LESSONS LEARNED FROM 20TH CENTUW TANK WARFARE: DOES A COMMON THREAD OF LESSONS EXIST?

A thesls presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Caunand and General Staff College In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MATTHEW L. SMITH, MAJ, USA B.S., Unl ted States MI 1 I tary Academy. 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1988

Approved for publlc release: dlstrlbutlon Is unllmlted.

88-3193

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of c a n d l d a t e a o r Matthew L. Smlth Title of thesls Warfare

L e s d

From 20th Century

es a r;pnrmnO Thread of e L

Exist. ' 3

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

A. Reichley. M.S.A.,

ember, Graduate Faculty

lae. &M4 Colonel Don harti

/
Y.

, Member, Consulting Faculty

, J r . , M.A.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1988 by:

,i6&Lp J i%dL , Director. Graduate Degree Programs

I

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the v i e w of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College o r any other government agency. ( w n c e s to th is study should include the foreaoinq statement . )

ABSTRACT

LESSONS LEARNED FROM 20TH CENTURY TANK WARFARE DOES A COMMON THREAD OF LESSONS EXISTS: A hlstorlcal analysis of the lessons learned concernlng the major tank warf lghtlng experlences of the 20th Century by Major Matthew L. Smlth, USA, 112 pages. Thls study Is an hlstorlcal analysis of lessons learned concernlng tank mobility, flrepower, protection. c m a n d and control, and overall design during the malor tank warfighting experience of the 20th Century. The alm of thls study was to make a determlnatlon concernlng the exlstence or non-exlstence of a common thread of lessons learned durlng Individual and small unit (company size or smaller) tank flghtlng. The major tank warfare experlences examined were World War I, World War 11, and the Arab-Israeli 1967 and 1973 Wars. The lessons learned were gleaned from sources written by soldlers, englneers. and hlstorlans who had elther participated In o r studied the particular tank warfare experience. Lessons are grouped into flve areas: mcbillty. flrepover, protectlon. command and control, and overall design. This study concludes that a c m o n thread of lessons learned concerning Individual and small unlt tank flghting does exist throughout the major tank warflghtlng experlences of the 20th century.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1.

Definlng the Problem

Introductlon Hlstorlcal Background Research Questlons Slgnlflcance of the Study Methodology Chapter 2. Survey of Literature

1
2 3 4 4

7
9 14 17 21

Part I Part I1 Part I11

- World War I - World War I1 - Arab-Israeli

- World War I - World War I1 - Arab-Israeli

1967-1973

Wars

Chapter 3. Lessons Learned f r m Past Tank Warfare Part I Part I 1 Part I 1 1 Chapter 4.

22
1967-1973

Wars

38 55 86 87 89 91 94 98 101 105

Analysis and Discussion

M o w I i ty Fl repower Protection C a m a n d and Control Overall Deslgn Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations
3ibl iogrdphy.

iv

CHAPTER 1

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of thls study I s twofold: to research the malor tank warflghtlng experlences during the 20th century wlth the alm

of ldentlfylng lessons learned concernlng Indlvldual tank and

small tank unlt (company slze or less) warflghtlng. and to analyze

the Identlfled lessons learned wlth the alm of determlnlng whether

or not a camnon thread of lessons exists.

The Unlted States has deslgned Its tank and tank forces to danlnate a battlefleld through superlor tactlcal moblllty,
firepower. protectlon. and ccmnand and control. The Unlted States has observed and partlclpated

In tank warfare throughout the 20th

century and has documented shortccmlngs or deflclencles concernlng moblllty, flreparer. protectlon. comand and control and overall design In the partlclpatlng tanks and tank forces. These shortccmlngs and deflclencles. or 'lessons learned,' wlll be the
.

focus of thls study. After a .thorough examlnatlor: and cmarlson. a determlnatlon regardlng the possible exlstence of a c m o n thread of lessons wlll be made.

_.

HISPDRICAL BACKGROUND

Tank warfare was lnltlated durlng the later part of World War I. Tank forces were developed to break years of battlefleld

stalemate by defeatlng the effects of the machlne gun. and restorlng tactlcal moblllty and declslve maneuver to the battlefleld. Whlle the tanks' slgnlflcance durlng World War I Is

debatable. tanks would rapldly evolve Into the centerpleces of every maJor 20th century land army. Most tank battles that occurred In World War 1. World War
11. and the Arab-Israel1 1967-1973 Wars have been studled and

lessons learned concerning Indlvldual tank and small tank unit moblllty. flrepower. protectlon. c m n d and control. and overall deslgn have been ldentlfled and documented. Sources for these documented lessons learned are numerous and have been prepared by persons of dlverse backgrounds, lncludlng soldiers. englneers. and hlstorlans.
No slngle source, ldentlfled In thls research,

focused solely on lessons learned nor attemped In Its scope to compare or llnk lessons learned frm more than two of the major tank warflghtlng experlences of the 20th century. Whlle It can be
..

argued that s m e lessons learned . . are sltuatlonal and are not . ..

--. -. .

.. .. .

..

always relevant to later combat sltuatlons, an examinatton and

_-.

canparlson of the lessons stlll needs to be conducted to determlne Uhether a carmon thread of lessons learned exlsts.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study focused on two research questlons:

(1) What are the lessons learned fran 20th century

tank warflghtlng concernlng Indlvldual tank and small tank unlt moblllty. firepower. protectlon. ccamand and control, and overall des I gn?
(2) Does a c0rmK)n thread of lessons learned exlst?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The Unlted States spends bllllons of dollars to develop and

fleld a danlnant tank, and daninant tank forces, for Its mound maneuver forces. Tank forces are the centerplece of US ground maneuver forces and thelr success or fallure m a y well be the decldlng factor in future hlgh-lntenslty confllcts. I f a cannon thread of lessons learned does exist, It can be used to establlsh a base llne for current and future tank development and also can be used as part of thefoun-datlon'for the development of tactlcs and tactlcal manuals concernlng tank--force organlzatlon and e m 1o m e n t

CHAPTER 3-- LESSONS LEARNED PROM PAST TANK WARFIGHTING

This chapter provides the reader a listing of lessons

learned concernlng lndlvldual tank and small tank unlt moblllty. flrepcuer, protectlon, command and control, and overall deslgn

frcm World War I through the Arab-Israel1 1967 and 1973 Wars.
CHAPtER 4-- ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Thls chapter provldes the reader an analysls of the lessons

llsted In chapter 3 and makes a detemlnatlon regardlng the exlstence of a c m o n thread of lessons learned.

CHAPTER 5-- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Thls chapter answers the research questions and draws a

concluslon of the meanlng of the study.

It also relates the study

to other works and to the base of knowledge. Suggestlons for future research are also Included.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
The purpose, background, and slgnlflcance of thls thesls have been establlshed In thls chapter. Addltlonally. the research questlons and the study's methodology are Included to provlde the reader wlth the study's dlrectlon and content.

In the next

chapter the reader w l l l be exposed to the sources of knowledge used to ldentlfy the lessons learned frcm 20th century tank

warf lghtlng.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A revlev of llterature I s presented to famlllarlze the

reader wlth the sources of knowledge studied and Incorporated In

thls thesls. The revlew wlll also provlde succeedlng researchers

a synopsls of Information avallable relatlng to tank warfIghtlng, doslgn. and lessons learned. The review of llterature for thls thesls conslsts of books and perlodlcals concernlng tank warfightlng. evolutlon. deslgn. and capabllltles. The sources range from those wrltten durlng World War I to the present. The Canblned Arms Research Llbrary at the Unlted States
Army

Camnand and General Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, provlded the foundat ion f o r document Ing the thesls. The research materlal used In thls thesls Is unclasslfled. The revlew of llterature appllcable to thls thesls Is dlvlded Into three sectlons. Part I examlnes llterature concerning lessons learned from World War I. Part 11 examines

sources of Informatlon concernlng lessons learned fram World War

11.

Part 111 examlnes llterature concernlng lessons learned from

the Arab-Israel1 1967 and 1973 confllcts. Other llterature was

consulted and Is Included In the blbllography. sources were the most beneflcial.

The following

PART I

- WORLD WAR

BOOKS

LTC Kenneth A . Steadrans work,

of the Tpnk

In the

US.

&my. examlnes the evolutlon of the US maln battle

tanks fraa 1919-1940. Steadnan examlnes the evolutlon of US tank design. mllltary force organlzatlon. and mechanlzed doctrlne. from the beglnnlng of World War I to the start of World War 11. He

also provldes an excellent dlscusslon of the political Issues and other factors that Influenced US tank evolutlon.

In -fare:

A W

v of

In 8

, wrltten by

Kenneth John Macksey, the history of the policymakers and strateglsts Is examlned as It relates to the technlcal and tactlcal development of tanks. The work examines the development of armor and the key factors in the tank development process beginning-vlth World-War I.anU endlng.vlth the Vletnam War. R.M. Ogorklewlczs work, D e v e l o u w of F19hLlnq

m. provldes a detalled

account of the progesslve evolution

of armored flghtlng vehlcles and deals In depth wlth the many dlfferent aspects of armor deslgn. Including guns, mlsslles, englnes, steering. and armor protectlon. Ogorklewlcz discusses

both mllltary and engineerlng issues and features incorporated

Into the design of main battle tanks.

In w l l c t : The Deslan and k t l c s of Armoured

u t l n a Vehicleg. written by Ian V. Hogg. provides a graphic

descrlptlon of the lnternatlonal development of tanks In the context of evolving tactlcal systems. Hogg examlnes the Interplay

of engineers and soldlers In tank development and ldentifles many

lessons learned from past armor conflicts. Ralph E. Jones, George H. Rarey, and Robert J. Ickes provlde a very detailed source with thelr book, Fiahtlna Tanks

Since. Thls work provides an excellent history of tank

warfare durlng World War I lncludlng technlcal dlscusslons of tank deslgn. employment, and anti-tank defenses and foes. The authors provlde many World War I lessons learned. An excellent source for World War I and World War I1 lessons learned Is -written Quesne. Martel. This:dork. by Gifford Le examines. tank varfare i n v o h i n g X,.,

German. Brltlsh, French, and Soviet forces.

I t focuses on tank

warfare In North Africa, Italy, the Sovlet Union, and France and
llsts many lessons learned from speclflc battles.

R.M. OarkIewIczs

analyzes the development

of tank design In several countries, lncludlng the US. Soviet Union, Brltain, Japan, France, and Italy from the beginning of the

10

20th century to the end of World War 11.

Thls source contalns

many lessons learned and explalns how tanks were modlfled to Incorporate them.
of, n a e W

wrltten by Trevor N.

Depuy, provldes a datalled examlnatlon of tank warfare In World War I and provldes many lessons learned. Depuy provldes many battlefleld facts and statlstlcs about the employment and engagements between tank forces. Thls source contalns a good dlscusslon of the Battle of Cambral.

Sir Ernest N. Swlnton's

mtness, provldes a collectlon

of personal reminlscences of certaln phases of World War I.

Swlnton provldes InformatIan about what he observed, heard, and knew about World War I tank flghtlng and development. The work

focuses on the devastatlng effects of the employment of the machlne

gun

and how the Brltlsh developed their tank force to

counter It. An excellent source for US tank development ana.varfIght:ng lessons learned i s The P a t t u n e r s

, by Martln

Blumenson. Thls source contalns Patton's written correspondence about World War I tank development and flghtlng and has many facts and lessons about how the US Tank Corps was establlshed and how it fought.

11

Paul Albert Dyster's

work,

the Wake of the Tank.

conducts an excellent study of the blrth and evolutlon of armored warfare doctrine and technology throughout the 20th century. Dyster takes a detailed look at World War I. the Interwar perlod. World War 11, the early atanlc age, and the present. He examlnes

several natlons' strategles and polltlcs concerning the development of their tanks and tank forces.
A good source for studylng tank warfare at the operatlonal

level Is Mlchael Carver's . - d n a

The ADOStleS of ~ l l l t v : The

Thls work looks at both the

theory and practlce of tank warfare, fran the flrst conceptlon of an armored vehlcle to the establlshment of the tank as the prlnclpal offenslve weapon of modern land warfare.

12

PERIODICALS

Brlgadler General Samuel Rockenback provldes a detalled dlscusslon of World War I small tank unit tactlcs In hls artlcle 'Tanks and Thelr Cooperatlon wlth other Arms: Rockenback

detalls what tanks, Infantry, and artlllery forces learned tactlcally from World War I flghtlng and how future comblned a m teams must flght on future battleflelds.

In the artlcle 'Some Notes on Tank Development during the

War,' Colonel Slr Hugh Ellls dlscusses the purpose and functlon of World War I tanks and provldes many British lessons learned about World War I tank development and flghtlng. Thls source focuses on lessons concernlng tank moblllty and rellablllty. HaJor B.C. Chynovlth provldes Informatlon about tank functlons and needed tank capabllltles In hls artlcle 'Tank Infantry.' Chynovlth focuses on the need for an Infantry support

tank that Vould.aid. the Infantry in. the close-in fight.

13

PART I 1

- WORLD WAR

I1

BOOKS

In,-

Steven Zaloga and James Loop

study the development of US maln battle tanks fran World War I1 throught 1980. Thls source provldes a detailed dlscusslon of how
US maln battle tanks were modlfled durlng thls perlod and how the
US tank development system works or does not work,

Zaloga and

Loop conduct a very obJectlve analysls of US tank development and dlscuss deflclencles and who should be blamed for them.

Robert Joseph kks' work, ,

value of the tank In 20th century warfare.

assesses the Icks detalls In

graphlcs. narratlve. and maps. 32 battles In whlch tanks played a danlnant role. The book centers on World War I 1 and dlscusses the Impact of armor on warfare. prbnciple of war. The most crltlcal examlnatlon of World War performance Is provlded by John El I Is In hls book Icks deflnes the tank Idea" as a

I tank

m .

E l l l s focuses hls study on the tanks' Ilmltatlons and conducts a

thorough dlscusslon of how vulnerable and unreliable World War I 1 tanks were.

14

The best source for lessons learned concernlng tank

flghtlng

In deserts Is Llddell Hart's

1 -

PaDerz. Hart's

edltlng and expanslon of Rmel's

World War I 1 correspondence

provldes the reader an excellent lnslght of tank flghtlng In the desert and has wrltlple levels of lessons learned ranglng frao the slngle tank to dlvlslon and army level lessons.
Llddell Hart agaln provldes the reader wlth valuable

lessons learned In hls work hls post-war

Slde of the H I I L .

Through

lntervlews wlth senlor German offlcers. Hart reveals

what the Germans learned about World War I! tank flghtlng and provldes a basls for German tank development and tactlcs. Mar as I Knew It, by George S. Patton Jr., can be consldered the best US source for lessons learned concernlng World War I 1 small tank unlt tactlcs. Patton provldes many lessons about how tanks should be employed and how cunblned arms operatlons should be conducted.
Tom Wlntringham's Starv of
.
and

'h3Lc.s I s an

excellent source of muitl-natlonal lessons learned. Wlntrlngham establlshes the tank flghtlng lessons learned for each major power of World War I 1 and llnks some lessons to earller armored warfare.

An excellent source for lessons learned 1s Janusz

Plekalklewlcz's TankWar. Plekalklewlcz coducts a thorough examlnatlon of World War I1 and h l s work provldes many pertlnent

15

lessons learned by the Allles and AXIS powers. every facet of tank flghtlng and deslgn.

81s work addresses

and Pollce. by Hoffman Nlckerson. contalns many general or overall lessons learned concernlng World War I 1 tank warfare.

Thls work focuses mre on lessons learned about the

prlnclples for tank deslgn than on small unlt tactlcs and

f lghtlng.
Battle

Tanks, by Rolf Hllmes, Is a canprehenslve look

at the evolutlon of maln battle tank technology frcm 1945 through

1986. Hllmes ccmpares and traces the development of all current

maln battle tanks, lncludlng the HlAl, H60 serles. T-72/64,

Leopard 1/11, Vlckers and the Merkava.

Thls source provldes a

detalled technlcal dlscusslon of tank armament. mnltlons. flre

control systems, pwerplants, and survlvablllty.

16

PART I11

- ARAB-ISRAELI

1967 AND 1973 CONFLICTS

BOOKS
The transcrlpt of the brleflng 'Impllcatlons of the Mlddle East War on US Army Tactlcs. Doctrine. and Systems'. by General

Willlam Depuy, contalns many lessons learned fran the Arab-Israel1

1973 tank warflghtlng. Depuy establlshed several general or

overall lessons learned and dlscusses each In detall, llnklng actual battles or sltuatlons to the lessons. This source focuses

on protectlon.

firepower. and c m a n d and control lessons.

'Lessons Learned frm the Mlddle East Crlsls', a memorandum wrltten by the Offlce of the Asslstant Chlef of Staff for Force Development, was the best suurce of detalled lessons learned fran tank flghtlng In the Mlddle East 1973 confllct. The memorandum provldes lessons learned for all aspects of tank flghtlng and development.

Cham Herzos provldes an excellent study of the Arab-Israel1

1967 and 1973 wars In hls work

Herzog's work

focuses on the macro-level of the wars and several overall lessons about tank crew tralnlng and tank employment are provlded. The best US source for technlcal lessons learned and lndlvldual tank lessons learned Is Walter 3 . Henderson's paper 'Analysls of the Lessons Learned In the October 1973 Arab-Israel1
17

W a r :

Henderson provldes many technlcal deslgn and capabllltles

lessons and relates how they have Impacted on the US Marlne Corps. He also establishes what lessons would not be applicable to US forces.

Nadav Sofran provldes scene valuable lessons learned durlng

the ' S I X Day War' In hls book

Ernm

War to War:

The Arab

- Israeli

1948 1 9 a . Sofran beglns hls study wlth an

analysis

of the 1948 confllct and links the later confllcts

concernlng what the Israelis learned and how they have changed strategy and tactlcs based on thelr past experlences.
Qn the Brinks of the

W. by

Avraham Adan, provides general

lessons learned about tank flghtlng In the Slnal durlng the 1973 October War.

This source dlscusses general characterlstlcs that

tanks need or already have that permlt tanks to survlve and wln on the battlefleld. Additlonally. It provldes a detalled account of

the entlre Israeli campaign in the Slnal. The best Israell source of lessons learned about the 1973 October War I s Oavld Elazar's Blltarv Asnects af the

L b f 1 Icts. Elazar examlnes every aspect of the October War and

provides many valuable lessons learned ranglng frm morale and selectlon and tralnlng of tank crews. to technlcal lessons concernlng tank deslgn and capabllltles. and flnally to general lessons about tank tactlcs and flghtlng techniques.

18

PER1OD ICALS
C.N. Barclay provldes several general lessons about

leadership. morale and the effects of technology In hls artlcle 'Lessons fraa the October War,'
&my,

March 1974. Barclay's focus

Is on lessons that made a slgnlflcant difference on the battlefleld. The artlcle, 'Tank Myth or a Mlsslle Mlrage.' nllltarv

ReyLai, August 1976, by Charles Wakebrldge. provldes a detalled

dlscusslon of how tanks fared agalnst the antl-tank mlsslles used during the 1973 October War. Wakebrldge focuses hls study on the
Egyptian's

use of the Sovlet SAGGER and RG-7 and concludes that

the gulded mlsslle can effectlvely neutrallze a tank attack and that the tank has lost Its dunlnance on the battlefleld. The best perlodlcal sources for 1973 October War lessons are provlded by Jac Weller In hls artlcles. 'Tanks In the Mlddle East.' Eilltarv Revlq, Hay 1976 and 'The Flght at Suez,' Elatlonal

Defense. September-October

1974. Welier provldes many lessons

learned ranging :ran iecnnlcai !essons:dDout the ianKs' a m e r plants and welghts. to more general lessons about tactlcs and procedures developed to defeat anti-tank mlsslles and overcome obstacles. The artlcle, 'The 1973 Hlddle East War: An Englneer's
Vlew,' lke M I 1 ltarv E n ,

November-December 1979, provldes

lessons concernlng what klnd of obstacles were employed In the

19

1973 October War to deny tank moblllty and what englneerlng

devlces and procedures were developed to counter these obstacles and restore moblllty. Brlgadler General Avlgdor Kohalanl's artlcle, "Defense of the Golan.' Dlltarv Rev&. October 1979, provldes an excellent

analysls of the vltal lessons learned about how the Israelis conducted their defense of the GoIan Helghts durlng the 1973 October War. Kohalanl focuses on the Importance of terraln and

how the defender should mesh hls defenslve posltlons wlth natural and man-made obstacles. He also dlscusses other general lessons

concerning the tralnlng of tank crews and the tactlcal employment

of tanks.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
The base of knowledge of tank warfighting and evolution is large and dlverse. The books and artlcles llsted In thls chapter

serve as the basls for Informatlon concernlng what soldlers. englneers and hlstorlans have learned from past tank warflghtlng. The next two chapters of thls study will provide a llstlng of the lessons learned and an analysis of the lessons learned gleaned from these sources.

20

CHAPTER 3

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST TANK WARFARE

Thls chapter provldes the reader wlth a llsting of lessons learned from 20th century tank warfighting experiences concerning tank and m a l l tank unit moblllty. firepower, protection, connand and control, and overall deslgn. The lessons learned will be derlved through an examination of llterature concernlng major 20th century tank warflghtlng experiences and gleanlng what soldiers. engineers, and hlstorians have learned and documented about tank warflghting and overall performance. The major 20th century tank warfighting experiences that will be studled are World War I. World War 11. and the Arab-Israeli 1967 and 1973 Wars. This chapter will.Se dlvided.1nto three.parts:.?art 1 World War I, Part I 1

- World War

11. and Part 111

- Arab-Israeli

Wars. Each part w111 further be divided into five areas: mobility. firepower, protection, comnand and control, and overall design. Under each area the reader will be provided with a list of lessons learned speciflc to that area and period of tank warfighting.

21

PART I

- WORLD WAR

World War I can be characterized as a confllct in which technology domlnated tactlcs. Technologlcal advancements such as the machlne gun. the rallroad. and the telegraph ccmblned to deny an attacker tactlcal and strateglc offenslve moblllty. The caubatlves. after a qulck race to the sea. settled Into thelr trenches, erected thelr barbed wlre fences and began four years of bloody. In-declslve trench warfare.' Almost Imedlately. the Brltlsh and French began looklng for a way to restore battlefleld moblllty. On September 15. 1916. durlng the Battle of the S m e . the Brltlsh Introduced the tank to the battlefleld. The French followed In August, 1918 by
introducing tanks during the battle for Amiens. Initially. German

h l s h colrmand reactlon was to downplay the tactlcal abiiities of

tanks and not to pursue German tank development, but after further study. the h i g h corrwand decided that tanks were needed. In 1918.. the Unlted States followed the Brltlsh and French lead and developed its own tank corps. The World War I lessons learned concernlng tank and small tank unlt moblllty. flrepower, protectlon. c m a n d and control, and overall design are listed in the pages that follows.

22

Obstacles
The maJor man-made obstacles used to deny tank moblllty were dltches, land mines. barbed wlre and concrete blocks.= Tanks wlll need the capablllty to cross elght-foot-wide trenches and surmount four-and-one-half foot vertlcal obstacles.a

A tanks center of gravity should be deslgned as low as posslble

and several Inches In front of the longltudlnal center to ald In spannlng tank dltches: Tanks will need fasclnes (an enormous bundle of wood chalned together) to be dropped Into trenches to help tanks cross. Tanks will need to be able to climb a 45-degree Incllne. The tanks track w i l l need long grousers (cleats) to climb steep

s l lppery hlIIs.&
Tanks are unsuitable for moving over wet..she!l-churned. ground. Tanks are not capable of crosslng battleflelds that have been torn up by lntenslve artlllery bombarahent. Artlllery can make terraln Impassable to tanks by causing large craters, destroylng natural drainage, and causlng water to f I I 1 the craters, whlch can cause tanks to bogsg The abillty to cross through barbed wlre Is chlefly dependent on the presence or absence of angles that are llkely to

23

hook and hold the wlre. When wlre becanes hooked, a tank's moblllty beccmes a westlon of the amount of wlre and Its strength agalnst the tank's p0wer.O Tank moblllty was slgnlflcantly improved by the development and use of an 'undltching beam' that could be fixed to the tank's tracks making self-undltchlng posslble.'O

In all contests, the nore aglle and mobile opponents always

have the advantage of belng able to selze and keep the Intlatlve.ll Tanks need to be faster. At Cambral. tanks could travel only 4-6 mph on roads and less cross country. Tanks need to be faster In order to: -Increase shock effect. -dlmlnlsh opportunltles for enemy escape. -increase prospects of overrunning.the enemy. -make hostlle fire less accurate.

-1lmlt number of hostile shots.

-Increase freedom In selectlon of polnt of assault. -get to key terraln faster. -deprive enemy of reaction t h e . -Increase chances of surprise.
-simplify abillty to concentrate tanks.12

24

Tanks have to move at such speed as to escape the dangers

of well aimed fires of heavy projectiles."

Tanks need hlgh road speeds to provide;

-strategic mobility.

-shorter road usage times.'* The prlmary objective Is not hlgh road speed, it Is superlor moblllty. Superlor moblllty requlres a very materlal reserve of power over the need for average condltlons. Thls can be done by providlng ample horsepower per ton, at least 20 horsepower per ton. A reserve of horsepower wlll also Improve rellablllty and protect the engine fran excesslve depreclatlon and reduce need

for overhauls.1a

The tank's suspension Is the keystone of vehlcle efficlency. The suspenslon needs to absorb vibrations. bumps, and shocks caused by the.roughness of. the terraln. A tank's 3uSpenSion needs to reduce bounclng and rocklng and cause the hull to move in a stralght llne In splte of rough terraln. Suspenslon deslgn shoul d have: -eight to twelve polnts of support(roaciwhee1s). -equallzatlon (bogies. levers, or cables).
-elasticity (rubber road wheels. springs. buffers).

-dampening (shock absorblng devlces).

25

-a aufflclent and large caupresslon amplltude

(relatlonshlp of the rlse and fall of roadwheels In relatlonshlp to the hul I )
.IL

Tank track I s superfluous and undeslreable for travel Ing long dlstances on good roads. A tank needs to have the dual capablllty of travellng on roads uslng wheels and cross country uslng tracks.I7 Tank track must be wlde enough to glve an adequate supportlng surface In relation to the aggregate weight of the vehicle. Ground pressure may be the determlning factor as to whether a tank wlll get mired or pass over the terrain.'O

Ransc
Tanks need to travel longer distances prlor to refueling. Inltlally, a tank's range was only 20 mlles on roads and only 12

mlles cross-country.. later nodel tank ranges were Improved to.

80-100 mlles.lp

26

FIREPOWER

Tank armament should conslst of one antl-tank cannon and three to four machine guns lnslde the turret and one to two machine guns outslde the turret.2o
A tank's

antl-tank cannon must be able to penetrate. at

reasonable ranges, the armor of hostlle tanks that it w l l l most likely encounter. Weapons must have some margin of safety, for there may be llttle or no opportunity to change armament after the enemy has thickened his armor.zi The maln gun needs to be effectlve agalnst Tanks need as many machine guns as possible."

Tanks should have rotating turrets to enabie them to fire in all directions wlthout having to change the directlon of movement. The turret must rotate quickly and must be tightly fitted to the
A tank needs multlple turrets to permit firing in two

directions simultaneously.2"

27

hostile fire The most important protection for tanks lies not In thelr

armor. but in their Proper

The best defense agalnst any and all methods of attack is constant movement. watchfulness, and a supply of smoke bombs to mask a tank if It is suddenly attacked. Tanks get safety from their mobillty and near lnvisiblllty (make tanks
I t Is not possible to armor against all hostile fire. No

matter how thick the armor used, the enemy can employ a gun to pierce it.

A t a mlnimum. tanks should have armor protection

against any sort of projectlle from any weapon that a single soldler can carry about i n Its complete form.a9 Tanks are highly vulnerable to the direct fire effects of artillery.ao

Tanks can prevent numerous casualties through their ability to rapidly overcome strong defenses and to rapldly decide battles. Crews should be protected from the heat and fumes of the engine.

28

The crew compartment and englne should be separated and a means of puttlng out englne flres should be provided."= Tanks need an effective interior fire extingulsher system.'" Dangerous projections lnside the turret should be minlmlzed and p a d d e d . ' . The tank's entry and exit methods are poor and rapld evacuation Is Tanks need to have at least two

hatches for the crew to enter or leave. Hatches should be located

so that If the tank overturns. the simultaneous blocklng of more

than one hatch Is hlghly improbable."* The tank's fuel supply is vulnerable to enemy flre. The fuel supply Is stored lnslde the hull and when ruptured fuel can
f l l l the hull and the entire tank could catch flre."

The fuel

supply should be separated from the crew ccarpartment and enclosed

with maximum thickness of armor.3g

Tanks need infantry, artillery, and air to be successful. Working alone they suffer greater casualtles.39

29

The aritlsh. French, ana OS'Dellevea that tanks met more than thelr match In contemporary antl-tank guns and therefore tanks could only be used In close llalson wlth Infantry and art I I lery.4n Tanks need artillery to suppress antl-tank guns. A battery s recQrmended.*' per 1000 meter front i Tanks need to have airplanes detalled to assist thelr maneuvers by augnentlng artlllery flres and provldlng Informatlon concernlng enemy and frlendly posltlons. A ratlo of one plane per
1000 meters Is recumnended.*=

The best alr defense for tanks can be provlded by attached antl-alrcraft units:"

When tanks are employed In small numbers thelr effects are less and thelr casualtles Increase.** Tanks are most effectlve when employed In depth and on a narrow front. Tank units need to have a reserve to exploit success.*3 The rullng factor for tank success or fallure I s the selectlon of the terraln tanks are requlred to cross.** Success depends on preparation. best terraln and select exact r o u t e s : ' Tanks are an offensive agent for overcomlng stubborn defense, for 'breaking the square.Y4e Leaders need to pick the

30

The ability to exploit a successful attacx is ilmited by the tanks' speed, range and rellabllIty.** Tanks should not attack at nlght.sa Attacks should be

llmlted to daytlme due to llmlted vlslblllty restrlctlon lnslde the tanks.3i Dawn 1s the best t h e to launch an attack. Tanks

should concentrate the night before and attack at flrst 11ght.3* Wlthout the concealment of mlst/smoke/nIght, slow movlng tanks can easlly be defeated by dlrect artlllery flre or speclal

. super-powered

antl-tank r l f l e ~ . ~ ~

The best defense agalnst a tank Is another tank.=* When tanks attack, they need to suprlse the defender to be successful.

Future tanks need to have the ablllty to s u r p r l ~ e . ~ ~

The employment of smoke Is more lmportant than potent shell. them.=& Do not use tanks as artillery pleces. It is a waste of thelr ~ a p a b l l l t i e s . ~ ~ When tanks meet the enemy. they are decIslve.se

It Is better to bllnd antl-tank qunners than to dlsrupt

Tank Intercwrmunlcatlon Is poor.3p Tanks need radlos to control thelr movements and flres.La Tank crews need Improved hand and arm slgnals to asslst In controlllng thelr movements and flres." Tanks should have flags

31

for vlsual slgnals. Orange is the Dest flag coior. then red. A protected opening should be provlded to allow flag slgnals when the tank is buttoned up or under flre.-2 Success depends on the tralnlng level of crews and unlts. Tanks, Infantry. and artlllery need to traln together." Tanks should have map boards.c* Tanks should have a dlrectlon lndlcator to asslst In navlgatlon when buttoned up.*'

Tanks allow llmlted observatlon from Inside.** Observatlon slits should be made of lamlnated glass that can easlly and qulckly be replaced when d a m a g e d : ' Due to llmlted vlslblllty. tanks cannot hold ground.Lg The wearlng of gas masks Interferes wlth the efflclency of the crew. All openlngs In the crew coznpartment should be made tlght so that a sllght Increase In alr pressure can be built up through the use of a power-operated blower that puts outside air through a gas protection fllter and dellvers It to the crew compartment.LP

32

Wear and tear and not enemy flre dlsables the majority of tanks. 70
A contlnuous supply, maintenance. and salvage system I s

needed to maintain the momentum of a tank attack.

A supply tank

Is needed to carry awnunltlon and other stores.=

Leaders should expect tank losses of 25% for each attack. Replacement tanks wlll be required In conslderable Tanks and crews can not sustain contlnuous combat beyond three d a y s . .

Ities
A tanks aeslgn should be based on its f~nction.~ A

tanks tactical purpose is the flrst fundamental in !ts origin.7L Tanks should be able to stop, start, and turn suddenly and qulckly wlthout harm to the crew or vehlcle. Controls should be

handlly located, easy to understand, operable with sllght effort, and rellable.77 Tanks should be as qulet as posslble and free from characteristic noises that would distinguish them from other types

of motor vehlcle~.~

33

A peacetime nation wlll never flnd the money for armored

forces equlpped wlth the best type of large expenslve tanks.

In

peacetime equlp the armored force wlth cheap and smaller tanks and plan for a change over when the fear of war looms and the natlon's purse strlngs loosen.7p

Tanks should be small and cheap and constructed almost

entlrely fran ccmnerclal motor c w o n e n t s . Thls wlll allow a large number of tanks to exlst In times of peace, reduce the cost of the mllltary, and facllltate rapld constructlon In the event of war.On The French turned to new methods after learnlng a cruc'lal lesson that a large number of small cheap machines stood a better chance of comblning survlval wlth success than a few heavy. expensive and less vulnerable tank9.O'

Trees
A ground army needs two types of tanks. One type, to work

with Infantry. must be heavily protected with emphasis on flrepover. The other type, to work wlth cavalry, must be llght and fast wlth emphasls on range and moblllty.a2 Speclal tanks wlll be needed:
-A flame-gun tank will be needed to burn out

plll b0xes.O"

34

-A mlne

rol I Ing tank wl1 I be needed to

counter mlneflelds.n4
- A bridge tank o r amphibious tank will be needed to

counter defenslve posltlons establlshed along rlvers. canals, and trenches.0a Tanks are selge warfare weapons that serve a speclal purpose. breaklng the trench stalemate.OL

Human factors need Improvements. The lnterlor of the tank Is not comfortable. Inslde It Is very hot, the alr I s bad and

the rlde Is uncmfortable. Crews are required to do malntenance in addltlon to fightlng.g7

A tank's

lnterlor space 1s determlned by the room requlred

by the crew to flrc the armament. Gunnerdguns should not interfere wlth each other. Gunners' firing positlons must be level and free of obstructlons. Gunners take less space standlng than sitting ar ciouching.Po Crew size depends more on armament than anythlng Falrly canfortable crew seats should be provlded for travellng purposes.9o Tanks are not able to store personal gear and addltlonal equlpment needed to sustain the fight. Space must be allotted for; -amnun1 t Ion

35

-radlo -personal equipment

-food. water

-gas protectlon devlces -spare parts and lubrlcantsea -tank baslc issue ItemseZ Tanks should have accesslblllty. They should allow easy access to all lubrlcatlng points, engine/transmlssIon bolts, wlrlng. batterles. and power traln elements. Assembiles should be removable wlth the greatest practicable ease and wlth mlnlmum disturbance to other parts.9"

Production
The most potent limltlng factor for tanks s the dlfflculty

In rapld productlon. In peace a natlon needs few. During war a

natlon need thousands.*Tank productlon is the tank's argest problem.

I t can take

a n k . ' = inore than a year to produce a certain type t

The weight and slze of a tank must always be the minimum practicable. A large target, of great weight, Is not desirable.*& Weight (31 tons) caused tanks to ditch easlly in the Flanders' mud.*'

36

The use of a diesel engine improves fuel economy and reduces the flre hazard.9o

A tank should be deslgned to be durable and rellable. In

spite of long wear and rough treatment.99 Tanks need to be more durable wlth fewer defects. There Is a contlnual need to replace heavy pleces of machlnery and tank

s lost through rapld wear and tear.Loo efflclency I

All power train parts (clutches/transmission reduction

gears) should be strong enough to wlthstand the straln englne operation w l l l put on t h e m s o L Tanks are mechanically inefflclent.Lo'

37

PART I 1

- WORLD WAR

I1

World War I1 can be characterized as a global war Involving multiple fronts, diverse battlefleld terraln, extreme and divergent weather condltlons. and numerous forms of battle ranglng

fran the German blltzkrieg to the US Island hopplng campala In

the South Paclflc. Independent of front, terrain, weather or form of warfare, the.tank qulckly establlshed itself as a weapon of declslon. and nations rapidly reorganized thelr ground armles and developed tactics based on maxlmlzlng the mobillty. firepower. and protectlon provided by armor formatlons and other moblle forces. Throughout World War I1 tanks were Involved In hundreds of battles and. when employed properly, slgnlficantly alded in deciding the victor. The World War I1 lessons learned concernlng tank and small tank unit mobility. flrepower, protection. command and control and overall design are listed on the pages that follow.

38

o.tshcb
Tanks are of little use In the process of clearing a way through a mlnefleld.loa Tank mobillty can be restricted by enemy Infantry defending

frm bullt-up areas along high speed routes of advance. Tanks can
not fleht effectlvelyln bullt-up areas and must Walt for Infantry to clear t h e m z o 4 Tank tracks can tangle with wire fences causing many tanks to throw or break track.IoS There Is no such thing as "tank country.' Some types of country are better than others, but tanks have and can operate everywhere.loA Terraln can severely hamper mobllity. In some battles,

nearly half the t a m s became bogged aown m e to unsuitable terrain. In European terrain. mud Is one of the great dangers and the velght of :he tank i s its own worst enemy.
!t

was not

u n c m o n for tanks to churn themselves lnto the mud untll only the turrets were v I ~ l b l e . * ~ ~ Artlllery barrages can churn the ground and make I t lmpassable for tanks.soP

39

Tanks are too

A tank's

S~OW.'~*

speed Is of greater Importance than Its armor.

Speed In exploiting the surprlse will allow tanks to defeat other tanks that are superlor In protection. armament and numbers.'1o

A track transport Is needed for long road movements. I t

wlll save on tank wear and tear."l

Ice/snow can cause tanks to. lose control and become giant toboggans. Rubber track pads should be used to provlde tractlon on Ice.

nobility Is ilmited o r based on the need to refuel the tank '

Armament
The value of the maln gun changed from being an infantry support gun to the additlonal role of 'tank busting."'*

40

Because of tank-proof defenslve posltlons. tanks lost thelr shock effect and their flrepower capablllties Increased In Importance. Tanks had to be able to flre effectlvely at any range
up to the

llmlt of dlrect vlslblllty.*lJ

Tanks need a hlgh-explosive shell to defeat personnel and

Superlor armament can turn the tlde In a tank batt1e.I"

Features
Tanks need 360-degree flre capabll Ity. Tanks should use rotatlng turrets to provlde It. The llmlted traverse of the maln

gun on the M3 General Lee was a grave Tanks.score a b1g advantage by belng able to shoot and hlt the enemy at a range at whlch the enemy could not hit back.LLP In European terraln. a tank is not often seen at greater ranges than
800 yards.

Usually the range 1s much less.

In the desert, tanks

can seen at a range of 2000 yardS.'an

In. aeserr' f.ighting,.a. CanK equippea.vith.long range

armament i s declslve.Lal Tanks need ranseflnders to ald gunners In determlnlng ranges to targets, thus lmprovlng maln gun accuracy. Wlth a ballistlc retlcle, a tank has only a 5% chance of a flrst round hlt at a range of 1500 meters. The stereoscopic rangefinder

Improved chances of a first round hit to 50% at 1500 meters.*z2

41

If a tank can dlsable an opponent whlle remalnlng outside the

opponent's weapons ranges. or If a tank can penetrate the opponent's armor whlle the tank remalns Invulnerable, the tank

wlll wln.lza
Tanks need a main gun stablizer to permit a shooting on the move capablllty.1a4 Tanks with a 'fire on the move' capability

have a demorallzlng effect on the defender because movlng tanks are harder for the defender to hlt than statlonary tanks.1zs

t hostlle

Lk.e
~ I e ;o-aetear. 3'

.inri.-canKguns'are d

concenrrarea. armor

punch. To survive, tanks have to spar with anti-tank gun positlons. When tanks encounter uperior flrepower. their

concentrated, decisive thrusts wi I be limited to slow piecemeal engagements.1zL

A slngle antl-tank gun hlt Is often not enough to destroy a

tank.

27

42

The airplane has the capabilltles to be the tank's deadllest foe.'ao Moving tanks are harder to hit than stationary

Tanks were destroyed

fo1 lows:

by

thelr opponent's weapons as

- main
ki 1 I s .

gun/artlllery accounted for 59.8% of the

- mlnes accounted - 65% of

suspension"'

for 23.7% of the kllls.

17.0% of the kills.'""

- bazookas accounted for

Tanks were hlt by thelr opponent's weapons as follows: all hlts were In the tank's hull.

35% of all hlts were In the tank's turret.

- 10% of.all hlts were

In the tank's lower

Approximately 45% of all turret hlts caused the tank to errupt in flre and canpletely burnt out the vehlcle.saa Approximately 60% of all hull hlts caused the tank to erupt

in fire and completely burnt out the ~ehicle.'~"

Crew and LLterlor crratectlpn

If a shell penetrates a tank and hlts ammunltion, I t Is

almost certaln to set the tank on fire.'"" Ammunition. not fuel, Is the prlmary flre hazard when a tank i s struck by shot or shell.'a3

43

Tanks save I l v e s . ' " ' per tank destroyed was 1 . 3 .

The average number of cremen kllled Approxlmately two to flve per cent of

crewmen deaths were caused by burns. Approxlmately 209: of crewmen casualtles happened whlle the crews were off thelr tanks.sa7

Tanks alone can not break through a prepared defense. Tanks need to flght Integrated wlth other arms.s3s The key t o success f o r tanks and Infantry Is close cooperatlon. Infantry Is needed to provlde essentlal antl-tank

protect 1on. I 19 Tanks and lnfantry that do not traln together wlll not be able to f l g h t together. Co!nbIned lnfantry/tank tralnlng should be part of Army education."O Close cooperatlon between tanks and aerial forces is essentlal. ComrmnIcatIon must be establlshed between forward

ground tanks and a l r squadrons to enable alr support wlthin mlnutes. The airplane 1s the best tank-support auxlllary.'41

Tanks' success hlnge dlrectly on the ablllty of artlllery to destroy antl-tank guns. Spllt second adjustments of artlllery flre can spell the dlfference between vlctory and d e f e a t . ' ' =

44

Fleld artlllery forward observers need to travel wlth tanks. Keep the same members of a combined a m team fighting together.

Do not separate or Interchange members.a44

Primary mlsslon of armor Is to attack Infantry and artillery. tanks. The enemy's rear Is the 'happy hunting ground' for

Use every means to get to

Prlmary purpose of a tank Is to be used to destroy

unarmored men. and agalnst the enemy's weakest posltlon and posltlon of these unarmored men.

Its antl-tank purpose I s

Tanks should lead Infantry when the terraln permlts rapld advance and the enemy's antl-tank defenses are weak. Infantry should lead tanks when the terrain restricts movement and flrepower or the enemy's antl-tank defenses are

The only.,vay t o successtui1y;fight motor!zea formations is wlth tank formations.14e Tanks should avoid occupylng Isolated groups of trees In oDen country because the enemy wlll lnvarlably tarset them wlth artlllery and alr fires. Tanks should dlsperse In open terrain.'** Because of Improved anti-tank weapons, tanks can no longer expose themselves for long periods whlle wlthln range of antl-tank

45

weapons. Tanks need to seek out the cover and concealment provlded by the terraln and only expose enough of the tank to permlt flrlng.lSn The superiority of defenslve flrepcuer can be sharply llmlted by the ablllty of the attacker to concentrate suddenly and In m e a t strength agalnst any part of the defenslve posltlon.lsl The tank does not fear the anti-tank gun; the tank fears the cDncealed anti-tank gun.1sa A concealed antl-tank gun Is worth four tanks."" Anti-tank guns are virtually lnvlslble to tanks and endless opportunities exlst for ambush and surprise. Tanks flghtlng In urban streets are at a serious dlsadvantage. Tanks should not flght In urban areas because: -limited ammuntlon wlll not permit suppression o r destructlon of all llkely antl-tank posltlons. -tanks cannot clear enemy Infantry from rubble o r rulns. -tanks wlll be In short grenade range of enemy lnfantry hldlng In bulldlngs along streets.IS4 Use of captured tanks can be dlsastrous because of: -no replacement parts.
-different atmnunltlon requlrements.
-different weapon ranges.z33

Tanks should never attack were the enemy expects them to come.1sL Tanks need to use thelr moblllty to strlke the enemy

46

using the longest way around or the lndlrect approach. Tanks should advance with the intent of avoiding the enemys ~trength.:~ Tanks should use secondary roads for routes of advance over prlmary roads because secondary roads are: -less apt to be thoroughly defended. -less apt to have demolltlons on t h e m i s n The main concern for tanks fightlng in open desert is to brlng the enemy under effectlve flre and start hitting hlm before he 1s In a position to hlt back.:s* The tank plays a declslve part In desert warfare because the desert contains no natural obstacles for It and no limitations on Its Tanks can move with perfect impunity under time fire provided by either 10-

or 155~10projectiles. Use proximlty or

normal time fire to cover tank attacks.: Terraln selection is essential for success. Terrraln can make the mass employment of tanks Impossible. Mountains, forest, waterways. and jungles can cause tanks to operate In dribs and
drabs.:-=

47

When radio comunications break down. the comnander w l l l lose the abllity to control his unlts.'Aa Leaders should comaand and control fran a forward postlon

In

order to:

-Improve troop morale. -take advantage of mmentary tactlcal advantages. -speed declslons.Ld4 Tanks need external phones to ccamuunlcate wlth ground

soI dl ers.

L3

Tank formations uslng a 'peep' wlth mlnlmum

(recon Jeep) can keep movlng

Tanks should f Ire at terraln whlch probably conceals anti-tank weapons. It Is better for a tank to waste amunition than rlsk Its d e s t r u ~ t l o n . ~ * ~ The rule for when to code or use clear concerning radlo aessages
IS:. if.

the. 3erioa of. accion. is:zhor:Ter rhan..:he ?erioa or

reaction, use clear: otherwise use code.Lda

48

Tanks have limited visibility.

Infantry using guerrilla

tactlcs have the capablllty to 'hand dellver' munltlons that can destroy tanks.'&*

More German tanks were disabled by wear and tear from long dlstance travel, lmproper dust fllters. and lmerslon in mud than by enemy Fleld repalr and overhaul has to be set up near the front to prevent the loss of tanks for extended per10ds.~~' Units in wartime wlll expend a slx month peacetime supply of repalr parts In a matter of a few days.'" The supply of replacement tanks has to be considered as lmportant as aimnunltion To flght contlnuously tanks must be employed in relays due
to crew fatigue and maintenance. requirements.*74

The average man could tolerate two to three tank burn outs. Few men withstood slx t o eight burn outs without mentally breaking down,
7s

49

The US deslgn attitude should change. The Uss zeal for a rellable machlne caused It to neglect the deslgn of the flghtlng system. The US was more concerned wlth transmlsslons. suspenslons. and chasls than wlth the deslgn of armor protectlon and armament

74

Tank versus tank superlorlty depends on: -maln gun accuracy. -rate of fire. -speed and maneuverablllty.
-leadershlp/tralnIng/morale.

-radlo ~0ntact.l~ Tanks havlng superlor armament and protectlon can offset slgnlflcant quantltatlve superlority. On average I t cost flve

U.S. Sherman M-4s or nlne Sovlet T-34s to destroy one German

Panther.17o The most slgnlflcant lnnovatlon In tank destructlon was the

small, close-range. lndlvldual soldler antl-tank weap~n.~

The more tanks rely on infantry, artillery. and a i r to support their maneuvers, the more vulnerable tanks became to Infantry, artlllery, and alr weapons. The more tanks have to rely

on ftrepower f r m air. Infantry, and artlllery. the less effecrlve they beccrme.
no

The whole alm of the modern technique of war Is to get men and weapons to effectlve polnts behlnd the enemy's maln posltlons. Effect polnts are fuel trucks, anmunltlon, supplies. mechanics and staff that are behlnd or followlng the enemy's vehlcl es. Tanks need to 'eat the cake of heavy protection and have moblllty too.'ie2 Heavy tanks, llke the 56-ton German Tlger. are not needed. What tanks lack In weIght/protectIon Is more than offset by Improved moblllty. History I s full of examples of a small, agile flghtlng

army defeatlng a larger, less moblle one.1ga Tanks are often required to carry lnfantry on the Inslde/outslde of the vehlcle. Tanks should be able to carry emergency supplles.s04

In desert

flghtlng, rellablllty. moblllty. and slze of the

main gun are more important than the quantity of tanks.ins Tanks have llmlted capabllltles and thelr role Is severely restrlcted by; -mechanical unre1iabIlity. -unfavorable terraln. -Improved AT weapons.1o1 Tanks need to be able to swlng around on their own axis.Ie7

51

The Brltlsh conflrmed the need for two types of tanks. One ,Isneeded whlch emphasizes speed/range/moblllty to perform cavalry type missions and one Is needed whlch emphaslzes firepower and protectlon to perform hard flghtlng.sOO
A unlversal tank Is needed to fill both Infantry and

cavalry roles.1s0 The Ideal tank would be well protected, aglle. powerful. and well armed.aPo Speclal tanks are needed to overccme physical obstacles llke concrete walls, plllars. plllboxes, and other fortlflcatlons. The other types of speclal tanks needed are; -amphI blous -mlne clearing -ditch fllllng -ground f lrmlng -br 1dgl ng

- f 1amet hrow I ng
-mlssi.le. launching

-search1 Ightlng19a Flamethrowlng tanks are very useful for attacks on houses, bulldlngs, and concrete emplacements. The morale effect Is tremendous.s92
Amphibious

tanks can be very useful. The US built 400

duplex drive tanks to supplement Brltlsh amphlblous tanks used In

52

the OVERLORD beach landlngs. The duplex drive tanks performed herolcally on the OVERLORD beaches and estlmates have them savlng the llves of more than 10,000 Allied soldiers. General Elsenhower

reported that wlthout amphlblous tanks, it would have been doubtful that the assualt forces could have f i r m l y establlshed the~elves.'~"

In

guerrilla flghtlng. llght tanks

wlll be more Important

than heavy tanks because light tank wlll facllltate air delivery and require less fuel .19*

The.we1ght of armor cannot make up for lack of maln gun power. Weight can only limit maneuverabillty and speed.*95 Tanks welghlng more than 40 tons wlll face conslderable difflcultles when belng transported or crosslng brldges. over 40 tons should be amphlblous.lPd

Any tank

Tanks equlpped wlth aircooled. dlesel englnes proved very satlsfactory. Dlesel englnes are better than gas englnes because

dlesel englnes have:

53

-better fuel econauy. -Increased range. -better rellablllty and less malntenance. -reduced potentlal for fire.'-'

Large numbers of rellable tanks can achleve superlority over fewer but more sophlcated tanks.sPg The Inherent defects of machlnes severely llmlted tank performance. Tanks were not sturdy enough f o r war. Trackplns and other parts broke at alarmlng rates. Tanks In ccmbat expended a
SIX month peacetlme supply of repair parts In a matter of a few

days. Nearly 60% of all tank casualtles were repalrable;

-80% of mlne casualltles were repalrable.
-40% of burned-out tanks were repalrable
.IQ9

Dust was a great problem even when speclal filters were

used. 3oo

54

PART I 1 1

- THE ARAB-ISRAELI

1967 AND 1973 WARS

The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 can be characterized as short, rapid confllcts domlnated by maneuver and flrepower. The weapons of declslon inltlally were tanks and hlgh performance alrcraft. but the lntroductlon of the mlsslle (In air defense
( S M S ) and anti-tank

(ATGMs) organlzations) to the battlefleld

ended the ablllty of the tank and the aircraft to dominate alone. In both confllcts, battles were fought over various terraln ranglng from deserts to mountains, farmlands, and urban areas. The weather condltlons under whlch both conflicts were fought varled. wlth temperatures ranglng from 130 degrees Inside tanks flghtlng in the Slnal to below freezing temperature readlngs

in the Golan Heights.

The size of battles ranged from indlvidual tank and platoon SiZea defenslve battles to divislon and army counterattacks. The lessons learned from the Arab-!sraeli conflicts concernlng tank and small tank mobility. firepower, protection. C m a n d and control. and overall deslgn are llsted on the pages that follow.

55

Hlneflelds, dltches. and e a r t h b e m were extenslvely used

to deny tanks the ablllty to move and concentrate.ao1

Antl-tank

dltches were flve meters wlde and two-and-one-half meters deep.aoa

The future belongs to the faster tank. Tanks should rely on speed rather than on armor for

Wheeled tank transportatlon should be used to move track vehlcles long dlstances.lO*

Tanks should be able to advance up to 60 mlles a day In war condltlons.zOs They should be able to cover 500 mlles In the

course of a campaIgn.aod

56

Tank maln guns are 10 tlmes as lethal as thelr World War I 1 counterparts. World War I1 maln guns could hlt only one out of 20 targets at 1,500 meters. Current maln guns can hlt between 10-15

out of 20 targets a t 1,500 meters.2a7 The tank ccnmander's machlne gun needs to be able to effectlvely flght close-In Infantry. The tank ccmander's machlne
gun needs to have a large amunition storage capaclty and be easy

to load.20n Both the -50 callber and 7.6machine guns are effectlve

agalnst hlgh performance alrcraft. Approximately 36 out of 100 ground kllls were credlted to machine gun
Armor plerclng rounds are not effectlve agalns Infantry.

There I s a need for a maln gun antl-personnel round.2ro

iilgh explosive anti-tanlc rounas,are effeccive at ranges

exceedlng 4000 meters.2sr There are not enough machlne guns on tanks to suppress
ATGMS . I S
2

57

The tank that has a longer maln gun range has an advantage. The Israell' maln gun outranged the Arabs' maln guns by 400 meters.
This enabled Israeli tanks to stand off and reglster hlts

wlthout recelvlng any.=')

The tank that has better maln gun accuracy wl11 decide
battles.sa4 Tanks equlpped wlth sophlstlcated slghtlng and

l m l f lcant advantage over stab1 I lzatlon systems wl11 have a s

opponents not slmllarly equIpped.s13 Tank amnunltlon must stlll remaln accurate even when the maln gun Is severely worn. The Israells were requlred to fire
105mm anmunltlon from maln guns worn out to 109mn.s1L

Most maln gun hlts In desert fighting are scored at ranges

less than 1600 meters.a17

If a tank can be seen, the enemy w l l l be able to hlt It. I f

a tank Is hlt, chances of the tank belns knocked out are very.

58

very hlgh.2'P

The battlefleld is very lethal. In the 1973 War. or

October War. the Arabs lost more than 2000 tanks and 500 artillery pieces in less than three weeks of flghtlng.2'9 more than 800 tanks durlng the same period.==O
A tank can increase its chances of survival through Its

The Israelis lost

moblllty. Quite slmply, a moving tank 1 s harder to hlt than a stationary o n e . ' " '

The way to enhance a tank's protection i s by

adding speed and firepower while reducing weight and

A tank using the terrain for cover and concealment doubles

Its chances of survival on the
Anti-tank (AT) weapons are more lethal than ever before and

in very large

Approximately 20% of tank kills during The mass use of A T M s

the October War were caused by ATGMs.""= can blunt armor attacks.2sr

Tanks should expect ATGHs to be

employed in mass frcm protected p o ~ l t l o n ~ . ~ ~ ~

ATGHs are more effective than tank main guns as the range
to the target
Tanks are more effective than ATGHs

at ranges less than 1000 meters because: -the tanks' main guns more accurate. -tanks can fire faster.a29 When fightlng ATGHs at extended ranges (greater than 1000 meters), chances of survival are better If the tank uses the cover and concealment provided by terrain rather than trylng to move. Movement by tanks at extended ranges i s relatively unimportant In affectlng the hittlng ability of ATGM

59

Antl-bazooka plates and external storage boxes can defeat

sane

AT mlsslles or rounds.2a1 Close air support (CAS) Is effectlve against tanks. The

maverick mlsslle recorded 42 dlrect hlts out of 50 tries. 'Smart barbs' hlt 25 out of 32 targets.="' Tanks should use passlve measures agalnst enemy alr attack. Armored forces should use small and dlspersed trains. bunkers, and tank positions. Crews and tanks should be camouflaged. Tanks should use the terraln for concealment from alr observatlon.aaa

Protect I p [ ~

Unprotected fuel and 011 containers are a flre hazard.2a* Storlng maln gun amrmnltlon above the turret rlng can result In secondary explosions and catastrophic kills of both tank and crew I f turret I s penetrated. Store all amrmntlon below the turret

r Ing.
A tank crew needs special flre reslstant unlforms to
prevent burns.
NOMEX unlforms are effectlve In reducing burns.

NOMEX should be modlfled as follows;

-sew up ventllatlon holes.

60

-double layers under forearms. buttocks, and outer thlgh areas.

-NOHEX back of tank seats.

-need NOMEX gloves. The combat vehlcle crewman (CVC) helmet Is effective protectlon If properly fltted. The padded lnterlor of the CVC helmet needs to be
fireproofed.*"*

Hydraullc fluld must be flame reslstant or It wlll cause the tank to catch flre when the turret Is ~enetrated.~"'

It Is essentlal to employ tanks as part of a combined arms

:em. Tanks need infantry, artillery, CAS; alr defense ana.other support and servlce support elements to successfully operate.aaa Unsupported tanks are at a deflnlte disadvantage agalnst
ATGMs due to ATGMs' surprise and long range accuracy

Uslng infantry and artlllery to suppress ATGMs can greatly reduce A T G M effectlveness.Z*O

61

Wlthout suppression of the enemys air defense systems, close air support for tank maneuvers is Ground

forces must break up the enemys SAM umbrella to use a l r wlth tanks.a4a

I f CAS Is not available. more artlllery will be needed.=.=

Diversffled AT weapons have elimlnated blltzkrieg

tactics.=*-

I t is Impossible to ensure the success of any tank attack

wlthout destroying or sllenclng the ATGM defense In advance.l*s

Tanks should not engage ATGMs at long ranges. Tanks should

move, uslng the cover and concealment provided by the terrain, to wlthin 1000 meters of the ATGHs to take advantage of the tanks better accuracy and rapid flre capabllltles.a46 In the defense, the ATGM Is superior to the tank. A n ATGM in
d

preparea and protected Dosi.tion will have an advantaae over a

tank even I f the tank Is supported by artlllery and Tanks that move In open terraln may expose themselves to highly lethal long range ATGM and cannon flre. Movement must be covered or concealed or done when enemy AT weapons are being surpressed.240

62

Independent of mlssion (defendkittack). tanks must be able to move on the battelfleld:

- The statlc defense Is no longer viable. - Tanks need the ability to suppress enemy
firepower

to allow movement.

Tanks need the other members of the canblned arms

team to successfully suppcess.2-p Tanks need to shoot and move to confuse the enemy's lndlrect flres.2sn Tanks should work In groups of elght to twelve vehlcles. Flrst, tanks should occupy hull down positions and observe, acqulre the enemy, and destroy the acqulred enemy. Then tanks should move and occupy different hull down positions and agaln observe, acqulre. destroy, and move. Tanks should repeat the occupying, acquiring, destroying. and moving sequence at least three times from three dlfferent locations. This procedure will confuse the enemy's lndlrect and direct flres.2s'

Yigh.exp1osive and white phosphorus-artiilery rounds used

In combinatlon are successful In dlsruptlng tank attacks. Leaders

should use hlgh exploslve rounds to puncture the enemy's external fuel/oll contalners and use whlte phosphorus rounds to set the fuel/oil afire, blind crewmen, and greatly degrade the enemy's morale.2s2

In desert sand, use variable time fuses because point

detonatlng fuses bury Into the sana and lose some of their

63

The slde that has the superior numbers of tanks on the battlefleld has the advantage.zsa The employment of captured tanks will be llmlted by lack of repalr parts and arrmunltlon.234 Tanks must be used In mass to be The best defense Is a good offense.23C

Control. and Close alr support Is not effectlve when the ground cclrmander and the alr cannander can not c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n l c CAS a tI e s. ~ ~ ~ posslble only after effectlve alr/ground coordlnatlon.zaO Tank forces will need tralned observers to effectlvely control alr/artlllery fires. Ineffectlve.aso The 'people factor' can wln over equlpment superiority. Tank forces need skllled crews, good leadership. and good c m a n d and control procedures to The tralnlng level of lndlvlduals and crews can determlne the dlfference between success or fallure on the battlefleld.zdl Leaders can Increase crew proflclency by:
64

Untrained observers v l l l be

-starting wlth high quality soldlers.

-1ncreaslng stablllty of assignments. -emphasizing realistic llve flre tralnlng.2c2 Tactical success depends on resourcefulness. Innovation. and flexlbillty.2*a Leaders and soldlers must be tralned to

exploit success regardless of whether It was planned for in the operations plan o r not. It i s not enough Just to be able to execute a rlgld plan.2c4 The best tank i s the one wlth the best crew.2L3 To succeed against quantltatlvely superlor forces, one needs a superior operatlve/skiIIed force.2cc Leaders need to be far forward and emphaslze mission The cannander's order should be 'follow me.'2ce

Tank forces need an emergency vehicle ldentlficatlon radio frequency on the mobile battelfield to ald In preventlng frlendly forces from firlng on other friendly forces.zL' Tanks and alrcraft need a rapld and posltlve method for identlfylng both friendly air and tank elements to aid in preventlng friendly forces from flring on each other.27o When tanks are defendlng, they should use wire to conanunicate. When tanks are attacking, they shouid use FM radio to ~ommunlcate.~~'

65

The use of fixed call slgns by tank forces makes I t easler for the enemy to plnpolnt the ccamand functlon at each conrnand level. Vulnerablllty of radlo ccmmunlcations can be a slgnlflcant factor In the loss of battlefleld carmander~.~~ Tanks need to be able to operate In an lntense electronlc warfare envlrcment. offset jammlng.z7a Wlthout good morale, there can be no success In war.=;* Pre-arranged procedures wlll be needed to

A buttoned up tanks llmlted vlslblllty will force tank

cauuanders (TCs) to open hatches to Tanks should

f l a t with

the TCs hatch open or partlally

open to overcome vlslblllty and target acqulsltlon During iarge nighc.sart1es.. the illumination createa
3y

burning vehlcles, flares, and search1 lghts tended to mlnlmlze the

value and degrade the effectlveness of passive vlslon d e v l c e ~ . ~ ~ ~

66

The key to a successful rnalntenance effort Is the foward use of area contact teams. Teams need to be tallored to meet the speclflc needs of the supported ~ n l t s . ~ ~ ~ Baslng class IX repair parts stockage on peacetime maneuvers w l l l result In wartlme shortages.a7D Extenslve

cannlballzation will be needed to sustaln operatlons.200 Recovery vehlcles need c r o s country capablllty.asl Water and Its protectlon are essentlal In the desert. Protect water by storlng It Inside the turret.ao2

The tank 1 s the slngle most Important weapon on the mechanized battlefield. It must be deslgned to break through enemy defenses, get to hls rear, destroy hls cmrmunlcatlons. reserves, artillery. malntenance, and
67

The future belongs to the faster, lighter tank armed with an ATGn of lmnense penetrating power. Tanks should rely on speed rather than armor for protectlon.s04

The heavy, relatlvely slow tank Is near the end of its

career .Oms A mlsslle mounted on a tank Is better than one carrled by the Infantry. A mlsslle mounted on a helicopter Is better than one on a tank.soL

A tank that has a larger main gun baslc load capaclty has
an advantage. Israeli tanks could carry between 63-70 rounds.

Arab tanks could carry between 42-46 Large tanks are better than small tanks because; -they can store more ammunition. -they can contain better flre control systems. -they are less tlring on crews.zos Small tanks are better than large tanks because of thelr lower A low tank sllhouette Is desirable because

lower tank sllhouettes are smaller targets and are easler to cover and conceal and harder to acquire and hit.z9o The tank conmander's cupola Is not satlsfactory because I t ;

-Increases the tank's sllhouette. -Interferes wlth machlne gun operatlon. -restricts ~ I s l o n . ~ ~ '
68

The tank connnander's

hatch needs to have the capablllty to

be locked in three posltlons:

-fully open.

-partially closed. but leaving a 3-5 Inch space between the tank and the hatch to permlt 360- degree observation. -fully Tank ammunition needs to prolong, not degrade, main gun tube Ilfe. Adding lubricant to the anmunltion powder charge can

extend tube Ilfe four to five tlme~.'~~ Tanks should have no external hardware such as
searchlights, water cans, oil cans that are vulnerable to overhead

artlllery fires or small arms flre that will prevent the tank commander fran brlnglng supporting air burst artillery onto hls tank to suppress enemy infantry.a94 Tanks need to be designed to mlnimize catastrophlc loss. The battle damaged tank repalr rates f o r the October War was: Britlsh Centurions 60% returned to action Soviet T54155
US 14WM60

55% returned to action

19% returned to actionzPa

h r l n g the October War. every Israel1 tank employed in the

Golan Helshts was hit at least once.

Approxlmately 150 of 250

"knocked out' tanks were returned to battle after repairs.a9'

69

Tanks have the a b l ity to detect and avold long range slar
moving ATGMS.~
A tanks mobility, armor, and firepover afford It both

protection and the abllity to move quickly fran sltuatlons of dlspersion to those of concentration -and vlce versa.a0o

Special tanks wi I be needed:

-mlnerol Ing or plovlng tanks will be needed to

counter mlneflelds. -bridge tanks or amphibious tanks w l l l be needed to counter defenslve posltlons established along rivers, canals, and trenches.aPe

Poorly deslgned tanks can lead to early crew fatlgue factor

because of: -excess fumes. -excess heat. -poor ventilatlon.300~

70

Tanks cannot be produced on a short notlce to react to

emergencies. The

main reason Is canponent productlon. It can take

9 months to produce some as long as 1

It I s better to have or produce many low cost tanks than to

have fewer more sophlstlcated expenslve tanks.ao=

Llghter weight means less track wear.and better sand crosslng capabllltles. Llghter welght can Improve maneuverablllty.aOa

power. ?!ant

A tank's

alr cleaner system needs armor protectlon against

artlllery fragnents and small arms flre. Penetrations w l l l allow sand and dirt to enter alr Intakes and cause englne fallure.30'

71

Tank amnunltlon needs quality control checks. Durlng the October War. more than 15.000 US sabot rounds were found to be unserviceable because of tumbllng or skewlng of the round.aos The more canpllcated the tank or system design, the harder

I t Is to repalr or fleld flx when broken.='*

The list of lessons learned In this chapter is not all-lncluslve. Further research may reveal other lessons that can be added. The lessons listed in thls chapter will form the basis for the analysls and comparison In chapter 4 and the determlnatlon

of the extstence of a c m o n thread of lessons.

72

ENDNGTES

1.
p.11.

Rlchard M. Ogorklewlcz. W u r o d Forces (New York: Arco, 1970), (London: Faber and Faber.

2,
3.

Gifford Martel, O u r w e d 1954). p.38.

Brmv

Hugh Elles, 'Some Notes on Tank Development during the War', Quarterle, Aprll 1921. p.268.

T k

4 . Robert 3, Icks and others, F l ~ Slnce s 1916 (Washington D . C . : Natlonal Services, 1933). p.197.

5. Ian V. Hogs, Bmpur In W f l l c t : The Deslan and Tactlcs pf m u r e d Fiuhtina V e h i u (London; Janes. 1980), p.31.
6 .

Icks and others, p.198. Elles. p.270. Hogg. p.31. Icks and others, p.198.

7.
8. 9.

10. Hogg, p.29.

11.
1 2 .

Ogorkiewlcz, p.4. Icks and others, p.311.

, Hay. 1921'.

13; 3.C. Chynowith. .'Taw infantry," U n r r v J o p.507.

14.

Icks and others, p.311.

15. Icks and others, p.186. 16. Icks and others. p.187. 17. Icks and others, p.191. 18. Icks and others, p.197. 19. Martel. ,73 p.38.

2 0 :

Icks and others, p.183.

21. Icks and others, P. 184.

22. Macleod G. Ross, Stockwell Ltd. 1976). p.?BA

1933 to 1945 (Elms Court:

23. Kenneth 3. Macksey. W: A Hlstorv of the BrmPuted Fiahtlns Vehicle (New York: Ballantine. 1971), p.45. 24.

Icks and others, p.201.

25. Macksey, p.45.

26. Icks and others, p.311. 27. Martln Blumeson, T h e D e r s 1885- 1940, (Boston : Houghton Hiffilln, 1972). p.454. 2 8 . Blumeson, p. 449. 29. Icks and other, p. 191.
30. Macksey, p.33.

31. Elles. p.270. 32. Icks and others, p.193. 33. Icks and others, p.193. 34. Icks and others, p.194. 35. Hogg. p.29. 36. Icks and others, p.201.
37;
Hogg;

p.29.

38. Icks and others, p.193. 39. Elles. p.279. 40. Ogorklewicz, p.15.
41. Samuel Rockenback. 'Tanks and Their Cooperatlon with Other Arms," lnfaatrv J m , January 1920, p.543.

42. Rockenback. p.543. 43. Icks and others, p.184. 74

44. Robert J. Icks. 19721, p.80,. 45.

(Gordon Clty: Doubleday,

Icks. p.80.

46. Elles, p. 271. 47. Macksey. p.33. 48. Elles. p.286. 49. Macksey. p . 3 3 . 50. Rockenback. p. 543. 51. Macksey. p. 33. 52. Rockenback. p.543.
53.

Hogg. p.34. (London: Hodder and Stoughton

54. Ernest D. Swlnton, Llmlted. 1932). p.30. 55. Elles, p. 64. 56.

Icks, p.80 and Macksey, p. 33.

57. Rockenback, p .540. 58. Elles, p.270. 59. Chynovlth. p. 507. 60. Martel, W

d Forces. p.38 and Macksey. P. 40.

61.. Icks and.others. p.311. 62. Icks and others, p.203. 63. Icks. p. 80. 64. Icks and others, p.203. 65. Icks and others, p.203. 66. Hogg. p.29. 67. Icksand others, p.191. 68. Rockenback, p.450. 75

69. Icks and others, p.193. 70. Rockenback. p. 542. 71. Icks. p.80. 72. Peter Chamberlaln and Chrls Ellls. and London: Hamlyn. 1974), p.2. 73. Icks and others, p.312. 74.

(New York

Icks. p.80.

75. Rockenback. p.450. 76. Icks and others, p.183. 77. Icks and others, p.202. 78.

Icks and others, p.202.

79. Martel, W A r m o u r e d

Farces. P.4.
July 1972,

80. Martel. 'Small Tanks and Cavalry: p.437.

81. Macksey, p.26.

82. Martel, O u r r e d F a . P.39.

83. Hacksey. p.43.

84. Chamberlaln and Ellls. p.24.

s . p.24 and Martel. O u r . l s . 85. Chamberlaln and El 1 i p.38.

86. Martel,
.*

; 9.39.

87. Icks and others, p.311. 88. Icks and others, p.194. 89. Icks and others, p.185. 90. Icks and others, p.194. 91. Hogg. p.25. 92. Icks and others, p.194.

76

93. Icks and others, p.202. 94. Icks and others, p312.
95. Rockenback, p.540.

96. Icks and others, p.183. 97. How. p.29. 98. Icks and others, p.195.
99. Icks and others, p.201.

100. Elles. p.269. 101. Icks and others, p.311. 102. Chynovith. p.507. 103. Martel. !&-&mured

m. p.220.

104. Tm Wlntrlngham. The Stow of WeaDons and Tactlcg (Freeport: Books for Librarles Press. 1943). p 277. 105. Icks. p.279.
106. George S. Patton Jr., Kar as I Knew I t (Boston: Houghton Mifflln, 1947). p.43.

107. John Ellls, p.127. 108. Ellis, p. 127.

(New York: Charles Scrlbner, 1980).

109. Martel. ( X l r d Porceg. p.157.

110. LiddeI.Hart,

of the d i l l , p.125.

..

111. E l l l s . p.126.

112. Ellls, p.127. 113. Hoffman Nickerson. Sons. 1945), p.264. 114. Martel. -Armouted 115. Wintringham. p.208. 116. Hoggs, 11.103. 77
Pol icy (New York: G. P. Putmans and

Forces, p.159.

117. Mlldred H . Glllle, Epralna the Thunderbol.t. (Harrlsburg: Mllltary Servlce, 1947). p.209. 118. Peter Chamherlaln and Chris Ellis. 1969) p.8. 119. Martel.

(New York: Arco,

.-

p.156. p.156.

120. Martel. , Cclnpany,

121. Llddel Hart, 1953). p.185.

(New York: Harcourt. Brace and (London: Arms

122. James Loop and Steven Zaloga. and Amour Press. 1983). p . 8 . 123. Nlckerson. p.250. 124. H o w . p.84. 125, Janusz Piekalklewlcz. 1986). p. 247. 126. E l l l s . p.125. 127. Plekalkiewlcz , p .298. 128. Plekalklewlcz. p.298. 129. Piekalklewicz. p.247.
130. Icks, p.341.

CPoole-Dorset: Blandford Press.

131. Icks. p.341. 132.. Icks. P.341.

133.. Icks. ?:341.

134. Martel', O u r ~ r m o u r e d , p.147. 135. Hoggs. p.84. 136. Glllie. p.268. 137. Icks. p.341. 138. Wlntrlngham. p.205. 139. Ellls. p.137.

78

140. Glllle. p.256. 141, Plekalklewlcz. p.75. 142. Glllle. p.215. 143. Martel, O u r w e d Forces. p.148. 144. Glllle. p.279. 145, Patton. p.413. 146. Wlntrlngham. p.209.

147. Patton. p.342.

148. Plekalklewlcz, p.47. 149. Patton, p.345. 150. Ellis, p.135. 151. Nlckerson. p.265. 152. Martel,, 153. Glllle. p.261. 154. Ellls, p.135. 155. Plekalklewlcz, p.77. 156. Patton. p.347. 157. Ellls. p.133.
158.

p.216.

Patton. 0.348.

159. Hart, p.186. 160. Hart, p.185. 161. Patton. p.348. 162. Ellls. 13.134. 163. Plekalkiewicz, p.75. 164. Plekalkiewicz. p.77. 165. Gillie. p.279. 79

166. Icks. p.341. 167. Patton. p.345. 168. Patton. p.348. 169. Wlntringham. p.222. 170. Plekalkiewicz. p.134. 171. Plekalklewlcz. p.135. 172. Ellls. p.126. 173. Martel. , 174. Nlckerson. p.264. 175. Icks. p.341. 176. Martel. m
d , p.155.

p.148.

177. Plekalklewlcz, p.77. 178. Plekalklewlcz. p.254. 179. Plekalklewlcz, p .297. 180. Chamberlaln and Ellls. p.36. 181. Wlntrlngham, p.227. 182. Glllle. p.217. 183. GIIlle. p.262. 184. Gillle. p.279. 185. Hart, p.185. 186. Ellis, p.125. 187. Hartel,, r e d 188. Martel. -

p.157.

Forces. p.147.

189. Hoggs, p.182. 190. Hoggs. 13.82. 191. Martel,,80

p.248.

192. Martel, -ed 193. Glllle. p.279. 194. Wlntrlngham. p.211. 195. Hart, p.185.

Forces, p.306.

p.158. 196. Martel, Our.ArmouredForees. 197. Martel, e d 198. John Sanders, p.5.
199.

Forces. p.157.

In B r W SCrVlce 1942-6, 1980.

Ellis, p.126.

200. Ellls. p.126. 201. Avlgdor Kahalaml. 'Defense of the Golan.' Mllltarv, October 1979, p . 4 .

202. 'The 1973 Mlddle East War; An Engtneer's View," November/December 1979, p.395. 203. Avaham Adan, Qn the W p.469. s of the

l h eMllltu

(Presldlo Press. 1980).

War to War: The e l l 204. Nadav Sofran. 1948 1961 (New York: Pegasus. 1969). 13.353.

Coofrontatlon

205. Sofran. p.353. 207. Wllllam Depuy, 'Impllcatlons of the Mlddle East War on US h n Y Tactlcs, Doctrine and Systems., US Amy Tralnlng and Doctrlne Camand, March 1975, p.10.
208; Waiter J. Henderson, .'Analysisof :he Lessons Learnea in the

October 1973 Arab-Israeli War,' Marine Corps Development Education C m a n d . May 1977. p.C-324.
209. Memorandum. 'The Lessons Learned frcm the Mlddle East Crlsls." Department of the Army, Offlce of the Asslstant Chief of Staff for Force Development, January 18, 1974. p.27. 210. Jac Weller, "Tanks In the Mlddle East", LlUJtarv Rev&, 1976, p.18. a s t . ' p.21. 211. Weller, ' Tanks in the Mlddle E

May

81

212. Jac Weller. 'The F l g h t at Suez', -1

p; 133:

n e t .

Sep/Oct 1974,

213. C. N. Barclay, 'Lessons from the October War'. P.28. 214. Weller, 'Tanks in the Middle East,' p.22. 215. Barkley. p.28. 216. Memorandum. p.6. a s t . ' p.22. 217. Weller, 'Tanks in the Mlddle E 218. Depuy, p.16. . 6 . 219. Depuy. p 220. Henderson, p.A-1-3. 221. Depuy. p.14. 222. Adan. p.469. 223. Depuy. p.4. 224. Depuy. p.2. 225. Henderson, p.C-3-24.

m, Mar

1974,

226. Cham Herzog, ^Arab-Israeli Wars- (New York: Vintage, 1984). p.190.
227. Weller, " T a n k s

in the Middle East,' p.21.

228. Depuy, p.12. 229. Depuy, p.13; 230. Depuy, p.16. 231. Memorandum, p . 3 . 232. Depuy. p.28. 233. Henderson, p.E-2-6.
234. Henderson, p.A-1-3

235. Henderson, p.C-3-24.

82

236. Henderson, p.1-1-9. 237. Memorandum, p.7. 238. Depuy, p.2.

&y&.

239. Charles Wakebridge. 'Tank Myth or a Mlssile Mlrage,' &lU&xy August 1976, p.10.

240. Memorandum. p.1. 241. Depuy. p.28. 242. Henderson, p.E-1-7. 243. Memorandum, p.24. 244. Wakebrldge, p.10. 245. Herzoz. p.26. 246. Depuy, p.13. 247. Wakebrldge. p.10. 248. Henderson, p.C-3-27. 249. Depuy, p.4. 250. Weller. T h e Flght at Suez,' p.133. 251. Weller, T h e Flght at Suez," p.133. 252. Memorandum, p.16. 253. Depuy, p.12.
254. Yenaerson. ?.i-i-8.

255. Wakebrldge. p.10. 256. Henderson, p.A-1-3. 257. Henderson, p.F-10. 258. Memorandum, p.24. 259. Memorandum, p.23. 260. Henderson, p.A-1-3.

83

261. Depuy. p.2. 262. Memorandum. p.4. 263. Henderson, p F-54. 264. Barclay. p.28. 265. Weller. 'Tanks In the Mlddle East.' p.17.

266. David Elagar, 2 (Tel Avlv: Unfverslty Pub1 Ishlng. 1975), p.247. 267. Henderson, p.A-1-3. 268. Sofran. p.350. 269. Henderson, p.F-10. 270. Henderson, p.F-10. 271. Henderson, p;F-10. 272. Henderson, p.F-54. 273. Henderson, p.F-54. 274. Barclay. p.26. 275. Sofran, p.350. 276. Memorandum. p . 4 . 277. Memorandum. p.18. 278. Henderson, p.1-1-6. 279. ilenderson. p.i.-l-7: 280. Henderson, p.1-1-8. 281. Henderson, p.1-1-8. 282. Memorandum. p.35. 283. Depuy. p.18. 284. Henderson. p.A-1-3 285. Wakebrldge, p.11

84

286. Depuy, p.33. 287. Henderson, p.A-1-3. 288. Wakebridge. p.11. 289. Wakebrldge. ~1.11. 290. Henderson, p.A-1-3. 291. Henderson, p.C-3-24. 292. Henderson, p.C-3-24. 293. Henderson, p.C-3-24. . 2 . 294. Memorandum. p 295. Memorandum, p.8. 296. Elagar. p.272. 297. WeIler. 'The Fight at Suez', 298. Adan. p.268.
p.133.

299. 'The 1973 Mlddle East War;

An Englneer's Vlew,The Mllltarv November/December 1979, p.395.

300. Henderson, p.A-1-3.

301. Memorandum, p.51.

302. Adan. p.469.
303. Weller, p. 16.

304. Henaerson,. p.C-3-24.

305. Henderson, p.C-3-24.

306. Memorandum. p.5.

85

CHAPTER

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter provides the reader an analysis of the lessons learned from World War I, World War 11. and the Arab-Israel1 1967 and 1973 Wars concernlng tank and small tank unit mobility, flrepower, protection. c a m a n d and control. and overall design.

Its purpose i s to determine whether there is a continuous thread

of lessons that can be considered c o m o n to these conflicts.

'

The analysis will be divided into flve areas: mobillty.

flrepower, protectlon, carnaand and control, and overall deslgn.

If a c m o n thread of lessons does exist in an area, a listing of

:he. c m o n . thread. iessons,wi i I be estaDi ished partlcular area analysls.
dt'

:he. end ot :he

86

MOBILITY

An examlnatlon of the lessons learned concernlng tank

moblllty established the followlng c a m o n ground.

In the three confllcts examlned. the major obstacles

employed by the cccnbatlves to deny tank moblllty were slmllar. The cccnbatlves attempted to deny tank amblllty by constructlng dltches. emplacing mlneflelds. or uslng natural or man-made features such as rlvers. mountalns, or urban areas. conflicts the consistency of the s o l l , whether mud of Flanders o r the desert sand of the Slnal hamper tank moblllty. Concernlng speed. the c c o n lesson was that tanks should be fast, The cannon standard concernlng how fast tanks should Se was twofold: tanks should be fast enough to degrade the ablllty of enemy AT gunners to dellver accurate flre. and tanks should Se faster than the enemy's tanks. The c a m o n tactical concept was In the three

t w a s the lowland

could severely

that tanks should rely on speed rather than thlck armor for battlefield survival. Another c m o n lesson was that tanks need an alternate method of movlng long dlstances over roadways. Inltlally. a

dual-capable tank was ought, one that could travel long distances uslng Its wheel capabl Ity and, as I t neared the battlefield. could stop and put on
ts tracks and flght the battle uslng Its
87

track capability.

After abandoning the dual concept Idea, a

wheeled tank transporter was deslgned. Wheeled o r rall tank transportation was used extenslvely in both World War I 1 and the Arab-Israeli Conflicts to move tanks long distances o r from one front o r theater to another front o r theater. The last c a m o n mobillty lesson was that a tanks range, or need to refuel, serves as a llmiting factor.

In maneuver warfare

the need to refuel tanks can have a slgniflcant effect on the campaign plan.

In sumnary, the comnon thread of lessons learned concernlng

mobility was as follows:
1)

The major obstacles that will be used to deny

moblllty Include dltches, mineflelds. barbed wire, urban areas, and natural features such as rivers, canals, and mountains.
2)

The conslstency of the soll. whether it be

earth o r sand, can severely limlt a tanks ability to cross terraln.

3)

The speed of a tank should be greater than the

tank speed of its opponents and fast enough to degrade the a b i l i t y of enemy AT gunners to hit the tank. Speed should be used to provide protection.
4)

Tanks need an alternate method of movlng long

dlstances over roadways.

5) A tanks range, or need to refuel, will be a

limiting factor on the maneuver warfare battlefield.

FIREPOWER

An examlnatlon of the lessons learned concernlng tank firepower established the folloulng c m o n ground.
A tanks maln gun or anti-tank cannon needs to be able to

penetrate o r bust through the armor of Its opponent. The requirement for accuracy at extended ranges, while not documented in the World War I lessons. was quite evident from the lessons learned durlng World War I1 and the Arab-Israel1 confllcts.
Thls

need for accuracy at extended ranges was derived from the Improved AT capabllitles of the defender durlng World War I 1 and the Arab-Israel1 confllcts. Improved AT weapons took away the tanks

ablllty to move wlthln polnt blank range of trench systems.

bunkers, and Infantrymen as tanks dld routinely durlns World War I engagements. The lesson that a tanks maln gun needs to have an anti-personnel capabillty serves as another common thread concerning main gun CapdDllitleS. The anti-personnel requiremenr grew in Importance as the range of the enemys AT weapons Increased to outslde the tanks machine gun ranges. The need for multlple machlne guns proved to be another c m o n lesson. Machine guns are needed to destroy o r suppress

enemy Infantrymen. antl-tank posltlong. combat support and service support personnel and equlpment. and to defend agalnst hostile

89

alrcraft. The exact number of machlne guns needed was not ldentlfled as a result of thls research, but the rule 'the more the better" appears applicable. Another c m o n lesson Is that tanks need to have a 360degree fire capability. Whlle this lesson was not specifically documented In the Arab-Israel1 confllcts, the fact that all tanks Involved In the S I X Day War and the October War had a 360- degree flre capablllty serves to relnforce the documented World War I and World War I 1 lessons on the need for that capablllty and on the need for a turret to provide It.

In addltlon to all around flre capablllty. a tank needs the

capablllty to engage In two dlrectlons simultaneously. While this need was documented only In World War I lessons, the fact that the vast majority of tanks that fought In later confllcts had and made

use of this capablllty tends to support thls need as a c m o n

1esson

.
One lesson that dld not appear In World War I. but should

be consldered cannon. was that technologlcal advancements Concerning the tank's flre control system, such as a rangefinder
or stablllzatlon. can provlde a marked advantage by providing

better accuracy at extended ranges or by provldlng a 'shoot on the move' capability.

It should also be noted that superior

technology by ltself Is not enough to gain the advantage. I t is equally Important to develop and use exploltatlve tactical methods

to take advantage of a tank's technologlcal superlorlty. Without

90

the development and use of exploltatlve tactlcal methods, superlor technology wlll lose much of
Its potential value.

In swnmary, the c a m o n thread of the lessons learned concernlng flrepaver was as follows:
1)

The tank's maln gun needs to be able to

penetrate Its opponents' armor at extended ranges.

2)

The tank's maln gun needs t o have an

antl-personnel capablllty.
3)

A tank needs multlple machine guns to destroy

or suppress enemy close-In Infantry. AT gunners, ccmbat support

and service support personnel and equipment. and provlde antl-alrcraft protectlon.
4)

A tank needs a 360-degree firing capabl lty.

5) A tank needs to be able to provlde fire in two

dlfferent dlrectlons slmultaneously.

6)

Superior technology, h e n coupled with tactical

methods to explolt It, can provlde a marked advantage.

PROTECTION

An examlnatlon of lessons learned concerning tank protectlon established the followlng c m o n ground.

91

The key to battlefield survival for tanks Is based on thelr proper employment. Tanks must be allowed to fight in a manner that maximlzes thelr abllltles and takes advantage of the enemys weaknesses. They must be allowed to maneuver using the cover and concealment provlded by the terraln whlle supported by the flrepover of other tanks or by other means (Infantry. artillery.
or alr). Tanks

must be allowed to flght at varlous ranges,

dependent on the terraln and the enemy sltuatlon, wlth the aim of maxlmlzlng their speed, protectlon, extended maln gun range, and rapid flre capabl1Itles.

It Is evldent that the cwmnon lesson concernlng the a u n t

of armor protectlon afforded a tank I s that a tank cannot be protected agalnst all hostlle flre. Whlle not documented In the World War I 1 and the Arab-Israel1 lessons, the common lesson

concernlng the mlnlmum amount of armor protectlon afforded a tank

was that a tank should be provided enough armor pmtection to defeat all enemy AT weapons that can be carrled on the battlefield
SY

a slngle soldler. The lesson that tanks saved thousands of soldlers llves

rang clear throughout the three confllcts.

The protectlon tanks

provlde agalnst lndlrect and machlne gun fires and the tanks abllltles to destroy machine guns and quickly decide battles repeatedly caused tanks to be credited wlth saving thousands of
1 ives.

92

The destructlon and death caused by fire serves as another c m o n thread lesson. Whether It was fuel flres In World War I. amunition fires in World War 11. or the combination of fuel, ammrnitlon and hydraullc fluld flres In the Arab-Israel1 confllcts. flre was the greatest destroyer of the tank and the greatest fear of Its crewmen. Every aspect of tank deslgn and

capabllitles should be examined wlth the alm of reducing the posslbllltles of flre. The last c o m o n thread was that tank crewmen need speclal unlforms to provlde protection agalnst flre and other hazards

unlque to tank flghtlng.

In sumnary, the carmon thread of lessons learned concerning

protectlon was as follows:
1)

The key to battlefleld survlval I s proper

emp 1 oyment

.
2)
A tank cannot be protected from all hostlle

Ire. but as a mlnlmum. It should be protected wlth the alm of defeatins all AT weapons that a sinsle soldier. can carry.
3)

A tank should be deslgned with the aim of

ellminatlng all possible flre hazards.

4)

Tank crews need speclal unlforms to protect

agalnst flre and other hazards unique to tank fightlng.

93

COMMAND AND CONTROL

An examlnatlon of the lessons learned concerning tank

ccrnmand and control established the followlng c a n o n ground. Tanks can not flght alone on the battlefleld. They need to

flght as part of a ccmblned arms team conslstlng of Infantry. artillery, air defense assets, air, and other cclnbat support and servlce support elements. Infantry wlll be needed to klll o r

Suppress enemy AT posltlons, clear urban and forested areas, and hold captured ground. Artlllery wlll be needed to suppress enemy

AT posltlons. provlde smoke to conceal tank maneuvers, and

suppress enemy alr defense assets. Air defense elements wlll be

needed to protect tank maneuvers frctn attacks by enemy air. Friendly air will be needed to gather information and augoent artlllery flres. Combat servlce support elements wlll be needed

to provlde contlnuous supply and malntenance tralns to sustain

combat operations. The combined arms team must be integrated into

a forces.structure a t - its. iowest ievei. The. lnaiviauai t a w or tank sectlon. the individual infantryman o r flre team, and the crew, section, and team leaders from the other combat support and servlce support elements must know how to fight or support based on the teams col lectlve strengths and weaknesses. Addltionally.

the team must traln or practlce together to be successful in combat.

94

When tanks are employed as part of a comblned arms team. their success depends on several factors: -tanks must be used in mass. -tanks must be concentrated In narrow sectors or polnts of enemy weakness. -the selection of terrain must permit mobility and

mass employment.
-the terrain must provlde cover and concealment or other means must be employed. such as smoke/fire to suppress o r blind possible and known enemy AT positions.. -tanks must be able to ccamunlcate wlth each other, other ground forces, and the alr. Another canmon lesson I s that tanks are offensive weapons that should be used to destroy or counter strong defenses. Whlle thls purpose i s ccamon. the method of how tanks overcame strong defenses changed. During World War I. tanks could conduct frontal

assaults and use their mobility, firepower and protectlon to close wi.th and destroy Infantrymen. machine gun posltlons. and artlllery. thus destroying the defense.
During the later stages

of World War I 1 and the Arab-Israeli 1973 War, superior AT weapons

forced tanks to use the "long way' or 'Indlrect approach' to cause the enemy to abandon his strong defensive positions in order to counter the tanks' movement. When engagements occurred, they were

at long range and wlth the intent of destroying or bypasslng enemy

AT weapons In route to the enemy's rear area.

95

Poor tank vlslblllty serves as another c a m o n thread. Wlth hatches open tank vlslblllty Is Ilmlted, and when buttoned-up vlslbllity Is severely restricted. Llmlted vlslbility i s the maln reason why tanks, wlthout the support of Infantry forces, are not capable of holdlng ground. Due to llmlted vlslblllty. enemy

Infantry can Ilterally hand-dellver deadly munltlons to tanks not flghtlng as part of a ccmblned arms team.
A cannon lesson concernlng tank movement I s that tanks
movlng In open terraln and wlthln range of enemy

AT posltlons must

elther employ smoke to conceal themselves o r effectlvely suppress enemy AT positions. Fallure to do either wlll most likely result

In the tanks destructlon.

The c o m o n thread concernlng control Is that leaders must
be well forward to effectlvely control tank maneuvers. Posltlonlng leaders forward wlll permit them to better see the battlefield. enable them to quickly make decisions that can take advantage of an opportunlty. and Improve the soldiers morale. The c m o n thread concerninq sustainment Is that the
lnablllty to provlde contlnuous sustalnment can be as deadly a foe

as the enemy. flres.

Wear and tear will dlsable more tanks than enemy

Wlthout an adequate supply of repalr parts and forward

located mechanlcs. tanks will not be mechanically able to fight. Fuel and amunition must be provlded on a contlnuous basls.

In sumnary, the c o m o n thread of lessons learnea concerning

c o m a n d and control was as follows:

96

1)

Tanks need to flght as part of a cmblned arms

team. The comblned arms team must be Integrated and tralned down

to the Indlvldual, sectlon. and squad level.

2)

Tank success depends on several factors:

-mass

-concentration

-terra1 n se 1ect I on -canmunIcatIon

3)

Tanks are offenslve weapons that should be used

to counter strong defenses.

4)

Tank vlslblllty 1s poor and ranges fran llmited

(hatches open) to severely restrlcted (hatches closed).

5)

h e to thelr llmlted vlslblllty problem, tanks

cannot hold ground wlthout Infantry support.

6)

Tank movement must be concealed or conducted

when enemy AT weapons are effectively suppressed.

7)

Leaders must be well forward to effectlvely

control maneuvers..
8)

The Inability to provlde contlnuous sustainment

can be as deadly a foe as the enemy.

97

OVERALL DESIGN

An examlnatlon of lessons learned concernlng overall design

establlshed the following cannon ground.

In all three confllcts, I t was concluded that a tank's

deslgn should be based on Its functlon or purpose. The functlon

or purpose for tanks i s twofold; to asslst the Infantry by provldlng a protected fire platform that could destroy or counter the enemy's strong defenses, and to provlde the capabillty to concentrate qulckly at a polnt of enemy weakness, penetrate his defenses and strlke deep Into the rear of his positions. These two purposes were constant throughout the study and they significantly contrlbute to the moblllty versus protectlon aspect of design. The need for special tanks also serves as cOmnon ground. Speclal tanks, such as mine rolllng, brldglng. and amphibious tanks, were successfully employed and made significant contributions on the battlefield.. The need for a fast, light. less sophisticated tank over a slower, heavy, more sophlstlcated tank serves as another c m o n lesson. The essence of this c m o n thought was on designing a tank that was fast enough and small enough that the enemy's anti-tank gunners or weapons probabllity of hit would be severely degraded,
light enough to cross all types of soil conslstency and cut down

on wear and tear, and wlth a minimum of production time and cost.

98

Several factors concerning a tank's design and production were c m o n to all of the studied conflicts.
(1)

The cost factor played a major role

throughout the conflicts and supported the concept of a smaller, lighter, less sophisticated, and cheaper tank over the larger, heavier, more sophisticated, and more expensive tank.
(2)

The inability to rapidly mass produce tanks

and the need for thousands of tanks was c m o n to all three conflicts. This inability and need supports the smaller. lighter,

less sophistlcated tank design concept.

(3) The reliability factor supports the concept of

having many tanks that are light and less sophisticated over the concept of having fewer tanks that are heavier and more sophisticated because lighter tanks have less wear and tear and less sophisticated tank are easier to field fix or repair. In summary. the c m o n threzd of lessons learned concerning overall design was as follows:
1)

b tank's

design should be based on its tactical

purposes.
2)

Special tanks will be needed.

At a minimum,

minefield breachlng. brldging. and amphibious tanks should be provided.

3)

The ideal tank would be light (less than 40

tons). fast (faster than opponents and with enough speed to

99

severely degrade enemy AT gunners' and weapons' probabillty of hlt). less sophlstfcated (to speed productfon time and ease In fleld flxlng and repair). and cheaper (to allow great numbers in peacetlme).

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provlded an analysis of the lessons learned

from World War I. World War 11, and the Arab-Israel1 1967 and 1973 Wars concernlng tank moblllty, flrepcwer. protectlon. c m a n d and control, and overall deslgn. The results of thls analysis establlshed a llst of lessons that can be consldered as a carmon thread and serve as a basis for the concluslons and recommenaations proviaea in.cnapter 5..

100

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this chapter Is threefold: to answer the research questlons. to ccament on the slgnlflcance and contributions of the thesls and to make reccomendatlons f o r future research.

Thls thesls focused on the questlon of the exlstence or

non-exlstence of a c m o n thread of lessons learned from 20th century tank warflghtlng concernlng Indlvldual tank and smal I tank unlt moblllty. flrepower. protectlon. command and control. and overall design. The two research questions were:
(1) What were the lessons learned fran 20th century

tank warflghtlng concernlng Indlvldual tank and small tank unlt moblllty, flrepower. protectlon. c m a n d and control, and overall
design?

(2) Does a carmon thread of lessons learned exlst?

To answer these-questions nisxorical researcn was conaucrea

of sources concerning the major 20th century tank warfighting confllcts; World War I. World War 11, and the Arab-Israel1 1967 and 1973 Wars. The answer to the first research questlon is found

In the multl-page llsts of lessons learned In chapter 3 of this thesis. These llsts of lessons-learned are not all-lncluslve. and the exlstence of addttional lessons Is hlghly probable. These

llsts served as the basls of the analysls and dlscussion presented

101

In chapter 4. The answer to the prlmary thesls questlon (the

second research question) Is that a common thread of lessons learned does exlst. Lists of the c m o n thread lessons and a

dlscusslon of each was presented in chapter 4 of this thesis. The

lists of c a m o n thread lessons, like the lists of lessons that

formed the basls for the analysls. are not all-Inclusive, and the exlstence of addltlonal ccamon thread lessons Is probable. Support for these answers to the research questions Is strong, and It canes frun multiple sources. Lessons learned were

gIeaned from varlous sources Includlng books, perlodlcals and US government documents. The authors of the sources were elther

actual partlclpants In the tank warflghtlng experiences, professlonal hlstorlans o r recognized subject matter experts concernlng tank warflghtlng. The majorlty of the lessons learned

were contalned In more than one rellable source, few were controversial, and all lessons could be dlrectly related to actual battles or combat experlence. The significance of this study I s threefold: this research provldes a basls of lessons learned that can be Incorporated into the future organlzatlon, deslgn and doctrine of US tank forces. Thls research should help prevent US tank forces frm relearning costly past lessons on future battlefields. Flnally. this

research should serve as a foundatlon for additlonal research concerning tank warfi.&t.ing lessons learned.

102

The contrlbutlons of thls research to the source of knowledge concernlng 20th century tank warfare are twofold. Flrst, It ccanpares and ties together what soldiers. engineers and hlstorlcal researchers have learned and documented about 20th century tank warflghtlng. Second, I t establlshes a comnon thread

of lessons learned concernlng indlvldual tank and small tank unlt

warflghtlng. The recommendatlons of thls thesls for future researchers are as follows:
(1)

Research should be conducted wlth the alm of

extendlng or expandlng the llsts of lessons learned In Chapter 3.

If additional lessons can be documented then the lists of c m o n

thread lessons may be Increased.
(2) Research should be conducted to determlne

whether current US tank design and capabllltles Incorporate the c m o n thread of lessons learned.
(3) Research should be conducted to determlne

whether current US tank force organlzatlon and doctrine reflect or incorporate the c m o n thread of lessons learned.
(4)

Research should be conducted to determine

whether the c m o n thread of lessons learned has relevance In the warfighting experlences of the 20th century that Involves smaller-scale tank warflghtlng.

103

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Thls chapter has accompllshed the follwlng: I t has

answered the research questlons. It has establlshed the slgniflcance and contrlbutlons of the thesls to the body of knowledge. and I t has made suggestions for further research and study.

104

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Depuy. Trevor N. &e Evolutlon of WeaDons and Warfare. Indlanapolis/New York: Bobbs-Merrlll Company, 1980. Elagar, David. billtarv A m e c t s of the Arab Israeli CQnflictg, Tel Aviv: Unlversity Publishing. 1975.

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Macksey. Kenneth J. Tank: A HLstorv of the A c m s w e d F l a b U n q Vehicles . New York: Ballantine. 1971. Nickerson. Hoffman. and Sons, 1945. Ogorklewlcz. Rlchard M. York: and Policv, A m o w e d For-

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New York: Arco. 1970.

New

Desion and De veloment of Fiahtlna Vehicles, Doubleday and Ccarpany. 1971.

Patton. George S. Jr. Mifflin, 1947.

&c as I

Boston: Houghton

Plekalkiewlcz, Janusz. Poole-Dorset: Blandford Press, 1986. of Tanks 1933 to 1945, Elms Ross. Macleod G. Court: Stockwell Llmlted. 1976. Sanders. john. Sofran. Nadav.
& Q D I

in Britlsh Ser vice 1942- 45, War to War:

The B t a-b a e l i Canfrontatlon 7 , New York: Pegasus, 1969. Detroit i

Stout, Wesley Wlnans. Tanks are Mlahtv h r y s l er Corporation, 1946. Limited. 1932. Winetrlngham. Tom. Storv of weaoons U c t i c s , York: Books for Libianes Press, 1943.

Swlnton. Ernest. E m U m g ~ London: Hodder and Stoughton

FreeportINew

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS Depuy. Willlam. 'Implicatlons of the Middle East War on US Army Tactics, Doctrine, and Systems,' US Army Training and Doctrine C m a n d , March 1975. Henderson, Walter J. "Analysls of the Lessons Learned In the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.' Marine Corps Development Education Command, May 1977.

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Memoranaum. "The Lessons Learnea from the Wladle East Crisis," Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chlef of Staff for Force Development, January 18, 1974.

PERIODICALS Barclay. C.N. Chynowlth. B.C. #Lessons from the October War.'
&my.

March 1974.

'Tank Infantry," lnfaotrv Jam. May 1921.

Ellis. Hugh. "Some Notes on Tank Development During the War.' ,April 1921.
Kahalaml, Avlgdor. "Defense of the Go1an.O Hllltarv Revley, October, 1979. Martel, Gifford. July. 1927.

oSmall Tanks and Cavalry,n

'Tanks in Future Wars.O

Patton, George S. Jr. Aprll, 1920.

U t r v JourL

Rockenback. Samuel. 'Tanks and Thier Cooperation wlth Other Arms: m t r v Journa, January 1920. OThe 1973 Middle East War:
Engineer,

An Engineer's V1ew.O

T& M l l l t u

Wakebrldge, Charles. 'Tank Myth o r a Missle Mirage.n Wlltarx Review. August 1976. Weller, Jac.
1976.

"Tanks In the Middle East," W1 itarv Rev iw,May 'The r'lgnt at Suez,"
I -

1974.

..., 3er-

, Sep/Occ

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INITIAL DISTRUBITION LIST

Combined Arms Research Llbrary U.S. Army C m a n d and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027

2. Major Slro Cappelletti CTAC USACGSC Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027

3. John Relchley Evaluatlon and Standards USACGSC Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027
4 .

Colonel Don Martin. Jr. 1688 S. Garland Court Lakewood. Colorado 80226

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