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1. Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty Corp.

FACTS: Municipality filed a complaint for expropriation against VM Realty over two parcels of land for providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. RTC issued order, authorizing petitioner to ta e the possession of the su!ject after depositing "#$ of the mar et value. %oon after, respondent files answer containing affirmative defenses and counter&claims' a. Complaint failed to state a cause of action !ecause it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as re(uired !y R) *"+,!. The cause of action if any, was !arred !y a prior judgment or res judicata. ISSUE:.hether a /ocal 0overnment 1nit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution !y its law&ma ing !ody. E!"' 2etition is not meritorious and is denied. 1nder %ection "3, of the present /ocal 0overnment Code 4R) *"+,5, it is stated as the first re(uisite that /01s can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted !y its legislative !ody ena!ling the municipal chief executive. ) resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law&ma ing !ody, and the latter is a law. The case cited !y 2etitioner involves 62 77*, which was the previous /ocal 0overnment Code, which is o!viously no longer in effect. R) *"+, prevails over the 8mplementing Rules, the former !eing the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule that cannot amend the former. )n /01 cannot authorize on expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its law&ma ing !ody. The /ocal 0overnment Code expressly and clearly re(uires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. #. Ma$i%ip v$ City of Pa$i& '(.R. )o.1*+*,-. Fact$: 2etitioner owns a parcel of land in 2asig City. 8n "339, the Municipality of 2asig sent her a letter pursuant to an enacted ordinance intending to expropriate a portion of her property to !e used for :sports and development and recreational activities of residents of 6rgy. Caniogan !ut petitioner refused contending that there was no genuine necessity for expropriation of property. I$$ue: .hether or not there was a genuine necessity for expropriation. el/: T0e po1er of e2inent /o2ain i$ lo/&e/ in t0e le&i$lative 3ranc0 of t0e &overn2ent. 8t delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other pu!lic entities and pu!lic utility corporations, su!ject only to Con$titutional li2itation$. /ocal governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized !y

statute. %ection "3 of the /ocal 0overnment Code of "33" 4Repu!lic )ct ;o. *"+,5 prescri!es the delegation !y Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. T0e ri&0t to o1n an/ po$$e$$ property i$ one of t0e 2o$t c0eri$0e/ ri&0t$ of 2en. 8t is so fundamental that it has !een written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. 1nless the re(uisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one<s property is clearly esta!lished, it shall !e the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. =udicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern' 4a5 the ade(uacy of the compensation 4!5 the nece$$ity of t0e ta%in&, and 4c5 the pu3lic u$e c0aracter of the purpose of the ta ing. T0e &enuine nece$$ity for t0e ta%in&4 10ic0 2u$t 3e of a pu3lic c0aracter4 2u$t al$o 3e $0o1n to e5i$t. Applyin& t0i$ $tan/ar/4 1e 0ol/ t0at re$pon/ent City of Pa$i& 0a$ faile/ to e$ta3li$0 t0at t0ere i$ a &enuine nece$$ity to e5propriate petitioner6$ property. >ur scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued !y the Caniogan 6arangay Council dated ;ovem!er ?,, "339, the !asis for the passage of >rdinance ;o. 9? s. "337 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended !eneficiary is the Melendres Compound @omeowners )ssociation, a private, non&profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. 8t can !e gleaned that the mem!ers of the said )ssociation are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. 2etitioner<s lot is the nearest vacant space availa!le. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically pu!lic. The necessity has not !een shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest 2ar , availa!le to all residents of 2asig City, including those of Caniogan. *. 7ar/illon v 7aran&ay Ma$ili FACTS' Two complaints for Aminent Bomain were filed !y 6arangay Masili to 6ardillon for the purchase of /ot 97C"&B at 2?,,,,,,., to !e turned into a multi&purpose hall. Dirst complaint was filed at the MTC and was dismissed due to lac of interest. The second complaint was filed at the RTC, which 6ardillon filed a motion to dismiss in pursuant to the doctrine of res judicatas. The order was issued in favor of 6arangay Masili and order of issuance of the .rit of 2ossesion for /ot 97C"&B. Court of )ppeals rules that the RTC did not commit grave a!use !ecause the MTC really had no jurisdiction over the action, which conse(uently doesnEt !ar the second complant from res judicata. ISSUE 8 1: 90et0er MTC 0a/ :uri$/iction over fir$t e5propriation ca$e: ;o. Axpropriation case does not involve sum of money. 8t is incapa!le of pecuniary estimation and should !e filed with the RTC 4%ection "3 of 62 "?3 as amended !y R) *+3"5. The primary consideration of expropriation proceedings is whether the government has complied

with the re(uisites for the ta ing or property. )n expropriation case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land. ISSUE 8 #: 90et0er t0e /i$2i$$al of t0e fir$t co2plaint in t0e MTC a2ount$ to re$ :u/icata. ;>. The re(uisites for res judicata are' ". Dormer judgment must !e final. ?. Court who rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the su!ject matter and the parties. 7. =udgment is on the merits. 9. 8dentity of parties, su!ject matter and cause of action in !oth actions. %ince MTC had no jurisdiction, there is no res judicata. ISSUE 8 *: 90et0er Court of Appeal$ erre/ 10en it i&nore/ t0e RTC6$ i$$uance of a 1rit of po$$e$$ion /e$pite t0e pen/in& Motion for Recon$i/eration of t0e rulin& /i$2i$$in& t0e co2plaint. ;>. The re(uisites of immediate entry are' ". Diling of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and su!stance ?. Beposit of amount e(uivalent to "#$ of the property<s fair mar et value !ased on its current tax declaration. )nd Masili complied with !oth re(uisites. The issue of necessity of the expropriation is a matter that should !e addressed !y the RTC. 8f petitioner o!jects to the necessity, her o!jection should !e included in her )nswer to the complaint. ISSUE 8 ,: 90et0er or not Ma$ili i$ &uilty of foru2 $0oppin& ;>. The test for determining forum shopping' whether the elements of litispendentia are present in two or more cases, such that a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.The earlier case in the MTC had already !een dismissed when the second complaint was filed in the RTC. Aven if the MTC case was still pending, it will ma e no difference, !ecause the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place. E!"' 2etition has no merit and is denied ,. REPU7!IC v P!"T Dacts' 2/BT is a pu!lic service corporation holding a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the 2hilippines and connection with other countries. 2/BT and RC) 4an )merican corporation5 entered into an agreement where 1% to the 2hilippines phone calls and vice versa are made easier. )fter terminating the contract of ?, years, 6ureau of Telecommunications set up their own telephone system for the government 4aided !y 2/BT5. The !ureau also enters into an agreement with RC) for a joint overseas telephone service. 2/BT complained that the !ureau was violating the conditions such that the !ureau was also serving private personsFgeneral pu!lic and not just the government anymore. 6ureau proposed an interconnecting agreement with 2/BT, !ut the latter refused. Repu!lic sues 2/BT complaining that 2/BT should execute a contract with them.

8%%1A' .hether 2/BT should !e compelled to sign the interconnecting agreement with Repu!lic. @A/B' Ges, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to pu!lic ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not re(uire a pu!lic utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid. .here the Repu!lic may not compel the 2/BT to cele!rate a contract with it, the Repu!lic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, re(uire the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the 2/BT, as the needs of the government service may re(uire, su!ject to the payment of just compensation to !e determined !y the court. ;ormally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the ta ing or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property- !ut no cogent reason appears why the said power may not !e availed of to impose only a !urden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. 8t is un(uestiona!le that the real property may, through expropriation, !e su!jected to an easement of right of way. The use of the 2/BT<s lines and services to allow interservice connection !etween !oth telephone systems is not much different. 8n either case private property i$ $u3:ecte/ to a 3ur/en for pu3lic u$e an/ 3enefit. 8f, under %ection +, )rticle H888, of the Constitution, the %tate may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to pu!lic ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the %tate may not re(uire a pu!lic utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. ;. R<=AS v CIT> <F MA)I!A FACTS' Carmen Roxas applied to the city engineer 4Ro!ert Biec 5 for a license to construct a terrace, starting from the main wall of her house to the edge of %an =acinto Canal, which she exclusively owns. City Angineer refused to grant the license !ecause it was intended to !e IreservedE for the esta!lishment for pu!lic easement 4discharging J landing goods, shelter for fishermen and shipwrec ed persons, among others5. The %ecretary of the Municipal 6oard didnEt recall ever hearingFseeing the said purpose, !ut !elieved that !y leaving that strip, it would !e easier to prevent collisions and facilitate navigation. ISSUE' .hether or not a mere act of o!struction in connection with !uilding regulations suppress the right of ownership without due process. E!"' ;>. )ccording to )rticle 793 of the Civil Code' No one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper indemnity; %ection # of the act of Congress' No legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;

City of Manila and Ro!ert Biec to immediately issue license in favor of the plaintiff herein, BoKa Carmen )yala de Roxas to construct a terrace. +. PE<P!E v FA?AR"< FACTS: The municipal council of !aao, camarinessur stating among others that construction of a !uilding, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not !e allowed and therefore !e destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. @erein appellant filed a written re(uest with the incum!ent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a !uilding adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Dajardo<s name, located along the national highway and separated from the pu!lic plaza !y a cree . The re(uest was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed !uilding would destroy the view or !eauty of the pu!lic plaza. Befendants reiterated their re(uest for a !uilding permit, !ut again the mayor turned down the re(uest. .hereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the !uilding without a permit, !ecause they needed a place of residence very !adly, their former house having !een destroyed !y a typhoon and hitherto they had !een living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and su!se(uently convicted. @ence this appeal. ISSUE: .hether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. E!": ;o. 8t is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasona!le and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property- hence, it oversteps the !ounds of police power, and amounts to a ta ing of appellantEs property without just compensation. .e do not overloo that the modern tendency is to regard the !eautification of neigh!orhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. )s the case now stands, every structure that may !e erected on appellants< land, regardless of its own !eauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in (uestion, !ecause it would interfere with the view of the pu!lic plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, !e constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the o!vious purpose for which it is !est suited, !eing ur!an in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to !e heard. @. )AP<C<R v (UTIERREA FACTS: 2laintiff ;)2>C>R is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its o!jectives, which among others is the construction, operation and maintenance of electric transmission lines throughout the 2hilippines. Dor the construction of its ?7, LV Mexico&/imay lines, it has to pass the lands !elonging to defendant 0utierrez. ;)2>C>REs unsuccessful negotiations for the ac(uisition of right of way easement prompts them to file eminent domain proceedings. Dor determining the fair and just compensation due, the court appointed three commissioners' one for the plaintiff, one for the defendant and one from the court, who would conduct ocular inspection of the lots and prepare appraisals as to the fair and just compensation. )fter careful consideration, the lower court decides to go for the

appraisal of the defendants commissioner of 2",.,, pero s(uare meter M 2C,,.,, attorney fees. ;)2>C>R filed a motion for reconsideration, and lower court amends the compensation to 2#.,, M 2C,,.,,. ;)2>C>R isnEt satisfied yet, and appeals, !ut the ruling is sustained. ISSUE 1' .hether petitioner should !e made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed !y its transmission lines. ISSUE #: .hether the ac(uisition of a mere right&of&way is an exercise of power of eminent domain contemplated !y law. E!": The assailed decision of the Court of )ppeals is )DD8RMAB. 2#.,,Fs(m M 2C,,.,, 6ecause of the high&tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and lim!s that may !e caused !eneath the wires cannot altogether !e discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on the affected portion of the lot. The easement of right&of&way is definitely a ta ing under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of transmission lines, the limitation imposed !y ;)2>C>R against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprived private respondents of its ordinary use. C. REPU7!IC v CASTE!VI FACTS: 8n "39*, the repu!lic, through the )rmed Dorces of the 2hilippines 4)D25, entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year&to&year !asis. .hen Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in "3#+, the )D2 refused. %he then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the )D2. 8n "3#3, however, the repu!lic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in (uestion. ISSUE: .hether or ;ot the compensation should !e determined as of "39* or "3#3. E!": The %upreme Court ruled that the :ta ingN should not !e rec oned as of "39*, and that just compensation should not !e determined on the !asis of the value of the property as of that year. The re(uisites for ta ing are' "5 The expropriator must enter a private property, ?5 The entry must !e for more than a momentary period, 75 8t must !e under warrant or color of authorities, 95 The property must !e devoted for pu!lic use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected #5 The utilization of the property for pu!lic use must !e such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of !eneficial enjoyment of the property.

1nder %ec. 9 Rule +* of the Rules of Court, :just compensationN is to !e determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The %upreme Court has ruled that when the ta ing of the property sought to !e expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or ta es place su!se(uent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should !e determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. 8n the instant case, it is undisputed that the Repu!lic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, !y authority of court, on )ugust ",, "3#3. The :ta ingN of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to !e paid must, therefore, !e rec oned as of =une ?+, "3#3 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no !asis to the contention of the Repu!lic that a lease on a year&to&year !asis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since !y express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand 4)rt. "++3, ;ew Civil Code5. The %upreme Court, however, did not apply )rt. "?#, of the ;ew Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation !ecause in eminent domain cases the o!ligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. 3. CIT> <F (<VER)ME)T <F BUEA<) CIT> v ERICTA FACTS' Ouezon City enacted an ordinance entitled :>RB8;);CA RA01/)T8;0 T@A A%T)6/8%@MA;T, M)8;TA;);CA );B >2AR)T8>; >D 2R8V)TA MAM>R8)/ TG2A CAMATARG >R 61R8)/ 0R>1;B .8T@8; T@A =1R8%B8CT8>; >D O1AP>; C8TG );B 2R>V8B8;0 2A;)/T8A% D>R T@A V8>/)T8>; T@ARA>DN. The law provides that at least six 4+5 percent of the total area of the memorial par cemetery shall !e set aside for charity !urial of deceased persons who are paupers and have !een residents of Ouezon City for at least # years prior to their death, to !e determined !y competent City )uthorities. Ouezon City justified the law !y invo ing police power. ISSUE: .hether or not the ordinance in (uestion isa valid exercise of police power. E!": The %C held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasona!le relation !etween the setting aside of at least six 4+5 percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity !urial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a ta ing without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to !enefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. 8nstead of !uilding or maintaining a pu!lic cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the !urden to private cemeteries. 2olice 2ower does not involve the ta ing or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article such as opium, firearms or a marijuana plantation.

",. RE>ES v )ATI<)A! <USI)( AUT <RIT> FACTS: Respondent ;@) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands owned !y Reyes. The stated pu!lic purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Basmarinas Resettlement 2roject to accommodate the s(uatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. >n )pril ?C, "33?, petitioners filed a complaint alleging that respondent ;@) had not relocated s(uatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated pu!lic purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed !y the court. >cular inspections were made and the trial court held that' - Respondent ;@) is not deemed to have a!andoned the pu!lic purpose for which the su!ject properties were expropriated !ecause the relocation of s(uatters involves a long and tedious process. - There is no condition imposed in the expropriation judgment that the su!ject properties shall revert !ac to its original owners in case the purpose of expropriation is terminated or a!andoned - The payment of just compensation is independent of the o!ligation of herein petitioners to pay capital gains tax - 8n the payment of just compensation, the !asis should !e the value at the time the property was ta en. ISSUE' .hether the @onora!le Court of )ppeals erred in not declaring the judgment of expropriation forfeited in light of the failure respondent to use the expropriated property for intended purpose !ut for a totally different purpose and partial payment of the just compensation. E!"' The decision appealed is M>B8D8AB. ;@) should pay petitioners amount of 2",?"C,#*9.7# with legal interest thereon at "?$ per annum computed from the ta ing of the expropriated properties in "33* until the amount due shall have !een fully paid The "3C* Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over the private properties upon payment of just compensation. %ec. 3, )rticle 888 states that private property shall not !e ta en for pu!lic use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are pu!lic use and just compensation. The expropriation judgment declared that ;@) has a lawful right to ta e petitioners properties :for the pu!lic use or purpose of expanding the Basmarinas Resettlement 2rojectN. The :pu!lic useN is synonymous with :pu!lic interestN, :pu!lic !enefitN, :pu!lic welfareN, and :pu!lic convenienceN. The act of ;@) in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing cannot !e ta en to mean as a deviation from the stated pu!lic purpose of their ta ing.

Axpropriation of private lands for slum clearance and ur!an development is for a pu!lic purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies and other private concerns. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under %ection ", )rticle H888 of the Constitution. .hen land has !een ac(uired for pu!lic use in fee simple unconditionally, either !y the exercise of eminent domain or !y purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the pu!lic use may !e a!andoned, or the land may !e devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title ac(uired, or any reversion to the former owner. 11. Fil$trea2 International Inc. v$. CA FACTS:Dilstream 8nternational is the registered owner of parcels of land located in )ntonio Rivera %t., Tondo 88 Manila. >n =anuary *, "337, it filed an ejectment suit against the occupants 4private respondents5 of the said parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non&payment of rentals. The ejectment suit !ecame final and executory as no further action was ta en !eyond the Court of )ppeals. Buring the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for )nnulment of Beed of Axchange against Dilstream. The City of Manila came into the picture when it approved >rdinance ;o. *C"7 authorizing Mayor )lfredo /im to initiate ac(uisition through legal means of certain parcels of land. %u!se(uently, the City of Manila approved >rdinance ;o. *C## declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of Dilstream. The said properties were sold and distri!uted to (ualified tenants pursuant to the /and 1se Bevelopment 2rogram of the City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain see ing to expropriate lands in )ntonio Rivera %t. The RTC issued a .rit of 2ossession in favor of the City. Dilstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to (uash the writ of possession. The motion to dismiss was premised on the following grounds' no valid cause of action- the petition does not satisfy the re(uirements of pu!lic use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued !y the RTC of Manila in the ejectment suit- violation of the constitutional guarantee against non&impairment of o!ligation and contract- price offered was too low hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution. The RTC denied the two motions. Dilstream filed a 2etition for Certiorari with the C) which dismissed the petition for !eing insufficient in form and su!stance, aside from the fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are !lurred and unreada!le. ISSUE 1:.hether The City of Manila may exercise power of eminent domain despite the existence of a final and executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the lots.

E!" 1:GA%. There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner Dilstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties su!ject of this dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already !ecame final and executory. @owever, it must also !e conceded that the City of Manila has an undenia!le right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for pu!lic use is expressly granted to it under %ec "3 of the /ocal 0overnment Code. %ec ",, of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila further empowers the city government to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its ur!an land reform and housing program. The cityEs right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the property to !e expropriated had already !een previously upheld !y the court in the case of Philippine Columbian ssociation vsPanis' :The City of Manila, acting through its legislative !ranch, has the express power to ac(uire private lands in the city and su!divide these lands into home lots for sale to !ona&fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to la!orers and low&salaried employees of the city. ISSUE #:.hetherexpropriations of DilstreamEs lots were legally and validly underta en. E!" #: ;>. .e ta e judicial notice of the fact that ur!an land reform has !ecome a paramount tas in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in ur!an areas particularly in Metro Manila. ;evertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an un!ridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these pro!lems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just compensation for the expropriation of private property must !e complied with. >ther laws have also set down specific rules in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, to wit' Q %ec "3 of /0C provides that such exercise must !e pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Q %ec 3 of the 1r!an Bevelopment and @ousing )ct of "33? 41B@)5 provides an order of priority in the ac(uisition of land for socialized housing, with private lands listed as the last option. Q %ec ", of 1B@) provides that expropriation shall !e resorted to only when other modes of ac(uisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to the government, etc. have !een exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned !y small property owners shall !e exempted. Compliance with the a!ove legislated conditions are deemed mandatory !ecause these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to B1A 2R>CA%% when their property is expropriated for pu!lic use. There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied with the a!ove conditions. DilstreamEs properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor

of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the ac(uisition of other lands listed under %ec. 3 of R) *?*3 have proved futile. Avidently, there was a violation of petitioner DilstreamEs right to due process. 1#. MA)<SCA v C<URT <F APPEA!S FACTS: 2etitioner Manosca inherited a!out 93? s(m of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila. ;ational @istorical 8nstitute supposedly claims this land to !e the !irth&site of Delix Manalo, the founder of 8glesia ;i Cristo and declares the land to !e a national historical landmar . The Repu!lic soon files a complaint for expropriation in !ehalf of ;@8. 2etitioners move to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for the pu!lic purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of pu!lic funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, !enefit, or support of 8glesia ;i Cristo, a religious entity. )fter the court denied numerous filings !y the petitioner, the latter lodged a petition for certiorari and prohi!ition with the Court of )ppeals !ut only to !e dismissed again. 2etitioners also assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set !y the Court' a5 The size of the land expropriated !5 The large num!er of people !enefited c5 Axtent of social and economic reform ISSUE: .hether or not the :pu!lic useN re(uirement of Aminent Bomain is extant in the attempted expropriation !y the Repulic of a 93?&s(uare&meter parcel of land so declared !y the ;@8 as a national historical landmar . E!": 2etition is BA;8AB. 2u!lic use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to ta e private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. 6ut each and every mem!er of society need not !e e(ually interested in such use, or !e personally and directly affected !y itif the o!jective is to satisfy a great pu!lic want or exigency, that is sufficient. The purpose in setting up the mar er is essentially to recognize the distinctive contri!ution of the late Delix Manalo to the culture of the 2hilippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the 8glesia ;i Cristo. The practical reality that greater !enefit may !e derived !y mem!ers of the 8glesia ;i Cristo than !y most other could well !e true !ut such a peculiar advantage still remains to !e merely incidental and secondary in nature. 8ndeed, that only a few would actually !enefit from the propriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of pu!lic use. 1*. )AP<C<R v C I<)( FACTS:2etitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation, created and existing pursuant to Repu!lic )ct ;o +73#. 8n order to carry out saide purposes, ;2C is authorized to exercise the power of Aminent Bomain. ;2C filed a complaint of eminent domain to ac(uire an easement of right&of&way and certain portions of agricultural lands owned !y %pouses ChiongJ heirs of )grifina )ngeles. ;2C prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and an order of expropriation, the appointment of 7 commissioners to determine the just

compensation. The heirs of )grifina )ngeles did not dispute the purpose of ;2C in instituting the expropriation proceedings. @owever, they pointed out that ;2C had already ta en 9,,,, s(m of their area and wanted to occupy another 9,,,, s(m of the adjacent property. They state that the fair mar et value for !oth properties was 2",",,.,,Fs(m, or a total of 2C,C,,,,,,.,,, and hope they get paid just that. )tty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio mar et value R 2#,,.,,Fs(m )tty. )log R 2??.#,Fs(m4heirs of )ngeles5 2"#.*#Fs(m 4%pouses Chiong5 Court ordered ;2C to pay 2#,,.,,Fs(m with an interest of +$ per annum from )pril "+,"33C until fully paid. ;2C files certiorari !ut was dismissed for lac of merit. ISSUE 1: .hether petitioner ;)2>C>R was deprived of due process ISSUE #: .hether the Court of )ppeals erred in sustaining the >rder of the RTC of 8!a, Pam!ales, dated =une *, ?,,,, !y dismissing ;2CEs petition for certiorari. E!": 2etition denied due to lac of merit. >n record, the Court find that the majority report of Commissioners Ragadio and )tty. Castillo was su!mitted to the trial court on March 3, ?,,,, while the minority report of Commissioner )tty. )log, was su!mitted on May #, ?,,,. 8t is not disputed that petitioner was furnished copies of said reports. )fter petitioner ;2C o!tained its copy of the majority report, it did nothing. )s pointed out that the petitioner was afforded this opportunity is !eyond (uestion. @aving failed to ma e use of this opportunity, the petitioner cannot justifia!ly claim now that its right to due process has !een violated. Drom March 3, ?,,, to =une *, ?,,,, petitioner did not o!ject to the majority report. )!sent the o!jections raised !y the petitioner, it !ecame the duty of the trial court to ma e a final order and judgment in which the proper award will !e made and thus end the controversy. ! Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. & .here an appeal is availa!le, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave a!use of discretion. "9. EPAA v "U!A> FACTS: The four parcels of land, which are the su!ject of this case, is where the Mactan Axport 2rocessing Pone )uthority in Ce!u 4A2P)5 is to !e constructed. 2rivate respondent %an )ntonio Bevelopment Corporation 4%an )ntonio, for !revity5, in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent =udge Bulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. 8t was later found out that the payment of the government to %an )ntonio would !e 2"# per s(uare meter, which was o!jected to !y the latter contending that under 2B "#77, the !asis of just compensation shall !e fair and according to the fair mar et value declared !y the owner of the property sought to !e expropriated, or !y the assessor, whichever is lower. %uch

o!jection and the su!se(uent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissionerEs report. A2P) then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. ISSUE: .hether or ;ot the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in 2B "#77 is unconstitutional. E!": The %upreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in 2B "#77 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissi!le encroachment to judicial prerogatives. 8t tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, !ut it may not su!stitute the courtEs own judgment as to what amount should !e awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may ma e the initial determination !ut when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the 6ill of Rights that the private party may not !e ta en for pu!lic use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courtEs findings. Much less can the courts !e precluded from loo ing into the justness of the decreed compensation. 1;. PE"R< M. 7E!E) vs.C<URT <F APPEA!S an/ A!FRE"< ?U!IA)< )ARVASA4 J.:p ) small portion of land measuring a hundred 4",,5 s(uare meters, more or less, !elonging to the Manotoc %ervices, 8nc. was leased to 2edro M. 6elen. That piece of land is nown as /ot ;o. ",, 6loc "C and is situated at %unog )pog, Tondo, Manila. 1 >n it stood a house !uilt !y 6elen. 2art of the land came to !e occupied !y )lfredo =uliano and his family in the early part of "3*C- =uliano !ought a house standing thereon, not !elonging to 6elen, and moved in without the latter<s nowledge. # >n learning of this, 6elen had a tal with =uliano, and they came to an agreement that =uliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay one& half of the rental to Manoto Realty, 8nc. /ater a fire razed !oth 6elen<s and =uliano<s houses to the ground. 6elen told =uliano not to !uild anything on the land any more. @owever, on =uliano<s pleas, 6elen acceded to =uliano<s continued stay on the land on the explicit condition that his occupancy should not !e longer than two and a half 4? "F?5 years. * .hen =uliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulated term despite demand, 6elen !rought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court sometime in %eptem!er, "3C?, ,and succeeded in o!taining judgment dated %eptem!er #, "3C9 ; disposing as follows' .@ARAD>RA, judgment is here!y rendered as follows'

"5 >rdering defendant and all persons claiming rights andFor title under him to vacate the su!ject lot he is presently occupying at ?C,# =avier %treet, 0agalangin, Tondo, Manila, and to surrender possession thereof to herein plaintiff, ?5 >rdering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of 27,,,,.,, as and for attorney<s fees, plus costs of suit. =uliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila. That Court reversed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The decision rendered on =une ?+, "3C#, + was made to rest on the expropriation of the Manoto Astate effected !y 2residential Becree ;o. "+*,, and declared that S 2B ;o. "+*, . . . has expropriated real property along the Astero de %unog& )pog, Tondo, Manila . . . formerly owned !y the Manoto Realty, 8nc. . . . The decree was signed on =anuary ?C, "3C,. The government has started to implement the expropriation 4"ee Axhi!it T?,T p. *- ?, rec.5. . . . )lfredo =uliano is a prospective !eneficiary of the 6liss 2roject !eing underta en !y the ;ational @ousing )uthority at the site in (uestion 4 "ee Axhi!its T?&6T and T7T5. Therefore, when the complaint in this case was filed on %eptem!er "7, "3C?, . . . Manoto Realty %ervices, 8nc. was no longer the owner of the premises in (uestion and as correctly contended !y defendants&appellants, the relation !etween plaintiff&appellee and defendants&appellants were also deemed terminated. )ccordingly, the decision appealed from was set aside and another entered Tdismissing the complaint filed in the court a #uo . . . 4without5 pronouncement as to costs.T 6elen seasona!ly filed with the Court of )ppeals a petition for review of the decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court. @is appeal was doc eted as C)&0.R. %2 ;o. ,+#C3 and after due proceedings, resolved against him !y Becision promulgated on >cto!er ?, "3C+. @ The )ppellate Court too account of 2residential Becree ;o. "+*, as the decisive factor in determining the Tpivotal and decisive issue S whether Manoto Realty, 8nc., petitioner<s lessor, has retained ownership of the lot in (uestion, the expropriating law invo ed !y private respondent 42B "+*,5 notwithstanding.T The Court specifically adverted to %ection " of the decree, vi$.' %ec. ". The real property along the Astero de %unog&)pog in Tondo, Manila, formerly consisting of /ots ;os. ##&), ##&6 and ##&C, 6loc ?3"C of the su!division plan 2sd&""*9+, covered !y TCT ;os. 93?C+, 93?C* and 93?CC, respectively, of the Registry of Beeds of Manila, and formerly owned !y the Manoto Realty, 8nc., with an area of *?,9?C.+ s(uare meters, more or less, is here!y declared expropriated. The ;ational @ousing )uthority hereinafter referred to as the T)uthorityT is designated administrator of the ;ational 0overnment with authority to immediately ta e possession, control and

disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive development plan for the condemned properties. The decision declared that !y virtue of the decree, Manoto Realty, 8nc. ceased to !e the owner of the land, including the lot leased to 6elen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the ;ational @ousing )uthority 4;@)5its only right !eing to claim the just compensation thereof- that as a result, Manoto <s lease contract with 6elen over the lot in (uestion also ipso facto ended, as well as the su!lease !etween 6elen and =uliano, since a su!lease can never extend !eyond the duration of the su!lessor<s lease of the su!lessor- that, conse(uently, neither Manoto Realty, 8nc. nor 6elen could judicially eject =uliano from the disputed lot- and that under said 2.B. "+*,, the fate of =uliano and the other actual occupants of the property was within the competence of the ;ational @ousing )uthority to determine- indeed, =uliano has !een Tduly certified !y the 2roject >8C of the %unog&)pog 1r!an 6liss as among the structure owners per "3C, census conducted !y the ;@) under its Ponal 8mprovement 2rogram for Metro Manila . . . 4and was hence5 a prospective !eneficiary of said project.T 6elen has perfected an appeal !y certiorari to this Court and prays for reversal of the judgment of the Court of )ppeals and the rendition of a new decision granting him the relief originally prayed for in his complaint in the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court. @e prays for judgment on the following essential propositions' "5 2B "+*, notwithstanding, Manoto Realty %ervices, 8nc. had not !een divested of its title as of )ugust, "3C7, it not having Treceived any money as payment for the su!ject property,T and the ;@) not having ta en possession thereof in an appropriate action of eminent domain 4Tuason J Co., 8nc. vs. /and Tenure )dministration etc., 93 %CR) 77C5?5 in any event, it is 6elen, not =uliano, who is entitled to !e declared a rightful occupant of the land and exercise the rights under 2B "+*,. The petition will !e granted and the challenged judgment of the Court of )ppeals, reversed. 2residential Becree ;o. "+*,, together with a companion decree, num!ered "++3 S which attempted to expropriate !y similar legislative fiat another property, the so&called TTam!unting AstateT S was struc down !y this Court as Tunconstitutional and therefore, null and void,T on May ?", "3C* in a joint judgment rendered in 0.R. ;o. ##"++ 4Manoto , et al. v. ;ational @ousing )uthority, et al.% and 0.R. ;o. ##"+* &Tiongson, et al. v. ;ational @ousing )uthority, et al%. C The Court found that !oth the decrees, !eing Tviolative of the petitioners< 4owners<5 right to due process of law,T failed Tthe test of constitutionality,T and that, additionally, they were tainted !y another infirmity as regards Tthe determination of just compensation.T The Court said'

The decrees do not !y themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure !y which the petitioners can (uestion the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasona!leness of the just compensation. @aving failed to provide for a hearing, the 0overnment should have filed an expropriation case under Rule +* of the Revised Rules of Court !ut it did not do so. >!viously, it did not deem it necessary !ecause the enactment of the (uestioned decrees which rendered, !y their very passage, any (uestions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. 8n effect, the properties under the decrees were Tautomatically expropriated.T This !ecomes more evident when the ;@) wrote the Register of Beeds and re(uested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Beeds only with copies of the decrees to support its re(uest. This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to o!serve when it exercises the power of eminent domain. xxx xxx xxx This Court further o!served that contrary to Rule +* and esta!lished precedents, the decrees provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that Tof the actual ta ing of the government or at the time of the judgment !y the court, whichever came first.T )part from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left !y the decrees to the City )ssessor. 8n 2.B. ;o. *+, 2.B. ;o. 9+9, 2.B. ;o. *39, and 2.B. ;o. "#77, the !asis for determining just compensation was fixed at the mar et value declared !y the owner or the mar et value determined !y the assessor, whichever is lower. 2.B.s "++3 and "+*, go further. 'here is no mention of any mar(et value declared by the owner)%ections + of the two decrees peg just compensation at the mar et value determined !y the City )ssessor. The City )ssessor is warned !y the decrees to Tconsider existing conditions in the area nota!ly that no improvement has !een underta en on the land and that the land is s(uatted upon !y resident families which should considera!ly depress the expropriation costs.T 8n other cases involving expropriation under 2.B. ;os. *+, 9+9, *39, and "#77, this Court has decided to invalidate the mode of fixing just compensation under said decrees. 4 "ee Axport 2rocessing Pone )uthority vs. @on. Ceferino A. Bulay, et al., 0.R. ;o. #3+,75 - .ith more reason should the method in 2.B.s "++3 and "+*, !e declared infirm. 2B "+*, !eing void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also !e deemed void ab initio, including particularly the ta ing of possession of the

property !y the ;ational @ousing )uthority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the !eneficiaries thereof. 8t appears that the ;ational @ousing )uthority has since instituted an expropriation suit involving the T%unog&)pogT property in (uestion, now pending in 6ranch H/ of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over !y @onora!le Delicidad Villalon- 1D and that petitioner 2edro 6elen continues to !e recognized !y the owner of the land, Manoto %ervices, 8nc. as a lessee of a part thereof, identified as /ot ",, 6loc "C. 11 The invalidation of 2.B. "+*, removes the !asis for the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of )ppeals, which are !oth contrary to the verdict of the Metropolitan Trial Court. >n the other hand, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate any error in the factual and legal dispositions in the latter judgment, recognizing and vindicating the petitioner<s superior right of possession over the /ot ",, !loc "C of the T%unog&)pog AstateT of the Manoto %ervices, 8nc. .@ARAD>RA, the decision of the Court of )ppeals of >cto!er ?, "3C+ and that of the Regional Trial Court there!y affirmed, are RAVAR%AB );B %AT )%8BA, and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court 46ranch V885, Manila, rendered on %eptem!er #, "3C9 in Civil Case ;o. ,*C*#+&CV is RA8;%T)TAB );B )DD8RMAB, with costs against the private respondents. %> >RBARAB. 1+. MA)I!A E!ECTRIC C<MPA)>4 v$. T E <)<RA7!E (RE(<RI< (. PI)E"A Dacts' Dor the purpose of constructing a ?7, LV Transmission line from 6arrio Malaya to Tower ??, at 2ililla, Rizal, the Manila Alectric Company 4MAR)/C>5 needed portions of the land of Teofilo )rayon, %r., 0il de 0uzman, /ucito %antiago and Teresa 6autista 4simple fee owners5, consisting of an aggregate area of ?7*,7?" s(uare meters. Bespite MAR)/C><s offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with )rayon, et. al., the parties failed to reach an agreement. >n ?3 >cto!er "3*9, a complaint for eminent domain was filed !y MAR)/C> against 9? defendants 4including Teofilo )rayon %r., 0il de 0uzman, /ucito %antiago, and Teresa 6autista5 with the Court of Dirst 8nstance 4now Regional Trial Court5 of Rizal, 6ranch HH88, 2asig, Metro Manila. Bespite the opposition of )rayon, et. al., the court issued an >rder dated "7 =anuary "3*# authorizing MAR)/C> to ta e or enter upon the possession of the property sought to !e expropriated. >n "7 =uly "3*+, )rayon, et. al., filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to !e paid at 29,.,, per s(uare meter or an approximate sum of 2?*?,,,,.,, and prayed that they !e allowed to withdraw the sum of 2*",**".#, from MAR)/C><s deposit&account with the 2hilippine ;ational 6an 42;65, 2asig 6ranch. @owever, )rayon, et. al.<s motion was denied in an order dated 7 %eptem!er "3*+. 2ursuant to a government policy, MAR)/C> on 7, >cto!er "3*3 sold to the ;ational 2ower Corporation 4;)2>C>R5 the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing )rayon, et. al.<s property. >n "" De!ruary "3C,, the court issued an >rder appointing the mem!ers of the

6oard of Commissioners to ma e an appraisal of the properties. >n # =une "3C,, MAR)/C> filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation !ecause of their sale to the ;)2>C>R. 8n view of this motion, the wor of the Commissioners was suspended. >n 3 =une "3C", )rayon, et. al. filed another motion for payment, !ut despite the opposition of MAR)/C>, the court issued an order dated 9 Becem!er "3C" granting the motion for payment of )rayon, et. al. 42?,,9,, or 27.,, per s(uare meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may !e proved in the final adjudication of the case5. >n "# Becem!er "3C", )rayon, et. al. filed an >mni!us Constitutional /aw 88, ?,,# 4 73 5;arratives 46erne 0uerrero5Motion praying that they !e allowed to withdraw an additional sum of 23,,"?#.#, from MAR)/C><s deposit& account with 2;6. 6y order dated ?" Becem!er "3C", the court granted the >mni!us Motion. )rayon, et. al. filed another motion dated C =anuary "3C? praying that MAR)/C> !e ordered to pay the sum of 2"+3,?,,.,,. >n "? =anuary "3C?, MAR)/C> filed a motion for reconsideration of the >rders and to declare )rayon, et. al. in contempt of court for forging or causing to !e forged the receiving stamp of MAR)/C><s counsel and falsifying or causing to !e falsified the signature of its receiving cler in their >mni!us Motion. >n 3 De!ruary "3C?, the court denied MAR)/C><s motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt. 8n said order, the Court adjudged in favor of )rayon, et. al. the fair mar et value of their property ta en !y MAR)/C> at 29,.,, per s(uare meter for a total of 27+3.*?,.,,- the amount to !earing legal interest from ?9 De!ruary "3*# until fully paid plus conse(uential damages in terms of attorney<s fees in the sum of 2",,,,,.,,- all these sums to !e paid !y MAR)/C> the former with costs of suit, minus the amount of 2",?,C,,.,, already withdrawn !y )rayon, et. al. Durthermore, the court stressed in said order that Tat this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credi!le real estate !ro er, or the =udge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in (uestion. ;evertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must !ase it upon competent evidence.T MAR)/C> filed a petition for review on certiorari. 8ssue' .hether the court can dispense with the assistance of a 6oard of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. @eld' 8n an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial !efore the Commissioners is indispensa!le to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 7 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to !e ta en is a mandatory re(uirement in expropriation cases. .hile it is true that the findings of commissioners may !e disregarded and the court may su!stitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence su!mitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inade(uate or excessive 4Manila Railroad Company v. Velas(uez, 7? 2hil. ?C+5 Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a su!stantial right that may not !e done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may !e disregarded, the trial court may ma e its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may !e gathered from the record. The T=oint Venture )greement on %u!division and @ousing

2rojectsT executed !y )6) @omes and )rayon, et. al. relied upon !y the judge, in the a!sence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation. The judge<s act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a 6oard of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MAR)/C><s constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule esta!lished !y the Revised Rules of Court. 1@. REPU7!IC VS SA)T<S This is a "3+3 expropriation case. 8t involves ++,,3+ s(uare meters of land claimed !y 99 persons, located in 2arana(ue and Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was necessary for the widening of, and construction of interchanges in, the Manila %outh Biversion Road. The only issue, and it had always !een a trou!lesome issue,is as to the just compensation to !e paid !y the 0overnment. The )ppraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at forty pesos 429,5 per s(uare meter, or an aggregate amount of 2?,+9","3,, the provisional value of the lands in its Resolution ;o. ",, series of "3+C. The 0overnment deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the 2hilippine ;ational 6an . %ome respondents, including Maura %antos, withdrew the amounts corresponding to them su!ject to the outcome of the case. The Court of Dirst 8nstance at 2asig, Rizal in its order of =une "3, "3+3 granted the fiscal<s motion fixing the provisional value at 2?,+9","3,. ) writ of possession was issued to the Repu!lic of the 2hilippines 4"C7 and "3? Record on )ppeal5. Dourteen 4"95 claimants 4including the Manila Alectric Company5 did not o!ject to the valuation of 29, a s(uare meter. They were paid the amounts due to them at that price 47",&"*, Record on )ppeal5. Thus, this lands of Direstone Tire J Ru!!er Company, Concepcion 8ndustries, 8nc., 8%C Realty Bevelopment Corporation, Consolidated Mills, 8nc., 2a!lo /. Aspiritu and Victoria C.0. Ty with areas of 7,*#", ",+C+, ",#,,, 7,?C3, ",,9" and 33C s(uare meters, respectively, were all sold to the *epublic at P+, a s#uare meter 4"+"&+7- "*C, ?7"&7#, ?99&9+, ?#,&#9 and ?++& *", Record on )ppeal5. The condemnation proceeding was terminated as to the said claimants. Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly indicative of the fair mar et value of the lands at the time of the expropriation in the later part of "3+C or early in "3+3. )s to those who did not settle at the price of 29, a s(uare meter, the trial court, pursuant to section #, Rule +* of the Rules of Court, appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation' 6enjamin Morales for the court as chairman- 2acifico =avier, the provincial assessor, for the Repu!lic, and 2acifico 8. 0uzman for the claimants 4?9", Record on )ppeal' %ee 2B ;o. "#77 dated =une "", "3*C as to the determination of just compensation without the need for appointing commissioners5. The commissioners in their report dated >cto!er ?, "3*, recommended that the just compensation for the lands should !e P-,, a s#uare meter except the land of Maura %antos

with an area of ?#,3,3 s(uare meters 4out of "9*,+,3 s(uare meters, 79?, Record on )ppeal5 which should !e evaluated at P., a s#uare meter 47?*, Record on )ppeal5. The trial court in its decision dated May "7, "3*? modified that recommendation. 8t fixed 2",, a s(uare meter as the uniform price to !e paid to the claimants 49,", Record on )ppeal5. The Court of )ppeals in its decision of =une ?3, "3C" in turn modified the trial court<s decision and adopted the commissioners< report. 8t added +$ legal rate of interest from De!ruary *, "3+3, the date of the filing of the complaint 4p. 9?, Rollo5. The Repu!lic appealed to this Court. The petitioner contends that the )ppellate Court erred in not holding that the commissioners should not have relied on the price of 2",, for the land of =ose )lcaraz which was sold in ;ovem!er, "3+3 and on other irrelevant evidence. 8t further argues that the )ppellate Court erred in disregarding the fact that "9 out of the 99 claimants already sold their lots to the Repu!lic at 29, a s(uare meter. Respondents Maura %antos, International 'extile /ills, Inc) and merican 0ire 1 Cable Co), Inc. su!mitted appellees< !riefs to justify the )ppellate Court<s decision. .e hold that the trial court and the )ppellate Court erred in relying on the commissioners< report whose recommendation was not su!stantiated !y trustworthy evidence. )s pointed out !y the )ssistant %olicitor 0eneral, the appraisal of 2",, a s(uare meter for the land of )lcaraz was made a!out eight months after the filing of the instant expropriation case. UU 8t may !e noted that 2residential Becree ;o. "#77 provides that just compensation should !e the value of the land2prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate 3overn ment office to ac#uire the property)2 The statement in the "3*, report of the commissioners that according to the owners of adjoining lots the prices per s(uare meter ranged from 2"#, to 2?,, and that su!division lots in the vicinity were !eing sold at 2C# to 2"?, a s(uare meter was not based on any documentary evidence) 8t is manifestly hearsay. Moreover, those prices refer to "3*, or more than a year after the expropriation was effected. 8n the case of Maura %antos, it should !e noted that the expropriation undenia!ly increased the value of the remainder of her land with an area of "?",*,, s(uare meters 4%ee 2rovincial 0overnment of Rizal vs. Caro de )raullo, #C 2hil. 7,C5. %he was already paid 2",,7+,7+, for her expropriated land. Durthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over the undisputed fact that "9 claimants out of 99 had winingly sold their lands to the 0overnment at 29, a s(uare meter as fixed !y the provincial )ppraisal Committee of which the provincial assessor was a mem!er. Avidently, they were satisfied that that was a reasona!le price.

)ccording to section C of Rule +*, the court is not !ound !y the commissioners< report. 8t may ma e such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may su!stitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record 4Manila Railroad Company vs. Velas(uez, 7? 2hil. ?C+5. )s noted in the 4elas#ue$ case, the moment a parcel of land is sought to !e condemned, the price, for some occult reason, immediately soars far !eyond what the owner would thin of as ing or receiving in the open mar et. >wners as fa!ulous prices for it and neigh!ors loo on with an indulgent smile or even persuade themselves that the land is worth the price for which the owner holds out in view of the fact that it is wanted !y an entity whose financial resources are supposed to !e inexhausti!le 4p. 7"75. Conse(uently, the petitioner should pay only 29, per s(uare meter for the expropriated lands. CMC 4CM%5 8nvestments, 8nc. was paid 27# a s(uare meter for its #7, s(uare meters 4#C, Record on )ppeal5. 8t is entitled to a deficiency on which +$ legal rate of interest per annum should !e paid from the time the petitioner too possession of its land up to the date of payment 4Repu!lic vs. Gaptinchay, ",C 2hil. ",9+,",#75. .@ARAD>RA, the decisions of the trial court and the Court of )ppeals are reversed and set aside. The just compensation for the lands descri!ed in paragraph ? of petitioner<s complaint is forty pesos 429,5 per s(uare meter. ;o costs. %> >RBARAB. 1C. !A)" 7A)E <F T E P I!IPPI)ES v$. FE!ICIA)< F. 9>C<C<

Meanwhile, B)R and /62 filed their respective answered that the valuation of .ycocoEs property was in accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies !y not participating in the summary administrative proceedings !efore the B)R)6 which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation. >n ;ovem!er "9, "33#, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of .ycoco. 8t ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of pu!lic nowledge that the prevailing mar et value of agricultural lands sold in /ica!, ;ueva Acija is from 2"7#,,,,.,, to "#,,,,,.,, per hectare. The court thus too judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 39."+3, hectare land at 2"9?,#,,.,, per hectare or a total of 2"7,9?C,,C?.,,. 8t also awarded .ycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. The B)R and the /62 filed separate petitions !efore the Court of )ppeals. The petition !rought !y B)R on jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted .ycoco to file a petition for mandamus !efore this Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ca!anatuan City !e executed, and that =udge Caspillo !e compelled to inhi!it himself from hearing the case. The petition !rought !y /62 on !oth su!stantive and procedural grounds was li ewise dismissed !y the Court of )ppeals. @owever, the Court of )ppeals modified its decision !y deducting from the compensation due to .ycoco the amount corresponding to the 7.7+*? hectare portion of the 39."+3, hectare land which was found to have !een previously sold !y .ycoco to the Repu!lic. /62 contended that the Court of )ppeals erred in its ruling.

FACTS: This case is a consolidated petition of one see ing review of the decision of C) modifying the decision of RTC acting as a %pecial )grarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of execution and to direct =udge Caspillo to inhi!it. Deliciano D. .ycoco is the registered owner of a 39."+3, hectare land. .ycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Bepartment of )grarian Reform for 2"9.3 million. B)R offered 2?,?C,,"#3.C?. The area which the B)R offered to ac(uire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. .ycoco rejected the offer, prompting the B)R to indorse the case to the Bepartment of )grarian Reform )djudication 6oard 4B)R)65 for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the B)R)6 re(uested /62 to open a trust account in the name of .ycoco and deposited the compensation offered !y B)R. 8n the meantime, the property was distri!uted to farmer&!eneficiaries. >n )pril "7, "337, .ycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Ca!anatuan City against B)R and /62. >n March 3, "339, the B)R)6 dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just compensation !y the RTC.

ISSUES: ". .hether or not the RTC ac(uired jurisdiction over the case acting as %pecial )grarian Court. ?. )ssuming that it ac(uired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation arrived at supported !y evidence. 7. .hether or not .ycoco can compel B)R to purchase the entire land. 9. .hether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid. HELD: ". Ges, the RTC acting as %pecial )grarian Court, ac(uired jurisdiction of the case. %ections #, and #* of Repu!lic )ct ;o. ++#* 4Comprehensive )grarian Reform /aw of "3CC5 provides' %ection #,.Ouasi&judicial 2owers of the B)R. V The B)R is here!y vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bepartment of )griculture 4B)5 and the Bepartment of Anvironment and ;atural Resources 4BA;R5W.

%ection #*.%pecial =urisdiction. V The %pecial )grarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this )ct. ?. ;o, the compensation arrived is not supported !y evidence. 8n arriving at the valuation of .ycocoEs land, the trial court too judicial notice of the alleged prevailing mar et value of agricultural lands without apprising the parties of its intention to ta e judicial notice thereof. %ection 7, Rule "?3 of the Rules on Avidence provides' %ec. 7. =udicial ;otice. .hen @earing ;ecessary. V Buring the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on re(uest of a party, may announce its intention to ta e judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to !e heard thereon. )fter trial and !efore judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on re(uest of a party, may ta e judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to !e heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without !asis. >nly the mar et value was ta en into account in determining the just compensation. %ince other factors were not considered, the case was remanded for determination of just compensation. 7. ;o, the B)R cannot !e compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered !y .ycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive )grarian Reform 2rogram is essentially lodged with the B)R. That .ycoco will suffer damages !y the B)REs non&ac(uisition of the approximately ", hectare portion of the entire land which was found to !e not suita!le for agriculture is no justification to compel B)R to ac(uire the whole area. 9. Ges, .ycocoEs claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The trust account opened as the mode of payment of just compensation should !e converted to a deposit account. The conversion should !e retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed !y the B)R in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the !enefits concomitant to payment in cash or /62 !onds. >therwise, petitionerEs right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would !e violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation. The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should !e deleted !ecause .ycoco failed to show proof of loss. .ycocoEs petition for mandamus in 0.R. ;o. "9+*77 was dismissed. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ca!anatuan City, acting as %pecial )grarian Court cannot !e enforced !ecause there is a need to remand the case to the trial court for determination of just compensation. /i ewise, the prayer for the inhi!ition of =udge Rodrigo %. Caspillo was denied for lac of !asis. 1-. ASS<CIATI<) <F SMA!! !A)"<9)ERS VS SECRETAR> <F A(RARIA) REF<RM Dacts' >n "* =uly "3C*, 2resident Corazon C. )(uino issued Axecutive >rder 4A>5 ??C, declaring full land ownership in favor of the !eneficiaries of 2residential Becree 42B5 ?* and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered !y the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on ?? =uly

"3C* !y 2B "7", instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program 4C)R25, and A> ??3, providing the mechanics for its implementation. %u!se(uently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the 2hilippines too over legislative power from the 2resident and started its own deli!erations, including extensive pu!lic hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited de!ate, was the enactment of Repu!lic )ct 4R)5 ++#*, otherwise nown as the Comprehensive )grarian Reform /aw of "3CC, which 2resident )(uino signed on ", =une ""3CC. This law, while considera!ly changing R) 7C99 4)gricultural /and Reform Code, C )ugust "3+75 and 2B ?* 4?" >cto!er "3*?5, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. The )ssociation of %mall /andowners in the 2hilippines, 8nc., =uanito B. 0omez, 0erardo 6. )larcio, Delife ). 0uico, =r., 6ernardo M. )lmonte, Canuto Ramir 6. Ca!rito, 8sidro T. 0uico, Delisa 8. /lamido, Dausto =. %alva, Reynaldo 0. Astrada, Delisa C. 6autista, Asmenia =. Ca!e, Teodoro 6. Madriaga, )urea =. 2restosa, Amerenciana =. 8sla, Delicisima C. )presto, Consuelo M. Morales, 6enjamin R. %egismundo, Cirila ). =ose, and ;apoleon %. Derrer invo e in their petition 40R *C*9?5 the right of retention granted !y 2B ?* to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding * hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit !ut are occupied !y tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are una!le to enjoy their right of retention !ecause the Bepartment of )grarian Reform 4B)R5 has so far not issued the implementing rules re(uired under 2B 7"+, implementing 2B ?*. They therefore as the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the %ecretary of )grarian Reform to issue the said rules. 8ssue' .hether just compensation should exclusively !e made in money and not other things of value. @eld' This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to !e ta en !y the %tate from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. .hat is dealt with herein is a revolutionary ind of expropriation. The Court assumes that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. 8t is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would !e needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to !e paid not in the orthodox way !ut a less conventional if more practical method. There can !e no dou!t that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would !e enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to !e distri!uted among the farmers. The court may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for !y the C)R2 /aw, particularly the payment of the !alance 4if the owner cannot !e paid fully with money5, or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the mem!ers regarding the meaning to !e given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program !eing contemplated. >n the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are ma ing of the general sentiments and intention of the mem!ers on the

content and manner of the payment to !e made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. )ccepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always re(uired to !e made fully in money, the Court find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the !asis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. 8t is noted that the smaller the land, the !igger the payment in money, primarily !ecause the small landowner will !e needing it more than the !ig landowners, who can afford a !igger !alance in !onds and other things of value. ;o less importantly, the government financial instruments ma ing up the !alance of the payment are Tnegotia!le at any time.T The other modes, which are li ewise availa!le to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasona!le !ecause payment is made in shares of stoc , /62 !onds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value e(uivalent to the amount of just compensation. )dmittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, !ig and small, not a little inconvenience. @owever, this cannot !e avoided. #D. )ATI<)A! P<9ER C<RP<RATI<) v$. CA an/ Man&on/ato D)CT%' 8n "3*C, ;ational 2ower Corporation 4;)2>C>R5, too possession of a ?",33# s(uare meter land which is a portion of /ot " of the su!division plan 4/RC5 2sd&""+"#3 situated in Marawi City, owned !y Mangondato, and covered !y Transfer Certificate of Title ;o. T&7*C&), under the mista en !elief that it forms part of the pu!lic land reserved for use !y ;)2>C>R for hydroelectric power purposes under 2roclamation ;o. "7#9 of the 2resident of the 2hilippines dated Becem!er 7, "3*9. ;)2>C>R alleged that the su!ject land was until then possessed and administered !y Marawi City so that in exchange for the cityEs waiver and (uitclaim of any right over the property, ;)2>C>R had paid the city a Ifinancial assistanceE of 29,.,, per s(uare meter. 8n "3*3, when ;)2>C>R started !uilding its )gus 8 @A 4@ydroelectric 2lant5 2roject, Mangondato demanded compensation from ;)2>C>R. ;)2>C>R refused to compensate insisting that the property is pu!lic land and that it had already paid Ifinancial assistanceE to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Mangondato claimed that the su!ject land is his duly registered private property covered !y Transfer Certificate of Title ;o. T&7*C&) in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement !etween ;)2>C>R and Marawi City and that any payment made to said city cannot !e considered as payment to him. More than a decade later ;)2>C>R acceded to the fact that the property !elongs to Mangondato. >n =uly *, "33?, Mangondato filed !efore the lower court Civil Case ;o. +,#&3? against ;)2>C>R see ing to recover the possession of the property descri!ed in the complaint as /ots " and 7 of the su!division plan 4/RC5 2sd&""+"#3 against ;)2>C>R, the payment of a

monthly rent of 2"#,,,,.,, from "3*C until the surrender of the property, attorneyEs fees and costs, and the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain ;)2>C>R from proceeding with any construction andFor improvements on MangondatoEs land or from committing any act of dispossession. 8%%1A' Rec oning point of mar et value' Date of Taking or Date of Suit? R1/8;0' The general rule in determining :just compensationN in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, as follows' :%ec. 9. 5rder of Condemnation) .hen such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as re(uired !y this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to ta e the property sought to !e condemned, for the pu!lic use or purpose descri!ed in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x 48talics supplied5. ;ormally, the time of the ta ing coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. @ence, many rulings of this Court have e(uated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the a!ove provision of the Rules. %o too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to !e ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. #1. CIT> <F CE7U v$. SP<USES AP<!<)I< an/ 7!ASA "E"AM< D)CT%' >n "* %eptem!er "337, petitioner City of Ce!u filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses )polonio and 6lasa Bedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that itneeded the land for a pu!lic purpose, i.e., for the construction of a pu!lic road which shall serveas an accessFrelief road of 0orordo )venue to extend to the 0eneral Maxilum )venue and the!ac of Magellan 8nternational @otel Roads in Ce!u City. The lower court fixed the amount of justcompensation at 2?,,C?+,773.#,.2etitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at2?,,C?+,773.#,. The just compensation should !e !ased on the prevailing mar et price of theproperty at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.The petitioner did not convince the Court of )ppeals, which affirmed the lower courtEsdecision in toto. 8%%1A'.hether or not just compensation should !e determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. @A/B';>. 8n the case at !ar, the applica!le law as to the point of rec oning for thedetermination of just compensation is %ection "3 of R.). ;o. *"+,, which expressly provides that just compensation shall !e determined as of the time of actual ta ing.The petitioner has misread our ruling in The ;ational 2ower Corp. vs. Court of )ppeals ..e did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should !e determined as of the filing of the complaint. .e explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in

determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint, the rule Tadmits of an exception' where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was ta en and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. ##. REPU7!IC v$. CA FACTS: 2etitioner 428)5 instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of #99,3C, s(uare meters of contiguous land situated along Mac)rthur @ighway, Malolos, 6ulacan, to !e utilized for the continued !roadcast operation and use ofradio transmitter facilities for the :Voice of the 2hilippinesN project. 2etitioner made a deposit of 2#"*,##C.C,, the sum provisionally fixed as !eing the reasona!le value of the property. >n ?+ De!ruary "3*3, or more than 3 years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendantsthe just compensation for the property. 8t would appear that the ;ational 0overnment failed to pay the respondents the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a motion see ing payment for the expropriated property. 8n response, the court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof. Meanwhile, 2res. Astrada issued 2roc. ;o. ?? transferring ?, hectares of the expropriated land to the 6ulacan %tate 1niversity. Bespite the courtEs order, the %antos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount 29,++9,,,, !y way of just compensation. The %antos heirs su!mitted a counter&motion to adjust the compensation from 2+Fs(.m. as previously fixed to its current zonal value of 2#,,,,Fs(.m. or to cause the return of the expropriated property. The RTC 6ulacan ruled in favor of the %antos heirs declaring its ?+ De!ruary "3*3Becision to !e unenforcea!le on the ground of prescription in accordance with %ec. +, Rule 73 of the "3+9F"33* R>C which states that a final and executory judgment or order may !e executed on motion within # years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitionerEs Motion to 2ermit Beposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of %antos. ISSUES: ". .>; the petitioner may appropriate the property ?. .>; the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in (uestion E!": ". The right of eminent domain is usually understood to !e an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a pu!lic purpose. Dundamental to the independent existence of a %tate, it re(uires no recognition !y

the Constitution, whose provisions are ta en as !eing merely confirmatory of its presence and as !eing regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. 8n the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. 8t reaches to every form of property the %tate needs for pu!lic use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the pu!lic interest so re(uires it. The u!i(uitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Axpropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not re(uired to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, !y filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is ta ing title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, !ut to prove a right to compensation for the ta ing. >!viously, however, the power is not without its limits' first, the ta ing must !e for pu!lic use, and second, that just compensation must !e given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving !alance !etween the %tate interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, !y effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. 8n determining : pu3lic u$e,N two approaches are utilized & the first is pu!lic employment or theactual use !y the pu!lic, and the second is pu!lic advantage or !enefit. 8t is also useful to view the matter as !eing su!ject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may !e devoted. The expropriated property has !een shown to !e for the continued utilization !y the 28), a significant portion thereof !eing ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the 6ulacan %tate 1niversity and for the propagation of the 2hilippine cara!ao, themselves in line with the re(uirements of pu!lic purpose. Respondents (uestion the pu!lic nature of the utilization !y petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the "3+3 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a pu!lic character upon its expropriation. %urely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation !eing that it !e for pu!lic use , which, decidedly, it is. ?. ;>. 8n insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial 3overnment of "orsogon vs) 4da) de Villaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in (uestion. 8t might !e !orne in mind that thecase involved the municipal government of %orsogon, to which the power ofeminent domain is not inherent, !ut merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Repu!lic )ct ;o. *"+, cannot !e understood as !eing the pervasive and all&encompassing power vested in the legislative !ranch of government. Dor local governments to !e a!le to wield the power, it must, !y ena!ling law, !e delegated to it !y the national legislature, !ut

even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly spea ing, a power of eminent, !ut only of inferior, domain or only as !road or confined as the real authority would want it to !e. Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Repu!lic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled & :The points in dispute are whether such payment can still !e made and, if so, in what amount. %aid lots have !een the su!ject of expropriation proceedings. 6y final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for pu!lic use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x 8t follows that !oth !y virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots & which are still devoted to the pu!lic use for which they were expropriated & !ut only to demand the fair mar et value of the same. T%aid relief may !e granted under plaintiffs< prayer for' Xsuch other remedies, which may !e deemed just and e(uita!le under the premises<.T The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in )lfonso vs. 2asay City where the recovery of possession of property ta en for pu!lic use prayed for !y the unpaid landowner was denied even while no re(uisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed at its mar et value at the time it was ta en and appropriated !y the %tate. The judgment rendered !y the 6ulacan RTC in "3*3 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents !ut li ewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are !ound. 2etitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the propertypursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the "3*3 judgment, there!y preempting any claim of !ar !y prescription on grounds of non&execution. 8n arguing for the return of their property on the !asis of non& payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. )n in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. )fter condemnation, the paramount title is in the pu!lic under a new and independent title- thus, !y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing !etter title against all the world than may !e o!tained !y voluntary conveyance. Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not ta e into account that the same argument could li ewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on ,3 May "3C9, or five years after the "3*3 judgment had !ecome final. The unusually long delay in !ringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should ta e good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon

the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property. The constitutional limitation of ::u$t co2pen$ationN is considered to !e the sum e(uivalent to the mar et value of the property, !roadly descri!ed to !e the price fixed !y the seller in open mar et in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as !etween one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual ta ing !y the government. Thus, if property is ta en for pu!lic use !efore compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to !e computed from the time the property is ta en to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. 8n fine, !etween the ta ing of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as 4!ut not !etter than5 the position he was in !efore the ta ing occurred. The 6ulacan trial court, in its "3*3 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to !e computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and :too N the property in %eptem!er "3+3. This allowance of interest on the amount found to !e the value of the property as of the time of the ta ing computed, !eing an effective for!earance, at "?$ per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. )rticle "?#, of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the esta!lishment of the o!ligation shall !e the !asis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual o!ligations. 8n other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to !e ta en into account to alter the value of the currency. )ll given, the trial court of 6ulacan in issuing its order, dated ," March ?,,,, vacating its decision of ?+ De!ruary "3*3 has acted !eyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it !eing to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to !e paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed !y final judgment of the 6ulacan RTC on ?+ De!ruary "3*3 at 2+.,, per s(uare meter, with legal interest thereon at "?$ per annum computed from the date of Tta ingT of the property, i.e., "3 %eptem!er "3+3, until the due amount shall have !een fully paid. #*. REPU7!IC <F T E P I!IPPI)ES4 et al v. VICE)TE (. !IM .hile the prevailing doctrine is that :the non&payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that :the government cannot eep the property and dishonor the judgment.N To !e sure, the five&year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in eeping with justice and e(uity.

>n %eptem!er #, "37C, Repu!lic of the 2hilippines instituted an expropriation case for the purpose of esta!lishing a military reservation for the 2hilippine )rmy. /ot 37? was registered in the name of 0ervasiaBenzon, while /ot 373 was in the name of Aulalia Benzon. )fter depositing 23,#,,.,, with the2hilippine ;ational 6an , the Repu!lic too possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May "9, "39,, the CD8 rendered its Becision ordering the Repu!lic to pay the Benzons the sum of 29,,+?.", as just compensation. )nentry of judgment was made on )pril #, "39C. Dor failure of the Repu!lic to pay for the lots, on %eptem!er ?,, "3+", the BenzonsE successors&in&interest, Drancisca 0aleos&Valdehueza and =osefina 0aleos&2anerio filed with the same CD8 an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Repu!lic and officers of the )rmed Dorces of the 2hilippines in possession of the property. 8n the interim or on ;ovem!er 3, "3+", TCT ;os. ?7379 and ?737#, with annotation :su!ject to the priority of the ;ational )irports Corporation to ac(uire said parcels of land, /ots 37? and 373 upon previous payment of a reasona!le mar et valueN were issued inthe names of Drancisca Valdehueza and =osefina 2anerio, respectively. >n =uly 7", "3+?, the CD8 promulgated its Becision in favor of Valdehueza and 2anerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over /ots 37? and 373 !ecause of the Repu!licEs failure to pay the amount adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. @owever, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Repu!lic. 8n view of :the differences in money value from "39, up to the present,N the court adjusted the mar et value at 2"+,?9C.9,, to !e paid with +$ interest per annum from )pril #, "39C, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment. )fter the denial of heir motion for reconsideration, Valdehueza and 2anerio appealed !efore CD8, which forwarded the case !efore the %upreme Court, which held that Valdehueza and 2anerio are still the registered owners lots there having !een no payment of just compensation !y the Repu!lic. They contend that although they are not entitled to recover possession !ased since the same are condemned for pu!lic use they must !e allowed to demand the fair mar et value of the same. 8n the meantime, Valdehueza and 2anerio mortgaged the property to Vicente /im. @aving failed to pay, the property was foreclosed. /im later filed an action to (uiet title against the Repu!lic. RTC ruled in his favor, declaring plaintiff Vicente /im the a!solute and exclusive owner of /ot ;o. 37? with all the rights of an a!solute owner including the right to possession. Court of )ppeals sustained the decision of the RTC. The %upreme Court initially denied the petition for review, having seen no reversi!le error on the part of the C). The petitioner Repu!lic however filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: .hether or not the Repu!lic has retained ownership of /ot 37? despite its failure to pay respondentsE predecessors&in&interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CD8 rendered as early as May "9, "39, E!"' 2etition is denied with finality. Court of )ppeals decision affirmed in toto.

The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. =urisprudence on this settled principle is consistent !oth here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can !e no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. >therwise stated, the Repu!licEs ac(uisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasona!le time. The Repu!lic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of /ot 37? !ut only to demand payment of its fair mar et value. >f course, the Court is aware of the doctrine that :non&payment of just compensation 4in an expropriation proceeding5 does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots.N 8t !ears stressing that the Repu!lic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Difty&seven years have passed since then. The Court cannot !ut construe the Repu!licEs failure to pay just compensation as a deli!erate refusal on its part. 1nder such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. 8n several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may !e had when property has !een wrongfully ta en or is wrongfully retained !y one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has !een assessed or agreed upon or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid. The issue of whether or not respondent acted in !ad faith for mortgaging the property. The Repu!lic failed to perfect its title over /ot 37? !y nonpayment just compensation. The issue of !ad faith would have assumed relevance if the Repu!lic actually ac(uired title over /ot 37?. 6ut assuming that the respondents did act in !ad faith, Repu!lic cannot !e vested of !etter title over the land since it has not title to spea of. )ssuming that respondent had indeed nowledge of the annotation, still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving /ot 37? while the expropriation proceeding was pending. )ny person who deals with a property su!ject of an expropriation does so at his own ris , ta ing into account the ultimate possi!ility of losing the property in favor of the government. @ere, the annotation merely served as a caveat that the Repu!lic had a preferential right to ac(uire /ot 37? upon its payment of a :reasona!le mar et value.N 8t did not proscri!e Valdehueza and 2anerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their property. 8t !ears emphasis that when Valdehueza and 2anerio mortgaged /ot 37? to respondent in "3+9, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Repu!lic. 8n fact, it never did. %uch title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that' :8t is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having !een a transfer of said lots in favor of the 0overnment.N 8n summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that :the non&payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five years RACA;T =1R8%2R1BA;CA V 2>/8T8C)/ /). from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their

property. This is in consonance with the principle that :the government cannot eep the property and dishonor the judgment.N To !e sure, the five&year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in eeping with justice and e(uity. )fter all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it ta es property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. 8n Cosculluela v. Court of )ppeals, the Court defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to !e paid to the property owner !ut also the payment of the property within a reasona!le time. .ithout prompt payment, compensation cannot !e considered :just.N #,. )PC VS CA an/ Antonino Po3re Fact$: 2etitioner ;ational 2ower Corporation is a pu!lic corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. ;2C is authorized !y law to ac(uire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. 2rivate respondent )ntonino 2o!re is the owner of a +C,3+3 s(uare&meter land located in 6arangay 6ano, Municipality of Tiwi, )l!ay. The 2roperty is covered !y TCT ;o. 9,+* and %u!division 2lan ""&3*,3. 8n "3+7, 2o!re !egan developing the 2roperty as a resort& su!division, which he named as :Tiwi @ot %prings Resort %u!division.N Commission on Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and steam suita!le for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. >n " %eptem!er "3*3, ;2C filed its second expropriation case against 2o!re to ac(uire an additional #,##9 s(uare meters of the 2roperty. >n + %eptem!er "3*3, ;2C entered the #,##9 s(uare&meter lot upon the trial courtEs issuance of a writ of possession to ;2C. >n ", Becem!er "3C9, 2o!re filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. 2o!re claimed that ;2C damaged his 2roperty. 8ssue' @eld' ;2C as plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. ;2C relies on %ection ", Rule "* of the "3+9 Rules of Court, the Rules then in effect. ;2C argues that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case including 2o!reEs counterclaim. Aven a timely opposition against 2o!reEs claim for damages would not yield a favora!le ruling for ;2C. 8t is not %ection ", Rule "* of the "3+9 Rules of Court that is applica!le to this case !ut Rule +* of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule "* referred to dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule +* specifically governed eminent domain cases. Aminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to ta e private property for pu!lic use upon o!servance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. The power of eminent domain may !e validly delegated to the local governments, other pu!lic entities and pu!lic utilities such as ;2C. Axpropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain. :Aminent BomainN was the former title of Rule +* of the "3+9 Rules of

Court. 8n the "33* Rules of Civil 2rocedure, which too effect on " =uly "33*, the prescri!ed method of expropriation is still found in Rule +*, !ut its title is now :Axpropriation.N ;2C is in no position to invo e %ection ", Rule "* of the "3+9 Rules of Court. ) plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment !efore the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the complaint. 2o!reEs :motion to dismissFanswer,N filed and served way ahead of ;2CEs motion to dismiss, ta es the case out of %ection ", Rule "* assuming the same applies. 8n expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffEs matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely !ecause the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the ta ing. The plaintiffEs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always !een su!ject to court approval and to certain conditions. #;. MCIAA, vs. CA an/ C I<)(7IA) (.R. )o. 1*-,-; )ove23er #@4 #DDD FACTS: >n )pril "+, "3#?, the Repu!lic, represented !y the C)), filed an expropriation proceeding to the CD8 of Ce!u on several parcels of land in /ahug, Ce!u City, which included /ot 39", for the expansion and improvement of /ahug )irport. 8n "3#7, appellee Chiong!ian purchased /ot 39" from its original owner, the original defendant in the expropriation case. %u!se(uently, a TCT was issued in her name Then in "3+", judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Repu!lic which was made to pay Chiong!ian an amount for /ot 39". Chiong!ian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, a!solute title to /ot 39" was transferred to the Repu!lic under a TCT. Then, in "33,, Repu!lic )ct ;o. +3#C was passed !y Congress creating the Mactan&Ce!u 8nternational )irport )uthority 4MC8))5 to which the assets of the /ahug )irport was transferred. /ot 39" was then transferred in the name of MC8)) under a TCT. 8n "33#, Chiong!ian filed a complaint for reconveyance of /ot 39" with the RTC of Ce!u, alleging, that sometime in "393, the ;ational )irport Corporation 4;)C5 ventured to expand the Ce!u /ahug )irport. )s a conse(uence, it sought to ac(uire !y expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the /ahug )irport, one of which was /ot 39" owned !y Chiong!ian. %ince she and other landowners could not agree with the ;)CEs offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, !efore the then CD8 of Ce!u against 9# landowners, including Chiong!ian, entitled :Repu!lic of the 2hilippine vs. Bamian >uano, et al.N 8t was finally decided in favor of the Repu!lic of the 2hilippines. %ome of the defendants&landowners appealed the decision to the C) which rendered a modified judgment allo1in& t0e2 to repurc0a$e their expropriated properties. Chiong!ian, on the other hand, /i/ not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for /ot 39" upon the assurance of the ;)C that she or her heirs would !e given the right of reconveyance for

the same price once the land would no longer !e used as 4sic5 airport.Y!y an alleged written agreementZ Conse(uently, the TCT of Chiong!ian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the Repu!lic. Then, with the creation of the MC8)), it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its name. @owever, no expansion of the /ahug )irport was underta en !y MC8)) and its predecessors&in&interest. Thus, the purpose for which /ot 39" was ta en ceased to exist. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiong!ian and MC8)) was ordered to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as /ot ;o. 39" upon reim!ursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RB is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff. MC8)) appealed the decision to the C) which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition. ISSUE: Petioner (uestions whether or not the a!andonment of the pu!lic use for which /ot ;o. 39" was expropriated entitles C@8>;068); to reac(uire it. E!": The Becision of the C) is here!y REVERSE" and SET ASI"E. The complaint of Chiong!ian against the Mactan&Ce!u 8nternational )irport )uthority for reconveyance of /ot ;o. 39" is "ISMISSE". :The answer to that (uestion depends upon the character of the title ac(uired !y the expropriatorW which has the right to ac(uire property under the power of eminent domain. 8f, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or a!andoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or a!andoned the former owner reac(uires the property so expropriated If4 upon t0e contrary4 0o1ever4 t0e /ecree of e5propriation &ive$ to t0e entity a fee $i2ple title4 t0en4 of cour$e4 t0e lan/ 3eco2e$ t0e a3$olute property of t0e e5propriator4 10et0er it 3e t0e State4 a province4 or 2unicipality4 an/ in t0at ca$e t0e nonFu$er /oe$ not 0ave t0e effect of /efeatin& t0e title acquire/ 3y t0e e5propriation procee/in&$. .hen land has !een ac(uired for pu!lic use in fee si p!e, unconditionally, either !y the exercise of eminent domain or !y purchase, the for2er o1ner retain$ no ri&0t$ in the land, and the pu!lic use may !e a!andoned, or the land may !e devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title ac(uired, or any reversion to the former owner.N 8n the present case, evidence reveals that /ot ;o. 39" was appropriated !y the Repu!lic of the 2hilippines through expropriation proceedings. The terms of the judgment are clear and une(uivocal and grant title to /ot ;o. 39" in fee $i2ple to the Repu!lic. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to C@8>;068); or that

C@8>;068); had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or a!andoned or if the property was to !e used other than as the /ahug airport.

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