National Integration in Soviet Georgia

Author(s): J. W. R. Parsons
Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 1982), pp. 547-569
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/151907
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 SOVIET STUDIES, vol. XXXIV, no. 4, October 1982, pp. 547-569

NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOVIET GEORGIA

By J. W. R. PARSONS

DESPITEsome differences about how the final end should be achieved and
at what date, the Soviet leadership has always committed itself to the
ultimate merging of the constituent parts of the USSR and to the erosion
of all historical, traditional, legal and linguistic barriersthat might impede
the progression towards that end. Nevertheless, almost sixty years after the
establishment of the USSR, national boundaries persist, and despite all
official rhetoric to the contrary, national self-awareness, in many of the
republics, is as strong, if not stronger, than at any time since the
revolution. I
Since Khrushchev's claim to the XXII Party Congress in 1961 that the
national question had been solved, that national differences were
subsiding, and that under the rapidly approaching period of mature
communism, the merger, or sliyanie of the Soviet nationalities would be
complete, there has been a reappraisal of the national question.2 The
term sliyanie has been dropped from official pronouncements and the
1977 Soviet constitution, while proclaiming the emergence of a 'new
historical community of people, the Soviet people',3 does not do so to the
exclusion of the nationalities. It is now maintained that the existence of a
common Soviet identity and of Soviet patriotism do not preclude the
possibility of continued national differences and national sentiment.4
Thus shortly before the ratification of the new constitution Brezhnev
declared:
The Soviet people's social and politicalunity does not in the least imply the
disappearance of national distinctions . . .
However, in the same speech he noted that there had been proposals
to introduceintothe constitutionthe conceptof one Sovietnation,to abolishthe
unionand autonomousrepublics,or to limitdrasticallythe sovereigntyof union
republicsby deprivingthemof the rightof secessionfromthe USSRand of the
right to enterinto foreignrelations.The proposalto liquidatethe Councilof
Nationalitiesand to establisha one-houseSupremeSovietwouldhavemovedin
the same direction.6

Despite their rejection and the acceptance of continuing national distinc-

548 NATIONAL INTEGRA TION
tions, the difference between Brezhnev and his more assimilationist
colleagues remains one of degree rather than of kind. Both seek the
ultimate merging of the Soviet peoples, but whereas Brezhnev appears to
hold to the conviction that the process of the drawing together, flourishing
and eventual merging together of nations is an objective one that can
neither be speeded up nor retarded, others, perhaps fearful of the growing
weight of non-Russian peoples and, in particular, Central Asians in the
total population, are anxious to speed the process of assimilation by
adopting administrative measures of the kind described above.
It is now sixty years since Georgian independence was terminated by the
Red Army and ten years since Eduard Shevardnadze replaced V. P.
Mzhavanadze as the republic's first party secretary. In that time Soviet
policy has given active encouragement to the rastsvet or flourishing of
Georgian culture (as of that of the other nationalities), in the belief that by
providing for both the socio-economic development of the republics and
for political and cultural equality, attachment to national differences
would, by itself, subside. Despite continuing commitment to the drawing
together of the nationalities, however, the success of Soviet policy in
displacing the Georgian nation as the focus of its people's loyalties and in
replacing the nation with the state remains in doubt. In this article we shall
consider these general questions further by looking in turn at socio-
economic development, language and political representation, and
political and cultural life in contemporary Soviet Georgia.

Socio-Economic Development and Assimilation

If one adopts the Soviet approach to the problem of nationalities, one
would presumably anticipate that as socio-economic conditions evened out
across the country and as national privilege was removed, so would
national differences show a tendency to disappear. An examination of the
evidence, however, produces mixed results. It is clear that Russia, or the
RSFSR, has become urbanized faster than any of the other ethno-
territories, and as the American political geographer, R. Clem, has pointed
out, in the USSR,
the levelof urbanisationis a good surrogatefor economicdevelopmentbecause
in the USSRhistoricallythe level and rateof urbanisationare linkedboth con-
ceptuallyand empiricallyto industrialisation.7
One does not have to resort to accusations of deliberate Russification to
find explanations as to why this should be the case. The urge for rapid
industrial growth, for instance, induced Soviet planners to invest in areas
where they could expect to get the greatest immediate returns on their
investments, and this led them to favour areas where industrial plant,
skilled manpower and resources were already available. Although it is
IN GEORGIA 549
evident that the level of development in Russia is still higher than in most
non-Russian areas, it is nonetheless the case that there has been a constant
migration from the rural areas to the towns and a concomitant process of
industrialization. However, it is equally evident that there is no apparent
correlation between the degree of urbanization in any one republic and its
level of assimilation. In fact, to take the example of the most urbanized
republic in the Soviet Union, Estonia, whose population in 1979 was
69-4%o urbanized (69-0% of the RSFSR was urbanized)8 the opposite
might well be claimed to be the case. Estonia has recently been the scene of
serious nationalist activity.9
Georgia, too, has followed the common pattern, although it is worth
noting that whereas in 1926 the Transcaucasus had the highest level of
urbanization in the RSFSR,'? Georgia is now only the eleventh most
urbanized republic. According to the 1979 census 5101oof the Georgian
population is urban, 11 o behind the USSR average. " Georgia, in fact, is
now the least urbanized of the Transcaucasian republics, as Armenia's
population is 65 4% urbanized and Azerbaijan's 52 6%. 2
Despite Georgia's relatively poor performance (if one is to measure
success by such a yardstick) considerable advances have been made since
the Bolshevik invasion in 1921. The urban population has risen from the
pre-revolutionary total of 666,000 to 2,548,667 in 1979,13and blue and
white-collar workers now make up 83 9% of the labour force.14
Unfortunately, this figure is far from precise in that the category rabochii
is used in the Soviet census data to include all those employed in rural or
urban areas who are neither white-collar workers nor kolkhozniki. If,
however, all those 'workers' employed in rural areas are excluded, it
emerges that in Georgia urban 'workers' comprise 28 8% of the total
labour force, as opposed to the overall USSR figure of 42 2%. 5 Whilst
this underlines the relatively slow pace of urbanization in the republic, it is
perhaps worth noting that 44 1Woof the urban employed in Georgia
consist of white-collar workers, well above the all-union figure of 35 6%
and the highest republican figure in the USSR.16
In line with increasing urbanization there has been a corresponding rise
in industrial output. Although starting out from a low base, output rose by
670% between 1921 and 1940, by 240%obetween 1940 and 1958 and by
57%7between 1958 and 1965. 7 By 1970, industry, construction and
transport and communications accounted for a total of 53% of Georgian
national income. The picture of steadily rising industrial production is
blemished, however, by the figures for 1960-71. In this period produced
national income rose by 102o%,18the third lowest in the USSR, a statistic
which precipitated a close investigation of what exactly was happening in
Georgia. Since then there has been a change in the republic's party leader-
ship and growth rates have picked up dramatically. Georgia was one of the
E
550 NA TIONAL INTEGRA TION
few republics to exceed the targets set for the 1976-80 tenth five-year plan,
recording record tea and grape harvests in 1980 despite adverse weather,
an average industrial growth of 41-0% and agricultural growth of 34%7
19
(5%oabove target). The size of the increases is, as much as anything else,
an indication of the extent of economic stagnation in Georgia in the 1960s
and the early 1970s. 20First party secretary Shevardnadze is not content to
let things rest there. At the XXVI CPSU congress in 1981 he commented:
The great tempo which we have establishedhas merelyreducedthe gap, our
backwardness is stillserious.I franklysayto you:a recordgrowthrateandprizes
for socialistcompetitiondo not yet mean that in Georgiapeople work more
effectivelythan in the country'sleadingregions.21
He went on to announce plan targets for 1981-85 for industrial growth of
30-33% and agricultural growth of 20-24%.22
In view of this progress has Georgia begun to lose its national identity,
and do the Georgian people display any signs of being assimilated into the
great Soviet fraternity of peoples? Are they, for instance, beginning to
adopt a new, specifically Soviet, socialist culture, and is there a tendency
towards the greater use of the Russian language, towards decreased attach-
ment to their native territory and all the remaining symbols of national
identity?
Part of the Soviet difficulty in explaining the survival of nations in the
USSR lies in the belief that the process of modernization will inevitably
reduce national differences. Experience, however, both in the USSR and
elsewhere demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case.
By the time of Georgia's incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921, it
was already a well integrated social, political, territorial and economic
entity. The country had, moreover, just experienced three years of
independent government. There was, therefore, a considerable difference
between Georgia and, for instance, Central Asia or Belorussia. Neverthe-
less, up to 1918 Georgians did not predominate in the administration and it
was only between 1918 and 1921 that they became the largest nationality in
their own capital city.23
Consequently, much of the credit for the continuing integration of the
Georgian population and the flourishing or rastsvet of its culture, and for
the predominance of Georgians in nearly all the leading positions of the
administration and within all walks of life, must go to the Soviet
government. Undoubtedly, this part of the policy towards the national
republics has been a marked success. The problem for Soviet theorists of
the national question is to demonstrate that, once the various nationalities
have 'flourished', once they have achieved a certain level of cultural
development, they will then begin to merge or 'draw together'.
By first granting territorial recognition to the existence of nations and
IN GEORGIA 551
then providing them with all the paraphernalia of statehood-separate
governments, separate party organizations with their own congresses and
hierarchies, separate courts, national flags and the right to secede-the
Soviet government has done much to provide the nationalities with a focus
for identification with their respective nations. Additionally, acting in
accordance with its commitment to the equalization of conditions
throughout the USSR, the Soviet leadership has provided Georgia with the
means for its industrialization, in the belief that the process of moderniza-
tion and the standardization of conditions throughout the state would lead
to decreased attachment to the symbols of nationhood. Whilst Soviet
economic policies have led to the incorporation of Georgia into the all-
union economy and limited the scope for independent development and
initiative, these policies have also resulted in the further spatial
redistribution of the population from the country to the towns. According
to the 1970 census, on average 31 3% of all migrations in Georgia were
from the country to urban areas.24 In certain parts of the USSR
urbanization has been accompanied by the Russification of large segments
of the population. In Latvia, for instance, the injection of heavy industry
necessitated a concomitant injection of skilled labour and has resulted in
the immigration of so many Russians and other Slavic peoples that in the
capital, Riga, the ethnic balance has been seriously altered.25In Central
Asia, whilst it is doubtful if much of the indigenous population has been
Russified, it is certainly the case that the immigration of vast numbers of
Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians has led to the predominance of
non-indigenous elements in the administrative centres.26 In Georgia,
however, urbanization has not been accompanied by anything
approaching the same influx of Slavs.
There are several reasons for this. During the 1920s, when the decision
was taken to embark on a massive literacy and social enlightenment
campaign and to press ahead with the indigenization or korenizatsiya of
the republics, there already existed a well established elite in Georgia, and
the independent government had already undertaken steps to improve
education in the republic.
Thus the skills required for transforming the country existed to an extent
which, for example, they did not in Central Asia. The whole concept of
indigenization itself, of course, mitigated against sending Russians to
Georgia, and besides, skilled labour was in short supply within the RSFSR
itself. Additionally there already existed a relatively skilled labour force in
the Transcaucasus, and as has been indicated above, the Transcaucasus
was still more urbanized than Russia was in 1926. It is important, too,
that Georgia was not a key investment area, so that at no stage was there
any requirement to make up a shortage of local labour by introducing it
from outside. There remains the possibility that Stalin and Beria may
552 NATIONAL INTEGRA TION
have sought to protect the national identity of Georgia, although the
evidence of the 1930s suggests that this is unlikely.27
An examination of the census data on Georgia from the 1897 census to
the most recent in 1979 reveals that since the 1930s when the purges and the
movement away from korenizatsiya caused a fall in the Georgian represen-
tation in the population from 67 1% in 1926 to 61 -4% in 1939,28there has
been a persistent indigenization of the republic's population. If one can
believe the figures, the drastic reduction in the Georgians' share of the
population in the 1930s was largely due to an equally dramatic rise in the
Russian share from 3-6% to 87%0.29 At 68-8% in 1979, however, the
percentage of Georgians in the total is higher than at any time since 1886.30
The obverse side of the coin is that since 1959 not only has the Russian
population declined as a percentage of the whole, but it has also declined
in absolute terms. The Russians now represent 7 4% of the population, a
fall of almost 46,000 since 1959.31

Language, Political Representation and Indigenization

It is sometimes maintained that the greater the degree of urbanization
within a republic the greater will be the propensity of its population to
linguistic assimilation and the weaker its resistance to Russian infiltration
of its cultural and political life. Thus Brian Silver's study of ethnic identity
in the USSR led him to the conclusion that urbanization and territorial
mobility are strongly linked with linguistic change, with non-Russians
displaying a greater inclination to adopt Russian in place of their native
languages. 32 The case of Riga, where Russians have been in the majority
since 1978 would appear to justify this observation, 33 but it remains irrele-
vant to Georgia. Although the number of Russians living in the capital
city, Tbilisi, is proportionately higher than their representation in the
republic as a whole, it is characterized by the same trends. On the basis of
the census figures for the ethnic composition of the republican cities it can
be seen that between 1959 and 1970 the number of Russians living in Tbilisi
declined from 18 1% to 14-0% and in absolute terms from 125,700 to
124,30034and that while this figure rose to 129,122 in 1979, arresting the
absolute decline of the previous decade, the share of Russians in the
population of the Georgian capital fell to 12.3%.35 A similar decline
(mirrored in the republican figures) was registered by the Armenian
population. Not only are Russians and Armenians migrating from
Georgia, their birth rate within the republic is also falling. Thus the 1970
census recorded an absolute majority for the Georgian population in
Tbilisi for the first time since figures have been collected in a reliable
manner. Their share of the total rose from 48 4% in 1959 to 57*5% in
1970 and by 1979 had reached 62 1%.36
IN GEORGIA 553
The relatively recent trend of Russians and Armenians to emigrate is
matched by the strength of Georgians' attachment to their native soil.
With 96 1% of all Georgians in the USSR domiciled within their own
republic, they constitute the greatest concentration of any nationality
within its national boundaries in the Soviet Union. 37This may in part be
explained by the fact that whilst even in Moscow and Leningrad fresh fruit
and vegetables may occasionally become items of relative scarcity, in
Georgia a warm climate and fertile soil ensure a regular supply. But it is
equally clear that people find it easier to communicate in their own
language and feel more secure in a familiar environment. It is also the case
that in Georgia the Georgians are in genuine control, occupying most of
the best jobs in the country and dominating education. They are familiar,
too, with how the 'system' operates, knowing the rules concerning the use
of bribery and influence. Once outside Georgia they are in a quite different
environment, where the same rules no longer apply, where the language is
alien and, most importantly, family ties can no longer back them up. As
Karl Deutsch puts it:
In a competitiveeconomyor culture,nationality(ethnicity)is an impliedclaimto
privilege.It emphasisesgrouppreferencesand grouppeculiarities,and so tends
to keep out all outsidecompetitors.38
Given this context, it becomes easier to understand the predicament of
Russians and Armenians living within the Georgian republic. There it is
they and, in particular, the Russians who are in an unfamiliar environ-
ment. The state language is Georgian and the communist party predomi-
nantly Georgian. Ralph Clem argues that the party is a means by which
Russian interests can be safeguarded in non-Russian territories,39 and
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and John Miller, among a host of others,
have pointed to the important role played by the Second Party Secretary in
the non-Russian republics.40In most cases, it is argued, the First Secretary
will be a native of the republic, but the Second Secretary Russian. Accor-
ding to Rakowska-Harmstone, 'the local leadership satisfied the represen-
tative aspect of the pattern, and his Russian deputy provided the necessary
control aspect'.41 It is to be doubted that the above applies to Georgia.
Since July 1956 (following the March demonstrationagainst Khrushchev's
condemnation of Stalin) a Russian has always been Second Party Secre-
tary.42 However, in other respects the influence of Russians in the
Georgian party has been in decline. Even in the period of intense
Russification unleashed by Stalin in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there
do not appear to have been many repercussions in Georgia. Despite the
relatively rapid turnover of personnel between 1949 and 1953 it was not
until September 1953 that a Russian was elected to the bureau of the
Georgian Central Committee. The Second Secretary remained Georgian
554 NATIONAL INTEGRATION
until the election of Kovanov in 1956.43Since then, despite the presence of
a Russian Second Secretary, Georgians have continued to increase their
domination of the party. Whereas in 1959 they made up 73 66%7, in 1970
they comprised 76 2% of total Georgian party membership. Their repre-
sentation is increasing substantially faster, moreover, than that of the
Russians, whose 5 *5% share of the membership in 1970 was less than their
share in the population of Georgia. 44 Whilst the representation of Russians
and Armenians continues to sag, there has been a marked tendency
towards increasing the representation of Azeris, Abkhaz and Ossetians,
particularly since Shevardnadze's appointment.45 This has partly been
prompted by increased articulation of grievances by Georgia's national
minorities, especially regarding their lagging cultural and economic
development. In 1978 a request that the Abkhaz autonomous republic be
allowed to secede from the GSSR and join the RSFSR was turned down.
Nevertheless, the situation had become sufficiently serious for Moscow to
send Central Committee secretary I. V. Kapitonov to Sukhumi to
investigate the situation.46 Since then more attention has been paid to
Abkhaz cultural welfare, including the foundation of a university in the
ASSR.47
It remains the case, however, that the higher one goes in the Georgian
party hierarchy the more Georgians one meets. As to the role of the
Second Party Secretary, it seems unlikely that, in a republic where the state
language is incomprehensible to him and the vast majority of the party are
Georgians, he can really have the controlling influence assigned to him. If
he does have such a role to play, the question arises as to how First Party
Secretary Mzhavanadze was able to run Georgia like a personal fiefdom
for 19 years from 1953 to 1972. It is worth noting too that in the clean up
of the Georgian party initiated by Shevardnadze (at Moscow's behest) one
of the leading victims was Russian Second Party Secretary Churkin.48
In such an environment, in which the fact of being Georgian gives one,
as Deutsch puts it, 'an implied claim to privilege', it is not entirely
surprising that Russians should be leaving. As regards education,
Georgians with 67% of the population in 1969-70 accounted for 82-67o
of the students in higher education, while Russians with 8 -5%oof the
population made up 6-8% of students in higher education.49 This may
suggest that the Russian population in Georgia is, unlike in many of the
other republics, not comprised primarily of the elite.50 Additionally, the
aggressive nature of Georgian national self-assertiveness and the hostility
sometimes expressed towards Russians would tend to detract from the
advantages of a pleasant climate.
The indigenization of the republic's population seems sure to continue
into the foreseeable future, whilst given the available demographic
information, the likelihood of renewed Russian immigration is remote. In
IN GEORGIA 555
the 1980s the RSFSR will face a significant labour shortage, but in Central
Asia and the Transcaucasus there will be a surplus.51 Even though the
Georgian birthrate declined in the 1970s, it remains above the USSR
average,52and with 3 -3 persons per cultivated hectare Georgia is the most
densely populated republic in the USSR.53 Further, with so much kudos
attached to acquiring a higher education amongst Georgians, the republic
has so many qualified people at its disposal that it already has difficulty
employing them. (150 in every 1,000 have a higher education, the highest
republican figure: the RSFSR has 101 per 1,000.)54 Similarly, the status
attached to education is reflected in the social composition of the towns.
As noted above, 44-1%o of the employed urban population are white-
collar workers,55and whilst blue-collar workers represent only 549%o of
the urban employed, there is no labour shortage.56 In October 1979
Shevardnadze announced that 16%oof the able-bodied population, nearly
twice the national average, was not employed in the public sector. 57There
is clearly little room for immigration from outwith the republic.
As has been shown, Georgian towns, and in particular Tbilisi, have not
become means for the acculturation of Georgians by Russians. Although
Georgians do not predominate in the capital to the same extent as in the
republic as a whole, there is no large minority nationality to challenge their
position, but rather a large number of small minorities. Tbilisi, as well as
being the centre of government and trade has also, as the centre for arts
and education, become the cultural focus of the nation. This is in contrast
with other parts of the USSR, notably the Baltic republics and Central
Asia, where the cultural centre of the various nationalities appears to
reside in the rural areas. The size of Georgia (approximately the same as
Scotland) and the location of most of its inhabitants along the country's
central valleys ensures that there is not the same sense of separation
between town and rural settlements as exists in the RSFSR. The physical
proximity of town and rural settlements has had the effect of minimizing
the advantages of urban life, a factor underlined by the relative wealth of
certain sectors of the Georgian peasantry. (This might help to explain the
continuing attraction of rural life to 48. 9% of the population.) Proximity,
moreover, has had the effect of preserving links between town and rural
inhabitants, so that most urban dwellers still have contacts with the
country. Whilst, too, Tbilisi has established itself as the cultural centre of
the nation, Georgian arts nevertheless show a decided inclination towards
the celebration not of urban or Soviet culture, but rather of rural and
traditional life. It is apparent that Georgians consider rural Georgia as the
repository of the nation's cultural heritage, a fact evident not just in the
fine arts, in poetry and prose writing, but also in the considerable body of
research into Georgian folklore, dance and music, as well as in films, many
of which have won awards at festivals in the West.
556 NA TIONAL INTEGRA TION
Nationalities policy has, it seems, merely consolidated Georgia's
attachment to its traditions and culture. In 1961 Khrushchev claimed that
the use of national languages was declining, suggesting the impending
linguistic assimilation of the national minorities. 58In most cases, however,
the percentage of members of nationalities considering their mother
tongue as their first has increased, and where it has decreased it has done
so only slightly and from a very high starting point. Thus since 1959 the
percentage of all Georgians in the USSR who consider Georgian their
native tongue has fallen by 0 3% to 98-3%, whilst within Georgia itself,
there was a modest increase between 1970 and 1979 from 99 4% to
99 5%.59 On the other hand, 25'5% of Georgians claim fluency in
Russian as a second language, an improvement on the past, but still a low
figure. 60Conversely, 15 5% of Russians within the republic claim fluency
in Georgian and a further 100,000 non-Georgians regard Georgian as their
primary language, while another 221,000 speak it fluently.61 Tbilisi and
Erevan, the capital cities of the republics with the highest level of
educational attainment, have the lowest percentages among republican
cities for fluency in Russian. In Tbilisi, 75% of the population now claim
Georgian as a first or second language, but the percentage with Russian as
a first or second language declined between 1970 and 1979 from 55 1% to
52-3%. Among Georgians, the proportion claiming fluency in Russian
dropped from 42 -6% to 39 8%o.It is almost certain, however, that this fall
was largely due to the migration of Georgians from other parts of the
republic, and particularly from rural areas where knowledge of Russian is
often rudimentary at best.62
Undoubtedly, the state policy of fostering Georgian language schools
and language instruction is partly responsible for the strength of ethnic
identity. 75%oof all schools teach in Georgian, while both Russian and
Armenian schools account for less than 10% of the total number.63 In
higher education Georgians predominate and most of the instruction is in
Georgian.
Quite unrelated to Russian and possessing its own alphabet, Georgian
has to a large extent been protected from the Russification of vocabulary
apparent in certain other republican languages, and in recent years there
has been a movement to rid the language of loan words.64 Despite the
strength of the language fears have been expressed about the threat of
linguistic assimilation and, in particular, the threat supposedly constituted
by the current Soviet policy of establishing bilingualism in the republics.
When in April 1978 an attempt was made to remove the clause in the con-
stitution recognizing Georgian as the state language of the republic, about
30,000 people demonstrated against the move, with most of them gather-
ing outside the Georgian party headquarters on Rustaveli Avenue.65 An
apparently 'green-faced' Shevardnadze came out personally to concede to
IN GEORGIA 557
their demands. The demonstration was a testimony to the importance at-
tached to language as a symbol of nationhood, and its result gives some
indication of the seriousness with which the state regards nationalism in
the republic. The rapturous applause which greeted the speech of novelist
Revaz Dzhaparidze at the 8th Congress of the Georgian Union of Writers
in April 1976, in which he condemned directives from Moscow as likely to
lead to the Russification of education, provides further evidence of
national feeling on this issue.66
In March 1981 there were two more demonstrations each involving
about a thousand people who protested at the threat to the Georgian
language and demanded the introduction of courses dealing specifically
with Georgian history in schools and higher educational establishments. 67
In December 1981 confirmation of a similar demonstration the previous
October was given by the Russian language newspaper Molodezh'
Gruzii.68 Nevertheless, since 1978 efforts have been made to improve the
standard of Georgian teaching and to compile a completely new series of
textbooks for all grades. A permanent commission now exists to establish
the norms of the language, and steps have been taken to educate the public
on the need to improve standards on the radio and in the press. 69 In an
article in the Georgian language party newspaper, Komunisti, Anton
Kelendzheridze warned that further measures are needed to improve
standards and was especially scathing about the use of language in the
press. 0
Still further evidence of the distance of the ultimate merging of the
Soviet nationalities is provided by the high level of endogamy in the USSR.
In 1975 the Soviet scholar L. V. Chuiko presented an index of endogamy
for each of the fourteen national republics which demonstrates the extent
to which nationality is a factor in marital choice by measuring the degree
to which people are 'attracted' to spouses of their own nationality in com-
parison with the probability of such an 'attraction' occurring if members
of that nationality married randomly.71In all the republics, the tendency
towards endogamy is higher than would be expected at random, but there
are marked differences between areas. Thus the index is exceptionally high
in Central Asia, marginally less so in Transcaucasia (Georgia has a figure
of 80 5) with the exception of Armenia where the figure is low, high in the
Baltic republics, and between 30 and 40% in the Ukraine and Belorussia.
If one ignores the opportunity to marry exogamously, and measures the
incidence of endogamous marriagesthe percentages are much higher. Thus
in 1969 93- 5%oof all marriages in Georgia were endogamous.72

Economy, Culture and National Self-Identification

Although Soviet policy has endorsed the rastsvet of national cultures,
this process was intended to take place within the parameters defined by
558 NATIONAL INTEGRA TION
the slogan 'national in form, socialist in content'. There can be no doubt
that the state has invested enormous resources in the pursuit of the latter
end, but just as the programme of political socialization in the RSFSR has
been far from a total success, so has the goal remained out of reach in the
republics.
The establishment of the sovnarkhozy in 1957 devolved considerable
administrative and planning responsibility to the new units, which in the
cases of the non-Russian republics were coextensive with the republican
ethno-territories and subordinate to their respective Gosplany. By 1958
98% of industrial output was produced by enterprisesunder the republic's
management. With success judged solely in terms of the fulfilment of plan
targets, enterpriseswithin the republics were directed to supply republican
needs first, even if this meant failing to meet obligations elsewhere. Since
all enterprisesin all the sovnarkhozy were doing the same thing, the supply
system became chaotic and a tendency emerged towards self-sufficiency. It
can be argued that it was not just the republics that behaved in this way,
but all the new economic regions and that this was not a manifestation of
nationalism, but of localism, or mestnichestvo. Nevertheless the reform
provided national elites with an opportunity for greater autonomy. The
case of Latvia is indicative of the sort of problem the reform produced.
The priority previously given by Moscow to the development of heavy
industry was abandoned in favour of expanding the agrarian base and
exploiting natural resources. Apparent concern for the rational
development of the economy, however, masked a desire to protect Latvia
from the immigration of Russian labour associated with the development
of heavy industry, and to maintain the homogeneity of Latvians within
their own ethno-territory.73
Although the Georgian party was spared the purge which accompanied
recentralization of the economy in Latvia, this was probably due more to
the government's reluctance to exacerbate national feeling in the republic,
still running high following the shooting of hundreds of those demon-
strating against Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, than to the
way the Georgians were contributing to the economy. In fact, throughout
the 1960s and early 1970s developments in Georgia continued to deviate
from the norms of Soviet practice. Such was the extent of corruption in the
administration and the economy that many in the USSR began to question
whether Soviet power still existed in Georgia. Despite having one of the
lowest produced national incomes in the country, the average size of
savings accounts was the third largest.74
The second economy exists throughout the USSR, but the scope it
achieved in Georgia in the 1960s remains unrivalled. The extent of the
problem induced Moscow to 'retire' Mzhavanadze and to replace him
with a man with a long service in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, E.
IN GEORGIA 559
Shevardnadze. In his period in office, Shevardnadze has done much to
reduce the scale of corruption, but it continues in all walks of life. 75 A
major difficulty facing attempts to clean up corruption lies in the all-
pervasiveness of family ties, and the cult of megobroba, or friendship,
often apparent in relations between Georgian men, stressing the virtue of
loyalty in all circumstances. As an official view has it, 'Business as usual'
meant
favouritism,parochialism,cronyism,and careerismflourishingon the basis of
familyties and corruption,as well as a broadfield for malicioustalk and tale-
bearing;wivesand otherfamilymembersbeganto usurpthe positionsof their
high-rankinghusbandsand state problemsbegan to be solved in the narrow
circleof relatives,the familyor close friends.76
Loosening of controls in economic life was mirrored by a relaxation of
control over ideology and cultural life. Thus in the mid-1960s a series of
articles appeared in Matsne, the journal of the Georgian Academy of
Sciences, in response to a publication by Professor I. Katcharava entitled
'The Stages of National Consolidation of the Georgian Nation'77 and a
paper by Professor A. Ap'akidze,78 both of which challenged Soviet
orthodoxy on the national question. Katcharava accused Stalin of failing
to see that there can be feudal as well as bourgeois and socialist nations,
using Georgia in the 10th century as an example of the former. Though the
argument is not always clear, appearing to rest on extending the meaning
of eri or nation to incorporate erovneba or nationality, there can be no
doubt that by putting back the formation of the Georgian nation to the
10th century, he was providing a case for those nationalists seeking to
stress the superiority and antiquity of Georgian culture. Ap'akidze,
however, went further still, and by using Stalin's definition of the nation,
but dropping his insistence on the capitalist mode of production, argues
that the Georgian nation existed in the 12th century on the basis of 'an
historically more or less formed unity of language, territory, economic life
and psychological character'. Not surprisingly this provoked a consider-
able response, and articles reasserting the orthodox view appeared in
196779and as late as 1969.80On the merging of nations under communism
Katcharavaclaimed that the prospect was so distant that it only concerned
us as a theoretical question.81
When Shevardnadze was appointed in 1972 his brief was not just to
clean up economic activity in Georgia, but to straighten it up ideologically.
Artists, writers, and film makers were criticized for selection of themes
open to nationalist interpretation, and the historians A. Menabde and U.
Sidamonidze were sharply criticized for books they had written three years
previously, in which the latter in particular was found to have made
serious mistakes in his analysis of Georgian Menshevism, and the national
question in the early 20th century. 82It did not help that he criticized Soviet
560 NATIONAL INTEGRA TION
scholars for failing to make use of the 'bourgeois literature' on the
period. 83
Evidence such as this has persuaded some Western scholars to conclude
that resistanceto assimilation presents a threat to the survival of the USSR.
H. Carrere d'Encausse gave her recent book on the subject the dramatic
title L'Empire Eclate and concluded that 'like the Empire that it
succeeded, the Soviet state seems incapable of extricating itself from the
nationality impasse'.84To the extent that nationalities remain and will no
doubt continue to remain a fact of life in the Soviet Union for the
foreseeable future this is no doubt true, but whether or not the survival of
national differences amounts to a problem of major dimensions, perhaps
even threatening the stability of the state is another matter. The national
question presents different issues from one area to another and whilst it is
conceivable that in Central Asia at some indeterminate point in the future
the combination of ethnicity, religion and competition between local elites
and immigrant Slavs for jobs, labour shortages in the RSFSR and
surpluses in Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan may lead to
nationalist demands and disturbances of a serious kind, in most of the
republics undoubted centrifugal tendencies are well balanced by centripetal
counterparts.
There is considerable ambivalence in the Georgian attitude towards
Russia and the Russians, for whilst in the 19th century Georgians resented
tsarist policy towards their country, they appreciatedthat Russia had made
possible their resistance to invasion from Persia and the Ottoman Empire
and created the conditions for a revival of the national economy. The
majority of the Georgian intelligentsia saw their future as linked with that
of a Russian people freed from tsarist oppression, and the Georgian
Mensheviks insisted on maintaining the union with Russia until their
rejection of the October Revolution finally forced them to declare
independence. It is an ambivalence that has continued to the present day,
for whilst many Georgians may express their hostility towards Russians, 85
few relish the prospect of an independence that would leave them bordered
by Muslim revivalists on one side and the Turkish military on the other.
Stability and sixty years of Soviet power have enabled Georgia to acquire a
standard of living (and the highest proportion of doctors per capita in the
world)86far in excess of that existing in Turkey and Iran.
Additionally, within the Soviet Union, Georgia is almost uniquely
privileged in that a favourable climate enables it to cultivate fruits and
vegetables that are in high demand elsewhere in the Soviet Union. With
food still scarce in many parts of the state, Georgians have a guaranteed
market for their produce. It is scarcely surprisingthat 49% of the popula-
tion remains rural, when the advantages to be had from growing citrus
fruit and grapes are so great. An article in the Georgian press revealed that
IN GEORGIA 561
although kolkhozy and sovkhozy account for 60%oof land devoted to
viticulture they accounted for only 40% of output.87 Yields on private
plots are twice as high and it is widely acknowledged that the quality of
privately grown produce is far superior. State procurement agencies pay
accordingly.88In 1970 farmers received three times as much income from
their private plots as from collective farms. Cheap transport and a near
monopoly of certain fruits and vegetables enables Georgian peasants to fly
to Moscow, sell on the markets there and return with sizeable profits.
Within the Soviet Union one hears jokes about money growing on trees in
Georgia, but in Georgia the jokes relate to the wealth of citrus farmers in
Makharadze region, or grape growers in Kakheti. Possession of a car is an
indicator of wealth in the Soviet Union and in Georgia there appear to be
more than anywhere else. A statistic given by Komunisti gives some idea. 89
In 1978 there were almost 1,000 deaths caused by car crashes. In Britain
6,000 are killed annually by the same cause, but whereas Georgia has a
population of 5 million, Britain has almost 60 million. It would be unwise
to infer too much from this, as it says as much about the quality of the
roads and the driving as it does about car ownership, but it gives some
impression.
Georgia's relative wealth stems in large part from her privileged position
in the USSR. The republic has produce to sell which is in heavy demand.
An independent Georgia would be subject to far greater competition. In
addition to the economic and social benefits gained, there remain the
penalties for opposition. Police control is not what it was, but supervision
of the population does continue, thus making the organization of any
extra-legal opposition to official policy a hazardous exercise. Most people,
too, are too preoccupied with assuring themselves of at least the basic
comforts of life to give serious thought to organized opposition.90 The
examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are ample warning, moreover,
of the penalty for over-zealous support for the national cause.
Moscow's concern at developments in the republics is reflected in the
volume of literature written on the subject of the national question in
recent years, and the importance attached to the Academy of Sciences
research centre on the question, but it is possible that it has given up all
hope of assimilation in certain republics, and settled for containment.91
Thus in Georgia Shevardnadze appears to have been granted considerable
leeway with cultural activities in return for conformity in the economy.
Although ideological aberrations like those of the 1960s are not allowed,
Georgian literature remains full of historical novels with nationalist
allusions and poetry glorifying the nation. There are countless poems
simply on the theme of Georgia, Sak'art'velo. 92The publication of books,
journals and newspapers expanded steadily up to the late 1970s, but then
experienced a decline probably best explained by the introduction of steps
 GEORGIAN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS IN THE GSSR
1965, 1970, 1975-80

Book and Total Journals Total

Brochure Number in Total Printed in and Other Number in Total Printed in N
Year Publications Georgian Printed Georgian Publications Georgian Printed Georgian p

1965 2,255 1,672 12-8 m 9-6 m 96 82 6-0 m 5-8 m

1970 2,211 1,610 15-9 m 13-0 m 132 97 14-4 m 13-7 m

1975 2,032 1,406 15-7 m 12-9 m 80 68 29-9 m 25-2 m

1976 2,311 1,508 16-0 m 13-3 m 80 68 30-1 m 25-8 m

1977 2,470 1,576 17-7 m 14-3 m 74 62 31-4 m 27-3 m

1978 2,366 1,545 14-0 m 13-5 m 75 65 31-6m 27-5 m

1979 2,341 1,545 17-0 m 14-0 m 80 67 26-7 m 261 m

1980 2,103 1,382 14-5 m 11-4m 81 67 26-9 m 26-3 m

Sources: Pechat' SSSR v 1975g, v 1976g, v 1977g, v 1978g, v 1979g, v 1980g. Narodnoe kho
IN GEORGIA 563
to conserve scarce paper supplies. However, the share of this literature
published in Georgian has been largely unaffected by the recent fall in
output. Throughout the last decade over 80% of books published in the
republic were in the vernacular, and although in 1980 their share of the
total fell to 78 6%0o,this is still well above the representation of Georgians
in the overall population.93 In 1980 81 journals were printed in the
republic, 97 8%oof the circulation of which was in Georgian, and 141
newspapers with an annual circulation of 740 million, 83 9% of which
were in Georgian. 94It is worth noting that over the same period, while the
number and circulation of Russian publications remained either static or
suffered a slight decline, the number and circulation of publications in
other languages increased considerably, reflecting the current policy of
devoting greater attention to the needs of Georgia's national minorities.95
The press plays a not inconsiderable role in concentrating the attention
of the population on the republic and its achievements. The successes, for
instance, of the Rustaveli Theatre, the national dance group and Georgian
football teams sometimes receive full page treatment in the republic's main
Georgian and Russian language daily newspapers, often accompanied with
quotations and cuttings from the foreign press complimenting the vitality
and originality of Georgian culture. The republican radio and television
perform similar functions, and like the press give considerable attention to
familiarizing their audience with Georgia's cultural heritage.
The Church, too, has been granted greater freedom in recent years and
attendance at services appears to be unimpeded.96The close relationship
between the survival of Georgian Orthodoxy and the survival of Georgian
culture and tradition has been consolidated through centuries of struggle,
first against Muslim invasion and, later, against Russification. From the
19th century the Church became associated with the emergence of
Georgian nationalism and in the 1930s, perhaps as a consequence, suffered
severely during the purges.97 More recently Georgians' pride in its
independence and age has been reinforced by the popularity of the present
Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II (whose prestige has been enhanced by his
appointment as the president of the World Council of Churches)98and by
the lack of appeal of Marxism-Leninism. In the absence of any alternative,
many Georgians have renewed their interest in the Church, although
perhaps more in defence of a specifically Georgian culture and identity
than through religious conviction. The performance of a play by the
republic's leading theatre group, the Rustaveli, in December 1978,
celebrating the life of the first Georgian saint, Shushanek, reflects both the
more liberal atmosphere prevailing in the republic by comparison with
most other parts of the Soviet Union, and the current interest in religious
themes. The importance of the event was underlined by the presence of the
entire hierarchy of the Georgian Church at the premiere.
564 NATIONAL INTEGRA TION
The official ideology is regarded with little enthusiasm by much of the
intelligentsia, not least because corruption, as in Poland, has destroyed its
credibility, a factor which helps to explain the survival of the nation as the
chief focus of loyalty. National sentiment, as well as expressing itself in
literature, theatre and art has found an outlet in an attachment to a tradi-
tionalism which seeks to keep intact a distinctive Georgian identity. This is
evident even in the choice of vocabulary. Thus the form of address batono,
equivalent to the use of gospodin in pre-revolutionary Russia, is, outside
party committee meetings, preferred to the word amkhanago, or
comrade.99 Tradition emerges particularly in the relations between the
sexes. Despite advances made by women their position in the household
and society in general is governed by the rules and mores of an often
idealized version of Georgia's past. Women are expected to conform to an
ideal, summed up in the word mandilosani, 00 which has more relevance to
the pages of Shot'a Rust'aveli's celebrated mediaeval epic poem, The
Knight in the Tiger's Skin, than to the present day. Though it is primarily
women who suffer from the survival of old attitudes, they are themselves
often reluctant to criticize something which they perceive as helping to
preserve a distinctive Georgian culture. 101

Conclusion
National sentiment, although denied political outlets, is undoubtedly
strong and widespread, but official responses to its various manifestations
are no longer as clumsy or brutal as in 1956.102Moscow is aware that
repression can have exactly the opposite effect to the one desired. Some
feel that is gives the republics considerable power as pressure groups. In
Tbilisi, for instance, rumour suggested that Shevardnadze realized that
dropping Georgian as the state language would provoke an angry reaction,
and calculated that by provoking such a reaction he would have greater
bargaining power in his future dealings with the centre by arguing the need
to avoid provoking a nationalist backlash. That the Georgian First Party
Secretary is quite as devious as this seems unlikely, but the suggestion
nevertheless gives some impression of the influence that national groups,
and particularly the republics may have. The nationality-based federal
structure of the USSR has provided the indigenous elites with the means
for the articulation and protection of national interests at the centre.
The decision to back down and restore the status of the Georgian
language in 1978 shows a pragmatic approach to nationality affairs which
has received recent confirmation with the reinstatement of a professor at
Tbilisi University following a demonstration by students on his behalf.103
Thus the state remains committed to the acculturation of the Georgian
population, but is not prepared to risk direct confrontations with national
IN GEORGIA 565
feeling. When strong opposition has been met, as over the status of the
Georgian language, the central authorities have backed down. It is
understood that nationalism is a potential threat to stability in the
republic, but that so long as the population does not feel its national iden-
tity is threatened, it will stay dormant. On the other hand, when there have
been attempts to stimulate an oppositional nationalism, such as in the
mid-1970s with the founding of the samizdat journal Ok'ros Satsmisi (The
Golden Fleece), and the setting up of a Human Rights Defence Group in
Tbilisi by Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava in 1974, the
authorities have shown a willingness to use force. 104
It would appear, therefore, that despite the depth of national sentiment
in Georgia, the party leadership is not unduly worried, believing that by
granting minor privileges which have little effect on the structure of power
but assuage national feeling, the situation can be contained. However,
whilst it has demonstrated its ability to suppress individual manifestations
of nationalism without provoking any serious response in the republic as a
whole, it seems quite unable to weaken the residual sense of attachment to
all the symbols of nationhood. The events of April 1978, while demon-
strating that Moscow remains committed to the removal of obstacles to the
acculturation of the Georgian population, effectively show the nature of
the dilemma confronting it. Whilst seeking to eliminate all impediments to
the emergence of an integrated Soviet people, it risks the possibility of
arousing national sensitivity and thereby strengtheningnational sentiment.
Moscow's reluctance to face such confrontations head on and the
awareness that open opposition will be dealt with severely suggest that the
prevailing stalemate will continue, and that the best that Soviet policy can
hope for is containment.

University of Glasgow

1 The
present article can touch upon only some aspects of the Soviet nationality question;
for a fuller discussion, see H. Carrere d'Encausse, The Decline of an Empire (New York,
1979), Z. Katz (ed.), Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York, 1975), R.
Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (London, 1967), E. Allworth, Soviet
Nationality Problems (New York, 1971), Sovremennye etnicheskieprotsessy v SSSR, 2nd ed.
(Moscow, 1977). For the historicalbackgroundto the national questionin Georgia, see W. E. D.
Allen, A History of the Georgian People (London, 1932), D. M. Lang, A Modern History of
Georgia (London, 1962).
2 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, 'The Dialectics of Nationalism', Problems of
Communism, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (May-June 1974), p. 18.
3 W. B. Simmons (ed.), The Constitutions of the Communist World (Netherlands:
Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980), p. 353.

F
566 NATIONAL INTEGRATION

4 P. N. Fedoseyev (ed.), Leninism and the National Question (Moscow, 1977), p. 330. See
too a number of articles on the national question that appeared in Voprosy istorii, nos. 1, 4, 6,
9, 1966 and in no. 2, 1967.
5 Ronald G.
Suny, 'Georgia and Soviet Nationalities Policy', in S. F. Cohen, A.
Rabinowitch, R. Sharlets (eds.), The Soviet Union Since Stalin (London, 1980), p. 203.
6 Izvestiya, 5 October 1977; translation in E. Bagramov, 'A Factual Survey of Soviet
Nationalities Policy', Reprintsfrom the Soviet Press, 15 September 1978, p. 49.
7 Ralph S. Clem, 'The Ethnic Dimension in the Soviet Union', in J. G. Pankhurst and
M. P. Sacks, Contemporary Soviet Society (New York, 1980), p. 23.
8 Vestnik statistiki, no. 1, 1981,
p. 66.
9 Jaan Pennar, 'Demonstrations and Dissidents in Estonia', Radio Liberty Research
Bulletin, 24 October 1980, no. 43 (hereafter all references to Radio Liberty are designated
RL).
'1 H. Carrere d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 107.
1 Vestnik statistiki, no. 1, 1981, p. 63.
12 Ibid.
13 Narodnoe khozyaistvo Gruzinskoi SSR v 1977 (Tbilisi, 1977), p. 9. Vestnikstatistiki, no.
1, 1981, p. 63. In fact the urban population of Georgia had declined to 423,000 by 1917 and
only surpassed the 1913 total of 666,000 between 1926 and 1940.
14 Vestnik statistiki, no. 1, 1981, p. 67.
15Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17A. Nove and J. A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East: A Communist Model for
Development? (London, 1967), p. 40.
18 R. B. Dobson, 'Georgia and the Georgians', in Z. Katz (ed.), op. cit., p. 10.
19 Komunisti, 12 February 1981, 'Dasakhuli Kursit" (Along the
planned course).
Komunisti, 26 February 1981, 'Amkhanag E. A. Shevardnadzis Sitqva' (Comrade E. A.
Shevardnadze's speech at the XXVI Party Congress). RL 26 February 1981 mistakenly
reported that 'average annual agriculturaloutput rose by 34%0o during the 10th five-year plan'.
20 It has also been suggested that this is an indication of the extent of private dealings, not
reflected in the official statistics.
21 Komunisti, 26 February 1981, op. cit.
22 Ibid.
23 Ramaz Klimiashvili, K'alak' T'bilisis demograp'iuli protsesebis sotsialuri p'aktorebi
(Tbilisi, 1974), p. 38. (Social Factors in the Demographic Processes of the City of T'bilisi.)
24 H. Carrere d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 99.
25 Ibid.,
pp. 100-01.
26 R. Lewis, R. Rowland and R. Clem, 'Modernisation, Population Change and
Nationality in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan', Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. XVII,
1975, p. 295. Russians comprised 70 3%0of the population of Alma-Ata, 66 1o0 of Frunze,
42-7%oof Ashkhabad, 42 1%lo of Dushanbe and 40- 8%oof Tashkent.
27 D. M.
Lang, op. cit., pp. 254-57. Boris Pasternak, Letters to Georgian Friends
(London, 1971).
28 R.
Klimiashvili, op. cit., p. 32.
29 Ibid.

30 Vestnik
statistiki, no. 10, 1980, p. 67.
31 Ibid.
32 Brian Silver, 'The Impact of Urbanisation and Geographical Dispersion on the

Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities ', Demography, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 89-103.
Cited in R. Clem, 'The Ethnic Dimension, pt. 2', in ContemporarySoviet Society, op. cit., p. 50.
33 G. E. Smith, The Latvian Nation-A Study in the Geography of Political Integration
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Glasgow, 1978), p. 390. In 1970 Russians (42.9%),
Belorussians and Ukrainians comprised 50-3% of Riga's population. Latvians made up
40-9%.
34 R. Klimiashvili, op. cit., p. 38.
35
Ibid.
36 Ann Sheehy, 'Georgian Language holds its Own in Georgia', RL 396/81, 5 October

1981, p. 9.
37 Ann Sheehy, 'Data from the Soviet Census of 1979 on the Georgians and the Georgian
SSR', RL 162/80, 2 May 1981. 'Migratsiis zogiert'i amzhamindeli t'aviseburebis gamo
IN GEORGIA 567

metsnieruli dzieba, problemebi' (Scientific Investigation and Problems Occasioned by Certain

Contemporary Characteristics of Migration), Komunisti, 30 March 1982. In this two-page
discussion in the Georgian CP's main newspaper it was noted that since 1957 more people
have emigrated from the republic than have immigrated. The participants blamed the slow
pace of economic development in Georgia during the 1960s and early 1970s, the fact that a
virtual surplus of well qualified personnel in the republic is forcing some to seek employment
elsewhere, and that numerous Georgians participate in projects for the economic exploitation
of Siberia. None of the discussants, however, made any attempt to explain why Russians and
Armenians should be leaving and no reference was made to mass emigration of Georgian
Jews in the 1970s, all of which are obvious factors in the net emigration recorded in this
period. An article by L. M. Drobizheva and A. A. Susukolov, 'Mezhetnicheskieotnosheniya i
etnokulturnye protsessy (po materialam etnosotsiologicheskikh issledovanii v SSSR),
Sovetskaya etnografiya, no. 3, 1981, p. 21, however, does note the decline in the Russian
population between the last two censuses. The authors further observed that ethno-
sociological polls indicate that Russians who have learnt Georgian and have adjusted to the
local norms of behaviour adapt better than those who have not and rarely express a desire to
leave the republic.
38 K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, 1953), p. 102.
39 R. Clem, op. cit., p. 46.
40 J. H. Miller, 'Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas', Soviet Studies, vol. XXIX, no. 1
(January 1977), pp. 3-36. T. Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in CentralAsia:
The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore, 1970), cited by R. Clem, op. cit. Y. Bilinsky, 'The
Rulers and the Ruled', Problems of Communism, vol. XVI, no. 5 (September-October
1967), p. 21.
41 T.
Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism . . ., op. cit., p. 96.
42 R. G.
Suny, op. cit., p. 212. Current Soviet Leaders, vol. 2, no. 1 (1975), p. 5. A. N.
Churkin was replaced by G. V. Kolbin on 15 April 1975.
43 R.
Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (London, 1961), pp. 130-35.
44 M. McAuley, 'Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A Study in the
Centre-Republican Relationships', British Journal of Political Science, no. 10, 1980, pp.
461-87.
45 Ibid, p. 482.
46 E. Fuller, 'Kapitonov on Nationality Relations in Georgia', RL 125/78, 9 June 1978.
47 E. Fuller, 'Measures to Improve the Teaching of Georgian', RL 157/80, 2 May 1980.
48 Current Soviet Leaders, op. cit., p. 5.

49 R. B. Dobson, op. cit., p. 177.

50 According to David E. Powell, 'Alcoholism in the USSR', Survey (Winter 1971) cited in
Nick Eberstadt, 'The Health Crisis in the USSR', New YorkReview, 19 February 1981, p. 24,
80%oof all the hospitalized alcoholics in the GSSR are Russians.
51 H. Carr&ere d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 110.
52 Ann Sheehy, RL, 162/80, 2 May 1980.
53 H. Carrere d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 110.
54 Vestnikstatistiki, no. 4, 1981, pp. 69-72.
55 Ibid., no. 1, 1981, p. 67.
56 Ibid.
57 Zarya vostoka, 31 October 1979. Komunisti, 3 March 1982. V. Dzhaoshvili, who took
part in the above-mentioned discussion and is a leading Georgian demographer, denied that
the level of employment of labour resources in Georgia is low and criticized those economists
who deny that those engaged in 'private auxiliary farming' contribute to the national
economy.
58 H. Carrere d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 109.
59 Ann Sheehy, RL 396/81, 5 October 1981.
60
Vestnik statistiki, no. 10, 1980, p. 67.
61 Ibid.
62
Ann Sheehy, RL 396/81, 5 October 1981.
63
H. Carrere d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 177.
64
Komunisti, 21 January 1982, 'Samart'lebrivi Ak'tebis Ena da Stili' (The style and
language of legal deeds). The author complains about the use of Russian and other foreign
words in Georgian legal texts when precise Georgian equivalents already exist. Why, he asks,
is the word 'creditor' often translated into Georgian as 'kreditori', when an exact Georgian
568 NATIONAL INTEGRA TION
word, mevale, which has the advantage of being readily comprehensibleto everybody, already
exists. Additionally, there appears to be a tendency to invent Georgian words for words that
only came into existence in the 20th century. For instance, tractor is now often translated into
Georgian not by traktori, but by satsevari, literally meaning 'that which pulls'.
65 The New York Times and The International Herald Tribune, 5 May 1978 made more
conservative estimates (20,000 and 5,000 respectively), but their figures may relate to events in
the centre of Tbilisi. People living in the city report demonstrations all over the city and
consistently give a higher figure. All, though, emphasize the difficulty of making accurate
estimations.
66 E. Fuller, 'Expressionsof Official and Unoffical Concern Over the Georgian Language',
RL 149/81, 17 April 1981. Official concern may well have been stimulated by an open letter to
the General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, and to GCP First Secretary, E.
Shevardnadze, from 365 members of the Georgian intelligentsia protesting against limitations
on the use of the Georgian language in education and on the teaching of Georgian history in
schools. See R/L 484/80, 17 December 1980 for the text of the letter.
67
E. Fuller, ibid.
68 E. Fuller, RL 13/82, 11 January 1982.
69 Zarya vostoka, 16 May 1979.

70 Komunisti, 'Gulisquri da Sip'ak'ize Amkhanago Zhurnalistebo!' (Care and Precision,

Comrade Journalists!), 26 April 1981.
71 L. B. Chuyko, Braki i Razvody (Moscow, 1975), p. 76.
72 Wesley A. Fisher, 'Ethnic Consciousness and Intermarriage:Correlates of Endogamy
among the Major Soviet Nationalities', Soviet Studies, vol. XXIX, no. 3 (July 1977), pp.
395-408.
73 G. E. Smith, op. cit., pp. 364-73.
74 R. B. Dobson, op. cit., p. 163.
75 Komunisti, 'Danashaulebrivi Dzhgup'is Aghsasruli' (The end of a criminal group), 6
January 1981. Details were given of a scheme devised by the director of the Tbilisi
Champagne Wines factory and his chief accountant for defrauding the state of thousands of
rubles. Since then the Georgian SSR Minister of Finance, Parnaoz Ananiashvili, has been
prosecuted for bribery. See RL 511/81 'Shevardnadze hints at reasons for dismissal of
Georgian Finance Minister', 22 December 1981.
76 R. G. Suny, op. cit., p. 216.
77 I. Katcharava, K'art'veli Khalkhis Erovnuli Konsolidatsiis
Etapebi (the stages of
national consolidation of the Georgian people) (Tbilisi, 1966).
78 A. Ap'ak'idze, Nat'esavit' K'art'veli (The Georgian People), cited by A. Surguladze,
'K'art'veli Eris Chamoqalibebis Shesakheb' (On the formation of the Georgian nation),
Matsne, no. 5, 1967, p. 350.
79 A. Surguladze, op. cit., pp. 343-70.
80 E. Akhobadze, 'K'art'veli Eris Dsarmoshobis Shesakheb' (on the origin of the Georgian
people), Matsne, no. 1, 1969, pp. 211-24.
81 I. Katcharava, op. cit., p. 29.
82 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIV, no. 18, p. 5.
83 U. Sidamonidze, Sak'art'velos burzhuaziul-demokratiuli modzraoba da sotsialisturi
revolutsiis Gamardzhvebis istoriograp'ia (1917-1921 ds, ds) (The bourgeois-democratic
movement in Georgia and a historiography of the victory of socialist revolution) (Tbilisi,
1970), p. 12.
84 H. Carrere d'Encausse,
op. cit., p. 274.
85
Opportunities for open expression of nationalism are few, but Georgians make full use
of the chances they get. In the past, mass spectator sports like football have provided a stage
for giving vent to nationalist sentiment.
86 R. G.
Suny, op. cit., p. 216. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1979 g (Moscow, 1979),
p. 528.
87
Izvestiya, 23 March 1973. CDSP, vol. XXV, no. 12 (18 April, 1973), pp. 9-10.
88
Apparently some Georgian farmers also manage to swindle the state procurement
agencies by buying up kolkhoz grapes and selling them to the state as private produce.
89 Komunisti, 'Mank'ana Mter-Moqvare' (The car-friend and enemy), 18 April 1978.
90 A passage in Nadezhda Mandelstam's Hope against Hope (London, 1970) p. 303 gives
an impression of attitudes among the intelligentsia: 'Recently I heard someone say: "It is well
known that everybody who has ever tried to make people happy only brought total disaster on
IN GEORGIA 569
them". This was said by a young man who does not want to see changes now, in case they
only bring misfortune on him and others. There are large numbers of people like him
nowadays-among the more or less well off needless to say. They live in inherited apartments
of two (or even three or four) rooms, or they can expect to get one from the organization in
which they work. They are horrified at what their fathers have wrought, but they are even
more horrified at the thought of change. Their ideal is to pass their lives quietly working
computers, not bothering their heads about the purpose or result, and devoting their free time
to whatever gives them pleasure: reading, women, music, or vacationing by the Black Sea.'
91 A. Benningsen, 'Modernisation and Conservatism in the Soviet Union', in D. J. Dunn
(ed.), Religion and Modernisation in the Soviet Union (Boulder, Colorado, 1977), p. 274,
concluded: '. . . at present, especially after the publication of the 1970 census data, no one in
the Soviet Union believes any more in the possibility of russification of the Muslims and there
is no longer any question of the merging of the nationalities.'
92 This poem by the prominent and highly regardedGeorgian poet Lado Asat'iani is typical
of the genre:
Sak'art'veloshiibadebodnen Theywerebornin Georgia
da shemdegmudamdsukhdnenamaze: and thereafterpleaded:
ekh-dsut'it'maintsdabrundebodes if only our beautyand childhood
chvenibavshvobada silamaze! couldreturnfor but an instant!
T'avsar moiklavsk'art'veli,ara, No, a Georgianis unableto takehis own life
is sheidzlebabrdzolashimokvdes but he maydie in the struggle
ert'iimedit':sitsotskhlemarad withone hope:thathis life continue
gagrdzeldes qveqnadda ganmeorves. and be repeatedin his country.
93 Narodnoe
khozyaistvo SSSR v 1980 g. (Moscow, 1980), p. 488.
94 Ibid, p. 491.
95 Pechat' SSSR v 1980 g. (Moscow, 1980),
pp. 142, 214, 240.
96 M. Bordeaux and M. Rowe (eds.), May One Believe-in Russia? (London, 1980), pp.
44-47. Since the election of Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II in 1977 the position of the Georgian
church has improved markedly. The corruption that existed under the previous Patriarch
involving the theft of church treasures by high ranking state officials as well as certain
members of the clergy has been ended. Metropolitan Gaioz, the previous Patriarch's right
hand man, has been sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for his part in the theft of church
property. Believers are no longer harassed, and although hundreds of churches remain
vandalized and badly in need of repair, efforts have been undertakento restore some of them.
Portraits of the Patriarch, as well as religious badges, candles, etc. can be bought openly at
churches.
97 E. Melia, 'The Georgian Orthodox Church', in R. D. Marshall (ed.), Aspects of Religion
in the Soviet Union, 1917-67 (Chicago, 1971), pp. 223-38. D. M. Lang, 'Religion and
Nationalism: A Case Study: The Caucasus', in M. Hayward and W. C. Fletcher (eds.),
Religion and the Soviet State (London, 1969).
98 Religion in Communist Dominated Lands, vol. XVIII, nos. 7, 8, 9 (1979), p. 117.
99 An amusing example of this is given in Nodar Dumbadze's recent novel, Maradisobis
Kanoni (The Law of Eternity) (Tbilisi, 1978), p. 154. The hero of the book, Bachana
Ramishvili, has applied to join the Communist Party and is now before the interviewing
board:
Andonemorething,Ramishvili, it wouldnot be out of orderif youwouldgetout of thehabitof using
that "batono"and got usedto saying"amkhanago".
Yes, batono,Bachanapromised.All threeburstout laughing.Bachanaleft the partyoffice.
100The word Mandilosani is derived from the noun, mandili, a type of headdress
traditionally worn by Georgian women and suggests an image of modesty, grace and sexual
passivity.
10IThe abduction of brides is a glaring anachronism in contemporary Georgia, not to
mention its illegality! Nevertheless it survives, nurtured by Georgian society's ambivalent
attitude towards the phenomenon. Akhalgazrda Komunisti (Young Communist), 30 May
1981, has indicated its concern. See RL 450/81, 10 November 1981.
102 The police opened fire on a large demonstration in Tbilisi in March 1956 protesting
against Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. Hundreds were either killed or wounded.
103 E. Fuller, RL 149/81, op. cit.
104
E. Fuller, 'Two Georgian Human Rights Activists Put on Trial', RL 112/78, 15 May
1978. 'Two Georgian Rights Activists Sentenced', RL 114/78, 22 May 1978.