loewald's re'ection o! .reud's conception o! the earliest stage o! development(1the primal psychical situation2 *see .reud, 191%, p. 54;+ (where he likened the condition o! the new orn to that o! a chick in its egg *1911, p. ,,- n. ;+. Unlike the chick, Loewald argues, the neonate's e%istence doesn't consist in a sel!"enclosed and relatively sel!"su!!icient homeostatic system,

regulated y the pleasure principle, which is set o!! !rom and surrounded y an alien and intrinsically hostile reality. Hather, it is made up o! an 1undi!!erentiated psychic !ield2(similar to Cahler's 1dual unity2 *Cahler et al., 197%, p. JJ7 see also Loewald, 198&, 198%+(in which inside and outside, sel! and o 'ect, ego and drives, pleasure principle and reality principle, primary and secondary processes and so on have yet to e distinguished. #he e%perience o! this 1primordial density2 *1978a, p. 58<+, out o! which the contents and structures o! psychic li!e are generated, continues to e%ert its pull over all later stages o! development. I!, as Loewald elieves, di!!erentiation and integration are the general task o! every developmental phase, this is especially true o! this earliest stage(where di!!erentiation must e achieved !or the !irst time. Indeed, we might say that the task o! this period is the introduction o! di!!erence as such. @ro'ection and intro'ection do not act as de!enses ut serve the all"important !unction o! creating oundaries. 1@rimary2 e%ternalizations and internalizations are the constitutive activities through which oundaries are created, thus ringing the realms o! e%ternality and internality into eing *see 1962, p. ,<<+. =nce a nascent distinction etween inside and outside has een demarcated and a 1pre"sel!2 and a 1pre"o 'ect2 have een esta lished, the 1interaction2 o! the in!ant and its mother ecomes the general medium !or !urther development. Indeed, no sooner has the in!ant di!!erentiated a 1pre"sel!2 and 1pre"o 'ect2 !rom the psychical !ield that contained oth o! them than a new task presents itsel!$ to integrate the newly di!!erentiated o 'ect. .rom here on, the task o! the pre"su 'ect (and, later, the ego proper(will e constantly to maintain and re"esta lish something o! that original unity 1on more and more comple% levels o! di!!erentiation and o 'ectivation o! reality2 *19%1, p. 55+. #he memory traces o! that original unity in the undi!!erentiated matri% e%ercise a 1magnetic attraction2 *6astoriadis, 1987, p. 4-,+ toward reintegration. Somewhat parado%ically, oth the archaic psyche's demand !or 1irrational nondi!!erentiaiton2 and the synthetic !unction o! the ego(the seat o! rationality(have their source in the undi!!erentiated matri%. In so !ar as .reud considered the mother's early interaction with the child, he approached it almost e%clusively in terms o! what Loewald calls 1!ul!illment2. .or .reud, her 'o is more or less completed when her in!ants are relieved o! their tensions and a state o! internal e?uili rium is restored. Ehen the mother's ministrations !ail, hallucinatory wish !ul!illment reaks down and the child is somehow(this is the ig mystery(led to register the independence o! the o 'ect. @ain, in short, is the agent o! di!!erentiation and the constitution o! the o 'ect. Loewald, !ollowing Einnicott's lead, adds a second aspect to the mother's caregiving activities, what he calls 1recognition.2 #hrough the empathic awareness and understanding o! her child's needs, the mother not only 1!ul!ills2 those needs, in the sense discussed y .reud, ut also gathers the in!ant's 1as yet undi!!erentiated urges2 together and gives them shape and organization. #hus the

mother's mirroring activity does not simply re!lect ack to the in!ant what was already in the child's e%perience. It adds something new. As a result, when in!ants internalize the e%periential material that has een partially integrated and structured y the mother, they also take in a new !ormal element, the schemes o! integration and structuralization that in!orm it. =nce set up in the mind, y demanding !urther organization and integration o! the material that will enter the psyche, these schema ecome a ma'or source o! the synthetic !unction. Loewald's account o! early development leads to a su stantial reinterpretation o! two other !undamental .reudian concepts$ reality and the psychic apparatus. Heality is, !or the most part, seen as a hostile 1!orce2 thrust on the psyche !rom the 1outside2 *19%1, p. 8+. #he !ather is the main 1representative o! the demands o! reality2, who severs the li idinous tie with the mother, thus e'ecting the child into the hostile world o! triadic reality. And the su mission to the castration threat is understood as the 1decisive step in the esta lishment o! the ego as ased on the reality principle2 *p. >+. Kespite the dominant tendency in .reud's thinking to view the relation etween psyche and environment as 1 asically antagonistic2, Loewald !inds elements o! an uno!!icial 1maternal2 position on the relation o! the psyche to reality in .reud and tries to construct an alternative account out o! it. 6lassical theory, he o serves, egins with the 1coe%istence o! two separate entities2, su 'ect and o 'ect, and then tries to e%plain how they 1come into contact with each other2. #he uno!!icial theory, in contrast, egins with 1a unitary whole2 and seeks to account !or how psyche and world ecome di!!erentiated !rom it. #o put it more concretely, 1mother and a y do not get together and develop a relationship, ut the a y is orn, ecomes detached !rom the mother, and thus a relatedness etween two parts that originally were one ecomes possi le2 * 19%1, p. 55+. .rom the maternal perspective, then, reality is not initially and intrinsically hostile to the ego. =n the contrary, it is 1intimately connected with and originally not even distinguished !rom it2 *p. 8+. #he e%istence o! the 1oceanic !eeling2 *see .reud, 1930, ch. 5+(which caused .reud so much consternation(testi!ies to the e%istence o! this original state and perhaps points to the possi ility o! another post"phallocentric and post"scientistic way o! relating to reality. Loewald argues that the two relations to reality, the paternal and the maternal, which have their own advantages and dangers, are, in !act, per!ect complements. I! the paternal position is associated with hostility, castration and e%cessive distance !rom the o 'ect, it also promotes individuation and autonomy and protects the individual !rom the danger o! 1maternal engul!ment2 *19%1, p. 5;+. And 'ust as the maternal position involves reconciliation, relatedness and union, it also contains the threat o! de"di!!erentiation and ego loss(which is simultaneously loss o! the o 'ect. Instead o! 1swinging !rom a paternal concept o! reality to a maternal one2 *p. 5,+(replacing the 1.ather o! the horde with the Cother Aoddess2 *Areen, 1980, p. ,J4+(or idealizing either stance at the e%pense o! the other, the ego must, Loewald argues, continually pursue 1its

course o! integrating reality2 *19%1, p. 5>+(the paternal and maternal(into 1new synthetic structures2 *1988, p. 54+. 6orresponding to these two conceptions o! reality, Loewald identi!ies two concepts o! the psychic apparatus and de!ense in .reud's thinking. According to the o!!icial version, ased on the re!le% arc, the sole !unction o! the psychic apparatus is the reduction o! tension. #his governed .reud's theorizing !rom the 1@ro'ect !or a scienti!ic psychology2 (189%,19%0) until his reluctant acknowledgment o! 1pleasura le tensions and the unpleasura le rela%ation o! tensions2 *see 192&, p. 5<-+ in 1#he economic pro lem o! masochism2. A!ter that, .reud could no longer maintain the constancy hypothesis(with its correlate the pleasure principle(as the monolithic law governing psychic li!e. Eith the recognition o! pleasura le tensions, .reud was also reluctantly !orced to introduce an ana olic or integrative !orce in psychic li!e. I am re!erring, o! course, to &ros, a second instinct whose aim 1is to esta lish ever"greater unities and to preserve them thus2 *19&0, p. 5;37 see also "ear, 1998+. #his instinct does its 'o o! creating larger unities through the inding o! energy, which is to say, the uilding up o! tension. It is generally assumed that the death instinct was the radically original element that .reud introduced in Beyond the pleasure principle, which constituted a decisive reak in his thinking. Loewald is one o! the !ew commentators to recognize that the ground reaking addition to the theory was not #hanatos ut &ros$ I cannot emphasize enough that it was the introduction of the idea of the life instinct that was a true and unsettling innovation in psychoanalytic theoryan innovation that Freud could no longer circumvent but with which he felt much less at home than he did with the death instinct (1988, p. 3 ! see also "hiteboo#, 1995, pp. $%&'(! )ear, 1998, pp. *$3'*+,. #hanatos, as an entropic !orce, had een present in nuce in .reud's thinking !rom the start. It represents the culmination o! a series o! trans!ormations o! the idea o! tension reduction that egins with the constancy hypothesis, moves through the pleasure principle and the Girvana principle and ends with the death instinct. A!ter all, stasis(that is, death(represents the ultimate aim o! tension reduction. 0ust as he did with the 1uno!!icial2 conception o! reality, Loewald also locates an alternative to the tension"reduction model o! psychic apparatus in the !irst chapter o! Civilization and its discontents(one o! .reud's richest te%ts, which Loewald mines !or all it's worth. I! the re!le% arc was meant to e%plain how things 1are gotten rid o!2 *1980, p. 553+, that is, discharged !rom the psyche, the 1psycho"archaeological2 *Schorske, 1998, pp. 535",58+ approach, sym olized y the city o! Home, is meant to account !or e%actly the opposite, how things are preserved 1in the realm o! the mind2 *.reud, 1930, p. <3+. #he !eature o! the 1&ternal 6ity2 that makes this preservation possi le is its strati!ication, which allows !or the simultaneous coe%istence o! material !rom di!!erent historical

epochs. Eith the psyche, the possi ility o! simultaneity is even more complete, !or it is possi le !or two mental o 'ects to occupy the same psychic place at the same time. Eith the psycho"archaeological model, the main 'o o! the ego is not only to regulate tension, ut to integrate and reintegrate all o! the heterogeneous and o!ten con!licting strata into a di!!erentiated whole, a process that re?uires the constant introduction o! 1!resh tensions2 *.reud, 1923, p. ;<+. According to the tension"reduction model, the ego seeks to deal with 1inner or outer demands or in!luences2 *Loewald, 1978a, p. 5><+ made on it through e%clusion. It ecomes strong to the e%tent that it e%cludes 1instinctual"unconscious li!e2 !rom its oundaries. )ut the presumed strength o! the 1strong2 ego, Loewald suggests, is actually a !orm o! weakness *1960, p. ,;5+7 it is achieved y narrowing the ego's domain, impoverishing its content and rigidi!ying its relation to inner and outer reality. Instead o! e%empli!ying strength, the e%clusionary ego resem les a !amiliar pathological mode o! ego !ormation, namely that o! the o sessional. .or Loewald, ideal development consists in the ego's 1assimilation or inclusion2 into its own organization o! the material that impinges on it !rom inner and outer reality. #he ego is enriched materially, owing to its incorporation o! that content, and its range is enlarged in so !ar as it ac?uires the possi ility o! 1!ree intercourse2 *.reud, 1926, p. 38+ with the domain o! unconscious"instinctual li!e, and the a ility to in!luence and e in!luenced y it at the same time. Unlike in the tension" reduction model, it no longer has to vigilantly ward o!! what it had e%perienced as its dangerous other7 the ego's !le%i ility, suppleness and spontaneity are increased. .inally, the ego ecomes the ene!iciary o! the energy that is now attached to it. #his means that, rather than 1getting closer to a state o! rest2, with 1higher ego organization F there is more li!e2 *Loewald, 1972, p. >;+.

Epistemology and technique

#hree decades ago 0Lrgen Ha ermas complained a out the lack o! methodological 1sel!"re!lection2 in psychoanalysis *1971, ch. 55+. #oday things have come !ull circle *at least in the United States+, and epistemological ?uestions (especially the criti?ue o! positivism, scientism and o 'ectivism(have moved to the center o! many psychoanalytic controversies. Indeed, the !ield may e su!!ering !rom a sur!eit o! epistemology(motivated at times as much y political as y theoretical concerns. .or e%ample, Lewis Aron evinces no discom!ort in divulging his intention o! e%ploiting the postmodern criti?ue o! 1!oundationalism2 !or the purpose o! uilding a psychoanalytic 1movement2. )ecause there are no ultimate criteria !or choosing etween conceptual schemes, he argues, we need not concern ourselves with the ?uestion o! which scheme 1is true or valid2. A!ter the de unking o! !oundationalism, we are !ree to choose etween theoretical models on the asis o! their 1practical2, which is to say, political 1conse?uences2 *1996, p. ;5+.

&agle et al. have provided an e%cellent assessment o! these recent developments in psychoanalysis. In no uncertain terms, they give credit to the 1new view theorists2(!or e%ample, Citchell, Henik and Konnell Stern(!or their ma'or contri ution to the !ield. #he 1new theorists2 criticisms o! the authoritarianism and rigidity o! classical psychoanalysis, re'ection o! the lank screen model o! neutrality and stress on interaction, they argue, have done much to open the discipline and provoke !undamental de ates. &agle et al. maintain, however, that the new theorists should stop at this point, that is, with their important psychoanalytic criti?ue. )ut they o!ten !eel compelled to take a !urther step and try to de!end their clinical claims with !ashiona le ut untena le philosophical arguments. Got only is this second step unnecessary, it also o!ten creates 1at least as many di!!iculties2 as it is meant to resolve, and 1undermines assumptions essential to psychoanalysis2 *2001, p. &61+. Ironically, the 1new theorists2 !ailure systematically to distinguish etween clinical and philosophical issues itsel! amounts to a piece o! philosophical naMvetN. #he widespread practice o! writing .reud o!! as a positivist is too simplistic. Aranted, he signed the 1@ositivist Cani!esto2 and maintained that psychoanalysis elongs to the scienti!ic Weltanschauung. And although his own approach deviated !rom the ?uantitative and e%perimental standards o! his day, he clearly elieved that modern natural science represented the culmination o! humanity's theoretical development *see Loewald, 1960, p. ,,8+. #he pro lem is, however, that it isn't e%actly easy to determine what he meant y 1science2. I would contend that !or .reud Wissenschaft(whatever its precise content(was the marker !or 1the sole discipline o! knowledge2 and 1the single rule o! intellectual honesty2 *Hicoeur, 1970, p. >4+. .or .reud, it stood !or the methodical struggle against !alsehood, that is, the human tendency toward sel!"deception and illusion. As a Hellenizing 0ew, he traced the history o! science thus conceived to Akhenaten's and Coses's attack on idolatry and the Areeks' criti?ue o! mythos y logos. #here is some similarity etween this view o! science and recent attempts y philosophers to re ut the postmodern criti?ue o! scienti!ic o 'ectivity. .or e%ample, )ernard Eilliams argues that the commitment to truth!ulness, accuracy and the methodical attempt 1to get things right2 distinguishes science !rom other !orms o! discourse and practice. And, like .reud, he elieves that this pursuit re?uires the constant struggle against the misleading temptations created y 1!antasy and wish2 *2002, p. ;J+. .ollowing .euer ach, .reud maintained that illusions are the result o! the pro'ection o! human ideas(primarily wishes(onto the e%ternal world *see *ar-e., 199%, ch. 5+. He was convinced that modern natural science had systematically eliminated anthropocentric pro'ection !rom its constitution and operated in strict accordance with the reality principle. .urthermore, ecause it had puri!ied itsel! o! anthropocentric pro'ections, he argued that science not only provides the methodology !or the e%ploration o! the natural world, ut could also serve as a weapon in the struggle against 1idolatry2, that is, illusion.

Ehat .reud !ailed ade?uately to acknowledge, however, is that there is a sense in which modern science is deeply anthropocentric and there!ore su 'ectivist. Indeed, such eminent thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger and Adorno have argued that, rather than creating the correct method !or o 'ectively apprehending 1the nature o! nature2, modern mathematical science 1constitutes2( or 1en!rames2 *Heidegger, 1977, pp. 53",5+(the natural world !rom a particular perspective, namely, the su 'ective standpoint o! the human mind conceived in a particular way. )eginning with Kescartes, the universal structures o! the knowing mind(as opposed to the nature o! the o 'ect to e known( ecame the point o! departure !or modern philosophical investigation. It is in this sense that modern science can e seen as su 'ectivist(or pro'ective. #he investigation o! the invariant structures o! the knowing mind, moreover, was supposed to produce a universal scienti!ic method, a mathesis universalis *see /a00alli, 2001+, that could e legitimately applied to all realms o! nature(inanimate, living and human alike. #he structures o! the mind, so it was claimed, which permit the attainment o! valid knowledge, are those having to do with ?uantity(time, space and num er. And correlatively, the !ounders o! modern philosophy and science sought to demonstrate that o 'ective nature is itsel! a mathematical mani!old( res extensa, as Kescartes called it *see Heidegger, 1977, p. 55J!!.+. And it !ollows that only those phenomena that are capa le o! ?uanti!ication can 1enter at all into2 *p. 553+ the structure o! o 'ective, that is to say, mathematical science, and e treated y its methods. .rom the standpoint o! o 'ective science, everything that can't e ?uanti!ied(!or e%ample, love, meaning or dreams(is written o!! as 1dross2 *Adorno, 1973, p. ;<+. #hose who criticize modern science !or its o 'ectivism don't realize that ultimately o 'ectivism and su 'ectivism coincide *see Dant, 196&, p. ,-7 Heidegger, 1977, p. 5,3+. Ehat can count as o 'ective knowledge, in its most general sense, is su 'ectively prede!ined y the structure o! the knowing su 'ect. #here are, in !act, two di!!erent meanings o! 1o 'ective2 that have to e distinguished. As the term itsel! suggests, the !irst 1primordial meaning2 *Lear, 2003, p. ;,+ has to do with apprehending the o 'ect in its own right, independently o! the su 'ective structures o! our mind. It there!ore re?uires a certain respect !or the sel!"standing o 'ect. #his is the way premodern philosophers, who were oriented more toward ontology than epistemology, tended to understand the term. #he second meaning o! the term is generally !avored y epistemologically oriented modern philosophers and pertains to the idea o! validity. I! an idea or theory is correctly !ormulated, y a knowing su 'ect or intersu 'ective group o! investigators, then it is, y de!inition, o 'ective in the sense o! eing valid. #his position, however, is con!ronted with a daunting pro lem, namely, how to gain su!!icient contact with the o 'ect so our thinking does not dissolve into an unaccepta le !orm o! su 'ective idealism. A!ter the re!lective turn in modern philosophy, we cannot simply return to the !irst meaning o! 1o 'ective2. It is necessary, however, to moderate the

epistemological o sessions o! modern philosophy and pay due attention to the demand that the primordial meaning o! o 'ectivity makes on our thinking. .or analysts, this is especially important when it comes to issues o! techni?ue. Eith his philosophical sophistication, there is no dou t that Loewald was thoroughly !amiliar with the pro lem o! o 'ectivism. )ut an important clinical(as opposed to epistemological(consideration leads him to take his criti?ue o! scientism in the opposite direction !rom the new psychoanalytic epistemologists who emphasize the su 'ectivity o! the analyst. His entre into the pro lem is an o servation o! .reud's$ even though 1paranoiacs2 pro'ect their own 1endopsychic2 material 1outwards2 on to the o 'ect, they do not 1pro'ect it into the lue2. Hather, 1they let themselves e guided y their knowledge o! the unconscious, and displace onto the unconscious minds o! others the attention which they have withdrawn !rom their own2 *.reud, 1922, p. ,,<+. #hat is, even in the e%treme case o! paranoia(where the pro'ection o! su 'ective material on the o 'ect is at its ma%imum(apprehension o! the nature o! the o 'ect still plays a crucial role. @ro'ection doesn't only consist in imposition o! our internal representations on the o 'ect, ut is also ased on an 1o scure knowledge2 *Loewald, 1987, p. J4+ o! it. It is striking that Ho!!man(a ma'or advocate o! constructivism(provides an illuminating countere%ample to radical su 'ectivism. As we know, the Horschach test presents su 'ects with highly unstructured ink" lots and asks them to construct a percept out o! the material. In an important statement, Ho!!man o serves that 1'ust as there are in!inite possi le percepts that con!orm to the !eatures2 o! the ink" lot, 1so too are there in!inite percepts that don't2. Indeed, responses to the Horschach are even scored in ?uasi"o 'ective terms o! 1good and poor !orm responses2 *1998, p. ,;+. #hus, even in the case o! the !amous ink" lots (which have come to represent the ?uintessence o! su 'ective pro'ection in everyday speech(a notion o! o 'ectivity, o! the right !it, enters in. Some percepts !it the pattern o! the ink" lot etter than others. Similarly, popularized versions o! Duhn's or .oucault's theories notwithstanding, not every paradigm can e imposed on the world at will. .or nature re'ects some o! the grids we seek to place on it *see 6astoriadis, 198&, p. 5<3!!.+, and there y provides o 'ective constraints on our powers o! construction. Although the correspondence theory o! truth( where the representation is supposed to mirror the o 'ect e%actly(may have een discredited, some descriptions o! the o 'ect remain more 1apposite2 *Iassalli, 2001, p. 11+ than others. Like most contemporary analysts, Loewald (1986) elieved that the re'ection o! the lank screen model o! neutrality and the acknowledgment o! the u i?uity o! countertrans!erence represented inestima le advances in psychoanalysis. His discussion o! the therapeutic action o! psychoanalysis (1960) suggests, however, that a heightened emphasis on the su 'ectivity o! the analyst may e e%actly the wrong response to these developments. #o speak o! the 1irreduci le2 (1eni+, 1998) su 'ectivity o! the analyst doesn't name a solution7 it only points to a pro lem. It is, in other words, a terminus ad quern not a terminus a quo. #hough

catchy, the term 1irreduci le2 is, in !act, misleading. Although the analyst's su 'ectivity cannot ultimately e eliminated, it can e reduced, that is, 1contained, stayed and channeled2, that is, 1su limated2 *Loewald, 1986, p. 281+( and this is the analyst's constant task. #he pro lem is how to handle it in the patient's est interest. .rom Loewald's perspective, what is called !or is not the cele ration o! su 'ectivity ut the reconceptualization o! o 'ectivity. As he puts it, 1the 'usti!ied and necessary re?uirement o! o 'ectivity and neutrality2 must e disentangled 1!rom a model o! neutrality2 *Loewald, 1960, p. ,,>+ drawn !rom the natural sciences. Cost patients have een !orced, in one way or another, to su ordinate their developmental potentialities to the 1su 'ectivity2(most especially, the pathology (o! their parents. #he ever"present danger is that this compliance will e repeated in the analysis, that(su tly or not so su tly(patients will e coerced into su mitting to the analyst's *o!ten unconscious+ agenda. Loewald argues, however, that 1through all the trans!erence distortions2, the patient can reveal 1rudiments at least o! the core o! himsel!2 *1960, p. ,,3+. #his core is 1mainly lost2 on analysands due to the continual repetition o! their pathological e%periences o! sel!"and o 'ect relations. #he good"enough analyst, however, must recognize that core and hold it 1in sa!e keeping2 *p. ,,<+ until the patient can appropriate it. Loewald argues that without a su!!icient apprehension o! that core(2rudimentary and vague as it may e2(the analyst cannot avoid the danger o! 1molding the patient in 9his/her: F own concept o! what the patient should ecome2. In a controversial statement, which may e his central thesis, he argues that the sa!eguarding o! the core 1re?uires an o 'ectivity and neutrality the essence o! which is love and respect !or the individual and !or individual development2 *p. ,,3+. #he re!erence to the analyst's love o! the patient has raised more than a !ew eye rows. It is o viously anathema to anyone who su scri es to the idea o! detached scienti!ic o servation, !or it appears to e a wholesale inter'ection not 'ust o! analysts' su 'ectivity, ut their passions, into the analytic process. Core trou ling still, it raises the specter o! oundary violations. .urthermore, Loewald's claim that the patient's core can provide a piece o! 1undistorted reality2 *p. ,,J+, which analysts can use as a sta le signpost through all the trans!erence and countertrans!erence distortions, smacks o! an o 'ectivism that runs counter to his own o servations a out trans!erence and the limits o! o 'ectivity. He has there!ore right!ully een criticized !or it *see Ho!!man, 1998, p. 3+. Ee might egin to unravel these pro lems y considering a much"maligned argument !rom Totem and taboo, where .reud drew a connection etween o 'ectivity and o 'ect love. He argued that the species attained its maturity when, having overcome magical thinking and the omnipotence o! thoughts, it arrived at the scienti!ic stage o! development where the world can e grasped in o 'ective terms. Similarly, individuals attain their maturity(which is the 1e%act counterpart2 o! scienti!ic maturity(when they su!!iciently relin?uish their in!antile narcissism

and achieve the capacity to love the other in his/her own right, rather than as a narcissistic e%tension o! themselves *1913, pp. 88"3-+. And many commentators (including Loewald *1960, p. ,,8+(have legitimately criticized this scheme !or its &urocentric conception o! historical progress and sheer naivete. Gevertheless, I elieve there is a valid intuition ehind .reud's thinking here that ought to e pursued. Ee know how di!!icult and pain!ul it is !or young children to accept the independence o! the o 'ect and how, as a result, they deploy a multitude o! 1manic de!enses2 to deny it. Ehether it is called the depressive position or the resolution o! the rapprochement crisis, an essential developmental milestone is achieved when children egin to acknowledge the !act that the mother e%ists outside the su 'ective sphere o! their omnipotent control. .reud tells us he 1suspects2 that 1this narcissistic organization is never wholly a andoned2 and that 1a human eing remains to some e%tent narcissistic even a!ter he has !ound e%ternal o 'ects !or his li ido2 *1913, p. 83+. #his is an understatement i! ever there was one. Heducing our omnipotent denial and accepting the independence o! the o 'ect ( especially with our spouses, lovers, children and !riends(is a li!e"time task that is always relative and incomplete. Indeed, I would maintain that this task represents an essential element o! the analytic pro'ect, oth inside and outside the consulting room. #he !act that we encourage our patients to struggle against their omnipotent denial o! the o 'ect's independence raises a ?uestion !or those o! us who sit on the other side o! the couch. Analysts have re'ected the old notion o! neutrality and acknowledged the u i?uity o! countertrans!erence. )ut we haven't taken the ne%t step. #hat is, we haven't systematically placed the same arduous demand that we place on our patients on ourselves. Instead o! cele rating the su 'ectivity o! the analyst, there should e a new !ocus on com ating our own 1manic2 resistances that inter!ere with our acceptance o! the independence(that is, 1the o 'ectivity2(o! the patient. 6onventional wisdom assumes that passion and scienti!ic o 'ectivity are opposed, that scientists must suppress their passion ecause it 1can only distur or corrupt the real work o! knowledge2 *6astoriadis, 1992, p. ><+. Loewald claimed 'ust the opposite. Like @lato in The symposium, he maintained that 1the love o! truth is no less passion ecause it desires truth rather than some less elevated end2. *.or a discussion o! how passion(&ros( ecomes attached to this peculiar 1o 'ect/nono 'ect2, truth, see 6astoriadis, 1992, pp. 88"34.+ Loewald isn't merely re!erring to the rather anal point that the will to power(!or e%ample, competition with rivals and the struggle !or recognition(plays a crucial motivating role in the development o! science. In our own !ield, .reud's !ervent desire to van?uish 0ung led him to write some o! his most important works$ 1#wo principles o! mental !unctioning2 (1911a), Totem and taboo (1913), Schre er (1911!) and, perhaps most especially, 1=n narcissism2 *191&7 see 6astoriadis, 198&, pp. <;"J, 1992, p. ><+. )ut what makes the di!!erence in great works o! creativity is not the desire !or power and recognition, ut the passion directed at

the o 'ect. 1All great works o! knowledge2, 6astoriadis notes, 1have een motivated y a single"minded passion and tyrannical a sorption in a single o 'ect2 *1992, p. ><+. Indeed, Loewald claimed that 1the scientist is !illed with love !or his o 'ect precisely in his most creative and OdispassionateP moments2, that is, when he/she has succeeded in reaching the o 'ect in its own right(what the Aermans call the ache elbst. *&%amples o! this phenomenon are, in descending order o! rigor, solving a mathematical pro lem, coming up with le mot !uste or !inding a musical interpretation(however idiosyncratic(that 1!its2 the composer's score.+ #he same can e said in our !ield. 1In our est moments o! dispassionate and o 'ective analyzing2, Loewald writes, 1we love our o 'ect, the patient, more than at any other time2 *1977, p. ,3>7 see also Lear, 1998, p. 5;,+. A consideration o! the distinction etween the states o! eing in love and loving might help us understand what Loewald is getting at. #he 1normal psychosis2 o! eing in love involves the overvaluation o! the o 'ect(that is, the pro'ection o! our idealized image o! ourselves on to it. #o e sure, the eloved will always e in part a sel!o 'ect. )ut in loving we are, to a larger degree, drawn to the o 'ect ecause o! what it is in itsel!. Loewald doesn't try to re!ute the philosophical skeptic(postmodern or otherwise( y attempting to demonstrate the epistemological possi ility o! gaining access to the patient's core. Instead, he o!!ers a psychological"developmental argument. It is possi le !or the analyst to approach the patient's core, he maintains, ecause o! 1the resonance etween2 their 1unconscious2 *1988, p. ,85+, which derives !rom the origin o! all psychic li!e in an undi!!erentiated matri%. #his doesn't mean, however, that Loewald denies the asymmetry etween analyst and analysand. He has no di!!iculty in claiming that analysts are more 1mature2 than their patients. )ut, as Citchell o serves, this claim is ound to ring 1!alse to many contemporary ears2. He also points out, however, that, !or Loewald, 1maturity2 doesn't have its customary meaning o! a more 1advanced position along a linear scale2. It means, rather, the capacity to navigate among and ridge di!!erent developmental and organizational levels' *Citchell, 2000, p. J-+. Somewhat ironically, a central component in analysts' maturity is their capacity to undergo the controlled regression o! the analysis in a less inhi ited and more !ruit!ul way than their patients. .or, despite the regressiveness o! their pathology, patients tend to !ear the regressive pull o! the analysis and cling to current 1neurotic compromise !ormation9s:2 *Loewald, 1960, p. ,,;+. Again, Loewald's philosophical style may mask how unconventional his thinking actually is. He cautions us against the dangers o! the 1disillusioned adult2 * 197%, p. 4<8+ and argues that the aim o! analysis is neither the 1dictatorship o! reason2 nor the adaptation to the mores o! contemporary society. It is, rather, 1more li!e2 *1972, p. >;+, which derives !rom an 1optimal communication2 *1971, p. 5-8+ with 1the more in!antile, archaic states and structure o! the psychic apparatus2 *1960, p. ,J;+. He is ready to admit, however, that 1more li!e2 doesn't necessarily coincide with more

sta ility. 'c+nowledgemen$02 I would like to thank Krs @eter Geu auer and .red @ine !or their criticisms o! an earlier dra!t o! this article that helped me rind my !ocus. #he paper was presented at a meeting o! the Association !or @sychoanalytic Cedicine on 5 April ,--4 and was discussed y Krs Aaron &sman, Lawrence .riedman and Helen Ceyers. I would also like to thank them !or their use!ul criticisms and comments. .inally, I am grate!ul to Ditty Hoss !or her uncompromising editorial assistance.

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Article Citation [Who Cited This?]

Whitebook, J. (288.). Hans Loe4ald. Int. 0. 1sycho'2nal., -5:9%6115
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