CONCLUSIUN
Part
I:
Operational Differences
Although t h e fundamental
purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s
is t o
u n c o v e r any common t e n e t s b y w h i c h t w o s u c c e s s f u l
of
pract it loners
in
the operational
a r t operated,
there
is u t i l i t y
d i s c o v e r i n g h o u t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s were d i s i m i l a r
Hence,
before Gudrr i a n
is i n o r d e r .
i s t r u e t h a t b o t h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n b e l i e v e d
he
p e n e t r a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a l e x p l o i t a t i o n . hand,
d i v i s ions,
182
Ostensibly,
t h i s gave each o f
diuisions.
It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t
o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e a t army,
it i s doubtful t h a t Patton's
a p p r o a c h t o ach i e u ing o p e r a t i o n a l dec i s i u e n e s s w o u l d have been e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t s t r o n g enemy r e s i s t a n c e . successful campaigns--Falaise-Wgentan, P a l a t inate--were R e c a l l t h a t h i s most
p u r s u i t t u t h e Seine,
in
waged a g a i n s t a r e t r e a t i n s enerny w h e r e a s
i n w h i c h t h e enemy
P a t t o n ' s a p p r o a c h was b o t h l a b o r i o u s a n d
'5
leuel
When P a t t o n assumed
suited for
exploitation,
no m a t u r e c o n c e p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l
183
W o r l d War
I!.
I n e s s e n c e , flmer i c a n c o m m a n d e r s e n t e r e d t h e war
t o e x e c u t e t h a t d o c t r i n e . More t h a n t h i s , h o w e v e r , G u d e r i a n
helped deuelnp t h e d o c t r i n e and t h e panzer o r g a n i z a t i o n s needed t o execute t h e doctrine,
t h a t doctrine a n d h e was
it
instrumental
in putting
i n t o e f f e c t . Hence,
is n o w o n d e r t h a t G u d e r i a n arms c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h
and P a t t o n d i f f e r e d
i n t h e i r combined
it r e m a i n s b o t h t r u e and s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e y
saw t h e n e e d f o r
a c o m b i n e d arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . S e c o n d , w h e r e a s Guder i a n a t t a c l t e d w i t h p a n z e r c o r p s on r e l a t i v e l v n a r r o w f r o n t s , P a t t o n a t t a c K e d on b r o a d f r o n t s w i t h
h i s armor d i s p e r s e d . figair,, d o c t r i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s h e l p e x p l a i n
t h e i r d i f f e r e n t m e t h o d s . What is s i g n i f i c a n t
is t h a t b o t h
P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n saw t h e v a l u e i n s e i z i n g t h e
i n i t i a t i v e and
i n K e e p t n g t h e enemy o f f b a l a n c e , b u t P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s
f o c u s e d more on r e t a i n i n g t h e t a c t i c a l
i n i t i a t i v e and
i n i t iat iue
Guder i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s S o u g h t t o r e t a i n o p e r a t i o n a l
try
StpiKing
edditionally,
in
o r d e r t o g a i n t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e needed t o
i n i t i a t i u e and a c h i e v e t h e d e p t h
In p a r t i c u l a r , h e placed s t r o n g emphasis
194
is b e t t e r t o h a l t t w o h o u r s b e f o r e d W K , r e s t t h e s o l d i e r s , a n d
3 t t a C K
before davn.
Moreover,
he thought
" n i g h t attacKs by
a r m o r were n o t e c o n o m i c a l .
fl t h i r d p o i n t
"< 1>
on w h i c h P a t t o n ' s a n d G u d e r i a n ' s t h i n K i n g
was i m p o r t a n t f o r h i m t o b e a b l e t o a f f e c t t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s
q u i C K I y b e c a u s e h i s t e c h n i q u e p l a c e d g r e a t r e l i a n c e on t h e s u c c e s s of t a c t l c a l o p e r a t i o n s at t h e schwsrpunKt, which had t o
least
c h a n g e r a p i d l y t o r e i n f o r c e s u c c e s s a g a i n s t p o i n t s of resistance.
To d o t h i s ,
G u d e r i a n n e e d e d a r a p i d means of
communication,
and t h e r a d i o p r o v i d e d j u s t s u c h a means.
P e r h a p s b e c a u s e of
h i s Knowledge of U l t r a a n d t h e a t t e n d a n t
security r i s ~ s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r a d i o cornmun i c a t I o n s , P a t t o n d i d
n o t p l a c e much e m p h a s i s o n t h e u s e o f
radio.
UnliKe Guderian,
t h e n , he p r e f e r r e d w i r e o v e r r a d i o a n d p e r s o n a l
wire.
c o n t a c t Over
IS5
i n b o t h t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n r o l e ,
a n d d i d so b e c a u s e he b e l i e v e d t h e o r g a n i c p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r infantry
i n t h e panzer d i u i s i o n s c o u l d p e r f o r m t h e tasK of
penetration: would
moreover,
he be1 ieued a t t a c K i n g m o b i l e f o r c e s
l o s e momenturn if t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o p a s s t h r o u g h l e s s
I t may b e s a i d o f
P a t t o n t h a t he as h i s
i n b y p a s s i n g enemy c e n t e r s o f r e s i s t a n c e ,
ons t o G e n e r a l O e u e r s ' e f f o r t s t o r e d u c e t h e C o l m a r
however,
are
in order here.
a n u n d e r l y i n 9 u l t r r l o r mot i u e f o r
186
Part
XI:
Common T e n e t s
As
significant
as t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t o be,
i n P a t t o n ' s and
appreciated of
t o be f u l l y
in t h e i r
t h e i r Operational
Indeed,
six a r e a s :
of
g r o u n d and a i r e f f o r t s :
operations
at high
and p e r s o n a l
leadership a t f r o n t l i n e
units.
these s i m i l a r i t i e s
if s i m i l a r
for
in principle
i n how P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n a p p l i e d
combined arms u n i t s ,
In p a r t i c u l a r ,
artillery
they
b o t h thought that
centralized
assets
is crucial an o p e r a t i o n Flfter
in t h e e a r I y stages of i s t h e tasK
penetration
a t hand.
187
t h e requirement
is f o r a r t i l l e r y t o b e d e c e n t r a l i z e d so t h a t
s o u g h t was h i g h l y m o b i l e a r t i l l e r y a n d a f l e x i b l e s y s t e m o f
a r t i l l e r y command a n d c o n t r o l
t h a t would a l l o w a r t i l l e r y f i r e s
t o be massed a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s of p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e n a l l o w
a r t i l l e r y u n i t 5 t o moue b e h i n d f o r w a r d c o m m i t t e d u n i t s a n d
del iver
i m m e d i a t e l y r c s p o n s i u e f i r e s i n ~ x p l o i t a t i o na n d
P u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s . Guder i a n , more t h a n P a t t o n , t r i e d t o
s u p p l e m e n t o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y f i r e s u p p o r t by e m p l o y i n g t a c t i c a l aircraft i n c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s . The d i f f e r e n c e
in their
tried to
o p e r a t i o n s on t h i s p o i n t
is t h a t G u d e r i a n a p p a r e n t l y
a c h i e v e a h i g h e r degree of
u n i t s t h a n P a t t o n . But t h e r e q u irement f o r c o n c e n t r a t e d
a r t i l l e r y c a n n o t b e s o l v e d by a r e l i a n c e
on t a c t i c a l
aircraft
is w e a t h e r d e p e n d e n t .
a r t depended on massed
a r t i l l e r y , and l o t s of
T h i r d flrrny c o n d u c t e d b a t t a l i o n s of
it.
is u s e f u l t o r e c a l l t h a t P a t t o n ' s employing
108
its Bulge c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e
f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , s u g g e s t i n g an a r t i l l e r y r i c h
cnu ironment
.
i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a
S e c o n d , b o t h men saw g r e a t v a l u e
P a t t o n SpOKe
i n g l o w i n g terms of
188
t h e cooperation and a s s i s t a n c e
XI% TfiC r e n d e r e d t o T h i r d a r m y
B o t h P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n Knew
throughout o p e r a t i o n s in Europe. t h a t t h e s u c c e s s of
their
o p e r a t i o n s depended
in large measure
on t h e q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of units.
a i r support given to t h e i r
find b o t h q u a n t i t y a n d q u a l i t y o f
support depended on t h e
art
e a c h man
is r e f l e c t e d
operat ions
indicate
t h a t h e t h o u g h t t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n f o l l o w e d by r a p i d
e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t o enemy t e r r i t o r y would p r e c i p i t a t e a n
o p e r a t i o n a l c o l l a p s e w i t h i n t h e e n e m y command a n d c o n t r o l structure. In b o t h t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns h i s In t h e Russian
t h e c a p t u r e of w h o l e armies a n d masses o f
i n t h e c o n d u c t of
remember,
BfiRBflROSSfi a n d h i 5 t h r e e - w e e K
Army
f r o m i t s f i n a l o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o f Moscow p r o v e d
183
l e v e l of
idar
r e q u i r e s t h a t t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n be f o l l o w e d by forces are
Because he h a d
cooperate
C a m p a i g n s a r e t h e b e s t examples. o f respect.
in t h i s
Ta some e x t e n t ,
P a t t o n was h a m p e r e d i n h i s e x e c u t i o n
o f O p e r a t i o n a l a r t b e c a u s e n e i t h e r h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commander5
requirements f o r
d s p t h and dec i s i v e n e s s
If t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
l e v e l of
war
IS
l e v e l u h i c h ernploys t a c t i c a l e v e n t s
linKed
i n a campaign p l a n t o a c h i e v e t h e a t e r s t r a t e g i c g o a l s ,
judgment about t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a commander's
operational
a r t must r e s t ,
at least in part,
on how w e l l h i s
into desired
o p e r a t i o n a l methods p a r l a y e d t a c t i c a l e v e n t s
198
strategic r e s u l t s . The s u e s t i o n r a i s e d
b e c a u s e t o answer
is d i f f i c u l t t o answer
it i n t e l l i g e n t l y o t h e r e q u a l l y important
The q u e s t i o n , f o r example,
"Centers of grau i t y
"
There
is p r o b a b l y
g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t t h a t b o t h P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n saw t h e
o p p o s i n g enemy f o r c e s as t h e c e n t e r of g r a u i t y , the immediate
o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i u e . D e s t r o y enemy f o r c e s i n large
p r o p o r t i o n s a n d t h e enemy armies w i l l opposing p o l i t i c a l collapse, forcing
Patton c l e a r l y
b e 1 i e u e d t h i s , a n d G u d e r ian Moscow n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,
preoccupation with t h e s e i z u r e of
h e t o o s o u g h t t h e d e s t r u c t ion o f enemy
f o r c e s on a g r a n d scale. H i s o p e r a t i o n s i n P o l a n d in France in
i n 1939 a n d
1948 a p p e a r t o b e c l a s s i c e x a r n p l e s o f t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e 1 inKage of t a c t i c a l engagements
in a campaign plan
i n N o r t h FIfrica a n d o n S i c i l y a p p e a r e d t o s u p p o r t t h e t h e a t e r commander
'5
s t r a t e g ic g o a l s .
Howeuer,
a p l a u s i b l e c a s e can b e made t h a t b o t h G u d e r i a n
i n a n i m p o r t a n t way
a n d P a t t o n f a i l e d t o m e a s u r e up
in t h e i r
e f f e c t i u e , o p e r a t i o n a l campaign p l a n s m u s t b e p r e d i c a t e d on
theater strategy: Guder i a n
' 5
t h e y have no
l i f e of
t h e i r own! B u t
great operational
"successes" in Russia a p p e a r t o
h a v e t a K e n on a l i f e of t h e i r own, d r a g g i n g t h e t h e a t e r
191
Certainly, t h i s charge
is t r u e
effort
reigning
i n P a t t o n as h e r a c e d a c r o s s E u r o p e .
scheme t o a t t a c K s t r a i g h t t o w a r d F r a n K f u r t w i t h o n e
t h r e e corp s , f o r example, f a i l e d e n t i r e l y t o
a r m y compor.ed o f
taKe a c c o u n t o f E i s e n h o w e r ' s t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y w i t h
its myriad
of p o l i t i c a l
and
logistical considerations.
Analytically,
in practice
and
interactiuely,
l e v e l c G m m a n d e r s is t o Keep
A s c a p a b l e a s b o t h t h e s e men
is f a i r t o s a y t h & t n e i t h e r h a d a f i r r n e n o u g h
and
strategical art.
A f o u r t h t e n e t P a t t o n and Guderian s h a r e
in their
c o n c e p t i o n of
on s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s .
t h a t b o t h men t h o u g h t a h i g h t e m p o o f
operations
essential t o success
speed
is a r e l a t i o n a l
i n t h e c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n a l
art. Because
is t h a t
t e r m , w h a t b o t h men r e a l l y meant
192
operations.
I n G u d e r i a n ' s c a s e , t h e c l a s s i c e x a m p l e is h i s
a t t a c K a c r o s s t h e Meuse R i v e r a n d s u b s e q u e n t d r i v e t o t h e
coast. In hi: boOK
TO
L o s e a B a t t l e , A l i s t a i r Horne v i v i d l y
in a
=lmilarly,
Patton's
high-speed
d a s h e s o u t o f t h e Normandy
beachhead,
across France t o t h e S e i n e R i v e r , t h r o u g h t h e E i f e l ,
in a
a n d a c r o s s t h e P a l a t i n a t e a l l Kept o p p o s i n g German f o r c e s
a c t , and d e s t r o y s h i s a b i l i t y t o f o c u s combat
p o l d e r a t a d e c i s i v e p o i n t b e c a u s e h i s Command a n d c o n t r o l s y s t e m is i n d i s a r r a y . In essence,
a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h e r speed of
o p e r a t i o n s s e r v e s t o fragment t h e enemy's combat powsr and d e s t r o y h i s c o l l e c t i v e and individual will t o fight. Guderian
a t t e m p t e d t o a c h i e v e a high tempo of o p e r a t i o n s ,
f i r s t , by
t h e attacK.
133
d i u is i o n commander a t t a C K e d a c r o s s a r e a l t i v e l y b r o a d f r o n t , e m p l o y i n g m u l t l p l e p a r a l l e l a x e s t o e n s u r e m a x i m u m c o m b a t power
was f o r u a r d a n d m i n i m a l c o r ~ g e s t i o n o c c u r r e d o n a x e s o f a d v a n c e .
T h u s , d b s p i t e some d i f f e r e n c e s
i n t e c h n i q u e , P a t t o n and
G u d e r i a n saw s p e e d o f
o p e r a t i o n s as o n e o f t h e Key t e n e t s o f
success in o p e r a t i o n a l a r t .
f if
in each man's
in order
w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t g r e a t f l a n K a n d l o g i s t i c a l risK t o p e n e t r a t e enem)
PiSK
defense;
t o exposed flanKs, t h e r e
is a g r e a t d e a l o f e v i d e n c e t h a t
and great
I n f a c t , b o t h men phenomenon
seemed t o a c c e p t o p e n f l a n K 5 as q u i t e a n a t u r a l high-speed
regarding
in
m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s a n d 90 t h e f u r t h e r s t e p of
a non-linear
l i n e of
c o n t a c t a s a n o p p o r t u n i t ~t o b e
e x p l o i t e d whenever p o s s i b l e .
e n t a i l s r 1 s . K ~a s w e l l a s o p p o r t u n i t i e s , G u d e r i a n a n d P a t t o n saw that
i t was
c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y i d e n t i f L e d , a t t a c K w i t h s u f f i c i e n t mass, a t
great s p e e d t o produce t h e tactical and o p e r a t i o n a l moral
c a s c a d i n g e f f e c t t h a t would l e a d t o o p e r a t i o n a l That, however, decisiveness.
194
o p e r a t i o n a l success.
I t i s m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o maKe a p l a u s i b l e c a s e f o r e i t h e r
G u d e r i a n o r P a t t o n t h a t would show t h e y had a f i r m understanding of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o p e r a t i o n a l filthough n e i t h e r man h a d
c a p a b i l i t y and l o g i s t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y .
rnuch t o s a y a b o u t h i s own l o g i s t i c a l
t o stretch h i s logistical tether t o
of
o p e r a t i o n s , e a c h was p r o n e
i t s v e r y 1 imits. I n S P i t e
and air r e s u p p l y ,
h e a v y r e l i a n c e on
t r U C K S r
railroads,
each
man, e s p e c i a l l y P a t t o n ,
Consistently,
then
i t may b e t h a t t h e o u t s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n a l
i s o n e who p l a n s f o r a n d t i m e s a p a u s e
in operations
i t m o s t b e n e f i t s h i m a n d h i s command.
t o ha'Je b e e n b e t t e r a t t i m i n g a n y s u c h l o g i s t i c a l Patton,
if
t o be considered.
r iSK to
t e n e t b o t h men c l e a r l y b e l i e v e d
in and adhered t o
commanding o r l e a d i n g f r o m is
n o w o r t h u h i l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e p e r s o n a l Presence of t h e
19s
c o m m a n d e r , e s p e c i a l l y when a c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n , battle is t a K i n g p l a c e .
e v e n t , or
invariably
T h e r e f o r e , e a c h man a l m o s t
t u r n e d UP
p e r s o n a l l y d i r e c t e d t h e a c t i o n , g o t a s t a l l e d *ttacK m o v i n g a g a i n , or w h e n t h e r e w e r e n o r e s e r v e s l e f t , a d d e d w e i g h t t o t h e
m a i n a t t a c K m e r e l y by b e i n g o n s i t e . To a i d i n c o n t r o l l i n 9 t h e
l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s t h e y c o m m a n d e d , b o t h men o p e r a t e d o u t o f
a
a
in person a t
the
, n e i t h e r m a n was
least b i t h e s i t a n t t o g i v e on-the-spot
o r d e r s t o committed
i n f o r m any i n t e r m e d i a t e C o m m a n d e r s c o n c e r n e d w h e n d i r e c t i n g t h e
a c t i o n s of It
a u n i t s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h a t commander.
p o s s i b l e t o see in t h e o p e r a t i o n s of
is c e r t a i n l y
I n some
instances t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in
their operations
is o n e o f e m p h a s i s r n o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e .
P a t t o n , f o r e x a m p l e , p l a c e d g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s on r e c e i v i n g
t i m e l y combat
mechanism--Colonel got t h a t
FicKett
' 5
ensure he
information.
There
is n o t h i n g , o f c o u r s e , w h i c h s h o w s
196
t h a t G u d e r i a n was n o t
but
interested
i n t imelv combat i n f o r m a t i o n ,
lengths t o
it
is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t h e d i d n o t g o t o s p e c i a l information i n t h e way P a t t o n d i d .
get such
W h a t t h i s t h e s i s h a s e n d e a v o r e d t o d o is u n c o v e r t h o s e
'5
and Guder i a n
'5
o p e r a t i o n a l methods which
t e n e t o r P r i n c i p l e b y w h i c h e a c h man g u i d e d h i s
t h i n K i n g about t h e art of
war a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f
i n v e s t i g a t i o n can be summarized
command.
by
The c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s
s t a t i n g t h a t G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n s h a r e d a v i e w o f
( 1 ) F l r t i l l e r y needs t o b e o r g a n i z e d and c o n t r o l l e d i n such a f a s h i o n t h a t its f i r e s can be c o n c e n t r a t e d r a p i d l y a n d y e t b e f l e x i b l e e n o u g h t o move a n d s h o o t during f l u i d , mobile, high-speed operations.
Having a r r i v e d a t t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of
197
Patton
' 5
and Guder i a n
' 5
operational art,
i t Pernairas t o e x p l a i n
Why t h e r e f i n d i n g s a r e i m p o r t a n t t o t h e f l m e r i c a n firmy t o d a y .
198
Part
111:
Implications for
Airland Battle
It
i s arguable t h a t a t t h e beginning of
W o r l d War
I1 the
R m e r i c a n Army d i d n o t P r a c t i c e a n d h a d n o d o c t r i n e f o r operational tactics. art, b u t d i d have a c o n c e p t i o n o f s t r a t e g y and p o l i t i c a l aversion t o large, standing and a
professional
i n s u l a r geograph i c pos it i o n ,
t o hold.
For t h e development o f
large
an o p e r a t i o n a l
doctrine that
e n v i s i o n s t h e maneuver o f
in a theater
m i l i t a r y formations operations
i s only necessary
of
m a n e u v e r 1a r a e f o r m a t i o n s .
I I the h e r ican
it is
A r m y h a d no s u c h o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t o meet b e c a u s e
commitments.
Today t h e s i t u * t i o n
a matter of
p o l i c y A m e r i c a now
is committed
i n Western
important
doctrine for
i n Europe,
strategy
199
m u s t g e t t o g e t h e r w i t h o u r a l l i e s i f we a r e s e r i o u s a b o u t
w i n n i n g a war a g a i n s t t h e Warsaw P a c t Second, t o have a d o c t r i n e doctrine i n Western E u r o p e .
is n o t t o h a v e a
in p r i n t only
s t r a t u m of o u r o f f i c e r
. Both
of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
coherent doctrine
is
a t a l l o r d e r b u t n o t beyond reach.
h i s t o r y h a s any u t i l i t y at a l l ,
it
If the s t u d y of m i l i t a r y
is t h a t
it helps
illuminate
w h a t f u n d a m e n t a l s o f t h e a r t a n d s c i e n c e o f war r e m a i n unchanged t h r o u g h time. Such s t u d i e s h e l p u n c o v e r t h e p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f war a n d , h e n c e , h e l p establish the theoretical warfighting. and d o c t r i n a l foundations for
This s t u d y o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t o f P a t t o n a n d
two c o m m a n d e r s c o n d u c t e d o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . T h o u g h t h e b a s e o f
evidence
is n a r r o w b e c a u s e t h e s t u d y o n l y f o c u s e s on t w o
the operational
i n l a r g e p a r t its c o n c l u s i o n s are r e f l e c t e d
d o c t r i n e of America's p r i n c i p a l
in the
potential adversary
180-5.
a n d o u r own c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e as r e c o r d e d
i n F i e l d Manual
In s p i t e o f s o m e e v e r l i n g e r i n g b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l i s m i n t h e
A m e r i c a n Flrmy, d o c t r i n a l l y we a r e c o m m i t t e d t o f i g h t i n g as a
200
Howeuer,
i t w i l l n e v e r b e s u f f i c i e n t merely
t o s a y we a r s c o m m i t t e d t o s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n o f w a r f a r e . F o r a
complete combined arms c o n c e r t ion at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
level
is e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t
c o n s i d e r i n s t h a t t h e requirement
is t h a t
WOrK
leuels m u i t
i m p e d e . More
than this,
we m u s t s t r i v e t o a c h i e v e t h i s c l o s e
f r o m p e a c e t o war
in duration.
In P a r t , Ideal
i n moving t o w a r d what
is s u r e l y a n
never t o b e f u l l y r e a l i z e d .
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n l e a v e s unanswered o t h e r q u e s t i o n s which do not fall i n t o t h e . j o i n t a r e n a . How, f o r e x a m p l e , s h o u l d US
c o r p s be c o n f i g u r e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s
i n Western E u r o p e t o d a y ? W e
taKe
i t as a g i v e n t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e c o n f i g u r e d t h e way t h e y
are. S h o u l d corpz. be
be p u r e l y t a c t i c a l
headquarters?
Is i t p l a u s i b l e t o t h i n K t h a t ,
and l o g i s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t e d ,
as c u r r e n t l y o r g a n i z e d , c o n t r o l l e d ,
201
a US a r m o r e d o r
m e c h a n i z e d d i v i s i o n c o u l d move a t t h e s p e e d a r t as G u d e r i a n o r P a t t o n
a command a n d c o n t r o l a p p a r a t u s t o p e r m i t t h e
o p e r a t i o n s Guder i a n and P a t t o n t h o u g h t to
S U C C ~ P .a ~
s o r t o f high-speed
t the operational
level of
Ftn o b v i o u s r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e s p e c u l a t i o n s
G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n d i d w i l l i n W o r l d War 11 i s
i s t h a t what
i r r e l e v a n t t o d a y and this
b e t o o on t o m o r r o w ' s
battlefield.
The s u b s t a n c e o f
r e n d e r s a W o r l d War
I 1 approach t o t h e conduct
Ftlternatiuely,
i t may b e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t
nothing
c o u l d be f u r t h e r In the f i r s t
w h i c h shows t h a t f u t u r e chemical/nuclear/EW
battlefields,
w i l l
battlefields,
be remarKably s i m i l a r t o
282
a r e 1 i K e l Y t o be t h e normal c o n d i t i o n ,
and and be
Unit5
w i l l be c u t o f f ,
Confusion w i l l
1iKely reign, be
intermittent,
and u n i t s w i l l
intermingled.
These words
1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i
War.
i n F r a n c e i n 1940,
The n u c l e a r a n d
c h e m i c a l d i m e n s i o n of
t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d o n l y amp1 i f i e s t h e
necessity f o r maintaining dispersion u n t i l concentrat Ion i s required, purpose5. even more and t h e n r a p i d l y c o n c e n t r a t i n g f o r Hence, operational is
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r speed o f o p e r a t i o n s
i t wa5
important than
C o n s i d e r i n g t h e emphasls t h e S o v i e t s p l a c e on t h e speed o f operat ions, essential t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t high-tempo success a t the o p e r a t i o n a l operat ions are
for
level rises
a s s e s s m e n t a n d a c c e p t a n c e a r e a l l t h e more
I n o r d e r t o w i n d e c i s i v e engagements and m a j o r
commanders
b a t t l e s t h a t a r e l i n K e d as p a r t s o f a campaign p l a n ,
m u s t be a b l e t o s e e a h e a d i n t i m e a n d s p a c e a n d b e w l l l i n 9 t o accept a t t h e r i g h t t i m e c a l c u l a t e d r i s K s t o t h e i r own f o r c e s .
I t may e v e n b e t r u e t h a t t h i s t h e s i s c o n f i r m s w h a t we h a v e
always i n t u i t i v e l y Known a b o u t s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l art:
283
speed of
operat ions,
c o n c e n t r a t e d and
envelop i n 2 maneuver,
iSK
acceptance,
i n it i a t i u e r e t e n t i o n ,
edge a r e a l l
and p e r s o n a l
the operational
the various
ingredients
KnOW
in a recipe
when,
e x p e r t i s e and j u d g m e n t t o each
a n d how much o f
desired result.
A c e r t a i n amount o f
m i l i t a r y judgment o f command.
i s what
B o t h G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n e x e r w l i f i e d r e f i n e d m i l i t a r y judgment,
b o l d n e s s and a
successes
in b a t t l e .
It i s a l s o easy t o a p p r e c i a t e
in
b o t h men t h e i r
i s much e v i d e n c e
g r o w t h and m a t u r a t i o n t h a t experiences,
a broad range of
r e f l e c t ion,
u t i l i t y
intellectual
F? f u r t h e r
t o t h e s t u d y of
military history,
i n t h e broadened
who
a n d o n whose
s u c c e s s f a l l s when w a r if,
l i K e l Y come t o n o u g h t
when t h e t i m e comes t o
l i v e o r d i e by t h e p r i n c i p l e s
it
204
is, i n p a r t ,
the stuff
a n d G e o r g e P a t t o n a r e m a d e , t h e n we w o u l d d o w e l l t o f o s t e r
g r o u t h b y c o n t i n u i n g t o s t u d y t h e l . e men a n d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l methods.
205
ENDNOTES
1 George S . P a t t o n , H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n Corwanr.
2 War As
I Knew
It, p.214.
206