I-Law and K Addendum

Gonzaga Debate Institute Intermediate Lab
1 International Law Addendum
International Law and Random K Addendums

International Law Addendums ............................................................................................................................................. 1 Shell 1/2................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Shell 2/2................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Links-Generic........................................................................................................................................................................ 4 Links Sudan........................................................................................................................................................................ 5 Links- Standing Army........................................................................................................................................................... 6 Rule of Law is Doomed 1/6.................................................................................................................................................. 7 Rule of Law is Doomed 2/6.................................................................................................................................................. 8 Rule of Law is Doomed 3/6.................................................................................................................................................. 9 Rule of Law is Doomed 4/6................................................................................................................................................ 10 Rule of Law is Doomed 5/6................................................................................................................................................ 11 Rule of Law is Doomed 6/6................................................................................................................................................ 12 The Alternative is a Better Choice1/8 ................................................................................................................................ 13 The Alternative is a Better Choice2/8 ................................................................................................................................ 14 The Alternative is a Better Choice 3/8 ............................................................................................................................... 15 The Alternative is a Better Choice 4/8 ............................................................................................................................... 16 The Alternative is a Better Choice 5/8 ............................................................................................................................... 17 The Alternative is a Better Choice 6/8 ............................................................................................................................... 18 The Alternative is a Better Choice 7/8 ............................................................................................................................... 19 The Alternative is a Better Choice 8/8 ............................................................................................................................... 20 Internal Links Law is Racist 1/3...................................................................................................................................... 21 Internal Links Law is Racist 3/3...................................................................................................................................... 22 Internal Links Law is Racist 3/3...................................................................................................................................... 23 Internal Links- Gender ........................................................................................................................................................ 24 Internal Links International Rule of Law Destroys Democratic Freedoms................................................................... 25 Internal Links- Rule of Law Leads to Self Determination ................................................................................................ 26 Internal Links- Leads to Genocides.................................................................................................................................... 27 Answers to Cant Sever the State.................................................................................................................................... 28 Answers to the Permutation................................................................................................................................................ 29 **** Hip Hop 1NC*** ....................................................................................................................................................... 30 Plan Based Advantages....................................................................................................................................................... 31 Counter Advocacy............................................................................................................................................................... 32 Hip Hop 1NC 1/4 ................................................................................................................................................................ 34 Hip Hop 1NC 2/4 ................................................................................................................................................................ 35 Hip Hop 1NC 3/4 ................................................................................................................................................................ 36 Hip Hop 1NC 4/4 ................................................................................................................................................................ 37 Counterplan Overview ........................................................................................................................................................ 38 Answers to the Permutation................................................................................................................................................ 40
Shell 1/2
A. The UN strengthens International Law Maura Hegarty Professor Ahmad Kamal Dec 4 2004 (http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:hvu-IV_pgIJ:www.geocities.com/mohegarty/HRSOV.doc+%22rise+in+International+Law%22&hl=en,DAP) Since its formation, the UN has attempted to influence the emerging human rights field in a positive manner. The inclusion of human rights in the UN Charter was an important step in the institutionalization of human rights and in the development of a normative role for these rights in the international community. The UN Charter ushered in a world wide movement in which states, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations are the principle players in an ongoing struggle over the role the international community should play in promoting and protecting human rights.20 By placing human rights at the forefront of international politics, the UN has contributed greatly to the rise in international law, treaties and regimes associated with human rights.
B.Belief in the Rule of Law Leads to A Belief in Justice as Opposed to an Exercise in Naked Ambition and Power John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University, LL.M.,
Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) This was the idea behind the concept of the divine right of kings. By making the king appear to be an integral part of God's plan for the world rather than an ordinary human being dominating his fellows [*218] by brute force, the public could be more easily persuaded to bow to his authority. However, when the doctrine of divine right became discredited, a replacement was needed to ensure that the public did not view political authority as merely the exercise of naked power. That replacement is the concept of the rule of law. People who believe they live under "a government of laws and not people" tend to view their nation's legal system as objective and impartial. They tend to see the rules under which they must live not as expressions of human will, but as embodiments of neutral principles of justice, i.e., as natural features of the social world. Once they believe that they are being commanded by an impersonal law rather than other human beings, they view their obedience to political authority as a publicspirited acceptance of the requirements of social life rather than mere acquiescence to superior power. In this way, the concept of the rule of law functions much like the use of the passive voice by the politician who describes a delict on his or her part with the assertion "mistakes were made." It allows people to hide the agency of power behind a facade of words; to believe that it is the law which compels their compliance, not self-aggrandizing politicians, or highly capitalized special interests, or wealthy white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males, or (fill in your favorite culprit). But the myth of the rule of law does more than render the people submissive to state authority; it also turns them into the state's accomplices in the exercise of its power. For people who would ordinarily consider it a great evil to deprive individuals of their rights or oppress politically powerless minority groups will respond with patriotic fervor when these same actions are described as upholding the rule of law.
Shell 2/2
C The Alternative- The States Monopoly on Law Binds Us to Contradiction. We Must Break Off this One Sided Affair John Hasnas 1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University,
LL.M., Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) The fact is that there is no such thing as a government of law and not people. The law is an amalgam of contradictory rules and counter-rules expressed in inherently vague language that can yield a legitimate legal argument for any desired conclusion. For this reason, as long as the law remains a state monopoly, it will always reflect the political ideology of those invested with decisionmaking power. Like it or not, we are faced with only two choices. We can continue the ideological power struggle for control of the law in which the group that gains dominance is empowered to impose its will on the rest of society, or we can end the monopoly. Our long-standing love affair with the myth of the rule of law has made us blind to the latter possibility. Like the Monosizeans, who after centuries of state control cannot imagine a society in which people can [*233] buy whatever size shoes they wish, we cannot conceive of a society in which individuals may purchase the legal services they desire. The very idea of a free market in law makes us uncomfortable. But it is time for us to overcome this discomfort and consider adopting Socrates' approach. We must recognize that our love for the rule of law is unrequited, and that, as so often happens in such cases, we have become enslaved to the object of our desire. No clearer example of this exists than the legal process by which our Constitution was transformed from a document creating a government of limited powers and guaranteed rights into one which provides the justification for the activities of the all-encompassing super-state of today. However heart-wrenching it may be, we must break off this one-sided affair. The time has come for those committed to individual liberty to realize that the establishment of a truly free society requires the abandonment of the myth of the rule of law.
Links-Generic
Peacekeeping Operations Offer Rule of Law While Failing Their Primary Mission Adbela in 2002( Leslie, Manchester Guardian)
If they are to succeed, post- conflict peace missions in other Bosnias and Kosovos require high quality civil capabilities to administer municipalities and government; a sufficient number of trained police capable of law enforcement; civil capabilities to work in partnership with the local population to deliver rule of law, justice, and the short and long-term reconstruction process of the infrastructure. This includes developing democratic political parties, NGOs, free media and human rights over a long enough time frame to induce stability, economic growth and democracy. But can any UN-directed peacekeeping/enforcement mission work? First there would need to be reform of international rule number one which is, senior staff shall be selected by buggins's turn. This highly politicised and sacrosanct selection process, unaccountable and Byzantine in its machinations, is foisted on international organisations by member states. And it means the UN cannot select mission personnel on merit. World leaders must face up to the possibility that the UN may survive only if it withdraws from its operational role in peace enforcement, riddled as such undertakings will always be with rivalry and rug-trading led by self-seeking politicos from 188 countries. There is an important role for the UN to play, not least on Churchill's principle of "jaw jaw is better than war war". A discussion forum of one nation, one vote, where representatives meet to prevent wars and conflicts is what the UN is best designed to do. Before we send a UN standing army down the road singing "Marchons, marchons", we should reexamine how best to keep the peace and rebuild provinces and nations. It's time for world leaders to stop sending the UN on kamikaze peace missions.
The UN Uses Local Civil Policing to Advance Rule of Law Kos in 99( Beret, accessed online at http://www.crossroad.to/text/articles/rapid-reaction99.htm)
Most of the incremental steps toward UN control over its own local police happen in secret, behind closed doors. But some are made public, such as the following UN Press Release (#6397) issued on July 14, 1997: "Noting the increasing role and special functions of civilian police in United Nations' peace-keeping operations, the Security Council this morning encouraged States to make appropriate trained police available to the Organization at short notice. . . . The council encouraged States to provide appropriate training of civilian police for international service. [C]ivilian police performed indispensable functions in monitoring and training national police forces. They could play a major role, through assistance to local police forces, in restoring civil order, supporting the rule of law, and fostering civil reconciliation."
The UN uses Rule of Law Language to Advance Economic Interests Yates 02 ( Steven, is a Margaret "Peg" Rowley Fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, accessed online at
http://www.lewrockwell.com/yates/yates51.html) The Monterrey Consensus, along with other critical UN documents, uses the phrase rule of law. This sounds good, of course. But one can be assured that no one is referring to the concept freedom believers understand that of law to which kings and governments are no less subject to than ordinary mortals. When the superelites use the phrase rule of law you can guarantee they mean law established by them, imposed through international agreements designed to control economic activity through "investments" and "partnerships" of various sorts
Governments Hide Behind Terminology of Rule of Law Jasper 00 (William, October 8, The New American)
"There should be no question of which way we go," assert Carlsson and Ramphal in their foreword to Our Global Neighborhood. "But the right way requires the assertion of the values of internationalism, the primacy of the rule of law worldwide, and institutional reforms that secure and sustain them." Ah yes, the "rule of law." Favorite weasel words of globalists seeking to conceal their true world-government ambitions. Obviously, it takes government to promulgate law, and for that law to have any meaning and effect, it must be backed up by government force. Genuine world law requires real world government force capable of overwhelming any national resistance to its rule. That is elementary and indisputable.
Links Sudan Western Influence in Sudan is Intended to Foster Rule of Law British Embassy Online, 2002 ( October, accessed online at
http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=10 17170901312) Another priority is to assist the people of Sudan to achieve their aspirations of improved respect for human rights, the rule of law and transformation to democracy. The British Embassy has been very active in promoting
these aims through dialogue with the concerned authorities and through strengthening civil society. I aim to continue and expand this work.
The UN is Seeking to Establish Rule of Law in Sudan World Revolution Online 2004 ( April 13, accessed online at
http://www.worldrevolution.org/article/1197) Ismail said the government was sending auxiliary units to help the shattered security forces in Darfur reestablish the rule of law. Government officials also said they were setting up committees to assess compensation for conflict victims. Thursday's cease-fire deal included offering access for relief groups. "We have free access along a number of corridors. Certain areas, in which we have concerns, we still have not been granted permission to travel to," said Glyn Taylor from the U.N. office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs for Sudan.
USAID Sponsors Commitment to Rule of Law USAID TOI 04( accessed online at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/sudan/fact0304.html) OTIs program in southern Sudan works to improve governance and to strengthen the balance between leaders and citizens. This activity focuses on strengthening rule of law by increasing the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary.
Links- Standing Army

Standing Armys Foster Rule of Law Adbela in 2002( Leslie, Manchester Guardian)
If they are to succeed, post- conflict peace missions in other Bosnias and Kosovos require high quality civil capabilities to administer municipalities and government; a sufficient number of trained police capable of law enforcement; civil capabilities to work in partnership with the local population to deliver rule of law, justice, and the short and long-term reconstruction process of the infrastructure. This includes developing democratic political parties, NGOs, free media and human rights over a long enough time frame to induce stability, economic growth and democracy. But can any UN-directed peacekeeping/enforcement mission work? First there would need to be reform of international rule number one which is, senior staff shall be selected by buggins's turn. This highly politicised and sacrosanct selection process, unaccountable and Byzantine in its machinations, is foisted on international organisations by member states. And it means the UN cannot select mission personnel on merit. World leaders must face up to the possibility that the UN may survive only if it withdraws from its operational role in peace enforcement, riddled as such undertakings will always be with rivalry and rug-trading led by self-seeking politicos from 188 countries. There is an important role for the UN to play, not least on Churchill's principle of "jaw jaw is better than war war". A discussion forum of one nation, one vote, where representatives meet to prevent wars and conflicts is what the UN is best designed to do. Before we send a UN standing army down the road singing "Marchons, marchons", we should reexamine how best to keep the peace and rebuild provinces and nations. It's time for world leaders to stop sending the UN on kamikaze peace missions.
Rule of Law is Doomed 1/6

Our Current Rule of Law is an Exercise in Orwellian Doublethink. We regard its practitioners as corruptible while believing its Tenets to be Objective. This duality maintains compliance to the state. John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke
University, LL.M., Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics)
Orwell's doublethink is usually regarded as a wonderful literary device, but, of course, one with no referent in reality since it is obviously impossible to believe both halves of a contradiction. In my opinion, this assessment is quite mistaken. Not only is it possible for people to believe both halves of a contradiction, it is something they do every day with no apparent difficulty. Consider, for example, people's beliefs about the legal system. They are obviously aware that the law is inherently political. The common complaint that members of Congress are corrupt, or are legislating for their own political benefit or for that of special interest groups demonstrates that citizens understand that the laws under which they live are a product of political forces rather than the embodiment of the ideal of justice. Further, as evidenced by the political battles fought over the recent nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, the public obviously believes that the ideology of the people who serve as judges influences the way the law is interpreted. This, however, in no way prevents people from simultaneously regarding the law as a body of definite, politically neutral rules amenable to an impartial application which all citizens have a moral obligation to obey. Thus, they seem both surprised and dismayed to learn that the Clean Air Act might have been written, not to produce the cleanest air possible, but to favor the economic interests of the miners of dirty [*201] burning West Virginia coal (West Virginia coincidentally being the home of Robert Byrd, who was then chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee) over those of the miners of cleaner-burning western coal. n3 And, when the Supreme Court hands down a controversial ruling on a subject such as abortion, civil rights, or capital punishment, then, like Louis in Casablanca, the public is shocked, shocked to find that the Court may have let political considerations influence its decision. The frequent condemnation of the judiciary for "undemocratic judicial activism" or "unprincipled social engineering" is merely a reflection of the public's belief that the law consists of a set of definite and consistent "neutral principles" n4 which the judge is obligated to apply in an objective manner, free from the influence of his or her personal political and moral beliefs. I believe that, much as Orwell suggested, it is the public's ability to engage in this type of doublethink, to be aware that the law is inherently political in character and yet believe it to be an objective embodiment of justice, that accounts for the amazing degree to which the federal government is able to exert its control over a supposedly free people. I would argue that this ability to maintain the belief that the law is a body of consistent, politically neutral rules that can be objectively applied by judges in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, goes a long way toward explaining citizens' acquiescence in the steady erosion of their fundamental freedoms. To show that this is, in fact, the case, I would like to direct your attention to the fiction which resides at the heart of this incongruity and allows the public to engage in the requisite doublethink without cognitive discomfort: the myth of the rule of law. I refer to the myth of the rule of law because, to the extent this phrase suggests a society in which all are governed by neutral rules that are objectively applied by judges, there is no such thing. As a myth, however, the concept of the rule of law is both powerful and dangerous. Its power derives from its great emotive appeal. The rule of law suggests an absence of arbitrariness, an absence of the worst abuses of tyranny. The image presented by the slogan "America is a government of laws and not people" is one of fair and impartial rule rather than subjugation to human whim. This is an image that can command both the allegiance and affection of the citizenry. After all, who wouldn't be in favor of the rule of law if the only alternative were arbitrary rule? But this image is also the source of the myth's danger. For if citizens really believe that they are being governed by fair and impartial rules and that the only alternative [*202] is subjection to personal rule, they will be much more likely to support the state as it progressively curtails their freedom.

Rule of Law Lacks Consistency While Lulling Its Adherents into the Belief that it Offers Consistent Remedies John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke
When the facts confirm the hypotheses, they are accepted as true, although subject to reevaluation as new evidence is discovered. This is a successful method of reasoning about scientific and other empirical matters because the physical world has a definite, unique structure. It works because the laws of nature are consistent. In the real world, it is entirely appropriate to assume that once you have confirmed your hypothesis, all other hypotheses inconsistent with it are incorrect. In the legal world, however, this assumption does not hold. This is because unlike the laws of nature, political laws are not consistent. The law human beings create to regulate their conduct is made up of incompatible, contradictory rules and principles; and, as anyone who has studied a little logic can demonstrate, any conclusion can be validly derived from a set of contradictory premises. This means that a logically sound argument can be found for any legal conclusion. When human beings engage in legal reasoning, they usually proceed in the same manner as they do when engaged in empirical reasoning. They begin with a hypothesis as to how a case should be decided and test it by searching for a sound supporting argument. After all, no one can "reason" directly to an unimagined conclusion. Without some end in view, there is no way of knowing what premises to employ or what direction the argument should take. When a sound argument is found, then, as in the case of empirical reasoning, one naturally concludes that one's legal hypothesis has been shown to be correct, and further, that all competing hypotheses are therefore incorrect. This is the fallacy of legal reasoning. Because the legal world is comprised of contradictory rules, there will be sound legal arguments available not only for the hypothesis one is investigating, but for other, competing hypotheses as well. The assumption that there is a unique, correct resolution, which serves so well in empirical investigations, leads one astray when dealing with legal matters. Kingsfield, who is well aware of this, knows that Arnie and Ann have both produced legitimate legal arguments for their competing conclusions. He does not reveal this knowledge to the class, however, because the fact that this is possible is precisely what his students must discover for themselves if they are ever to learn to "think like a lawyer."
Regardless of Reform, No System is Capable of a Consistent Rule of Law John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke
I have been arguing that the law is not a body of determinate rules that can be objectively and impersonally applied by judges; that what the law prescribes is necessarily determined by the normative predispositions of the one who is interpreting it. In short, I have been arguing that law is inherently political. If you, my reader, are like most people, you are far from convinced of this. In fact, I dare say I can read your thoughts. You are thinking that even if I have shown that the present legal system is somewhat indeterminate, I certainly have not shown that the law is inherently political. Although you may agree that the law as presently constituted is too vague or contains too many contradictions, you probably believe that this state of affairs is due to the actions of the liberal judicial activists, or the Reaganite adherents of the doctrine of original intent, or the self-serving politicians, or the (feel free to fill in your favorite candidate for the group that is responsible for the legal system's ills). However, you do not believe that the law must be this way, that it can never be definite and politically neutral. You believe that the law can be reformed; that to bring about an end to political strife and institute a true rule of law, we merely need to create a legal system comprised of consistent rules that are expressed in clear, definite language. It is my sad duty to inform you that this cannot be done. Even with all the good will in the world, we could not produce such a legal code because there is simply no such thing as uninterpretable language. Now I could attempt to convince you of this by the conventional method of regaling you with myriad examples of the manipulation of legal language (e.g., an account of how the relatively straightforward language of the Commerce Clause giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States" has been interpreted to permit the regulation of both farmers growing wheat for use on their own farms n21 and the nature of male-female relationships in all

private businesses that employ more than fifteen persons n22 ). However, I prefer to try a more direct approach. Accordingly, let me direct your attention to the quiz you completed at the beginning of this Article. Please consider your responses.

The notion that Rule of Law is stable gives to the myth that legal remedy can solve in a consistent, non-biased way. John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke
. In fact, however, the law is not truly stable, since it is continually, if slowly, evolving in response to changing social mores and conditions. This evolution occurs because each new generation of judges brings with it its own set of "progressive" normative assumptions. As the older [*216] generation passes from the scene, these assumptions come to be shared by an ever-increasing percentage of the judiciary. Eventually, they become the consensus of opinion among judicial decisionmakers, and the law changes to reflect them. Thus, a generation of judges that regarded "separate but equal" as a perfectly legitimate interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment n30 gave way to one which interpreted that clause as prohibiting virtually all governmental actions that classify individuals by race, which, in turn, gave way to one which interpreted the same language to permit "benign" racial classifications designed to advance the social status of minority groups. In this way, as the moral and political values conventionally accepted by society change over time, so too do those embedded in the law. The law appears to be stable because of the slowness with which it evolves. But the slow pace of legal development is not due to any inherent characteristic of the law itself. Logically speaking, any conclusion, however radical, is derivable from the rules of law. It is simply that, even between generations, the range of ideological opinion represented on the bench is so narrow that anything more than incremental departures from conventional wisdom and morality will not be respected within the profession. Such decisions are virtually certain to be overturned on appeal, and thus, are rarely even rendered in the first instance. Confirming evidence for this thesis can be found in our contemporary judicial history. Over the past quarter-century, the "diversity" movement has produced a bar, and concomitantly a bench, somewhat more open to people of different racial, sexual, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds. To some extent, this movement has produced a judiciary that represents a broader range of ideological viewpoints than has been the case in the past. Over the same time period, we have seen an accelerated rate of legal change. Today, long-standing precedents are more freely overruled, novel theories of liability are more frequently accepted by the courts, and different courts hand down different, and seemingly irreconcilable, decisions more often. In addition, it is worth noting that recently, the chief complaint about the legal system seems to concern the degree to which it has become "politicized." This suggests that as the ideological solidarity of the judiciary breaks down, so too does the predictability of legal decisionmaking, and hence, the stability of the law. Regardless of this trend, I hope it is now apparent that to assume that the law is stable because it is determinate is to reverse cause and effect. Rather, it is because the law is basically stable that it appears to be determinate. It is not rule of law that gives us a stable legal [*217] system; it is the stability of the culturally shared values of the judiciary that gives rise to and supports the myth of the rule of law.
Belief in the Rule of Law Allows People to Subjugate Themselves to the State John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University, LL.M.,
Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) This raises an interesting question. If it has been known for 100 years that the law does not consist of a body of determinate rules, why is the belief that it does still so widespread? If four generations of jurisprudential scholars have shown that the rule of law is a myth, why does the concept still command such fervent commitment? The answer is implicit in the question itself, for the question recognizes that the rule of law is a myth and like all myths, it is designed to serve an emotive, rather than cognitive, function. The purpose of a myth is not to persuade one's reason, but to enlist one's emotions in support of an idea. And this is precisely the case for the myth of the rule of law; its purpose is to enlist the emotions of the public in support of society's political power structure. People are more willing to support the exercise of authority over themselves when they believe it to be an objective, neutral feature of the natural world

Belief in the Rule of Law Leads to A Belief in Justice as Opposed to an Exercise in Naked Ambition and Power John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University, LL.M.,
Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) This was the idea behind the concept of the divine right of kings. By making the king appear to be an integral part of God's plan for the world rather than an ordinary human being dominating his fellows [*218] by brute force, the public could be more easily persuaded to bow to his authority. However, when the doctrine of divine right became discredited, a replacement was needed to ensure that the public did not view political authority as merely the exercise of naked power. That replacement is the concept of the rule of law. People who believe they live under "a government of laws and not people" tend to view their nation's legal system as objective and impartial. They tend to see the rules under which they must live not as expressions of human will, but as embodiments of neutral principles of justice, i.e., as natural features of the social world. Once they believe that they are being commanded by an impersonal law rather than other human beings, they view their obedience to political authority as a publicspirited acceptance of the requirements of social life rather than mere acquiescence to superior power. In this way, the concept of the rule of law functions much like the use of the passive voice by the politician who describes a delict on his or her part with the assertion "mistakes were made." It allows people to hide the agency of power behind a facade of words; to believe that it is the law which compels their compliance, not self-aggrandizing politicians, or highly capitalized special interests, or wealthy white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males, or (fill in your favorite culprit). But the myth of the rule of law does more than render the people submissive to state authority; it also turns them into the state's accomplices in the exercise of its power. For people who would ordinarily consider it a great evil to deprive individuals of their rights or oppress politically powerless minority groups will respond with patriotic fervor when these same actions are described as upholding the rule of law.
International law leads to abuses of justice Brett Schaefer, fellow in international regulatory affairs at Heritage, 2001
http://www.heritage.org/views/2001/ed071301b.html, accessed 3/19/02 An ICJ that holds to its official purpose -- arbitrating legal disputes between sovereign nations -- serves a good purpose, but thats not what were getting here. For example, some have called on the Court to try Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for war crimes for his role in killings of Palestinians in Lebanon 19 years ago. Why? Because they oppose Sharons policies today. So where does it end? How long until the folks who booted the United States off the United Nations Human Rights Council -- and voted Sudan and Cuba on -- turn their attention to American officials whose policies they disagree with? How long until some tragic death at our southern border leads to calls to haul our attorney general into the dock over U.S. immigration policies? Think about it. Who defines the reach of the ICJ? Or its jurisdiction? And what happens when it goes overboard?

Your Rule of Law is Jacked. It Can Never Solve for the Violence of Society. Both Functions of Punishment Fail in the Current System Mark Drumbl in 2000 ( mar, NYU Law Review, 2000, Assistant Professor, William H. Bowen School of
Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock;) Will punishment and retribution prevent "radical evil" from occurring or reoccurring? The answer to this question turns on whether potential perpetrators of "radical evil" will be dissuaded from committing barbarities simply by the threat of criminal sanction. The deterrent value of punishment derives from the utilitarian retributivist notion that if people fear punishment they rationally will choose not to act criminally. n143 Professor Dianne Martin's work suggests that we should not be particularly optimistic about the deterrent effect of punishment; in fact, she argues that punitive criminal justice does little to deter personal violence. n144 Martin notes that "a theory of rational choice is largely irrelevant to acts motivated by nonrational impulses," especially given the reality that the policing machinery of the retributive state produces low apprehension rates. n145 Although Martin writes in the domestic context, her arguments are readily applicable to international crimes such as genocide. Societies engulfed by mass political violence are not particularly conducive to rational behavior or fears of eventual apprehension. How can we expect individuals to make a rational choice calculus when they are surrounded by hysteria, social chaos, panic, coercion, prejudice, and a government that is exhorting mass violence? n146 Layered on top of the irrational context in which mass violence operates is the reality that an individual's decision to act violently may not be perceived as a legal or even a moral wrong. n147 When taken together, these two factors support the conclusion that choices to participate in mass violence well may be [*1255] only slightly, if at all, deterred by the prospect of eventual prosecution - especially if undertaken by some distant international tribunal. If those committing the barbarities do not expect to lose power to the victims (or to third parties such as international authorities), they may not take the threat of penal sanction very seriously. n148 After all, criminologists long have advised that the uncertainty of sanction is more determinative than the severity of sanction in influencing behavior.." It is not only utilitarian retributivism that may be applied awkwardly to "radical evil." Deontological retributivism may also be inapposite. The deontological retributivist argues that punishment is required to recognize evil, even evil that may not be deterred by the threat of such punishment, and that punishment is to be meted out regardless of the effects on offenders, victims, communities, or society. n150 Even if the importance of recognizing evil is conceded, the deontological argument's assumption that criminal punishment is the only (or best) way to recognize evil remains open to questioning. The South African experience eloquently attests to the fact that there are other mechanisms to achieve this goal. In today's South Africa, is there any question that the architects of apartheid and the bureaucrats who enforced it acted evilly? Has the Truth and Reconciliation Commission not unearthed this embarrassing cancer? When evil is exposed outside the criminal justice system, it is not only recognized by the public, but even may become acknowledged by those who inflicted it in the first place. n151 Observers of retributivist criminal justice note that perpetrators tend to posture defensively for the benefit of the trial: This leads to denying involvement, disputing wrongdoing, and ignoring harm. n152 Moreover, simply because an act is punished after a trial does not mean that the offender or society as a whole will perceive that act as evil. In many cases, especially when the prosecution [*1256] is perceived as politically motivated, criminal punishment can yield sympathy, empathy, or even support for the defendant.
The Alternative is a Better Choice1/8

All Oppressive forms of Law have originated with the State. Non State Legal Frameworks Have a History of Solving Peacefully John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University, LL.M.,
Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) So, what would a free market in legal services be like? As Sherlock Holmes would regularly say to the good doctor, "You see, Watson, but you do not observe." Examples of non-state law are all around us. Consider labormanagement collective bargaining agreements. In addition to setting wage rates, such agreements typically determine both the work rules the parties must abide by and the grievance procedures they must follow to resolve disputes. In essence, such contracts create the substantive law of the workplace as well as the workplace judiciary. A similar situation exists with regard to homeowner agreements, which create both the rules and dispute settlement procedures within a condominium or housing development, i.e., the law and judicial procedure of the residential community. Perhaps a better example is supplied by universities. These institutions create their own codes of conduct for both students and faculty that cover everything from academic dishonesty to what constitutes acceptable speech and dating behavior. In addition, they not only devise their own elaborate judicial procedures to deal with violations of these codes, but typically supply their own campus police forces as well. A final example may be supplied by the many commercial enterprises that voluntarily opt out of the state judicial system by writing clauses in their contracts that require disputes to be settled through binding arbitration or mediation rather than through a lawsuit. In this vein, the variegated "legal" procedures that have recently been assigned the sobriquet of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) do a good job of suggesting what a free market in legal service might be like. n34 Of course, it is not merely that we fail to observe what is presently all around us. We also act as though we have no knowledge of our own cultural or legal history. Consider, for example, the situation of AfricanAmerican communities in the segregated South or the immigrant communities in New York in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Because of prejudice, poverty and the language barrier, these groups were essentially cut off from the state legal system. And yet, rather than disintegrate into chaotic disorder, they were able to privately supply themselves with the rules of behavior and dispute-settlement procedures necessary to maintain peaceful, stable, and highly structured communities. Furthermore, virtually none of the law that orders our interpersonal relationships was produced by the intentional actions of central [*228] governments. Our commercial law arose almost entirely from the Law Merchant, a non-governmental set of rules and procedures developed by merchants to quickly and peacefully resolve disputes and facilitate commercial relations. Property, tort, and criminal law are all the products of common law processes by which rules of behavior evolve out of and are informed by the particular circumstances of actual human controversies. In fact, a careful study of Anglo-American legal history will demonstrate that almost all of the law which facilitates peaceful human interaction arose in this way. On the other hand, the source of the law which produces oppression and social division is almost always the state. Measures that impose religious or racial intolerance, economic exploitation, one group's idea of "fairness," or another's of "community" or "family" values virtually always originate in legislation, the law consciously made by the central government. If the purpose of the law really is to bring order to human existence, then it is fair to say that the law actually made by the state is precisely the law that does not work. Unfortunately, no matter how suggestive these examples might be, they represent only what can develop within a state-dominated system. Since, for the reasons indicated above, it is impossible to out-think a free market, any attempt to account for what would result from a true free market in law would be pure speculation. However, if I must engage in such speculation, I will try to avoid what might be called "static thinking" in doing so. Static thinking occurs when we imagine changing one feature of a dynamic system without appreciating how doing so will alter the character of all other features of the system. For example, I would be engaging in static thinking were I to ask how, if the state did not provide the law and courts, the free market could provide them in their present form. It is this type of thinking that is responsible for the conventional assumption that free market legal services would be "competing governments" which would be the equivalent of organized gang warfare. Once this static thinking is rejected, it becomes apparent that if the state did not provide the law and courts, they simply would not exist in their present form. This, however, only highlights the difficulty of describing free market order-generating services and reinforces the speculative nature of all attempts to do so. One thing it seems safe to assume is that there would not be any universally binding, society-wide set of "legal" rules. In a free market, the law would not come in one-size-fits-all.
The Alternative is a Better Choice2/8

Organic Legal Resolutions are Key to Transforming Governing Systems Daly in 2002( Erin,Associate Professor of Law, Widener University. International Legal Perspectives, Fall
2001/Spring 2002) When nations transition from oppressive and lawless regimes to democratic ones they face myriad challenges. As an anxious public and an impatient world look on, they must create new governing bodies, write new laws and repeal old ones, redefine the balance of private and public power, and organize elections, just to name a few of the daunting tasks. But perhaps the greatest challenge facing these nascent liberal governments is one that receives insufficient attention: if the values of the new government are to take root, the new leaders must also transform the culture in which they operate. This aspect of transitional justice is implicit in the growing recognition of the role of the public at large in the commission of state oppression and atrocity. "The relatively recent Rwandan and Yugoslavian events, no less than apartheid before them, throw into question the inherited distinction between civilian and military spheres, combatants and noncombatants." n1 Thus, it has become abundantly clear that oppressive policies often emerge from cultures that tolerate or actively promote them. If the new democratic governments aim to secure their authority and their values, then it is necessary for them to transform their societies from ones that tolerated or fostered oppression to ones that respect human rights and democratic values. In other words, if the public was involved in some way in the original oppression, then the culture that allowed the oppression to take place or actively pursued it must be changed. Simply changing the governors won't cure a problem that resides as well in the governed. This entails not just a transition, but rather a transformation. Transition suggests movement from one thing to another - from oppression to liberation, from oligarchy to democracy, from lawlessness to due process, from injustice to justice. Transformation, however, suggests that the thing that is moving from one place to another is itself changing as it proceeds through the transition; it can be thought of as radical change. A nation in transition is the same nation with a new government; a nation in the midst of a transformation is reinventing itself. Because transformation entails a recreation of the culture, it fulfills the promises of reconciliation and deterrence that transition alone can not achieve. While much has been written about transitional justice and the process of democratization throughout the world, inadequate attention has been paid to the importance of transformation as an element of the transitional project. Indeed, in much of the literature, the terms "transition" and "transformation" tend to be used interchangeably. Yet, the distinction is critical: because transition happens at the top, it does not reach deep into the soil of the new society where the commitment to democratic values actually takes root. One of the most important opportunities for promoting the transformation of the culture is in the new government's response to past abuses - the gross violations of human rights that were committed by the predecessor (and sometimes by the current) regime. This response has the potential to inculcate the values of the new government in the society at large because it has a far greater hold on the public's attention than most other aspects of the transition. Unlike an election or an inauguration, the government's response to past abuse is not a transitional moment, but can last over an extended period of time and can therefore seep into the public consciousness and even evolve dialectically. Whereas a new constitution or a set of laws can codify new values, a tribunal comprises individuals who can articulate and even embody those values. By engaging in a dialogue with the public, the institutional actors can promote the values of the new government. This institutional response is often the earliest and most visible manifestation of the deepest values of the new order. n2 As such, it can begin the transformation of the society at large. The new government's choice of institutional mechanisms to deal with past abuses is therefore critical.
The Alternative is a Better Choice 3/8

The Synaptic Correlation Between Law and Order Must be Severed. This Indoctrination is What Ultimately Leads to blind Obedience to the Law John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University,
LL.M., Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) So, what is the point of this outlandish parable? I stated at the beginning of this section that as long as the law remains a state monopoly, there will always be a political struggle for its control. This sounds like a cynical conclusion because we naturally assume that the law is necessarily the province of the state. Just as the Monosizeans could not conceive of a world in which shoe size was not set by the government, we cannot conceive of one in which law is not provided exclusively by it. But what if we are wrong? What if, just as Monosizea could eliminate the politics of shoe size by allowing individuals to produce and buy whatever size shoes they pleased, we could eliminate the politics of law by allowing individuals to adopt whatever rules of behavior best fit their needs? What if law is not a unique product that must be supplied on a one-size-fits-all basis by the state, but one which could be adequately supplied by the ordinary play of market forces? What if we were to try Socrates' solution and end the monopoly of law? XII. The problem with this suggestion is that most people are unable to understand what it could possibly mean. This is chiefly because the language necessary to express the idea clearly does not really exist. Most people have been raised to identify law with the state. They cannot even conceive of the idea of legal services apart from the government. The very notion of a free market in legal services conjures up the image of anarchic gang warfare or rule by organized crime. In our system, an advocate of free market law is treated the same way Socrates was treated in Monosizea, and is confronted with the same types of arguments. The primary reason for this is that the public has been politically indoctrinated to fail to recognize the distinction between order and law. Order is what people need if they are to live together in peace and [*225] security. Law, on the other hand, is a particular method of producing order. As it is presently constituted, law is the production of order by requiring all members of society to live under the same set of stategenerated rules; it is order produced by centralized planning. Yet, from childhood, citizens are taught to invariably link the words "law" and "order." Political discourse conditions them to hear and use the terms as though they were synonymous and to express the desire for a safer, more peaceful society as a desire for "law and order." The state nurtures this confusion because it is the public's inability to distinguish order from law that generates its fundamental support for the state. As long as the public identifies order with law, it will believe that an orderly society is impossible without the law the state provides. And as long as the public believes this, it will continue to support the state almost without regard to how oppressive it may become. The public's identification of order with law makes it impossible for the public to ask for one without asking for the other. There is clearly a public demand for an orderly society. One of human beings' most fundamental desires is for a peaceful existence secure from violence. But because the public has been conditioned to express its desire for order as one for law, all calls for a more orderly society are interpreted as calls for more law. And since under our current political system, all law is supplied by the state, all such calls are interpreted as calls for a more active and powerful state. The identification of order with law eliminates from public consciousness the very concept of the decentralized provision of order. With regard to legal services, it renders the classical liberal idea of a market-generated, spontaneous order incomprehensible. I began this Article with a reference to Orwell's concept of doublethink. But I am now describing the most effective contemporary example we have of Orwellian "newspeak," the process by which words are redefined to render certain thoughts unthinkable. n33 Were the distinction between order and law well-understood, the question of whether a state monopoly of law is the best way to ensure an orderly society could be intelligently discussed. But this is precisely the question that the state does not wish to see raised. By collapsing the concept of order into that of law, the state can ensure that it is not, for it will have effectively eliminated the idea of a non-state generated order from the public mind. Under such circumstances, we can hardly be surprised if the advocates of a free market in law are treated like Socrates of Monosizea.

The Inability to Clearly Articulate the Alternative is Not a Weakness. It is its Strength John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University, LL.M.,
Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) I am aware that this explanation probably appears as initially unconvincing as was my earlier contention that the law is inherently political. Even if you found my Monosizea parable entertaining, it is likely that you regard it as irrelevant. You probably believe that the analogy fails because shoes are qualitatively different from legal services. After all, law is a public good which, unlike shoes, really is crucial to public welfare. It is easy to see how the free market can adequately supply the public with shoes. But how can it possibly provide the ordergenerating and maintaining processes necessary for the peaceful coexistence of human beings in society? What would a free market in legal services be like? I am always tempted to give the honest and accurate response to this challenge, which is that to ask the question is to miss the point. If human beings had the wisdom and knowledge-generating capacity to be able to describe how a free market would work, that would be the strongest possible argument for central planning. One advocates a free market not because of some moral imprimatur written across the heavens, but because it is impossible for human beings to amass the knowledge of local conditions and the predictive capacity necessary to effectively organize economic relationships among millions of individuals. It is possible to describe what a free market in shoes would be like because we have one. But such a description is merely an observation of the current state of a functioning market, not a projection of how human beings would organize themselves to supply a currently non-marketed good. To demand that an advocate of free market law (or Socrates of Monosizea, for that matter) describe in advance how markets would supply legal services (or shoes) is to issue an impossible challenge. Further, for an advocate of free market law (or Socrates) to even accept this challenge would be to engage in self-defeating activity since the more successfully he or she could describe how the law (or shoe) market would function, the more he or she would prove that it could be run by state planners. Free markets supply human wants better than state monopolies precisely because they allow an unlimited number of suppliers to attempt to do so. By patronizing those who most effectively meet their particular needs and causing those who do not to fail, consumers determine the optimal method of supply. If it were possible to specify in advance what the outcome of this process of selection would be, there would be no need for the process itself. Although I am tempted to give this response, I never do. This is because, although true, it never persuades. Instead, it is usually interpreted as an appeal for blind faith in the free market, and the failure to provide a specific explanation as to how such a market would provide legal services is interpreted as proof that it cannot. Therefore, despite the [*227] self-defeating nature of the attempt, I usually do try to suggest how a free market in law might work.

The Adversarial Nature of the Current Legal System Dooms it to Failure. The Free Market Would Not Likely be Adversarial John Hasnas1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University, LL.M.,
Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) I suspect that in many ways a free market in law would resemble the situation in Medieval Europe before the rise of strong central governments in which disputants could select among several fora. Depending upon the nature of the dispute, its geographical location, the parties' status, and what was convenient, the parties could bring their case in either village, shire, urban, merchant, manorial, ecclesiastical, or royal courts. Even with the limited mobility and communications of the time, this restricted market for dispute-settlement services was able to generate the order necessary for both the commercial and civil advancement of society. Consider how much more effectively such a market could function given the current level of travel and telecommunication technology. Under contemporary conditions, there would be an explosion of alternative order-providing organizations. I would expect that, late at night, wedged between commercials for Veg-omatic and Slim Whitman albums, we would find television ads with messages such as, "Upset with your neighbor for playing rock and roll music all night long? Is his dog digging up your flower beds? Come to Acme Arbitration Company's grand opening two for one sale." I should point out that, despite my earlier disclaimer, even these suggestions embody static thinking since they assume that a free market would produce a choice among confrontational systems of justice similar to the one we are most familiar with. In fact, I strongly believe that this would not be the case. The current state-supplied legal system is adversarial in nature, pitting the plaintiff or prosecution against the defendant in a winner-take-all, loser-get-nothing contest. The reason for this arrangement has absolutely nothing to do with this procedure's effectiveness in settling disputes and everything to do with the medieval English kings' desire to centralize power. For historical reasons well beyond the scope of this Article, the Crown was able to extend its temporal power relative to the feudal lords as well as raise significant revenue by commanding or enticing the parties to local disputes to bring their case before the king or other royal official for decision. n36 Our current system of adversarial presentation to a third-party decisionmaker is an outgrowth of these early "public choice" considerations, not its ability to successfully provide mutually satisfactory resolutions to interpersonal disputes. In fact, this system is a terrible one for peacefully resolving disputes and would be extremely unlikely to have many adherents in a free market. [*231] Its adversarial nature causes each party to view the other as an enemy to be defeated, and its winner-take-all character motivates each to fight as hard as he or she can to the bitter end. Since the loser gets nothing, he or she has every reason to attempt to reopen the dispute, which gives rise to frequent appeals. The incentives of the system make it in each party's interest to do whatever he or she can to wear down the opponent while being uniformly opposed to cooperation, compromise, and reconciliation. That this is not the kind of dispute-settlement procedure people are likely to employ if given a choice is evidenced by the large percentage of litigants who are turning to ADR in an effort to avoid it. My personal belief is that under free market conditions, most people would adopt compositional, rather than confrontational, dispute settlement procedures, i.e., procedures designed to compose disputes and reconcile the parties rather than render third party judgments. This was, in fact, the essential character of the ancient "legal system" that was replaced by the extension of royal jurisdiction.

The States Monopoly on Law Binds Us to Contradiction. We Must Break Off this One Sided Affair John Hasnas 1995 (Wisonsin Law Review, January/FebruaryJ.D., Ph.D., Philosophy, Duke University,
LL.M., Temple University. Assistant Professor of Business Ethics, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Kennedy Institute of Ethics) The fact is that there is no such thing as a government of law and not people. The law is an amalgam of contradictory rules and counter-rules expressed in inherently vague language that can yield a legitimate legal argument for any desired conclusion. For this reason, as long as the law remains a state monopoly, it will always reflect the political ideology of those invested with decisionmaking power. Like it or not, we are faced with only two choices. We can continue the ideological power struggle for control of the law in which the group that gains dominance is empowered to impose its will on the rest of society, or we can end the monopoly. Our long-standing love affair with the myth of the rule of law has made us blind to the latter possibility. Like the Monosizeans, who after centuries of state control cannot imagine a society in which people can [*233] buy whatever size shoes they wish, we cannot conceive of a society in which individuals may purchase the legal services they desire. The very idea of a free market in law makes us uncomfortable. But it is time for us to overcome this discomfort and consider adopting Socrates' approach. We must recognize that our love for the rule of law is unrequited, and that, as so often happens in such cases, we have become enslaved to the object of our desire. No clearer example of this exists than the legal process by which our Constitution was transformed from a document creating a government of limited powers and guaranteed rights into one which provides the justification for the activities of the all-encompassing super-state of today. However heart-wrenching it may be, we must break off this one-sided affair. The time has come for those committed to individual liberty to realize that the establishment of a truly free society requires the abandonment of the myth of the rule of law.

Polycentrism Empirically Solves Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) That primitive societies reveal much about the practice of polycentric law should cause no surprise, since by definition they do not have statist legal systems. The surprise comes in discovering that so-called "primitive" societies tend to hold quite conventional notions about rights to person and property, and that they enforce these rights through remarkably sophisticated means. The respect for personal autonomy, freedom of contract, and private property so often observed in primitive societies flows naturally from polycentric law's reliance on reciprocal relationships.[35] "After all, voluntary recognition of laws and participation in their enforcement is likely to arise only when substantial benefits from doing so can be internalized by each individual."[36] As for the sophistication of polycentric law in primitive societies, it derives not from masterful legislation but from time, trial, and error.
Polycentrism Empirically Solves Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) These customary legal systems arise spontaneously out of the undirected actions of individuals seeking common standards for mutual coordination.[37] This is not to say, however, that customary legal systems move only subject to imperceptible and anonymous social forces. Particularly influential figures sometimes effect changes suddenly and self-consciously. Leopold Popsil's work with the Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea provides an excellent study of the structure, origins, and operation of polycentric law in a primitive society.[38] The Kapauku have no formal government with coercive powers. Healthy, rich, and well-respected men called tonowi establish jurisdictional boundaries and settle disputes in the Kapauku legal system.[39] Each individual can choose to contract with any available tonowi by accepting loans in exchange the performance of certain duties. Either party can break this reciprocal bond at will (by either paying off the debt or demanding its repayment).[40] Each individual in the Kapauku society typically belongs to several nested groups simultaneously, with groups at each level having their own particular set of rules and sanctions.[41] To settle potential jurisdictional conflicts, Kapauku custom requires that disputes be heard by the tonowi of the least inclusive group [p. 16/p. 17] that includes both litigants as members.[42] The litigants usually "file a claim" by engaging in a loud, ritualistic quarrel designed to attract the attention of their tonowi. Once on the scene, the tonowi listens to the exchange until it nears violence, admonishes the parties calm themselves, and then launches into an investigation by questioning the disputants, taking testimony from witnesses, and searching for evidence.[43] Once he has reached a conclusion as to how to settle the case, the tonowi sums up the evidence, cites the relevant rules and precedents, and sets about convincing the disputants to abide by his suggested remedy.[44] One who refuses to abide by a decision that the community recognizes as just faces ostracism via public reprimand or outlawry. The public reprimand is "the most dreaded and feared of the psychological and social sanctions of the Kapauku . . ."[45] Outlawry, by nullifying the reciprocal agreements that protect law-abiding Kapauku, exposes those who refuse to respect the law to murder or banishment.[46] Substantively speaking, the Kapauku legal system consistently supports two basic values: individualism and personal freedom.[47] [p. 17/p. 18] A guilty defendant, for instance, typically gets to choose between paying the victim compensation or suffering physical punishment. Although the Kapauku favor the former sanction, they regard it as insufficient punishment for a few particularly serious crimes. Even for these, however, "a heinous criminal or a captured enemy would be killed but never tortured or deprived of liberty."[48] And those thus sentenced would always have the chance to run or fight back.[49] The Kapauku regard private property so highly that they eschew communal ownership of any sort. One man explained that "If we were both owners we would quarrel too much, we would steal from each other in order to obtain most from the field. My children and wives would probably go hungry--oh, it would be bad."[50] Despite this steadfast commitment to bedrock values, the Kapauku legal system readily adapts to new circumstances. First, the law responds to changes in customary behavior. This occurred, for example, when inflation in the price of wives eroded support for the rule that adulterous women be killed by their husbands. The rule was eventually abolished.[51] Second, a particularly influential individual can "legislate" a change in the laws. Popsil observed this process in the machinations of a love-stricken tonowi who cleverly revised

an old rule of sib exogamy to allow him to overcome a prohibition on marriages between second [p. 18/p. 19] cousins. Though hecould not force this rule on others, its popularity slowly spread as others accepted his reasoning.[52] Kapauku society provides only one example among many of "primitive" polycentric legal systems that protect rights to person and property through sophisticated procedures. Researchers have found similar features in the legal systems of the Yurok of Northern California,[53] the Comanche,[54] the Ifuago of Northern Luzon,[55] and the people of medieval Iceland.[56] Examples of polycentric legal systems have also appeared in less exotic locales, such as Anglo Saxon England,[57] Celtic Ireland,[58] and early medieval Europe.[59] [p. 19/p. 20] In more modern times, polycentric legal systems regulating social behavior have begun to cross the line between customary law and privately produced law. This is particularly true in America, which has long enjoyed a rich variety of voluntary associations.
There are Many Empirical Examples of Polycentric Law Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) Polycentric law has served American communities isolated by cultural barriers, such as those made up by newly arrived immigrants,[60] and by spatial barriers, such those of the western pioneers.[61] Even people with free access to the U.S. legal system routinely choose to join self-regulating private associations.[62] Under our definition of the term, each of these private associations creates its own "law." Fuller explains: If the law is considered as "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules," then this enterprise is being conducted, not on two or three fronts, but on thousands. Engaged in this enterprise are those who draft and administer rules governing the internal affairs of clubs, churches, schools, labor unions, trade associations, agricultural fairs, and a hundred and one other forms of human association. . . . there are in this country alone "systems of law" numbering in the hundreds of thousands.[63]
Internal Links Law is Racist 1/3

Our Own Rule of Law is Moving Backwards Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado, and
Research Associate, University of Colorado School of Law, WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW, 36 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 547, WINTER, 1995, p. 182 As a culture, and as a legal profession, we are rapidly returning to the regime of Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine and the Civil Rights Cases view of blacks as imposers and whiners because they desire to live in American society on the same terms as whites. Moreover, we find some frightening straws in the wind--indications that ought to give pause to any defender of freedom and minority rights. We have reviewed evidence that society generally, and the legal system in particular, are beginning to regress in one final, decisive quantum jump. American society, without the spur of Cold War competition or the need for minority labor or soldiers, is in serious danger of quietly, implicitly readopting a familiar standard from another era: Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which blacks and other minorities of color have no rights that white Americans are bound to respect.
Rule of Law Only Serves the Impowered Eric K. Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii. J.D., MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 821, February, 1997, p.842
What Krupat and others describe is the oppressive way law sometimes operates as a discursive strategy backed by force. It starts with the assessments of cultural difference and the marking of inferiority upon the racialized minority. It then inscribes an inferior identity into a legal text - defining Indians as wards of the government - that then legitimates paternalism - requiring Indian acceptance of the subordinated identity of "dependent sovereign" - or negation - removal. In this manner, law operates as a "cultural system that structures relationships throughout society, not just those that come before courts." As a cultural system, law sometimes inscribes and reproduces liberatory ideas and group images. Often, however, it reflects dominant interests and fosters structural "oppression less by coercion than by offering people identities contingent upon their acceptance of oppression as defining characteristics of their very selves." Law is experienced in this fashion by racial minorities as injustice, not because of any particular hostile legislative enactment or court ruling, but because of the systemic oppression it legitimates.
LEGAL PROCESSES PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO Eric K. Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii. J.D., MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 821, February, 1997, p.846
While political lawyers struggle to cope with the practical ramifications of this dissociation - constricted substantive claims, inhospitable procedures, impatient judges, frustrated clients - progressive race scholars critically search for explanations. Five explanations developed by theorists warrant brief mention. The first is that even the Court's "progressive" antidiscrimination rulings reflect majoritarian interests. From this view, law and legal process tend primarily to preserve the social and political status quo, and thus antidiscrimination law generates illusions of systemic reordering and long-term racial justice. Society perceives the declaration and occasional enforcement of intentionalist antidiscrimination laws as justice done. This perception enables society's majority to believe in equality while ignoring the limitations of legal justice and the persistence of institutional racism. See Delgado & Stefancic, Failed Revolutions, supra note 57 (describing how the methods and structure of legal justice operate to preserve unequal status quo social arrangements while persuading society, including traditional civil rights lawyers, of continuing social progress). Related critiques of law and legal process have been made since the turn of the last century. Those critiques in varying ways challenge the presumed neutrality and objectivity of legal rules in their formulation, interpretation, and application; interrogate legal methods in terms of power; and value and examine the operation and social effects of the legal system.

MINORITY ADVANCES ARE SHORT-LIVED IN LAW Roy L. Brooks, Professor of Law, University of San Diego; B.A., University of Connecticut, 1972; J.D., Yale Law School, 1975, HARVARD BLACKLETTER JOURNAL, 85, 1994, p.323
See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992). According to Professor Bell, [b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary "peaks of progress," short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it and move on to adopt policies based on what I call: "Racial Realism." Id. at 373. Bell also maintains that advances in racial justice are only realized when the interests of whites coincide with the interests of minorities.
LAW STACKS THE DECK AGAINST JUSTICE FOR MINORITIES Eric K. Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii. J.D., MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 821, February, 1997, p.849
A fourth explanation involves a procedural realism attentive to questions of power and value. I have written elsewhere about how recent efficiency reforms in the law's adjudicatory procedures and the narrowing of remedial options tend to diminish court access for those already at society's margins, especially racial and other minorities asserting novel claims or theories that challenge existing social and political arrangements. Critical sociological proceduralists observe ways in which procedural rules and systems, in formulation, interpretation, and application, often reflect so-called substantive value choices. The collapse of the clean substance-procedure dichotomy implicates power allocation and political value judgments in the framing and handling of adjudicatory process. These theoretical observations are buttressed by 849 empirical studies of court access for disadvantaged groups seeking social structural change through law. The studies identify the ways in which dominant interests exclude from government [justice] agenda issues that threaten the status quo [by the use of] ... "a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others." As procedural justice research confirms, these kinds of racial minority experiences with legal process, the system's procedures and methods, are likely to influence strongly minorities' overall perceptions of the limitations of legal justice.
WHITES WILL NOT DISMANTLE WHITENESS Thomas Ross, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, BUFFALO LAW REVIEW, 46 Buffalo L. Rev. 257, Winter, 1998, p.79
Thus, many reasons exist to be pessimistic about Haney Lopez's strategy of Whites dismantling Whiteness. First, some Whites are unabashed racists--neo-Nazis, Klan, skinheads, or whatever. Such Whites seek to bolster, not tear down, the edifice of Whiteness. Many more are "race conscious" Whites. The narratives of racism, by whatever name, are a part of their normative universe and provide an essential coherence to their choices and lives. Dismantling Whiteness, for them, means losing that normative coherence, as well as the loss of that psychic comfort of knowing that there is an "other" to whom you are superior. Finally, even for those Whites who reject at the conscious level the narratives of racism, the prospect of confronting and dismantling Whiteness is daunting. First, the strategy of dismantling Whiteness entails loss and the coming of a new, unfamiliar world. Second, the full confrontation of the implications of Whiteness as we look back across the story of our lives has the potential to shatter our sense of self-worth and accomplishment. It is no wonder that Whites fall into a transparent sense of their race.

WHITES ARE UNLIKELY TO CHALLENGE THEIR OWN PRIVILEGE Thomas Ross, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, BUFFALO LAW REVIEW, 46 Buffalo L. Rev. 257, Winter, 1998, p. 86
The point is that what Haney Lopez calls the "purely social construction of race," understood as the narratives of a nomos, however evil its nature, may be the last thing Whites would be willing to give up. There's just too much at stake. Haney Lopez understands the basic problem. He in fact projects a deep pessimism about the chances for his agenda of White renunciation and explains this pessimism in the concluding chapter of his book, entitled The Value to Whites of Whiteness. Haney Lopez takes the example of the Supreme Court in the Thind case. Those Justices faced the breakdown of any scientific basis or objective reality against which race might be measured. But instead of questioning the very idea of Whiteness and the underlying logic of the statute's exclusion of non-Whites, the Court instead preserved Whiteness. Haney Lopez explains the Court's response in Thind in the following terms: While the Court's decision is intelligible on a number of levels, it is perhaps best understood as an expression of the value of Whiteness to Whites. White identity provides material and spiritual assurances of superiority in a crowded society. We should thus not be too surprised that the prerequisite courts clung to the notion of a fixed White race, even when confronted by its falsity. He concludes his book with the image of contemporary Whites as persons, like the judges of the prerequisite cases, "unwilling to relinquish the privileges of Whiteness."
Internal Links- Gender

International law re-inscribes public-private dichotomies, marginalizing women Elizabeth Dietz, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Fall, 1996, 13 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law
551 Statistics on violence against women in the United States indicate alarming levels of abuse. Injuries to women as a result of violence occur more often than injuries due to automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined. n2 Three out of four women become the victims of a violent crime sometime during [*552] their lifetime, and four million women fall victim to domestic violence yearly. n3 Perceived in terms of time, every fifteen seconds a woman is battered, and every six minutes a woman is raped in the United States. n4 By comparison, "a woman is ten times more likely to be raped than she is to die in a car crash; . . . eight times more likely to be victimized by a violent crime than to die of heart disease, and fifteen times more likely to be a crime victim than to die of cancer." n5 The staggering number of women victimized by violence at the hands of men desecrates the moral vision encapsulated in the internationally ascribed concepts of human rights: "the inherent dignity and worth of all members of the human family, the inalienable right to freedom from fear and want, and the equal rights of men and women." n6 However, until recently, states have failed or refused to recognize the violations of human rights that individuals suffer because they are [*553] women. n7 Traditionally, theoretically gender-neutral international law precepts focused on violations of rights in the public sphere of male existence, such as in the civil and political arenas. n8 For example, from the beginning human rights law protected the right of citizens to vote and to participate in the political arena, or guaranteed the rights of individuals to a fair trial or to legal recourse. n9 Historically, however, most states precluded women from the political and legal processes and confined them, whether by law or by custom, to the private domestic and social spheres. n10 Thus, human rights law left unchallenged violations of women that typically occurred in the home and in social life as beyond the state's purview of responsibility. n11 As a consequence of this inherent [*554] gender bias, States justify violations of women's human rights "as an essential element of culture or religion, or as an aspect of human nature." n12
Internal Links International Rule of Law Destroys Democratic Freedoms

International law kills democracy David B. Rivkin, Jr., American Enterprise Institute; and Lee A. Casey, Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason School of Law, 2000/2001 WINTER, The National Interest
Although the Clinton administration has been generally supportive of the new international law, its key tenets create problems of the highest order for the United States. First, as a philosophical matter, any attack upon the principle of sovereignty threatens the very foundation of American democracy. Sovereignty is the necessary predicate of self-government. As Vattel wrote, a "sovereign State" is one that "governs itself, under what form so ever." Any limitation on sovereignty as an organizing principle, any "cession", to paraphrase Secretary Albright, is an abdication of the right of the citizens of the United States to be governed solely in accordance with their Constitution, and by individuals whom they have elected and who are ultimately accountable to them. To the extent that international law allows supranational, or extra-national, institutions to determine whether the actions of the United States are lawful, ultimate authority will no longer be vested in the American people, but in these institutions. Thus, for all of its humanitarian and democracy-building rhetoric, the new international law is profoundly undemocratic at its core. Indeed, with its lack of accountability and disdain for democratic practice (as opposed to rhetoric), it arguably poses the greatest challenge to Francis Fukuyama's anticipated global triumph of liberal democracy. If the aspirations of today's international law proponents were ever to prevail, the resulting international system would not remotely resemble a community of democratic nations.
Internal Links- Rule of Law Leads to Self Determination

International law respects sovereignty Christopher C. Joyner, Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, Spring, 1999, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377
International political science professors are increasingly coming to realize that legal concepts and principles actually contribute much to shaping the components and contours of the international system. n3 For one, international law embraces and legitimizes the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the paramount political characteristic of the state. Sovereignty means that a state is independent from any authority superior to its own, that a state can not be bound without its consent, and that it enjoys judicial equality among other states. The state is politically independent, with equal legal status in the international community. While the exercised sovereignty of a state may fluctuate, the concept still constitutes a fundamental operating principle of international relations, and sovereignty remains a cardinal principle of international law. n4
Forms of Polycentrism Protect Individual Rights Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) That primitive societies reveal much about the practice of polycentric law should cause no surprise, since by definition they do not have statist legal systems. The surprise comes in discovering that so-called "primitive" societies tend to hold quite conventional notions about rights to person and property, and that they enforce these rights through remarkably sophisticated means. The respect for personal autonomy, freedom of contract, and private property so often observed in primitive societies flows naturally from polycentric law's reliance on reciprocal relationships.[35] "After all, voluntary recognition of laws and participation in their enforcement is likely to arise only when substantial benefits from doing so can be internalized by each individual."[36]
Internal Links- Leads to Genocides

Western law cannot prevent genocide Paul W. Kahn, Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities, and Director of the Orville H. Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, Spring, 2000, Chicago Journal of International Law, 1
Chi. J. Int'l L. 1 The lesson of the last decade, however, is that politics is not dead, but diverse. The hard truth may be that citizens, at many times and places, put a higher value on politics than markets; they prefer political identity to economic identity. Today, democracy is as likely to bring nationalism as markets. The problems of the most troubling regions of the world resist Western analysis precisely because the gross violations of human rights that we see cannot be attributed to a repressive regime acting against "the people." Rwanda saw the involvement of hundreds of thousands in genocide against the Tutsis; Serbia has been led by a popularly elected nationalist pursuing policies of ethnic cleansing; and in Russia, the war in Chechnya has produced surprising electoral success.
Military intervention solves genocide better than international law William A. Schabas, Chair, Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2000, Genocide in
International Law, p. 522. Given that other instruments exist or are emerging to cover the crimes that lie on the margins of genocide, including mass killing taking the form of crimes against humanity, enlargement of the definition does not rate at the top of the list of priorities. Admittedly, the author remains marked and indeed haunted by the failure of the international community to intervene in order to prevent the Rwandan genocide. These views prompt a preference for strengthening the obligations that flow from prevention rather than extension of the scope of those protected by the Convention. In other words, if a choice must be made, it would be better to engage States in a commitment to intervene, with force if necessary, in order to prevent the crime of genocide, rather than to expand the definition or suggest its borders are uncertain.
The Larger Call for International Justice Overlooks Local Implications and Fails to Stop Genocide Mark Drumbl in 2000 ( mar, NYU Law Review, 2000, Assistant Professor, William H. Bowen School of
Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock;) International lawyers have been successful in embedding the notion of justice in the discourse of a new, and perhaps more humanized, world order. However, is this a narrow justice limited to prosecutions, or a broader understanding of justice that includes reparations for victims, shaming for ambivalent bystanders, and apologies from aggressors? For lawyers, trained to equate justice with guilt or innocence in the courtroom, this is a particularly difficult question. This Article suggests that the deontological view has given rise to an imperative to implement criminal trials. This imperative may create a disconnect between the pursuit of trials and the consequences these trials have on local communities, national reconciliation, and international peace. n28 As journalist Philip Gourevitch poignantly concludes in his widely acclaimed work on Rwanda, "for all the fine sentiments inspired by the memory of Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a far cry from doing good
Answers to Cant Sever the State

The State Can be Severed from the Law Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) What has jurisprudence got to do with statism? Most people scarcely separate the two. When attempting to justify the State they routinely cite the need for an independent and objective means of resolving disputes.[1] And when they think of jurisprudence, most people think of what judges do as State officials and what academics say about State courts. But nothing in the formal definition of jurisprudence necessarily binds it to statism. "Jurisprudence in its widest sense is the science of law."[2] This description leaves ample room for the jurisprudence of non-statist, or "polycentric," law. [p. 1/p. 2] The ubiquity of statist jurisprudence comes in part from the influence of legal positivists and analytic philosophers, who typically view State law as the only kind of law.[3] But even those who justifiably reject this cramped definition have failed to recognize the possibility of developing a jurisprudence for polycentric legal systems. If pressed for a reason, they might well appeal to rational ignorance. State courts already provide scholars with more material than they can easily digest. In contrast, polycentric law tends to surface only in footnotes about the dark ages--if at all. Statist jurisprudence commands attention as a direct and powerful influence on nearly every aspect of modern life. But when was the last time a polycentric court jailed a felon, issued an injunction, or fined a polluter? Ignoring the jurisprudence of polycentric law is not rational however; it is simply ignorant. I say this without malice, as a simple fact about prevailing academic trends.
Answers to the Permutation

The Permutation Risks Being Overrun by the Statist Thugs Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) Depending on how one views the problem, justifying polycentric law appears either trivially easy or terribly difficult. Easy, because people live under the laws of their choosing in a polycentric legal order. They thus care not so much for justifications as for consumer satisfaction. But the project of justifying polycentric law runs into old and thorny problems when it addresses a more critical audience:[120] third party statists who would deny others the right to freely market and purchase legal services. This audience demands more than a mere justification of polycentric law standing alone; it demands a justification of citizens' alleged rights to escape the reach of statist law. Satisfying this demand calls for proof that polycentric law is more justified than statist law. Section A responds to the challenge by taking a fresh look at standards of justification. It argues that the success of a justification [p. 41/p. 42] should be measured by how nearly it comes to obtaining the express consent of those to whom it would apply. Section B applies this standard and finds polycentric law to be more justified than statist law.
The Permutations Cannot Solve because the State is Coercive Bell in 1992 (Tom, The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law, accessed online at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html) This reveals a second sense in which justification is relative. The previous section described the first sense: a justification stands or falls only relative to the person who accepts or rejects it. The present section shows that justifications also stand or fall relative to each other. Consent acts like a bridge between these two senses of "relative." A justification applies only relative to a person who consents to it, and that justification is relatively better than alternative justifications to which a person denies consent. Despite this more generous view of justification, statist law still fares poorly. The coercive nature of statist law condemns it, for the purposes of the present inquiry, to remain less justified than [p. 59/ p. 60] polycentric law. Recall that this section sought to determine whether polycentric law is more justified than statist law. Relative to persons who prefer polycentric law, it must be. They can thus rightfully denounce statist interference as unjustified. Polycentric law will not be more justified than statist law relative to persons who prefer the latter, but this still does not justify a universal monopoly in law. Because statist law is only justified relative to its fans, they can only justify inflicting institutionalized coercion on themselves. A statist may object that if her preference for statist law justifies it relative to her, then she can justifiably fulfill its call for imposing a monopoly in legal services even on objecting polycentrists. But if she begins with the premise that a justification applies only relative to a person who accepts it, she cannot conclude that she is justified in imposing statism a person who prefers polycentric law. At best, she can only show that those on whom she would impose statism have not yet and cannot not now expressly object, and that they have impliedly, or would hypothetically, consent to statism. It bears noting that the statist can scarcely satisfy this burden of proof by setting up a monopoly in law and then claiming that seeking out the express consent of those subjected to it would cause her too much trouble. Nor can the statist get by with the even more incredible claim that she need not seek out the express consent of all who fall within her monopoly on law because doing so would certainly prove fatal to her project. Any statist trying this ploy would face the same question that Spooner asked with regard to the U.S. Constitution:
**** Hip Hop 1NC***
Plan Based Advantages

A Violation
The affirmative team offers defense of US support of UN PKOs but offers no advantages or support, no argument anecdotal or otherwise to endorse the plan
B Implications
1 ground loss all that makes the affirmative defense predictable is its defense of a resolution. Allowing the resolution to serve as a lose gateway to personal advocacy unpredictably destroys ground 2 fairness this sort of defense of the resolution will be exploited by teams who will trot out a plan and then claim to defend only racism bad or genocide bad claim. This exacerbates side bias 3 advocate intervention not having to defend advantages that logically extend from the plan invites intervention based on critics personal politics which is both unfair and unpredictable
All of the above are reasons to reject them
Counter Advocacy
Observation 1Text Text: We affirm Zeki Ali - Steffen Franz - Haji Mike Observation 2 Competition Non topical- We violate almost every word in the resolution UN, PKO and Support. Net Beneficial We access all of the case advantages and avoid the disad Observation 3 Cross apply the solvency from the 1AC. Every card they read is an endorsement of the artistic product of the above. We access all of that and avoid the net benefit Observation 4 The Net Benefit
Putting minority artists into collective protest role destroys their individual agency and happiness, privileging their group identity over their individual identity. The 1961 film Paris Blues illustrates this historical phenomenon. Steele, Shelby, research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, Harpers Magazine, November 2002
In 1961, when I was fifteen years old, my imagination was taken over for some months by the movie Paris Blues, starring Sidney Poitier, Diahann Carroll, Paul Newman, and Joanne Woodward. For me this film was first of all an articulation of adult sophistication and deserved to be studied on these grounds alone. The music was by Duke Ellingron and Billy Strayhorn, and the film was set in the jazz world of early-sixties Parisa city that represented, in the folklore of American Negroes, a nirvana of complete racial freedom. To establish this freedom at the outset, Paul Newman (Ram) makes a pass at Diahann Carroll (Connie) as if her race means no more to him than the color of her coat. Of course the protocols of segregation return soon enough, and the four stars are paired off by race. But I could not hold this against a film that gave me a chance to watch the beautiful, if prim, Diahann Carroll against a backdrop of Montmartre and the Seine, Paris a little dim for being next to her. Sidney Poitiers character (Eddie) has by far the most interesting internal conflict. He has come to Parislike almost the entire postwar generation of black American artists, musicians, and intellectualsto develop his talents and live as an individual free of American racism. Eddie finds this in Paris as a jazz musician in Rams band, and when he and Connie begin their romance, he is an unapologetic advocate of expatriation for blacks. Paris is freedom; America, interminable humiliation. Ill never forget the first time I walked down the Champs-EIyses.... I knew I was here to stay. But there is a ghost on his trail. And Connie, the new and true love of his life, embodies that ghost. A teacher on vacation in Paris, she brings him news of the civil-rights movement building momentum back home, and, as their love deepens, she makes it clear that their future together will require his coming home and playing some part in the struggle of his people. She brings him precisely what he has escaped: the priority of group identity over individual freedom. The best acting in the film is Eddies impassioned rejection of this priority. He hates America with good reason, and it is impossible to see him as simply selfish. He has already found in Paris the freedom blacks are fighting for back home. And he has found this freedom precisely by thinking of himself as an individual who is free to choose. For him individualism is freedom. And even if blacks won the civilrights struggle, true freedom would still require individuals to choose for themselves. So by what ethic should he leave the freedom of Paris for the indignities of America? Clearly no ethic would be enough. But love, on the other hand, is the tie that binds. And when the object of that love is Connie, Eddie begins to see a point in responsibility to the group. But at the very end Eddie does not get on the train out of Paris with Connie. He promises to follow her home as soon as he can arrange his affairs, and it looks like he will be good to his word. But the movie ends on his promise rather than on his action. It is a long time now since 1961, so we can know that Eddie will never have the same degree of individual freedom if he goes back home. If whites dont use his race against him, they will use it for him. And there are always the pressures of
his own group identity. As an individual he will have a hard swim. Thinking of the lovely Connie, some days I root for him to leave. Other days, even thinking of her, I root for him to stay.
Hip Hop 1NC 1/4

1.Criticism Without Defending a Course of Action Risk Assuaging Movements by Becoming the Predictable Loyal Opposition. Like the Washington Generals To Harlems Globetrotters, The Activists Role Out the Same Message Week after Week Without Engaging in the Substantive Discussion Necessary for Change Martin in02 (Brian, Social Alternatives, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 2002, pp. 6-10.)
Criticising the existing system seems pretty easy. Lots of people do it. Why is it so difficult, in comparison, to promote alternatives? Whether the topic is the military, the nuclear family, the market or the prison system, there is little attention to alternatives compared to criticism of the current system.For example, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1979) in their classic book The Political Economy of Human Rights document US government sponsorship of repressive regimes. But they dont discuss how to promote change in these policies. In his book The Credential Society, Randall Collins (1979) offers a devastating critique of the role of education systems in maintaining social inequality. Although he outlines several political positions regarding the market in educational qualifications, he gives no serious attention to how to create alternatives. Benjamin Ginsberg (1984) in his penetrating book The Consequences of Consent argues that the system of elections increases the power of the state and reduces the prospects for greater democratisation. However, he doesnt discuss alternatives to electoral politics or how to achieve them. I am tremendously impressed by each of these books. They offer eye-opening critiques. But, like many other such works, they say little about taking action. Alternatives often arent mentioned at all. I think authors such as these do a tremendous service through their critiques. Many readers are outraged and energised and become more active. The problem is not too much critique, but rather that there isnt nearly enough discussion of alternatives to go along with the critique. Without alternatives, there is a risk that critique becomes a form of loyal opposition. Here I discuss several explanations for why promoting alternatives is so difficult.
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2.Their Criticism is the Easy Way Out Identifying the Problem is not the Solution. Hip Hop has won a number of rounds this camp and not Effected Substantive Change in debate meaning that the criticism without the alternative has empirically failed Martin in02 (Brian, Social Alternatives, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 2002, pp. 6-10.)
Although there are divergent interpretations of reality and disagreements about diagnoses, nearly everyone agrees about many things, such as that, in Australia, most people drive cars, elections are held and rape occurs. These areas of agreement constitute a shared reality. In contrast to the level of agreement about current reality, there are many conceivable and possible future realities, especially if we think decades down the track. Even when we restrict thinking to better futures, there are still plenty of possibilities. There might be better funded public education systems or perhaps more home schooling or instead deschooling with learning as part of community activity. There could be work for everyone or instead leisure for everyone. There could be international peace protected through international organisations or instead expansion of the capacity for waging conflict nonviolently.Because there are so many possible alternatives, when it comes to specifics its easier for many people to agree on what theyre against than about what theyre for.That helps explain why rallies are relatively easy to organise against specific problems, such as the latest war or racist policy. Antiglobalisation rallies bring together protesters from a range of perspectives, united mainly by their opposition to globalisation, not any specific positive view.Another factor is that, because we live in the existing world (rather than an alternative one), it is easier to understand the current system and how it operates than to understand a hypothetical alternative. Just through living in the world, people share many understandings of what exists. Despite differences in perception and interpretation, these commonalities are substantial and provide a basis for protesters to agree on what they are against. But because alternatives, whether they are free schools, cohousing, consensus decision making or towns without cars, are experienced by relatively few people, there is less basis for common understanding.
3.The criticism is a vacuous exercise in escapism. By constantly pointing the finger elsewhere, the advocates fall prey to Dorian Grey fallacy. Debate plays the roll of the picture. Like Dorian it is much easier to project the flaws into the picture than to seek to make changes in the self. To endorse the project paralyzes the advocates opportunity to change. JA Futterman in 94 (Obscenity and Peace, Meditations on the Bomb)
This type of self-sacrifice has a potential redeeming effect on the evil-doer, because it offers him (or her) the opportunity to re-evaluate himself and his pursuits in its light, should he choose to do so. The non-violent resister, by acknowledging full responsibility for his or her own actions in a confrontation, invites the evildoer to acknowledge responsibility for his, as well. The non-violent resister holds up a mirror to the evil-doer showing him both as he is and as he can become. A complimentary type of mirror was employed by Oscar Wilde in his novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray.
Gray came into possession of a portrait of himself as a young man. Gray led a life of debauchery and deceit, but none of this left its mark on his ageless face. The picture, however, did age, becoming perceptibly more hideous with Gray's every foul deed. Eventually Gray could no longer stand to look at the picture, or even to know that it existed, and thrust a knife into it. The next morning Gray was found dead, an ugly old man with a knife in his heart, lying next to the portrait of his handsome younger self.
Although Gray wished not to know it, the picture showed him as he truly was. Rather than to attack the portrait, Gray would have done better to own up to the testimony the picture bore of him, and change his ways. Only in this manner could he have improved its appearance. So it is with nuclear weapons and society. Like Dorian Gray's picture, they show all of us in the world who we are. Similarly, trying to destroy the portrait, or the ones who paint it, will avail us little. The only choice which leads to life is for us to own up to what they say about us, and begin treating each other better.
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4.The affirmatives cry to put out own house in order replete with the isolationist advocacy of withdrawing from NATO results in an external displacement of Racial Animosity Kevin R Johnson, Prof of Law @UC Davis, 73 Indiana Law Journal 1111, Fall 98
Moreover, a relationship exists between society's treatment of domestic minorities and noncitizens of color. Congress passed the Chinese exclusion laws not long after ratification of the revolutionary Reconstruction Amendments designed to protect the rights of African Americans. 263 Korematsu and "Operation Wetback" came close in time to Brown v. Board of Education. 264 Haitian repatriation continued at roughly the same time as the "Rebuild L.A." campaign in the wake of the Rodney King violence. 265 Because of the recurring nature of such events, it cannot be viewed as a coincidence that they occurred at the same time but should be considered to be part and parcel of a complex pattern of racial subordination in the United States. Psychological theory at times has served as a tool for analyzing the legal implications of racial discrimination. 266 In some ways, the reaction to immigrants 1155 [*1155] of color can be explained by the psychological construct known as transference "in which feelings toward one person are refocused on another." 267 Transference ordinarily occurs unconsciously in the individual. 268 The general public, in light of modern sensibilities, often is foreclosed from directly attacking minority citizens, at least publicly. Society can, however, lash out with full force at noncitizens of color. In so doing, they contend that the attacks are not racially motivated but that other facially neutral factors animate restrictionist goals. 269 Such attacks amount to transference of frustration from domestic minorities to immigrants of color. The related psychological construct of displacement also helps understand the phenomenon. 270 "Displacement" is "[a] defense mechanism in which a drive or feeling is shifted upon a substitute object, one that is psychologically more available. For example, aggressive impulses may be displaced, as in 'scapegoating,' upon people (or even inanimate objects) who are not sources of frustration but are safer to attack." 271 Psychological studies show how displaced frustration may unconsciously result in the development of racial prejudice. 272 For example, one famous study of displaced aggression found that negative attitudes toward persons of Japanese and Mexican ancestry increased after a tedious testing session that caused children to miss a trip to the movies. Animosity was displaced from the test-givers, immune from attack because of their positions of authority, to defenseless racial minorities. 273 1156 [*1156] Such examples square with the history of scapegoating immigrants for the social problems of the day. 274 For example, the U.S. economy went south in the late 1800s and the frustration was displaced from diffuse economic causes to Chinese immigrants. 275 Gordon Allport offered a most apt example: "Most Germans did not see the connection between their humiliating defeat in World War I and their subsequent anti-Semitism." 276 Frustration was displaced from complex real- world causes to a simple-and defenseless-solution.
5.This form of transference Results in Increased Violence Toward the External Other and Turns the Case on a Substantive and Discursive Level Kevin R Johnson, Prof of Law @UC Davis, 73 Indiana Law Journal 1111, Fall 98
Transference and displacement serve to hide racial animosity toward all people of color, not just immigrants of color. Unfortunately, however, an unsatisfied appetite for homogeneity knows no border between immigrants and citizens. 277 Minority citizens as well as minority noncitizens remain a distinct racial minority whatever the fine legal distinctions made with respect to immigration status. The popular perception that Latinos 278 and Asian Americans 279 are "foreigners" in the United States, supports this idea. Transference and displacement also help us better understand interethnic conflict in the United States. 280 Racial minorities all too often fight each other because their frustration is displaced from white society, too powerful to attack successfully. Latinos and African Americans, for example, have blamed each other for their social and economic woes. 281 African Americans and Asian Americans have done the same. 282 Though understandable, this displaced animosity obscures the fact that dominant society, which is fighting to maintain 1157 [*1157] the racial status quo, is the true culprit. This insight suggests the importance of efforts to resolve interethnic conflict and build constructive coalitions between communities of color to challenge discrimination. 283
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6. The affirmative advocacy articulates a disengagement of international rights discourses for the purpose of fixing things at home This turns into a Discourse on Civil Rights. Civil rights discourse puts control in the hands of the oppressors and diverts focus from human rights, masking and perpetuating degradation.
Ali Khan, Professor of Law, Washburn University, Howard Law Journal, 94, 38 How. L.J. 79 The oppressed should change the nature of moral discourse and "take it away from the civil rights label, and put in the human rights label." The two types of rights have distinctive normative assumptions. Civil rights flow from the values of those in power; human rights originate in the universal values of the peoples of the world. n176 Civil rights are derived from a national statute or a constitution over which the oppressors might have full control; human rights are rooted in the inherent dignity of all members of the human family. Civil rights are administered within the jurisdiction of a nation-state; human rights are monitored in global forums. n177 Those in power may manipulate the interpretation and enforcement of civil rights, but violations of human rights will expose the oppressors. By granting civil rights, those in power assert their own moral virtuousness as if they were under no prior obligation to extend these rights to all; by recognizing human rights, those in power must acknowledge their legal and moral duty to have respect for every human being. n178 The oppressors must further admit that "disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind," n179 and that they have been morally insincere and uncivilized in their treatment of other human beings.
7. Voting Implications A. It turns the case: civil rights inevitably backfire

Ali Khan, Professor of Law, Washburn University, Howard Law Journal, 94, 38 How. L.J. 79 The reality is that the oppressor in control of the legal means is also in charge of the civil rights. There are many ways in which the oppressor may recognize civil rights in law but deny them in practice. If the system is under the command of the oppressor, the legislature may distort the rights recognized in the constitution; the judge may diminish the rights granted in the statutes; and the police may simply breach with impunity even the most basic rights entrenched in law. "This is the trickery" by which the oppressor grants rights with one hand and takes them away with the other. n166 Malcolm characterizes the civil rights movement as "a hopeless battle." n167 The problem with a civil rights struggle is that the oppressed can only go forward to the degree that the oppressors will allow. n168 Seeking civil rights as a relief from oppression may be a tragic admission by the oppressed that the oppressor alone has the authority to come to their rescue and lift the siege of oppression. n169
B. Acceptance of a human rights approach instead of the affirmative civil rights discourse demands a negative ballot.
Peter Goldman, The Death and Life of Malcolm X, 2nd Edition, 1979, p. 156-157 This meant rewriting the entire vocabulary of race relations in America. It meant creating a new national allegiance based on one's color, not on the accident of one's birthplace. "We're not Americans," Malcolm said at a Harlem rally that spring, "we're Africans who happen to be in America. We were kidnaped and brought here against our will from Africa. We didn't land on Plymouth Rock-that rock landed on us." It meant forgetting about civil rights, which were America's to grant or withhold, and recasting the movement as a struggle for human rights, which belonged inalienably to everybody everywhere. Malcolm, as a man of words, believed that one could alter reality by changing the terms with which one described realities. "When you are begging for civil rights," he said, "you're putting it in Uncle Sam's lap. You're taking it to Uncle Sam's courts. You're taking the criminal to the criminal-asking the criminal to solve the crime. Whereas, when you're attacking this thing at the level of human rights, you can take it to the United Nations. You can take Uncle Sam, the one who's really guilty, to the UN and accuse him or charge him with violating the UN Charter on Human Rights."
Counterplan Overview
Thump. Thump. Thump. That is the beat. That is the beat. But it isnt the only beat. It isnt the only thing that defines Zeki Ali - Steffen Franz or Haji Mike. The louder the base, the stronger their message, the more lost the individual identities of the ones they call poetzforpeace become. We affirm Zeki Ali - Steffen Franz - Haji Mike. We see the value in the message that they send but we know that as individuals they are much more than a group name on a disk cover. We know that they are complex human beings who live beyond the conflicts that they speak of. If we are ever to overcome the issues that drive wedges between us as INDIVIDUALS we must first stop conflating them with the groups that they identify with. We must first stop sacrificing the value of the individual for the sake of the ballot. Affirm Zeki Ali - Steffen Franz - Haji Mike as three complex human beings who are more than just the message in a song. Appropriating art for the use of protest destroys an artists individual development and therefore the quality of their art. Steele, Shelby, research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, Harpers Magazine, November 2002
The greatest problem in coming from an oppressed group is the power the oppressor has over your group. The second greatest problem is the power your group has over you. Group identity in oppressed groups is always very strategic, always a calculation of advantage. The humble black identity of the Booker T. Washington eraa little education spoiled many a good plow1 handallowed blacks to function as tradesmen, laborers, and farmers during the rise of Jim Crow, when hundreds of blacks were being lynched yearly. Likewise, the black militancy of the late sixties strategically aimed for advantage in an America suddenly contrite over its long indulgence in racism. Ones group identity is always a maska mask replete with a politics. When a teenager in East Los Angeles says he is Hispanic, he is thinking of himself within a group strategy pitched at larger America. His identity is related far more to America than to Mexico or Guatemala, where he would not often think of himself as Hispanic. In fact, Hispanic is much more a political concept than a cultural one, and its first purpose is to win power within the frays of American identity politics. So this teenager must wear the mask that serves his groups ambitions in these politics. With the civil-rights victories, black identity became more carefully calculated around the pursuit of power, because black power was finally possible in America. So, as the repressions of racism receded, the repressions of group identity grew more intense for blacks. Even in Paris, Connie uses the censoring voice of the group: Things are much better than they were five1 years ago ... not because Negroes come to Paris but because Negroes stay home. Here the collective identity is the true identity, and individual autonomy a mere affectation. .1 If Pans Blues ends without Eddies actual return to America, we can witness such a return in the life of a real-life counterpart to Eddie, the black American writer James Baldwin. In the late forties, Baldwin went to Paris, like his friend and mentor Richard Wright, to escape Americas smothering racism and to find himself as a writer and as an individual. He succeeded dramatically and quickly on both counts. His first novel, the minor masterpiece Go Tell It on the Mountain, appeared in 1953 and was quickly followed by another novel and two important essay collections. It was clearly the remove of Europe that gave Baldwin the room to find his first important theme: self-acceptance. In a Swiss mountain village in winter, against an absolutely alabaster landscape and listening to Bessie Smith records, he accepts that he is black, gay, talented, despised by his father, and haunted by a difficult childhood. From this self-acceptance emerges an individual voice and one of the most unmistakable styles in American writing. Then, in 1957, Baldwin did something that changed himand his writingforever. He came home to America. He gave up the psychological remove of Europe and allowed himself to become once again fully accountable as a black American. And soon, in blatant contradiction of his own powerful arguments against protest writing, he became a protest writer. There is little doubt that this new accountability weakened him greatly as an artist. Nothing he wrote after the early sixties had the human complexity, depth, or literary mastery of what he wrote in those remote European locales where children gawked at him for his color. The South African writer Nadine Gordimer saw the black writer in her own country as conflicted between a deep, intense, private view on the one hand and the call to be a spokesman for his people on the other. This classic
conflictcommon to writers from oppressed groups around the world is really a conflict of authority. In Europe, Baldwin enjoyed exclusive authority over his own identity. When he came back to America, he did what in Western culture is anathema to the artist: he submitted his artistic visionhis private viewto the authority of his group. From The Fire Next Time to the end of his writing life, he allowed protest to be the framing authority of his work. What Baldwin did was perhaps understandable, because his group was in a pitched battle for its freedom. The group had enormous moral authority, and he had a splendid rhetorical gift the group needed. Baldwin was transformed in the sixties into an embodiment of black protest, an archetypal Davidfrail, effeminate, brilliantagainst a brutish and stupid American racism. He became a celebrity writer on the American scene, a charismatic presence with huge, penetrating eyes that were fierce and vulnerable at the same time. People who had never read him had strong opinions about him. His fame was out of proportion to his work, and if all this had been limited to Baldwin himself, it might be called the Baldwin phenomenon. But, in fact, his ascendancy established a pattern that would broadly define, and in many ways corrupt, an entire generation of black intellectuals, writers, and academics. And so it must be called the Baldwin model. The goal of the Baldwin model is to link ones intellectual reputation to the moral authoritythe moral glamourof an oppressed groups liberation struggle. In this way one ceases to be a mere individual with a mere point of view and becomes, in effect, the embodiment of a moral imperative. This is rarely done consciously, as a Faustian bargain in which the intellectual knowingly sells his individual soul to the group. Rather the group identity is already a protest-focused identity, and the intellectual simply goes along with it. Adherence to the Baldwin model is usually more a sin of thoughtlessness and convenience than of conscious avarice, though it is always an appropriation of moral power,
Answers to the Permutation

1 no net benefit- we access all of their affirmative with the counter advocacy without linking to the disadvantage of co-opting their individual quality. Extend the Steele card in the 1NC and the cross apply the card from the overview. Not once in their presentation are these people identified by their individual names. The affirmation of the perm is a flawed methodology, 2 No solvency advocate- no one in the literature advocates making this one exception for the permutation Implications: A Research burden cant generate new disads to the perm because there is no literature base B Division of Ground- Is always uneven because they create a fictional form of argument that we cant engage when they combine methodologies that are wholly incompatible 3 Extend the Martin cards from the case debate in the 1NC. At a minimum the repetition of the group name in the permutation risks becoming the loyal opposition more than the counter advocacy. 4 The permutation is an advocacy shift. They ask the critic to step out of traditional notions of debate to entertain a non- topical, non plan affirmative but then want to fall back on its traditional notions of competition to avoid substantive discussion of their political methodology. They cannot test competition without undermining their agenda and this is an independent reason to reject them. 5. extend the Johnson evidence in the 1NC. The permutation also links to this debate harder than the counter advocacy. Our recognition of them as individuals does not turn the spotlight on them as political beacons and therefore accesses solvency claims with a much smaller risk. 6 No theoretical justification for the permutation. This is not a plan. This is an activism. It either fails or it doesnt .Our counter advocacy proves that it is an insufficient and fatally flawed movement and a reason to vote against them

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** Hip Hop 1NC*