EXPROPRIATION CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs.

OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA, ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, respondents. G.R. No. 142304 June 20, 2001 Mendoza, J.: CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA reversing the order of the RTC- Br 16, Manila and perpetually enjoining it from proceeding with the petitioner's complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282. Facts: On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted the Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila 's First District in Tondo,(TCT Nos. 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the RD of Manila), which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, (343.10 sqm). It is covered by TCT No. 138272 which was derived from TCT No. 70869 issued in the name of Feliza De Guia.1 After her death, the estate of Feliza De Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the RTC-Br 53, Manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986.2 In 1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the heirs of Feliza De Guia, died, as a result of which his estate, consisting of his share in the properties left by his mother, was partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia.3 On April 15, 1994, Edgardo De Guia was issued TCT No. 215593, covering Lot 1-C.4 On July 29, 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT No. 217018 was issued.5 The property was subsequently sold on January 24,1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT No. 226048 was issued.6 On September 26, 1997, petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation(Civil Case No. 9472282), with the RTC-Br 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202 and 138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed are Serrano.7 On November 12, 1997, respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot l-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot l-C would result in their disclosure, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Lot l-C exempt from expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048,8 regarding the pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282. for eminent domain filed by petitioner.9 RTC Ruling: Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner to deposit the amount of Pl,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties.10 After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated

December 15, 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner.ll Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the expropriation of Lot l-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof, landless; that Lot l-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriations; that respondents would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot l-C which consists of only 343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 square meters.12 CA Ruling: The CA rendered a decision holding that Lot l-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279. However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in 9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the CA gave judgment for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated February 23, 2000, the CA likewise denied two MR filed by petitioner.l5 Hence this petition. Issues: Petitioner contends that the CA erred in -1) Giving due course to the petition of the Serranos under Rule 65 notwithstanding its own declaration of the impropriety of the resort to the writ and filing thereof with the wrong appellate court; 2) Concluding that the Order of October 9, 1998 which authorizes the immediate entry of the City as the expropriating agency into the property sough to be expropriated upon the deposit of the provisionally fixed fair market value thereof as tantamount to condemnation of the property without prior showing of compliance with the acquisition of other lands enumerated in Sec. 9 of R.A. 7279 ergo a violation of due process of the Serranos by the doctrinaire application of FILSTREAM ruling and corrollarily, 3) In prohibiting permanently, by writ of injunction, the trial court from proceeding with a complaint for expropriation of the City in Civil Case No. 9472282.16 We will deal with these contentions in the order they are presented. RULING: First. Petitioner contends that the respondents' remedy against the order of the trial court granting a writ of possession was not to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but a petition for review under Rule 45 which should have been filed in the Supreme Court.17 Held: This contention has no merit. Ratio: A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal. Accordingly, it could not have been resorted to by the respondents inasmuch as the order of the trial court granting a writ of possession was merely interlocutory from which no

appeal could be taken. Rule 45, 1 of the 1997 Rules for Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable remedy in view of Rule 65, 1 which provides: When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainly and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as laws and justice may require. Respondents' petition before the CA alleged that the trial court had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order resolving that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation and ordering the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of petitioner.18 Second. Petitioner faults the CA for deciding issues not raised in the trial court, specifically the question of whether or not there was compliance with 9 and 10 of RA. No. 7279. It argues that the sole defense set up by respondents in their petition before the Court of Appeals was that their property was exempted from expropriation because it comes within the purview of a "small property" as defined by R.A. No. 7279 . Accordingly, the CA should not have applied the doctrine laid down by this Court in the Filstream19 case as such issue was not raised by respondents in their petition before the CA. Held: This contention likewise has no merit. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, respondents raised the following issues: 1. Whether or not the subject Lot 1-C with an area of 343.10 square meters covered by T.C.T. No. 226048 in the name of petitioners' mother, the late Demetria [De Guia] Serrano, may be lawfully expropriated "for the public purpose of providing landless occupants thereof homelots of their own under the "land-forthe landless program of respondent City of Manila." 2. Whether or not the expropriation of the said Lot lC by respondent City of Manila violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, since petitioners, with the exemption of petitioner Oscar G. Serranno, who are likewise landless are actual occupants hereof. 3. Whether or not Lot 1-C is or may be exempted from expropriation pursuant to R.A. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.20 Ratio: It is clear that respondents raised in issue the propriety of the expropriation of their property in connection with RA. No. 7279. Although what was discussed at length in their petition before the CA was whether or not the said property could be considered a small property within the purview of the exemption under the said law, the other provisions of the said law concerning expropriation proceedings need also be looked into to address the first issue

raised by the respondents and to determine whether or not expropriation of Lot 1-C was proper under the circumstances. The CA properly considered relevant provisions of R A. No.7279 to determine the issues raised by respondents. Whether or not it correctly applied the doctrine laid down in Filstream in resolving the issues raised by respondents, however, is a different matter altogether, and this brings us to the next point. Third. Petitioner contends that the CA erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has been ordered condemned in its favor when the fact is that the order of the trial court, dated December 15, 1998, merely authorized the issuance of a writ of possession and petitioner's entry into the property pursuant to Rule 67, 2. At that stage, it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA. No. 7279, 9 - 10 have been complied with since no evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the trial court.21 Held: This contention is well taken. Rule 67, 2 provides: Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depository an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.22 In this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession. The CA, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements laid down in 9 - 10 of RA. No. 7279 and reiterated in Filstream ruling. This is error. The ruling in the Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA. No. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in 10 of the law. RA. No 7279 in pertinent parts provide: SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declares Areas or Priority Development, Zone Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Programs sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement and Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired, and; (f) Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageously to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority on-site development of government lands. SEC. 10. Modes of Lands Acquisition. -- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, amount others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, jointventure agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however; That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further; That were expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase:Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the lands shall be given the right of first refusal. Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements.23 The determination of this question must await that hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of the private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.24 The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and the order of the trial court is REINSTATED. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE, respondents.

The Case: A petition for review1 of the Decision2 and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the RTC Br17, Tabaco, Albay in Civil Case No. T-552. The Antecedents: Petitioner National Power Corporation ("NPC") is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide.4 NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent Antonino Pobre ("Pobre") is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. (TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709). In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resortsubdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision." On 12 January 1966, the then CFI of Albay approved the subdivision plan of the Property. The RD thus cancelled TCT No. 4067 and issued independent titles for the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising and selling the lots. On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property. The Commission on Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances. First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan. Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property.5 On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPC's payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 sqm of the Property. This is the subject of this petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and RA No. 5092.7 NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the PNB. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession to NPC. On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages. On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre's opposition.

G.R. No. 106804 CARPIO, J.:

August 12, 2004

On 8 January 1985, the trial court granted NPC's motion to dismiss but the trial court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court admitted Pobre's exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to object. On 30 August 1985, the trial court ordered the case submitted for decision since NPC failed to appear to present its evidence. The trial court denied NPC's motion to reconsider the submission of the case for decision. NPC filed a petition for certiorari8 with the then Intermediate Appellate Court, questioning the 30 August 1985 Order of the trial court. On 12 February 1987, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed NPC's petition but directed the lower court to rule on NPC's objections to Pobre's documentary exhibits. On 27 March 1987, the trial court admitted all of Pobre's exhibits and upheld its Order dated 30 August 1985. The trial court considered the case submitted for decision. On 29 April 1987, the trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff to pay unto the defendant: (1) The sum of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY (P3,448,450.00) PESOS which is the fair market value of the subdivision of defendant with an area of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty nine (68,969) square meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum from September 6, 1979 until the whole amount is paid, and upon payment thereof by the plaintiff the defendant is hereby ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Conveyance or Absolute Sale of the property in favor of the plaintiff; (2) The sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS for and as attorney's fees. Costs against the plaintiff. SO ORDERED.9 On 13 July 1987, NPC filed its MR of the decision. On 30 October 1987, the trial court issued its Order denying NPC's motion for reconsideration. NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 30 March 1992, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, by reason of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of attorney's fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.10 The Court of Appeals denied NPC's motion reconsideration in a Resolution dated 14 August 1992. for

suffered "permanent injury" because of the noise, water, air and land pollution generated by NPC's geothermal plants. The construction and operation of the geothermal plants drastically changed the topography of the Property making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision. The chemicals emitted by the geothermal plants damaged the natural resources in the Property and endangered the lives of the residents. NPC did not only take the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property, but also the remaining area of the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had rendered Pobre's entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. The Property has become useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre's entire Property and pay for it. The trial court found the following badges of NPC's bad faith: (1) NPC allowed five years to pass before it moved for the dismissal of the second expropriation case; (2) NPC did not act on Pobre's plea for NPC to eliminate or at least reduce the damage to the Property; and (3) NPC singled out Pobre's Property for piecemeal expropriation when NPC could have expropriated other properties which were not affected in their entirety by NPC's operation. The trial court found the just compensation to be P50 per square meter or a total of P3,448,450 for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC failed to contest this valuation. Since NPC was in bad faith and it employed dilatory tactics to prolong this case, the trial court imposed legal interest on the P3,448,450 from 6 September 1979 until full payment. The trial court awarded Pobre attorney's fees of P150,000. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the appellate court deleted the award of attorney's fees because Pobre did not properly plead for it. The Issues: NPC claims that the CA committed the following errors that warrant reversal of the appellate court's decision: 1. In not annulling the appealed Decision for having been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction; 2. In holding that NPC had "taken" the entire Property of Pobre; 3. Assuming arguendo that there was "taking" of the entire Property, in not excluding from the Property the 8,311.60 square-meter portion NPC had previously expropriated and paid for; 4. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 6, 1979 until fully paid, is just and fair; 5. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25.00 per square meter only as what NPC and Pobre had previously mutually agreed upon; and 6. In not totally setting aside the appealed Decision of the trial court.11 Procedural Issue: NPC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, insists that at the time that it moved for the dismissal of its complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment on NPC. Thus, NPC as

The Ruling of the Trial Court: In its 69-page decision, the trial court recounted in great detail the scale and scope of the damage NPC inflicted on the Property that Pobre had developed into a resort-subdivision. Pobre's Property

plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. NPC relies on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then in effect. NPC argues that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case including Pobre's counterclaim. Held:NPC's belated attack on Pobre's claim for damages must fail. The trial court's reservation of Pobre's right to recover damages in the same case is already beyond review. The 8 January 1985 Order of the trial court attained finality when NPC failed to move for its reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period. NPC opposed the order only on 27 May 1985 or more than four months from the issuance of the order. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for not considering NPC's objections against the subsistence of Pobre's claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in its assignment of errors nor discussed it in its appellant's brief. NPC also failed to question the trial court's 8 January 1985 Order in the petition for certiorari12 it had earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this Court that NPC now vigorously assails the preservation of Pobre's claim for damages. Clearly, NPC's opposition to the existence of Pobre's claim for damages is a mere afterthought. Rules of fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.13 We must correct NPC's claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just "shortly" after it had filed the complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated several times to the trial court its desire to dismiss the expropriation case it filed on 5 September 1979,14 it was only on 2 January 1985 that NPC filed its notice of dismissal.15 It took NPC more than five years to actually file the notice of dismissal. Five years is definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously dillydallied in filing its notice of dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobre's property rights. Even a timely opposition against Pobre's claim for damages would not yield a favorable ruling for NPC. It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases. Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation.16 The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities17 such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain.18 "Eminent Domain" was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now "Expropriation." Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the general rule that the dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.19 For as long as all of the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiff's will.20 The defending party and even the courts were powerless to prevent the dismissal.21 The courts could only accept and record the dismissal.22

A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, provided that: SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court. While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the "service of answer or summary judgment," the Rules then did not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases.23 In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in the complaint.24 In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer. The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer"25 even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its notice of dismissal of the complaint on 2 January 1985. However, as early as 10 December 1984, Pobre had already filed with the trial court and served on NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer." A certain Divina Cerela received Pobre's pleading on behalf of NPC.26 Unfortunately for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court could not save its cause. NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the complaint.27Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions.28 The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.29 The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court.30 The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law.31 If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private

rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use,32 then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.33 However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action.34 Thus, NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre's claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case.35 The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's right to recover damages either in the same or in another action.36 The trial court in this case reserved Pobre's right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC's own fault. Factual Findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts Bind the Court The trial and appellate courts held that even before the first expropriation case, Pobre had already established his Property as a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the Property that NPC had made the Property uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision. NPC's facilities such as steam wells, nag wells, power plants, power lines, and canals had hemmed in Pobre's Property. NPC's operations of its geothermal project also posed a risk to lives and properties. We uphold the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Questions of facts are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may only raise questions of law.37 Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.38 We thus find no reason to set aside the two courts' factual findings. NPC points out that it did not take Pobre's 68,969 squaremeter Property. NPC argues that assuming that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 square-meter portion that it had successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been excluded from the 68,969 square-meter Property that Pobre claims NPC had damaged. We are not persuaded. In its 30 October 1987 Order denying NPC's motion for reconsideration, the trial court pointed out that the Property originally had a total area of 141,300 square meters.39 Pobre converted the Property into a resort-subdivision and sold lots to the public. What remained of the lots are the 68,969 square meters of land.40 Pobre no longer claimed damages for the other lots that he had before the expropriation. Pobre identified in court the lots forming the 68,969 squaremeter Property. NPC had the opportunity to object to the identification of the lots.41 NPC, however, failed to do so. Thus, we do not disturb the trial and appellate courts' finding on the total land area NPC had damaged. NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner.42 However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.43 In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property. In United States v. Causby,44 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such taking is thus compensable. In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation.45 This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.46 In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,47 the Court compelled the National Housing Authority ("NHA") to pay just compensation to the landowners even after the NHA had already abandoned the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a government agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, and then just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary and capricious and was condemned by the Court in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held liable to the landowners for the prejudice that they had suffered. In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre. This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable. We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements.48 NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobre's entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of

the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobre's repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre.49 NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre's property rights. Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.50 The trial and appellate courts endeavored to meet this standard. The P50 per square meter valuation of the 68,969 square-meter Property is reasonable considering that the Property was already an established resort-subdivision. NPC has itself to blame for not contesting the valuation before the trial court. Based on the P50 per square meter valuation, the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre is P3,448,450. The landowner is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of the taking up to the time of full payment by the government.51 In accord with jurisprudence, we fix the legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum.52 The legal interest should accrue from 6 September 1979, the date when the trial court issued the writ of possession to NPC, up to the time that NPC fully pays Pobre.53 NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it.54 We also cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of attorney's fees.55 Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages to Pobre. The court may award temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, if the court finds that a party has suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved with certainty from the nature of the case.56 As the trial and appellate courts noted, Pobre's resort-subdivision was no longer just a dream because Pobre had already established the resort-subdivision and the prospect for it was initially encouraging. That is, until NPC permanently damaged Pobre's Property. NPC did not just destroy the property. NPC dashed Pobre's hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential as a resort-subdivision. The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we hold NPC liable for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.57

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National Power Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully paid. Upon National Power Corporation's payment of the full amount, Antonino Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National Power Corporation's favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000, respectively. No costs. SO ORDERED. RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION 3. ASIAS EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, et al. 552 SCRA 59 April 18, 2008 G.R. No. 169914 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Two Petitions involving the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) Project to the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). FACTS: Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.: The SC declared as null and void the 1997 Concession, Amended and Restated Concession Agreement between the Government and PIATCO. It ruled that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, the award by the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA, which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void. In a Resolution dated 21 January 2004, the SC denied with finality the Motions for Reconsideration of its Decision in Agan. Significantly, the SC declared that: This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity

for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors. It is these afore-quoted pronouncements that gave rise to the Petition in Gingoyon. Republic v. Gingoyon After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued. However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects. Two crucial differences between the procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67: (1) Under R.A. 8974, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession; Whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. (2) Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation;

Unlike R.A. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. Accordingly, on the basis of R.A. 8974 and its Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation; and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed to maintain, preserve and safeguard the NAIA 3 facilities or perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other parties. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order which appointed three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, praying for the nullification of the RTC orders. The SC resolved the Petition of the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY in Gingoyon in this wise: (1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases. (2) R.A. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation. (3) Applying R.A. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law. (4) Applying R.A. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions above-stated. (5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged

to comply with the standards set under R.A. 8974 and its Implementing Rules. (6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. (7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision. All told, the SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. The SC denied with finality the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of therein petitioners and remained faithful to its assailed Decision based on the following ratiocination: Admittedly, the 2004 Resolution in Agan could be construed as mandating the full payment of the final amount of just compensation before the Government may be permitted to take over the NAIA 3. However, the Decision ultimately rejected such a construction, acknowledging the public good that would result from the immediate operation of the NAIA 3. Instead, the Decision adopted an interpretation which is in consonance with R.A. 8974 and with equitable standards as well, that allowed the Government to take possession of the NAIA 3 after payment of the proffered value of the facilities to PIATCO. Such a reading is substantially compliant with the pronouncement in the 2004 Agan Resolution, and is in accord with law and equity. In contrast, the Governments position, hewing to the strict application of Rule 67, would permit the Government to acquire possession over the NAIA 3 and implement its operation without having to pay PIATCO a single centavo, a situation that is obviously unfair. Whatever animosity the Government may have towards PIATCO does not acquit it from settling its obligations to the latter, particularly those which had already been previously affirmed by the SC.

ISSUE: WHETHER AEDC IS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT MANDAMUS PRAYED FOR. HELD: NO. AEDC IS NOT ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF MANDAMUS, THERE BEING NO SPECIFIC, CERTAIN, AND CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO BE ENFORCED, NOR DUTY TO BE PERFORMED THAT IS CLEARLY AND PEREMPTORILY ENJOINED BY LAW OR BY REASON OF OFFICIAL STATION. RATIO: (1) Legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Otherwise, the mandamus petition must be dismissed. Only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ will not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. Just as fundamental is the principle governing the issuance of mandamus that the duties to be performed must be such as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases. It requires a showing of a complete and clear legal right in the petitioner to the performance of ministerial acts. (2) None of the rights or privileges given by law to the original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project would justify the automatic award of the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC after its previous award to PIATCO was declared null and void. Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, and Section 10 of its IRR, accord certain rights or privileges to the original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project. They are meant to encourage private sector initiative in conceptualizing infrastructure projects that would benefit the public. HOWEVER, these rights or privileges are never meant to be absolute. Otherwise, the original proponent can hold the Government hostage and secure the award of the infrastructure project based solely on the fact that it was the first to submit a proposal. The absurdity of such a situation becomes even more apparent when considering that the proposal is unsolicited by the Government. The rights or privileges of an original proponent depends on compliance with the procedure and conditions explicitly provided by the statutes and their IRR. (3) An unsolicited proposal is subject to evaluation, after which, the government agency or local government unit (LGU) concerned may accept or reject the proposal outright. Under Section 10.6 of the IRR, the acceptance of the unsolicited proposal by the agency/LGU is limited to the commitment of the agency/LGU to pursue the project and recognition of the proponent as the original proponent. Upon acceptance then of the unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is recognized as such but no award is yet made to it. The commitment of the agency/LGU upon acceptance of the unsolicited proposal is to the pursuit of the project, regardless of to whom it shall subsequently award the same. The acceptance of the unsolicited proposal only precludes the

Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) (G.R. No. 169914) Banking on the SCs declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO is null and void, Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed before the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying that judgment be rendered commanding the DOTC and MIAA to formally award the NAIA-IPT III PROJECT to AEDC and to execute and formalize with AEDC the approved Draft Concession Agreement embodying the agreed terms and conditions for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project. At the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof.

agency/LGU from entertaining other similar proposals until the solicitation of comparative proposals. (4) Consistent in both the statutes and the IRR is the requirement that invitations be published for comparative or competitive proposals. Therefore, it is mandatory that a public bidding be held before the awarding of the project. The negotiations between the agency/LGU and the original proponent, as provided in Section 10.9 of the IRR, is for the sole purpose of coming up with draft agreements, which shall be used in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the solicitation of comparative proposals. Even at this point, there is no definite commitment made to the original proponent as to the awarding of the project. In fact, the same IRR provision even gives the concerned agency/LGU, in case of unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the option to reject the original proponents proposal and just bid out the project. Generally, in the course of processing an unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is treated in much the same way as all other prospective bidders for the proposed infrastructure project. These requirements ensure that the public bidding under Rule 10 of IRR on Unsolicited Proposals still remain in accord with the three principles in public bidding, which are: the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition, and a basis for exact comparison of bids. (5) The special rights or privileges of an original proponent thus come into play only when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the infrastructure project. Thus, when the original proponent is able to timely match the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy preference in the awarding of the infrastructure project. This is the extent of the protection that Legislature intended to afford the original proponent The original proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within 30 working days from notice thereof, and (2) in the event that the original proponent is able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right or privilege is contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before the project could be awarded to the original proponent, he must have been able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period. (6) As already found by the SC in the narration of facts in Agan, AEDC failed to match the more advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30-day working period expired; and, without exercising its right to match the most advantageous proposal, it cannot now lay claim to the award of the project. The bidding process as to the NAIA IPT III Project was already over after the award thereof to PIATCO, even if eventually, the said award was nullified and voided. The nullification of the award to PIATCO did not revive the proposal nor re-open the bidding. AEDC cannot insist that the

SC turn back the hands of time and award the NAIA IPT III Project to it, as if the bid of PIATCO never existed and the award of the project to PIATCO did not take place. (7) The physical structures comprising the NAIA IPT III Project are already substantially built, and there is almost nothing left for AEDC to construct. Hence, the project could no longer be awarded to AEDC based on the theory of legal impossibility of performance. PIATCO is already close to finishing the building of the structures comprising NAIA IPT III. The NAIA IPT III Project was proposed, subjected to bidding, and awarded as a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project. The original proposal of AEDC is for a BOT project, in which it undertook to build, operate, and transfer to the Government the NAIA IPT III facilities. This is clearly no longer applicable or practicable under the existing circumstances. (8) AEDCs offer to reimburse the Government the amount it shall pay to PIATCO for the NAIA IPT III Project facilities, as shall be determined in the ongoing expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Pasay City, cannot restore AEDC to its status and rights as the project proponent. The law requires the project proponent to undertake the construction of the project, including financing; financing, thus, is but a component of the construction of the structures and not the entirety thereof. (9) Just as AEDC has no legal right to the NAIA IPT III Project, corollarily, it has no legal right over the NAIA IPT III facility. The claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project, after the award thereof to PIATCO was set aside for being null and void, grounded solely on its being the original proponent of the project, is specious and an apparent stretch in the interpretation of Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, and Rule 10 of the IRR. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Baterina (G.R. No. 174166) Expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was instituted by the Government with the RTC of Pasay City. Congressman Baterina, together with other members of the House of Representatives, sought intervention in said case by filing a Petition for Prohibition in Intervention (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Baterina, et al. believe that the Government need not file expropriation proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is not entitled to payment of just compensation, arguing thus A) PIATCO does not own Terminal III because BOT Contracts do not vest ownership in PIATCO. As such, neither PIATCO nor FRAPORT are entitled to compensation. B) Articles 448, ET SEQ., of the New Civil Code, as regards builders in good faith/bad faith, do not apply to PIATCOs Construction of Terminal III.

C) Article 1412(2) of the New Civil Code allows the Government to demand the return of what it has given without any obligation to comply with its promise. D) The payment of compensation to PIATCO is unconstitutional, violative of the Build-Operate-Transfer Law, and violates the Civil Code and other laws. In the meantime, on 19 December 2005, the SCs Decision in Gingoyon was promulgated. On 27 March 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order and Writ of Execution, the dispositive portion of which reads WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution be issued in this case directing the Sheriff of this court to immediately implement the Order dated January 4, 2005 and January 10, 2005, as affirmed by the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 166429 in the above-entitled case dated December 19, 2005, in the following manner: 1. Ordering the General Manager, the Senior Assistant General Manager and the Vice President of Finance of the MIAA to immediately withdraw the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 from with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch; 2. Ordering the Branch Manager, Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch to immediately release the sum of P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO Baterina, meanwhile, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CAG.R. No. 95539, assailing the issuance, in grave abuse of discretion, by the RTC of Pasay City of its Orders dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006 and Writ of Execution. By 24 August 2006, the Republic was all set to comply with the 9 August 2006 Order of the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, the representatives of the Republic and PIATCO met before the RTC of Pasay City for the supposed payment by the former to the latter of the proferred amount. However, on the same day, the CA, in CA G.R. No. 95539, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining, among other things, the RTC of Pasay City from implementing the questioned Orders, dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006, or from otherwise causing payment and from further proceeding with the determination of just compensation in the expropriation case. While the Urgent Motion to lift the TRO was still pending with the Court of Appeals, the Republic already filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, attributing to the CA grave abuse of discretion in granting the TRO and seeking a writ of prohibition against the CA to enjoin it from giving due course to Baterinas Petition in CA-G.R. No. 95539. CA: issued a Resolution lifting the TRO it issued.

There being no more legal impediment, the Republic tendered on 11 September 2006 Land Bank check in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 representing the proferred value of NAIA IPT III, which was received by a duly authorized representative of PIATCO. On 27 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA G.R. No. 95539 dismissing Baterinas Petition. Baterina, as the private respondent in the instant Petition is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that NAIA IPT III is already public property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation for NAIA IPT III. He is asking the SC to make a definitive ruling on this matter considering that it was not settled in either Agan or Gingoyon. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE REPUBLICS RESORT TO EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS IS PROPER. HELD: YES. RATIO: (1) As things stood after the 2004 Resolution (Agan), the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures. The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. The case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment. However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. (2) Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals. The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should

be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]. (3) Eminent domain may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case. (4) The property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned by PIATCO. PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution (Agan) squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCOs ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings. ISSUE 2: WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS OF THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION DUE PIATCO. HELD: RATIO: Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. The BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be limited to the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7, with Section 7 referring to the implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land. Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to be based using the replacement cost method. However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation. In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in

ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well. Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 of the law. The proffered value may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which proffered value should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value. In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.

4.

HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, et al. vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TRANSCO) 624 SCRA 360 July 7, 2010 G.R. No. 173355-56 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land. FACTS: These consolidated petitions involve the same subject matter: 1. A small parcel of land known as Lot 1 covering an area of 3,635 square meters or 0.36 hectares and which became the subject matter of GLRO 6908.

2. A larger parcel of land known as Lot 2 covering an area of 378,707 square meters or 37.87 hectares and which became the subject matter of GLRO 6909. Both of these parcels of land are located at Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte. PRECEDING CASES 1914 Cacho Case (Cacho v. US) In this case, the late Dona Demetria Cacho filed for the registration of the above parcels of land with the LRC (Land Registration Court). The LRC docketed Lot no. 1 under GLRO 6908 and Lot no. 2 under GLRO 6909. Doa Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos (Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon. On the other hand, Dona Demetria allegedly acquired Lot no. 2 from Datto Bunglaw who, in turn, acquired the said lot from Datto Anandog through succession, who died without issue. Only the Government opposed the registration. After due hearing, the LRC found that Lot no. 1 was the conjugal property of Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga. However, the court also found that the deed of sale was executed by Alanga only. Thus, the LRC required that a deed from Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in favor of the applicant. As to Lot no. 2, the LRC found that Datto Anandog was only occupying and cultivating the southern part of the land. Thus, Datto Anandog can only pass upon a portion of Lot no. 2 to his heir. With this, the LRC required that a new survey be made and a corrected plan be presented with respect to the said lands. The LRC further held that the final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan. The SC affirmed in toto the LRC decision. Decrees were issued for Lots 1 and 2.

Antecedent Facts to the Case at bar The controversy over the subject matter did not end with the 1997 Cacho case. Expropriation Case (G.R. No. 170375) In this case, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), created by virtue of PD 2729 and now the NSC, filed an expropriation case against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC). When the statutory existence of the ISA expired, MCFC filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the ISA lacked the legal capacity to sue. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, which was affirmed by the CA. However, the SC in ISA v. CA allowed the substitution of the parties from ISA to the Republic. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case on August 31, 1998. Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of expropriation, the Republic filed with the RTCBranch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated seeking to implead in Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. RTC denied such motion. Subsequently, MCFC filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to implead indispensible parties because of the fact that they are not the owners of the parcels of land. RTC (JUDGE MANGOTARA): GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that MCFC is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed. It ratiocinated that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the SC in Cacho v. Government of the United States decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doa Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Thus, MCFC is not the proper party defendant. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Thus, the Republic filed a consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein the REPUBLIC insists that MCFC is a real party-ininterest, impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason of its ownership of the said properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE MCFC IS A PROPER PARTY IN THE EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS.

1997 Cacho Case In this case, an alleged son and heir of the late Dona Demetria Cacho, Teofilo Cacho, together filed for the reconstitution of the OCTs involving Lots 1 and 2. The RTC initially dismissed the petition on the ground that what must be reconstituted were the decrees that were issued the court in the 1914 Cacho case. The RTC held that "it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were issued." Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his amended petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to the SC in Cacho v. Mangotara, docketed as G.R. No. 85495, the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept Teofilos amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees. The decrees were subsequently re-issued. Thereafter, two OCTs were issued in the name of Dona Demetria Cacho.

HELD: YES. Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in the expropriation proceedings. RATIO: (1) Defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted: Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When property is taken by eminent domain, the owner is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term owner when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (2) At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE RTC ERRED IN DISMISSING THE EXPROPRIATION CASE. HELD: YES. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. RATIO: Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court

SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IN THIS CASE IS AN INDESPENSABLE PARTY. MCFC contends that the Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court does not apply in this case where the party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable party. HELD: NO. The owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the subject Complaint for Expropriation. RATIO: (1) An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. (2) When the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party. Is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals. The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party. (3) Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106.

(4) The non-joinder of an indispensable party does not warrant the immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz: [F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply. In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the Republic upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 sought leave of court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC. ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE REPUBLIC IS PRECLUDED FROM INSTITUTION AN ACTION FOR EXPROPRIATION AFTER IT HAS FILED A COMPLAINT FOR REVERSION. HELD: NO. The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other. RATIO: (1) The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof. (2) Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for expropriation even when the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners.

(3) The filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain. Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides: SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

5.

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, et al. vs. FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION 636 SCRA 247 G.R. No. 189239 November 24, 2010 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (REALTY CORPORATIONS), co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and covered by TCTs 21712 and 21713, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. before the Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). REALTY CORPORATIONS alleged that SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL., through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them. SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that REALTY CORPORATIONS predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the question of ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may be resolved. During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the RTC with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City. MeTC: rendered judgment in favor of the REALTY CORPORATIONS and, consequently, ORDERED SPOUSES

ABAD, ET AL. to vacate and surrender possession of the subject premises. It held that as no payment had been made to the REALTY CORPORATIONS for the lots, they still maintain ownership thereon. It added that SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named. RTC: On appeal, REVERSED the MeTC Decision and DISMISSED the REALTY CORPORATIONS complaint for unlawful detainer. It ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the final judgment and writ of possession due to non-payment of just compensation. CA: ruled IN FAVOR OF THE REALTY CORPORATIONS. It noted that SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL.S failure to present evidence to rebut the CORPORATIONS allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering formers admission that they commenced occupation of the property without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas Development Corporation were indicative of tolerance by the CORPORATIONS predecessor-ininterest. With respect to the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon, held the same does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. SPOUSES ABD, ET AL.S motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the filing of the present petition for review. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS WERE SUSPENDED BY THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION. HELD: NO. RATIO: (1) As a General Rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. (2) HOWEVER, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538 provides: Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit

the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. (3) SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension. ISSUE 2: WHETHER SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO CONTINUE OCCUPYING THE SUBJECT LOTS, BY VIRTUE OF THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE INITITATION OF EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS. SOUSES ABAD, ET AL. posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there. HELD: NO. RATIO: (1) Expropriation of lands consists of two stages (Lintag v. National Power Corporation): The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation. (2) In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the Local Government Code.

(3) The city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not, contrary to SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL.s claim, state that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots. Thus, SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. cannot claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance. (4) Certain requirements must be met and complied with before SPOUSES ABAD, ET AL. can be considered to be beneficiaries. Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof.

The REGISTERED OWNERS of the affected parcels of land alleged, inter alia, in their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an abandoned government property adjacent to theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value at 5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties valued at 250,000. The RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish the just compensation to be paid to the owners. RTC: promulgated its Judgment adopting the findings of the Commissioners. NIA: APPEALED the Decision of the RTC to the CA. NIA assailed the trial courts adoption of the Commissioners Report, which had determined the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the lands expropriated. NIA also impugned as error the RTCs inclusion for compensation of the excavated soil from the expropriated properties. Finally, it disputed the trial courts Order to deliver the payment intended for the Rural Bank of Kabacan to defendantsintervenors, who allegedly acquired ownership of the land still titled in the name of the said rural bank. CA: AFFIRMED with modification the RTC Decision. Aggrieved by the appellate courts Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS. HELD: NO. The commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated by the NIA (REPUBLIC). RATIO: (1) In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal

6.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA) vs. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., et al. 664 SCRA 233 G.R. No. 185124 SERENO, J.: January 25, 2012

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution which affirmed with modification the 31 August 1999 Judgment promulgated by the RTC. The RTC had fixed the just compensation for the value of the land and improvements thereon that were expropriated by the REPUBLIC, but excluded the value of the excavated soil. The Republic of the Philippines is represented in this case by the National Irrigation Authority (NIA). FACTS: NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under R.A. 3601. It is primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the country. Its charter was amended by P.D. 552 and P.D. 1702. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain. NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters. The affected parcels of land were the following: 1) Lot No. 3080 covered by TCT No. T-61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan 2) Lot No. 455 covered by TCT No. T-74516 and registered under the names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all surnamed Lao 3) Lot No. 3039 registered under the name of Littie Sarah Agdeppa NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of 19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.

action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. (2) The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. (3) The just-ness of the compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. (4) The committee members endeavored a rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the expropriated properties. They based their recommendations on reliable data and considered various factors that affected the value of the land and the improvements. The first set of committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. (5) Factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this Court. The rule admits of exceptions, though, such as when the factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are contradictory, or when the findings are not supported by the evidence on record. These exceptions, however, are not present in the instant case. Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, the findings of the CA, which sustained the trial courts Decision adopting the committees recommendations on the just compensation to be awarded to herein respondents, is hereby affirmed. ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR LOT NO. 3080 SHOULD BE MADE TO MARGARITA TABOADA AND PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ ON THE BASIS OF THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF THE RURAL BANK IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE LATTERS SUBSEQUENT MANIFESTATION THAT IT WAS NO LONGER THE OWNER OF THAT LOT.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the payment of just compensation intended for Lot No. 3080 registered in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the defendants-intervenors on the basis of the nonparticipation of the rural bank in the proceedings and the latters subsequent Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of that lot. HELD: YES. It was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on the Rural Bank of Kabacans mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in the expropriation proceeding to validate defendantsintervenors claim of entitlement to that payment. RATIO: (1) In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public document and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property is situated. The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. (2) There is no proof of conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to defendantsintervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the said rural bank. It is not disputed that the bank did not participate in the expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080. The trial court should have nevertheless required the rural bank and the defendantsintervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance of the subject lot. (3) The court cannot rely on mere inference, considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be awarded solely to the owner based on the latters proof of ownership. (4) Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts Order to award payment of just compensation to the defendants-intervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but the defendants-intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to the conveyance thereof. In this regard, the SC deem it proper to remand the case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive the payment of just compensation.