18
26 DECEMBER 1 9 4 4
A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U. S . fhrrn? Cornmanil and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l I i l l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r the degree MkSTEH OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE
F o r t Leavsnwor t h 1985
Kansas
Approved for
pub1 i c r e l e a s e , d i s t r i b u t i o n
i s unl i n i t e d
MASTER
OF
Name o f C a n d i d a t e : T i t l e of Thesis :
A p p r o v e d by:
T h e s i s Committee C h a i r m i n G r a d u a t e F a c t i l t;.
, Member,
Member, C o n s u l t i n g f-acui t y
A c c e p t e d t h i s 7 t h d a y o f J u n e 1985 by:
,
P h i l i p l J . Brookes, Ph.0.
D i r e c t o r , G r a d u a t e IDegrr!e Programs
The op i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e of t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t!ie v i e w s o f t h e U.!;. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l ~ r g eo r any o t h e r gouerrlmental agency. ( R e f e r e n c e s t o t h i rr j t u d y should include t k f o r e a o i n a statement.)
F I E L D ARTILLtiliY SIJPPORT FOR 1 1 1 CORPS ATTACK 18 25 DECEllBEH 184.1 by Gregory U . M o r t o n , USA, 152 p a g e s . T h i s s t i i d y i s an h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e e m p l u y m r n t of t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y d u r i n g t h e I 1 1 C o i - p i a t t a c k t o r e 1 teve t h e American s o l d i e r s surrounded <it BASTOGNE. Tha d o c t r i n e a n d t r a i n i n g o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s i s examined. T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n i s IJ!ied t o e v a l u a t e t h e empl oymen t t e c h n i q u e s u s e d by I II Corpci artillery. The d e v e l o p m e n t a n d m a t u r a t i o n p r o c e s s c r f t h e I 1 1 C o r p s a r t i l l e r y i s t r a c e d f r o m i t s f i r s t comba,t e x p e r i e n c e a t M e t z t h r o u g h i t s e m p l o y m e n t d u r i n g the. T h i s slL,dr i n 1 t i a l stage:: o f t h e B a t t l e o f t h e B u l g e . d i s c u s s e s the pre-war t r a i n i n g , d o c t r i n e o f the p e r i o d , and development and u s e o f the F i e l d A r t i l l e r y GrouF. A c t i o n s t a k e n hy 1 1 1 C o r p s p r i o r t o a n d d u r i n g t h e a t t x k a r e a n a l y z e d i n r e v i e w t h e i r employment t e c h n i q u e s and compliance w i t h the d o c t r i n e o f the p e r i o d . Among t h e l e s s o n s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h i s s t u d y a r e : t h e a d h e r e n c e t o a s t a n d a r d s e t o f e m p l o y m e n t procedure:; and ~ ~ m ~ p l i a n wci e t h d o c t r i n e was e f f e c t i u e i n t h i s b a t t l e ; f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s s h o u l d be e m p l o y e d as b a t t a l i o n Fiize u n i t s ; c u r r e n t d a y f i e l d a r t i l l e r y m e n s h o u l d p r a c t i c e it11 the standard t . r c t i c a l missions; l o c a l procedures t h a t v i o l a t e d o c t r t l , l e s h e u l d be a v o i d e d ; f i e l d a r t i l l e r ? u n i t c s h o u l d t r a i n W I t h t h e maneuver u n i t s t h e y w i 1 1 s u p p o - t . The s t u d r c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d i z e d s e t D f e m p l o y m e n t p r o t : e d u r e s u s e d b y I 1 1 C o r p s , a n d a throumah u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d o c t r i n e , c r e a t e d t h e f l e x i b i l i t y n e c e s s a r y f o r !he e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r , , d u r i n g thiz. b a t t l e .
-i
i-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS F i r s t and f o r e m o s t under t h i s h e a d i n g I must l i s t m y w i f e J a n e t and o u r two c h i l d r e n , J u l i e and Nancy. It is o n l y t h r o u g h t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t I was a b l e t o c o m p l e t e t h i s study. They gave me t h e i r most p r e c i o u s g i f t - t i m e .
M y c o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n , LTC John H i x s o n was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h e l p i n g t o d e f i n e and n a r r o w t h i s t o p i c . He h a s n u r t u r e d and g u i d e d t h i s e f f o r t w i t h p a t i e n c e and understanding. LTC John M a r t i n p r o v i ded c r i t i c a l comments and s e r v e d a s an e x c e l l e n t s o u n d i n g b o a r d . COL C l a y t o n Freeark accepted the task o f s e r v i n g as a c o n s u l t i n g f a c u l t y member on v e r y s h o r t n o t i c e . H i s comments w e r e i n s t r u m e n t a l i n f o c u s i n g t h i s s t u d y and p r o v i d i n g most welcome I a m most a p p r e c i a t i v e o f t h e u n t i r i n g encouragement. e f f o r t s o f C a r o l Ramkey, a r e s e a r c h e r w i t h t h e Combined A r m s Research L i b r a r y . She was most h e l p f u l , and a t t h e r i s k o f o v e r l o a d i n g h e r a l r e a d y busy s c h e d u l e , I h i g h l y recommend h e r t o anyone c o n d u c t i n g r e s e a r c h a t F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h . Mr. Les M i l l e r , o f the M o r r i s Swett L i b r a r y , F o r t S i l l , Oklahoma, was k i n d enough t o l e n d me documents t h a t e n a b l e d t h i s s t u d y t o b e conducted. Without h i s help, t h i s p r o j e c t c o u l d n o t have been c o m p l e t e d .
-iv-
TABLE O F CONTENTS
T H E S I S APPROV;+L ABSTRACT
.-
- - -
----------
i i
iii
----------------------
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
--
iv
1
CHAPTER ONE
CHAPTER TWO
9
31
CHAPTER THREE
51
72
85
86
111
APPENDIX TWO
118 126
BIBLIOGRAPHY DISTRIBUTION L I S T -
132
- - - - - -
-----
138
-V-
CHAPTER ONE
At
t h e T h i r d Army A r t i l l e r y C o n f e r e n c e a t
BOD
Fatton
S.
I t h i n k t h a t i n e v a l u a t i n g a r t i 1 l e r y , thr, p r o o f of t h e p u d d i n g i s i n t h e e a t i n g . W e won t h e w a r And i t was l a r g e l y won by t h e a r t i l l e r - ) , . I t h i n k i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t YOU now r e c o r d o n p a p e r w h a t YOU d i d ( n o t w h a t you t h i n k you d i d ) , so t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y i n t h e n e x t w a r c a r s t a r t o f f where you s t o p p e d . ( 1 )
I t i s i n t h i s s p i r i t t h a t t h i s s t u d y h a s been
a t tempted.
The p u r p l i s e o f employment o f
I : i e l d a r t i l l e r y (FA)
CurpE. d u r i n g I I J
26 December 1944.
1 1 1 C o r p s was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n t r o l a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f 25
d i f f e r e n t f ielcl a r t i 1 l e r y b a t t a l ions. c o n t r o l and d i r e c t the f i r e s of h a s i s of t h i s thesis. The m e t h o d s tJ<rsd t o
t h e s e b a t t a l i o n s i s (:he
s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e d u r i n g t h i s t i m e the
I 1 1 Corps
BELGIUM.
field artillery,
elements o f Commu n i c a t e
the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y m i s s i o n
- Move,
an cj
.
-1-
d i s c u s s who
and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and
i n t h e a t t a c k t o r e l i e v e BASTOGNE:
Hq and Hq B a t t e r y ,
I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y
2 8 8 t h FA O b s e r v a t i o n 6n
1 7 7 t h FA 6n (155mm
H)
253rd FA 6n (185mm H)
2 7 4 t h FA Bn (185mm
H)
7 7 6 t h FA Bn (155mm H)
193rd
Fa Group
-2-
9 4 9 t h FA Bn (155mm H)
2l13rd FA G r o u p
1 7 6 t h FA En (4.5''
0)
7 3 1 s t FA Bn (155mm 0 )
482nd FA Group
5 6 1 s t FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m G) 5 5 9 t h FA En (155mm G) 5 7 8 t h FA Bn ( 0 "
H)
4134th FA Qroup
5 1 2 t h FA Bn ( 1 8 5 m m H)
7 5 2 n d FA En (15Smm H)
4 h Armored D i v i s i o n A r t i
2 2 n d FA En (1B5mm 6 6 t h FA Bn ( 1 0 5 m m 9 4 t h FA En ( 1 0 5 m m
H)
H)
H)
26th I n f a n t r y Division A r t i l l e r y
I B l s t FA Bn ( 1 8 5 m m H)
182nd FA Bn ( 1 0 5 m m H) 1 8 8 t h FA En ( 1 5 5 m m H)
;!63rd FA En (185mm
H)
314th FA Bn (185mm H)
3 1 5 t h FA Bn (155mm H) 9 6 5 t h FA Bn (185mm H) ( 2 )
A s o f 188881A Dcc 4 4 o n l y t w o o f t h e s e
e m p l o y m e n t o f t h i s v a s t amount o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i s t h e focus of t h i s s t u d y .
H i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h m e t h o d o l o g y was u s e d f o r t h i s
study.
u n i t journals,
o f f i c i a l documents, s t u d i e s and r e p o r t s .
the a c t i o n s .
-4-
I 1 1 Corps.
I t i s l i m i t ? d to
an a n a l y s i s o+ t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r , t h e e f f e c t oi t h a t e m p l o y m e n t on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .
and
!t i s
s p e c i f i c a l l y I i m i t e d t o an a n a l y s i s o f t h e employmeitt of
25 FA b a t t a l i c i n s 1 i s t e d p r e v i o u s l y .
T h i s study ha5 beon o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d t h e hypotheEiis t h a t t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h o artillery d u r i n g t h i s butt),:. was e f f e c t u e due t o t h e s t a n d a r d l z a t i o n o f p r o c e d u r e s a n d emp 1 o m e n t t e c h n i q u e 6 a n d t h a t t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s h a v e appl i c a b i 1
ty
t o t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d .
This
i n f l u e n c e on a m a j o r b a t t l e .
assumptions f o i . t h i s s t u d y were:
(1)
The f i e l d a r t i l l e r y h a d an i m p a c t
011
the
outcome o f t h e a t t a c k .
( 2 ) The f i e l d a r t l l l e r r s u p p o r t was a
coordinated e f i o r t .
(3) The p r o c e d u r e s u s e d by t h e f i e l d
a r t i l l e r y c a n be r e l a t e d t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f 1944.
Several of
t h i s study <ire
When
General SuDaort General s u p p o r t a r t i l e r y i s r e t a i n e d under c o n t r o l of the h i g h e r a r t l l e r y commander f o r e m p l o y m e n t a n y w h e r e i n t h e s e c t o r o f o p e r a t i o n of t h e u n i t a s a whole. When an a r t i l l e r y u n i t i s a t t a c h e d Attachment t o a n y o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e h i g h e r commander re1 inquishes d i r e c t control of that a r t i l l e r y a n d i t becomes as much a p a r t o f t h e u n i t t o which i t i s attached as are the organic organizations of that unit. p e in f o r c i n g An a r t i l l e r y u n i t g i v e n t h e m i s s i o n of r e i n f o r c i n g the f i r e s of another u n i t e s t a b l i s h e s l i a i s o n w i t h t h a t u n i t and g i v e s t h e reinforced u n i t p r i o r i t y i n c a l l i n g for f i r e s . I t r e m a i n s under c o n t r o l o f t h e h i g h e r commander. " General S u D D o r t / R e i n f o r c i n q A c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e g e n e r a l s u p p o r t and r e i n f o r c i n g m i s s i o n s . The a r t i l l e r y i s m a i n t a i n e d u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e h i g h e r a r t i l l e r y commander. The u n i t assigned t h i s mission responds t o c a l l s for f i r e support from the r e i n f o r c e d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n f i r s t . The u n i t w i t h t h i s m i s s i o n i 0 p o s i t i o n e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d by t h e h i g h e r a r t i l e r r (3) commander. The r e m a i n d e r o f t h e t h e s i s i s o r g a n z e d i n t o f o u r Chapters. C h a p t e r Two d i s c u s s e s t h e d o c t r i n e o f 1944, the
-6-
training.
3hapter
phase,
the r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n
h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s among u n i t s .
r e 1 a t i o n s h i p a amor'g
T h i s s t u d y s h o u l d be of v a l u e t o in particular,
a n d combat t h e o r i s t s i n g e n e r a l .
How do we a s s e m b l e a n d e m p l o y t h e f i e l d a r t i
lery
i n a surprise attack?
We
c o u l d w e l l be f a c e d w i t h e m p l o y i n g f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i i c i t , ! , who do n o t h a v e l o n g - t e r m s u p p o r t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e a t t a c k i n g q r o u n d g a i n i n g arms.
."
BY t r a c i n g t h e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t ;
in
1.
George S .
P a t t o n , J r , as q u o t e d i n
XI1
Corps
A r t i l l e r y i n Combat
U S Army,
(Regensburg, Germany,
1945), p . i .
2.
US A r m y ,
242488A Dec 44
1.
4.
John M . L e n t r , BG,
i n Combat
(Regensburg, Germany, U S A r m y ,
1945), p . i .
-8-
CHAPTER TWO
T h i s Chapter d i s c u s s e s t h e d o c t r i n e o f
1944.
The
in
Presented f i r s t
i n t h i s C h a p t e r i s ;n
then the s p e c i f i c After
artillery.
an e x a m p l e o f how t h e
" I t c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e a c t i o n of the entii-6, f o r c e by g i v i n g c l o s e a n d c o n t i n u o u s f i r e s u p p o r t tc:, i n f a n t r y ( c a u a l r y ) ( a r m o r e d ) u n i t s arid by g i v i n g d e p t h t o combat by c o u n t e r b a t t e r y f i r e , f i r e on h o s t i l e r e s e r v e s , f i r e t o r e s t r i c t movement5 i n r e a r a r e a s , a n d f i r e t o d i s r u p t command aqenc i e s " ( 1 >
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e w r i t e r s of
d o c t r i n e of
the
1940's
maneuuer u n i t s .and t h e i r s u p p o r t i n g a r t i I 1 e r y .
indepeident
t h e per.is>d
the r o l e o f
t h e a r t i l l e r y ir,
support terms.
However,
t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n wa5 n o t intended
I t was r e c o g n i z e d
t o demean t h e a r t i l l c r y c a p a b i l i t i e s .
The s y s t e m s o
t h e p e r od w e r e c l a s s i f i e d p r i m a r i l y Artillery
by t h e i r r a n g e , mob 1 i t y a n d f i r e p o w e r .
c l a s s i f i e d a s l i g h t w a s g e n e r a l l y o f 105mm a n d s m a l l e r . T h e s e s y s t e m s w e r e i n t e n d e d t o b e u s e d by t h e d i v i s i o n s i n c o n t a c t as t h e i r p r i m a r y d i r e c t s u p p o r t a s s e t s . Light
a r t i l l e r y was h i g h l y m o b i l e a n d c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a h i g h
r a t e of f i r e .
M e d i u m a r t i l l e r y i n c l u d e d b o t h t h e 4.5
inch
I t was l e s s m o b i l e , h a d a
WEAPON
CALIBER
RANGE
W E I GHT
33 l b s
95 l b s 95 l b s
1B 5mm
155mm
155mm
-10-
8"
155mm
1 8 , 5 1 8 yds
2 8 , 1 8 8 yds 2 8 , 5 8 8 yds
288 It,s
CM2)
95 lbr; 55 l b i .
4.5" (Mi
)
1 SJmm
25,715 yds
95 l b s .
s u i t e d t o p a r i c u l a r r o l e s . For e x a m p l e , w h e n e v e r p c s s i b l e
i t was b e t t e r t o o r g a n i z e t h e a r t i l l e r y so t h a t t h e meillium o r heavy a r t i l e r y c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e c o u n t e r b a t t e r r
mission.
g e n e r a l l y t h e s m a l l e r c a l i b e r weapons, u n i t s i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy.
b a t t a l i o n of medium a r t i l l e r y .
s u p p o r t i n g role o f t h e a r t i l l e r y .
t h r o u g h t h e u s e of s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s .
b u t t h e y b e a r r e p e a t i n g h e r e for.
-1 1 -
c1 a r t y ' s
saKe.
The m i s s i o n o f d i r e c t s u p p o r t w a s one
one a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n .
I t w a s common t o f i n d t h e same
FA b a t t a l i o n s u p p o r t i n g t h e same m a n e u v e r u n i t t h r o u g h o u t
a campaign. D i r e c t s u p p o r t b a t t a l i o n s were maneuvered as
n e c e s s a r y by t h e i r commander t o p r o v i d e t h e b e s t s u p p o r t
for
the supported u n i t .
Even t h o u g h i t : i s p o a . s i b l e t o s e e
the f i r e s of
the d i r e c t support u n i t s .
t h e f i r e o f t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y u n i t 5 c o u l d be
o n a n y t a r g e t when o r d e r e d by t h e C o r p s Commander...or when t h e C o r p s A r t i l l e r y Commander, t h r o u g h h i s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e f l o w o f b a t t l e , i s cognizant of the f a c t that c e r t a i n b a t t a l i o n s of d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y a r e n o t b e i n g e m o l o r e d . t h e i r f i r e s c a n a n d s h o u l d be u t i l i z e d by'him t o r e i n f o r c e the i r e on p o r t i o n s o f t h e f r o n t where r e i n f o r c e m c n s a r e i n d i c a t e d . This i 5 a m a t t e r f o r thorough u n d e r s t a n d i n g and mutual cooperation." (2)
'...
I n t h i s m a n n e r , t h e C o r p s A r t 1 1 e r y Commander e x e r t e d some
i n f l u e n c e over the u n i t s w i t h a di.rect support mission.
a s s i g n e d t o t h e medium a n d h e a v y a r t i l l e r y .
I t was t h e
-1 2-
m e t h o d by wh i i:h
t h e C o r p s A r t i 1 1 e r y Commander c o u 1 d we i gh t
t h e zone o f a c t i o n .
any p a r t i c u l a r . p o r t i o n o f
W e i g h t c o u l d a l s o be a p p l i e d t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f r e i n f o r c i n g mission.
the
T h i s m i s s i o n wa5 u n i q u e becau5.e a
u n i t t h a t p e r f o r m e d t h i s r o l e a n s w e r e d c a l l s f o r f i r e 1:rom a n o t h e r FA u n i t , n o t f r o m a m a n e u v e r u n i t d i r e c t l y . . Tb~is
was a b l e n d o f
on a b a t t a l i o n a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w e i g h t t h e m a i n a t t a c k :
by a s s i g n i n g t t l i s . m i s s i o n .
The manii.il
g o e s so f a r a s t o s a y t h a t t h e
reinforcing unit w i l l
When a t t a c h e d t o a d i v i s o n ,
the groups b a t t a l i o n s
c o u l d be u s e d t o p e r f o r m a n y o f
-13-
The s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s o f d i r e c t s u p p o r t
(GSR) f o r m e d t h e b a s i s f o r employment
I n a d d i t i o n t o the types o f
methods o f o b s e r v a t i o n , p r o c e d u r e s t o be used.
t h e d o c t r i n e o f the p e r i o d i s t h a t conducted by f o r w a r d
observers. These o b s e r v e r s w e r e a l l o c a t e d on a b a s i s o f They u s u a l l y came f r o m t h e
Another source o f f o r w a r d
observation b a t t a l i o n .
of
i t s adJusting function.
forward
i n t h e maneuver b a t t a l i o n o p e r a t i o n c e n t e r .
H i s primary
-1 4-
r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t v was t o i n s u r e t h a t
did not f i r e c a n f r i e n d l y troops.
the f o r w a r d obserlrer*s He a c c o m p l i s h e d t l i i s - b y
as w e l l a s f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s , w e r e a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
p r o v i d i n g a d v i c e on t h e employment o f a r t i l l e r y t o t h e i r s u p p o r t e d u n i t commanders.
(4)
1 i a i s o i r o f f i c e r s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o v i d i n g
t h e maneuver f o r c e s . i.e.
The l o n g e r
r a n g e o h s e r v a t ~ n na s s e t s ,
sound a n d f l a s h a n d a r
i d e n t i f y i n g and n e u t r a l z i n g the sound and f l a s t i
a s s e t s , were r r s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e enemy a r t i l l e r y .
(The use o f
the method of
a l l t:arQets
were p r o c e s s e d i n t h e f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r (FDC)
-15-
G r o u p s a n d C o r p s a l s o had f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r s .
P r i mar l y t h e s e w e r e u s e d t o m a s s t h e f i r e s o f s e v e r a l
b a t t a l o n s on one t a r g e t ,
a n d t o a t t a c k deep t a r g e t s . The
of the d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r i e s .
of a l l
t h e a r t i l l e r y t o m a s s o n one t a r g e t .
c o n c l u s i o n s on t h i s t o p i c r e a c h e d b y t h e The G e n e r a l B o a r d
i nc 1 u d e d :
...the a b i l i t y t o mass q u i c k l y and a c c u r a t e l y t h e f i r e s of many f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s on a s i n g l e t a r g e t w a s q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f an operation... t h e r e was n o s u b s t i t u t e f o r massed a r t i l l e r y fires... these f i r e s p l a y e d a major r o l e i n t h e advance of o u r t r o o p s and i n b r e a k i n g u p a n d d i s o r g a n i z i n g enemy counterattacks... these f i r e s were c a r e f u l l y c o n t r o l l e d and r e a d i l y s h i f t e d t o t h e d e s i r e d location... t h e s e f i r e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e , on s h o r t n o t i c e , during a l l h o u r s o f t h e day and n i g h t and i n a l l kinds. of w e a t h e r . ( 6 ) T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s r e f l e c t n o t o n l y on t h e FDC d o c t r i n e b u t a l s o on t h e r a t h e r s t r i n g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s p l a c e d o n u n i t s f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n of f i r e s .
-1 6-
" S e n d i n g o f 1 i a i s o n detachm ents t o i n f a n t i - y b a t t a l jaras and assi gnm ent o f m i s s i o n s t o f o r w a i - d Agreement w i t h supported i n f a n t r y observer:<. commandevs as t o a r t i 1 1 e r y s u p p o r t and s i g n a l s f o r s h i f t i n g fires...(and) any p r e a r r a n g e d f i r a b s i n o r d e r t o f a c i 1 i t a t e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t a r g e t s I>Y i n f a n t r y commanders, 1 i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , and a i l and a r t i I l e r y o b s e r v e r s . " ( 7 ) The u n i t s , b o t h f i e l d a r t i l l e r y and maneuver, The v a l u e o f planned
numerous c o n c e n t r a t i o n s .
these pre-ar.r
armed
a r t i 1 l a r y was a v a i l a b l e on such s h o r t n o t i c e . C o o r d i n a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s w e r e s p e c i f i c , b u t n o t so d e t a i l e d
as t o p r e c l u d e a l 1 f l e x i b i 1 i t y .
f i e l d artiller;.,
As w i t h other p o r t i
m E
of
d o c t r i n e t h e emphasis Wac. a l w a y s
o r 1
This The
t around t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i I l e r y .
(8)
Whenever
t h e s i t u a t i on exceedl?d t h i s
-17-
weaK resistance state additional artillery w a s allocated from C o r p s assets. T h e divsional artillery habitually C o r p s artillery w a s
normally formed into g r o u p s and then the group w a s attached to a Division o r i t was assigned one of the standard missions. a common mission. structure.
assignments for one C o r p s artillery battalion over the course of its European Theater a s s i ~ n m e n t .This 1 isting i s included to giue some indication o f the fluid nature of an assignment to any particu a r group.
T h e 177th Field A r t l l e r r Battalion arrived on the continent on 21 July 1944. Getween its arrival and the
DATE
GROUP
CORPS
2 1 J U L 44
28 A U G 44
STH FA G P
xx
ATTCH'D
F A BN
943RD
xx
xx
111
3 SEP 44
5 NOV 44
264TH FA G P
Z B 4 T H FA GP
-18-
18 DEC 4 4
1 9 DEC 4 4 ATTCH'D 4TH
I11
111
ARMORED D I U
26 DEC 4 4
6 1 JAN 45
I
111 111 UIII
22 JAN 45
1 2 FEB 45
12 MAR 45
6 2 APR 45
UIII
xx xx
THIRD ARMY
0 9 APR 4 5
22 JUN 45
#:9 )
A s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h i s c h a r t ,
u n i t t o move a i - o u n d q u i t e a b i t .
i t was n o t unusua.1 f o r a
This particular
the exception.
Below
iy,
a chronological
l i s t i n g o f t h e b a t t e a li o n s
(The f i r s t t i m e t h e b a t t a l i o n i s t h e weapon
i s n o t e d i n parentb8eses
the c a l i b e r of
DATE
BATTALIONS ASSIGNED
CORPS
-.I 9-
18 AUG 4 4
XI I
XI I
21 AUG 4 4
512TH F A (105mm H) 731ST F A (155mm H) P74TH F A 2 8 AUG 44 176TH F A 512TH F A 775TH F A ( 4 . 5 " 974TH F A
1 1 SEP 44
< 155mm
H)
XII
G)
XI I
25 SEP 4 4
XII
0 9 OCT 44
XII
10 DEC 44
111
20 DEC 44
111
01 JAN 45
XI I
-20
752ND FA
(10)
and varied assignments in a very short period o f time?. their. case t h e y controlled P different battalions in 2 different Corps in a period of 4 months.
In
T h e twc, previous 1 tsts demonstrate the flexibility that the group headquarters gave the Corps in orgariizing the field artillery. Groups were originally desigrled much That is, i t w a s a
tactical headquarters with no battalions organic 1:c i t . The primary function w a s to assign missions for tactical employment of attached battalions, exercise fire direction
" T h e flexibility of the n e w organtzation makes i t readi ly possible to form tasK forces without reorganltatlon of units or disruption of the old fixed regimental organization and at tt.e same time permits a masstng of m e a n s a s required by the situation." ( 1 2 )
'The original p an w a s for the groups to form in t h e United States, train and then deploy to a theater of operations as a n ent ty. However, due to training
seldom occurred.
Upon arrival in
This
Groups w e r e o f t e n assigned t o a
D i v i s i o n o r Corps w i t h no b a t t a l i o n s a t t a c h e d , as was the case w i t h the 464th c i t e d e a r l i e r . "The i n i t i a l f u n c t i o n s o f the group headquarters a f t e r l a n d i n g c o n s i s t e d o f a s s i s t i n g the d i v i s i o n s , t o which t h e y w e r e a t t a c h e d , i n s u p e r v i s i o n and f i r e d i r e c t i o n o f the a v a i l a b l e a r t i l l e r y . Some groups p e r f o r e d c o u n t e r - b a t t e r y f u n c t i ons f o r t h e d i v i s i o n , o t h e r s a c t e d as an a d d i t i o n a l d i u i s i o n a r t i l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r , and s t i l l o t h e r s Derformed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s on the beach (13)
T h i s p ecemeal commitment t o combat f o r group headquar t e r s s e t the p a t t e r n f o r the r e s t o f the war. Groups as we 1 a5 n o n - d i v i s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y were s h i f t e d
from Corps t o C o r p s and i n some cases from A r m y t o A r m y throughout the remainder o f the c o n f l i c t .
f lexibi1 ity
This
a r t i l l e r y un t s .
T h i s f e x i b i 1 i t y was n o t c r e a t e d by the War Department doc tr i ne however. "The v a r i o u s h i g h e r commanders developed t h e i r own d o c t r i n e s on the f u n c t i o n s and use o f the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y groups. Some commanders a t t e m p t e d t o r e t a i n groups and b a t t a l i o n s together w h i l e o t h e r s s h i f t e d b a t t a l i o n s c o n t i n u o u s l y from one group t o another w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o c o n t i n u i t y o f command. Regardless o f the v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l i d e a s on proper o r g a n i z a t i o n for combat, the f l e x i b i l i t y o f the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y group o r g a n i z a t i o n gaue
-22-
A s n o t e d above,
own idea!;
"The I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y h a b i t u a l l y attached a l l non-divisional 1 ight b a t t a l i o n s l o d i v i s i o n s and, when t h e a v a i l a b l e a r t i l l e r y perm1 t t e d , an a d d i t i o n a l 155mm h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n was a l s o a t t a c h e d t o an i n f a n t r y division. A group c o n s i s t i n g o f two 155 howl t z e i - b a t t a l i o n s , one 195 mm gun b a t t a l i o n and one 13 i n c h h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n r e i n f o r c e d the f i r e s o f each i n f a n t r y d l u i s i o n a r t i l l e r y . A group c o i i s i s t i n g o f one 4.5 i n c h gun b a t t a l i o n and one 155mm gun b a t t a l I o n ( s e l f - p r o p e l l e d ) 11 r e i n f o r c v a d t h e f i r e s o f an armored d i v i s i o n . 159 mm hcJWi t z e r b a t t a l i o n was a t t a c h e d t o the A l l oth6.r l a t t e r q'oup when i t wa5 a v a i l a b l e . a r t i l l e r y was i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t . " ( 1 5 ) T h i s i s an a c r u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f how the 1 1 1 Corp'i d e p l o y e d i a r t i l l e r y d u r l n g t h e a t t a c k commencing 22 December 1944.
the
r e s u l t s s e r v e a s a t y p c a l example.
d e t a i l o f t h e s e t e s t s , A p p e n d i x One c o n t a i n s t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e 4 8 4 t h FA G r o u p t e s t .
doc t r ne t o t h e n e e d s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f w a r .
that
The f a c t
is a
h i s p r o c e d u r e was f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r
testament t o i t s v a l i d i t y .
I n l a t e r Chapters i t w i l l
be
-24-
f i r e support.
The c c l n c l u d i n g p o r t i o n s o f t h i s C h a p t e r d e s c r b e a s m a l l p o r t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k t o r e i eve
BASTUGNE c o n d u c t e d by t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ( A D ) .
4 t h AD was on- o f t h e d i v i s i o n s a t t a c h e d t o 111 C o r 3 s . T h i s a c t i o n dkbpicts d o c t r i n a l employment o f t h e f i e l d artillery.
The
The a r t i l l e r y w i t h t h e D i v i s i o n was o r g a n i z e d as f o l l o i d s :
(A d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l
bs
p r e s e n t e d i n Chapter.. F o u r )
Combat Command A
2 2 n d FA (105mm t i )
( o r g a n i :)
253rd FA (105mm
H, a t t a c : h , ? d
a t t a c h e d f r o m I 1 1 Corps)
-25-
561st FA (155mm G)
attached to the division and that one group of medium and h e a y artillery w a s assigned a mission of general support
t0
Di v sion Artillerr.
al 1 these f i r i n g units and the Division Artillery Headquarters and the Group Headquarters. (18) The forward observers assigned to the maneuver companies were from the organic artillery battalions and no additional observers were assigned by Corps.. <1P)
Division Artillery headquarters, despite some communication problems caused by terrain and weather. (20)
-26-
The 3 7 t h TanK B a t t a l i o n ,
commanded b y LTC C.
W.
This
Combat Command h a d t h e m i s s i o n o f c o v e r i n g t h e l e f t f l a n k
of
the D i v i s i o n .
i n t:he
d i r e c t i o n o f 3IBRET,
by 1586 on t h e
RASTOGNE.
L t Col Abrams r a d i o e d b a c k t o h i s S-3 ant1 said, t h i s i s it. A few m i n u t e s l a t e r Capt Cook, L n 0 f r o m t h e 9 4 t h FA Bn t o CCR, r e c e i v r c a r a d i o message back a t t h e CCR CP a t REMOIUIL.LE f r o m Abrams t e l l i n g h i m t o h a v e a l l a r t i l l e r y Cook p r e p a r e d t o f i r e o n ASSENOIS on c a l 1 . r a d i o e d d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y t o h a v e them make a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e 22 a n d 253 t o p r e p a r e t o fire. T h e 94 w a s a l r e a d y r e g i s t e r e d on t h e t a r g e t a n d f i r i n g d a t a was t r a n s m i t t e d t o D i v Ai-ty. The a r t i l l e r y p l a n was f o r t h e t h r e e 1 i g h t Bns t o f i r e b a t t a l i o n 16 v o l l e y s w i t h t h e 155 B t r y t o f i r e o n t h e c e n t e r o f t h e t o w n . . . D u r i n g t h i s s h o r t b u t i n t e n s e s h o o t on ASSENOXS a p p r o x i m a t e l y 368 r o u n d s o f 1 8 5 a n d 68 r o u n d s O F 155 were . + i r e d (21)
What
t h i s d e p i ( : t s i s t h a t a m a n e u v e r commander, on t h e
t h e moment, was a b l e t o a r r a n g e f o r the f i r e o f 3 This
spur o f
FA b a t t a l i o n s 1:18Smm) a n d 1 a t t a c h e d 155mm B a t t e r y .
i s some d i s p u t e a s t o w h e t h e r
t h i s tooL:
38 or 45 m i n u t e s ,
but t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t
i s t h a t due t o
I t a l s o shows t h e a b i l i t y
t h e a r t i l l e r y t o q u i c k l y mass f i r e on a s i n g l e t a r g e t .
I t d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e importance of a l i a i s o n o f f i c e r and
t h e s h a r i n g o f f i r e d i r e c t i o n d a t a among u n i t s .
The m o s t
i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n t h a t t h i s example
the c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of the
doctrine.
I t i s a t r i b u t e to the standardization
t h a t b e g a n w i t h t h e Army G r o u n d F o r c e s t e s t s b e f o r e
the war.
the
a d d r e s s e s how t h e c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n o f
the doctrine
phase of
t h i s operation.
t h i s study.
-28-
US War D e p a r t m e n t ,
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Tactics!, 1944, p .
Employment
FM 6-28,
1.
US War D e p a r t m e n t ,
F i e l d Ar t i l l e r r T a c t i c s - g g
T&!,uues
o f D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y and
FM 6 - 1 8 6 ,
ibid.,
p.
9.
pp. 18-28.
FM 6-28,
i bid.,
p.
30.
R e p o r t on S t u d y o f F i e l d
The G e n e r a l B o a r d ,
Artii!.erY
Cmerations
undated,
p.
186.
(7)
(8)
FM 6-28,
FEl 6 - 1 6 0 ,
p. p.
26.
2. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d Tank D e s t r o x Q : 1P44
(9)
T h i r d Army,
O p e r a t i o n Summary A u a u s t
June
1 9 4 5
(18
1945, p.
all.
4 8 4 t h FA G r o u p ,
Headau+rters Battery.
-
19 9 44
lP44, p.
pp.
2-3.
(11)
(12)
FM 6 - 1 8 8 ,
5Y.
R e p o r t on t h e S t u d y o f F i c J d
The G e n e r a l B o a r d , A r t i l l e r y Groug
undated,
p . 3.
( 1 3)
ibid.,
pp.
7-8.
(14)
The G e n e r a l B o a r d ,
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Groug
- 29-
undated, p . 8.
(15)
(16)
O~erations
pp.
163-164
V.
McCoy,
as c i t e d i n 4 t h Armored
R e l i e f o f Bastosne
, ,
undated,
1.
O p e r a t i o n Summary
p.
(17)
T h i r d Army, summary,
25 December
1.
(18)
C a p t H a r o l d U . M c C o y , as c i t e d i n 4 t h Armoped
Division,
p.1.
(13)
R e l i e f o f Bastosne
undated,
(ZB) 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ,
undated, p p .
(22)
1-11.
ibid.,
pp7-8.
-30-
CHAPTER THREE
BELGIUM, 22-26
To
:he
u n i t s w e r e dc8ing p r i o r t o t h e b a t l e .
The d i s c u s s i o n h e r e a f t e r w i o v e r v i e w of
1 depict a b r i e f
t h e 5.i t u a t i u n b e t w e e n 10 a n d 18 December.
Some o f
t h e 25 b a t t a l i o n s r e f e r e n c e d i n C h a p t e r One A i l 1
be p l a c e d i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e i r employment dees0:ribed.
of
T h i s Chapter w i l l
a d d r e s s on1
11
t h e s e b a t t a i i o n s b e c a u s e i t was n o t u n t i 1 t h e ac:t.Jal
attack that
X I [ Corps c o n t r o l l e d a l l the b a t t a l i o n s
lery w i l l be descr
The bed,
reorganization of the f i e l d a r t i
o f these u n i t s t c l . h e i r
A brief c o erview of
the
I 1 1 Corps b a t t l e e x p e r i e n c e s
I C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s a r r i v e d on t h e
I t s f i r s t mission, while
c o n t n e n t on 15 September 1944.
18 O c t o b e r , when i t w a s
The d o c t r i n e o f t h e p e r i o d Even
r e q u i r e d t h a t a r t i l l e r y n e v e r be K e p t i n r e s e r v e .
The 111 C o r p s a r t i l l e r y m e n
f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r f o r t h e XX
(1)
On 5 December,
m i s s i o n d i r e c t i v e f r o m T h i r d Army.
"(1) t o r e 1 i e v e XX C o r p s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Metz (France) area! ( 2 ) t o r e l i e v e t h e 5 t h D i v i s i o n w i t h elements o f the 87th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n and c o n t a i n t h e r e m a i n i n g Metz f o r t s w i t h o u t d i r e c t l y a s s a u l t i n g any m a j o r f o r t i f i c a t i o n ; a n d (3) t o b e p r e p a r e d t o r e c e i v e a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p s a n d a d v a n c e on Army o r d e r (2)
."
T h e f o r t s a t MET2 h a d b e e n b y - p a s s e d by t h e T h i r d Army i n
i t s d r i v e t h r o u g h F r a n c e a n d w e r e b e i n g s e c u r e d by t h e 5 t h
Division.
The r e l i e f o f t h e 5 t h D i v i s i o n by t h e 8 7 t h Elements o f
D i v s i o n was n o t c o m p l e t e d u n t i l 8 December.
-32-
Control o f t h e 1 1 1 C:orp.
a t t h i s time.
A r t i l l e r r Battalion,
u s i n g c a p t u r e d German weapon.3,
a s s i g n e d t o ca:induct a p r o g r a m o f h a r a s s i n g f i r e . of
( T h e men
yet.)
the
111 C o r p s ,
t h e e n t i r e T h i r d Army,
t h e 8i'tl1
e l e m e n t s o f t h e 8 7 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a n d was o f f i c i a l l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e I 1 1 C o r p s on 12 December.
(3)
t o s e a l o f f t h e r e m a i n i n g Germans a n d a w a i t a s u r r e n d e r
b r o u g h t a b o u t b y l a c k o f f o o d a n d ammuni t i o n , The p l a n
:4)
They were a s s i g n e d a r a t t e r
-33-
easy combat m i s s i o n ,
t o switch
t h e i r f i r s t combat m i s s i o n t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s was a s s i g n e d a
mission o f r e l a t i v e l y low r i s k .
T h i s g a v e them t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y t o g e t combat e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t a g r e a t d e a l
of exposure t o c a s u a l t i e s ,
The e x p e r i e n c e m u s t h a v e b e e n
i n v a l u a b l e f o r t h e commander a n d t h e s t a f f .
I t was a
been p e r f o r m i n g .
v a l u a b l e e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r t h e t u t e l a g e o f XX C o r p s .
A s n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , Hq a n d Hq B t r y ,
111 C o r p s A r t i l l e r y
They d i d n o t
was a s s i g n e d t o t h e XX C o r p s on 16 O c t o b e r . arrive
i n t h e XX C o r p s z o n e o f a c t i o n u n t i l 29 O c t o b e r . i ndependent a c t i v i
The o f f i c i a1 r e c o r d s do n o t r e f 1 ec t
tr
o f t h e I 1 1 C o r p s A r t i l l e r y u n t i 1 16 December.
During the
25 O c t o b e r t o 16 December t i m e f r a m e t h e y o p e r a t e d u n d e r
t h e c o n t r o l o f XX C o r p s . Throughout t h i s p e r i o d the
-34-
METZ, w o u l d s e r v e t h e a r t i l l e r y w e l l
EASTOGNE.
E a r l y i n t h e i r combat e x p e r i e n c e t h e y w e r e a h i g h degree o f f l e x i b i l i t y .
1 : s )
f o r c e d t o pr,id:tice
AS
an examp e o f t h a t f l e x i b i l i t y ,
t r a c e d b c l # ) w .are the p e r i o d 16
1 6 December
2 4 4 FA En (Enemy Weapons)
87 I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y
15 Decemher
183rd
FA Group
a s s i g n e d f r o m X I 1 Cor->s assigned from
6 9 6 t h FA Bn 1 7 5 t h FA Bn 1 7 7 t h FA Rn 2 8 2 n d FA En B Btry, i143r.d FA Bn
XI1 Cor:)s
1 8 December.
183r.d FA Group
282nd FA Bn < 1 8 5 m m H)
177th FA Bn (155mm H)
6 9 6 t h FA Bn (lB5mm
H)
t o Corps c o n t r o l u n t i l 15
December.
( 7 ) XX Corps a s s i g n e d t h i s a r t i l l e r y t o 111
b a t t a l i o r 1 5 and i n the p e r i o d o f t h r e e days task o r g a n i z e d them i n a manner t h a t w o u l d s e t the p a t t e r n for the employment of the a r t i l l e r y w i t h i n t h i s C o r p s . that A 1 5 0 note
u n i t s assigned.
a r t i l l e r y battalions.
-36-
r e c e i v e d t h e :armored f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n ,
8 t h o f December t h e I 1 I C o r p s A r t i 1 I e l - y h a d
58 days,
t h e XX C o r p s .
p e r f o r m a n c e a t EASTOGNE, Prior
t o t h e EASTOGNE o p e r a t i o n t h e C o r p s u n d e r w e n t
it?
b o t h o f m a n e u v e r a n d colnbat
r e o r g a r i i z a t i on t e c h n i q u e s a f t e r compl e t i on o f
m i s s i or1 a t MET;.
After
the c a p i t u l a t i o n o f
t h e l a s t MET2 f o r t ,
111
m i s s i n.
T h i s r e s p i t e was,
its
a r t i l l e r y r r t t a l : h e d , was a s s i g n e d a new m i s s i o n a n d new combat f o r c e s lo c o n d u c t directed to assume command o f t h e 6 t h A r m o r e d D i u i s i o n , t h e 4 2 n d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , upon i t s a r r i v a l a t M e t i , a n d t e m p o r a r y command o f t h e that mission.
I 1 1 C o r p s Wac,
- 37-
6th C a v a l r y Group ( r e i n f o r c e d ) . I t further d i r e c t e d t h a t 1 1 1 Corps ( 1 ) c o n t i n u e i t s present m i s s i o n s i n M e t z ; ( 2 ) m a i n t a i n maximum p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t t h e enemy i n t h e a s s i g n e d z o n e ! (3) d r i v e t h e enemy E a s t o f t h e S a a r R i v e r w i t h i n t h e C o r p s z o n e on c o m p l e t i o n o f r e f i t t i n g t h e 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a n d on Army o r d e r ; ( 4 ) s e i z e a n d s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d a c r o s s t h e Saar R i v e r i n t h e C o r p s z o n e on Army o r d e r ; a n d ( 5 ) a d v a n c e N o r t h e a s t a n d s e i z e N e u n k i r c h e n ( s i c ) on Army order (8)
."
German b r e a k t h r o u g h i n t h e A r d e n n e s .
a t t a c k i n g t h e s o u t h e r n f l a n k o f t h e German s a l i e n t .
(9)
I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a l r e a d y a s s i g n e d t o t h e Corps.
MET2 c o n d u c t i n g t r a i n i n g .
ARLON, BELGIUM on t h e 2 0 t h a n d p r e p a r e d f o r t h e a t t a c k .
-38-
d i v i s i o n s c l o s e d on a s s e m b l y a r e a s n e a r ARLON on
The 2 6 t h D i u i i j i o n h a d c o m p l e t e d i t s moue by 2318 hoJr5. on the 28th. was s e t f o r By l a t e i n t h e e u e n i n g on 21 December t h ? z t a g e tile a t t a c k t h a t w o u l d take p l a c e e a r l y m the Three d i v i s i o n s were
swing.
AS
m o r n i n g o f 22 December. the p l a n n i n g t o r
t h e a t t a c k was i n f u l l
maneuver e l e m e n t s c o m p l e t e ,
a r t i l l e r y u n i t s t h a t supported t h l s a t t a c k a r e desc:ribcd,
On 19 December 1 1 1 C o r p s r e c e i v e d P new f i e l d
a r t i I l r ? r y b a t t a l ions.
A l l o f t h e s e b a t t a l i o n s h a d bsen
IPI'.Y
u n i t s i n t h e t o l l o w i n g manner: "A f i e l d a r t l l l e r y g r o u p , w i t h t h r e e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s , was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ; a f i e l d a r t i l l e r y group w i t h t w o f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i u i s i o n ; and two f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s (armored) were a t t a c h e d t o the 4 t h Armored D i u i s i o n . The r e m a i n i n g g r o u p w i t h f o u r f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s , one o f w h i c h was an o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n , was r e t a i n e c by I 1 1 C o r p s A r t i l l e r y . ' ' ( 1 1 )
-39-
By a t t a c h i n g the b a t t a l i o n s and groups t o the d i u i s i o n s , the C o r p s p r o v i d e d the d i v i s i o n s w i t h the most f l e x i h i l i t y f o r the employment o f the FA.
Chapter Four w i l l
UNITS
MISSION
F R O M
4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n
253rd FA Bra (185mm H)
Attached Attached
X I 1 Corps
274th FA Bn (lB5mm H)
XX Corps
XX Corps
X I 1 Corps
6th Armd
D i v i s i on
XX Corps
X I 1 Corps
X I 1 Corps
-46-
7 5 2 n d FA Bn (155mm H)
Attached
X I I Corps
2(33rd FA Group
1 7 6 t h FA Bn t 4 5 G ) 1 7 7 t h I-A En ( T h l s b a t a1 i o n previous x assigned t o I 1 1 Corps) 7 3 1 s t F A Bn (135mm H )
(12)
(
XX 3or ps XX :orps
155mm H )
Attached
What of
th
5.
l i 5 t d e m o n s t r a t e s i s the v a r i e d bacKground
t h e b a t t a l con5 a n d t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f
the f i e l d
artillery.
W t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e 6 9 6 t h a n d the I i i t h ,
rhi
5
a1 I of t h e s e Ls.sttal t o n s w e r e new t o t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s .
list
also show+. t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y
Once a g a i n , a s on 18 D e c r m l > e r ,
employment hy ? h e C o r p s .
d i r e c t Corps c o n t r o l .
The r e s t o f
ttte
a r t i l l e r y was a t t a c h e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n s .
By a t t a c h i r g
t h e s e u n i t s t o t h e d i v i s i o n s t h e C o r p s Commander was a l l o w i n g h i s m i < n e u v e r commanders, a s much f l e x i b i l i t y a s he could. C h a p t e r Four w i l l show how t h e d i v i s i o n commanders
used t h i s a r t i 1 l e r y .
or m a n e u v e r e l e m e n t .
T h i s w a s n o t the f i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n
the Corps
d e t a i l s some o f t h o s e moues.
Space d o e s n o t p e r m i t , n o r n e c e s s i t y d i c t a t e d i s c u s s i o n o f a l l o f t h e s e moves.:.
I h a v e s e l e c t e d some o f
i t y of
a r t i l l e r y was a b l e t o q u i c k l y c h a n g e m i s s i o n s . noted e a r l i e r ,
all
A s was
t o t h e C o r p s on 19 December e x c e p t t w o . Corps a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t ,
a l l o f t h e u n i t s h a d c l o s e d on A1 1 o f
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a s s e m b l y a r e a s by 21 December.
t h e u n i t s w e r e a c t i v e l y e n g a g e d when n o t i f i e d o f t h e i r
s h i f t t o the 1 1 1 Corps.
(13)
-42-
XI1 C o r p s .
I t was a b o u t 15 m i l e s s o u t h o f
I t s mission a t th?
t i m e o f n o t i f i c a t i o n t o moue was g e n e r a l s u p p o r t t o X I 1
Corps w i i : h a . t u r t h e r m i s s i o n o f r e i n f o r c i n g the 80tti I n f a n t r y [)ivie:ion upon i t s c o m m i t t m e n t . Upon i t s i i r r i i a l
<rth
i t was a s s i c n e c l
the m i s s i c i n o i r e i n 4 o r c i n g t h e f i r e s o f t h e 2 2 n d FA
Battalion. Diuieion. The 22nd w a s o r g a n i c t o t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d The 253rcl c o m p l e t e d a 156 m i l e r o a d m a r c h ,
m r l i
th a
)(I1
1:hn?
C o r p s i t h a d b v e n o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e g u i d a n c e of 1 7 7 t h FA G r o u p . ( 1 4 )
Plate 1).
Upon i t s a r r i v a l
I n t h e ARLON a r e a ,
the
-43-
D i v i s on.
T h i s was a change i n m i s s i o n ,
group attachment.
(15)
The l a s t e x a m p l e o f t h e c h a n g e i n m i s s i o n s , a n d m a n e u v e r a f f i l i a t i o n s i s t h e 4 6 4 t h FA G r o u p .
location This
C o r p s t h a t K e p t t h e same b a t t a l i o n s a t t a c h e d . o r d e r e d t o march,
When
i t was i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t t o t h e X I 1
f o r a s s i g n i n g m i s s i o n s a n d c o n t r o l l i n g n i n e new f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s i n a v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d of time. b a t t a l i o n s h a d t o conduct arduous r o a d marches over d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n w i t h o u t the b e n e f i t o f reconnaissance. Each u n i t s h a r e d t h e r o a d m a r c h e x p e r i e n c e as w e l l a s c h a n g e s i n t h e i r m i s s i o n a n d s u p p o r t e d manuever e l e m e n t . The
-44-
Essentially,
i t 5 d i r e c t i o n o f a t t a c k 98 d e g r e e s . A s h a s b e e n r e l a t e d
above, t h i s :;liift i n d i r e c t i o n r e q u i r e d s u b s t a n t i n l moues the u n i t s assigned.
on t h e p a r t o i : v i r t u a l l y a l l
None o f
t h i s s t u d y g o i n t o a n y d e t a i l on t h e s p e c i f i c s o f C o r p s move t o ARLON.
One
r e f l e c t i o n on t h e T h i r d Army t h a n on I 1 1 C o r p s .
l h c on1
mention of
the plannin
conducted f c l r
Commanding G e n e r a l
7h i r d
" I t I c. n o t e w o r t h y t h a t a1 1 t h e o p e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g p l a n s f o r a t t a c k e x e c u t e d on 22nd Decemher, w e r e done by p e r s o n a l c o n f e r e n c e or Iby t e l e p h o n e , and t h a t t h e h i g h l y c o m p l i c a t e d road and s u p p l , ~ movements w e r e o n l y made p o s s i b l e by t h e o l d and v e r y e x p e r i e n c e d G e n e r a l S t a f f o f t h e 3 r d Ai-ms a n d t h e h i g h d i s c i p l i n e a n d
- 1s-
the u n i t s inuolved." t o do
T h e movement o f t h e X I 1
945.
A c o p y o f t h i s r e p o r t i s i n c l u d e d as The u n i t s t h a t w e r e d e t a c h e d
A p p e n d i x Two t o t h i s s t u d y .
f r o m t h e X I 1 C o r p s a n d a s s i g n e d t o t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s wou d
i t o r g a n i z e d t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y f o r combat.
I t had
b e e n a s s i g n e d i t s f i r s t r e a l combat t e s t .
examine t h e i r s t r e n g t h s a n d d e t e r m i n e i f t h e i r p r o c e d u r e s a r e sound.
-46-
Chapter Four w i l l
i t i s p o s s l b l e t o p o i n t o u t some t e n t a t i v e
findings.
1. problem!;
I n <$I1
t h e documents r e v i e w e d f o r
t h i s rittidy
t o complete t h i s s h i f t w i t h o u t problems or
never included i n o f f i c i a l reports.
2.
combat,
m i s s i o n s a n d a s . s i g n e d u n i t s b e f o r e i t e m b a r k e d on t h i s
project.
Under t h e XX C o r p s i t h a d e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h t h e
p r oc e d i i r I? s the:., d e v e 1 o p e d .
3.
'The f a c t
t h a t a l l o f these f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s
All
Linits
4.
The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat d e s i g n e d by t h e 1 1 1
C o r p s r e f l e c t s t h e t y p i c a l p r o c e d u r e s t h a t t h i s C o r p s urjed
-47-
throughout
I t a t t a c h e d the
Now
on t o t h e a c t u a l a t t a c k i t s e l f !
-48-
I f 1 Cor.(os,
A f t e r A c t i o n Report. p. 1.
Dec 4 4
31
Decenher 1944,
ihid.,
11. 2.
1:'.
i tiid.,
T1.ii.d
3.
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d Tank D e s t r o y 2 y
Army,
O p e r a t i o n s Summary
T h i r d AI.ITIY,
20 November 1 9 4 4 , p . 2.
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d Tank D e s t r o y e r
O o e r a t i o n s Summary T h i r d Army,
,
,
1 1 December 1 9 4 4 ,
p.
1.
O D e r a t i o n s Summary
18 December 1 9 4 4 , p .
T h i r d ArLmy, ;;urnmarl;.: 11; CorFl!,,
Daily Artillerr
15 December 1 9 4 4 ,
31
[)ecembrr ibid.,
ibid.,
ibid,
pp.
p . 8.
p.
7.
T h i r d Army, Summary
D a i l y A r t i l l e r y Information 20 December 1 9 4 4 , p.
2.
Dec 4 4
1 1 1 Corps-,
A f t e r A c t i o n ReDort.
31
9.
et.
al
.,
Armor a t B a s t o q i e
p.
liv.
-49-
(15)
4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , Dec 44
A f t e r A c t i o n ReDort
u n d a t e d , no page numbers A f t e r A c t i o n R e D o r t , D e c 44
(16)
111 C o r p s ,
31
December 1 9 4 4 , p . 9 .
(17)
T h i r d Grmy,
N o t e s on B a s t o a n e O p e r a t i o n
J a n u a r y 16, 1 9 4 5 , p . 4 .
CHAPTER FOUR
d e s c r i b e s t h e a c t i o n s by t h e f i e d
1 1 1 C o r p s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 22
26
T h e s e d a t e s c o n s t i t u t e t h e p e r i o d wlien I 1 1
lh6- 26th
I t h a s been c h o w n
t h e 4 t h Armored D i v l s i c m
made c o r l t a c t w i t h t h e b e l e a g u e r e d d e f e n d e r s o f BASTtIGNi!.
111 C o r p s c o n t i n u e d t h e a t t a c k l o n g a f t e r t h e 2 6 t h ,
however. of Thi!i s t u d y e n d s on t h e 2 6 t h b e c a u s e t h i s p e r i o d
time w e l l
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e employment o f t h e f i e l d
ar t i 1 1ery
T h i s Chapter b e g i n s w i t h a d e x r i p t i o n o f F i e l d
Order
# 1 pub1 I s h e d by
I 1 1 C o r p s on 21 December 1944.
i n i t i a l organization for
l'h
I S
t h e e l e m e n t s o f 111 C o r p s .
No a t t e m p t h a s
the
COJlCl
been made t o d e s c r i b e a l l
t h e combat a c t i o n s o f
Such a d e s c r i p t i o n
w i l l d e s c r i b e t h e a c t i o n s of
t o t h e einployrnt!nt o f t h e i r f i e l d a r t i l l e r y a s s e t s .
ouervitrw o f
tti5.b
employment o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y t)e,ains
w i t h a d c p i c t i c m of
1 1 1 C o r p s as a w h o l e a n d c o n c l u d r s
the
w i t h t h e d e s c r f p t i o n of
FA employment
by t h e t t r r J r e
di v i s i ons.
1 1 1 C o r p s h a d e s t a b l i s h e d a Command P o s t a t ARLON by
t h e e v e n i n g o f 20 December. T h e y knew w h a t f i e l d i n the
f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n h a s been e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h a t F i e l d Order.
enemy e n c o u n t e r e d .
T h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n was on t h e
r i g h t f l a n K and i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a t t a c k and d e s t r o y
m i s s i o n , was t o p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t f l a n k a n d m a i n t a i n
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e X I 1 Corps. i n the center of The 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ,
t h e C o r p s z o n e , was t o a t t a c k a n d d e s t r o y
t h e enemy a n d m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d on t h e i r l e f t a n d t h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y on t h e i r r i g h t . The 4 t h
"d.
(1)
-52-
mission:
(Z!:
1 9 3 r d FA Gp: attached:
mission:
( Z : , , 4 8 4 t h FA G p : attached:
mission:
( : )
A s was r i o t e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e ,
f itmld
a r t i l l e r y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat by I 1 1 C o r p s .
T h i s wa?, n o t a l l o f I 1 1 Corps.
the f i e l d a r t i
L i t e r a l l y j u s t hours before
he a t t a c k : , n o t h e r
FA Group was h t t a c h e d .
" P r i o r t o t h e a t t a c k , t h e Commanding G e n e r a l , V I I I C o r p s o f f e r e d Commanding G e n e r a l I 1 1 C a r p . t h e u s e o f some o f h i s a r t i l l e r y , w h i c h he c o u l d n o t then employ. Consequently, t h e 482ncl F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Group w i t h one o b b e r v a t i o n a n d .Four f i r i n g b a t t a l i o n s , was a t t a c h e d t o I 1 1 Corps. O f t h i s g r o u p , one f i t r i d a r t i l l e r : . b a t t a l i o n was i n t u r n a t t a c h e d t o the 4 t h Armored D i u i s i o n , and t h e remainder p l a c e d i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t o f Corps. A l l o f these b a t t a l i o n s had seen h a r d f l g h t i n g and had s u i f e r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 25 p e r c e n t l o s s e s i n b o t h e q u i p m e n t arid p e r s o n n e l . Many o f t h e p e r s o n n e l los,ses, h o w e v e r , h a d been c o m p e n s a t e d f o r by t t e a c q u i s i t i o n o f a number o f o t h e r a r t i l l e r y m e n who h a d t:secome s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e i r u n i t s d u r i r g
-53-
t h e i n i t i a l German A d v a n c e . "
(2)
e m p l o y d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k on BASTOGNE.
made t o t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat was o n 2 4 December when t h e 1 7 7 t h FA En was d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e 283rd FA Group and a t t a c h e d t o t h e 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n .
A n o t h e r l i s t i n g o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y m i g h t seem repetitive,
but
i t h a s b e e n i n c l u d e d h e r e f o r u s e as a
r e a d y r e f e r e n c e f o r the r e s t of t h i s Chapter.
The f i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k
was :
H)
-54-
In In
I
E m
h h
A
.Y
E
h
I
E
10
I
E
10
v
m
E E
E E
.
m
v
Q)
d
I#
.
0 .I n .C
0 .c
..
> .-
..
"l
- m m
a .m
C
v v
ffi
4 Y
Y
Y
..
2
Y
2
U
U
L3
a
n
Q
ffi
U
IT IT
a
c
2
a
m
x
L
Y
d
rn
U .-
16
(JI
Y
U .C
43
C
In
P
N
C
m
* m
43
'CI N
..
01
2
IT
m
U
Y)
0.
Y)
h P 0.
0 I n
..
16
CG
U
L
+
C
U#
i
+ ,
c 1 6
m c n
H)
H)
(3)
by t h e Corps a r e a p p r o p r i a t e ,
b a t t a l i o n s i n general support.
t h e maximum o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f c o n t r o l feasible.
" D u r i n g t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e week, s e v e r a l c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p s were a t t a c h e d t o d i v i s i o n s , a n d b a t t a l i o n s w i t h i n g r o u p s , i n some cases, were i n t u r n f u r t h e r a t t a c h e d t o divisional a r t i l l e r y battalions. This d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f c o r p s a r t i l l e r y was n e c e s s i t a t e d by w i d e d i v i s i o n z o n e s o f a c t i o n , r a p i d movement w i t h i t s i n h e r e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s , a n d t h e combat-team t y p e o f a c t i o n t h a t was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a t t h i s t i m e . Toward t h e l a s t p a r t o f t h e week, t h e s i t u a t i o n h a d become somewhat s t a b i l i z e d a n d c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f t h e c o r p s a r t i l l e r y was e f f e c t e d . "
...
-56-
(4)
The a d v a n t a g e o f c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l was t h e p e r c e i c l e d a b i l i t y t o ma55 t h e Corps a r t i l l e r y q u i c K l y . a b i 1 i t y t o m a 5 . s was n o t l o s t , echelon lower. HowevGmr, the
The d i v i s i o n s w h i c h h a d t h e a s s e t s l o mass
a r t i l l e r y f i r e s d i d so f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k . a b i l i t y t o ma45 f i r e s q u i c K l y was l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o r
'The
ot
and o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t manner.
'The 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d t h e
m i s s i o n o f a t t a c k i n g t o w a r d s BASTOGNE a n d p r o t e c t i n g t t I e
Corps l e f t f l a n k . n o t e d above.
I t h a d been a s s i g n e d t h e a r t i l l e r y
iis
O n 22 December:
Combat Command A S 6 t h FA B n ( 1 8 5 m m HB 2 7 4 t h Fi4 Bn (185mm
By 2 4 December:
H)
(-1
Combat Command B
22~d FA F 3 n (185rnm H)
2 S 3 r d Ff+ Bn (185mrn
H)
H)
7 7 6 t h FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m H )
-57-
Combat Command R
9 4 t h FA Bn (1BSmm H)
C Btry,
DivArty 9 4 t h FA Bn (1B5mm H)
1 7 7 t h (155mm H)
-- - -- - -- ( 6 )
(5)
T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l u n u s u a l a r r a n g e m e n t s i n hoth t h e s e
1istings.
i n that
the a t t a c k order t o
(7)
it
i s shown u n d e r D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y c o n t r o l .
p r o b a b l y j u s t a c o n v e n i e n t m e t h o d t o show t h a t w h i l e R e s e r v e Command was h e l d i n r e s e r v e t h a t t h e b a t t a l i o n would f i r e general support missions for the d i v i s i o n . T h i s i s i n f a c t what t h e b a t t a l i o n d i d u n t i l t h e Reserve Command was c o m m i t t e d .
c o n t r o l o v e r any f i r i n g u n i t s .
i s u n i q u e , b u t p r o v e d t o be e f f e c t i v e .
-58-
I t wasn' t
Each i:ombat
Command b r o k e i n t o a t t a c k e c h e l o n s a n d e a c h e c h e l c m t h e n
was a s s . g n e d
i(
f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n f o r suppcw:.
For
r i g h t c o l u m n c a l l e d "Oden" a n d t h e 2''4tIi
FA
r e c e i u e d t h e i i ~ i s s i o no f g e n e r a l s u p p o r t t o t h e e n t cclmrnand,
Combat Command B,
after-action I-eports.
A s i s n o t e d i n t h e 24 D e c c m b t ~ r
t h e 1 7 7 t h was d e t a c h e d f r o m
o r g a n i z a t i o n , one b a t t e r y o f
i t s p a r e n t u n i t a n d a t t a c h e d t o Combat Command
R.
1 t was
u s e d hy Combat Command R i n a g e n e r a l s u p p o r t r o l e .
(8.4
T h i s o r q a n i z a t i o n f o r combat was c e r t a i n l y c r ( t a t ~ u c ,
but
i t d i d no+ v i o l a t e the o v e r a l l
concept f o r
the
employment of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .
As noted i n tho A l l m o d
Force A r t i l l e r y I n f o r m a t i o n L e t t e r
...
" I n t h e d i v i s i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat s h o u l d p i - o v i d e a r t i l l e r y i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t and a r t i l l e r y i n general support. I n the corps, i 1 s h o u i d pl-nuide f o r r e i n f o r c i n g t h e f i r e s o f d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y and a r t i l l e r y t o execute coiin t e r b . i t t e r y , h a r a s s i n g a n d i n t e r d i c t i o n fires. I n g e n e r a l , t a c t i c a l c o n t r o l of a r t i Iler). battalions should be maintained a t t t e l e v e l o f t h e i n f a n t r y command i n whose s e c t o r t h e weapcrn i n v o l v e d c a n be e f f e c t i v e l y emp 1 o ye d " ( 9 )
-59-
c a r r i e d p e r m i s s i o n t o o r g a n i z e t h e a r t i l l e r y a s h e saw
fit.
T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t o f a r t i l l e r y was c e r t a i n l y
f i e l d a r t i l l e r y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat.
and m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y I 1 1 C o r p s h a d a t t a c h e d t h e 4 8 4 t h FA to the
D i v i s i o n on t h e l e f t .
S i n c e t h e g r o u p was a t t a c h e d ,
-68-
The f i e l d a r t i l l e r y w a s o r g a n i z e d a s b e l o w :
UNIT 3 1 7 t h I n f Rgmt
FA UNIT/MI SSI O N
(None
Division
Reserue)
318th
Iiit
Rgmt
3 1 4 t h FA Bn (185mm t i ) DY 7 5 2 n d FA En ( 1 5 5 m m t i ) R, 314th
5 1 2 t h FA En (1Er5mm ti)
GS t o D i u , R 3 1 4 t l i
3191:h I n f
Rgmt
9 6 5 t h FA
En
(185mm \I)
DC.
3 1 5 t h FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m )-I)
R, Y E r 5 t I i
3 1 3 t h FA Bn (IBS,, +I> GS t o D i v ,
R 5'05th
(10)
4 0 4 t h FA Gp
GS,
88th I n f Div ( 1 1 )
a s s i g n i n g them t h e GSR m i s s i o n .
-61
f o r combat became:
UNIT 3 1 7 t h I n f Rgmt
FA UNIT/MISSION 3 1 3 t h FA En ( 1 0 5 m m H) 5 1 2 t h FA En (165mm H)
DS
R,
313th
3 1 8 t h I n f Rgmt
3 1 4 t h FA En (1B5mm H) DS
752nd FA En (155mm H)
R,
314th
3 1 9 t h I n f Rgmt
9 6 5 t h FA En (165mm H) DS 3 1 5 t h FA En (155mm H)
R, 9 6 5 t h
4 0 4 t h FA Gp
GS,
8Bth I n f D i v (11)
I t continued t o
2nd w e r e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e D i v i s i o n a n d a t t a c h e d t o t h e
4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n .
-62-
The 1 / 3 1 8 t h
A a n d 2/31E:th
blei t h e r t h e W t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n r e c o r d s n o r thoso? o f
t h e 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n r e f l e c t t h a t the 3 1 8 t h b r o i i g h t
a n y a r t i l l e r y w i t h them d u r i n g t h i s t i m e . This ic, tl\e
p l a c e d i n s u p p o r t t h r o u g h DS,
o r GSR m i s s , i o n s . .
f l e x i b l e a p p r o a c h t o t h e employment c ) f
.field artillety.
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t a'lihoiigh
tbio
the!;
In
fact
8 0 t h Dic.i<;ion was r e a s s i g n e d t o X I 1 C o r p s .
Group was t r a n s f e r r e d a l o n g w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n .
(13)
The
have
u n i t s o f 111 C o r p s ; now t o t h e c e n l : e r
the 26th I n f a n t r y .
Tb8e 2 6 t l
I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n h a d t h e m i s s i o n oG
-63-
t h e 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y on t h e i r r i g h t .
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r G-3 t h e i r p l a n was t o
p e r i o d i c r e p o r t f r o m 21 December 1 9 4 4 ,
I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t was h e l d i n d i v i s i o n r e s e r u e . a r t i l l e r y was o r g a n i z e d a s b e l o w .
FA UNIT/MISSION
263rd FA En (105mm H) US
l 8 l s t FA
Bn (185mm H)
R,
263rd
1 7 9 t h FA Bn (155mm H)
263rd
1E4th I n f Rgmt
1 8 2 n d FA Bn (1E5mm H) DS 1 8 8 t h FA En (155mm H)
R,
182nd
6 9 6 t h FA Bn (185mm H)
R,
1E2nd
Diu A r t y
9 4 9 t h FA En (155mm H)
GS t o D i u
A l t e r n a t e D i v A r t y FDC ( 1 4 )
i s a doctrinal organization
-64-
.for c o m t m t .
I..ike t h e 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s on,
the 1 3 1 G ~ o u p
a s s i g n e d t o t h i s d i v i s i o n was s p l i t u p .
was n o t e d i II
(15)
H a v i n g mclre
i n a r e i n f o r c i n g r o l e would c e r t i i n l r a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l JII1
the
w . 3 ~ a
i t w a s n o t so n o t e d .
The d o c u m e n t s r e v i e w e d t o r
i s t h a t t h i s d i v i s i o n k e p t one
(is
t o the D i v i s i o n .
A s was d i s c u s s e d i n
the D i v i s i o n
C h a p t e r One,
t h i s i s one m e t h o d t h a t
r e o r g a n i ze tun t i 1 a f t e r 26 December,
so t h i s o r g a n i r a t i c:sn
The o n l y
t h e a r t i 1 l e r y i n t h e 6-3 p e r i o d i c
t h i s d i v i s i o n a r e o b s e r v a t i o n s such as:
A s ha!;
heen n o t e d i n t h e d i s c u s s o n s a b o v e ,
t?arh
-65-
t h e commander
t o o r g a n i z e t h e a r t i 1 1 e r y he r e c e i v e d Chapter F i v e
t h r o u g h a t t a c h m e n t i n a n y manner he d e s i r e d . will
d i s c u s s t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r
methods.
i m p a c t on t h i s b a t t l e a r e p r e s e n t e d .
D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 22-26
December t h e a r t i l l e r y u n i t s r o u n d s o f ammunition of
w i t h t h e c o r p s f i r e d o v e r 55,000
all t y p e s and c a l i b e r s ,
T r u l y i m p r e s s i v e t o t a l s f o r f i v e days of
ammunition s u p p l y d i f f i c u l t i e s c a u s e d momen t a r 7 ammun i t i o n shor tagez. d u r i n g t h e week (18-24 D e c ) , b u t d i d n o t a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e x p e n d i t u r e s were t h e operations....Ammunition moderate wi t h I 1 1 Corps and X I 1 Corps c o n t r i b u t i n g most t o t h e t o t a l . For s e v e r a l d a y s a m m u n i t i o n r e s u p p l y was e x t r e m e l y difficult. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s were obliged to travel long distances i n order t o r e a c h ASPS a n d d e p o t s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n was aggravated by the necessity of supplying three c o r p s f r o m one ASP. However, w i t h i n a f e w d a y s new a d v a n c e d r a i l h e a d ASPS w e r e o p e n e d w h i c h d i d
". . .
-66-
much t o a l l e v i a t e t h e s i t u a t i o n .
(17)
the e n t i r e b a t t l e of
the Ardennes.
D u r i n g t h e week o f
'I.
1-7 J a n u a r y , 1 1 1 C o r p s
f ii-ipd
t h a n 125,666 r o u n d s o f l65mm h i 1 e e x p e n d i t u r e o f a1 1 c a l i ber.5 amniuni t i m . W During the period e x c e e d e d 432,866 r o u n d s . 298666 December 630608 J a n u a r y a t o t a l o f S,:i80 t o n s o f a r t i l l e r y a m m u n i t i o n was f i r e d i r i t h e p o c k p t s o u t h e a s t o f BASTOGNE i n I 1 1 C o r p s area." (18)
. . more
thi!;
110
i t a p p a r e n t l y hi,d
adverse a f f e c t
t h i s p o r t i o n of
the o v e r a l l batt'l6..
L i t e r a l l y ,111
t h i s s t u d y w e r e complimentary of
w o u l d r e q u i r e another chapter
It
t o j u s t quote a l l
the a r t i l l e r y ,
q u o t e f r o m C h a p t e r One d e t a i l i n g t h e bombardment o+
f4SSENOIS a n d thi!;
r-epor t
"Dur i n q t h e 18 d a y s o f t h e a s s a u l t 1 1 1 C o r p ' j l o s s e s a m o u n t e d t o a t o t a l o f 3,338 k i l l e d , wounded a n d m i s s i n g , o f whom o n l y 383 were k i l l e d . On t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e l e d g e r , , t h e enem,' l o s t 4,736 c a p t u r e d , an e s t i m a t e d 4,851 k i l l e d , a n d a n e s t i m a t e d 28,357 wounded, o r a r a t i o o f 11 t o 1 i n o u r f a v o r . The h i g h enemy l o s s e s w e r e i n g r e a t p a r t a d i r e c t r e s u l t of a r t i 1 l e r y f i r e . The l a r g e s u r p r i s e
-67-
so q u i c k l y w a s a p r o c e d u r e c a l l e d " S e r e n a d e " .
This
p r o c e d u r e i s n o t d e t a i l e d i n any o f t h e documents r e v i e w e d
for
F o r t Leavenworth. Four t o t h i s s t u d y .
P e r h a p s t h e b e s t c o n c l u s i o n f o r t h i s C h a p t e r comes f r o m t h e I 1 1 Corps a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t . "The move o f t h e C o r p s t o A r l o n a n d t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e a t t a c k w e r e b o r n of need and conceived i n urgency. The suddenness a n d u n e x p e c t e d s t r e n g t h o f t h e enemy a s s a u l t , h i s r a p i d i n i t i a l successes and t h e e a r l y American reverses l e f t no time f o r lengthy planning, l o n g thought-out o r d e r s , or e x t e n s i v e reconnaissance. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t i m e was t h e a l l - i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r . . . T h i s was r e c o g n i z e d f u l l y , and t h e d e t a i l e d n i c e t i e s w h i c h n o r m a l l y w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a1 i n p l a n n i n g s u c h an o p e r a t i o n were s a c r i f i c e d i n p a r t t o g a i n Only s u r p r i s e and a s w i f t l y mounted a t t a c k . t h i r t y - s i x hours elapsed d u r i n g the time the C o r p s H e a d q u a r t e r s f i r s t r e c e i v e d i t s movement i n s t r u c t I o n s , moved t o L u x e m b o u r g a n d t h e n t o Arlon. I n t h r e e days, t h r e e d i v i s i o n s h a d r e c e i v e d o r d e r s , p l a n n e d and c o o r d i n a t e d t h e i r movements, a n d moved f r o m s i x t y t o e i g h t y m i l e s t o new a n d u n f a m i l i a r a s s e m b l y a r e a s . . . I t meant t h a t t h e a t t a c k m u s t be l a u n c h e d w i t h a m i n i m u m k n o w l e d g e o f t h e f r i e n d l y a n d enemy s i t u a t i o n . E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , i t m e a n t t h a t a C o r p s whose c o m p o n e n t s h a d n e v e r b e f o r e o p e r a t e d a s one u n i t must b e q u i c k l y w e l d e d i n t o a s m o o t h l y f u n c t i on i n g t earn. " < 26 ) The p r i d e t h a t t h e a u t h o r c s ) o f t h i s passage
-68-
Chapter F i v e w i l l
draw
a b o u t t h e s o u r ' c e ~o f
this pride.
-69-
111 Corps,
A f t e r A c t i o n Report.
9.
Dec 4 4
31
December 1 9 4 4 , p .
ibid.,
p.
11. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y and T a n k
T h i r d A rm y ,
D e s t r o y e r O D e r a t i o n s Summary December 1 9 4 4 , T h i r d A rm y , p.
25
1.
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y and T a n k
D e s t r o y e r O D e r a t i o n s Summary
January 1 9 4 5 ,
p.
7.
et.
Summers, R o b e r t R.,
al.,
Armor a t Bastoane p.
1 iii.
ibid.,
A p p e n d x UI, No. 9 , p .
Field Artillerr
#6
p . 4.
, December
44,
p.4.
(11)
4 8 4 t h FA Group,
H i s t o r y of H e a d a u a r t e r s
and H e a d a u a r t e r s B a t t e r y . 4 0 4 t h FA
GrouD,
1944
June 1945,
p.
6.
(12) 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ,
, Dec
p.
7.
-70-
G-3 P e r i o d i c
Dec 44
, 21 1268-221288
22 Dec 44,
undated,
N o t e s a n d Obs e r v a t i o n s
on A r t i l l e r y O D e r a t i o n s
(16) 2 6 t h
undated,
pp. 2-3.
Inf-nti-r Division,
0 -3 P e r i o d i c
Dec 4 4
R e p o r t . 211288-221288
22 Dec 44,
undated,
&em!.i n n s
(18)
ibid., p.
8 January 1945, p p . i - t ! .
8.
(15)
I 1 1 Ccrpr:.,
P f t e r A c f i n n Reclor.t,
Dec 4 9
31
December 1944, p .
(28)
ibid.,
21.
p . 28.
-71
CHAPTER F I V E
A s s t a t e d i n C h a p t e r One,
the purpose of t h i s
c o n c l u s i o n s a n d recommend a r e a s f o r f u r t h e r s t u d y .
T h i s Chapter
c o n c l u s i o n of the s t u d y ;
t r a i n i n g r e c e i v e d by t h e b a t t a l i o n s t h r o u g h T h i s conclusion
t h e f i n a l employment i n a b a t t l e .
p r e c i s e l y t h e same manner
Rather,
this in
The f i n d i n g s p r e s e n t e d h e r e g e n e r a l l y
0.C
trace the o u t l i n e
the p r e v i o u s Chapters.
A s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n C h a p t e r One,
t h e r e was a
i n the past,
f i e l d a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t was a d d e d l i t e r a l l y a t t h e
-72-
l a s t minute.
N o t o n l y h a d m o s t o f t h e FA b a t t a 1 i c i n . i tht?y
n o t w o r k e d w i t h t h e s u p p o r t e d maneuver e l e m e n t s ,
A s 111
Corps s t a t e d i n t h e i r A f t e r - A c t i o n c h a l l e n g e was t o w e l d a l l
report,
the v a r i o u s u n i t s i n t o an time.
e f f e c t i v e team i n a v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d o f The s i m i l a r i t y o f
(1)
adherence t o the d o c t r i n e of
c o n t r i b u t e d t o the q u i c k c r e a t i o n of
on t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .
procedures,
w i t h t h e common s t a n d a r d s ,
h.sd a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
Reinforcing,
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and d u t i e s .
t r a n s f e r s w e r e made w i t h o n l y t h e s m a l l e s t o f
-7 3-
t h e FA b a t t a l i o n s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y time. This
r e o r g a n i z e d i n a two day p e r i o d o f
Application of constricting.
t h e d o c t r i n e was n o t
as r e p o r t e d i n t h e Army G r o u n d
t h e war.
(2)
As t h a t
b a t t a l i o n s and groups.
d i d not v i o l a t e t h e d o c t r i n e o f
No
m a t t e r how t h e a r t i l l e r y was o r g a n i z e d ,
Compliance w i t h d o c t r i n a l apparent
p r e c e p t s was a so The
i n the f i r e d i r e c t i o n procedures.
i m p o s i t i o n of
t h e SERENADE p r o c e d u r e f r o m t h e T h i r d
-74-
A r m y Conimandei-. may a p p e a r o n t h e s u r f a c e t o be
constraining.
However,
i t was n o t .
T h i s procedure when u s e d
w i d e l y disperF:.ed u n i t s .
I t was a l s o r e a d i l y a d a p t a t l l v
One c a n see t h e s e p r o c e d u r i ! ~ A l t h o u g h not
combat.
u s e d i n t h e hcmbardment o f ASSENOIS.
EiERENfiDt. i c . a l l o t h e r e x a m p l e o f
a common p r o c e d u r e t h e FA.
t h a t enhanced the f l e x i b i l i t y of
Th e c I i v , s i o n s u n d e r I 1 1 C o r p s s u p e r v i s i o n a 1 5 1 ~
cjsmonsti.ate.d + l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e way t h e y o r g a n i z e d the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . The 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n u s e d
As described
t h i s D i v i s i o n a s s i g n e d 2 FA
However
t h e manner t h a t
the 4 t h
- 75--
t h e D i v i s i o n Commander h a d p r o v i d e d
t h e most r e s p o n s i v e f i r e s u p p o r t t o each o f h i s combat e l e m e n t s . f r o m the This organization did not detract The bombardment
FA'S
a b i l i t y t o mass f i r e s .
o f ASSENOIS p r o v e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n .
The 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n t o o k a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t o t h e u s e o f t h e i r FA s u p p o r t .
I n t h i s case,
the use o f
t h e GSR m i s s i o n a l l o w e d t h e t h e FA,
D i v sion t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of a p o r t i o n of whi
e s t i l l a l l o w i n g t h e commander i n c o n t a c t w i t h The
also e a s e d t h e t r a n s i t i o n
the D i v i s i o n
three Regiments o f
i n c o n t a c t a t t h e same t i m e .
The t w o b a t t a l i o n s
t h i r d Regiment.
S i n c e t h e y h a d been o p e r a t i n g under
the d i r e c t i o n of D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y ,
i t i s v a l i d to
the a c t i o n and
assume t h e y w e r e b e i n g k e p t a b r e a s t o f i n f a c t h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n combat.
When t h e y made
-76-
continuous f i r e support.
they had
n o t been a s s i q n e d t h e g e n e r a l s u p p o r t m i s s i o n a n d i n s t e a d h a c t w e n o n l y r e i n f o r c i n g one o t h e r u n i t .
i': irl
is difficult
l o evaluate
t h e i r methods. t h e war,
However,
r e p o r t s produi e d a t t h e end of
i t was n o t i ? ( l
Wilt-
t h a t u s i n g t w o b a t t a l i o n s t o r e i n f o r c e one o t h e r
a d i f f i c u l t p~ o c e s s .
2 6 t h do n o t r e f l e c t
p r e s e n t e d p r a l . ~ I e r n sd u r i n g t h i s b a t t l e .
The corrlrnm t h r e a d among t h e d i u i s i o n a l method:, o f emplcuyment may n o t b e a p p a r e n t . that they a l l that they kept The t h r e a d i s
iunits.
of B a t t e r y C,
Armored D i v i s i o n .
however by t h e ainmun i t i o n p r o c e d u r e s i n t h e 4 t h
Armored.
The D i v i s i o n w a s o f t e n a s s i g n e d a 155mm
So o f t e n
Howitzer battalion.
in fact,
that they
t h e 155mm a m m u n i t i o n t o t h e
i t w i t h them a l o n g t h e
the b a t t l e , i t was
I n the midst o f
t o s e n d C B a t t e r y t o s h o o t t h i s ammuni t on
3)
The d e t a c h m e n t o f C
B a t t e r y , when v i e w e d i n
h i s l i g h t , does n o t appear
so u n u s u a l .
Rather,
i t d e p i c t s a n o t h e r example o f
t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f t h e FA a n d t h e u s e o f e x p e d i e n t
measures t o r e s p o n d t o b a t t l e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s .
a n d GSR.
These m i s s i o n s a l l o w e d a span o f
organization i s only p a r t i a l l y in
c e n t r a l i z e d b e c a u s e o n l y one b a t t a l i o n was k e p t
-78-
t h e GS role.
C e n t r a l i z a t i o n was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e i n The s i t u a t i o n w a s so f l u i d a n d r a p i t l l : f
this battle.
This
a + f e c t t h e a b i l i t y t o mass f i r e s . t h e b a t t a l ion!.
Even t h o u g h n o t u n d e r c e n t r a l c o n t r o l
w e r e s t i 1 1 a b l e t o m a s s t h e i r f i r e when a p p r o p r i a t e
and i n " a t l e a s t t w o a c t i o n s were c r e d i t e d w i t h b r e a k i n g up l a r g e s c a l e a t t a c k s " .
(4)
As n o t e d e a r l i e r ,
the standardization o f
p r o c e d u r e s ' s t a r t e d w i t h t h e t r a i n i n g of each u n i t .
A s n o t e d i n Chapti?r
t h e guidixncc
D u r i n g t h i s timi?
I 1 1 Corp:;
p r a c : ? i c e d t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f FA a s s e t s .
yi t o s e e t h e r a p i d c h a n g e s t h a : T h e y h a d an o p v ~ o r t u rt~
the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f
the
c u r r e n t F,'A d o c t r i n e .
What does. t h i s s t u d y h a v e t o s a y t o t h e f i e l d
-75
a r t i l l e r y m e n o f today ?
The q u e s t i o n i s b e s t
a n s w e r e d by a n a l y z i n g some o f t h e i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h i s b a t t l e :
LESSON ONE:
The m o s t i m p o r t a n t f i n d i n g o f
this
s u p p o r t p r o v i d e d by t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .
and g r o u p s were a b l e t o p r o v i d e t i m e l y and e f f e c t i v e s u p p o r t because t h e y o p e r a t e d under a s e t o f r u l e s and p r o c e d u r e s t h a t were w i d e l y adhered to. The
s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n c r e a t e d f 1 ex b i l i t y n o t r g i d i t y .
LESSON TWO:
F i e l d A r t 1 l e r y b a t t a l ons s h o u l d Current
b e e m p l o y e d a s B a t t a l i o n s ze u n i t s .
a g a i n s t t h e d i s p e r s i o n a l l o w e d by m o d e r n
c ommu n c a t i o n s .
modern b a t t l e f i e l d .
I f t h e FA u n i t s o f
-80-
c o n c e n t r a t e cm t h e c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i r procedures, they w i l l
be a b l e to respond t o v i r t u s . 1 y
any b a t t l e f i e l d r e q u i r e m e n t .
LE:SSON IHREE:
well
The FA u n i t s o f
today w o u l d be
t a c t i c a l missions.
u n i t by a s i n g l e t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n i s d a n g e r o u s . u n i t s m u s t be a b l e t o p e r f o r m a n y o f
the missions.
s h o u l d n o t be 1 o s . t .
The f l e x i b i l i t y o f
a r t i 1 I e r y c a n h e t r a c e d t o t h e a r t i 1 erymen o f W o r l d War. 1 1 .
curreii t
Y m u s t be ma n t a i n e d by
.
Local p r o c e d u r e s and arrangement 5
I-ESSUN IWIUR:
t h a t v i o l a t e i j t ) c t r i n e must be avoided.
The s t a n d a r d
h which s h i i : t i
L.E!;SObI
FIVE:
The F i e l d A r t i l l e r y m u s t t r a i n The FA
w i t h t h e marleuver u n i t s t h a t t h e y s u p p o r t .
T r a i n i n g w i t h t h e s u p p o r t e d maneuver u n i t s w i l l c r e a t e a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c a p a b i l i t i e s of
t h e FA a n d an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e m y r i a d o f t a s k s
t h e FA c a n p e r f o r m .
systems w e r e t r i e d .
methods c o u l d p r o v e i n t e r e s t i n g ,
A s was n o t e d i n
management o f t h i s a m m u n i t i o n c o u l d h a v e a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o c u r r e n t procedures.
-82-
W o r l d War I I .
The p r o b l e m s o f c o n t r o l 1 i n g 25 T h e r e c o u l d be a
RCi L e n t 2
X I 1 C o r p s A r t i 1 1 e r y commander,
sa i d
(5) T h i s s t u d y h a s made an a t t e m p t t o
t h e o p e r a t i o n s and methods o f
r e c o r d ?mine 01 C:orps.
111
Fielcl A r t i
l e r y u n i t s today s h o u l d h e e d t h e he
a s e t of s t a n d a r d i z e d procedures,
cummi t m e n t
t o employment d o c t r i n e ,
c r e a t e the
f l e x i b i l i t y so n e c e s s a r y on a moderri
battlefield.
-:33-
CHAPTER F I V E ENDNOTES
1 1 1 CORPS,
A f t e r A c t i o n R e p o r t , Dec 44
31 December 1944, p . 2 1 .
The G e n e r a l Board, R e p o r t on t h e S t u d y o f F i e l d
A r t i l l e r y Group
undated,
p.
3.
4th Armored D i v i s i o n ,
Dec 44
A f t e r A c t i o n Report
1 1 1 Corps,
D e c 44
31 December 1944, p . 2 1 .
John M . L e n t z , BG Combat
X I 1 CorD6 A r t i l l e r y in
Germany, U S A r m y ,
(Regensburg,
1945), p . i
-84-
PLATE ONE
ao'
1.10'
sO*lo'-
40'40'
-85-
APPENDIX ONE
APPENDIX ONE
Group t o G r o u p w i t h r e l a t i v e e a s e . underwent a s e r i e s of
Each b a t t a l i o n
t e s t s c o n d u c t e d by Army G r o u n d
O f the f i e l d
a r t l l e r y u n i t s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a t t a c k c o n d u c t e d by
111 Corps,
t h e 4 6 4 t h FA g r o u p
i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of The
t h e t e s t i n g p r o c e s s and t h e t e s t i n g r e s u l t s . following
i s an e x t r a c t f r o m t h e t e s t r e s u l t s f o r
The G r o u p u n d e r w e n t t h e t e s t d u r i n g 1944, a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 m o n t h s b e f o r e t h e i r
t h i s Group. 17-28 A p r i l
a r r i v a l on t h e c o n t i n e n t . t h a t t h e G r o u p took
I t i s interesting t o note
t h i s t e s t w i t h t h e 772nd and
773rd FA B a t t a l i o n s a n d n e v e r a g a i n h a d t h e s e
battalions attached. T h i s a p p e n d i x has b e e n i n c l u d e d
for
the types of e v e n t s
The f o l l o w i n g h a s b e e n e x t r a c t e d f r o m :
-86-
US A r m y . .
X X I I I Corps A r t i l l e r y .
T e s t s C : c m d u c t e d by X Corps, X X I I I C o r p s
farti I l e r y ,
1 J a n u a r y 1943
31 O c t o b e r 1944."
Volume 1 , Georgia,
it. N o v e m b e r 1944
26 Apr'i 1 1944
R e p o r t o f AGF FA Bn T e s t s
Ref:
(19 Oc
42.1
" R e v i s i o n of
Un i t :
Place: Date:
4 0 4 t h FA Group
Carrip H o w i e ,
Texas
17 - 28 A p r i l
1944
T e s t I - Adjustments of F i r e : Grade Speed 7.800 O c c u p a t i o n and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f psrl 10.540 P r e c i s i o n adjustments 14.102 Brac Ke t a d j u s tmen t s 37.147 Observed f i r e c h a r t a n d bn c o n c e n t r a t i o n s
Weight
12
15
38
15
4 * 455
Grade f o r T e s t I 74.044
Test I 1
Transfers of Fire: 10
S e l e c t i o n and l o c a t i o n o f base p o i n t 10.00 Vertical 4.000 Determination of K 9.925 Laying b a t t a l i o n o f d i r e c t i o n 10 . O O Accuracy o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n s 16.545 contra1
10
10
30
-88-
Sp e e cI
15
15.00
A i r a d j us tmen t
15.00
10
C:I & p r e p a r a t i o n f o r n i g h t a d j u s t m e n t
'?. ----
1 8 -
700
W a d e f o r Test $34.726
11
Test
111
-. Lho,bserued
Fires: 15
Su r v e :v 12.75rj N i g h t occupation of p o s i t i o n
15
12 . 3 7 : s
P i - e p a r a t i on 0 . f f i r e
1 h . 58Cl E f f e c i of fire
28
30
2N. 638
N i g h t h i q h bur%*.;ta d j u s t m e n t 9.750 O p e r a t i on o f
F:[C
10
10
--
9 . 750
I
Grade f o r . 'Test
111
81.755
-85
Grade f o r T e s t I x 5 . 0 378.228
Grade f o r T e s t I 1 x 2 . 5
21 1.806 Grade f o r T e s t 1 1 1 x 2 . 5 204.387
Total
786.407
D i v by 10
78.641
Form 4 6
A r t i l l e r y section
(NOTE:
time was 7 8 . 7 )
-90-
Camp Bow i e
24 A p r i 1
Texas,
1944
Test
772d F. A.
Battal ion
SLe&
Phase 3 Nac. 21 m i n u t e s 46 s e c o n d s o u e r t i m e b e c a u a e o f !:lowness
far
o f FDC a n d s l o w n e s s o f a d j u s t m e n t
t h e Zd c o n c e n t r a t i o n . Speed
f0l'
occupation of p o s i t i o n excellent;
f i r s t r o u n d f i i . c d 24 m i n u t e s a f t e r p r o b l e m t i m e
star t ecl.
&cuuatiion
and , D r a a n i z a t i o n of P o s i t i o n
"A" B a t t e r y
all
1 l e d t h e i r d u t e s i n a qu e t a n d
e f f i c i en t m a n n e r .
'I
8" Ba t t e r y
I l c c ~ ~ pi a on t o f p o s i t i o n v e r y good, however
1 d y i n g because
sections.
No. 2 piece fired 4
mils in error in
de f 1 ec t i on dur i n g r e g i st r a t i on
"C" Battery
I n occupation of position, prime m o v e r s
cut a c r o s s ground indiscriminately m a k i n g fresh tracks into position. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w a s unsatisfactory. Wire
m a d e i t necessary to establish a r e l a y r a d i o station be tween OP and bat tery wh i ch c a u s e d consi derabl e delay in conduct of fire. S e r v i c e of piece very good.
Small T r e g i s t r a t i o n s of
I#
-92-
an e x c e l l e n t a d j u s t m e n t w i t h t i m e f i r e
i n 4 minutes 3
seconds..
I-leioht of
b u r s t 18 y a r d s .
B a t t a l i o n Forward Observer
I n i t i a l data was
I n i t i a l d a t a i n e r r o r 155 Officer
d i r e c t i o n a n d 268 y a r d s i n r a n g e .
f i r i n g made c h a n g e s p r o m p t 1 y b u t p r o b l e m e x c e e d e d
"C" B a t t e r y .
Commands h a d to t o the
be r e l a y e d t h r o u g h an i n t e r m e d i a t e s e t
battery
.
T
E3racket
Large
I n i t i a l data i n error
126
Officer
f i r i n g t h i 5 problem attempted t o a d j u s t height o f b u r s t by c h a n g i n g t i m e s e t t i n g i n s t e a d o f c h a n g i n g site, c a u s i n g 4 s a l v o s t o b e wamted d u r i n g Lack o f p r o c e d u r e and i n c o r r e c t " S " t h i s problem t o exceed time
adjustment.
f a c t o r cause,j l i m e f o r
a l l o w e d b y 1 5 i n i n u t e s a n d 26 s e c o n d s .
O h s e r v e d F i r e 1:hart
and B a t t a l i o n C o n c e n t r a t i o n 5
( 1 t ) s e r v ~ dF i r e c h a r t c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m a d j u s t e d
-Y3
b u t t h e c e n t e r b a t t e r y w a s a b o u t 266 y a r d s
.
I n i t a1 p l o t o f o b s e r u e r ' s s e n s ng f o r f i r s t o b s e r v e r sensed 966 o v e r " ,
HCU p l o t t e d " 8 6 0
this causing
S h i f t f o r "A" b a t t e r y for
19 m i l s e r r o r i n i n i t i a l d a t a f o r " A " b a t t e r y .
caught and c o r r e c t e d b e f o r e f i r i n g .
of adjustment u n t i l
Error
Time c o m p l e t i o n
c o n c e n t r a t i o n was 16 m i n u t e s 5 6 s e c o n d s ,
e x c e s s i v e e r r o r s by FDC p e r s o n n e l a n d 5-3 c h e c k i n g and c o r r e c t i n g d a t a . T o o many p e o p l e i n FDC; a t one t i m e t h e r e w e r e 28, many who h a d n o b u s i n e s s t h e r e . Battal ion phone t o
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o f f i c e r u s e d one c o m p u t e r ' s
-94-
HEADQUARTERS X X I I I CORPS A R T I L L E R Y
C:amp B o w i e ,
Texas,
25 A p r i l
1944
Comments f o r 7 7 3 d
F. A .
Test I
773d F. A .
Battalion
Speed
Phase 3 w a s 6 m i n u t e s 38 s e c o n d s o v e r t i m e due
t o s l o w n e s s i n o p e r a t i o n o f FDC.
Speed f o r o c c u p a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n e x c e l l e n t ; f i r s t r o u n d f i l * c d 25 m i n u t e s a f t e r p r o b l e m t i m e s t a r t6.d.
0 c . c u D a t i o n i.ntl O r a a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i o n
"8" B a t t e r y
S e r v i c e o f p i e c e and o c c u p a t i o n o f
p o s i t i o n was g e n e r a l l y e x c e l l e n t ;
cannoneers o p e r a t e d
s m o o t h l y and e f f i c i e n t l y and c o n t i n u e d t o improve p o s i t i o n through o u t t h e t e s t . assistant executive. T h e command "Do n o t L o a d " was r e c e i v e d
f r o m FDC on one m i s s i o n ;
Maximum u s e made o f
a f t e r 5B s e c o n d s e l a p s e d
.
Battery
"C"
No e f f o r t made t o b o r e s i g h t p i e c e s .
After i n i t i a l l a y i n g the executive put
p u t o u t u n t i l a f t e r base p o i n t r e g i s t r a t i o n .
No e f f o r t w a s made by c h i e f s o f s e c t i o n s
t o c a m o u f l a g e u n t i l r e m i n d e d t o d o so by a s s i s t a n t
executive.
improve p o s i t i o n ;
r e a r o f p i e c e s when n o t f i r i n g .
a n d a m m u n i t i o n p i t s w e r e n o t dug.
-?6-
F r ' e c i s i on ------
Fte c
~s i t ra t
i on 2
I n i t i a l data for a x i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n very poor; i n e r r o r 77 m i l s i n d i r e c t i o n a n d 1888 y a r d s i n range. I n i t i a l data for t h e Small T and B a t t a l i o n
Forward Observer r e g i s t e r i n g t h e Large T b a t t e r y e x c e l 1 en t , B a t t a l i o n Forward Observer r e q u e s t e d " F i r e for. E f f e c t " w i t h o u t h a v i n g e s t a b l i e h e d a 108 y a r d r a n g e bracket i n t h e base p o i n t r e g i s t r a t i o n .
----_Bracket
problem,
R s i s j . r a t i on
B a t t e r y F o r w a r d O b s e r v e r f i r e d a v e r y good b u t t i m e w a s S m i n u t e % o v e r a l l o w e d t i m e due
t o s l o w n e s s iil o p e r a t i o n o f FDC.
d a t a f o r Small T b r a c k e t a d j u s t m e n t i n
5,
18U m i
C o n d u c t c?f f r t .
-9; -
e r r o r 86 m i l s i n d i r e c t i o n a n d 686 y a r d s i n r a n g e . Officer f i r i n g r e q u i r e d 4 m i n u t e s 46 s e c o n d s t o
Observed F i r e C h a r t and B a t t a l i o n C o n c e n t r a t i o n s
E r r o r made by HCO i n i n i t i a l p l o t o f f i r s t
'Corrections
o f 4 m i l s i n d e f l e c t i o n and 5 6 a n d 75 y a r d s i n r a n g e i n t h e e f f e c t o f t h e n o n - a d j u s t i n g b a t t e r i e s on t h e
f i r s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n a n d 1 8 6 a n d 156 y a r d s i n r a n g e on
t h e second c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,
HCO a n d VCO made n u m e r o u s e r r o r s c a u s i n g
-?8-
HEADQUARTERS
XXIII
CORPS ARTILLERY
Camp B o w i e , T e x a s ,
24 Api- i 1 1 9 4 4
Cnmments f o r 772d F. A. Test I 1
772d F
. A.
Battalion
Selection
tr.ansier
No e r r o r
to a! 1
Vertical
Altitude<. o f high.
-------_. D e t e r m i n a t i o n of K and K r S e t t i n q
No e r r o r :
i n r e g i s t r a t i o n n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o#
correct ions,
Layina -
B a t t a l i o n on Base P o i n t
E f--f .e
c t l v e n e s s O F-- F i r e on F o u r C o n c e n t r a t i o n s fzounds w e r e a l l g r a z e b u r s t s on T a r g e
14.
cat-eful check
1311
d a t a #or t h i s t a r g e t r e v e a s no
e r r o r t h a t w o u l d cause a l l g r a z e b u r s t s .
H e i g h t o f b u r s t s f o r T a r g e t 19 wa5 39 y a r d s .
VCO made a p l u s 2 m i l s e r r o r
i n determination of s i t e
R e f i r e of
t h i s t a r g e t w i t h an i n c r e a s e o f 3 m i l s s i t e
test.
A i r Adjustment A i r a d j u s t m e n t was v e r y
o p e r a t i o n o f FDC.
SlOW
due t o s l o w n e s s o f
Ge n e r a 1 Comme n t s
O c c u p a t i o n and O r a a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i o n
-100-
"cb"
Battery U n n e c e s s a r y t a l K i n g i n a1 1 s e c t i 011s
d u r i n g f i r e misstonr;;
No 1 c a n n o n e e r 2d s e c t i o n
t a l k e d c o n t ihiiousl Y d u r i n g missions. L i t t l e e f f o r t made t o d i g i n o r 'tc) organize position. Battery recorder l a i d the b a t t e r y i n an e x c e l l e n t m a n n e r ; was c h e c k e d by e x e c u t i v e .
"tc" B a t t e r y
D i s c i p l i n e o f c a n n o n e e r s was excel l e n t tliri,ughout test. C h i e f s of sections
f I r i nq..
I ,
[I
.a
s l r i o o t h l y ancl c l i i i e t l r d u r i n g o c c u p a t i o n of and f i r i n g .
position
when n o t f i r i n r l .
-101-
HEADPUARTEPS
Camp Bowie, T e x a s ,
24 Apr i 1 1944
Comments f o r 773d F. A. 773d F. A. Test
I1
Battalion
S e l e c t i o n and L o c a t i o n o f Base P o i n t
No e r r o r i n l o c a t i o n ; l o c a t i o n s u i t a b l e f o r
t r a n s f e r s t o a1 1 t a r g e t s .
ical Control
VCO d i d n o t r i d g e and s t r e a m l i n e c h a r t w h i l e a t
OP
.
K and K r S e t t i n q
No e r r o r I n r e g i s t r a t i o n n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f
Determination of
c o r r e c t i o n s , however,
r e g i s t r a t i o n was c o m p l e t e d
L a r i n a B a t t a l i o n on Base P o i n t
-102-
^ -
E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f F i r e on F o u r C o n c e n t r a t i o n s
No 3 p i t a c e B a t t e r y "C" f i r e d 134 m i l s i n e r r o r
i n d e f 1 e c t i or1 on 2d c o n c e n t r a t i o n .
Arl errcmr
i n p l o t t i n g t h e base l i n e e x t e n s i o n
for
"A"
B a t t e r y on t h e
HCO c h a r t c a u s e d s h i f t t o
t a r g e t 1 t o t - e t o o s m a l l w i t h n o e f f o r t on t a r g e t . A l t i t u d e o f T a r g e t 19 was 23 y a r d s t o o h i g h i i r d
1 m i l error
i n computation o f s i t e f o r
t h i s target
c:aused h e i g 9 t o f b u r s t s t o b e 74 y a r d s .
A1 1 r o u r l d s f i r e d o n T a r g e t 1 4 w e r e g r a z e . A
careful error
check f o f d a t a f o r t h i s t a r g e t r e v e a l s no
I~)C,U I
that
d cause g r a z e bursts.
.
for N i q h t A d j u s t m e n t and
-_ PreDaration
C.I.
G e n e r a l Comm.?ntc. -
-183-
OccuDat i on a n d O r o a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i o n
"A"
Bat t e r r B a t t e r y d i d n o t c a r r y out c o m p l e t e
I'
'I
C 'I Ba t t e r Y
Occupation of p o s i t i o n r a p i d and
order Y .
No 3 p i e c e f i r e d 134 m i l s i n e r r o r
i n d e f l e c t i o n on s e c o n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n . BDL 67, No 3 p i e c e s h i f t e d BDR 67. Command was
Camp H o w i e , T e x a s ,
i!4 Apt- i 1
1944 Comments f o r 4 8 4 t h
F. A . Group l e s t 1 1 1
Group H e a d q u a r t e r s
I _ .
G e n e r a l Commeri t s
d u t i e s i n an e x c e l l e n t m a n n e r .
T , w g e t s w e r e r e s t i t u t e d by en1 i s t e d men w i t h a v e r a g e
er.ror
of
122 yards i n X a n d 6 y a r d s i n Y.
Officers
made c h e c k s on r e s t i t u t i o n .
post wrre all complete.
I n s t a l l a t i o n s a t commanc:
772d F. A.
5 U l - W
Battalion
c a u s e d c*ri*orc> o f targets.
f r o m 3 t o 6 y a r d s i n a1 t i t u d e s o f
-1 85-
O c c u P a t i on,
Camouf 1 aqe a n d O r a a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i on
f l a s h 1 i g h t s c a u s e d some c o n f u s i o n among g u n n e r s
d u r i n g l a y i n g of
S e c u r i t y was g e n e r a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . umpires toured a l l areas a f t e r dark without encountering guards or s e n t i n e l s . c o u n t e r s i g n w e r e n o t used. Headauarters Battery
Password and
"A"
Batt e r r
No 1 p i e c e c o u l d n o t b e p l a c e i n t h e p o s i t i o n
s e 1 ec t e d .
I ,
0 ,I B a t t e r y
En1 i s t e d men s l e e p i n g i n o p e n a f t e r d a y 1 i g h t .
-166-
." C "
Battery
0i.gan i ::<At i o n o f p o s i t i o n a n d camouf 1 age e x c e 1 1 eri t a.1 t h o u g h en 1 i s t e d men w e r e s l eep I n g i n crpt?n a f t e r d a y 1 i gbli
-_f'reoarat
i o n ot F i r e
Acsistant
S-3 r e s t 1 t u t e d t a r g e t s u s i n g t r a c i r r l l
R e s t i t u t i o n was n o t c h e c k e d by u 5 e o f
paper method.
No 1 h a d 1 g r a z e a n d 2 a i r
b u r s t s ; i i u e r a q t ' h e i g h t o f a i r b u r s t s 19 y a r d s . C : o r l c e n t r i t t i o n No 21 h a d 1 g r a z e a n d 2 a i r bursts; a u e r a g l r h e i g h t o f a i r b u r s t s 37 y a r d s .
4 c a r e f u l check of a l l d a t a r e v e a l s n o e r r o r
t h a t w o u l d cauje the v a r i a t i o n s i n these c n n c e n t r a t i o n s . Range a n d d e f l e c t i o n c o r r e c t f o r a l l concentrations. O n l y 3 guns p e r b a t t e r y w e r e a v a i l a b l e f o r
tesi:.
i n h e i g h t s ol: b u r s t s
four
Ni (ah t tI I 913
Burst Adjustment
Sep.hrale w i r e 1 i n e s t o e a c h o b s e r v e r e n a b l e d
prompt r e p o r t i n g o f
instruments readings.
S-3 e x e r c i s e d e x c e l l e n t a n d c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l i n
f i r i n g h i g h burst a d j u s t m e n t .
Oaeration of F i r e D i r e c t i o n Center FDC e x c e l l e n t l y o r g a n i z e d . computed officers. HCO a n d UCO made s e v e r a l m i s t a k e s i n p l o t t i n g and r e a d i n g a n g l e s and r a n g e s c a u g h t a n d c o r r e c t e d by S-3 En1 i s t e d men
UE a n d s o l v e d m e t r o m e s s a g e s
c h e c K e d by
a l l of which w e r e
or a s s i s t a n t
S-3.
One c o m p u t e r u s e d command.
"OK,
l e a d 'em u p " .
T h i s , c a u s e d some d e l a y i n s t a r t i n g t h e h i g h b u r s t adjustment.
773d F. A . B a t t a l i o n
Survey Adequate and p r a c t i c a l s u r v e y p l a n ; prompt i n i t i a t i o n of survey, b u t completion slow.
Occupat i on.
A1 1 b a t t e r i e s made e x c e l 1 en t o c c u p a t i o n s o f
-108-
A1 1
d u g i n ; e x c e l l e n t u s e made o f e x i s t i n g
I. m i l
5 mils
i n m e a w r e d ba:e
5 mils in
i n r e s t i t u t i o n of target.
1 1 m i l s i n same d i r e c t i o n .
T h i s e r r o r was l a r g e e n o u g h t o c a u s e loss o+ a1 I
e , f f e ct on t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n .
T h e d e f l e c t i o n c o r r e c t i o n c h a n g e as c o m p u t e d
M e a s u r e d s h i f t BDL 26, a d j u s t e d
No 1 p i e c e
' t h a t f i r e d t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n f i r e d 28
m i l s i n error" iii d e f l e c t i o n to l e f t .
An e r r o r a l s o this
wa!;
made i n computing t h e q u a d r a n t e l e v a t i o n f o r
( :
colic en t r a t i or1
.IUS
i rig e f f ec t a p p r o x i ma t e 1 y 175 y a r d s
-109.-
over.
q u a d r a n t 14?.
Altitude of
c a r e f u l check o f a l l d a t a f o r t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n r e v e a l s no e r r o r t h a t w o u l d cause t h i s v a r i a t i o n .
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and p r o c e d u r e
adequate and a c c u r a t e s e n s i n g .
-110-
APPENDIX TWO
APPENDIX TWO
The f a c t
of
1 i t a r r planning.
this
i s n o t t o a n a l y z e t h i s moue.
t o stucy
g i v e t h e reicder. a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e c o m p l e x i t i e , :
o i r e 1 t e v i n q ctirnbat u n i t s i n c o n t a c t a n d r e p l a c i n g
them
WI
tli 0 t h t : I . s .
d a t e d 3 J a n u a r y 1945.
i n t h e Combined Arms
R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y u n d e r t h e number N6739.
OF OPERATIONS
APO 887
-1 11.-
3 J a n u a r y 1945
SUBJECT:
AGF R e p o r t No.
SB9
Movement o f X I 1 C or ps
A r t i1l e r y
SUBMITTED BY:
Colonel
JAMES W.
CLYBURN, F i e l d
A r t i 1 1 e r y Observer.
1.
counter-offensive
moved n o r t h and p l a c e d i n p o s i t i o n t o s u p p o r t a c o u n t e r a t t ac k ,
2.
The f o l l o w i n g b r i e f o u t l i n e o f
t h i s move of the X I 1
was o b t a n e d f r o m M a j o r E . W. Cor p s A r
i1 1ery:
B a r t l e y , S-4
a. obscure;
BY 211880,
t h e t a c t i c a l p i c t u r e was
n o r t h t o w a r d s Luxembourg, XU Cor ps w o u l d t a k e o v e r o u r zone, we w o u l d l e a v e 3 heavy b a t t a l i o n s and b r i g a d e h e a d q u a r t e r s , move o u r own h e a d q u a r t e r s , 3 groups, 2 observation battalions, 3 1 ight battalions,
4 medical b a t t a l ions,
2 heavy gun b a t t a l i o n s ;
send a
- 1 12-
C o r p s one 1 i g h t t r u c k b a t t a l i o n a n d r e c e i v e f r o m thsm
ir
18:;
SP b a t t , , l i o n .
b.
The f o l l o w i n g p l a n was a d o p t e d ,
a d j a c e n t c o r p s a r t i l l e r y commanders a n d u n i t s n o t i f i e c l b y 21 2388.
(1)
s e t up i n t h e f i r s t
An i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r w o u l d tie
town s o u t h o f c i t y o f Luxembourc..
:3 p e r o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n , 5 p e r g r o u p
to r e p o r t t o the
instruction. i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r on B a t t a l i o n s a n d group!;
headquarter!$,
22 December f o r
wt!re
alei*ted
+,Jr
movement o n o r d e r a f t e r 2 2 2 4 8 0 .
(2)
XU C o r p s a g r e e d t o s e n d i n mi!
g r o u p a n d 4 b a i t a l i o n s on 22 December.
(3)
One l i g h t b a t t a l i o n w o u l d s e n t l
art a d v a n c e p a r t y t o XX C o r p s a n d XX C o r p s w o u l d h a v e t h e SP b a t t a l i o n s e n d an a d v a n c e p a r t y t o t h e
i r i f u r m a t i on c e n t e r
.
(4) A l l maps, charts,
-1 .I3-
communication l i n e s ,
etc..,
t h a t w o u l d be o f v a l u e
w o u l d be t u r n e d o v e r t o XU C o r p s A r t i l l e r y .
(5)
C o r p s a r t i 1 l e r y commander w i t h
( 6 ) C o r p s CP a d v a n c e e c h e l o n w o u l d
f o l l o w a t 221200.
( 7 ) No maps o f new a r e a w e r e
a v a i l a b l e e x c e p t a f e w r o a d maps t o L u x e m b o u r g a n d a f e w l/l00,00Bs o f the area.
(8)
X I 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y was t o
( 9 ) A new h e a v y m a i n t e n a n c e
o r d n a n c e company f o r m XU C o r p s r e p o r t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e c o r p s a r t i l l e r y o n 22 December. O r d n a n c e company
was t o f o r m l a r g e m a i n t e n a n c e c o n t a c t p a r t i e s a n d move w i t h e a c h g r o u p .
-114-
( 1 6 ) Corps a r t i l l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n
c e n t e r s w e r e to c o o r d i n a t e movement i n d i v i s i o n a r e i i s ;and g e t u n i t s t o I P S . corps area for
us.
Army s e l e c t e d t h e r o u t e s fronb
c.
B a t t a l i o n s were o r d e r e d t o d i s p l a c s -
o v e r .;everal
hour
time
i n t e r v a l between u n i t s .
Each u n i t was t o s e n d an
2 h o u r s ahead o f t h e m a i n body t o
t h e t:orps i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r .
d.
I n the
interim,
a CP was s e l e c t e d , advance
p l a n s made f o r p . i r t i e s Cjiuen
.
o r g a n i z a t i o n for combat,
t ~
much
areas t o +elect p o s i t i o n s .
h e a d q u a r t e r s was l e f t on d u t y a t t h e center.
I?.
B a t t a l i o n s moved a s p l a n n e d on t h e
23d a n d by e u e n i n g o f t h e 23d, a l l b a t t a l i o n s h a d
c l o s e d i n t h e <3r.ea a n d t h e m a j o r i t y o f f i r s i n g the nigh': o f t h e 23d. them w o r e
The move w a s a l i t t l e
-1 1 5 . -
f.
The f o l l o w i n g a r t i l l e r y u n i t s w e r e
battalion
medical
4th Division
3 l i g h t b a t t a l i o n s and 1 m e d i c a l
(2
o f t h e l i g h t b a t t a i o n s w e r e SP) l B t h Armored D i u s i o n A r t i l l e r y w i t h 2 o r g a n i c
-A
5 t h D i v i s i o n &nd d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y moved i n on t h e
9.
The l e t t e r b a t t e r i e s o f
the
o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n s t h a t w e r e l e f t i n the o l d area d i s p l a c e d on t h e 2 4 t h .
h.
t h a t on t h e 2 4 t h ,
n excess o f
-1 16-
they a l I a t e 1:urker.
3..
T h e s u i c e s s o f t h i s movement i s a t t r i b u t e i j
p a r t to t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t p l a n c o n t a i n e d i n A r t i l l e r y Standing Operating Procedur(,.
i n great
.the X I 1 Carp.
/s/ James W .
Clyburn
JAMES W .
CLYBURN
C o l o n e l , FA
W D O b s e r v e r s Eloal-d.
-1 1 7 -
APPENDIX THREE
APPENDIX THREE
11.
The
T h i s i s an e x a c t c o p y o f contained i n
t h e F i e l d Order as
111 C o r p s A f t e r A c t i o n R e p o r t
Dec 4 4
Dec 44.
T h i s document
i s i n t h e Combined Arms
R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y u n d e r t h e f i l e number N-12029.
-118-
1'0
1
C!XS
13,
MAPS:
4416
4436,
Scale 1/166,608.
Sheets:
PIARCHE:
I.
a.
b.
Annex 2 ( I n t e l l i g e n c e ) .
t o W ancl S.
D e t a i l s on XI1 C o r p s l a t e r .
i! ,
S'T.
I 1 1 C . w p s advances N
i n Zone
i n d i r e c t i o n of
U I T H (UP 855882) a t H H o u r ,
D Day; d e s t r o y s a n y
enemy e n c o u n t s r e d ( o v e r l a y ) .
3.
if..
86 I i i f D i v :
Attached:
633 AAA A W Bn ( M b l )
7 6 2 Tk En
6 1 0 TD Bn
(SP)
4 0 4 FA Gp (312, 943 FA B n s )
3 Plat,
1 6 F i e l d Hosp
(1)
cidvance i n z o n e t h r o u g h e l e m e n t s o f
a n d 28 I n t D i v ) .
A t t a c k a n d d e s t r o y enemy.
(2) P r o t e c t C o r p s r i g h t ( e a s t ) f l a n K a n d
m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h X I 1 Corps.
(3) , H a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h 26 I n f D i v on
-119-
l e f t (west).
1 9 3 FA Gp (179, 7 5 2 FA E n s !
696 Armd FA E n )
2 P l a t , 59 F i e l d Hosp (1)
enemy. A d ance i n zone. A t t a c k and d e s t r o y
(2)
Ma n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h 88 I n f D i v on
r i g h t ( e a s t ) a n d 4 Armd D i v on l e f t ( w e s t ) .
c.
4 Armd D i v :
Attached: 4 8 9 AAA A W En (SP) 7 0 4 TD En (SP)
253 Armd FA 8 n
2 7 4 Armd FA Bn 4 4 4 OM T r k Co 3864 QM T r k C o
1 Plat,
16 F i e l d Hosp
995 E n g r T r e a d w a y E r Co
(1)
A d v a n c e on l e f t o f 26 I n f D i v ;
attack
a n d d e s t r o y a n y enemy e n c o u n t e r e d .
-126-
(Z!)
M a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h 26 I n f D i v on
I
right (east)
(5)
(4) element:.
P r o t e c t Corps l e f t ( w e s t ) . C o n t a c t , when g a i n e d , w i t h
UIII
Corp.5
wi 1 1 be maintained.
d. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y :
(1)
Z B 3 FA Gp:
A t t a c h a d s 176 F A Bn ( 4 . 5 " Gun)
177 FA Bn
15Smm Haw)
r e i n f o r c e f ir e 5 4 Armd
I ) i v w i t h o n e b a t t a l i o n 155mm G u n s .
(2)
r Y 3 FA Gp: r.)ttached:
949 F A Bn
C i t t a c h e d t o 26 I n f D i u .
(3)
4 8 4 t h F A Qp: Attached:
A t t a c h e d t o 80 I n f D i u .
(4)
:?I53 A r m d
FA B n a t t a c h e d t o 4 A r m d
Div.,
-121
(5)
2 7 4 Armd FA 8 n a t t a c h e d t o 4 Armd D i v
( 6 ) 288 FA Ohsn Bn s u p p o r t o f C o r p s .
e.
4 6 8 AAA A W Bn (SP)
Corps A r t i l l e r y
( 2 ) B r i d g e s and Corps
i n s t a l 1 a t i ons.
f . Tank D e s t r o y e r :
Hq 8 TD Gp a t t a c h e d I 1 1 C r o p s A r t y .
9. A i r S u p p o r t :
F i g h t e r bombers of t h e X I X TAC w i 1 1
support a t t a c k of 111 Corps w i t h c l o s e support m i s s i o n s a n d armed r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o v e r t a c t i c a l a r e a . Squadrons w i l l c o n t a c t Corps and D i v i s i o n A i r Support Party for targets. weather p e r m i t s . T i m e o v e r t a r g e t a r e a a s soon a s
h. Engineers:
(1)
1 1 3 7 E n g r C Gp: Attached: 1 8 3 E n g r C Bn
-1 22-
1 8 8 E n g r C Bn 1 4 5 E n g r C Bn 249 Engr C
Bn
<-)
778 E n g r Dp Trlc CO
632 E n g r LE
Co
(-)
72 E n g r L Pon C o
513 E n g r
L Pon
Co
998 E n g r T r d w r B r Go
3:a)
ch)
Support a t t a c k . Be p r e p a r e d t o a t t a c h one
battalioil to
ii
d i v i s i o n on C o r p s o r d e r .
t.c)
D i r e c t Support;
(1)
L Pon Co a t c h c l j o f 86 D i u
I
1 4 5 E n g r C En ( o n e p l a t E i l : 3
(2)
2 4 9 E n g r C 5 n ( 5 1 3 L Pon C c l
less o n e p l a t i r t c h d ) o f 26 D i u .
188 E n g r C Bn o f 4 A r m d Div.
(2)
Attachments:
'?(?SE n g r T r d w y B r Co a t t a c h e d 4 Armd
Div
:3)
(ieneral Support:
1 .'8 E n g r C Bn.
A t t a c h e d : One P l a t ,
-1 23-
One P l a t , 632 E n g r LE C o .
i . Corps R e s e r v e :
(1)
26 I n f D i v :
One I n f En t o h e c o m m i t t e d
on C o r p s o r d e r o n l y .
(2)
80 I n f D i v :
One I n f Bn t o h e c o m m i t t e d
on C o r p s o r d e r o n l y .
X.
(1)
B r i d g e s w i l l h e b l o w n on D i v o r d e r
only.
s u h o r d i n a t e un i ts.
(2)
S t r i c t measures t o i n s u r e ai'r
security
w i l l be e n f o r c e d .
(3)
Each u n i t commander w i l l
taKe s p e c i a l
(4) No g a s o l i n e , weapons, u e h i c l e s , o r
ammunition w i l l
be permitted t o f a l l
i n t o enemy h a n d s
R e p o r t i n g l i n e s ( o v e r l a y ) w i l l h e used
f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n and a s r e f e r e n c e s i n r e p o r t s t o t h i s headquarters.
(6)
Air
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n panels w i l l
be
d i s p l a y e d on a l l v e h i c l e s .
4.
Adm U No. 2,
20 Dec 4 4 .
-124-
5.
a . See l e t t e r o f S i g n a l
Dec 4 4 . C:Ps: N o c h a n g e .
Instructions,
Hq 111
C o r p s , ;:B
tr. ( 1 )
L o c a t i o n s o f new CFs
t o be r e p o r t e d w h e n o c c u p i e d .
(2)
AXES ( s i c )
O F SIG COM :
I 1 1 Corps -
ARLON
ESCHDORF
- WILT2
HAMIUILLE.
26. D i u :
ESCHDORF
EISCHEN
GROSBAUS
IJ1L.TZ
HAMIUILLE. DOMMELANGE
80 D i u :
BISSEN
KEISFELT
BOIJRSCHEID
- WILWERWITZ - CLERF
W E I SWAMPACH
.
4 Armd D i u :
To b e r e p o r t e d .
c.
MILLIKIN M a j Gen
OFF1 CI AL :
/s/ MEWSHAW
MEWSHAW
G-cJ
-12:-
APPENDIX FOUR
APPENDIX FOUR
"SERENADE" w a s a p r o c e d u r e d i r e c t e d by T h i r d Army.
t h e i r designs.
standard o p e r a t i n g procedures, b u t the concept would h a v e been t h e same a s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s A p p e n d i x . X I I C o r p s A r t i 1 1 e r y (who " b r o k e - i n " I I I C o r p s A r t i l l e r y ) adopted t h i s procedure e s s e n t i a l l y verbatim. T h i s p r o c e d u r e i s one o f t h e r e a s o n s why
See b i b l i o g r a p h y o f
- 1 26-
22 A p r i I
1944
OPERAT I C I N S MEPIURANDUM)
:
NUMBER
1)
SERENADE
1.
T?e p u r p o s e o f
herein, which w i l l
be d e s i g n a t e d a s SERENADE,
e x p e d i t e t h e in.assing o f a l l a v a i l a b l e f i r e s w i t h i n a
corps sector
i n e x t r e m e e m e r g e n c y when l a c k o f
time
p r e c l u d e s pi-e.ar-rangement o f f i r e .
The f o l l o w i n g
0.F
N o r m a l 1 y a r e q u e s t f o r SERENADE w i 1 1 f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r who t r a n s m i t s t o
SERENADE
(2)
5301794
(3)
N a t u r e of t a r g e t .
46 t a n k s
b.
The b a t t a l i o n f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r
will
t r a n s m i t t h e r e q u e s t by t e l e p h o n e t o t h e
I f the
(or
i s to f a l l .
N o r m a l l y Corps and D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y
T i m e m u s t be
I f s u r p r i s e f i r e i s n o t d e s i r e d because
the e x i g e n c i e s of the s i t u a t i o n ,
t h e w o r d s "When
a r t i l l e r y r e q u e s t f o r SERENADE: SERENADE
J3B 1794
-1 28-
46 t a n k s
1 4 3 5 ( o r "when r e a d y " )
c.
profitable,
I f the t a r g e t
i s deemed s u f f i c i e n t l ) ,
the c o r p s a r t i l l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r
more i m p o r t a n t m i s s i o n .
d.
F i r ng procedure:
(
Each b a t t a l i o n ,
i t s normal s h e a f ,
c e n t e r e d on t h e c o o r d i n a t e s given, f i r e s t h r e e (3)
v o l l e y s a t c e n t e r range.
( 2 ) T a r g e t s of m o r e t h a t 466 yard!;
i n w i d t h or depth are covered
by i n c l u d i n g an a d d l t i o n a l
sel:
of for
w i l l be announced.
-1 2P-
e.
d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r w i l l r e l a y t h e r e q u e s t by t e l e p h o n e t o t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y (or c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p ) f i r e d i r e c t i o n center.
I f the d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y
commander ( o r c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p commander) o r h i s authorized representative decides the request i s warranted, he w i l l transmit over the corps a r t i l l e r y Each b a t t a l i o n
r a d i o n e t "REPEAT SERENADE".
E x t r e m e c a r e m u s t be e x e r c i s e d t o l o c a t i o n on a n y r e q u e s t f o r
T h i s i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f commanders T h e y w i l l be
o f a l l e c h e l o n s hand1 i n g such r e q u e s t s .
responsible that
requests are j u s t i f i a b l e ,
w a r r e n t s (sic.) s u c h an e x p e n d i t u r e o f a m m u n i t i o n . there
t a r g e t and a d j u s t m e n t of f i r e
-136-
By
commmand o f L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l PATTOI'I
/S/
R. W. R. W.
Hartman
HARTMAN
G.
L t Col, A .
D.
A s s t , A d j Gen.
BOOKS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
B u c h a n a n , A. R u s s e l l . The U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d W o r l d War I 1 U o l , 11. New Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d Row, 1964, C h u r c h i l l , W i n s t o n S. Triumph and Traaedy B a n t a m B o o k s , 1962. Cole,
New Y o r k :
Koyen,
.
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Camp P o l k ,
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o+ F r a n c e and G e r m a n y 1 9 4 4 1945." No piibl i c a t ion c i t y 1 i e t e d , undated, ICombined Arms Research L i b r a r y h e r e i n a + t e r c i t e d a s CARL, D o c u m e n t n u m b e r 8 4 2 2 5 9 1 US A r m y . The Armored S c h o o l . "Armor a t Bastogne." F o r t Kncmx, K e n t u c K y , May 1 9 4 9 .
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Ilery.
" A r t i l l e r y i n the
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t h e Enemy
US A r m y .
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US A r m y .
Dec: 4 4 . "
US A r m y . 4th Armored D i v i s i o n . " H i s t o r y , Headquartcmrs, D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y . " APO 254, G e r m a n y , O c t o b e r . 1 9 4 4 [CARL D o c u m e n t n u m b e r N 1 2 5 6 3 3 . US A r m y . 4th Armored D i v i s i o n . " R e l i e f of Bastogne.," APCl 254, G e r m a n y ICARL D o c u m e n t n u m b e r 1 2 5 6 2 ,,' 1 1.
US A r m y . 9th Armored D i v i s i o n . "Report a f t e r a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e e n e m y 1-31 D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 5 . " APO 2 5 Y , I J a n u a r y 1 Y 4 5 [CARL D o c u m e n t n u m b e r N 1 2 1 5 4 1 . US A r m y . 26th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n . "After Action Against 31 Jan 1 9 4 5 . " t h e Enemy R e p o r t : l J a n I3onna1, L . u x e m b a u r g , 1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 5 I:CARL IDocument n u m b e r N 1 2 4 6 2 . 1 1 .
- 1 33-
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R115481.
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US A r m y . T h i r d Army. " F i e l d A r t i l l e r y and Tank D e s t r o y e r J u n e 1945." O p e r a t i o n Summary A u g u s t 1 9 4 4 APO 4 6 3 , G e r m a n y , ZB J u n e 1 9 4 5 .
- 134-
F o r c e s H o a r d R e p o r t #168.
1 6 J u l y 1944.
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US War D e p a r t m e n t ,
US Wai. Depat-tinent,
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--Techniqiie
US War D e p a r t m e n t . T a c t i c a l EmDloyment o f F i e l d
Arti Ilerx 5 J u l y 1941, F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , Kansar, !CARL O b s o l e t e F i e l d Manual C o l l e c t i o n l .
A l l o f t h e b e l o w l i s t e d r e p o r t s a r e u n d a t e d , .nrld g i v e n o i n d i c a t i o n o f pub1 i c a t i o n l o c a t i o n s . I n c l u c e c l w i t h e a c h t i t l e i s t h e f i l e number c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e p o r t a n d t h e s t u d y number. A l l r e p o r t s c o n t a i n t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n cln t h e t i t l e page " T h e G e n e r a l B o a r d was e s t a b ) i s h e ' d by Genere1 O r d e r s 128, H e a d q u a r t e r s E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r af O p e r a t i o n s , US Army, d a t e d 17 June 1945, a s amended by G e n e r a l O r d e r s 182, d a t e d 7 Augi1s.t 1945 a n d G e n e r a l O r d e r s 3 1 2 d a t e d 26 November 1 9 4 5 , H e a d q u a r t e r s U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r c e s , European Theater, t o prepare a f a c t u a l a n a l y s i s o f the s t r a t e g y , t a c t i c s , a n d admi n i s t r a t i on emp 1 o y e d
by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s i n t h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r .I'
" R e p o r t on t h e S t u d y o f F i e l d A r t i l l e r y O p e r a t i o n s . . " F i l e number 3 7 0 / 4 , S t u d y number 61. " R e p o r t on S t u d y of F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Communications." F i l e number 311/1, S t u d y number 63. "Ammunition S u p p l y and O p e r a t i o n s , European C a m p a i g n . " F i l e number 471/2, S t u d y number 10B. " R e p o r t on A m m u n i t i o n S u p p l y f o r F i e l d A r t i l l e r y . " F i l e number 471/1, S t u d y number 58. " L i a i s o n A i r c r a f t w i t h Ground F o r c e U n i t s . " F i l e number 452.1/2, S t u d y number 2 0 . " R e p o r t on S t u d y o f F i e l d A r t i l l e r y G u n n e r y . " F i l e number 3 5 3 . 4 / 1 , S t u d y number 6 4 . " R e p o r t on S t u d y o f t h e F i e l d A r t i l l e r y G r o u p . " F i l e number 328.2/62, S t u d y number 65.
NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES MG " I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n i n E u r o p e . " B l a k e l e y , H. W . . , F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Journal 36 (May 1 9 4 6 ) : 262268. Burns, J o h n T . COL " T h e E m p l o y m e n t o f Corps. A r t i l l e r y . " F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Journal 3 3 ( M a r c h 943): 2 1 6 .
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