KATHY MIRIAM

TOWARDA
PHENOME
NOLOGYOF
SEXRIGHT
Reviving Radical Feminist Theory
of Compulsory Heterosexuality
3
In 200+, a special issue ot the ourroi
o, Vo.r's H:stor, devoted itselt to Adrienne Rich's land
mark 1986 essay, The Lesbian Continuum and Compulso
ry Heterosexuality." As a contributor to this volume, Rich
retlects critically, trom the perspective ot twentythree years,
on the shortcomins ot her essay. While expressin ambiva
lence about the concept ot the lesbian continuum," she re
mains convinced ot the lastin usetulness" ot her critique
ot the heterosexual presumption. $he writes, That new
enerations ot youn women have met with that critique
tor the tirst time in my essay only indicates how deeply the
presumption still prevails" (10).
My own encounters, in the past tive years, with collee
ae women and men contirm Rich's remarks. $easoned by
mass media circulatin normal" and likeable" imaes ot
ays and lesbians and to some deree enlihtened by the
educational ettorts ot OLBT roups on campus, many ot
the youn people I teach hold the liberal attitude that ays
and lesbians are just like everyone else." Yet despite this
spirit ot tolerance tor ays and lesbians, the i.t.ros.uoi r.
sut:or remains intact, even in my teminism classes. For
most ot my teminism students, the claim that heterosexual
ity is social, institutionalized, and compulsory comes as a
revelation.
+
Kathy Miriam
The tact that the theory ot compulsory heterosexuality is both so new to
my students and has such a (positive) impact on their teminist conscious
ness, points to the extent to which the couisor, dimension ot heterosex
uality remains mystitiednaturalized in the contemporary liteworld, and
indeed the extent to which heterosexuality remains compulsory despite
the visibility-and to some extent cultural leitimacy-ot diverse sexual
identities. Political and cultural backlash tactics aainst queers and queer
rihts point to the extent to which heterosexual privilee and entitlement
remain deeply sedimented within the wider culture. In the Lnited $tates,
the current administration clearly seeks to enshrine heterosexual mar
riae as the norm tor civilization and has siniticant support tor this mis
sion trom the American public. In the 200+ L.$. presidential elections,
eleven out ot eleven states with an amendment to ban ay marriae on the
ballot approved the measure. $ince that time (as well as leadin up to it),
state and local leislators, as well as publiccitizen roups, have reularly
introduced measures to roll back ay rihts. The most recent tlash point
tor backlash continencies, the battle aainst ay marriae, is the tip ot
the iceber ot heterosexualism. By i.t.ros.uoi:s I reter to an ensemble
ot social, political, and cultural torces that naturalize and uphold hetero
sexuality as an entitlement and privilee, while threatenin the social and
existential survival ot anyone who deviates trom the heterosexual norm.
Despite the tact that so much societal enery is exerted to uphold this
norm, most people cleave to the idea that heterosexuality is natural.
I'd like to take the occasion ot this special H,ot:o issue on heterosexual
ism to revisit the radicallesbian teminist claim that normative hetero
sexuality is crucial tor the maintenance ot temale subordination. In my
view, we cannot tully understand heterosexist biotry, or the heterosexual
norm, without (re)theorizin the connection between heteronormativity
and male supremacy. I also believe that the obtuscation ot this connection
in teminist and queer theory contributes to the continued mystitication
ot the compulsory dimension ot heterosexuality, and thus remains an
obstacle to overcomin heterosexualism more enerally. This is why temi
nism needs a radical teminist view.
While most teminists would aree that heterosexuality remains compul
sory within contemporary L.$. society, the radical teminist view no lon
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
5
er has much play within academic teminism. The cornerstone ot Rich's
notion ot compulsory heterosexuality is the theory ot the law ot male
sexriht to women" (1986, +7)-a theory ot heterosexuality as a means tor
men to ain access to women's emotions, sexuality, and bodies (36-39,
50).
1
Many teminist theorists now contest this notion ot (male) power.
Elisabeth Orosz's claim alon these lines is typical, she arues that the
theory ot patriarchy as the system ot universal male riht to the appro
priation ot women's bodies" opens the way tor a victim discourse" (199+,
9). $imilarly, many theorists have claimed that radical teminist accounts
ot compulsory heterosexuality and sexriht" detine heterosexuality in
terms ot male desires and aression, and theretore, siniticantly tail to
account tor temale aency.
2
$uch critics miht point to the current liberal
ization ot sexual norms within industrialistcapitalist contexts as evidence
ot women's and irls' active participation in (hetero)sexual relations. To
be sure, the Riht pushes tor its sexual austerity measures to some deree
in vain. Few people would disaree that despite such measures, irls and
women continue to have sex outside ot marital contexts and at youner
aes, and increasinly have sexual encounters independent ot onoin,
monoamous sexual relationships.
In this essay, I do rant that in order to understand heteronormativity,
teminists must include an account ot women's and irls' sexual aency.
However, I r.,.ct the idea that a theory ot sexriht is theretore outdated
and inadequate. I arue that the liberalization ot sexual norms, and, more
enerally, temale aency, needs to be understood in terms ot the sexu
al antinomies in late modernity" (]ackson and $cott 200+). Analysis ot
these sexual antinomies helps demystity the current ways that the com
pulsory dimension ot heterosexuality is at once more hidden and more
entrenched in our culture. First, new torms ot women's and irls' sexual
aency coexist with unabated (and still vastly underreported) rates ot rape
and sexual coercion. $econd, increased sexual activity needs to be under
stood in a context where many torms ot mass culture have hypersexualized
a youner and youner temale body throuh advertisin, tashion, cosmet
ics, and media imaes. Consider the emerence ot a new sweetsixteen"
itt tor irls-breast implants (Duenwald 200+). Do new torms ot sexual
aency represent a new sexual treedom tor women and irls or do they
6
Kathy Miriam
more predominantly constitute new torms ot inducement to (hetero)sex.
It inducement, do new torms ot temale aency imply a new means tor
men to ain access to women's sexuality and women's bodies. Does this
include men's access to lesbian sexuality.
My project in this essay is to tocus on the ettect ot heteronormativity on
the aency ot women and irls who, even it identitied as bisexual, actively
enae in sexual heterorelations. Thus, unlike most queer theory, this
essay does not tocus on the relation between heteronormativity and les
bian or queer aency. However, it's important to note the extent to which
lesbianism itselt has been retiured by heteronormativity today as central
to the heterosexual norm, that is, tor the pleasure ot men. The cable
television show Ti. LVorc exemplities the way that a pornoraphic view
ot lesbian sexuality has become a staple ot masculinist culture. Aain,
my own teachin experiences have provided me with insiht into sexual
culture on a university campus. I have learned, tor example, that a com
mon practice at traternity parties is tor the male students to et the irls
to make out-trats hold bikini contests where the youn women make out
with one another as part ot the competition, and women are asked to
make out just to et into the door ot trat parties. $everal women students
have told me that male students have beed them to make out with their
temale triends and in some cases ottered to pay them to watch. On one
traternity traternity related website, the top ten hottest lesbian sex scenes
in mainstream movies are listed. In sum, there is a reat likelihood that
today, the sexual aency ot lesbianism, rather than simply toreclosed by
heteronormativity, is retiured in terms ot men's access to women.
3

Is it paradoxical to claim that contemporary torms ot sexual aency in
straiht women and lesbians presuppose male access to women's bodies.
Or, on the contrary, does the paradox disappear once aency is viewed
outside a liberal paradim ot treedom trom coercion and trom a new
philosophical perspective.
In this essay, I view aency trom a perspective that distinuishes it in
the ontoloical sense ot how a human subject lives throuh her or his
situation (Vasterlin 2003) trom treedom as a capacity to cocreate (and
transtorm) one's situation. From this perspective, there is no paradox in
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
7
the idea ot a temale aency that reproduces or reentrenches rather than
overcomes domination, coercion, or victimization.
+
In order to elaborate
this concept ot aency, I arue that teminism needs to revive rather than
jettison the concept ot sexriht- only then can we rasp the normative
and social conditions ot temale aency (includin lesbian aency) within
a situation ot ender subordination. I detend the concept ot sexriht on
new theoretical rounds. I arue that we need to read and expand the
radical teminist theory ot compulsory heterosexuality and sexriht trom
a i.ro.roio:coii.r.r.ut:c .rs.ct::.. That is to say, we need to under
stand men's riht to have sexual access to women as part ot a backround
understandin-the interpretative round-ot women's (and men's) lived
experience ot heterorelations. Toward this end, I enlist the work ot Mau
rice MerleauPonty (1962, 196+) as well as teminist phenomenoloy, par
ticularly the work ot Linda Martn Alcott (2001, 2000) and $andra Lee
Bartky (1990). I draw on these theorists to enae a phenomenoloical
hermeneutic rereadin ot Catharine MacKinnon's (1989) theory ot sexu
ality and, more extensively, Carole Pateman's (1988, 2002) theories ot
the sexual contract. I arue that Pateman's theorizin especially attords
us a unique insiht into the meanin ot sexriht in the contemporary
liteworld.
Followin a stratey ot arumentation Alcott has used, I round my
i.ro.roio, o, s.r:it in a sample phenomenoloical description ot
women's lived experience ot sexual aency. In order to clear the way tor
my new approach to sexriht and aency within heterorelations, it's im
portant to tirst review the main tenets ot the radical teminist notion ot
compulsory heterosexuality and sexriht.
!"#$%&'&() +$,-./0$%1 "#!#%$0#2.3/&!1 &( 4567
My interest is not in revivin Rich's theory as a whole but in the radical
teminist approach her arument crystallized, particularly with the notion
ot sexriht. Accordin to Rich, compulsory heterosexuality exists in and
throuh a pervasive cluster ot torces, ranin trom men's physical bru
tality to control ot women's consciousness" (1986, 185). These torces
include men denyin women's sexuality, torcin their own sexuality upon
8
Kathy Miriam
women, exploitin women's labor, and physically continin women. Rich
concluded,
Whatever its oriins, when we look hard and clearly at the extent and
elaboration ot measures desined to keep women within a male sexual
purlieu, it becomes an inescapable question whether the issue we have
to address as teminists is not simple ender inequality" nor the domi
nation ot culture by males, nor mere taboos aainst homosexuality,"
but the entorcement ot heterosexuality tor women as a means ot as
surin male riht ot physical, economical and emotional access. (191)
Rich was theorizin the heterosexual norm in terms ot a relation ot pow
er-a relation ot power that, in her view, oes to the root ot heterosexual
biotry, homophobia, and denial ot juridical rihts to women.
,3+8&(($(90 !"#$%1 $: 0#2.3/&!1
MacKinnon's theory ot sexuality developed the notion ot sexriht in si
niticant ways. Her critics typically have claimed that the determinism ot
her theory inherently precludes the possibility ot women's treedom and
thus undermines the very project ot teminism she would advance (Cor
nell 1991, 119-6+, Brown 1995, chap. +).
5
This criticism ot Mackinnon
as determinist" relies on an implicit contusion between MacKinnon's
social constructionism and a theory ot causal determinism. Thus Butler
arued that MacKinnon was positin causal relations" between sex, en
der, domination, and heterosexuality. $ex is ender is sexual positional
ity" (Butler 199+, 9). Causal determinist theories ot human behavior, as
MerleauPonty arued, do indeed misrepresent human beins by conceiv
in ot them as the meetin place ot causal aencies. But human beins
are not objects within a causal chain ot events, they are subjects actively
embodyin a relation between the selt and world, and thus are involved in
interpretin and ivin torm to their environment (MerleauPonty 1962,
chap. 3).
However, rather than providin a causal analysis, MacKinnon-in an
ironic similarity to Butler here-exposed the normative conditions ot in
telliibility tor (hetero)sexuality (Butler 1993, 1+). That is to say, MacKin
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
9
non theorized what is taken to be sexuality, what sex means and what
is meant by sex" (MacKinnon 1989, 129). However, in sharp contrast to
Butler, tor MacKinnon, sexual meanin" is made in the social relations
ot power in the world" (129) that cannot be tully accounted tor by (as But
ler assumes) normative and linuistic trameworks ot analysis. Thus MacK
innon wanted to know what sexuality means when, how, with whom,
and with what consequences to whom" (129). The answer she arrived at is
that (hetero)sexual meanin is made specitically in the interests ot male
sexuality" (129). And she emphasized, It is these interests that construct
what heterosexuality as such means, includin the standard way it is al
lowed and reconized to be telt and expressed and experienced, in a way
that determines women's bioraphies, includin sexual ones" (129).
The meanin ot c.t.r:r.s tor MacKinnon, rather than implyin mecha
nistic, causal relations between (hetero)sexuality and ender, suests that
ender is the rourc ot sexuality, rather than cous.c o, or a cous. o, sexual
ity. MerleauPonty's distinction between cause and round ot perception
is usetul here. In the context ot discussin visibility, MerleauPonty ar
ued aainst the notion that visible ditterence (tor example, color) is the
cause" ot how it is perceived. On the contrary, certain contents ot per
ception-sensory data"-are the round (or object") and not the cause ot
perception. throuh acts ot perception we put these contents into play. In
other words, embodied consciousness or:rs ti. ::s:oi. :rto o.:r (Merleau
Ponty 1962, 1+6). Analoously, Mackinnon's theory is suestive ot the
idea that ender brins (hetero)sexuality into bein.
Accordin to MacKinnon, we cannot understand how (hetero)sexuality
produces ender" without lookin at how, throuh sexuality, men's in
terests are put into play (1989, 129). For example, we can see that the con
tents ot normative teminine behavior-what is allowed and disallowed-
shows evidence ot men's interests (131), which is to say that the ender
detinition ot 'temale' " coheres with the social requirements tor male
sexual arousal and satistaction" (1+3). Thus (hetero)sexuality itselt :s this
process ot puttin into play the contents ot ender, the process throuh
which meanins ot ender are embodied, and are thus constituted and
oranized in socially determinativecompulsory ways. The meanin ot c.
t.r:r.s in this account coheres with the theory ot heemony developed
10
Kathy Miriam
by Marxists. some socialcultural interpretative schemas ain more leiti
macy than others within specitic liteworld contexts and thus take hold
ot our sense ot reality. Thus, I arue that (hetero)sexuality-considered as
a heemony- is a process throuh which men's interests ain leitimacy
in a patriarchal social order, or, in other words, a process throuh which
masculinist sexuality constitutes itselt as men's r:it to have sexual access
to women.
6
The issue that incites MacKinnon's critics is whether she was advanc
in a totalizin" view ot (hetero)sexuality, or, in other words, a view ot
(hetero)sexuality so thorouhly constructed by male desire and aression
that temale sexual aency and alternative bodilysexual schemas" are en
tirely toreclosed.
7
This criticism, however, relies on a misrepresentation
ot MacKinnon's social constructionism as a mechanistic, causal social de
terminism. When read as a political, phenomenoloicalhermeneutics ot
(hetero)sexuality, one can say ot MacKinnon's theory what Butler says ot
her own theory ot the heterosexual matrix. rather than preclude aency,
Mackinnon is theorizin the conditions under which women's sexual
aency is enabled." In other words, (hetero)sexuality is the round ot
women's aency-where aency is understood in the ontoloical sense ot
how an embodied temale subject i::.s tiroui (hetero)sexuality. However,
to say that women are aents is not to say that they are empowered or tree.
On the contrary, and in distinction trom Butler, MacKinnon's theory ot
(hetero)sexuality shows that women's aency is only enabled within an
interpretive and power schema based on men's sexriht. It MacKinnon is
riht, her theory compels us to ditterentiate aency in and ot itselt trom
transtormative aency. To elaborate this point, however, MacKinnon's
theory, and radical teminist theory more enerally, needs to be expanded
by a teminist phenomenoloical approach to aency in the context ot
compulsory heterosexuality
:#,&(&0! -"#($,#($/$)1
In her 2000 essay MerleauPonty and Feminist Theory on Experience,"
Alcott specitically tocuses on the issue ot sexual violation to make the
point that in order to clearly understand social reality, teminist theory
must attend to lived experience as a central source ot social meanin. To
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
11
make this point, she retrieves experience trom the maw ot a linuistic
discourse model ot aency.
In its rebound trom the early teminist attair with experience" as authori
tative toundation ot knowlede, poststructuralist intellectualism now
construes experience as merely epiphenomenal, that is, as the ettect" ot
discourseideas lanuae.
8
With this move in teminist theory, our hold
on sexual violence-its meanin in the world-slips, this slide in meanin
is evidenced on both sides ot a terrain dividin certain sectors ot hih
theory trom popular antiteminist backlash discourse. Backlash writers are
particularly tond ot reducin violence to an ettect ot teminist discourse.
Thus date rape" is said to be a tiction invented by teminists that is now
havin material ettects in needlessly traumatizin youn impressionable
women" (Alcott 2000, 256). In hih theory too, sexual violence also otten
disappears behind the maicshield ot discourse."
9

In order to retrieve experience-in particular, the experience ot sexual
violence-trom the skeptics, we can draw on phenomenoloy to develop
an alternative account that understands experience as epistemically in
dispensable but never epistemically seltsutticient" (25+). Reterrin spe
citically to sexual experience, Alcott arues that sexual experiences are
conitive" (269), that is to say, sexual experiences disclose meanins about
how the subject is socially situated, whether or not they can be rendered
intelliible in any discursive tormation" (269). To elaborate this point, Al
cott constructs a phenomenoloical description ot sexual violation trom
the perspective ot an adult survivor ot childhood sexual abuse (268).
In crucial ways, the experiences ot date rape and childhood sexual abuse
are incommensurable. Nevertheless, central teatures ot sexual abuse, as
described by Alcott, disclose common teatures ot sexual meanin in a pa
triarchal culture. Alcott describes the shame marked on the body itselt,
as it the abused child were a thin to be used, a kind ot livin spittoon"
(268). An abused child teels dependent on an adult who will meet her
needs only upon the condition that she acts as this spittoon," which is
to say, on the condition that the child provides this adult with enital
stimulation. One is told by a trusted adult to take the thin in one's
mouth, to allow ropin explorations, to pertorm distressin enactments
12
Kathy Miriam
that teel humiliatin and torein. When the child as and whimpers (or
screams and cries), the adult sihs and moans, holdin tihtly so that the
child cannot et away" (268). The child comes to corporeally perceive
the abuser's pleasure as the product ot the child's own pain and tor
ment" (269). $uch corporeal perceptions are specitic to the brutality ot
the powerrelation between a victim and abuser, but, as I will discuss in
more detail in the conclusion, they also disclose a dimension ot sexual
meanin that is common to a rane ot sexually coercive practices in a
patriarchal sociality.
Alcott thus reters to a relationship ot ontoloical dependence" (269)
between pleasure and violation. In other words, pleasure and violation
are inextricably related within the meanincomplex that underlies our
sense ot reality. We can describe this meanincomplex in terms ot invis
ible backround understandins that enable the intelliibility ot a social
situation where the intertwinin ot pleasure and humiliation is one ot
the most central teatures ot patriarchy" (269). Institutions, such as the
entertainment industry and (unmentioned by Alcott) pornoraphy, pro
duce entertainment throuh ridicule and derision . . . and pleasurable
sensations ot satistaction throuh acts ot conquest and mastery over oth
ers" (269).
Extrapolatin now trom Alcott, it this ontoloy ot sexual pleasure is in
teral to sexual meanin, then the liberal, sexpositive" model ot sexual
treedom based on women claimin sexual pleasure is drastically inade
quate tor understandin the real meanin ot women's sexual aency. It
Alcott is riht, sexual pleasure does not presuppose, as the sexpositive"
teminist otten assumes, absence ot sexual coercion. But neither does this
political ontoloy ot pleasure" toreclose temale aency. It we understand
aency in the ontoloical sense ot a subject livin throuh the structures
and processes ot her social situation, then, Alcott's political ontoloy ot
pleasure indicates that the experience ot coercion in a patriarchal society
is one condition ot women's sexual aency.
This last claim is possible when we round a political critique ot male
domination-such as MacKinnon's-in a phenomenoloical account ot
temale aency. The truittulness ot a political teministphenomenoloical
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
13
approach tor my project is turther demonstrated by turnin to Bartky's
teminist approach to phenomenoloy. Like Alcott's phenomenoloical
approach to sexual experience, Bartky's phenomenoloy ot shame and
ender tocused on emotions-shame, in particular-as modes ot lived
experience, which while they are otten inaccessible to explicit modes
ot discourse disclose a subject's Beinintheworld" (1990, 83). Bartky
explored the question ot whether the conitive dimension ot women's
shame miht otter insihts into women's social situation that are not ex
pressed by women's propositional" beliets about their situation. Indeed,
the drama at the heart ot Bartky's essay consists in her inquiry into a
commonly experienced contlict between one's emotional experience ot a
situation and one's explicit beliets about that same situation. To illustrate,
Bartky took the case ot a teachin situation where her women students,
in sharp contrast to the men, apoloized tor their own work-despite the
tact that the men's work was enerally interior. Yet these same women
students explicitly believed that women are men's equals. Bartky drew
on ]eanPaul $artre's phenomenoloical description ot shame to make
her point that the women's shame disclosed reality in a way that their
explicit beliets about ender equality did not. For $artre, shame was a
preretlexive mode ot knowin that consists in the selt's reconition"
ot how she or he is seen by an Other. The tascinatin $artrean insiht,
which Bartky turther elaborated, is that one's reconition" does not im
ply one's overt identitication" with, much less attirmation ot, the selt
asseenbytheOther. Yet, without the reconition ot this selt, as $artre
arued, there would be no shame. I o indeed that object which the
Other is lookin at and judin," (1956, 261) $artre wrote, I do not reject
it as a strane imae, but it is present to me as a selt which I o without
irou:r it" (261). My reconition ot how I am seen by the Other reters
to a mode ot preretlexive consciousness that may very well contlict with
how I explicitly :c.rt:,, myselt-a contlict that attests to the power ot the
reconition. Thus, to use a personal example, I, as a ]ew, am compelled
to reconize" myselt in the residue ot anti $emitic stereotypes still pres
ent in our culture (schlemiel, pushy, loud)-the physical twines ot shame
that surprise me as I write these words contirms the extent to which this is
true. Lnless I reconize that I o as I am seen by the Other, the Other's
judment cannot cast me down" (Bartky 1990, 85). Thus I am compelled
1+
Kathy Miriam
to reconize my own bein in stereotypes, even when (as a critical thinker
and teminist) I explicitly reject them. Indeed, I can be cauht in the
shametul act" ot actin too ]ewish" even in the absence ot a specitic con
crete Other. Once an actual Other has revealed my objectcharacter to
me, I can become an object tor myselt, I can come to see myselt as I miht
be seen by another" (85).
The shame Bartky's women students telt indicates that they were com
pelled to reconize their bein (as interior) in the aze" ot the Other.
This was so, even in the absence ot men or other authority tiures an
nouncin the women's interiority, and even when they believed they
were the equals ot men, they still came to see their selves as cauht in
the shametul act" when turnin in their (superior) work. To brin back
MerleauPonty's and Alcott's conceptual trameworks, the experience ot
endered shame implies an embodied temale subject puttin into play
those endered meanins already at her disposal" reardless ot whether
some individual or roup is directly, overtly shamin her. In a male su
premacist society, women corporeally perceive" their interiority, shame is
one mode ot this perception. The moral ot the story here is that there are
modes ot experience, tor example shame, that not only can't be expressed
but that also miht sometimes contlict with one's overt beliets about the
selt and world. Evidence ot this contlict can be a valuable source ot in
siht into dimensions ot social reality that would be otherwise masked,
especially it we were to rely solely on peoples' explicit beliets as a source
ot knowlede about peoples' lived experience ot social reality. Bartky's ap
proach to shame is thus usetul tor my own attempt to show that in a social
situation where tew people believe (or openly state) that men have a riht
to women's bodies, the law" ot men's sexriht nevertheless prevails.
!$;3%< 3 -"#($,#($/$)1 $: 0#2=%&)"!
!"# 0#2.3/ +$(!%3+! 30 3 0!%.+!.%# $: /&>#< #2-#%&#(+#
The tact that women have" aency within a patriarchal culture does not
successtully challene such radical teminist theories as Rich's and MacK
innon's that root compulsory heterosexuality in male dominance. On
the contrary, it we round MacKinnon's theory ot sexuality in phenom
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
15
enoloy, the theory challenes us to address the question ot how women
live throuh (how they experience and make meanin out ot) structures
ot domination. In modern, liberal social orders, the lived experience
ot subordination tor women is also the lived experience ot individual
choice. The lived contradiction ot choice and subordination is central
to women's aency in these social orders, and to the persistin (tacit) as
sumption-by both men and women-ot men's sexriht. This lived con
tradiction is what now needs turther explication in order to move toward
a phenomenoloy ot sexriht and to revive the radical teminist theory ot
compulsory heterosexuality trom this new perspective.
Bartky's insiht into the meanin ot endered shame provides a startin
point. women's shame discloses women's preretlexive consciousness ot
their interiority in a culture where most people believe that women are
autonomous individuals and men's equals. However, extrapolatin trom
Bartky, liberalism is not only an overt ideoloy, beliet system, or set ot
tormal principles. Liberalism is also an ontoloy and, as such, part ot
the interpretative backround ot our lived experience in (post)modernity.
Our experience and knowlede presuppose preretlexive, tacit assump
tions about personhood, embodiment, and treedom that are central to
this ontoloy. In other words, liberalism structures our lived experience,
includin, or especially the lived experience ot domination and subordi
nation in liberal social orders. We ..r:.rc. orc ort:c:ot. :r our own
subordination as inextricable trom our choices. this lived contradiction
ot subordination and treedom" in modern, liberal social orders-and
specitically in the context ot (hetero)sexuality-is best elucidated by Pate
man's (1988) theory ot the sexual contract.
Pateman's main innovation was to elucidate male dominance as embed
ded within liberalism's ontoloy ot treedom. When read trom a phenom
enoloicalhermeneutic perspective, Pateman's theory ot the sexual con
tract shows that the latter is part ot our backround understandins ot
patriarchal sociality, the sexual contract reters to the interpretative schema
throuh which meanins ot heterorelational sexualsocial association are
put into play, includin the meanin ot temale aency and sexual auton
omy. This readin ot Pateman tollows trom her arument that the social
sexual contract, rather than reterrin to existent contracts, texts, policies,
16
Kathy Miriam
or doctrines, is an oranizin principle ot social association" (1988, 5),
or, in other words, a social means ot creatin relationships (2002, 27).
Althouh we think ot contract as an exchane" ot pieces ot (material)
property between two parties (2002, 27), Pateman calls attention to a spe
cial kind ot property exchaned" in the socialsexual contract, namely,
property in the person." Here we have a central ontoloical assumption
ot liberal individualism, or what C. B. MacPhereson tirst theorized as
the possessive individualism" associated with the contract tradition trom
Hobbes to Locke. Accordin to this tradition, the individual is detined
as owner ot property in his person. Pateman shows that this central onto
loical concept ot the individual has siniticant implications tor related
assumptions about treedom and embodiment. First, as owner ot property
in the person, an individual's treedom comes to mean her or his ability
to control that property. As a principle ot social association, the social
sexual contract thus structures those relations throuh which one party
can i.:t:ot.i, use another party's property in their person, includin her
or his body and capacities, without in principle violatin the latter party's
basic treedom (detined as ownership). As owner ot property in one's per
son, the individual is constructed as tree" to trade or sell his or her ca
pacities throuh the contract relation in exchane tor some benetit. Note
that this exchane" presupposes a particular notion ot embodiment.
what is presupposed is a Cartesian view ot the individual as able to stand
in external relation to her or his body and capacities, as it one's capacities
were separable, like pieces ot (material) property, trom the selt" (Pate
man 1988, 55). As Pateman noted, a powertul political tiction" masks
the tact that a person's capacities are in tact rot separable trom her or his
selt like pieces ot property. Two powertul examples ot this political tiction
are the idea ot labor power"-in the case ot employment-and sexual
services"-in the case ot prostitution. In each case, there is the tiction that
an individual can separate her capacities trom her selt. An ontoloical
presumption ot mindbody separation enables the tiction that enables
the exchane (employment, prostitution) to be intelliible as an act ot
treedom, atter all, she is not sellin her selt" or her body, she is said to be
exchanin services" in exchane tor some benetit. However, as Pateman
arued, a person corrot separate her capacities trom her selt and corrot
separate her body trom her selt. The political and metaphysical tiction ot
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
17
labor powersexual services masks this phenomenoloical tact, as well as
hidin the real nature ot the transaction takin place throuh contract-
namely, that what a subordinate sells is the riht tor a dominant party
to have command over the subordinate's body tor a specitied amount ot
time (Pateman 1988, chaps. 3, 7).
What are the implications ot Pateman's analysis tor the contemporary
(hetero)sexual situation. To what extent do women and irls today experi
ence their individual sexual treedom as ownership ot property in their
person. Political sloans such as I own my body" and Keep your laws ott
my body" certainly resonate with the assumption that embodied treedom
is ownership. $uch political statements have been ettective rhetorical and
political weapons in teminist strules to tree women's bodies trom male
control. However, do these sloans presuppose the very treedom tor irls
and women that implicitly licenses-leitimizes-boys' and men's access to
women's and irls' bodies. In other words, To what extent does the expe
rience ot individual aencytreedom tor women and irls today include
tacit presuppositions about preexistin relations ot domination and sub
ordination. Do.s ti. s.uoi cortroct .:st os or :rt.rr.tot::. ,ro.uori ,or our
s.i,urc.rstorc:rs o, s.uoi ,r..co orc o.rc,! To answer, and to round my
overall arument, I now enae a phenomenoloical account ot women's
(hetero)sexual experience.
(#)$!&3!&() !"#&% $;( 0.?$%<&(3!&$(@
3 -"#($,#($/$)&+3/ <#0+%&-!&$( $: ;$,#(90 /&>#< #2-#%&#(+#
$: 0#2.3/ 3)#(+1 ;&!"&( "#!#%$%#/3!&$(0
It was violent and hurttul and really scary. But I don't think I could ever
call it rape. Let's just say that thins went badly" (Phillips 2000, 1+9). This
statement comes trom one ot thirty temale collee students interviewed
by social psycholoist Lynn Phillips tor her qualitative study, Fi:rt:r u:ti
Dor.r: Your Vo.r's R.,i.ct:ors or S.uoi:t, orc Do:rot:or. The quo
tation hihlihts one ot the more siniticant questions Phillips's study
raises, namely, Why do these youn women consistently resist labelin
their sexual encounters as rape or even abuse when they also describe
these as encounters with a male partner who otten intimidates, humili
ates, and uses physical torce aainst them. One answer is that these wom
18
Kathy Miriam
en's descriptions ot their lived experience challene the assumption that
yes means yes and no means no. This popular sloan is not only inad
equate tor addressin, but may also very well serve to mystity the complex
interpretative processes involved in women's actual consent to sex with
men. Indeed, yes means yes, no means no" assumes a liberal individual
ist model ot heterorelational encounters as temporally discrete encoun
ters between two choosin individuals. This model leads us to tocus on
whether women clearly say-and men clearly understand-yes" or no" as
the main litmus test tor determinin coercion. But contrary to this mod
el, as Marilyn Frye has arued, The elements ot coercion lie not in the
coerced individual's person, mind, or body, but in the manipulation ot
the circumstances and manipulation ot the options" (1983, 56). In order
to understand women's sexual aency we have to shitt our attention trom
the liberal model ot individual choice to the meanin ot the situation in
which women make choices. Followin Pateman, these women's narra
tive descriptions disclose relations ot power that precede any temporally
discrete decision to consent to unwanted sex. The narrative descriptions
in Phillips's study suest that the liberal ontoloy ot the individual and
men's sexriht are mutually reintorcin structures ot the interpretative
backround ot women's experience ot sexual aency.
Phillips's descriptive vocabulary tor what the women are doin in their
heterorelational encounters inadvertently connotes a contract principle
ot socialsexual association. Phillips describes the women as neotiat
in" and manain" their situation, they employ multiple strataems"
tor dealin with unwanted sex. $uch strataems include pretendin to
be asleep, takin orasms, pertormin oral sex on men in order to avoid
real" sex (intercourse), ettin sex over with" quickly, and runnin nu
merous and contlictin tantasies in the head" in order to reinterpret
unwanted sex as wanted."
Lnderlyin most ot the women's strataems is an ettort to interpret their
decision makin as evidence ot their own accountability tor unwanted sex
with men. Yet, departin now trom Phillips, the women see themselves
as makin decisions in a situation where one tactor seems to have been
(tacitly) decided on in advance and is thus nonneotiable, namely, men's
riht to have sex with them. As Phillips shows, the women's multiple strat
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
19
aems tor obtainin their own satety and control are consistently predi
cated upon their ability to please and satisty the men they are with (per
tormin oral sex, takin orasm, and so on). Yet the dominance ot male
interests is part ot an interpretative schema that remains (mostly) hidden.
Despite the descriptive details ot the women's stories, male accountability
completely disappears trom these same stories (2000, 112-13).
The disappearance ot male accountability in these narratives is puzzlin
tor several reasons, not least because, as Phillips lets us know, the women
students interviewed by her are larely seltdetined ,.:r:sts, many ot who
have taken women's studies classes and have some analysis ot the relation
between rape, male power, and women's oppression. Indeed, male ac
countability reappears the moment that these women are asked to retlect
on oti.r uo.r's stories (15+-55, and chap. 6). The same women who
resisted the label rape" tor scenarios they themselves lived throuh do
not hesitate to use the label tor the very same scenarios it they hear it as
someone else's story.
In my view, the ditterence between i:::r tiroui a scenario and oroi,;:r
it is the key to unravelin the meanin ot this discrepancy in the women's
accounts. $imilarly to the temale students Bartky described, Phillips's in
terviewees reveal a clear contlict between their overt teminist beliets, on
the one hand, and their preretlexive modes ot teelin and knowin, on
the other. As Bartky arued ot shame, I'd suest that these preretlexive
modes ot knowin-revealed throuh the women's narrative descrip
tions-may disclose more about the reality ot their situation than is ac
cessible to their overt beliets. In sum, male accountability disappears in
these women's stories to the extent that i:::r tiroui the heterosexual
encounter includes, tor these women, the corporeal perception" in con
trast to the propositional claim or beliet, that men have a riht to sexual
access to them.
To elaborate, we can consider some ot the somatic experiences described
by Phillips's interviewees. Their stories reveal that these youn women re
peatedly live throuh encounters with partners who are wholly absorbed
in their own ratitication and completely oblivious to the women's non
verbal cues-nonlinuistic expressions ot pain, discomtort, or desire tor
20
Kathy Miriam
pleasure. Like the abused child Alcott described, these women come to
know (at a preretlexive level) that their partner's pleasure is dependent
on their own anuish or alienation.
Thus sex becomes a hihly instrumentalized exchane tor these women.
Participants reported repeatedly that their decisions about how to pres
ent themselves physically, how and when to make noises, and how to
move their bodies were determined tar less by their own bodily sensations
than by their mental calculations ot what men would want them to do"
(108). $everal participants noted that they spent a reat deal ot enery
'watchin' themselves havin sex with men, mentally steppin outside
their experiences to determine whether they were actin appropriately"
(108). Thus a primary attective state tor these women is the sense ot be
in 'up on the ceilin . . . lookin down on the whole thin . . . so busy ob
servin myselt that I don't even teel what I'm teelin' " (108). $uch a cor
poreal perception ot selt suests that the ontoloy ot the sexual contract
is part ot the interpretative backround ot women's lived experience ot
embodied aency. The very experience ot their aency as decision makin
is the experience ot alienatin the selt trom the body, and this experience
ot alienation-or dissociation-is these women's way ot livin throuh and
participatin in interpretative schema detined by men's interests. It's as it
the women have always already contracted, what remains is to neotiate
the particulars ot a done deal. The women's somatic, emotional experi
ence ot sexuality indicates an attunement"
10
to power relations that they
(most otten) do not articulate in explicit, propositional torm-not, that is,
in relation to their own experience.
Yet one participant in Phillips's study does explicitly retlect, There are
times when women can't control the shit that men do to them. I mean,
come on, men are really the ones with all the real power. But I tiure, as
lon as I'm already oin to et screwed, at least maybe I can set the terms
ot the abuse or humiliation" (1+9). While openly acknowledin that her
aency is detined by male interests, she assumes this situation to be inevi
table rather than open to transtormation. It tollows that her experience
precludes the label victimization" or rape". the notion ot victimization
is unintelliible iven that she experiences her subordination os aency-
an aency detined by neotiatin the terms ot her subordination.
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
21
We need a phenomenoloical approach that distinuishes aency trom
treedom to brin this backround understandin ot aencyasneotiat
inone's subordination turther into the toreround. ]eremy Weate's con
cise articulation ot MerleauPonty's notion ot bodily treedom" is helptul
here. Bodily treedom means an embodied subject's participation in the
transtormation ot its expressive horizons. . . . This conception ot treedom
entails a tundamental relation to the historical. bein tree involves the
body's capacity throuh expression to transtiure (and be transtiured
by) what is iven as history" (2001, 171). What is iven by history" to
the youn women in Phillips's study is the contemporary situation ot
heterorelations, thus their treedom requires a capacity to transtiure this
situation. But treedom in this sense is toreclosed by the meanin ot o.rc,
in the sexual situations so tar described. These women experience aency
not as an ability to transtorm and cocreate a socialsexual situation in its
very historicity, they experience aency only as the ability to neotiate the
terms ot a situation they take to be inevitable, namely, a situation detined
by men's implicit riht to have sexual access to them.
I contend that without a radical analysis ot compulsory heterosexuality, we
cannot adequately understand contemporary heterosexualism, the new
torms ot biotry it has spawned, and the entrenchment ot heterosexual
entitlement in our culture's norms and laws. This is because I remain con
vinced (with my back aainst the current ot the postmodern theoretical
zeiteist) ot a central radical teminist claim, namely, that the heterosexual
norm has deep roots in a malesupremacist ender order. I have arued in
this essay that a tresh approach to theorizin this claim and particularly
the central concept ot sexriht discloses its siniticance tor understandin
temale aency in the context ot contemporary heterorelations. $exriht
can and must be understood trom a phenomenoloicalhermeneutic per
spective. Once we adopt this perspective, we can cut throuh many ot the
misreadins ot radical teminism that haunt teminist discourse to date.
First, we can see that by sexriht we are not talkin about a juridical riht,
nor are we claimin that all people explicitly o.i:.:. that men have a riht
to women's bodies-althouh some still do. $econd, we can see that sex
riht does not imply that male domination is individual men's exercise ot
their soverein wills over their temale subordinates-the tyrantmen who
22
Kathy Miriam
are literal owners ot women. Finally, we can see that sexriht is not sim
ply synonymous with male sexual aression or men's acts ot coercion.
1

When understood trom a phenomenoloicalhermeneutic perspective,
sexriht is part ot our backround understandin ot heteronormativity
within modern liberal social orders. As a backround understandin ot
heteronormativity-and thus an important condition ot its intelliibility-
the assumption that men have a riht ot sexual access to women and irls
allows tor specitic acts ot coercion and aression to take place, but sex
riht is not synonymous with those acts.
From this perspective, new torms ot irls' and women's sexual aency reter
to new ways ot i:::r tiroui heterorelations. However, as I have arued, it
does not thereby tollow that irls and women are theretore experiencin a
new sexual ,r..co. On the contrary, new torms ot sexual aency-ot par
ticipatin in, livin throuh, and experiencin heterorelations-may very
well presuppose new torms ot men's access to women and irls.
2
As women and irls are increasinly positioned as the autonomous ne
otiators ot or decision makers in heterosexual relations, men's sexriht
becomes less intelliible at an explicit level. Hence sexriht becomes an
invisible backround ot power presupposed by women's choice to neoti
ate sex. In this context, the very notion ot choice assumes a liberal, con
tract paradim ot tree areement in a discrete temporal moment between
two choosin (decisionmakin) individuals. But, as Pateman shows, and
as the women's stories in Phillips's study contirm, this very paradim ot
tree areement presupposes a backround understandin ot relations ot
domination and subordination. Women's aency, on the one hand, and
men's sexriht, on the other, are not mutually exclusive but ontoloi
cally dependent. From a phenomenoloical perspective, women's sexual
aency within heterorelations today presupposes men's sexriht. Only by
critically describin this reality can we truly distinuish an aency detined
by choosin the terms ot a iven historicalsexual situation (detined by
women's subordination) trom a treedom detined by women's ability to
cocreate and transtorm this historicalsexual situation. Only then will we
come to a deeper understandin ot what makes heterosexuality compul
sory" today. And only then will we bein to truly conceive ot practices that
miht realize women's sexual and (other torms ot) lived treedom.
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
23
($! # 0

This essay is tor Nancy Meyer, Whitney Williams, and Meaan $mith. It is
also tor the students in my $prin $eminar 2006 on Feminist Phenomenol
oy at the Lniversity ot New Hampshire. I am very ratetul to my triend and
mentor Robert $chartt tor teedback and insihts. Finally, I thank my anony
mous reviewer at H,ot:o, and especially ]oan Callahan, $ara Ruddick, and
Bonnie Mann tor their compassionate and brilliant work as editors ot this
manuscript and ot this special issue.
1. Lesbian separatist theorists were amon the tirst to theorize male power as
a relation ot access to women-a relation throuh which men monopolized
women's attention, eneries, and bodies. Oiven this theory, the practice
ot withdrawin access trom men-separatism-seemed a loical and practi
cal way to recenter women's enery and reain autonomy (Frye 1983). In
another theoretical context-materialist radical teminism in France-Colette
Ouillaumin (1981) developed the concept ot 'appropriation' tor theorizin
male power. Like Rich-who actually used a schema oriinally developed by
Kathleen Oouh (1975)-Ouillaumin conceptualized a schema displayin
the variety ot ways that men appropriate women's labor, resources, sexual
ity, and time. The concept ot 'appropriation' underscores the way that
the dominant roup has access to the entire reservoir ot eneries ot the
subordinate-a relation, accordin to Ouillaumin, that also detines sertdom,
colonization, and slavery.

2. For an example ot this criticism, see the correspondence between Rich
and Ann $nitow, $haron Thompson, and Carol Vance, included by as part
ot a new atterward ot the reprinted essay (Rich 1986, 69).
3. I am ratetul to Nancy ]. Meyer tor contributin insihts to this last para
raph about lesbian aency.

+. Readers will note the similarity between my concept ot aency and But
ler's notion ot subjectivation (1993, 15, 1997, chap. 3), that is, ot a subject
inprocess that is at once a process ot subjection. However, Butler's notion
ot aency :s a real paradox, because Butler's purely linuistic model has no
resources tor distinuishin aency in and ot itselt trom treedom.

5. MacKinnon tends to contlate sexuality per se with heterosexuality, thus
occludin new and potentially transtormative torms ot aency such as queer
and lesbian sexuality. I concede that this is a ditticulty with MacKinnon's
work-thus in the context ot my own readin ot her, I will, wherever it is
teasible, use the term (i.t.ro)s.uoi:t, in place ot s.uoi:t,.

6. $ee R. W. Connell's (1995, chap. 3) theorization ot heemony.
2+
Kathy Miriam

7. Butler claims that alternative schemas ot endersexuality are internal to
the very loic ot the heterosexual symbolic" (1993, 12) and that the very
phallocentric" symbolic structure ot heteronormativity opens up anatomy
as a site ot proliterative resinitications" (89).

8. A lcott discusses this as a talse dilemma that replays tired modernist
debates between empiricism and idealism" (2000, 25+).

9. $ee Mardorossiarn (2002) tor a critical comparison between hih" and
low" (popular, backlash) theorists on the issue ot rape.

10. Bartky uses Heideer's term ottur..rt, which reters to the state in
which one may be tound," the tindin tiot one is situated in a world and
to the particular iou ot this situation, this 'tindin' can occur only insotar
as Dos.:r has moods, teelins, or humours that constitute its openness or
'attunement' to Bein" (1990, 83).

11. Various critics ot radical teminism have misread the concept ot sexriht
in these very ways. Oood examples are critiques ot Pateman by Fraser (1997)
and Okin (1990).

12. The most vivid and disturbin illustration ot this phenomenon-and
certainly one ot the most vivid contemporary examples ot the instrumental,
contractual model ot (hetero)sex-has been described as triendship with
benetits." A N.u Yori T:.s Moo;:r. article (DenizetLewis 200+) describes
current sexual practice amon suburban teenaers as consistin in a series
ot neotiations, conducted larely throuh use ot the internet or telephone.
The youn people interviewed in the article use technoloy to arrane a se
ries ot hookups-sexual encounters intended to be purely casual, dissociated
trom datin or romantic relationships. What is strikin about this neotia
tion process is that it is larely a practice ot irls and boys neotiatin tor
irls to pertorm oral sex on boys (not only is there no reciprocity but boy
onirl oral sex on is widely rearded-especially by the boys-as a repulsive
activity in which to enae). In my view, what is called neotiatin here is a
superbly etticient, new means to enable irls to sexually service boys. The
process is etticient in that it ettectively neutralizes the concept ot date rape.
in the situation ot hookups we have a radically instrumentalized sexual
exchane constructed primarily in men's interests yet so deeply embedded
in a contractual mode ot association that women's role as decisionmakers
could tunction to undermine any claim that they are coerced. I am ratetul
to Kass Fleisher's insihttul contribution to a discussion ot this issue on the
Women's $tudies Listserv.
Toward a Phenomenoloy ot $exRiht
25
%# : # %# (+# 0
Alcott, Linda Martn. 2000. MerleauPonty and teminist theory on expe
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t:or, orc ti. iou. New York. Routlede. 228 Hypatia
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man's Ti. s.uoi cortroct. In ust:c. :rt.rrutus: Cr:t:coi r.,i.ct:ors or ti.
'ostsoc:oi:st corc:t:or. New York. Routlede.
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o, uo.r, ed. Rayna Reiter. New York. Monthly Review Press.
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ton. Indiana Lniversity Press.
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I. The appropriation ot women. F.:r:st Issu.s 1 (2). 3-28.
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petroleusepress.com || petroleusepress@gmail.com

Indeed, yes means yes, no means no" assumes a liberal
individualist model ot heterorelational encounters as
temporally discrete encounters between two choosin
individuals. This model leads us to tocus on whether women
clearly say-and men clearly understand-yes" or no" as
the main litmus test tor determinin coercion. In order
to understand women's sexual aency we have to shitt our
attention trom the liberal model ot individual choice to the
meanin ot the situation in which women make choices.
PTROLEUSE PRESS